

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Remarks at Principia College
Elsah, Illinois
5 February 1980

Thank you, President Andrews, thank all of you. Having been in Christian Scientist since I was five years old, I have known a lot of Principians, and have learned a lot about Principia. I am really excited at this first opportunity for me to be here on the Elsay Campus.

By coincidence, it was just 3 years ago this week that I received what proved to be a rather fateful telephone call. I was sitting in my office in Naples, Italy when I received a call telling me that the President of the United States wanted to see me in Washington the next morning. I was a classmate and friend of the President, but I'm not sure he knew where I was when he asked to see me.

All the way across the Atlantic I wondered what he would ask me to undertake. Would it permit me to continue to work toward the goals that I wanted to see accomplished in the United States military establishment? I admit that it did cross my mind that two weeks before, the President's first nominee for the Director of Central Intelligence Agency had not passed muster with the Senate. But, I rejected that out of hand and continued to think about the things I wanted to try to accomplish in the United States military.

The next day, in the Oval Office, the President told me he wanted me to take over the Central Intelligence Agency. I remonstrated and tried to say that I would prefer to stay in my military profession, but you run out of argumentation with the President quickly. As if across a screen, I saw 32 years of naval experience flash by, going, going, and then before me was a stark new challenge.

I mention this to you only because many of you will be undertaking a new challenge this summer when you graduate. Others of you are already thinking ahead to what you will seek as your first challenge in the working community. I would suggest that, as happened to me, you will make that very important decision when you leave this college and embark on one field, one profession, one endeavor. But don't think you will be making that decision just once. You will make it over and over again during your life. No one set of preparations, no one set of skills will be adequate to prepare you for the kinds of opportunities that will come your way.

I believe there are three particular preparations that will be very helpful to you in adapting to new opportunities. One is to have defined your objectives. Another is to have established your work habits. And still a third is to have thought through and understood the ethical standards which will guide your conduct in your working life.

I was fortunate in this shift from a military career to a career as an intelligence officer. My objectives did not have to change. They have always been to serve this country. I don't say that in any altruistic or absolute way. I joined the Navy during World War II when it was popular to serve one's country. Immediately thereafter, it was not my objective to continue to serve. It wasn't until I had been in the Navy 8 or 9 years that I truly felt the enthusiasm, the stimulus, the sense of reward of being part of our national security apparatus. When that realization came to me, I became dedicated to serving my country as long as it had use for me in the government service. You will need to define and redefine your objectives as you go along, and watch them so that when new opportunities do offer themselves you will know whether or not they lead you in the direction that you ultimately want to go.

As far as work habits were concerned, as I rose progressively in the Navy I found my capacity for work continued to increase. The time and effort I was willing to devote to my work reached a point that when I became the Director of Central Intelligence I couldn't imagine that there was more that could be asked of me. But, there was. And, somehow, I found the time and the energy to do more. You must also decide whether you can or want to expand your capacity for work as you rise in seniority and importance. This is not just a question of capability. This is a question relating to the quality of your life. Most top businessmen and government officials in our country work too hard. So, as you go along, you must balance your sense of ambition and objectives and your sense of the quality of life that you want to lead. That should be a conscious decision, one that you have thought about most seriously.

As for ethical standards, I was also very grateful that my military career had prepared me very well for the kinds of ethical dilemmas I have had to face in intelligence. A military man must ask himself, does the Golden Rule always apply? Does it apply equally to my country's enemies, as well as its friends? Or do I treat enemies differently? If so, how differently, and what are those ethical limits? You must ask yourself if American ideals are worth fighting for. Are they worth killing for? Similarly, as Director of Central Intelligence, I must ask myself what risks we

should take for our country. How important is it that we gain certain information? You too need to lay the foundation early in your working careers as to what ethical standards are going to be the basis for your approach to the problems of your career. It is too late to wait until the dilemma arises to establish ethical standards.

Let me move on to share with you a little of what it was like after I left the Oval Office that day three years ago, and what it has been like since, being the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the Central Intelligence Agency at this very special time in the intelligence history of our country.

