


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4 October 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, 3 October 1979



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2. We talked about the budget. He indicated there is strong resistance to a supplemental, but at the meeting tomorrow we will have to decide whether to recommend reopening the issue. If we are to reopen it, it will have to be on the grounds of impact on SALT.

I described my concept of how to get the FY 81 budget put together for a November submission to the Congress. He thought it was a sound plan but again would hinge on whether the SCC would in effect endorse it -- the importance of doing it this way for SALT. (S)

3. I thanked him for the assistance to [redacted] (U)

25X1

4. He indicated that he had not sat in on the [redacted] meetings enough to have good MEMCONS on it. Keep this on my agenda for State. (C)

25X1


5. I arranged to read the Dobrynin-Vance and Gromyko-Vance MEMCONS in Bob Gates' office. [redacted] can have such access also if he calls Bob and arranges to go down and read them. (S)

25X1

6. He indicated, upon my inquiry, that he would send me a memorandum of record of his conversations with [redacted]

25X1

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED



*Sensitive items contained
in 2 separate approved files
"OCI Eyes Only"*

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7. We talked about the evidence of a nuclear detonation. I suggested that a public announcement now might be better than after a leak. He indicated, because of the criticism of the premature announcement on Cuba, perhaps we should hold off even at the risk of a leak. (DDCI)

I indicated my preference for going to the Soviets enough prior to any public announcement, before or after a leak, to probe as to whether they have confirmatory evidence. He thought this was a good point. He requested that our representative on Henry Owens' Working Group transmit that concept to Henry in advance of another mini-SCC meeting on that subject. (Bruce Clarke) (TS)

[Redacted]

25X1

9. I gave him a copy of the predicted SSCI position to be delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 10th. (C)

[Redacted]

25X1

11. I gave him a chart on Soviet economic assistance to Cuba and how it has grown over the years. We talked about ways to increase the US propaganda capability for publicizing such events. He thought it would be very difficult to get VOA to fall off its insistence that it has to be otherwise published information before they will broadcast it. (S)

12. I informed him that we were going ahead with the [Redacted] program. (S)

25X1

13. I did not cover the PLO issue as [Redacted] had done it earlier. (S) 25X1

14. I did not cover the [Redacted] issue because I had covered it with the President and Brzezinski. (S)

25X1

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

TOP SECRET

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25X1

18. I delivered the talking paper on the NID. He reacted negatively. He feels we must immediately put out some directives that by a certain date the percentage of sensitive items in the NID will be reduced by "x" percent and that because the sensitive items are being deleted, the distribution will not be changed but there will be supplementary hand-delivery distribution on a need-to-know basis for the sensitive material that was withdrawn from the general publication.


After some period of discussion, I believe I have gained his recognition that while one could do that to the NID, it wouldn't come close to solving the problem. Producing the DINSUM reports on the Cuban brigade of 29 August and later, and pointing out they went to 276 addressees, including Capitol Hill, was a help here. (Unfortunately, I didn't get to read the DINSUMs in advance. I didn't recognize that I had them in my folder until I was talking with Dr. Brzezinski--I would like to see them and read them.)

Dr. Brzezinski didn't want to get involved in a jurisdictional battle between ourselves and DIA and INR and NSA. I pointed out to them that I had the authority to control dissemination under the Executive Order, but needed support from the NSC in how we are going to try to exercise that authority. That's what I was suggesting.

He indicated he would have someone on his staff work with Bruce Clarke on the issue. (S)

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


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19. I delivered both [redacted] talking points to me and his draft memorandum for Presidential signature. Brzezinski felt that a new committee might attract more attention. Perhaps we would call it the SCC(S-Special). I said that was fine with me. Maybe we could call it the SCC(SRC). (S)

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