

OFFICE OF THE DDI

File Narcotics

21 August 1975

TO : Mr. Paul Walsh, ADDI

FROM : DDI/CINM

SUBJECT: Report of President's Task Force on Narcotics

The attached draft document will become part of the final report to the President from the special task force that was created under the direction of the Domestic Council to study the government's overall narcotics control effort.

is the CIA representative on the Task Force; and we have been supporting him as requested. The final report is due in September.

The attached paper is the draft "Assessment of the Narcotics Intelligence Functions." Although CIA is only dealt with in a limited way--and the DDI only by inference--I believe you will find the entire report interesting, especially the section dealing with strategic intelligence analysis. I have marked those paragraphs of particular interest.

--continued

Not Referred to OMB. Waiver applies
DOJ Review Completed.

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SUBJECT: Report of President's Task
Force on Narcotics

The paper points up the deficiencies of the "national narcotics intelligence system" under the direct leadership of the DEA. These are deficiencies that I believe we can help alleviate if we are permitted to publish more current intelligence on the international narcotics control situation, at least until the DEA develops a capability to fill this intelligence gap. The DEA Quarterly Intelligence Trends and the other DEA periodical Drug Enforcement, although highly professional publications, do not meet the requirement for continuing current intelligence coverage of the subject.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

ASSESSMENT OF THE NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

AUGUST, 1975

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 THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION

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THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

The Functional Group on Intelligence comprehensively reviewed the narcotics intelligence function. In order to focus on the main issues and problem areas, the group assumed the underlying rationale embodied in Reorganization Plan No. 2 as one of its principal guideposts. However, it was recognized that the Plan did create certain operational problems which were reviewed.

The assessment resulted in certain basic and long-standing differences in philosophies and operations among agencies. These differences could not be resolved at the working group level. Accordingly, a separate issue/problem paper was prepared (Attachment A) which sets forth these positions. The resolution of these issues could result in changes to the sections of this paper which follow.

The group concluded that the intelligence function is an essential and integral part of the overall narcotics enforcement effort. While it is fundamentally in a support role, intelligence in fact enhances more effective utilization of enforcement resources by permitting focusing of resources on specific targets. Without this key input, the enforcement effort would be deployed on a more random basis with a resultant reduction of efficiency and effectiveness.

It was also concluded that the narcotics intelligence function generally suffered during the internal resource allocation process of the domestic agencies.

II. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

A. Assessment of Current Capabilities

1. General Comments on Current Operational Intelligence Capabilities

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 placed in DEA the responsibility for developing a national narcotics intelligence capability. Outlined below are some of the key issues that persist and proposals for future action to resolve these problems.

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Two comments should be made at the outset, since they apply to the entire intelligence process, from collection to dissemination:

a. If the several enforcement agencies are to be adequately supported by intelligence, in order to permit enforcement action to become more effective than mere reliance on random inspections and informants' initiatives, then all intelligence producers must be made to recognize that they serve many users. There is ample evidence that competitive attitudes within and among agencies have impeded the development of an optimal production and flow of operational intelligence. While DEA has the primary charter to take the initiative (under the CCINC's overall direction for overseas efforts) in designing the national narcotics intelligence system and plays a central role in determining what should be produced by that overall enforcement activity, nor does it control all intelligence collectors. Therefore it is not in a position to resolve serious conflict among agencies. Some person or group of persons must be identified as serving a neutral "inspector general" role. The CCINC has responsibility only for international aspects of the problem, and there appears to be inadequate control over the entire intelligence system from above. The Tyler Group is currently wrestling with some of these issues, but it is too early to determine whether it will fill the obvious gap.

Something missing here! ?

b. -In the process of shifting narcotics operational intelligence toward conspiracy cases against major traffickers, the receipt, by Customs, of interdiction-related tactical and operational intelligence has suffered. Customs is no longer in a position to collect such intelligence itself, under Reorganization Plan No. 2, and says it is not receiving it in the needed quantity from other agencies (primarily DEA). There appear to be aspects of DEA's collection activity, analytical processing and dissemination procedures which are in need of improvement.

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2. Current Capabilities for Collection

a. Severe sentencing of drug offenders may be the single most effective means of increasing the intelligence flow. While a wide variety of agencies are actively collecting operational intelligence, the greatest single source of such information is from interrogations of persons detained by enforcement officers light sentences of offenders inhibit collection of such information. The Intelligence Group agrees that, insofar as it would have a favorable impact upon the amount of raw intelligence available, more severe sentencing would be helpful.

b. The flow of operational intelligence from debriefing of arrested persons and other sources is also impeded by failure of the agencies to fully exploit such sources for the purposes of both their own agency and other arms of the Government. The DEA representative has stated that one great problem is simply getting investigative officers to commit to paper the operational intelligence they receive. Furthermore, the range of questions asked in such debriefings tends to focus too narrowly upon the immediately exploitable tactical information rather than upon what that source may know which would be of use to other elements of the officer's agency, or to other agencies. (See Task 35 for suggestions as to how to resolve this problem.)

c. The Narcotics Intelligence Officer (NIO) program has been slowed somewhat by the post-Watergate climate. Foreign governments have expressed reservations about permitting intelligence officers to be accredited to their countries, part of their sensitivity stems from the recent revelations concerning CIA activities. Nonetheless, the program has been launched and there are plans for its expansion. It is too early in the program's development to make a judgment as to whether separating the NIO function from the Special Agent function overseas is a more effective approach than is combining both functions in the same officers.

d. A consistent and integrated "country organization overseas" would be useful. Collection of narcotics intelligence abroad is coordinated within the missions under the aegis of the Ambassador's Country Team, and the procedures appear to be needlessly complicated by DEA's continuing to operate through regional, as opposed to country, directors. The Ambassador of Belgium does not, therefore, have control over DEA elements there, who report to a DEA Regional Office in Paris. With the growth in DEA presence abroad to the point it has now reached, with personnel assigned to virtually all major countries of interest, the "regional director" appears to be an anachronism. Insofar as regional management is called for in certain aspects of the foreign narcotics problem, this could be accomplished by adopting the regional approach at Headquarters. Field organization abroad, however, should more closely parallel that of the State Department. DEA does not fully concur in this observation.

e. Some unnecessary duplication of effort occurs insofar as certain Customs activities in non-narcotics areas occasionally lead them into investigations which overlap those of DEA. Improved cooperation and intelligence sharing between DEA and Customs will ensure that Customs' potential for contributing to the narcotics effort is exploited while unnecessary duplication of effort is minimized.

