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DDI-311 -67

25 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Reducing DDI Information Processing

Commitment

REFERENCE: D/OCR memorandum for DDI, 12 Jan 67,

Subj: Plans for the Reduction of OCR

1. This memorandum comments generally on referent paper and suggests next steps.

- 2. I believe that the way in which I can best assist you in arriving at a decision on the ultimate level of OCR operations you wish to approve is to provide judgments independent of John Vance's, based upon my own nearly ten years experience in this field (six as head of OCR and almost four in a more general supervisory capacity), during which time we have already reduced the level of these activities in excess of \_\_\_\_\_\_ even allowing for the assumption of new tasks.
- 3. The paper Mr. Vance has submitted is a succinct appraisal of a complex matter presented as accurately as it is within OCR's power to do without more immediate reference to those it serves. It contains sufficient detail to permit several decisions now, some tentative, some more conclusive. A validation, for example, of the substantive assumptions (page 2 of PLAN) would clarify a great deal immediately.
- 4. The alternatives explored by Mr. Vance clearly meet the letter of your instructions, but in my judgment any reduction below is too extensive. My quarrel is a matter of degree, not of kind. For example, in PLAN C the projected reduction of indexing and machine support will so weaken the retrieval and file building capabilities of OCR as to render them negligible, and simply force the production offices into separate individual programs supported by OCS. You should in my judgment limit the maximum reduction over the next 24 to 30 months to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ There, in the absence of any new developments, the matter would rest and no further reductions would be planned.

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- 5. In addition, I believe we can reduce the number of alternatives Vance has outlined by eliminating the least feasible now rather than postponing decisions and thereby aggravating management problems of implementation. For example, PLAN C calling for the abolition of CHIVE in any form could be dropped as the least preferable of the alternatives.
- 6. At some point, consultation with production offices needs to be undertaken. This input would make us more confident about minimal levels of required activity. This is especially so in setting levels of operations with an elastic demand (such as biographic and translation services). In these cases the intellectual input of OCR serves to save the time of production analysts themselves. Here the deciding as procuring, receiving, controlling, routing) need is not at issue, the question is how best to get the job done, that is, should centralization survive?
- 7. An added consideration as to timing of cuts is the relocation of personnel. I know that program justification is to be arrived at without regard for effect on people. However, Agency personnel policy makes this distinction one of little practical significance in the short run as far as the line manager is concerned. A reduction of the magnitude proposed will require considerable time to effect, even assuming we get more help in dealing with personnel problems than we have gotten in the past under similar circumstances.
- 8. Following your review of the OCR study, I feel it imperative that we have the opportunity to discuss with you the concepts which John Vance has set forth in his Tab C, submitted, and your views on the specific reductions proposed. When we have the benefit of your views, we can recommend a specific course of action, including how to take user views into account in arriving at projected levels of operation.

Director of Intelligence Support

cc: D/OCR

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