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DRAFT ITEM FOR NOTES FROM THE DIRECTORQUESTIONS ABOUT SECURITY LEAKS

I continue to be asked questions about security leaks. This indicates the concern all of us have over the damage being done to the country's intelligence capabilities and security by the continuing flow of leaks. Because this is a matter of concern for each of us, I would like to address some of the recurring questions that I receive.

One of these is: "Who leaks? Is it us? The Defense Department? State? <sup>The</sup> Congress?" In my opinion, there is no evidence that any particular organization leaks more than any other. I believe that nearly all recipients of classified information leak to some degree. Perhaps at one time or on one subject a particular department or agency will be the guilty party, but over the long run evidence is lacking to show that any particular organization is more guilty than any other. Leaks, however, can be broken into two categories--those as a result of carelessness and those which are deliberate.

Carelessness. One form of carelessness is failure to comply with the prescribed rules for handling classified material. Shortcuts such as "talking around a problem" or "doubletalking" on an unclassified telephone, failure to keep classified material under required control, or not ensuring that everyone privy to a conversation has the

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22 Oct 79*

requisite clearances all can contribute to leaks. Each such breach of procedure may have only a small probability of leading to an actual leak, but cumulatively they are the source of a great deal of our problems. Another form of carelessness that results in loss of important information is vulnerability to entrapment. This is particularly true in dealings with members of the media. The standard ploy is for a member of the media to pretend that he knows the whole of some story and then get you to flesh it out for him. Good journalists try these ploys repeatedly until they have pieced together what should be highly classified material. All too often we are entrapped because we want to feel important.

Deliberateness. Espionage is, of course, the most pernicious type of deliberate disclosure in an unauthorized way. Beyond that, there are individuals who deliberately leak classified information in order to influence events or policy formulation. Sometimes they are giving official background briefings which transcend what they are authorized to say. Sometimes they feel the only way to further some program or policy is to bring the pressure of the media to bear through leaking classified information to the public. With deliberate leaks it is possible to deduce that there are more likely motives for a particular agency or department or the Congress to leak than some other, depending on what policy or program appears to be at stake. That does not mean,

however, that any particular organization is more likely to be the source of a leak than another or that we can place the blame for the problem of leaks on someone else. It is my strong conviction that the only way we will correct the problem in the long run is for each of us to start with his own office and attempt to improve security where we each work. Instead, if we each blame it on the Congress, or the White House, or the Defense Department or anyone else and stop looking for ways to make our own operations more secure, we will never improve.

Another question that frequently crops up is: "Isn't it more difficult today for CIA employees to adhere to the rules of security since we have a policy of greater openness with the public?" Some people feel that it was easier for us when we just didn't talk at all about our work.

In my view, it is no more difficult today for each of us to observe proper security than it ever was. In point of fact, there never was a time when nothing was unclassified or when we did not talk about our work at all. It has been many years, for instance, since the government instituted the policy of deliberate periodic downgrading of classified information to unclassified. All along we each have had to be acutely aware of the distinction between what is classified and what is unclassified. Today in public we still don't talk about classified material. This applies whether it is classified "Confidential" or "Top Secret."

Sometimes I am asked: "How can you distinguish between what is 'sensitive' and what is not?" In point of fact, the term "sensitive" has no meaning in our security structure and we should never be fooled into thinking that because someone judges a piece of classified information as not being sensitive it can in fact be discussed in public.

What is different today than in the past is that the public and the media are much more interested in our activities and much more persevering in looking into them than ever before. This is not something which we can control; it is not something that is likely to go away. The only thing that we can control is how we respond to these probings. The rules which govern Agency employees in dealing with the media have not changed one whit. CIA employees simply do not deal with the media unless they are specifically authorized to do so by the Office of Public Affairs. Of course, there is no way we can or would want to rule out social contact between our employees and members of the media. Here, however, is where entrapment is a particular problem. What appears to be an innocent social conversation can quickly turn into deft probing by a member of the media. Our rules, however, are that CIA employees do not answer phone calls or have meetings with members of the media on matters of intelligence unless they are specifically authorized.

In sum, our openness has always been a controlled openness bounded carefully by who is authorized to deal with the media; bounded by a firm

dividing line between anything that is classified and what may be discussed in an open forum; and bounded by careful adherence to all of the established security procedures. Nothing has changed these boundaries. Each one of us needs to observe them.

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