Customs, however, perceives a further gap in that they no longer have agents abroad in the numbers they previously had, collecting operational and tactical information from official (host government Customs) and unofficial (shipping community) sources. Customs claims that their personnel had unique expertise in areas of knowledge vital to their operations, and that the withdrawal of most of these personnel has created an intelligence gap.

f. There has been a problem in coordination and exchange of information between DEA and Customs. Customs has found it difficult if not impossible to arrange access for follow-up questioning of sources turned over to DEA. This occurs despite Customs belief that such questioning would be productive and that answers they seek are not contained in the reports they receive from DEA. Apparently this

reflects uncooperative attitudes at field installation level rather than the intentions of the DEA management. DEA management (Office of Intel) has no control over DEA enforcement officers in the field. Only the DEA Administrator can resolve issues of this type. Steps to resolve this problem have been taken by DEA through recent field instructions and through establishment of a Liaison Group to ensure compliance.

3. Current Capabilities for Analysis/Production

The analytic function is important in developing cases and provides vital support to the planner of operations against major traffickers. Analysis is also important in ensuring that intelligence that has been collected is correctly identified and transmitted to those who can use it. In both of these areas, DEA's analytical resources have been found to be inadequate. Customs' limited analytical resources, located in the Office of Enforcement Support (OES), are endeavoring to fully process the data currently being received by them. However, their ability to handle a larger flow of intelligence, should it be provided by DEA or Customs personnel, is probably inadequate. Steps to keep this unit abreast of future demands upon it are currently being taken.

Intelligence support is wasted if enforcement officials do not use it. It follows that enforcement officials must be convinced of the value and utility of intelligence. The quality and relevance of the intelligence product are therefore critical to its impact on enforcement operations, and both quality and relevance depend upon sound analysis.

There are approximately 34 intelligence analysts at DEA Headquarters, responsible mainly for geographic areas, but where necessary they have functional responsibilities. These responsibilities correspond with the geographical breakdown of the Office of Enforcement. In relation to the amount of information available to them and the requirements laid on them, the analysts are not able to process the raw data adequately. A problem at this phase of the intelligence cycle affects not only the use of the operational intelligence by enforcement agencies but also the support of the strategic intelligence effort, dependent as it is upon operational intelligence.

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Moreover, in addition to the lack of qualified analysts, DEA cites an inadequate level of clerical and support personnel.

Related to the shortage of analytical personnel is the lack of adequate information processing procedures and well-conceived ADP systems.

Agencies currently maintain, or has under development, four major automated systems:

- a. PATHFINDER
- b. NADDIS
- c. TECS
- d. MINT System

a. PATHFINDER I System. The principal objective of the PATHFINDER I system shall be to provide DEA intelligence with a totally integrated centralized capability for the automated storage and retrieval of information concerning known or suspected illicit drug activity. In providing this capability, the system shall accommodate the operational needs of DEA Intelligence in terms of both the specific information to be processed and the modes and methods of user/system interaction. With regard to the specific information to be processed, the system shall provide a data base structure which facilitates the storage, search, retrieval and presentation of information which identifies and describes:

- o Individuals known or suspected of illicit drug activity.
- o Illicit drug activities and their known or suspected relationship with identified individuals.
- o Aircraft and aircraft related operations known or suspected of involvement with illicit drug activities.

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The modes and methods of user/system interaction shall be such as to support the tactical, operational and strategic mission objectives of DEA Intelligence.

The system shall operate in an on-line/interactive mode through the use of keyboard/CRT type terminal devices located in secured facilities within the Office of Intelligence, DEA. Through the use of these terminals facilities, authorized DEA Intelligence personnel shall be able to access the system data base for the retrieval of specific information of interest, the input of new information, and the modifications or deletion of existing information. In addition to these basic on-line functions, the system shall also include processing functions which continuously monitor system activity and alert DEA Intelligence personnel to the occurrence of or request for significant information for which an information look-out has been established. Additional system processing functions shall provide for log-on/log-off system access control, telecommunication support, system maintenance support, batch mode data base update, intelligence report generation, system audit and management support reporting, and operations report generation.

b. Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (NADDIS). NADDIS is an on-line computer automated system that permits the compilation, retrieval, and analysis of operational intelligence data from over 330,000 criminal history records of drug law violators. The system is an integral portion of the comprehensive data base accessible through DEA ADP Telecommunication System (DATS) and consequently, provides instantaneous access to information on persons of interest to DEA both at Headquarters and in DEA field offices.

Through off-line processing the NADDIS data base provides drug traffic statistics, biographic profiles of drug law violators to support DEA enforcement and intelligence operations both in the field and at Headquarters. Also provided are various management reports related to operational effectiveness and planning.

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Requirements exist for the enhancement of NADDIS through expanded time of operation, increased efficiency of operation and retrieval, improved security, and interfaces with other DEA data bases as well as the law enforcement data bases of other agencies. DEA also has TECS - NADDIS exchange and Customs has DEA/NADDIS terminal in house.

The NADDIS is composed of centralized automated files on subjects of DEA interest, a nationwide computerized telecommunications network, and a set of supporting system maintenance, security, and user procedures. NADDIS terminal and communication facilities provide NADDIS subscribers with the capability to access the NADDIS files, as well as other on-line DEA automated files and relevant files in the Department of Justice.

Computer support for the DEA NADDIS, compliance and certain administrative files is provided by the Department of Justice (DOJ) IBM, 370/155 system. The NCIC files are supported by the FBI IBM 360/50 NCIC computer. DEA access to the NCIC files is provided by a communications link between the DOJ and FBI computer systems. The DEA headquarters IBM 360/40 provides the capability for remote entry of NADDIS batch transactions into the DOJ system.

The telecommunications network links DEA headquarters, all domestic regional officers, and most district offices. Communications linking the stations are a combination of dedicated leased and dial-up telephone circuits. Computer programs have been designed and stations at the regional offices are configured such that the capability exists to both access and update NADDIS files from the remote terminals. District offices with appropriate terminal equipment also possess this capability. Most district office stations, however, will be supported by dial-up communications that will provide the query capability only.

