

OFFICE OF THE DD/I


2 May 1974

NOTE FOR: The Director

FROM : Ed Proctor

I talked to Bill Hyland about your proposal as outlined in the attached draft. Bill had three reactions:

1. That the evaluation of reporting from the Embassies as reflected in your draft was generally correct;
2. That even if we were to go through the joint study, formulated ways of improving State reporting and issued instructions to the Embassy, there would really be no perceptual difference in the way the Embassies actually performed.



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
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. ~~Proctor~~/Walsh

Colby wants to increase the flow of Foreign Service reporting available to the Agency and wants a rep from DDI and one from INR to study the problem and come up with recommendations. Do you want comments from OCI before contacting Hyland?



29 Apr 74  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR:



File *State Dept*

Mr. Proctor's answer to Mr. Colby's draft on increasing the flow of Foreign Service reporting available to the Agency, etc.

Mr. Walsh has read.

bev

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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DCI/DDCI  
Routing Slip

74-5543  
Executive Registry

TO:

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2	DDCI			12	<del>DDMP</del>		
3	DDS&T			13	SAYA		
④	DDI	✓		14	ASST/DCI		
5	DDO		✓	15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	EX/SEC		
7	D/DCI/IC		✓	17			
8	D/ <del>DDI</del>		✓	18			
9	GC			19			
10	LC			20			

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks:

① Pls consider & well discuss  
② Could you also feel out Jell Hyland?

*[Handwritten signature]*

DCI/DDCI

4/27/74

DRAFT

WEC:jlj (26 April 1974)

Dear Ken:

Following up on our conversation at the most pleasant lunch you provided recently, I have reflected further on our discussion of ways to improve the flow of information from the Foreign Service into our finished intelligence reports and assessments. I suggest that this be the subject of a special study group set up between the Department and CIA.

As I noted, I have the highest respect for the talents and access of the Foreign Service, Officers and their potential to provide much of the political and economic information necessary <sup>for</sup> to make our intelligence assessments. I am concerned, however, that some practical and some institutional barriers may be reducing the degree of their involvement in this process. On the practical side, there is a natural concern in the Department as to the sheer volume of reporting, which imposes a tremendous burden on the leadership. This is one of the reasons I am sure for the Secretary's recent direction to our Embassies to lay greater stress on analytical as distinct from purely factual reporting. While I concur fully with the utility and desirability of such analytical reporting, I note that a fall-off in factual reporting can remove the basis for the independent assessment of foreign developments which is essential to the intelligence process.

Another practical matter is the growing use of the telephone for spot reporting and even informal discussion. As technical capabilities improve this use is apt to grow. Again I welcome this contribution to easier reporting but express some concern that the information may stop with the individual who hears it in the geographic bureau, or at best be highly summarized and generalized in dissemination further. The Department has long had an extremely effective tool for ~~the transmission~~<sup>rel</sup> information, flavor and opinion through "official-informal" letters exchanged between Washington desks and officers in Embassies. Unfortunately, again, this material frequently does not find its way into the intelligence process, perhaps because of its "informal" character.

As institutional concerns I would note the understandable and laudable tendency of the geographic bureaus not to impose reporting requirements on Embassies except for the most significant reasons. There is also a natural attenuation of contact between the intelligence analyst and the desk and field officers by reason of our necessary bureaucratic channels here in CIA and in INR. My appointment of National Intelligence Officers was an attempt to bridge this gap to some extent and to provide a vehicle for informal contact between experts wherever located in the bureaucratic firmament. I am pleased to say that they have been well received in the Department but I do not believe they have entirely solved the basic problem to date.

Thus I propose a joint study by someone from your INR (perhaps supported by one or more representatives from a geographic bureau) and our DDI might identify some improvements in the ways in which intelligence needs are identified and information flows to meet them. The Foreign Service obviously has many other policy, operational and representational functions, but we look on it as a unique contribution to national intelligence and would like to see its potential fully utilized. I believe this particularly appropriate in view of the growing importance of economic intelligence to which the Foreign Service has traditionally made a major contribution. There is also increasing pressure on our clandestine intelligence activity to focus on a few targets of major national importance and turn away from local coverage: If <sup>each of us</sup> we could appoint <sup>an</sup> two officers to examine the problem, we might <sup>identify</sup> ~~see together~~ the degree to which difficulties exist and ~~then~~ consequently the degree to which <sup>what steps</sup> efforts should be <sup>taken</sup> ~~made~~ to resolve them.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby  
Director