

31 OCT 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Public Affairs
Publications Review Board

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: George Bush's Manuscript

I have reviewed George Bush's manuscript and the two specific proposed deletions. I personally don't think we should raise either of these deletions with George Bush. There is no security impact on either one and that is, as I understand it, our only real role. I don't believe his statement of [redacted] issue is either inaccurate or likely to rub much salt in wounds. On the other issue, I understand the portrayal is absolutely accurate and it seems to me we would be asking George Bush to take out something that does characterize the state of the Agency when he arrived here. I think it is preferable to leave that in if I am correct in my understanding that it is accurate.

STAT


STANSFIELD TURNER

STAT

Tape 32

Side A, 7 1/8 - 7 1/8

31 OCT 1978

STAT

NOTE FOR:

Set aside a lunch in the week of 6 November for possible meeting with

STAT

Doubt

that I'll be able to get hold of him much before the 6th, however.

ST

STAT

cc:

EOB

FATHER IN CIA 'MURDER CLUE' QUEST

By KENNETH CLARKE

MR EDWARD CHAPMAN, father of Ann Chapman, the British freelance journalist murdered in Athens in 1971, is hoping to meet a former deputy premier of Turkey who believes she may have been killed by Greek agents acting for the American Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr Sadi Kocas, 59, who is also a former Turkish Army staff colonel, well up in intelligence matters, said in recently published memoirs that Miss Chapman could have been killed on CIA orders because she had secret American documents on Turkey.

This version of the murder was reported to Mr Kocas in a letter mailed to him from an anonymous Englishman soon after Miss Chapman, 25, was strangled. The letter was accompanied by American intelligence documents allegedly given to the author of the letter by Miss Chapman herself.

Mr Chapman said yesterday he would be asking the Turkish Embassy in London to help him to find, and arrange to see Mr Kocas, who now lives in retirement in Istanbul.

Verdict challenged

He said he had been "amazed" to receive a letter from Mr J. Hanratty, the British consul in Ankara, Turkey's capital, saying Mr Kocas "is unknown to us" and that inquiries to establish his whereabouts could not be undertaken.

Mr Chapman's anxiety to interview the former Turkish deputy premier has been given added impetus in recent days by news from Greece that three judges of the Greek Supreme Court have challenged the guilty verdict against Nicos Moundis, a Greek former prison guard, who is serving a life sentence for the Chapman killing.

The three judges were among seven in the Supreme Court in Athens which dismissed Moundis' plea for a retrial early last month. The decision against was four to three, and now the minority view has been made public.

The minority report stated: "The conclusion is drawn that Miss Chapman was strangled by a person or persons who sought her death directly and immediately, and in any event not by a person attempting to have sexual intercourse with her."


New heart

Moundis was alleged to have killed Miss Chapman during a sex-attack as she waited at a bus stop in an Athens suburb. He confessed to the murder when questioned by Piraeus police, but later repudiated it.

The minority report stated that the exact contents of the confession remained unknown as it had never been in the Chapman case dossier. A point that had not been clarified by the court was that the strangling had been committed by a right-hand man, according to the coroner, although Moundis was left-handed.

Mr Chapman, who has consistently believed that his daughter died at the hands of security agents of the former military junta in Greece, or because of some embarrassing information she obtained as a journalist, has taken new heart from the judges' report.

The memoirs of Mr Kocas give another possible suspect in his daughter's case—agents acting for the CIA—and she now believes grounds for re-opening the file.

DONE STAT


Tape 32


Side A, 7/8 - 1

30 OCT 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Public Affairs

FROM: D C I

~~SUBJECT:~~

I'd like to get a copy of that portion of the FACE THE NATION transcript that covered the situation in Iran. [Make a note for  that STAT when I get that to put it in the next Brzezinski meeting.]

ST

William Safire

A practitioner of the art of forgetting

Several years ago, I charged that Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, deputy and later successor to Robert Kennedy as attorney general, had tacitly approved the wiretapping of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. — as one part of what I believed was the most flagrant abuse of any American's civil liberty before or since.

Katzenbach — now a \$350,000-a-year lawyer for IBM — thundered his denial. Then a congressional committee came up with a document showing he must have known of the horrendous surveillance, and the skilled lawyer blandly conceded that his earlier testimony may have been "mistaken."

Now we have another example of an early-sixties decision that — in retrospect — seems wrong, and once again that keen legal mind just cannot remember what happened.

As writer Edward Jay Epstein recounted in his book *Legend*, a Soviet defector fresh from the KGB named Yuri Nosenko dropped in our laps soon after the assassination of President Kennedy, to assure us that Lee Harvey Oswald's association with the Soviets had nothing to do with the president's murder.

Concerned that Nosenko might be a phony defector,

sent here to plant disinformation on behalf of the KGB, the CIA put him in solitary confinement for a few years under what are euphemistically termed "Spartan" conditions. (Present management at CIA thinks he is a real defector and a great help; some old-timers think he is a spy in our midst.)

The question and immediate issue is: Does the CIA now have, or did it ever have, the right to clap an incoming alien in the clink without due process, or without Justice Department approval?

To get this answer, House Assassination Committee staff director G. Robert Blakey, called a couple of witnesses: ex-CIA chief Richard Helms, and ex-Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, who ran the Justice Department in 1964, when the Soviet defector arrived.

Through his attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, Helms notified Katzenbach that he intended to testify that the authorization to hold Nosenko was obtained from Justice in a meeting in Katzenbach's office. This was evidently to help the lawyer refresh his recollection about a get-together on a subject that seems to me should have been unforgettable: whether to grill a Soviet agent about possible

Soviet complicity in the assassination.

But Katzenbach testified his memory was a blank: "I have no recollection of any conversation involving Nosenko with Helms. There may have been such a conversation. I don't think I authorized putting anybody in jail for three years. I simply have no recollection of any such conversation occurring, but there may have been a conversation about a defector. I don't know."

To my mind, that was pretty shrewd poker-playing. If Helms had no proof of the conversation, then it was just his word against Katzenbach's, and who believes an ex-CIA man these days? On the other hand, if Helms should be able to come up with some proof, Katzenbach never said "absolutely" — he left the possibility open far enough with "there may have been."

Next day, Helms laid his proof on the committee table: two internal CIA memos showing that on April 2, 1964, five officials of Justice met with three CIA men in Katzenbach's office and decided in his presence how to use the immigration laws to hold defector Nosenko.

"In light of the document which you have just read," said the committee chairman, "and along with your

other testimony, then obviously the statement of Katzenbach to this committee yesterday could not be true, could it?" Replied Helms: "No, I am afraid it is not."

With the fact of the meeting to decide Nosenko's fate definitely established, the former attorney general — who could not recall any conversation about Nosenko — suddenly found his calendar for that day contained a notation that a "defector case" was discussed with three CIA men. "Although it is clear from this page that there was such a meeting," Katzenbach wrote the committee after Helms produced his documents, "I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it . . ."

Fancy that: six months after a president is murdered, a top law officer of the U.S. approved the holding of a spy to see whether the Soviet Union nulled the trigger — but later on cannot remember a thing about it. Incontrovertible evidence is presented to refresh his recollection — and he completely draws a blank.

Of course, if the evidence had proven Helms mistaken, or if the man with the blank memory had not been one of the best and the brightest, a great cry would ensue for further investigation — you may not mislead Congress if you wear a black hat.

Not so with Nick deB. Let us, then, salute that rigged defender of the faith: when it comes to abuses of power that took place in the early sixties, he has shown that the best memory is a good forgettery.