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c. Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). Treasury Enforcement Communications System is a system of telecommunication terminals located in law enforcement facilities of the Department of Treasury throughout the United States and connected to a computer center in San Diego, California.

TECS users include the U.S. Customs Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, IRS Inspection Service, IRS Intelligence Division, DEA, and INTERPOL Washington.

TECS provides to the Treasury law enforcement community with:

- o A computer-based index to files of common interest to Treasury enforcement agencies.
- o On-line access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- o Immediate message-switching capability point-to-point and broadcast among Headquarters and Treasury enforcement field levels.
- o An interface with the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) which provides:
 - a) An administrative message-switching capability between TECS and the enforcement agencies in the fifty states.
 - b) Vehicle registration inquiries.
 - c) Driver's license inquiries.

The computer-based network, which was originally conceived as CADPIN (Customs Automatic Data Processing Intelligence Network), began operation in April 1970 with a total of 20 terminals, all located at the Customs port of entry in San Ysidro, California.

Currently the network consists of more than 500 terminals located at land-border crossings along the Canadian and Mexican borders, key ports of entry at seaports and international airports, field offices of the Customs Office of Investigations, as well as offices of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, IRS Inspection Service, and the IRS Intelligence Division.

These terminals have immediate access to records in the TECS data base containing information on known or suspected violators of Customs laws. TECS records contain information on individuals, businesses, vehicles, aircraft and vessels; and include active records in NCIC contained in eight separate files on wanted persons, vehicles, license plates, articles, guns, securities, boats and criminal history records.

d. The Major International Narcotics Trafficker Program (MINT). The MINT program was initially approved by CCINC in early 1973. The concept of the program was to identify and accord highest priority to intelligence collection and enforcement action against key foreign leaders of large scale narcotics trafficking organizations throughout the world. It was an effort to focus the limited resources of the U.S. Government where they would have the greatest impact. Experience of the past few years has shown that a major factor contributing to the disruption of the flow of illicit narcotics into the United States has been the immobilization of a relatively small number of persons who play a major role in the international narcotics traffic, -- for example, the small group of major traffickers immobilized a few years ago that disrupted the France/Latin America connection.

CIA, Customs and DEA jointly identified and compiled basic data on approximately 225 major international foreign narcotics traffickers in Latin America, Europe, the Near East and East Asia. (The MINT includes no U.S. citizens.) This inventory was formally approved by the CCINC Working Group in September 1973 and designated as the MINT Register. It was sent to the field in January 1974 for additions and deletions and has been modified slightly as a result of subsequent field comments.

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A special computerized information retrieval system known as the MINT Target Analysis System (TAS) was developed by CIA to manipulate and analyze intelligence information on individuals on the MINT Register. This system uses the NMCS Information Processing System (NIPS), a formatted file system developed by IBM and the Department of Defense. This system provides for both batch and online processing, and allows the user to search and retrieve information from any data element in the file. A MINT record contains basic biographic data on the major trafficker, plus information on his associates, criminal history, addresses and phone numbers, vehicles and bank accounts. By sorting out these items of data, the system can establish relationships between various traffickers on the basis of common associates, the use of the same phone numbers or addresses, etc. Retrieval of data is accomplished either through online terminals, or in batch mode. A number of regular reports are produced both in printed form and in microfiche.

This system is designed to serve the needs of CIA and DEA until the latter Agency's PATHFINDER I system is operational. By employing a proven data management system and existing hardware, CIA was able to develop a usable system by mid-1974. When the PATHFINDER system is fully developed, the data in the MINT file will be transferred to DEA.

4. Current Capabilities for Dissemination

Competitive attitudes within and among agencies have had a negative impact on the sharing and use of intelligence. So long as budget hearings emphasize numbers of arrests as justification for enforcement agency budgets, intelligence will be withheld in order to maximize its holder's advantage over competing agencies. Two things are needed: (1) an educational program for the Congress and the public designed to provide a more sophisticated measure of the effectiveness of the Government's overall anti-narcotics program than numbers of arrests and seizures; and (2) some pressure on the agencies from above (perhaps from the Tyler Group) to minimize the destructive impact of the competitive attitudes which persist.

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One of the responsibilities of the analyst, as mentioned above, is the recognition of which data is of interest to users both within and outside of his own agency. It is also the analyst who can establish the links which make individual intelligence reports relevant to the work of the user. It is wrong, once this has been established, to then permit the withholding of information on specious grounds simply to advance the bureaucratic cause of the agency. Rather, the presumption should be that the information should be passed, and will be properly exploited by the user.

A problem which centers upon the behavior of the user, rather than the originator, has also surfaced: users of intelligence information must be compelled to observe all caveats concerning its exploitation and/or further dissemination. Failure to impose discipline in this regard leads to reluctance on intelligence producers' parts to provide sensitive intelligence.

Speed in dissemination of operational intelligence is often important. One man's operational intelligence may be another's tactical intelligence (for example, Customs would logically regard much of DEA's operational intelligence as tactical to their border operations). As DEA does not have the executive responsibility for all narcotics enforcement operatives, it follows that a higher level entity must take responsibility for policing the timely intelligence support of enforcement officers. The technical and organizational capabilities for speedy intelligence dissemination are clearly available; the problem is one of policy and -- perhaps to a greater degree -- of working level attitudes. (e.g., sharing of tactical information must usually be handled by field elements because of the time element; however, it is the field elements which are reportedly the source of much of the uncooperative and narrowly competitive attitudes cited to us.)

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Other impediments to dissemination of operational intelligence are the Right to Privacy Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and other statutory provisions regulating the handling of defendants' and witnesses' statements obtained in the course of criminal investigation. The full ramifications of these statutes and their interpretation by the courts are not yet foreseeable.

5. Value of Tactical and Operational Intelligence Analysis in Developing Cases

a. Value of Analysis. Certainly any pursuit of major traffickers will require analysis beyond the tactical thinking done by the investigative officer in the field. The latter is, of course, an essential input into enforcement activity and it is not our intention to belittle it. However, the full capabilities of intelligence support

for more effective operational planning (including the most efficient allocation of limited enforcement resources) can only be brought into play with the assistance of analytical resources beyond the field investigative officer. The analyst provides access to a broader information base than is available to the investigative officer. Much important information concerns activity beyond the regional assignment of the enforcement officer, and can assure that adequate attention can be focused on the linkages among narcotics-related individuals in different areas and activities. Only in this manner can the basis be provided for intelligent targeting and for the effective coordination of enforcement operations.

