

8 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
 National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs


FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Strategic Force Trends as Seen by Soviets

1. Attached is a recent article by General Milshteyn. It presents U.S. military and particularly strategic force trends as seen from the Soviet viewpoint. In view of the fact that Milshteyn is one of the Soviets' more sophisticated observers of the strategic scene, this may have some credibility. (C/NF)


2. Thinking about our discussion on an NIE 11-3/8 volume especially for the President, I wonder if a review of how the Soviets see the evolution of our strategic forces might not be worthwhile. At least for the first edition it could be rather modest in length. (S/NF)


3. The Pentagon has been pushing us in this direction anyway and I think they're right. (C/NF)


 STANSFIELD TURNER

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Attachment

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MILSHTEYN SEES COUNTERFORCE OPTION TREND; DIKTAT, EXPANSIONIST POLICY

LD221445 Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5 Signed to Press
10 Apr 80 pp 9-18--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[M.A. Milshteyn article: "Some Characteristic Features of Present-Day U.S. Military Doctrine"]

[Text] Historical experience shows that when American imperialism is experiencing difficulties or suffering defeats in particular directions of its expansionist foreign policy, the aggressive and interventionist features characteristic of U.S. military doctrine appear particularly sharply and prominently. As L.I. Brezhnev noted in his speech at the voters' election meeting in Moscow City's Baumanskiy Electoral Okrug, "the more imperialism's opportunities to dominate other countries and peoples decrease, the more fiercely its most aggressive and shortsighted representatives react to this" (Note 1). (PRAVDA 23 February 1980).

That is what is happening now. This is finding expression not only or not so much in the bellicose phraseology so characteristic of Washington's present administration, or in the creation in the country of sentiments reminiscent of a state of war psychosis, as in specific deeds and actions creating a serious threat to the cause of peace.

Just what specific forms are the most characteristic features of U.S. military doctrine and military policy now taking? Above all, these are finding expression in the sharp increase of military spending. Thus U.S. military spending in fiscal 1981 will total \$161.8 billion (in today's dollars), which is an increase of more than \$20 billion over the military appropriations originally requested by the administration for fiscal 1980. Military spending will be increased more than 5 percent in real terms. The constant growth of "real" (that is, taking inflation into account) military spending at more than 4.5 percent per year is envisaged for subsequent years. It has already been announced that in 1982 spending will amount to \$183.4 billion (in today's dollars), will then rise to \$205.3 billion and \$228.3 billion in the next 2 years, and in 1985 will reach the astronomical figure of \$253.2 billion. If you take it into account that the budget for fiscal 1979/80 totals more than \$130 billion, it turns out that the United States is spending \$1.2 trillion on military purposes over 5 years. It is characteristic here that record U.S. military spending has been proposed by J. Carter, who only a little more than 3 years ago, when he was seeking election to the country's presidency, publically promised voters he would reduce the Pentagon's spending by \$5 billion-\$7 billion per year.

However, even this kind of increase in military spending seems inadequate to many people in the United States. In an article in the New York TIMES F. Ikle, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under G. Ford's administration, now a consultant on national security questions, advocates that the U.S. military budget be not \$161 billion, nor even \$250 billion, but no less than \$1 trillion. "The sooner this sixfold increase in our defense effort is implemented," he writes, "the more effective it will be" (Note 2). (the New York TIMES 5 February 1980). American physicist E. Teller, another champion of the arms race, also claims (in FORBES magazine for 18 February 1980) that the 5-percent increase in the military budget is not enough.

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It should be taken into account that the Pentagon earmarks more than \$40 billion from its budget for purchasing various military equipment, from spare parts for existing weapons to extremely complex new systems. This naturally means an opportunity to make very high profits for the military industry. It is no accident that people in the military-industrial complex are predicting "a boom in the U.S. military industry" (Note 3) (See, for instance, NEWSWEEK for 4 February 1980). The shares of giant Pentagon contractors such as the Boeing, General Dynamics and United Technologies Corporations are rising steadily on the New York Stock Exchange, and other companies large and small are also hatching plans for expanding military production.