One thing, perhaps unfortunately, that being the Director of Central Intelligence has not been like is James Bond. I said unfortunately. My wife, who is sitting there in the fifth row, thinks it is very fortunate that I don't have the exotic experiences of James Bond. If there is any similarity between the the Director of Central Intelligence, the DCI, and 007, it is in the kind of gadgetry we use. Mine isn't a rear firing gun or blades that stick out from the hubcaps of an Aston-Martin. Mine is exotic satellites, listening devices that hear signals that are going through this room right now from radars, radios, and all kinds of other electronic devices. The United States is blessed in having the scientific expertise to give us the very best of intelligence collecting devices, the gadgets.

Technical intelligence collection, collection through electronic wizardry, has one interesting characteristic. It is phenomenally capable, yet it cannot do the job of acquiring information about other countries alone. Generally, a photograph shows you something that happened in the past. The interception of a radar signal tells you that yesterday, at that place, on that frequency, with that power, a certain radar was operating. When I present that to a policymaker, he will say, but Stan, why did that happen? What does it mean is going to happen next? To learn people's motives, why they are doing something, and what they are planning, we turn to a human being, a spy. Only a human being can talk to the people making the decisions in another country, probe their minds and bring back their intentions and plans. So, today, despite technology, we continue to need spies. We have them and they are very good. Nonetheless, it is here, with the spies, where many of the most difficult decisions must be made.

Unlike James Bond, my decisions are not whether or not to jump out of the airplane without a parachute. They are not that straightforward. They are not as clearly right or wrong. The essence of

spying is risk taking. Each time I must judge whether the benefits of spying will be worth the risk we must take. The risk might be of embarrassing the country if we are caught. There is the risk of actually complicating our diplomatic efforts. There is the risk to human life. When I make a decision to conduct a spying activity, I must ask myself, is the information really valuable? Will it actually help the President, or the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense? Could we obtain that information in a less risky way? If the answer is yes it is that valuable, then of course, we do our best to get it. But if my staff says, yes it is valuable, but with much less risk you will have a 30 percent probability of getting what you want. Do I take that 30 percent chance, particularly if in taking it I foreclose the higher probability option - and the higher risk - because there won't be time to do both? Or do I decide to take a greater risk and be surer of obtaining the information we need?

Then, there is the question of to what ethical limits will we go to obtain the information? Is there some threshold below which I will not go? Perhaps more important, do the ethical standards that apply vary with the quality and the importance of the information that you are likely to obtain? Are there things I would do to obtain information that would prevent World War III that I would not do to find out about Soviet intentions to enter the grain market and cheat us as they did in 1972? There is no formula. There are no set rules for these kinds of tough decisions. It is personal judgment, and it is that ethical foundation, that sense of what you will or will not do, that counts. Managing a spying organization is an intellectual, thoughtful vocation not one of adventure and daring-do.

Collecting information, either by technical systems like satellites and photos, or by the human spy, is only half of intelligence work. Once you have collected the information you need to do something with it. You need to interpret it, analyze it, study it, and come up with some kind of an assessment that will help the policymaker make a good decision. This is very much like your writing a term paper, or the research department of a major corporation looking at future business prospects, or like the research done on a college campus. At this time in our country's history it is especially interesting to be involved in the intelligence analytic process.

For the first 30 years after World War II, American intelligence focused largely on the Soviet military threat. But, today, this afternoon for example, we are closer to being at economic war with the Soviets than we are military war. Political and economic

considerations are very important to our country. Therefore, intelligence must put more emphasis on them than we have in the past. Although the Soviet Union remains our number one priority intelligence target, look this evening at where we are concerned about impending crises in the world.

In Southeast Asia the Vietnamese have invaded Kampuchea. They are pushing next door to where they may spill into Thailand. Look at the pending elections in Zimbabwe, Rhodesia. Look at the possibility of a revolution in El Salvador. Look at the quirks of a 79 year old Shiite cleric in Iran, and next door, look at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the threat that represents to India and Pakistan. These are all non-Soviet areas of the world. They are largely in the Third World, an area of growing importance to us. So, there are difficult but interesting choices to make today in trying to decide where to put our effort.