DEA's inadequate staffing of analytical positions is recognized both within its own management and by other agencies, since both groups perceive the gaps in intelligence support which result in part from insufficient analysis. Boosting the analytical staff of DEA's Office of Intelligence would not only increase the effectiveness of DEA's enforcement activity but would better enable DEA to meet its responsibilities in providing better intelligence support to other agencies, such as Customs.

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Improved analysis would also help resolve another problem hampering intelligence support within DEA: the problem of inadequate recognition by enforcement officers of the potential value of intelligence support. The analyst performs the key function of ensuring that information is evaluated and that the right information reaches the interested user. Improving the quality of that analysis helps promote the dialogue between intelligence producer and intelligence user which we have described elsewhere as essential to good intelligence support.

Analytical personnel must be supported by a well-organized data base, so that their work may be of maximum effectiveness and timeliness. The existing and the planned computer-based information systems in DEA as well as in the other intelligence producing and using agencies must be carefully reviewed in order to ensure that the most efficient system is being devised.

At the same time, it is recognized that requirements of security as well as of covering differing assortments of agency responsibilities will require some duplication of equipment and data bases.

B. Effect of Intelligence from Sensitive Sources on Prosecution

In some recent cases the need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods has required that prosecutions of traffickers be dropped. This has drawn attention to the question of the degree to which agencies producing such intelligence and supplying

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it to enforcement agencies should continue such activity. Primarily, of course, the intelligence producing agency in question is the CIA. Further, the intelligence at issue here is not the valuable strategic and background intelligence CIA produces, but rather the collection and reporting of information on individual traffickers and suspects.

Any response to this question must distinguish among users of CIA's product. While prosecutions by other agencies may be affected, the operations of the Customs authorities are not affected by this problem: Customs can use sensitive information for an arrest or seizure, and then use the arrest/seizure as the basis of an investigation. Customs' authority to search at border points is very broad; it is virtually inconceivable that the source of a tip which led to the search could be the subject of a discovery motion. (Should this ever happen, Customs would forego prosecution in order to protect the source; in any event, the contraband will have been taken out of circulation even though the violator may have to be released). For other enforcement agencies, the problem is a more serious one.

Ethical, statutory, and case law requirements force the Federal criminal prosecutor to disclose certain types of evidence which, when disclosed, would jeopardize the identify and continued existence of the source or publicly reveal a confidential agreement between the United States and a foreign government. Such revelations could cause serious adverse political or national security problems for either country.

The government's disclosure responsibilities are discussed briefly below. The impact of disclosure on federal prosecutions is discussed thereafter.

Under the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16 provides for disclosure to the defense of written or recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant. In addition, Rule 16 permits the defendant access to books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places which are within the custody or control of the government upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of his defense and provided the request for disclosure is reasonable.

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The Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. S3500) provides that a statement or report by a government witness in the government's possession must be turned over to the defense following direct examination of the witness at trial. The Act also applies to a witness' transcribed grand jury testimony if the witness is subsequently called as a government witness at trial. Failure or refusal to produce a Jencks statement will result in the trial court striking the testimony of that witness or declaring a mistrial.

In Brady vs. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(1963) the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution must turn over evidence favorable to the accused after a defense request. Non-compliance requires reversal irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith. Brady applies even where the prosecutor was personally unaware of the exculpatory information [Giglio vs. United States, 405 U.S. 15C(1972).]

Circumstances arise where the prosecution must disclose the identity of an informant or a source of information. In a pretrial hearing concerning the sufficiency of a warrant and affidavit, disclosure may become essential to prevent suppression of evidence when the reliability of the informant is in serious doubt and independent proof does not establish it. At trial, disclosure will be required if the informer's testimony is relevant and helpful to the defense or essential to a fair trial [Roviaro vs. United States, 353 U.S. 52(1957).]

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S3504 the government has an obligation to conduct a search of appropriate agencies to affirm or deny a defendant's claim, based upon sufficient evidence contained in an affidavit, that he has been the subject of electronic surveillance. In Alderman vs. United States, 394 U.S. 165(1969) the Supreme Court held that a defendant should receive all surveillance records as to which he has standing, e.g., conversations to which he was a party and conversations taking place on his premises. In Toscanino vs. United States, 500 F.2d (1974) the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held not only that the Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal electronic surveillance protects citizens abroad but also that it protects aliens illegally monitored in foreign countries by federal agents. Consequently, the government is obliged to

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supply information concerning electronic surveillance information to aliens whose conversations were overheard in foreign countries by federal agents.

The foregoing illustrate that a defendant may pursue a number of courses in order to obtain information regarding the way in which the government develop its case. The defendant can challenge each link in the chain. If a sensitive source is a link, it is entirely possible and often highly probable that the government will have to produce evidence regarding his identity and the nature of his agency affiliation. Once the government decides that it is necessary to protect the source, - regardless of reason - the defendant is, in effect, immunized from prosecution as long as the need for confidentiality exists. The government could not risk prosecution for fear of the consequences of disclosure.

Assuming that government agencies will continue to use sensitive sources for drug intelligence gathering purposes, we must look for ways to minimize the possible detrimental effects of such a procedure. One method of accomplishing this would be to ensure that drug intelligence gathering is under the direction of one agency (DEA). This would reduce the possibility that the intelligence operations of the various agencies would conflict and cause a drug prosecution to be dismissed. The agency charged with overall responsibility in drug intelligence matters should decide how best to handle a developing case. It may well be that greater emphasis would be placed on helping foreign countries build prosecutable cases against their indigenous violators with American connections. Foreign legal systems may not permit defense discovery motions and thus no sensitive source would be divulged.

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It is therefore recommended that in the long run DEA should fully develop its own capabilities and sources. While the advantages of having CIA operatives supplement the efforts of DEA abroad are important, the risk of contaminating cases must be considered in order that prosecutions not be dropped in the interest of protecting CIA's "sensitive sources and methods." While CIA performed an extremely valuable service during DEA's early years, this collection effort should be phased down concurrently with DEA's ability to build its own assets. CIA should continue to collect strategic intelligence, particularly that obtainable only through sources within foreign governments. However, coordination between CIA and DEA is essential. Only in this manner can complex cases involving both U.S. and foreign nationals be kept prosecutable in U.S. courts.