Simultaneously with this the United States is, at an increased pace, improving the existing and creating a new generation of strategic offensive weapons. It is primarily a question of increasing the number of nuclear warheads. And claims that the United States long ago ceased building up the numerical strength of its strategic nuclear forces whereas the Soviet Union is allegedly constantly increasing them have a wide currency. Only one thing is true about these claims: Over the past decade the number of American delivery vehicles has remained at the same level. However, the number of nuclear warheads on those delivery vehicles is growing constantly, and it is precisely the number of warheads and their yield that determine the effective status of strategic forces. Thus while in 1969 the American missile forces had 1,710 nuclear warheads, at present the total number of nuclear munitions that can be delivered by all vehicles is about 10,000 units (Note 4) ("Arms Control Today," April 1970 p 1; "SIPRI Yearbook 1977," Stockholm 1977 p 24; "Department of Defense Annual Report f.y. 1981." Washington 1980 p 77). And although the number of delivery vehicles, as already mentioned, is remaining almost constant, the number of nuclear warheads has increased by approximately 1,000 units per year over the last 10 years (Note 5) ("SIPRI Yearbook 1977"; J. Collins "American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis." Washington 1978 pp 113-114).

Along with the buildup of the quantity of nuclear munitions, their yield is increasing. For instance, Minuteman-3 missiles, which each have three 200-kiloton warheads, are being refitted with nose cones that will carry three 370-kiloton warheads, which considerably increases their potential destructiveness (Note 6) ("The Military Balance 1978-1979." London 1978 p 3). A new generation of ICBM warheads with components ensuring that they can be maneuvered and guided during the terminal phases of their trajectory (the so-called MARV system) is also being intensively developed.

From next year the United States will start producing cruise missiles. The missile submarine fleet will receive new systems of the Trident 1 type. The first such submarine has already been launched, and the second is to be launched by summer 1980. The unit of Poseidon submarines is getting new Trident 1 missiles with a range of more than 6,000 km, and by 1984 all Poseidon nuclear submarines are to be equipped with Trident 1 missiles with increased accuracy (Note 7) ("The Military Balance 1979-1980." London 1979 p 3; "The Military Balance 1978-1979." London 1978 p 3).

In September 1979 the U.S. President decided to expedite the development, production and deployment of the new mobile MX land-based ICBM, designed to replace the Minuteman-3 missile. It is considerably heavier (as a comparison, the MX weighs 95 tons and the Minuteman-3 39 tons), will have 10 MIRVed warheads instead of the 3 on Minuteman-3s and a considerably greater payload, and, which is extremely material, it will be considerably more accurate (it may be equipped with the MARV system). One of the main differences will be the basing system. The existing launchers for the Minuteman-3 missiles are permanently housed in deep silos constructed beforehand--that is, at permanent-basing sites. The new system will consist of 200 MX missiles mounted on transporter-erector-launchers and will have 23 horizontal-type shelters for each transporter-erector-launcher and missile.

Thus the missile can be launched from the installation mounted on the transporter either from any point along the track or from a shelter. The constant movement of the transporters and the existence of 23 shelters makes it impossible, in the opinion of the system's creators, to hit all the missiles simultaneously in the event of a nuclear exchange. According to the most modest calculations, the cost of this system is estimated at \$41.6 billion (Note 8) (NEWSWEEK 4 February 1980 p 41). The new missiles may enter service in the second half of the eighties, and experts of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, the U.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology and others believe that in view of its invulnerability, accuracy, potential destructiveness and number of warheads, the new missile system can effectively be regarded as a first-strike weapon (Note 9) ("Strategic Survey." London 1977 p 116; M. Callahan, B. Field, E. Hadjimichael, K. Tsipis. "The MX Missile. An Arms Control Impact Statement." Boston 1978 p 20).

It is in this context that the December (1979) NATO Council session's decision to accept the American offer to produce and deploy in Europe 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles with a range of more than 2,000 km should be considered; some of these weapons can carry not one but several nuclear charges. If it is implemented, this decision may lead to a qualitative and quantitative change in both the balance of forces in Europe and the strategic balance as a whole, and to the disruption in NATO's favor of the military equilibrium in Europe. It should be taken into account here that the decision to produce and deploy new nuclear armaments is part of a broad NATO plan adopted under U.S. pressure at the Washington (May 1978) NATO Council session. This plan envisages increasing appropriations for military purposes by many tens of billions of dollars over and above the already swollen military budgets, the adoption of new programs for developing [razvertyvaniye] the NATO Armed Forces covering decades ahead, and the reequipping of those forces with increasingly devastating types of mass-destruction weapons.