To further complicate the picture, we must also try to look ahead and ask ourselves if the crises of 1985 and 1990 will be the same kinds of crises that we are facing today or will they be generically quite different. Will we be more concerned with food to feed the growing population of the world, proliferation of nuclear weapons to small countries, or terrorism, or international narcotics trafficking? We must then ask ourselves if we are developing the right satellites and the right listening posts, if we are training our spies adequately to collect information on tomorrow's problems. Are we developing the right analytic skills and talents, the languages and academic skills that will be necessary to analyze this kind of information? It is an exciting and demanding challenge to try to look ahead in that way.

There are two other facets of being the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the CIA which I would like to describe briefly because they relate to my responsibility to the American public as a whole and to the Congress in particular. You, as part of the American public, have a right to know as much as possible about what your government is doing. It is not easy for a necessarily secret agency to keep you informed but we do the best we can. I am here tonight, I give speeches around the country, we join in academic and business symposia, all to share as much of what we are doing, in a general sense, as we can with the American public. Only if you are aware of government activities can you make good decisions about your government, and lend support where it deserves and needs it.

One of the most frequent means of such communication with the public is through the media. This is an exacting and time consuming element of my work. In interviews on television or with the press, I must be very careful, very well-prepared. An erroneous impression can be given to foreign countries or individuals if language is imprecise. It is time consuming also because the relationship between anyone in government and anyone in the media is fundamentally an adversarial relationship. It is adversarial because, generally, the media wants to get out of you more information than you are normally willing to share. It is a healthy relationship and it should be adversarial. But, I would suggest that, since Watergate, that relationship may have become more adversarial than is good for our country.

The relationship that I have with Congress is quite new. It is part adversarial and it is part cooperative. The amount of interchange between the Congress and the Intelligence Community is vastly greater today than ever before. Two foreign affairs committees and two armed services committees need and deserve to be up-dated on what's going on around the world as they make their decisions. The two budget committees and the two appropriations committees need to know why we need the money that we ask for. And, just in the last two years, there have been established two oversight committees dedicated exclusively to supervising the intelligence function of the country. These committees in particular give us guidance, sometimes in law, sometimes in advice. In the process they share the responsibility for intelligence activities. They are your surrogates. Because we cannot reveal enough to you for you to be able to be assured we are doing our job, we reveal our activities to these Congressional committees and they act for you in seeing that we are properly and fully utilizing the authority that we have, and that we are not ignoring the restrictions that have been placed on us by the Congress and the President.

All of this raises a tremendously complex question. Are secrecy in intelligence and openness in a democratic society compatible? Today, this country is involved in a bold experiment in finding a balance between secrecy and openness. We are being more open to the public than any intelligence organization in the history of the world has ever been. While protecting national secrets, we are, at the same time, being more open to the public than any intelligence organization in the history of the world has ever been. We are being totally cooperative with the Congress. In addition, we have had spelled out for us by the Congress and the Executive over the last two years more strict regulations on what we can and cannot do than have ever been legislated for intelligence bodies.

We are not sure yet that this mix of secrecy, regulations and openness is exactly what it should be, but we are moving in the right direction. We are trying to achieve an appropriate balance.

On the one hand if, because so many people are looking over your shoulder, you are afraid to take risks, then we will have no intelligence at all. If, because our most sensitive secrets are revealed to too many people, those secrets leak and our allies and agents around the world do not have confidence in us, we will have no intelligence at all. If, because we have to clear our actions through so many bureaucratic processes that we have no flexibility and cannot act quickly in a crisis, we will not be up to the task.

Interestingly, just a few days ago, the President in his State of the Union address to the Congress, asked for two things. The first, was for charters to codify the rules under which the intelligence community operates. They would consist of three parts: what we are authorized to do; what we are restricted from doing; and how the oversight process would work to balance the first two. At the same time, the President asked for a relaxation of some of these restrictions that have been placed on us. I think the fact that he could ask for these changes, and that he received a strong round of applause from the Congress, indicates how far we have come in rebuilding both Presidential and Congressional confidence in the Intelligence Community since the investigations of the intelligence process from 1974-1976. Those investigations did uncover some abuses. There were not as many as the media would have you think, but enough that the country reacted by imposing many of these restrictions which the President is now seeking to have eased.

