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ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH FILES

22 MAY 1973

ADDRESS TO NAVAL ACADEMY ALUMNI ASSOCI-
ATION IN NEW YORK CITY BY STANSFIELD
TURNER

Navy Declassification/Release Instructions on File

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THANK YOU PRESIDENT JACK PARK - HEAD TABLE
GUESTS

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SECOND, INEXACT WORLD OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

THIRDLY, PROBABLISTIC WORLD OF TACTICAL DECISIONS -
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
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NEW YORK CITY

NAVAL ACADEMY ALUMNI ASSOCIATION

22 MAY 1973

Thank you, President Jack Park, distinguished head table guests, members of the New York City Naval Academy Alumni Association. It's a treat and a great pleasure to be here with you today. I am honored to be your speaker and to have the opportunity to talk about what we are attempting to accomplish at the Naval War College and what effect that effort may have on the Navy of the future. I will keep my formal comments brief so that we will have time for questions.

My task as President of your Navy's senior educational institution is a particularly interesting one today. As you know, I am involved in directing the mid-career education of 450 hand-picked officers and career civilians from all of our military services, the State Department, Coast Guard and the CIA. These are men who are destined for top leadership positions. They come to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. from what I call a Newtonian Universe, a universe of rational explanations for almost all phenomena. Their vocational experience and much of their training and education have been in a technical world where right and wrong answers must exist and an authoritarian world of military decisions that are either correct or incorrect.

Our objective at the Naval War College is to develop in these officers a concept of thinking about three very imprecise

subjects with which all senior decision makers must grapple. The first subject is Strategy or the uncertain world of broad strategic questions such as "How does the United States adapt from the bi-polar world of just the U.S. and Soviet Union of the 1950's and 60's to the multi-polar environment of the U.S., Soviets, European community, China and Japan, of the 1970's and 80's?"

The second subject that we cover is the inexact world of management where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier or do we buy two or three smaller carriers each with limited capabilities?"

Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of tactical decisions amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly that standard doctrines are always outdated. Compounding the complexities in all of these cases, we face the ultimate uncertainty of not having a standard of measure such as most of you gentlemen enjoy in the profit and loss statement! (At least I hope that most of you are enjoying yours.)

When I say that we do not have a specific standard of measure, for our \$80B corporation in the DOD, I mean two things. First, our corporation, the Department of Defense, cannot agree upon basic objectives as easily as can those of you in business. Why do we want a military? Where and when might we employ it. These questions regarding objectives are

less amenable to clarification than is the question of how a corporation or a company best sets out to satisfy a consumer's needs. Secondly, we also have difficulty in measuring performance. How well did the Navy satisfy its customers - you the public last year? Compared with the Army? Now in the business world you fortunately have many good measures such as sales, profit as a percent of sales, turnover, return on assets, return on stockholders investment. We lack such tools.

There is, then, a great need for military men who can approach complex problems such as establishing military objectives and measuring success without waiting for the test of war. To do these things we need men who are not only skilled craftsmen at the relatively exact arts of driving ships and aircraft, but men who are architects of inexact policies of vast national and international import.

The task that these officers face in 1973 is compounded by the fact that the very foundation on which we have based our military objectives since World War II has disappeared.

George Kennan's policy of containment has gone the way of monolithic communism. We can no longer justify military force on pushing back communism wherever it may exude.

We are, though, accustomed to measuring our objectives in terms of readiness for military action anywhere along the Soviet-Chinese periphery. We measured our success in terms of how well our foreign policy backed by military preparedness, held the line. Interestingly, the only geographical extension of communism since 1949 was to Cuba, not an extension of

With containment gone we must now redefine our objectives and our measures of success in new terms. Thus, in our course at the Naval War College, we insist on taking the students back to the two fundamental reasons for military power - first, insurance in case of war and second, use as an instrument of foreign policy in peacetime.

Today, though, there are some who avow that our need for military insurance has diminished if not disappeared. This is just as understandable as it is for a man who has paid for a new sprinkler system in his factory to ask whether he can reduce his fire insurance premiums. Detente appears to be approaching; in turn, military preparedness appears to be less critical.

There are also those who contend that it is not in our interests today to use the presence of military forces in support of foreign policy. They point out that our domestic needs are too urgent to afford this capability or that sabre rattling is too risky.

