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**Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence**


DATE: 8 May 1974

TO : DDI

SUBJECT: Portugal

Attached is an estimative memorandum on the new regime in Portugal and its African problem, done by a group from CIA, INR and DIA. The many uncertainties prevailing in this situation dictate a fairly short-term look ahead, but this assessment does seek to define the forces at work and foreseeable crunch points.

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Keith Clark
National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

*File - NIO for
West Europe*

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INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM

8 May 1974

SUBJECT: PORTUGAL AFTER THE COUP*

* *This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. Experts from CIA, DIA and INR participated in its preparation.*

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PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

A. General Spínola and the junta have set in train a process with ends which are clearer than the means by which they hope to achieve them. The announced objectives are:

- A speedy liberalization of Portuguese political life;
- An urgent effort to improve economic and social conditions,
- and an accommodation in Africa.

In the first euphoric days, the program has been enthusiastically received by the bulk of the Portuguese at home and a honeymoon phase is still on. Those in African territories are torn between hope and apprehension. The difficulty will come in defining these goals in practical terms and in evolving methods of government which will work without getting out of control. A kind of instant liberalization has been started in which inexperienced political forces will compete for power under untested procedures and the consequent strains and uncertainties make for a very chancey outlook. Political liberalization must be considered a very tender plant in Portugal, and moderate forces have not yet organized effectively.

B. A counter-coup or other drastic reaction from the right is conceivable but unlikely.

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-- Institutional pillars of the old regime have been so caught off guard, purged and fragmented that they are probably incapable of organized action, for a considerable time to come at least.

-- Most elements that made up the former establishment are highly apprehensive, but can do little at the moment. Some, including elements of the forty families, will probably go along with the junta. Others will look for opportunities to reverse the course of events -- particularly as the new regime encounters frustrations in Africa and challenges at home from the left.

C. On the long suppressed left, the new freedom is still heady stuff, but rivalries are beginning to appear and will probably become more apparent when the junta begins actually to allocate positions of power in the prospective provisional government.

-- For some time at least, both Socialist and Communist leaders, mindful of their own organizations' weaknesses and inexperience, will probably try to maintain a moderate enough line to avoid provoking the junta into a crackdown on the left (something for which the conservatives will hope and work).

-- However, with inexperienced factions contesting for power, the chances of provocative acts will remain high, and the junta may resort to repression.

D. The most critical determinant of success or failure will be the armed forces' unity and support for the junta and the provisional government. Unified military support will be essential both to the regime's ability to liberalize at home without losing uncontrollable forces and to make difficult decisions in Africa without losing control either to black insurgents or dissident white settlers. Armed forces

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unity will, in turn, depend heavily on progress toward military disengagement on the African front -- an uncertain prospect. Yet if this regime cannot keep military support for its program, the alternatives are probably a reversion to suppression or another military coup.

E. A tolerable accommodation in the provinces will be dependent not just on the Lisbon government but also on the African insurgents, other African governments, Portuguese settlers, and the territorial governments. The left at home is making African independence its political battle cry. Given the conflicting interests, the process could easily be derailed.

F. As for the new regime's specific policies, we do not yet know enough about the junta to make confident assessments of its orientation, and it has hardly had time to turn attention to details of substantive policy. With Portugal facing problems as intractable as France in 1958, Spinoza may prove to be a Portuguese de Gaulle, or he may turn out to be a Naguib. Subject to these qualifications, however, the provisional government now appears likely to pursue the following lines:


-- At home, an effort to open up political life and move speedily toward representative government -- subject to certain minimal controls by the junta against excesses by the far left or a resurgence on the right.

-- In the African territories, a policy of disavowing military solutions and working through new governors to institute certain high impact concessions to blacks, while trying to promote a Portuguese national consensus on the eventual solution. Since concessions to the blacks will generate apprehension among the white settlers -- at least in Angola and Mozambique -- chances that the regime can walk this tight rope are not good. The insurgencies are thus likely to continue.

