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ATTACHMENT (2)

SCHEMA FOR ANALYSIS OF MBFR MONITORING CAPABILITIES

1. Provide the National Security Council (NSC) and the U.S. MBFR Negotiating Team with a current, realistic, and insofar as possible, quantified appreciation of the present performance and future capabilities of U.S. and allied collection resources to monitor Warsaw Pact air and ground forces in the NATO Guidelines and peripheral areas (Hungary plus the Western Military District of the USSR) in the negotiation, reduction, and post MBFR reduction phases.

2. SCOPE: Emphasis will be placed on evaluating U.S. and allied capability to collect information in support of a set of basic MBFR monitoring requirements in the NATO Guidelines area. Maximum advantage will be taken of analyses previously conducted by CIA, DIA, State, ACDA, NSA, and interagency study groups. The analysis will be undertaken as a phased series of studies, each revolving around a related aspect of the MBFR monitoring capabilities problem. The general topics to be addressed are as follows:

a. An appreciation of current U.S. intelligence collection resource performance against basic MBFR monitoring requirements.

b. Options to improve current MBFR collection operations within existing resources constraints.

c. An estimate of the impact of new collection resources on future MBFR monitoring capabilities.

d. The contribution to MBFR monitoring that would be made by negotiated collateral constraints and inspection measures.

Special attention will be given in all phases of the study program to problems of deception and the limitations of collection resources in terms of their performance and capabilities.

3. PURPOSE: The purpose of this study is fourfold:

a. To establish a collection baseline founded insofar as possible on quantifiable empirical data which will assist in defining current U.S. intelligence collection resource performance against a set of basic MBFR related monitoring requirements. (See paragraph 4. for a discussion of Basic Requirements).

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The basic requirements relate to but do not necessarily encompass all of the immediate and pressing intelligence needs associated with the negotiation, reduction, and post reduction phases. These requirements do, however, represent those very fundamental needs that must as a minimum be serviced in order to verify Warsaw Pact compliance with the provision of any resulting agreement. The purpose of the first study is to answer the question:

"In what manner and with what degree of success are U.S. and allied collection resources currently performing against basic MBFR monitoring requirements on Soviet and indigenous air and ground force units?

b. To identify and define a collection strategy or sets of strategies which will optimize current collection resources against the MBFR related basic requirements and measure the expected intelligence gain over current collection operations. The baseline developed in chapter one will be the point of departure for this analysis and the necessary estimates.

"How much better could existing U.S. and allied collection resources perform in support of MBFR monitoring if the present collection strategy were changed and focused with a much higher priority against the basic MBFR air and ground force requirements?"

c. To identify additional collection resources which in the future would significantly improve current monitoring capability and insofar as possible define their impact in relation to current collection effectiveness. Future improvements will be examined within the following collection discipline context:

- (1) Imagery
- (2) SIGINT
- (3) Special Technical Sensors
- (4) Human Sources

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the question:

"What is the potential impact of future collection systems on the MBFR related air and ground force monitoring problem?"

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d. To identify and insofar as possible define the contribution to MBFR monitoring that would be made by the collateral constraints now being proposed to accompany air and ground force reductions as well as the negotiated inspection measures now being considered by the U.S. and NATO. In addition, define the contribution to MBFR monitoring that would result by various mixes of collateral constraints and negotiated inspection measures. Collateral constraints to be considered include the following:

- (1) Limits on introduction of forces into NGA.
- (2) Limits on exercises in the NGA.
- (3) Advance notification of troop movements and reserve call-up in NGA area.

Negotiated inspection measures include:

- (1) Mobile inspection teams.
- (2) Stationed observers.
- (3) Exchange of observers during maneuvers.
- (4) Open skies.
- (5) On site observation of reductions.

The question to be answered is:

"What will be the impact of potential MBFR collateral constraints and inspection measures on the ability of the U.S. to monitor compliance with an MBFR agreement?"

4. BASIC REQUIREMENTS: By way of definition, basic MBFR monitoring requirements are those requirements associated with the continuing collection and evaluation of information and the production of intelligence on Warsaw Pact forces and areas affected by agreed or proposed mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). Basic MBFR monitoring requirements are those which are fundamental to the negotiation, reduction and post reduction phases in terms of the intelligence support required of the DCI and the national intelligence community to support the President and other national policymaking elements. These requirements are closely allied to classic strategic warning and ground force order of battle information needs which if satisfied would in large part support MBFR monitoring needs.

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For the purpose of this series of studies the following are considered to be the basic MBFR requirements as they relate to monitoring stationed and indigenous forces within the NATO Guidelines Area:

a. To determine the type, number, echelon, and location of ground and air force units in the Warsaw Pact NATO Guidelines Area.

b. To determine the strength (manning) and major equipments (amount and type) associated with air and ground force units in this area.

c. During the negotiation, reduction, and post reduction phases, determine the strength, disposition, and movement of air and ground force units within, into, and out of the NATO Guideline Area.

There are numerous other questions with related intelligence requirements of major importance to decision makers and negotiators associated with the MBFR verification problem, however, the three categories of requirements stated above are believed to be the most fundamental.