The emergence of highly accurate nuclear missile weapons--in considerable quantity, what is more--has in the United States prompted the revision in an extremely dangerous direction of a number of fundamental strategic military concepts, especially those considering the possible consequences of nuclear war and the procedure for the use of nuclear missile weapons in such a war. It is essentially a matter of the fundamental, the most vital problems of nuclear strategy, for instance: Can nuclear weapons be used effectively in the interests of resolving foreign policy tasks? Or: Can there be victory in nuclear war and what would be the cost of such a victory? In other words, to speak more directly, the question is this: Is there to be nuclear war, or not?

It is well known that for a long time a widespread opinion in the United States was that nuclear war was unthinkable, that there could be no winner in such a war, that a world nuclear war would mean the end of civilization and whoever unleashed it would be committing suicide. Nuclear forces were regarded, at least in official declarations, not as a means of waging war but merely as a means of deterring and averting it. American official documents and verbal statements by administration spokesman repeatedly stressed that the huge U.S. nuclear arsenal served, so to speak, as a terrible warning to the other side that in any circumstances the United States had the permanent potential for a mighty retaliatory strike capable of inflicting irreparable losses on the other side's population and economy. This is the essence of the concept of "assured destruction" first proposed by R. McNamara back in the sixties.

Time passed. Presidents came and went, the names of the American doctrines changed--"flexible response," "realistic deterrence"--but the concept of "assured destruction" remained the basic, fundamental concept in the scheme of the U.S. military doctrine. The "assured destruction" section of the U.S. defense secretary's annual report to Congress for fiscal 1979 said, in particular: "It is important that we always retain the possibility of inflicting unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, including the destruction of at least 200 major cities of the Soviet Union" (Note 10) ("Department of Defense Annual Report F.Y. 1979." Washington 1978 p 55).

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It is believed that, since acknowledged parity in strategic forces exists, the other side has a similar potential for "assured destruction" and, as it were, an objectively existing situation of "mutual assured destruction" is established between the two sides. In American specialists' opinion, this meant: mutual deterrence; acknowledgement of the inadmissibility of nuclear war; that the use of nuclear weapons is fraught with tremendous potential danger to the United States itself.

But it would be naive to believe that everyone in the United States agreed with this in the past, or so agrees now. On the contrary, the whole history of the development of U.S. strategic military thought shows that there has been and is in that country a constant quest for ways to make nuclear weapons "acceptable" and to ensure the utilization of the huge arsenal of nuclear weapons as a means of resolving international problems in its own favor without running the risk of sustaining "unacceptable losses." Of course, this quest and these studies have proceeded and still do proceed behind closed doors, in profound secrecy, and it is only occasionally that the American public leans of them.

The "assured destruction" concept's choice of big targets such as cities and industrial centers as the main objectives for attack was no accident. It was explained largely by the fact that current strategic offensive forces were extremely inaccurate. Thus, according to American figures, the Titan missile, which entered service in 1962, and the first Polaris missiles, which entered service in 1966, had a mean probable error of about 1 km, and the Minuteman-2 a mean probable error of 0.6 km (Note 11) (ARMS CONTROL TODAY, April 1979 p 9. The Americans define accuracy in terms of the so-called "average circular error probable"--that is, the radius of a circle around the target in which 50 percent of the targeted warheads may fall). The gradual improvement in missiles' accuracy brought into being new strategic nuclear charges against a small number of military targets. That was how the concept of "limited strategic war," still known under the name of the "Schlesinger doctrine" (at the time he was U.S. defense secretary), emerged; since 1974 it has been an integral part of American military doctrine (Note 12) (For more details about this concept, see SSHA: EKONOMIK, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 11 for 1974, pp 3-12). The accuracy of Minuteman-3 missiles with the Mark-12A warhead, adopted in 1979, is three times that of the Minuteman-2 missile, the Poseidon naval missile (1971) is twice as accurate as the Polaris and the Trident missiles that will enter service in 1981 are almost four times as accurate as the Polaris (Note 13) (ARMS CONTROL TODAY, April 1980 p 9; "The Military Balance 1979-1980" p 3).