One could argue each of these points interminably. The debate would not be between the extremes of no insurance or no presence capability on one hand and overwhelming superiority to all potential opponents on the other. The debate would be about some point in between, some point where it appears acceptable for this country to set its defenses. I think that we can bracket that point.

I would start from the assumption that one acceptable point between the extremes would be our honoring our NATO commitments if Western Europe were assaulted. There are few people in this country who do not agree that our vital interests lie in preventing Western Europe from falling into the orbit of the Soviet Union. How much military power we require to prevent this, and of what kind, is a matter for considerable debate.

Now, nearer to the other extreme, most people today want to avoid involvement in another prolonged ambiguous ground war in Asia. National consensus on our need for military forces must lie somewhere in between support for NATO and aversion to more Vietnams. The spectrum covers a vast scope of insurance against potential conflicts and possible ways to employ military force, for diplomatic purpose. Even with the best techniques that tools like systems analysis can offer us, precise numerical analysis is not capable of identifying this point. It is a matter of weighing national priorities and exercising judgment.

We must weigh those priorities in light of the changes both in the world environment and in domestic attitudes. On the international scene this means recognizing the impact of our emergence from the bi-polar world into a multi-polar one.

At the War College we start our students with the study of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars, in the 5th Century B.C. This was an era of a bi-polar focus. We point out that bi-polar periods have been aberrations in history. More often there have been a number of powers to balance against each other. Balance of power, means just that. You must have

power to be a player in the game. Power, though, is not limited to military force. National power is comprised of industrial strength, national will, moral stature, organizational ability and other elements in addition to military strength. The issue for military students, is to probe for that type of military force which the country needs to complement our other sources of power. If a prime purpose of having military forces in the 1970's is to balance, or, to provide negotiating pressure, rather than to contain by military action as in Korea and Vietnam, the construction of those forces may be different. It requires sophistication for a military man to think in terms of influencing rather than fighting and winning, especially in terms of understanding how other's perceptions of our military might can influence their diplomatic decisions.

In other words, a world of multi-power negotiations requires a military posture that has virtues other than simply being capable of defeating the next fellow's. In fact, in an era of negotiations you may achieve your military purpose or fail to do so without directly engaging the enemy, or perhaps by engaging only a fraction of his force in a quick engagement that is hastily terminated. I suggest that today's environment will require us to pay more attention to the responsiveness of our military forces to political and diplomatic needs, than heretofore.

What those needs are, though, is something that we in uniform can not and should not determine. That is where the changes in domestic attitudes must come into consideration. As graduates of the USNA, you know that we in the military uniform are servants to the public. That is the only way we can

Our role is to be prepared to comprehend and to follow whatever course the nation selects and to do so with purpose, dedication, and proficiency. We also must advise whether our forces are capable of achieving the national objectives or strategy. The purpose of having a War College today is to intellectually prepare the next crop of naval leaders to do this - to understand the society they serve, and to deal intelligently with the imprecise, uncertain and subjective character of the national will.

There is no simple way for the public to express that will under our democratic process. It must, of course, be through the Congress and the President. I submit though, that this requires from the public a positive approach to military matters. The most dangerous course I can imagine would be for us to back into an evaluation of military needs through disinterest in the military or through dismay at the magnitude of the task. Nothing could be more extravagant. We could well end up with the military preparing for a set of objectives that might be 180° out from an unexpressed public opinion.

Thus, as we move into the era of the All-Volunteer Force, the public must assume a greater responsibility for providing direction to the military establishment. The end of the draft must not mean the end of public concern for and interest in your armed forces. In short, giving a sense of positive direction to military purpose is an essential element to ensuring that such force is both tailored and employed only as the national will dictates.

We are striving, through higher military education today, to be ready to work with the civilian public in locating the consensus on military purpose that we require. The task demands higher and more flexible intellectual capabilities in military men than ever before. The risks in making errors or in inadequate preparation are severe in this age of swift and treacherous weaponry and of intricate balancing of international forces. We are dedicated in higher military education to ensuring that the military leaders of tomorrow are sensitive to the public's direction and worthy of its relying on them for whatever purpose is selected. Your help in reaching this goal would be deeply appreciated.

Thank you.

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The second subject that we cover is the inexact world of management where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier or do we buy two or three smaller carriers each with limited capabilities?"

Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of tactical decisions amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly that standard doctrines are always outdated. Compounding the complexities in all of these cases, we face the ultimate uncertainty of not having a standard of measure such as most of you gentlemen enjoy in the profit and loss statement! (At least I hope that most of you are enjoying yours.)

When I say that we do not have a specific standard of measure, for our \$80B corporation in the DOD, I mean two things. First, our corporation, the Department of Defense, cannot agree upon basic objectives as easily as can those of you in business. Why do we want a military? Where and when might we employ it. These questions regarding objectives are

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THANK YOU PRESIDENT JACK PARK - HEAD TABLE

GUESTS

WHAT ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH AT NWC - MIRROR

WHAT EFFECT MAY HAVE ON THE NAVY OF THE FUTURE

TASK IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING ONE TODAY

MID-CAREER EDUCATION OF 450

DESTINED TOP LEADERSHIP

COME FROM A NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE

VOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

AUTHORITARIAN WORLD

PROPER

BUT MOVING UP

1

OUR OBJECTIVE - DEVELOP CONCEPT OF THINKING

2

THREE VERY IMPRECISE SUBJECTS - MUST GRAPPLE -

WHETHER IN WORLD OF MILITARY OR BUSINESS

FIRST, UNCERTAIN WORLD OF BROAD QUESTIONS

SECOND, INEXACT WORLD OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

THIRDLY, PROBABLISTIC WORLD OF TACTICAL DECISIONS -

TECH CHANGING

COMPOUNDING THE COMPLEXITIES - IMPRECISE OBJECTIVES

UNCERTAINTY OF NOT HAVING A STANDARD OF MEASURE - PROFIT AND

LOSS STATEMENT

WHEN SAY TO NOT HAVE SPECIFIC STANDARD OF MEASURE MEAN 2 THINGS

FIRST, DOD CANNOT ESTABLISH & AGREE UPON BASIC OBJECTIVES -
AS EASILY AS YOU IN BUSINESS

WHY A MILITARY?

WHERE & WHEN MIGHT EMPLOY IT?

QUESTIONS ON OBJECTIVES LESS AMENABLE THAN IS QUESTION HOW A
CORPORATION CAN SATISFY A CONSUMER'S NEED

SECONDLY, DIFFICULTY IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE

4

BUSINESS WORLD: SALES, PROFIT AS % OF SALES, TURNOVER,

RETURN ON ASSETS, RETURN ON STOCKHOLDERS INVESTMENT

WE LACK SUCH TOOLS

NEED FOR MILITARY MEN WHO CAN APPROACH COMPLEX PROBLEMS

ESTABLISHING MILITARY OBJECTIVES & MEASURING THE DEGREE OF FULFILLMENT

WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE TEST OF WAR

NOT ONLY SKILLED CRAFTSMEN - DRIVING SHIPS

ARCHITECTS OF INEXACT POLICIES - VAST IMPORT

TASK OFFICERS FACE IN 1973 IS COMPOUNDED

FOUNDATION HAS DISAPPEARED

ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR OBJECTIVES

ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR SUCCESS - HELD LINE

ONLY EXTENSION TO CUBA LEAP FROG ACROSS THE SEAS

WITH CONTAINMENT GONE WE MUST NOW REDEFINE OBJECTIVES & MEASURES

COURSE - TAKING THE STUDENTS BACK TO TWO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS

FIRST, DETERRENT IN PEACETIME

SECONDLY, INSURANCE IN CASE DETERRENCE FAILS

TODAY, SOME WHO AVOW THAT OUR NEED FOR MILITARY

INSURANCE HAS DIMINISHED

JUST AS UNDERSTANDABLE - NEW SPRINKLER SYSTEM

DETENTE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING

ALSO THOSE WHO CONTEND - NOT IN OUR INTERESTS - TO USE THE
PRESENCE OF MILITARY FORCES - SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY

6

DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE TOO URGENT

SABER RATTLING IS TOO RISKY

ARGUE EACH OF THESE POINTS INTERMINABLY DEBATE NOT BE

BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF

NO INSURANCE OR NO PRESENCE CAPABILITY & OVERWHELMING
SUPERIORITY

DEBATE ON POINT IN BETWEEN

WHERE ACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRY TO SET ITS DEFENSES CAN BRACKET

