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Thank you all for being here. I thought I owed it to you to give a little explanation of how we got here, and how this all started not quite two years ago.

Actually, it started before the Kampiles case, but that was an important catalyst in bringing this subject to the fore in the Intelligence Community. It actually started at a retreat that I held with the leaders of the Intelligence Community, where we talked about the problem of security and the example of Kampiles, and leaks in general. When the codeword system came up, I went around the room and asked for an explanation of a list of codewords I brought with me and which I did not understand. I found that even the leaders of the Intelligence Community couldn't explain what each of them was intended to achieve. That was embarrassing, but it made us feel, as a group, that we had a system here that had just grown up over four decades and, quite understandably, had grown in different sequences as the different systems had come on the line.

There were separate systems, they were uncoordinated, they sometimes had conflicting or at least different instructions. There were instructions that particularly hurt people where there were multiple disciplines involved and particularly in industry--when a contractor had contracts with different programs that operated under different, compartmented, control systems. It also had the feature that more and more of our material was gravitating into the

compartments. So we resolved to try to study whether something could be done.

We had two objectives in mind. The primary and the foremost one was to increase security. But, almost equally important was to make access to material that was then compartmented more available where it was proper to do so, with less encumbrances.

I asked retired General John Voght, United States Air Force, to come and give us some help. I knew him as an individual with deep experience in these areas. As someone who, because he was a senior operational commander before he retired from the Air Force, could well represent the operational side of the house and the need for access to the kind of valuable information we produce in the compartmented categories. But, also someone who had a deep understanding of the need for preserving our secrets where they had to be preserved. He used the old studies that had been done--the Pettibone study, the Taylor study, the Cook study. With a very short deadline, he came up with an outline of much of what we have today. His objective was to simplify, if it could possibly be done, to get uniform standards and measures and rules and procedures, to downgrade or declassify as much as was compatible with preserving our sources and methods, to strengthen the need-to-know principle in the system and, overall, to protect what really are the true secrets.

My response to what he did was very favorable. I turned it over to an NFIB Working Group which tried to get total unanimity in our wide Community on the report and how to go about it. Clearly, the NFIB

Working Group did make some very substantial changes and improvements because they represented the view of those who really were going to put the new system to work. As a result of their very fine effort, we have a single Community-wide system here. It does provide for more dissemination to the consumers, but it also provides for tighter control of what really needs to be controlled.

We try to control what needs to be controlled in two principal ways. We have created operational compartments which really are not much different than the existing plethora of compartments that we have today. They are needed to protect the technical methods by which we collect intelligence information. It is important, however, that not as many people know the details of those systems as in the past. The Kampiles case again being a prime example of a document which contained far more technical information about the workings of a technical system than was necessary for the people in the operations center where Kampiles was located, for instance, to use. We have, however, recognized

We have, however, recognized that analysts do need an interface with the collectors. That is a critical point in our intelligence efforts. Therefore, we have created an operational subcompartment category where a limited number of analysts' supervisors will have access to a limited amount of the operational technical details on these collection systems. So, in that one sense, we are trying to close down access that is not needed to the details of our operational systems which, if spewed out as they were by Kampiles, would cost this country billions of dollars and, perhaps, our security.

We are also creating what is known as the ROYAL category in APEX in which a very limited number of extremely sensitive content data will be set aside. We do not have the final procedures for establishing what is in ROYAL and what is not in ROYAL ironed out at this point, but we are very close to it. There will be tight controls on what can be put into this category so that it does not grow out of all bounds. These will be the real exclusives; those few pieces of information which provide our policymakers a real advantage if the other side does not know that we know them.

The bulk of APEX material will be in the four product compartments: Technical, Humint, Comint and Imagery. But even here, we are looking toward a major decompartmentation effort which has already been established within the rules of APEX. Under certain categories, this will take what now is codeword material and move it down into the genser categories. Let me emphasize here that we are not talking about declassifying. We are talking about respecting the classification of CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET as they should be, and moving into them what we can if it will not jeopardize the technical methods of collecting this information, or Humint sources. By moving more information into these categories, more people can have access to it and do something useful with it for the country. We hope this will reduce the volume of compartmentation, which will be an important step for security. When everything is overclassified we have a disregard, a disdain for classification, and we do not pay as much attention to the details of handling and caring for that information that we should. So

the decompartmentation effort to reduce the quantity of material in these four APEX codeword compartments is a very important element of this program.

Making more information available in the SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, TOP SECRET categories is of particular importance to the military. A great deal has been done in the last three to four years to try to make the national collection systems available to the military commander. There is still a great distance to be covered for these systems to have real potential for helping the military commander to do things that he just cannot do with his own tactical systems. In some cases there is an overlap. Understandably, there should be. But, there are capabilities well behind the front lines, in particular, where our national systems can provide almost critical support to the military commander. Getting this to the point where it can be managed and handled in a timely manner is going to be of great importance to the military commander. So we hope in this effort to decompartment, to find the important judgment lines between what, if it does get out--which it should not even from TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL--will do serious harm, and what will not.

Overall then, we hope for better security within the four major compartments of APEX and the operational compartments and the ROYAL compartment. We hope, because volume will be reduced, that there will be fewer resources needed and there would be a greater economy of effort in the whole program. That does not help you as you sit here today because there is going to be a great deal of additional effort required to get started. How you undertake that, how you indoctrinate, train those

who are going to make this system work in your departments and agencies will be absolutely critical to the success of this program.

But it is much more than that. It is critical to the country. We have made a very important and a very fundamental decision here. There is no walking back from it. If we do not make it work, we will not have the old system to fall back on, and we will not have a good new one. The security of the country would be in serious jeopardy. This was a very studied, a very thorough, a very deliberate decision. It was a difficult one to take because clearly it was going to be costly in terms of effort to make it effective. We have made that decision. We have crossed that bridge. It is now up to you in very large measure to provide the impetus to get it going and get it going on the right foot. I hope in that process that in addition to teaching people the specific details, you will keep in mind that basic security consciousness, basic discipline in handling classified material is the ultimate measure of success of this country's security.

Therefore, as you revitalize people in the process of installing APEX, you will also be doing what is needed regularly, regardless of what security system is in effect. That is bringing to people's attention the importance of being attentive, being exacting, being disciplined in their handling of highly classified information. That, I think, we have to do in any event. I hope you will achieve that also in the process of installing this new APEX system. Between the two--the general indoctrination and the renewed attention to the specifics of how you handle individual types of classified

material, we have a marvelous opportunity here to direct the attention to security throughout the national security establishment. I can assure you that picking up the paper and groaning as I do at what I see, I do not believe there is anything more important to the Intelligence Community of this country today than to tighten up on our security. We talk a lot about getting new laws passed. I am up there lobbying all the time. We talk a great deal about what other people can do and why the leaks come from this department or that, or about official spokesmen who say things they should not say. I assure you those things all bother me tremendously. We are working as best we can to correct them. But at the root of it all is the day-to-day security procedures and system of the government. That system is now APEX. It is now up to you to help us get APEX installed, to get it moving so that nothing drops between the cracks-- as we shift from the old system to the new. And, in the process, we heighten the interest, the attention, the sense of dedication of all of our many thousands of people who handle sensitive material so that we can, in fact, begin again to keep secrets where they belong. Thank you very much for what you are going to do.