American strategists were again faced with illusory hopes of making effective use of their nuclear arsenal in the interests of implementing a "position of strength" policy. Criticism of the "assured destruction" concept began in all directions. H. Brown's report for fiscal 1980 was already saying: "However, unfortunately a strategy based only on assured destruction cannot be regarded as wholly correct. Many Americans are questioning whether we should subscribe to such a strategy" (Note 14) ("Department of Defense Annual Report F.Y. 1980," Washington 1979 p 75). The year before, H. Brown's report had noted: "Of course, we want our forces to be capable not merely of surviving a strike and penetrating the enemy defenses... A sufficient number of guided missiles and bombers must be used to deliver highly accurate nuclear munitions with both large and small yields. And these forces must be effective against a broad spectrum of targets, including small hardened targets" (Note 15) ("Department of Defense Annual Report F.Y. 1979" p 59).

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In 1977 and 1978 studies appeared--including on the official level--which considered the possibility and advisability of switching to a new "counterforce" strategic concept in view of the improvements in accuracy (Note 16) (Official studies of the "counterforce" concept include the following: "Planning U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces for the Nineteen Eighties," Washington 1978; "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces. Deterrence Policies and Procurement Issues," Washington 1977; "Retaliatory Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces," Washington 1978; "Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces," Washington 1978 (all are publications of the Congressional Budget Office). Newspapers and journals published articles urging the need to revise all the conceptual postulates of American strategy. "... There is a critical need to revise American Strategic and doctrinal concepts," the prestigious journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS said in one article on this theme, for instance. Moreover, it transpired that the revision "has already been started, is being analyzed in detail and is being carried out by the U.S. Defense Department" (Note 17) (FOREIGN AFFAIRS April 1978 p 562).

However, it is acknowledged that the most intensive debate over strategic problems developed in the United States in 1979. This is largely explained by the fact that that was the year of the start of the extensive SALT II debate in the United States during which vital questions of nuclear strategy were broached, and as a result 1979 became, as American academic (C. Grey) predicted, "the year of the most intense debate over fundamental doctrinal problems since the wrongly predicted 'missile gap' between the USSR and the United States of 1959-1960" (Note 18) (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 1979 p 54).

Two "schools," two directions of strategic thinking in the United States emerged during the discussion. One of them continues to subscribe to the former concept of "assured destruction" (that is, "deterrence through punishment") whereas the other "school" sees effective warfare as the "center of deterrence" (Note 19) (ibid p 73). and, (C. Grey) believes, there are not consistent adherents of the former concept of "assured destruction" among the American military (Note 20) (ibid p 72). For the first time in many years supporters of this "school" are now speaking openly of the need to devise a concept envisaging not "deterrence" but fighting and winning a nuclear war.

The ideas of the second trend are presented in their most concentrated form in the book by Lt Gen D. Graham, former director of the U.S. Defense Department Military [as published] Intelligence Agency, bearing the pretentious title "Shall America Be Defended?" here are some of the most typical remarks: "Many 'outsiders' (he is referring to himself and those like him--that is, people who currently hold no official position--M.M.) believe that ... America can and must be defended. Moreover, they believe that unless the United States is prepared for war, for survival and victory in a nuclear war, the Soviet Union, fearing nothing, will start such a war." "In order to gain access to efficient...counterforce weapons and to active and passive defense, the United States in 1980 will have to conclude that war is possible and preparations for fighting that war must be begun" (Note 21) (D. Graham. "Shall America Be Defended? SALT II and Beyond." New York 1979 pp 9, 240).

These remarks show just how dangerous a direction current American military thinking is moving in, and all the evidence is that they are typical not just of "outsiders" but of those responsible for devising U.S. military strategy. "The Carter administration," the New York TIMES wrote recently, "has revised its strategy for deterring nuclear war and has adopted a concept envisaging the availability of strategic forces capable of hitting Soviet military targets on a large scale, with the simultaneous capacity for a retaliatory countercity strike" (Note 22) (The New York TIMES 10 February 1979). The newspaper adds that the new strategy, the result of months of debate in the Pentagon, represents a significant departure from the concept of nuclear deterrence long regarded as officially recognized, which envisaged a retaliatory strike against cities.