START FROM THE ASSUMPTION - HONORING OUR NATO COMMITMENTS

HOW MUCH MILITARY POWER REQUIRED IS MATTER FOR DEBATE

NEARER TO THE OTHER EXTREME

CONSENSUS MUST LIE SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN

SPECTRUM - VAST SCOPE - INSURANCE - WAYS EMPLOY

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IS NOT CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING THIS EXPLICITLY

WEIGH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGES -

WORLD ENVIRONMENT

DOMESTIC ATTITUDES

IMPACT OF EMERGENCE FROM THE BI-POLAR WORLD

START OUR STUDENTS WITH THUCYDIDES

ERA A BI-POLAR FOCUS - ABERATION

NUMBER OF POWERS TO BALANCE

BALANCE OF POWER MEANS JUST THAT

8

MUST HAVE POWER - NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY FORCE

INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, NATIONAL WILL, MORAL STATURE,

ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY

ISSUE MILITARY STUDENTS PROBE FOR THAT TYPE OF MILITARY FORCE COUNTRY NEEDS

COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER SOURCES OF POWER

IF A PRIME PURPOSE - MILITARY FORCES IN 1970'S IS TO BALANCE OR

PROVIDE NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN TO CONTAIN

CONSTRUCTION OF FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT

SOPHISTICATION FOR A MILITARY MAN TO THINK OF INFLUENCING

IN ADDITION TO FIGHTING

UNDERSTANDING HOW OTHER'S PERCEPTIONS CAN

INFLUENCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC DECISIONS

A WORLD OF MULTI-POWER NEGOTIATIONS, REQUIRES
MILITARY POSTURE THAT HAS ^{VIRTUES} ~~VIRTUES~~ OTHER THAN SIMPLY BEING
CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NEXT FELLOW'S
MAY ACHIEVE YOUR MILITARY PURPOSE
WITHOUT DIRECTLY ENGAGING THE ENEMY - ONLY A FRACTION OF HIS FORCE - QUICK
ENGAGEMENT - HASTILY TERMINATED
SUGGEST TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE MILITARY,
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC FORCES

WHAT POLITICAL NEEDS ARE - SOMETHING THAT WE IN UNIFORM CAN NOT AND
AND SHOULD NOT DETERMINE

10

CHANGES IN DOMESTIC ATTITUDES

MILITARY ARE SERVANTS - USNA WELL REALIZE

OUR ROLE - PREPARED TO COMPREHEND AND TO FOLLOW COURSE THE
NATION SELECTS

PURPOSE, DEDICATION, AND PROFICIENCY

ALSO MUST ADVISE THE DEGREE FORCES CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

INTELLECTUALLY PREPARE THE NEXT CROP
TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE
DEAL WITH THE IMPRECISE, UNCERTAIN NATIONAL CHARACTER - WILL
NO SIMPLE WAY FOR THE PUBLIC TO EXPRESS THAT WILL
THROUGH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
REQUIRES FROM THE PUBLIC A POSITIVE APPROACH
TO MILITARY MATTERS
DANGEROUS TO BACK INTO AN EVALUATION OF MILITARY NEEDS DISINTEREST - DISMAY
EXTRAVAGANT END UP WITH THE MILITARY PREPARING
SET OF OBJECTIVES 180° - UNEXPRESSED PUBLIC OPINION

12

MOVE INTO THE ERA OF THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE
PUBLIC MUST ASSUME A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY
DIRECTION TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
THE END OF THE DRAFT - NOT MEAN THE END OF PUBLIC CONCERN
GIVING SENSE OF POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MILITARY
PURPOSE - ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
IN ENSURING SUCH FORCE BOTH TAILORED AND EMPLOYED
AS THE NATIONAL WILL DICTATES
STRIVING, THROUGH HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
TO BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU
LOCATING CONSENSUS ON MILITARY PURPOSE WE REQUIRE AS GUIDANCE

THIS DEMANDS HIGHER AND MORE FLEXIBLE INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES
RISKS OF ERRORS SEVERE - TECH AGE OF SWIFT AND TREACHEROUS
WEAPONRY AND BALANCING FORCES
DEDICATED IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
ENSURING LEADERS OF TOMORROW
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We are striving, through higher military education today, to be ready to work with the civilian public in locating the consensus on military purpose that we require. The task demands higher and more flexible intellectual capabilities in military men than ever before. The risks in making errors or in inadequate preparation are severe in this age of swift and treacherous weaponry and of intricate balancing of international forces. We are dedicated in higher military education to ensuring that the military leaders of tomorrow are sensitive to the public's direction and worthy of its relying on them for whatever purpose is selected. Your help in reaching this goal would be deeply appreciated.

