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I'd like to obtain the following articles please:

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"The Long-range Cruise Missile," <u>Scientific American</u>, Volume 233, No. 1, July 1975, pgs. 15-26, by Kosta Tsipis

Also by the same man, "Cruise Missiles," from <u>Scientific American</u>,
Volume 236, No. 2, February 1977, pg. 23.

Also, "The Cruise Missile: Bargaining Chip or Defense Bargain?," Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, January 1977, by Pfaltzgraff & Davis.

pointed out to Secretary of State Kissinger that I had sympathy for a number of Mr. Easum's views as I understood them, and was not confident that I could satisfy him where Easum apparently had not. The Secretary happened to be out of Washington when the question came to a head, and I telegraphed him, saying that the African Bureau was not a responsibility I would seek under the circumstances. However, Foreign Service officers are bound to accept discipline in assignments. In my telegram to the Secretary, I added, therefore, that I would do my best as chief of the African Bureau if the Secretary nonetheless asked me to discharge that assignment. He did, and the nomination was announced on January 8, 1975.

On February 21, 1975, the Ministerial Council of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), meeting in Addis Ababa, passed without vote a consensus resolution questioning what the nomination might portend in light of what was called "the U.S. policy of 'political destabilization' in Latin America." Nevertheless, after public hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate confirmed my appointment on March 11, 1975.

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Shortly thereafter, William G. Hyland, the Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, told me that a \$300,000 program of covert support for the veteran Angolan liberation fighter, Holden Roberto, had been approved that past January by the Forty Committee, the top-level review board that passes on covert operations abroad.² This came as a surprise. While the money was for political action and expenses, and not for arms, I had not been aware that such programs were still being approved in the wake of the congressional investigations and interest in U.S. covert activities abroad. In any case, this was water over the dam.

I was sworn in as Assistant Secretary on April 2, 1975. Shortly thereafter, my colleagues in the African Bureau and I prepared a Staff Study on Angola for the Secretary. It was directed to the developing political situation in Angola and was essentially a status report. However, the Central Intelligence Agency soon posed the question of substantially greater covert support for Holden Roberto and his National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the initiation of support for Jonas Savimbi, the head of the second of the three main Angolan independence movements

² Seymour M. Hersh revealed this program in a New York Times article of December 19, 1975.