

TAPE 36  
Side A, 1/16 -  $\frac{1}{8}$   $\frac{2}{16}$

15 January 1979

REMINDER MEMO

25X1            Talk to  about the desirability of taking some trends  
implications to the meetings with Brown and Vance, e.g., both of them  
asked where we are going in Iran. Not next week, but next month.

Ironically, the 40 Committee's first approval of support for the FNLA and its rejection of \$100,000 in aid to UNITA came only eight days before Angola's transitional government, made up of all three parties and the Portuguese, was installed on January 30, 1975. Marcum speculates that the 40 Committee, when it refused to help UNITA, was "apparently moved by past connections and habits to think in terms of 'our team' and 'theirs.'" Our decision not to aid Savimbi's UNITA when his movement was militarily almost helpless assured its later defeat. As long as Washington believed it had a winner in the FNLA, UNITA could be dropped. That view of UNITA prevailed until mid-July when the FNLA began to look like a paper tiger. Then the 40 Committee approved the first grant of military aid to Savimbi's party. The CIA knew that the outmoded arms sent to UNITA could not prevent its defeat; it nevertheless thought these weapons would at least make the MPLA's eventual victory more costly.

Here Stockwell makes one of his grimmest revelations—that the US deliberately pursued a "no-win" policy in Angola. Colby, he writes, advised the National Security Council in July 1975 that "the CIA would have to spend \$100 million to be sure of winning in Angola, and a \$100-million program would be too big to keep secret." Stockwell asked a superior what he was expected to do with the mere \$14 million the CIA was supposed to give Roberto and Savimbi. He was told: "the best we can. The 40 Committee paper reads that we are to prevent an easy victory by Soviet-backed forces in Angola." Later, reflecting on a CIA memo to Colby which spelled out the "no-win" policy and stated the objective of avoiding "a cheap Neto victory," Stockwell writes: "I wondered what 'cheap' meant. Would it be measured in dollars or in African lives?"

Henry Kissinger told a news conference in Brussels in December 1975 that "the United States favors a solution in which all of the parties in Angola can negotiate with each other free of outside interference and in which the problem of Angola is handled as an African issue." But in fact the CIA had been interfering, and with destructive effects. When Stockwell met with Savimbi in Angola in late August 1975, the UNITA leader suggested repeatedly "that the ultimate hope for Angola still lay at the conference table rather than on the battlefield."

Apparently following this line of thought, Savimbi is reported to have sent representatives to meet in Lisbon with MPLA leaders in late August. Portuguese newspapers speculated about an alliance between the MPLA and UNITA. On August 29, informed political journalists in Lisbon wrote that the MPLA and UNITA had agreed to a cease-fire and their reports were not denied. In September, the CIA reported to Washington on Savimbi's "feelers to the MPLA for a negotiated solution." This immediately prompted headquarters to send a CIA station officer from Zaire into Angola to tell the UNITA leader that, as Stockwell puts it, "We wanted no 'soft' allies in our war against the MPLA." This, Stockwell writes, was the last opportunity for UNITA and the MPLA to negotiate with each other free from outside interference. Instead they met on the battlefield, aided respectively by South Africans and the Cubans, and UNITA, as the CIA had foreseen, was defeated.

Marcum presents considerable evidence suggesting that a UNITA-MPLA alliance would have been more workable than the short-lived UNITA-FNLA alliance at the end of the war. Whether UNITA and MPLA could in fact have agreed to work together in September 1975 if the CIA had not discouraged Savimbi, no one can say. But had such an alliance been allowed to emerge without the CIA or Soviet Union undermining it, Angola would be a very different and less troubled country today. The estrangement and resistance of UNITA's supporters are still among the main problems facing the Neto government.

Superficially, the no-win policy had been "successful," for the MPLA's victory was far from cheap. It "cost" the Russians between \$300 million and \$400 million in military assistance; tens of thousands of Angolans died. Obviously the victory was far more expensive for Angola than for either the US or the USSR. The cost in lives would have been considerably greater—without changing the outcome—the Congress had not rejected the administration's request for an additional \$28 million for Angola in December 1975.