Thank you.

I solicit your help in maintaining the kind of constructive dialogue that is essential to our national security. I know that we can count on you. I assure you that we are trying our best to be certain that you can count on us.

USA ALEMAN

5/22/73

THANK YOU PRESIDENT JACK PARK - HEAD TABLE

GUESTS

WHAT ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH AT NWC - MIRROR

WHAT EFFECT MAY HAVE ON THE NAVY OF THE FUTURE

TASK IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING ONE TODAY

MID-CAREER EDUCATION OF 450

DESTINED TOP LEADERSHIP

COME FROM A NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE

VOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

AUTHORITARIAN WORLD

PROPER

BUT MOVING UP

1

OUR OBJECTIVE - DEVELOP CONCEPT OF THINKING

2

THREE VERY IMPRECISE SUBJECTS - MUST GRAPPLE -

WHETHER IN WORLD OF MILITARY OR BUSINESS

FIRST, UNCERTAIN WORLD OF BROAD QUESTIONS

SECOND, INEXACT WORLD OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

THIRDLY, PROBABLISTIC WORLD OF TACTICAL DECISIONS -

TECH CHANGING

COMPOUNDING THE COMPLEXITIES - IMPRECISE OBJECTIVES

UNCERTAINTY OF NOT HAVING A STANDARD OF MEASURE - PROFIT AND

LOSS STATEMENT

WHEN SAY TO NOT HAVE SPECIFIC STANDARD OF MEASURE MEAN 2 THINGS

FIRST, DOD CANNOT ESTABLISH & AGREE UPON BASIC OBJECTIVES -
AS EASILY AS YOU IN BUSINESS

WHY A MILITARY?

WHERE & WHEN MIGHT EMPLOY IT?

QUESTIONS ON OBJECTIVES LESS AMENABLE THAN IS QUESTION HOW A
CORPORATION CAN SATISFY A CONSUMER'S NEED

SECONDLY, DIFFICULTY IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE

4

BUSINESS WORLD: SALES, PROFIT AS % OF SALES, TURNOVER,

RETURN ON ASSETS, RETURN ON STOCKHOLDERS INVESTMENT

WE LACK SUCH TOOLS

NEED FOR MILITARY MEN WHO CAN APPROACH COMPLEX PROBLEMS

ESTABLISHING MILITARY OBJECTIVES & MEASURING THE DEGREE OF FULFILLMENT

WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE TEST OF WAR

NOT ONLY SKILLED CRAFTSMEN - DRIVING SHIPS

ARCHITECTS OF INEXACT POLICIES - VAST IMPORT

TASK OFFICERS FACE IN 1973 IS COMPOUNDED

FOUNDATION HAS DISAPPEARED

ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR OBJECTIVES

READINESS FOR ACTION ALONG THE SOVIET - CHINESE PERIPHERY

ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR SUCCESS - HELD LINE

ONLY EXTENSION TO CUBA LEAP FROG ACROSS THE SEAS

WITH CONTAINMENT GONE WE MUST NOW REDEFINE OBJECTIVES & MEASURES

COURSE - TAKING THE STUDENTS BACK TO TWO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS

FIRST, DETERRENT IN PEACETIME

SECONDLY, INSURANCE IN CASE DETERRENCE FAILS

TODAY, SOME WHO AVOW THAT OUR NEED FOR MILITARY

INSURANCE HAS DIMINISHED

JUST AS UNDERSTANDABLE - NEW SPRINKLER SYSTEM

DETENTE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING

ALSO THOSE WHO CONTEND - NOT IN OUR INTERESTS - TO USE THE
PRESENCE OF MILITARY FORCES - SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY

6

DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE TOO URGENT

SABER RATTLING IS TOO RISKY

ARGUE EACH OF THESE POINTS INTERMINABLY DEBATE NOT BE

BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF

NO INSURANCE OR NO PRESENCE CAPABILITY & OVERWHELMING
SUPERIORITY

DEBATE ON POINT IN BETWEEN

WHERE ACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRY TO SET ITS DEFENSES CAN BRACKET

