

REMINDER MEMORANDUM

3 Oct 79

Follow up on your conversation with Admiral Davies.

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3 Sep 79

1. When did we get the first HUMINT reports using the word "brigade?"
2. Why did the Soviets decide to emphasize 17 years? At least if our analysis is anywhere near correct, there really has been some change in this 17 year period.
3. Should we continue a major analytic push on when the brigade became combat?

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DCI
3 Oct 79

cc: Dr. Brzezinski
Bruce Clarke

NID IN PERSPECTIVE

I. Leaks and the NID

- A. Share your concern about leaks
- B. Two issues
 - Leaks of security info
 - Premature leaks of politically sensitive data
- C. My memo to you of 25 September detailed NID distribution, criteria for NID items, and classification of NID material.

II. Value of NID

- A. We could reduce distribution and content, but:
 - We would pay a price in a less well-informed Administration with increased risk of people working at cross purposes.
 - It would raise questions about the credibility of the NID and the impact of political considerations in CIA publications.
- B. Appropriate distribution on the Hill is not only useful, but necessary:
 - The Congress demands to be kept informed
 - The creation of Intelligence Committees has heightened these demands
 - The NID covers this requirement to a large extent and is particularly valuable as a document of record

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
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- Without it would would have to provide the Congress some alternative service.

° Several years ago Agency tried to withhold NID and provide a substitute publication ("The Congressional Checklist") but this created distrust, increased demands for the NID.

III. NID's record

- A. Very likely have been leaks of security info, but by no means worst offender
- B. Leaks of politically sensitive data - record is impeccable - 25X1



In short, any system to prevent premature publication of sensitive material depends on a clearance procedure with NSC or State, and such has been followed by the NID

IV. Focus on NID alone won't solve problem

- A. Leakers have ample access to sensitive data without relying on the NID

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- Defense, NSA, and State each produce current intelligence publications that are disseminated outside their organizations;
DIA's goes to the Hill.
- Restrictions on the dissemination of sensitive info, to be effective, would have to extend down to raw intelligence.

B. Three generic sources of leaks:

1. Capitol Hill

- NID seen by eight committees--usually only read by staff, who then alert members
- Info flows directly to the Hill from various intelligence agencies on subjects of political sensitivity; sometimes in routine distributions; sometimes in response to requests.
- DCI authorities presently inadequate to control

2. Executive Branch

- Most leaks are for political purposes, i.e., to sell some policy or program. Such program sponsors are in DoD, State and NSC generally, but others, including CIA, also play a role. The info for most such leaks is readily available from within DoD, State and the NSC.

3. Officials, authorized and unauthorized, who give background briefings.

- The bulk of the politically sensitive leaks, e.g., PRC meetings, are not of intelligence, but of policy

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matters and come from backgrounders (I believe), not from malicious people. Many of the serious intelligence leaks are incidental to such policy leaks.

V. Can we reduce "sensitivity" of NID?

Yes--but to a rather limited extent

-- Sensitivity is not easily controlled by classification.

- Clearly TS is usually more sensitive than Confidential, but the line almost stops there. Codewords are generally to protect the source, not the substance. Curtailing content of the NID to "lesser" codewords may protect some intelligence sources, but not have much impact on the sensitivity of the content.

VI. Recommendations

1. Review distribution of NID and of DoD and State finished intelligence publications as well. Establish a policy for distribution, e.g., Assistant Secretary level and above.

Note: Will require some NSC support to DCI

2. Review distribution of raw intelligence to other than DIA, NFAC and INR who normally process into intelligence products.

Note: White House would have to be included.

3. As suggested, ask NID and INR and DIA recipients to propose sequential sharing of publications.

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4. Presidential support for new system which will reduce volume of codeword material and establish a very restricted category for very sensitive material.

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