In the debate which will go on in the Congress for the next few months, an effort will be made to balance explicit restrictions which, once legislated, are inflexible in moments of emergency with more generalized restrictions which, although offering less control, will be overseen by the Congress and thus adequately controlled. I think too, that the applause from the Congress indicated a greater recognition, in the Congress as well as throughout the country, of the very great importance of good intelligence for our country and for its policymakers today. Our responsibility is not only to our own people but to all the people in the free world.

We will, in the next two or three years, move surely and progressively toward a good balance of controls and flexibility. When we have found that balance we will have constructed a new, uniquely American model of intelligence. That will be an historic accomplishment.

Personally, I have found it very challenging and rewarding to have been wrenched from 32 years of experience and preparation and hopes and aspirations, and forced to expand my horizons and to take on this new opportunity. I encourage you, as you look forward to leaving Principia to think ahead and to recognize what preparation you will need for the changing opportunities which will present themselves to you all through your working life. Thank you very much.

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Approved For Release 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003100040001-7
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Thank you, President Andrews, thank all of you. Having been in Christian Scientist since I was five years old, I have known a lot of Principians, I have known a lot about Principia and I am really excited at this point for the first opportunity to be here on the Elsay Campus.

By coincidence, it was just 3 years ago this week that I received what proved to be a rather fateful telephone call. I was sitting in my office in Naples, Italy where I was in a NATO position when I received a call that said the President of the United States wants to see you in Washington tomorrow morning. I was a classmate and friend of the President, but I'm not sure he knew where I was. All the way across the Atlantic I was thinking to myself, what will he be asking me to undertake? Will it let me continue some of the goals, some of the ends that I could see accomplished in the United States military establishment. I did think just passively the two weeks before that the President's first nominee for the Director of Central Intelligence Agency had not passed muster with the Senate, but I rejected that out of hand and continued to think about the things I wanted to try to accomplish in the United States military. Then when I sat in the Oval Office and heard the President say to me that he wanted me to take over the Central Intelligence Agency and I remonstrated and tried to say that I would prefer to stay in my military profession, I heard him continually say, no the Central Intelligence Agency. You run out of argumentation with the President quickly. Across the screen, I saw flashing 32 years of naval experience, going, going, and then before me was a stark new challenge.

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a new challenge this summer when you graduate. Others of you are already thinking ahead, as you what you are going to do for your first challenge in the working community. I would suggest that, as happened in my experience, it will happen in yours that you will make a very important decision when you leave this college and you embark on one field, one profession, one endeavor. But don't think you will be making that decision just once, you will make it over and over again. No one set of preparations, no one set of skills will be adequate to prepare you for the kinds of opportunities that will come your way. I would suggest there are three particular preparations that will be very helpful to you in adapting to new opportunities that may come your way. One is to define your objectives in your working lives. Another is to establish your work habits, and still a third is to have understood the ethical standards in which you will conduct your working life. I was fortunate, when I made this shift from a military career to a career as an intelligence officer my objectives did not have to change because my objectives had been to serve this country. Now I don't say that to try to sound altruistic or absolute. I joined the Navy when it was popular to serve your country during World War II. But my objective was not, immediately thereafter to continue to serve. It wasn't until I had been in 8 or 9 years and I felt the enthusiasm, the stimulus, the sense of reward of being part of our national security apparatus that I became dedicated to serving my country as long as they had use for me in the government service. But I would suggest to you that you need to define your objectives as you go along, and watch them so that when new opportunities do offer themselves you know whether they lead you in the direction that you ultimately want to go or in some other way. As far as work habits were concerned, as I rose progressively in the

Navy, I found my work habits continued to increase. My capacity and time I was willing to devote to my work reached a point that when I became the Director of Central Intelligence I couldn't imagine that there was more that could be asked or demanded of me, but there was. Somehow, I found time and the effort to do more.