The roles of the various agencies overseas involved in the narcotics intelligence effort is an area of extreme sensitivity and complexity. Accordingly, with respect to the role of the CIA in narcotics intelligence activities and its relationship to DEA, it is recommended that the USIB re-examine and update its 1972 Intelligence Activities Against Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs study and in conjunction with CCINC make specific operating recommendations for both the long and short run.

C. Requirements for Development and Coordination of Intelligence Capabilities for the Future

Any program for improving our national narcotics operational intelligence over the next few years must include an improvement both in the way individual agencies perform their intelligence roles and the ways in which they interact. The improvements we seek will make themselves felt throughout the intelligence cycle from collection through dissemination to enforcement agencies. Substantial agency disagreement exists concerning the respective agency roles in the intelligence function.

Accordingly, a separate issue paper has been prepared which if resolved, could alter the comments of this section.

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1. Performance of Individual Agencies

a. The key to improving the intelligence support to the narcotics program is attracting and training good personnel, especially for the overseas collection assignments and the analyst functions. With regard to the overseas NIO's it might be worth considering a separate "foreign service" corps of officers, distinct from those on domestic U.S. duty, since the attraction of overseas service may draw candidates otherwise unreachable. Another suggestion which should be considered is combining the NIO function with the Special Agent function, if after a reasonable period of experience with the present arrangement such a change appears warranted. We suggest that after another year has passed DEA review this matter and assess the performance of the NIOs.

b. DEA's analytical resources must be increased. Failure to do this will cause negative impact not only upon DEA's own operations against major traffickers but also upon DEA's ability to provide needed intelligence support to other enforcement agencies (e.g., Customs). Along with increased analytical personnel, the requisite clerical and support personnel must also be added.

c. Each intelligence-collecting agency must exploit its sources fully and for the whole narcotics intelligence and enforcement community. Much information becomes available to debriefers and interrogators that is not now passed along to potentially interested users. We suggest that a new investigative report form be devised, with the participation of representatives of all user agencies, which would reflect priority operational intelligence questions and would compel the interrogator to cover a broader range of subjects than his individual investigation might dictate. Such a form could be divided into two parts, with the first part containing data on modus operandi, routes, concealment devices, communications, documentation, etc., which would automatically becoming available to other agencies with appropriate caveats. This bureaucratic device would therefore also serve to improve the flow of operational information among agencies involved in the narcotics supply reduction program.

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d. In addition to the interrogation of sources cited above, DEA officers abroad must be directed to collect against Customs requirements, rather than shift their efforts entirely away from interdiction-related intelligence. The withdrawal of most Customs officials from overseas has left an information gap which, despite DEA claims of having equal "expertise" to that possessed by the Customs personnel withdrawn (indeed, DEA points out that the majority of their personnel overseas are ex-Customs men), reflects a total lack of activity directed against Customs intelligence needs. (The options paper cited under 33-I-B- is relevant to this subject.)

e. The information processing, storage and retrieval system within DEA must be studied and improved. A filing system established for case reference must be transformed to meet intelligence analysis needs. Appropriate systems, both manual and ADP, should be studied. CIA experts could give good guidance on this.

f. There must be a recognition on the part of DEA management that enforcement and intelligence elements, both in the field and at headquarters work more closely. Field elements must be made responsive to Headquarters decisions and communications. In other words, management must re-assert its authority over its field elements, and see that the Office of Intelligence needs are being given appropriate attention by enforcement elements (just as intelligence must work in support of enforcement).

2. Interagency Relations and Cooperation

a. Ideally, something very basic must be attempted to remove the causes of the competitive strife among the agencies involved in this program, primarily between Customs and DEA. The committees of the Congress who pass on the agencies' budgets

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e. Provision must be made for Customs officers to be granted direct access to sources of operational information for follow-up questioning on points of particular interest. In cases involving sources turned over to DEA by Customs. The results of the recent DEA memorandum to its field elements calling for Customs access should be assessed after an appropriate interval to ensure that it is being complied with in the field.

3. Basic Requirements

DEA (subject to the overall guidance of the CCINC with regard to foreign activity, and of the Tyler Group with regard to domestic) should take the lead in coordinating with agencies which collect against the following requirements by mounting anti-narcotics intelligence collection operations. All collection agencies should use the list as a guide in screening information they collect as a by-product of their other activity, so that this type of operational intelligence will be disseminated to users.

a. Information on individuals:

- Biographic (Name, date of birth, race, sex, height, weight, other descriptions, address and telephone number, identification numbers--social security number, drivers license, passport, NCIC)
- Associates and Contacts (with bio)
- Narcotics activities and modus operandi
- Travel patterns and routes
- Vehicles, ships, planes used
- Criminal record
- Language capability
- Financial data (including bank accounts)

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b. Production

- Identify production cycles (e.g., locations where specific plants are grown; growing and harvest seasons).
- Describe production methods (e.g., equipment needed, seed supplies, method of collecting raw materials).
- Identify the owners and/or financiers of narcotic crop producing areas.
- Describe eradication efforts; assess their effectiveness.

c. Processing/Laboratories

- Identify marihuana packaging sites.
- Identify the personalities involved in the purchase and use of precursors.
- How are precursors purchased, protected, stored, and shipped? By whom?
- Identify the sources of precursors and other items necessary for the processing of narcotics.
- Identify laboratory chemists involved in the production of illicit drugs.
- Identify the characteristics, if any, of various types of laboratories which make them susceptible to identification.
- Identify the reasons laboratories are moved. What happens to laboratory equipment when not being used?
- Are diluents or cutting agents ever added to a specific drug in a foreign country prior to entry into the U.S.? At what level? Where? What materials are used? Who adds the diluents? When are the diluents added?

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d. Caches

- Identify storage sites for various drugs and narcotics; both raw and finished products.
- Proximity of storage sites to major urban or port areas with connecting international transportation facilities.
- Definitive listing of major international carriers and/or routes which service urban areas in or near storage sites.
- Can all narcotics be stored? Which narcotics deteriorate? What is done about narcotics that deteriorate? How does this affect the trafficker's method of operating?

e. Organizations

- Identify the role played by a particular trafficker/group vis-a-vis other individuals/groups.
- Identify organizational trends in trafficking. What causes traffickers to operate independently? In Groups? In splinter groups? As entrepreneurs?
- Identify rivalries between traffickers/groups. How are these problems handled?
- Identify methods groups use in controlling/eliminating competition.
- Identify role played by particular groups, ethnic groups and traffickers (e.g., some are traditionally suppliers, others are couriers, etc.).
- Identify sub-groups, satellite groups and specialists and the roles they play.
- Describe the ability and capability of a trafficker or group to provide, deliver, and produce narcotics.