Congress's vote against CIA funds for Angola created the impression that Congress had finally succeeded in gaining control over the CIA's activities, and that the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, passed in 1974 to exert congressional control over the Agency, was working effectively. Most congressmen probably believed that it was no longer possible for the US to become involved clandestinely

Angola showed that they were wrong. The 40 Committee's first approval of CIA assistance for the FNLA in January 1975 came only one month after the Hughes-Ryan Amendment was passed in December 1974. Yet the first briefing of a congressman on the CIA's actions did not take place until July 25—half a year later. Almost two weeks before the briefings began, the 40 Committee had approved an additional \$14 million for the CIA's Angolan operation; thereby drawing the US further into the civil war. The timing of the briefings illustrates a major weakness in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which does not require congressional approval of CIA operations, only that Congress be informed. The Angolan operation also showed that the amendment does not oblige the CIA to be complete or even accurate when it briefs congressmen. Colby told Senator Clark neither that the CIA had been assisting the FNLA before July 1975 nor that it was also aiding UNITA. Before Clark left for southern Africa, Colby told him "no American arms would be sent into Angola."

The Agency, as Stockwell observed, also went to extraordinary lengths to hide the truth from Clark during his fact-finding trip to Angola and Zaire in August 1975. Clark was scheduled to meet with Mobutu, Roberto, Savimbi, and Neto. Concerned that he would discover the full extent of its operations on his trip, CIA headquarters cabled the Kinshasa station chief to prepare Roberto and Mobutu for their meetings with the senator. Stockwell asked his CIA colleagues whether they thought they could get away with "coaching African politicians before they met with one of our senators." A fellow officer told him, "Clark shouldn't waste our taxpayers' money on such a trip... you couldn't trust senators any further than you could throw them."

Clark returned from his August trip convinced that American involvement was a mistake; he immediately put this view to Colby, who simply replied that he disagreed. Frustrated, Clark concluded that the Hughes-Ryan Amendment provided "for nothing more than an ex-post-facto communication to Congress of decisions already reached... [with] no provision for advice or consent." Classified briefings, he said, "actually become an impediment to effective oversight." Once he had been briefed by the CIA, Clark, the senator best informed about Angola, could no longer question government witnesses appearing before his committee about sensitive matters. Nor could he take part in the public debate because, as he was now muzzled

Tape: DCI-17  
Side: A  
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15 JAN 1979

REMINDER MEMO: Call Dick Stolz about Ambassador Joseph

15 JAN 1979

GRAPHICS

2 PDB items - facing

List of issues

2 all-purpose strategic curves -- following

CHINA ISSUE

Last fall Bob Bowie briefed on China's economy. Since then Deng has opened things up even more--foreign credits pseudo-joint ventures, etc.

We believe Chinese may seriously underestimate effort and time scale to develop their country.

Opens up questions of where west expects China to fit into international order.

Credit is easy today because everyone excited at prospective market--but where will Chinese products be marketed in due course? Could generate substantial shift in world trade pattern.

How much credit today that won't pay off 5-10 years if all goes well. How much military technology to fuel one side of Sino-Soviet tensions.

Do other Western leaders share such concerns? Are there discussions yet on how to accommodate both PRC & USSR?

Will we be able, willing, to attempt to encourage some-overall discipline with respect to how China is brought back into world community?

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SECRET

PRES BRIEF - Intro

We talked two months ago about problem of my trying to keep abreast policy concerns and prospective decisions so as to provide intell support - and problem of gaining intelligence feedback from policy discussions with foreigners.

Problem aggravated by need for intense secrecy

e.g., none of us in intell knew impending move toward PRC -- did not analyze potential impact

You suggested we take 15 min. from a briefing to have discussion Like to do today -- brought Frank and Bob.

Like get feel what your concerns are--

What policy issues contemplating--not necessarily how going solve.

Start with review what provided in PDB over past year.

Move from there to discussion--problem areas which we think important because they are not only immediate issues but matters of long-term import.

We'll between us give few ideas why we think these issues are important.

Hope can discuss whether you share our attitudes or have other info or other concerns.

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