I would suggest again to you, that you must decide as you go along can you, and do you want to be able to expand your work habits as you rise in seniority and importance. Now this is not just a question of capability, this is a question of the quality of life. Because I would further suggest that most top businessmen, most top government officials in our country work too much. You have to make the judgment as you go along, balancing your sense of ambition and objectives and your sense of quality of life that you want to lead. You should make a consciously you should think about it.

As for ethical standards, I was also very grateful that my military career had prepared me quite precisely for the kinds of things I have faced on the ethical scene in intelligence. A military man must look and ask himself, does the Golden Rule always apply? Does it apply equally to your country's enemies, be they countries or individuals representing those countries. Or do you treat them differently? And if so, how differently and with what limits? You have to ask yourself are American ideals worth fighting for? Killing for? Similarly, as Director of Central Intelligence I have to ask myself, what risks do we take for our country? How important is it that we gain certain information. Similarly, I would suggest to you that you need to lay foundations early in your working careers as to what

ethical standards are going to be the foundations on which you will approach the problems of your career, your profession as you proceed through it, because you need to be prepared when the time comes.

I am sorry to have digressed on ethics and work habits and objectives. What I really want to share with you tonight is a little of the feeling of what it was like after I left the Oval Office and what it has been like the three years since being the Director of Central Intelligence, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency of our country and in this particular time. I think it has been a very special time to the intelligence history of our country.

One thing, perhaps unfortunately, that being the Director of Central Intelligence is not like is James Bond and 007. I said unfortunately, my wife is sitting here in the fifth row thinks it is very fortunate. I don't have the exotic experiences of James Bond. If there is a similarity between the DCI, I'm sorry we in Washington always have to talk in acronyms, and I am the Director of Central Intelligence, the DCI. If there is a similarity between 007 and the DCI it is in the kind of gadgetry we use. Now mine, isn't rear firing guns and blades that stick out from the hubcaps on the Maserati. Mine is exotic satellites, listening devices that hear signals that are going through this room right now, pick up radars, radios, all kinds of electronic emissions. The United States is very blessed because we have a scientific expertise in this country that gives us the very best of intelligence collecting devices, gadgets. Technical intelligence collection is what we call collection through electronic wizardry, and such.

It has one interesting characteristic. Generally speaking a photograph tells you something that happened in the past. The intercept of a radar tells you that yesterday at that place on that frequency with that power that radar was operating. But when an intelligence officers presents that to his political policymaking masters, they say, but Stan why did that happen and what does it mean is going to happen next? And when I want to find out what people's motives are, why they are doing things and what they are planning, what do we turn to, we turn to the human spy, the agent who can talk to people and probe their minds and come back to these thoughts that our intentions and plans. So, yes, today we have to have spies, we do and we are very good at it. But, hereto, perhaps, fortunately my role is not like James Bond from the spy world, my decisions are not whether to jump out of the airplane without a parachute, they are not that straightforward, they are not as clearly right or wrong when all is said and done. He either gets to the ground or he doesn't. I sometimes never know whether my spy decisions are right or wrong, because the essence of spying is risk taking. Each time we have to judge whether the benefits are going to be worth the risks. There are risks, there are risks for instance of embarrassing the country if you get caught spying where you should not be caught. There are risks of actually complicating our diplomacy and by far not the least there are risks to human lives when you make decisions to conduct spying activity. So, I must ask myself the questions - how valuable is the information, will it really do something to help the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and so on. Could we obtain it in a less risky way? The answer to that is usually yes, we might. They will come to me and they will say, yes, with much less risk you might have a 30 percent probability of getting what you want. Now do I take that 30 percent chance, particularly if in taking

it I foreclose the higher risk at high probability option because maybe there won't be time to do both. And then there is a question of what ethical limits will we go to to obtain the information. Is there some floor below which we will not go? And very importantly, do the ethical standards that apply vary with the quality and the importance of the information that you are likely to obtain. Are there things I would do to obtain information that would prevent World War III that I would not do that would tell us about Soviet intentions to enter the grain market and cheat us almost as they did in 1972. There is no formula there are no set rules for these kinds of tough decisions. It is judgment and it is that ethical foundation, that sense of what you will do and why, that counts. It is a very intellectual, a very thoughtful process to manage a spying organization, not an adventuresome, daring-do one.