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- Describe the relationships among various traffickers. Is there any common bond or unity among traffickers? Do they owe allegiance to any higher authority? Are there different levels of traffickers? How is this determined? Are there gang wars for control of production or the market? Is there competition for base and raw materials? If there are conflicts, how are they resolved? What kinds of decisions do traffickers have to make and how do they make them? What do they worry about? What is important to them? How do they go about evaluating their operations and personal situations as circumstances change?

f. Subversives

- Identify narcotics trafficking activity associated with subversive and terrorist activities.

g. Method of Operation

- Identify the diversion of legally produced materials into illegal channels.
- Identify characteristics of methods used by traffickers, groups and couriers in the transportation and concealment of illicit narcotic substances which make them susceptible to discovery.
- Identify traffickers' methods of protecting each other and cohorts who have been caught.
- Identify other criminal (non-narcotic) activity on the part of traffickers.
- Identify security measures taken by traffickers to preclude rip-offs.
- Identify the methods used by U.S. buyers to contact foreign sources of supply. How do sources of supply find buyers?

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- Describe how connections are made and transactions are negotiated.
- Are transactions dependent on the personalities involved (e.g., level of importance of principals; nationality; established traffickers vs. new entrepreneurs)?
- Identify methods or means used by traffickers for security and protection from arrest or harrassment or discovery from other traffickers or criminals.
- How do traffickers protect themselves from customers who may be informants?
- Are couriers used more than once? Under what circumstances?
- Describe the relations among various traffickers. To what extent, if any, is the traffic organized? Are trafficking groups formed ad hoc or do they have any degree of permanence?
- Are there different types of customers in relation to their security, reliability, value as a customer? How would different categories of customers be described?

h. Neutralization

- Identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities of traffickers and groups of traffickers for legal prosecution; for enforcement activities; for infiltration; for disruption; for action by other agencies, governments and jurisdictions.
- Identify means for introducing collectors of information into the groups (e.g. informants, undercover personnel, technical equipment).
- Identify potential sources of information within groups; identify potential witnesses.

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- Identify from among the recognized narcotics traffickers, those most promising for further investigation and ultimate neutralization either through prosecution, conviction or sentencing (or other actions on the part of foreign governments); disruption by seizures; disruption by cutting off supplies or narcotics.
- Identify conditions requiring immediate and prompt investigative and enforcement action.
- Identify conditions requiring long-term information gathering prior to the possibility of enforcement action/resolution.

i. Infrastructure/Personalities

- Identify owners of production areas (poppy, coca and marihuana fields, etc.).
- Identify Class I violators as targets for intensified intelligence and enforcement activity.
- Identify chemists, sources of financial support, attorneys, bail bonds persons, sources of supply, financiers, couriers/groups, stolen or false document specialists, domestic distributors, importers, enforcers.

j. Communications

- Identify methods of communications used by major traffickers (e.g., codes, terminology, language, radios (frequencies, hours of transmission), letters, telephones, telegraphs, carrier pigeon).
- Describe communications security used by traffickers or the non-use of security (e.g., those who talk freely over telephones).

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k. Finances

- Identify the methods for the handling of funds in narcotics transactions.
- Identify other means of payment for narcotics (e.g., exchange of one drug for another, exchange of weapons, gold, precious metals, precious stones, strategic materials).
- Identify the price of drugs. Are there different price levels for a specific drug? What is the basis for the difference and how is it determined? What are the going standard prices? How much leeway is there in negotiations over price?
- What do traffickers do with their profits?

l. Concealment/Transportation

- Identify methods of concealment used in the shipping of narcotics (at all stages of the traffic).
- Identify and describe methods of transportation at various stages from production to ultimate distribution (e.g., vehicles, vessels, aircrafts, locations of airstrips, identity of businesses used in the transportation, pilots).
- Describe transportation security used by traffickers.
- Identify routes, frequency of shipments, and patterns.
- What is the easiest way to bring drugs into the U.S? Why?
- Identify major Free Zone areas which could be utilized as transshipment points.

- Identify international firms with U.S. connections utilizing Free Zone Areas.
- Identify existing carnets available which provide maximum potential for smuggling activity.
- Identify shipping methods -- e.g., containers -- which provide maximum potential for smuggling of drugs.

m. Businesses

- Identify businesses used as covers for the narcotics traffickers.
- Identify ownership of businesses which lend themselves to smuggling operations -- e.g., bottling, canning -- owned or controlled by known or suspected smugglers.
- Identify hotels, bars, restaurants, night clubs, etc., frequented by major traffickers.
- Identify rest and recreation sites frequented, owned, or used by traffickers.

n. Political/Economic Support

- Identify banking or other financial institutions suspected of underwriting narcotics transactions.
- Identify international businesses or financial institutions having contacts with major traffickers.
- Report any information indicating that major traffickers are being aided by foreign governments or by officials of those governments. What form does this aid take?

4. Other

a. The pattern of light sentences of offenders reduces any incentive arrested suspects might have to cooperate in a full debriefing. As the DEA Acting Administrator believes heavier sentences imposed upon

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offenders would stimulate more cooperation with enforcement officers and increase the amount and quality of intelligence obtained from these potentially valuable sources.

b. Court and legislative actions affecting these programs will have to be watched closely during the next few years, since agency actions which improve the sharing of intelligence information and promote effective enforcement efforts may increasingly be restricted under laws (and court interpretations of laws) protecting privacy of individuals. Regulation of the flow of official reporting and record keeping may result.

III. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

A. Assessment of Current Capabilities

1. Current Capabilities for Collection

DEA is inadequately equipped for the collection of the foreign strategic intelligence needed. In part, this reflects the heavy demands which domestic enforcement responsibilities impose upon DEA's limited manpower, and the resulting imbalance between DEA's relatively large allocation of resources to domestic operations. In part, it also reflects the fact that in DEA the strategic collection responsibility falls largely upon the same shoulders as the criminal investigation: On the special agent, rather than on resources devoted to intelligence collection. The gradual development of the NIO system is seen as potentially helpful in resolving this difficulty.