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In his report to Congress on the fiscal 1981 military budget Defense Secretary H. Brown admits that the Pentagon "recently completed a radical revision of American strategic policy" (Note 23) ("Department of Defense Annual Report F.Y. 1981" Washington 1980 p 66). The name of the new strategy might be provisionally translated from the English as "compensated" or "balanced strategy" (Note 24) (in English: "countervailing strategy" (op cit p 65). What is meant is that American nuclear strategy envisages various versions of or scenarios for nuclear war and that, in contrast with the past, the United States must have the nuclear potential not just to hit cities and industrial targets. "Therefore we must," H. Brown declares, "have plans for delivering strikes that would create a more serious threat than strikes against Soviet industry and cities. These plans must include delivering strikes against targets constituting the military and political structure of the USSR..." (Note 25) (op cit p 66).

So it is obvious that the United States is moving toward adopting the "counterforce" concept, which will receive further development and material support in the eighties, as the fundamental concept for the use of strategic forces. At the same time its adoption also means that the possibility and acceptability of nuclear war are being acknowledged at official level. It is no accident that the U.S. defense secretary's annual report to Congress says that the "U.S. and NATO strategy takes into account the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons, if this should prove necessary." It is stressed here that high combat readiness must be maintained not only for defense purposes, but also to "mount offensive operations" (Note 26) ("Department of Defense Annual Report F.Y. 1980," Washington 1979 pp 86, 112).

The new concept envisaging the use of strategic offensive forces mainly against military targets can in essence potentially be regarded as the concept for a first--that is, disarming--strike, since the constant striving to increase accuracy and the adoption of invulnerable mobile systems lead to the material support of the concept. Those are certain trends--and extremely dangerous ones--in the development of current strategic thinking in the United States.

In highlighting other characteristic features of present-day American military doctrine one cannot help noting that in essence the United States has returned to the "pre-Vietnam" strategic concept of using its armed forces outside their American Continent as a world policeman and is creating a large grouping of armed forces to implement this concept. One would think that the Vietnam war, which was unleashed by the United States and which cost it a huge number of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, ought to have provided plenty of lessons, especially for those who plan military and foreign policy in Washington. But it is less than 5 years since this shameful war for the United States ended, and despite the lessons of Vietnam these people are again seeking to control the course of world events exclusively by military means and to implement a "position of strength" policy by claiming the role of international policeman.

To all appearances, the only lesson certain figures in the United States would like to derive from the Vietnam war is to learn to ensure that armed interference is not as protracted as it was in Vietnam. Gen A. Goodpaster, former NATO supreme allied commander, and S. Huntington, former National Security Council staffer who took part in planning U.S. foreign policy measures, wrote in their book "Civil-Military Relations": "The next Vietnam will most likely last 7 weeks, not 7 years.... The United States will use overwhelming forces to achieve its aims rapidly and resolutely. The emphasis will be on limiting the means" (Note 27) (A. Goodpaster and S. Huntington. "Civil-Military Relations," Washington 1977 pp 21-22).

There is more. Washington's present military doctrine devotes special attention to creating so-called "quick-reaction forces" for interventionist operations in regions where there are no military blocs of which the United States is a member. In other words, we are talking about mobile forces for armed interference in the internal affairs of other countries, especially Near Eastern, Asian and Latin American countries.

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And the Pentagon's plans to form these forces were learned of back in August 1977--that is, long before the seizure of the American hostages in Tehran and the Afghan events.

The President's 1980 "State of the Union" Message to Congress says this about these forces: "We will systematically enhance our ability to respond rapidly to emergencies outside the NATO sphere wherever required by our commitments or when our vital interests are threatened. The rapid deployment forces we are assembling will be extraordinarily flexible: They could range in size from a few ships or air squadrons to formations numbering 100,000 men, together with the requisite supporting subunits. Our forces will be prepared for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance" (Note 28) (the Washington POST 23 January 1980).