START FROM THE ASSUMPTION - HONORING OUR NATO COMMITMENTS

HOW MUCH MILITARY POWER REQUIRED IS MATTER FOR DEBATE

NEARER TO THE OTHER EXTREME

CONSENSUS MUST LIE SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN

SPECTRUM - VAST SCOPE - INSURANCE - WAYS EMPLOY

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IS NOT CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING THIS EXPLICITLY

WEIGH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGES -

WORLD ENVIRONMENT

DOMESTIC ATTITUDES

IMPACT OF EMERGENCE FROM THE BI-POLAR WORLD

START OUR STUDENTS WITH THUCYDIDES

ERA A BI-POLAR FOCUS - ABERATION

NUMBER OF POWERS TO BALANCE

BALANCE OF POWER MEANS JUST THAT

8

MUST HAVE POWER - NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY FORCE

INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, NATIONAL WILL, MORAL STATURE,

ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY

ISSUE MILITARY STUDENTS PROBE FOR THAT TYPE OF MILITARY FORCE COUNTRY NEEDS

COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER SOURCES OF POWER

IF A PRIME PURPOSE - MILITARY FORCES IN 1970'S IS TO BALANCE OR

PROVIDE NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN TO CONTAIN

CONSTRUCTION OF FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT

SOPHISTICATION FOR A MILITARY MAN TO THINK OF INFLUENCING

IN ADDITION TO FIGHTING

UNDERSTANDING HOW OTHER'S PERCEPTIONS CAN

INFLUENCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC DECISIONS

A WORLD OF MULTI-POWER NEGOTIATIONS, REQUIRES
MILITARY POSTURE THAT HAS ^{VIRTUES} ~~VIRTUES~~ OTHER THAN SIMPLY BEING
CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NEXT FELLOW'S
MAY ACHIEVE YOUR MILITARY PURPOSE
WITHOUT DIRECTLY ENGAGING THE ENEMY - ONLY A FRACTION OF HIS FORCE - QUICK
ENGAGEMENT - HASTILY TERMINATED
SUGGEST TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE MILITARY,
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC FORCES

WHAT POLITICAL NEEDS ARE - SOMETHING THAT WE IN UNIFORM CAN NOT AND
AND SHOULD NOT DETERMINE

10

CHANGES IN DOMESTIC ATTITUDES

MILITARY ARE SERVANTS - USNA WELL REALIZE

OUR ROLE - PREPARED TO COMPREHEND AND TO FOLLOW COURSE THE
NATION SELECTS

PURPOSE, DEDICATION, AND PROFICIENCY

ALSO MUST ADVISE THE DEGREE FORCES CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

INTELLECTUALLY PREPARE THE NEXT CROP
TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE
DEAL WITH THE IMPRECISE, UNCERTAIN NATIONAL CHARACTER - WILL
NO SIMPLE WAY FOR THE PUBLIC TO EXPRESS THAT WILL
THROUGH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
REQUIRES FROM THE PUBLIC A POSITIVE APPROACH
TO MILITARY MATTERS
DANGEROUS TO BACK INTO AN EVALUATION OF MILITARY NEEDS DISINTEREST - DISMAY
EXTRAVAGANT END UP WITH THE MILITARY PREPARING
SET OF OBJECTIVES 180° - UNEXPRESSED PUBLIC OPINION

12

MOVE INTO THE ERA OF THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE
PUBLIC MUST ASSUME A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY
DIRECTION TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
THE END OF THE DRAFT - NOT MEAN THE END OF PUBLIC CONCERN
GIVING SENSE OF POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MILITARY
PURPOSE - ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
IN ENSURING SUCH FORCE BOTH TAILORED AND EMPLOYED
AS THE NATIONAL WILL DICTATES
STRIVING, THROUGH HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
TO BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU
LOCATING CONSENSUS ON MILITARY PURPOSE WE REQUIRE AS GUIDANCE

THIS DEMANDS HIGHER AND MORE FLEXIBLE INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES
RISKS OF ERRORS SEVERE - TECH AGE OF SWIFT AND TREACHEROUS
WEAPONRY AND BALANCING FORCES
DEDICATED IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
ENSURING LEADERS OF TOMORROW
SENSITIVE TO YOUR DIRECTION
WORTHY OF YOUR RELYING ON THEM
WHATEVER PURPOSE YOU SELECT