For the reasons stated above, DEA's strategic intelligence effort satisfies neither its internal needs nor those of the U.S. Government narcotics control effort. Precise strategic requirements must therefore be met by other intelligence collection agencies, including CIA. The DEA requirements staff must show both greater perception of

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the kind of guidance required by collectors and of the needs of DEA and the U.S. Government's policy-level decision makers.

Experience in this area -- new to DEA's law enforcement-oriented organization -- and additional resources will contribute to a more rapid development of DEA's collection requirements system.

The Group believes that it is DEA, as the agency charged (under CCINC guidance) with the overall direction of the U.S. Government's anti-narcotics strategy and planning, which must both develop a perception of its strategic intelligence needs (appropriately through its Office of Policy and Evaluation) and articulate these needs to the intelligence collectors via its Requirements Staff.

2. Current Capabilities for Strategic Intelligence Analysis

DEA's in-house personnel assigned to strategic intelligence analysis (9 persons and clerical support) are inadequate to the task of handling the high volume of incoming information, largely contained in operational rather than strategic reporting. They are therefore compelled to fall back upon reviewing operational intelligence analyses and extrapolating from them. DEA also turns to CIA for support in this area. CIA, if provided with both precise requirements and a reasonable flow of reporting from DEA channels to supplement its own reporting, performs very useful strategic intelligence analysis.

3. Current capabilities for strategic intelligence production

The production of strategic intelligence has suffered from a lack of effective central direction of the effort, as well as inadequate allocation of resources within DEA. CIA has considerable production capability if it is advised of precisely what is needed, but CIA has been receiving little by way of requests from DEA on this type of intelligence.

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DEA recognizes that its "capabilities for collection, analysis and production in the strategic area are very modest indeed." It also recognizes that "the consumers of this type of intelligence at the policy level of government have needs considerably greater than what they are receiving." But the problem is not merely one of assigning more analysts to the Strategic Intelligence Staff. DEA itself must, as the lead agency in the Federal anti-narcotics program, provide the leadership to its own production unit as well as coordinate with those in other agencies capable of effective work of this kind. This requires that DEA offices outside of the Office of Intelligence (such as the Office of Planning and Evaluation) become involved. These outside offices should have good ideas as to what the most pressing strategic intelligence needs are at any given time.

B. Requirements for Development and Coordination of Strategic Intelligence Capabilities

DEA must under appropriate CCINC supervision, provide the leadership in the foreign strategic intelligence area which is currently lacking. Its own Administrator and staff are the key users of such intelligence, and are in the best position to know what the system should be required to provide at any given time.

However, DEA should not attempt to do the entire job alone. Once more precise requirements are articulated, other agencies with good capabilities in this area should be asked for their contributions. CIA, for example, should continue to collect and assess strategic intelligence.

1. Interagency Coordination

DEA should also coordinate, but not attempt to develop the capability to carry out alone, the process of producing strategic estimates. CIA and other agencies should be brought into such enterprises, when needs are clearly perceived and expressed. Again, it is DEA's own leadership which should provide the initiative in calling for estimates in support of policy decision-making.

An Intelligence Estimates Board has been (Foreign and Domestic) established within DEA. The purpose of the Board is to focus insights from various disciplines on major intelligence questions and situations requiring authoritative assessments. To assess the impact of foreign political and military developments that might significantly affect DEA's presence and effectiveness in critical overseas areas, an appropriate intelligence community committee and the aegis of USIB should be considered. *under*

2. Basic Strategic Collection Requirements

a. Domestic

- What changes are occurring in the U.S. addict population?
- What are the current patterns of drug abuse?
- What measure do we have of availability and price of drugs?
- What is the relative availability, in each major drug use area, of drugs from each of the various foreign sources?
- Through what import centers are drugs currently entering the U.S.?
- What are current ethnic patterns in drug trafficking and distribution?
- What are the distribution routes of illicit drugs within the U.S.?
- What is the overall current impact of enforcement programs on traffickers and trafficking patterns?

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b. International

- What are the current and potential foreign source and levels of production of narcotics and dangerous drugs?
- What are the current international trafficking patterns in narcotics and dangerous drugs?
- What are the international political factors which may be involved with drug trafficking or which may affect U.S. counteractions against traffic?
- To what extent will foreign governments fulfill their commitments for narcotics control?
- In which countries will the presence of corrupt or weak officials in the government adversely affect narcotics control?
- What are the currency flows within and into illicit drug conspiracies, and which domestic U.S. and foreign financial institutions are involved?
- What are current drug abuse trends in the foreign countries on the CCINC Priority Country List? Include data on availability, price and purity of illicit drugs in these countries, and the impact of international sanctions or changes in drug enforcement procedures and national laws directed at drug abuse.
- What scientific and medical innovations have a bearing on the production, availability, effects and profitability of known and potential illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs?
- What are the anti-narcotic plans and intentions of the priority countries designated by the CCINC?

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- What are the capabilities and performance of the priority countries in carrying out anti-narcotics programs?
- To what degree are these anti-narcotic activities supported by politically influential groups within the designated countries?
- What role do licit or illicit narcotics play in the designated countries' economics?
- Does the existence of corruption within these countries inhibit or prevent effective anti-narcotic programs?
- How willing are these governments to cooperate with U.S. efforts to expose and prosecute producers, traffickers and their collaborators?

IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Caution must be used in reliance upon quantitative measures of any sort in measuring intelligence achievements. Too often, management has read into indices which supposedly relate intelligence to operations something other than what those indices actually measured. Sheer numbers of reports seldom indicate the precision, credibility, or utility of the sources employed. One is, therefore, obliged to depend upon a combination of qualitative judgments: some from within the collection apparatus itself, others from the perspective of the user.

A. Identification of Methods

1. In-house Management Supervision

Collectors of sensitive intelligence protect their sources and methods from disclosure in order to remain effective. For this reason, even those who receive and use the intelligence produced are often left unaware of details of the collection process (exceptions

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occur if such precise background is essential for them to know in order for the intelligence itself to be of value). For this reason, a certain amount of the judgment concerning the effectiveness of the intelligence effort must be performed within the collecting agency. This constant internal (intra-agency) assessment is an important responsibility of management. Management is in the unique position to know the difficulty of the job, the relevant operational problems and circumstances, and the effort being applied toward its accomplishment.