These forces' primary task is to strengthen U.S. positions in the Persian Gulf. They will reportedly be based on units of the 1st and 3d Marine divisions, and also the 2d and 101st Airborne divisions (Note 29) (TIME 4 February 1980 p 9). The forces will be supported by 16 special floating bases. It is planned that these floating bases, with reserves of heavy armaments and ammunition on board, could be anchored in strategically important ports abroad to await the airlifting of troops from the United States in the event of "emergencies." At the same time it is planned to buy, to supplement the existing aircraft fleet, about 50 of the latest CX transport aircraft, designed to transport tanks and other heavy armaments over great distances. At present the aircraft fleet is based on 77 C-5A transport planes produced by the Lockheed Corporation. Each such airplane is capable of transporting two tanks. The forces' composition and support are being planned with the intention that they should be able to conduct combat operations for 60 days without reinforcements or resupply in theaters remote from the United States (for instance, in the Near East). According to preliminary estimates, the total cost of these forces will be \$10 billion.

According to the Baltimore SUN for 6 February 1980, the formations the Pentagon is planning to transfer to bases in the Near East primarily include the following: 1 or 2 fighter squadrons; a battalion of the 82d Airborne Division (1,000 men), a marine battalion (1,300 men), a marine landing detachment (2,200 men), a marine landing group (10,000-12,000 men), a ground forces mechanized brigade (8,000 men), 54 tanks and 126 armored personnel carriers. According to Pentagon calculations, the transfer of all these forces may take anything from a few days to a fortnight; in addition to this, the same newspaper reports, the Pentagon has elaborated plans and scenarios for using tactical nuclear weapons "in regions other than NATO's sphere."

It is not hard to guess just which regions are meant. It is well known that J. Carter's administration singles out three extremely important regions of the world--West Europe, the Far and Near East, and the Persian Gulf--as regions in which the United States has "vital interests" and which it intends to "defend," should it be deemed necessary, by employing military force, tactical nuclear weapons included. The American press has also disclosed a secret Pentagon report envisaging the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons "in the event of an invasion of Iran" (Note 30) (The Chicago TRIBUNE 9 February 1980).

Thus Washington has gone considerably further in planning the use of tactical nuclear weapons than in the "pre-Vietnam period" and is promising pretty lavishly and recklessly to use nuclear weapons on foreign territories without considering the consequences of such a move for the United States itself.

Nor can one fail to mention that Washington is changing its policy on armed forces manning levels and is taking measures for a gradual return to compulsory military service. Those are certain characteristic features of present-day U.S. military doctrine and military policy. What is the explanation of the sharp intensification of the most extreme trends in U.S. military policy and what aims is the United States pursuing in steering this course?

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The formal pretext and, as it were, the cover for all these measures is the myth of the "Soviet military threat," which is widely fueled and circulated in the country by every available means. Thus the building of the military budget is justified chiefly by the claim that the Soviet Union is constantly increasing its military spending. In actual fact the Soviet Union has not increased its defense spending, and this year even reduced it, confining its defense budget to the interests of security alone. The decision to expedite the development and deployment of the new MX mobile missile is being justified, in particular, by the claim that the Soviet Union, by improving its heavy missiles, is acquiring a first-strike potential and therefore the U.S. land-based missiles are becoming vulnerable. However, it is well known--and the Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated this--that the USSR is opposed to the concept of a "first strike" and does not seek to acquire the potential for such a strike. It was also on the pretext of the "Soviet military threat" and under U.S. pressure that NATO took the decision to produce medium-range missiles and deploy them in West Europe. Therefore the "Soviet military threat" myth is used extensively, constantly and at every level as the main motif to justify the measures and actions envisaged recently by U.S. military doctrine and military policy.

The real reasons for the new and more dangerous trends in U.S. military doctrine and military policy lie elsewhere. They are determined above all by the serious change toward a policy of diktat and expansionism in the U.S. foreign policy course as a whole. There is a sharp turn toward militarization, whereby it is proposed to achieve any foreign policy solution merely by means of military force--the threat or actual use of force. In an interview with CBS-TV G. Kennan, former American ambassador to the USSR, stressed in this connection: An extremely disturbing phenomenon can now be observed in the United States, which could be defined as a kind of "militarization of thought" that finds expression in the fact that administration strategists are approaching every aspect of Soviet-American relations with a military yardstick.