Now collecting information, either by these technical systems, like satellites and photos or by the human spy, is only one-half of the intelligence business. Once you have the information you've got to do something with it. You have got to interpret it, you've got to analyze it, you have got to study it and come up with some kind of an estimate that will help the policymakers make a good decision based on that information. Now this is a very intellectual kind of prize. It is very much like your sitting down to write a term paper, or like a research department of a major corporation, or research on a university or a college campus. At this particular time in our country's history it is particularly interesting to be involved in this analytic process in the world of intelligence.

For the first 30 years or so after World War II, our intelligence focused very largely on the Soviet military threat as well it might. Today, this afternoon, for example we are closer to being at economic warfare with the Soviets than we are military warfare. Today, around the world, political and economic considerations are very important to our country, we must put more emphasis on them than we have in the past. And although the Soviet Union remains our number one priority intelligence target and always will, I believe, look this evening at where we are concerned about impending crises in the world. In Southeast Asia the Vietnamese have invaded Kampuchea, they are pushing next door to where they may spill into our friendly country Thailand. Look at the elections that our pending in Zimbabwe, Rhodesia. Look at the possibility of a near revolution in the next door El Salvador. Look how we study the quirks of a 79 year old Shiite cleric in Iran and next door the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its threats to India and Pakistan. These are all non-Soviet Union areas of the world, largely of what we call the Third World and this is growing in importance to us also. So, we have difficult but interesting choices to make today in trying to decide where to put our efforts. Particularly in trying to look ahead and say to ourselves will the crises of 1985 and 1990 be the same kind of crises that we are facing today or will they be generically quite different. Will we be more concerned in that period of this decade with food to feed the growing population of the world? With the proliferation of nuclear weapons to small countries, or even

to terrorists, or just to terrorism itself, or to international narcotics trafficking. And therefore, we in the world of intelligence must be asking ourselves everyday, are we developing today the right satellites, the right listening posts, the right kinds of spies to collect information on these problems that we will face tomorrow, which may not be the same as today. Are we developing the right analytic skills and talents, the languages and academic skills that will be necessary to analyze this kind of information. It is an exciting and demanding challenge to try to look ahead in that way.

There are two other facets of being the Director of Central Intelligence, the head of the CIA. I would like to describe them very briefly because they are my public responsibility. My responsibility to the American public as a whole, and to the Congress in particular. You, of course, are part of the American public and I am here tonight because we do give speeches, we do join in symposia, we do try, even though our business is very largely secretive, to share as much as we can with the American public. We do that because the foundation stone of our way of government is that the people know as much about that government as is possible, so they can make good decisions about it, and so they can lend support to it where it deserves it. We need that support and therefore we need to illuminate to the American public where we can.

A key means of such communication with the public of course is through the media. This is a very exacting, demanding, and time consuming element

of my work. When you go before the television cameras, when you go for an interview before the press; you have to be very careful, very cautious, very well-prepared; you have to choose your words precisely because you may over-commit the Administration to something it is not committed to. You may give an impression to foreign countries and individuals that is not warranted if you are not exacting and precise in your language. It is time consuming also because the relationship between anyone in government and anyone in the media is fundamentally an adversarial relationship and you have to be cautious and on your guard. The media wants to get out of you more information than you are normally willing to share, particularly those of us who have large secrets at our disposal. That is a good relationship and it should be adversarial. I am not complaining but I would suggest that since Watergate, I believe that relationship has become more adversarial than is healthy for our country.