2. Judgment by Users of Operational Intelligence

From the perspective of the overall Federal drug supply reduction program, however, there are other and, in some ways more important, methods of monitoring intelligence achievements. Of course, success or failures in reducing narcotics supplies may or may not reflect significant intelligence achievements. The users of operational intelligence (primarily analysts and enforcement officers) are in the best position to judge the degree to which intelligence has contributed to the achievement of their missions. In the intelligence community, these judgments are usually communicated to management and to collectors in two ways: (a) in formally-designed questionnaires of one sort or another (DEA currently uses a transmittal form requesting customer evaluation of the accompanying intelligence report within sixty days), and (b) in the form of feedback from users to collectors of the kind that takes place informally and frequently in an effective intelligence support operation.

3. A Note on Strategic Intelligence:

In the case of strategic intelligence collection, the key measure of achievement is whether the user -- in this case the policy planner -- has the data base he requires for decision-making. He is the best judge of this, and no measure that relies on the judgments of others is

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valid. As with other types of intelligence, regular dialogue back and forth between those who produce and those who are strategic intelligence not only improves the intelligence support to the planners but can provide an important measure of intelligence achievement.

B. Assessment of Methods, and Proposed Improvements

The most important improvement that could be made in the ways in which the above functions are performed would be to improve the relationship between those who provide intelligence and those who use it, in that it is the dialogue between enforcement officer and intelligence collector, or between policy-level planner and strategic intelligence producer, which is currently inadequate. Those who use intelligence in support of their missions and want to have its full benefit must feed back to those who provide it comments on its value and apparent accuracy, as well as follow-up questions to guide further efforts.

DEA's current form requesting comments has had disappointing results and DEA has, therefore, designed a simplified form to reduce the burden on the user of the intelligence report, in the hope of increasing use of the form.

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PRELIMINARY ALTERNATIVES ON INTELLIGENCE ROLES
OF FEDERAL AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE NARCOTICS EFFORT

Reorganization Plan #2 created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in recognition of the importance to focus Federal efforts on overall supply reduction of drugs. While DEA is the lead enforcement agency in this effort, other agencies play a key complementary role in interdicting the flow of materials.

Unfortunately, a substantial rift has developed between two of the major agencies -- DEA and Customs. While the disagreement is allegedly based on differing "philosophies", the real problem appears to be that DEA is not now adequately meeting Customs' legitimate requirements for intelligence needs related to drugs crossing the U. S. borders.

The DEA, as result of Reorganization Plan #2, was vested with the responsibility for overseas and domestic intelligence collection and dissemination in support of its drug enforcement mission. However, the Customs Service maintains that the intelligence requirements for its mission differ substantially from the requirements of DEA. Accordingly, the information supplied in the past by DEA does not permit full utilization of Customs' resources in combating the increasing drug flows into the United States. However, it must be noted that DEA Administrator Dogin has agreed to supply Customs with all the intelligence it requires and DEA is currently implementing this decision.

In recognition of this operational problem, four basic alternative approaches are presented for the collecting of "actionable" intelligence:

1. Maintain the Current Division of Responsibilities

- DEA retains exclusive actionable intelligence collection authority.
- Customs levies requirements on DEA and provides feedback.
- DEA services Customs' needs to support border interdiction mission.
- Customs to be given access to information derived from persons arrested or seized and turned over to DEA, as well as access to the individual.

- Arguments for:
 - Strictly complies with Reorganization Plan #2.
 - Retains "Single Agency" profile for overseas responsibility.
 - It is not timely to make fundamental changes in the process until the current DEA/Customs agreement is fully implemented and evaluated.
- Arguments against:
 - The intelligence requirements of Customs are not being met, although there are clear indications that DEA is prepared to give raw intelligence data to Customs.
 - Difficult to have one agency interpret and filter intelligence for a separate consumer.
 - Differing "philosophical" approaches will be difficult to overcome.
- 2. Creation of an Interagency National Narcotics Intelligence Operation
 - Collection operations retained by DEA.
 - DEA to commit specific resources to meet Customs' requirements.
 - DEA, Customs, and INS would jointly provide analysis capabilities under DEA auspices.
 - Personnel (colocated) would service parent organization requirements.
 - Retain "single agency profile" overseas.
 - Arguments for:
 - Establishes a formal mechanism for all agencies to share intelligence data.
 - May enhance user feedback.
 - Could provide resources necessary for continuous 7 day-a-week services.

- Arguments against:

- Experience indicates that interagency operations are not effective. Similar to Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI) which did not work.
- CCINC Foreign Intelligence Subcommittee and USIB already provide a formal mechanism for intelligence sharing.
- May deemphasize the importance of the intelligence function within DEA by providing DEA with "unaccountable" resources.

3. Establish Limited Complementary Customs Intelligence Role

- Establish complementary overseas narcotics intelligence role for Customs to support its border interdiction function.
- Customs personnel would service a full range of requirements for its parent organization.
- Customs required to coordinate with DEA on all narcotics activities.

- Arguments for:

- Permits consumer to ensure intelligence requirements are met.
- Personnel, familiar with agency requirements, would collect against those requirements.
- May increase utilization of a key Federal resource in reducing the supply of drugs into the central states.
- Permits a Customs-to-Customs interface overseas.

- Arguments against:

- Abrogates single agency profile overseas.
- May violate informal agreements with foreign countries.
- Creation, in a limited way, of potential redundant efforts.
- Requires additional resources.

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4. Establish Full Complementary Customs Intelligence Role

- Reestablish complementary Customs narcotics role in operational and intelligence activities relative to its border interdiction mission.
- Customs personnel would service full range of Customs requirements, including actionable intelligence and modus operandi.
- Coordination role with DEA to develop strategic intelligence.
- Specifically excludes lead responsibility for domestic intelligence and investigation.
- Arguments for:
 - Would maximize the resources brought to bear against the drug problem.
 - Requirements and mission of Customs differ substantially from DEA.
 - Narcotics is only one segment of the Customs mission.
- Arguments against:
 - Could foster unwarranted competition among the agencies.
 - Abrogates "single agency profile" overseas.
 - Requires substantial additional resources, much of which could be redundant.