And the United States is using this yardstick in approaching not only Soviet-American relations, but also relations with many other countries, American-Iranian relations included. The circles prevailing in the sphere of military policy in the United States are those representing chiefly the interests of militarism and the military-industrial complex, which have long militated for a sharp buildup of American military might and have always sought opportunities to break out of the state of equality, hoping to establish military superiority over the Soviet Union with the aid of further spurts in the arms race and the retardation of arms limitation talks.

Thus it is a matter of attempts to gain the opportunity in the military sphere to pursue a "position of strength" policy on both a regional and global scale on the basis of military superiority.

A certain role has been played here by the interests of the election campaign. To please rightwing circles, J. Carter is fueling war hysteria in the country so as to avoid accusations from the right that he is "disregarding U.S. national interests and security." Historical experience shows that on the threshold of presidential elections the country's politicians cannot avoid the temptation to make political capital out of the temporary and largely unjustified sentiments of certain circles in the country by acting counter to national interests. It is also certain that the "Soviet military threat" myth has been malevolently exploited by U.S. aggressive circles to pressure Congress to accept new military programs.

A special danger is represented by the trends in U.S. military doctrine aimed at acquiring a "counterforce" potential, at elaborating new views regarding the use of nuclear missile weapons and at adopting highly accurate and mobile nuclear missile systems.

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The dangerousness of the aforementioned trends is further increased by the dissemination in the United States of ideas of the acceptability of nuclear war and the possibility of winning such a war. Under these conditions it is not impossible that some people in the United States might be tempted to switch overtly or covertly to the concept of a disarming first strike.

At the same time many sober-minded politicians in Washington are well aware that a new surge in the arms race will add nothing to the safeguarding of U.S. security, whatever the pretext on which it is carried out, and they believe that any attempts to secure military superiority can only destabilize the situation and sharply increase the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. They realize that there is no further rational path in the arms race and that the "common interests that initially prompted the course of detente are now just as real as they were before." A unilateral weapons buildup, no matter how all-embracing, no matter what astronomical amounts [razmery] it takes, will never ensure U.S. national security" (Note 31) (The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 11 February 1980). The extent of these circles' influence can be judged only from Washington's future policy, taking into account the fact that the balance of forces in the United States between aggressive militarist forces and the forces of realism and restraint is extremely complex and often changes not in the latter's favor.

HEARING INVESTIGATES SOVIET ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY

ID160921 London THE GUARDIAN in English 16 May 80 p 5--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Michael Simmons report: "Russian Embassy Snubs Hearing"]

[Excerpt] A group of exiled Soviet dissidents, lawyers and some distinguished psychiatrists met at Westminster Central Hall yesterday to investigate the use of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. Invitations to the Soviet Embassy were not accepted.

The public hearing investigated, in his absence, the activities of an unemployed Soviet computer scientist Vyacheslav Bakhmin. The findings will be collated by observers, translated into Russian and sent to the Moscow City procurator, in the hope they will be used as evidence at any hearing against Mr Bakhmin.

Mr Bakhmin was arrested in February, after 18 months as chief co-ordinator and convenor of the working commission to investigate the use of psychiatry for political purposes in Moscow. The findings of yesterday's meeting are likely to fall on deaf ears in the Soviet Union.

In a letter to THE GUARDIAN, the praesidium of the all-union society of neurologists and psychiatrists wrote in 1973 that "insane persons may inflict damage on themselves or the people around them, and urgent hospitalization is a way of preventing socially dangerous actions on their part."

But people have been detained in Soviet "special" or "ordinary" psychiatric hospitals, and given courses of treatment, including potent drugs, which Mr Bakhmin and his commission colleagues see as a punitive abuse of psychiatry.

A key witness yesterday was Mr Aleksandr Voloshanovich, aged 38, a dissident who left the Soviet Union in February.

Mr Voloshanovich became dissatisfied after examining a Soviet worker who had been sent to a hospital for treatment after quarrelling with his management.

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