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# 'Hawks' cry for rallying of US might

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor  
Elkridge, Maryland

If the United States is to move from present military and political weakness back to strength in the 1980s, it must spend much more for defense and fashion new long-term strategies with allies.

So finds a distinguished panel of "hawkish" defense scholars and retired military men. Meeting privately here Dec. 19-21 in the shadow of the Iran crisis and the less-noticed, but still severe, difficulties for the Carter administration's SALT II arms-limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, the panel suggested a series of "quick fixes" and longer-term ways to restore American strength between now and 1990.

All of the 30 participants and Monroe Brown, president of the San Francisco-based Institute for Contemporary Studies, a private foundation that sponsored the meeting, acknowledged that these remedies will cost Americans large amounts of money and effort. The Soviet Union, as they pointed out in detail, now is expending both on a much larger scale than is the US.

Striking the keynote for a book on "national security in the '80s," which the institute will publish next spring, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt Jr. (USN, ret.) warned that in the new decade "the shift in military power toward the Soviet Union threatens to weaken our alliances with Western Europe and Japan."

This is especially true "in the third world, where the danger is most immediate," and where the United States and its allies are dependent on petroleum and mineral resources, Admiral Zumwalt adds in a draft chapter for the book.

Admiral Zumwalt and most of the other authors, including W. Scott Thompson and Geoffrey Kemp, both professors at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Massachusetts; William Van Cleave of the University of Southern California, and Richard Burt of the New York Times outlined how and why, in their view, US defense spending possibly exceeding \$1 trillion by 1990 ought to be matched by better strategic planning.

Allies, especially Japan and West Germany, should increasingly defend their own Middle East oil supplies, but may also prod the US into doing more to defend Pacific sea lanes against the rising Soviet naval threat, urged defense analyst Kenneth Adelman and several other conferees.

Henry S. Rowen of Stanford University outlined a perspective of increasingly short oil supplies during the 1980s, as multinational companies have less control over the world market and producing countries cut back supplies.

Leonard Sullivan Jr. of the Systems Planning Corporation, said that although US strategy for deterring conventional war has not changed from the idea of the 1960s of preparing for a "war and a half" — in Europe and some such third-world area as the Indian Ocean. Besides, "considerations for actually fighting" the "war and a half" are "seriously incomplete," and "the strategy itself is probably no longer appropriate or adequate" because of a lack of US will to build war-fighting capacity.

To upgrade US strategic arms and secure "quick fixes" to overcome Soviet superiority, present or future, the US should spend about twice as much, for bombers, missiles and space

programs, or about \$11 billion per year in 1980 with or without SALT, Mr. Sullivan proposes.

(The SALT II treaty faces an uncertain fate in the US Senate next year, after the Armed Services Committee issued an unfavorable majority report on it.)

To modernize conventional forces, "we should be spending \$19 billion annually [in fiscal 1980 dollars] for Navy and Air Force tactical air and Army helicopters; \$3 billion for armored vehicles and air defense systems, and \$7 billion for general-purpose naval ships and submarines," with current outlays running roughly to one-half these figures.

Instead of the old one-and-a-half war strategy, "Congress should be given the option of funding either a one-, two-, or three-front [Europe, Asia, Indian Ocean] war capability." This should include either a "short" war of 30 to 60 days or a "long" one of well over 180 days.

Urgent needs in intelligence and industrial mobilization and the need to halt the present drain of high military technology to the Soviets through stronger trade controls were aired at the meeting.

Paul Nitze, a leading opponent of SALT and former secretary of the Navy, and strategic analyst Charles Burton Marshall outlined ideas for a new long-range strategy — less concerned with reacting on a case-by-case basis to local third-world or Soviet pressures, and more with spreading confidence in American purpose to friends and allies.