The relationship that I have with Congress is a responsibility. It is part adversarial, it is part cooperative, but mainly it is new. The amount of interchange with the Congress and the Intelligence Community and the appropriate Congressional committees is today just vastly greater than it has ever been in the history of our country. It is also a very time consuming requirement for me. There are for instance two foreign affairs committees and two arm services committees, all four of whom want to, need to, deserve to be up-to-date on what's going on around the world as they make their decisions for our country. There are two budget committees, there are two appropriations committees and all four of them want to know why we need the money that we ask for. And in addition, and just

in the last two years, and most significantly there are now two oversight committees dedicated only to supervising the intelligence function of our country. These committees in particular give us guidance sometimes in law, sometimes in advice. In the process they are sharing the responsibility for what we are doing in intelligence. They are also your surrogates. Because we cannot reveal that needs to be seen in order to conduct oversight in the intelligence process of our country to the public, we reveal what we cannot give to the public to these Congressional committees and they act for the public as a surrogate in seeing on the one hand that we are properly and fully utilizing the authority that we have and on the other hand that we are not abusing the restrictions that are placed on us by the Congress or by the President.

All of this opens a tremendously difficult question of the compatibility of secrecy in intelligence and openness in an democratic society. Today, this country is involved in bold experiment in finding a balance between secrecy and openness. We are being more open to the public than any intelligence organization in the history of the world has ever been. We are being totally cooperative with the Congress than ever before and we have had spelled out for us by the Congress and the Executive over the last two years more strict regulations on what we can and cannot do than have ever been legislated for intelligence bodies than before.

Today, I say to you we are trying to achieve a balance. We are not sure that this mix of regulations and openness is exactly what it should be. I believe we are moving in the right direction. On the one hand

we run the risk of intelligence by temerity. If because so many people are looking over your shoulder, you are afraid to take risks, then we will have no intelligence at all. If because so many people are exposed to our inner secrets, if those secrets leak and our allies and our agents around the world do not have confidence in us, we will have no intelligence at all. If because you have to clear your actions through so many bureaucratic processes that you have no flexibility and cannot act quickly in a crisis, we will not be up to the task. Interestingly, just a few days ago, the President of the United States in his State of the Union address to the Congress asked them for two things. First, was for charters, as he calls them for the intelligence community. These are legal qualifications of the rules under which we would operate. They would consist of three parts, the authorization of what we can and should do; the restrictions on what we cannot do, and then the oversight process by which you balance the two. At the same time, the President asked for a relaxation of some of these restrictions that had been placed upon us. I think the fact that he could and did ask for this and received a strong round of applause from the Congress indicates how far we have come since the period of 1974-1976, when there were the investigations of the intelligence process of our country. Those investigations did uncover some abuses, not as many as the media would have you think, but enough that the country reacted by enacting these restrictions which the President is now, in some cases asking to have eased, not removed just eased somewhat. The fact that the Congress did applaud that suggestion indicates that they, because of the way the President has gone about the relationship between intelligence and the Congress has developed confidence in us. Because of the way the President has set up the oversight procedures within the White House, he has confidence in us.

go on in the Congress for the next few months, is that we need to balance explicit restrictions because when they are put in law by the Congress are very rigid and you just can't anticipate all the kinds of circumstances in which they may hamper you with generalized restrictions which are overseen by the committees of the Congress to tell whether you are taking undue advantage of the generalization rather than following a very specific law or rule that is set forth. I think too, that the applause from the Congress at the State of the Union address indicates a greater recognition in the Congress and throughout the country of a very deep importance of having good intelligence for our country and for its policymakers today. Our responsibilityinaudible.....not only to our own people but to all the people in the free world. It is increasingly important that we have the information baseinaudible.

When we have that right balance and I think we will in the next two or three years, we are moving there surely and progressively, when we have found that balance we will have constructed a new, a uniquely American model of intelligence and that will be a historic accomplishment.

May I conclude by saying, that personally I have found it very challenging and very rewarding to have been wrenched out of 32 years of experience and preparation and hopes and aspirations and forced to expand my horizons and to take up this new opportunity and I encourage you, as you look forward to leaving Principia one day to think ahead to recognize that you want to be prepared for a new and challenging opportunities all through your working life. Thank you very much.