5. STUDY APPROACH: The study series will be structured as a phased series of reports; each part focused on a related aspect of the MBFR monitoring capabilities problem.

Part I - "Current U.S. Collection Resource Performance Against Basic MBFR Monitoring Requirements" will be a country by country analysis building to a regional analysis of current collection operations against the NGA plus Hungary and the Western Military Districts of the USSR. It will consist of an inventory of collection resources and statistical and map displays of the major collection discipline's performance against basic MBFR requirements over a one year period.

Part II - "Options to Improve Current Collection Performance Against Basic MBFR Requirements" will address the collection strategies defined in Part I and develop options to improve quality, quantity, and timeliness of information over the current performance using presently available resources. Efforts will be made to illustrate and quantify the gain to be achieved by comparison with statistical data from Part I. Performance trade-offs will be identified as appropriate for each option.

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Part III - "Impact of Future Collection Resources on MBFR Monitoring" will identify future collection capabilities that will or could become operational during the 70's and estimate their impact on the current collection capability. Simulation will be used where practicable and data presented in statistical and graphic form as appropriate.

Part IV - "Intelligence Collection Value of Collateral Constraints and Inspection Measures" will discuss and illustrate the expected gain to be achieved by these negotiated compliance assurances.

What follows is an outline of each of the study series parts and a set of definitions to be used at the study outset:

PART I

OUTLINE

TITLE: CURRENT U.S. COLLECTION RESOURCE PERFORMANCE AGAINST BASIC MBFR MONITORING REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. The Monitoring & Verification Problem
2. Purpose & Scope
3. Background
4. Definition of Terms

B. Methodology

1. Requirements
2. Collection Resources
3. Description & Source(s) of Data
4. Statistical Techniques

C. Current U.S. Collection Monitoring Performance

1. Country Analysis

- a. SIGINT
- b. Imagery
- c. HUMINT
- d. Multi-Source
- e. Technical Sensors (As Required)
- f. All Sources Combined

2. Regional Analysis of Current Collection Strategy

D. Summary & Conclusions

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PART II

OUTLINE

TITLE: OPTIONS TO IMPROVE CURRENT COLLECTION PERFORMANCE  
AGAINST BASIC MBFR REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Purpose & Scope
2. Review of Current Monitoring Strategies
3. Improvement Assumptions & Definitions

B. Identification of Options

1. Identification of Monitoring Options by Collection Discipline
  - a. SIGINT Resources
  - b. Imagery Resources
  - c. HUMINT Resources
  - d. Special Sensor Resources (As Required)
2. Identification of Collection Mix Options

C. Comparison of Options

D. Summary & Conclusions

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PART III

OUTLINE

TITLE: IMPACT OF FUTURE COLLECTION RESOURCES ON MBFR MONITORING

- A. Introduction
  - 1. Purpose & Scope
  - 2. Assumptions & Definitions
- B. Summary of Current Collection Systems
  - 1. SIGINT
  - 2. Imagery
  - 3. HUMINT
  - 4. Special Sensor (As Required)
- C. Identification & Description of Future Collection Systems
- D. Simulate & Estimate Impact of Future Collection Systems on Monitoring Performance
- E. Summary & Conclusions

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PART IV

OUTLINE

TITLE: INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION VALUE OF COLLATERAL  
CONSTRAINTS AND INSPECTION MEASURES

- A. Introduction
  - 1. Purpose and Scope
  - 2. Assumptions and Definitions
- B. Identification of Collateral Constraints  
and Negotiated Inspection Measures
- C. Estimate of the Effect of Agreed Constraints  
and Inspection Measures on Monitoring Capability
- D. Summary and Conclusions

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6. DEFINITIONS: In order to facilitate communications among those involved in this study series and insure understanding of the product by its ultimate consumers, rather rigorous definition of terms used in discussing verification related problems will be required. As a point of departure the following definitions which are contained in CIA/OSR study SR SP 72-4, TCS 1335/72, dated November 1972, are recommended. As the study progresses these definitions will be amended as appropriate and new terms will probably be added:

Monitoring: The continuing collection and evaluation of information - the production of intelligence - on Warsaw Pact forces and areas affected by an agreed force reduction.

Verification: The determination at policy level that agreed force reductions have or have not taken place, and that agreed force levels and restrictions in a designated area are or are not being respected.

Order of Battle: The sum of the elements of information required for the evaluation of a military force. Includes - but is not limited to - location, organization, manning and equipment levels, disposition, and activity of military units.

Verification Intelligence: That intelligence used to establish violation of or compliance with an agreement. The term is used to differentiate, both in product and in production, between the intelligence necessary for a verification estimate and the intelligence produced for other purposes. In many, perhaps most, instances these will be similar.

Warning Intelligence: That intelligence, often called indications intelligence, which deals with indications of whether an attack or other hostile action against the U.S. or its forces or its allies is intended.

Violation: The failure to remove from or to disband forces in the area of reduction, as prescribed by an agreement, or the introduction or activation of forces in the area of reduction, prohibited by an agreement.