-- Relations with Spain will be marked by intense Spanish wariness over the forces set loose in Portugal, but the chances are the two governments will achieve a precarious modus vivendi unless Spinoia and the moderates lose control.

-- Portugal will seek to improve political and economic relations with West European governments and enhance its role in NATO and ties with the EC. It will find these governments sympathetic to any movement toward accommodation in Africa and to giving Portuguese moderates and socialists power in a liberalized government.

-- Good relations with the US will be particularly important to Spinoia and the moderates. Whether this will translate into better terms for US use of the Azores base is uncertain. The regime may de-couple arms for Africa from the negotiations, or it may press for arms as protection for the territories while they move toward self-determination. It will in any case probably seek postponement of the Azores negotiations.



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
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8 May 1974

INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Portugal After the Coup

WHO STAGED THE COUP AND WHY?

1. The Armed Forces Movement which overthrew the Portuguese government on April 25 is composed principally of middle rank officers -- most, if not all, career officers -- who largely remain an unknown quantity. The officers were moved to act by:

-- anger over the firing of Generals Costa Gomes and Spínola after the publication last February of General Spínola's book advocating political rights for Portuguese and a federation to solve the African problem.

-- conviction that Prime Minister Caetano, by his response to Spínola's challenge, was a captive of the far rightists and therefore incapable of making any moves toward liberalization at home or in the African provinces.

-- beyond these specifics lay a more general discontent with low military pay, lack of modern weapons, repeated assignments

in Portuguese Africa, and a feeling that the army might be made a scapegoat if and when the civilians decided to pull out of Africa.

2. Following the swift takeover of the government the Armed Forces Movement called on Spinoła to lead a junta of National Salvation and to run the government until a new administration could be formed. Costa Gomes and five other officers from the three services comprise the junta.

3. Because they were ostensibly "invited" to join after the revolt was launched it is not clear how significant a role Spinoła and the other junta members played in the planning of the coup.

-- Spinoła and Costa Gomes may have known about the coup for some time but preferred to remain in the background to be available for another try in the event that it failed.

-- or the young officers, acting on their own but recognizing the need to reassure moderates and gain broad popular support, may have decided late in the process to invite Spinoła's support.

4. Whatever the circumstances, Spinoła and Costa Gomes have a power and prestige of their own that argues against their playing merely figurehead roles. They and the new junta appear to have a wide latitude in making decisions; and the Armed Forces Movement is so far remaining in the background. General Spinoła gives the impression that he is in charge.

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THE SECURITY FORCES

5. The junta, and after it the provisional government, can probably count on the military and what remains of the security forces to keep order in Portugal.* This, at least, is the conclusion to be drawn from public statements and behavior so far, other evidence concerning military loyalties to Spinoia and the junta, and the fact that purges have been carried out or are in process against those in the military or security services whose loyalty to the old regime would make them suspect to the new.

* *With the abolition in the Metropole of the principal security service, the Directorate General of Security (DGS), and the ultra-rightist paramilitary organization, the Portuguese Legion, the remaining security services are the Portuguese Security Police (PSP), the National Republican Guard (GNR), the Judiciary Police and the Customs Guard or Fiscal Guard. Other small, specialized police forces exist, but they would not make a significant contribution to the overall Portuguese security situation. Of the security services currently in existence, only the GNR gave any resistance to the coup on 25 April. But its resistance was minimal and on 26 April the junta announced that the GNR had submitted to the junta and was to be obeyed by the populace.*

The junta announced on 26 April and reiterated on 2 May that a reorganization and cleansing of the armed and military forces is presently underway and included the PSP, GNR, and Customs Guard among the organizations which would be affected.

In the overseas provinces, the DGS has been reorganized under the military with a reduced role. In Portugal, some working-level elements of the DGS may also be reorganized under control of the military with restricted duties.

6. But this estimate must be qualified. Not only have the Spinoia regime's liberalization measures opened up a wide spectrum of suppressed political forces in new and untested relations with each other and the government, but they have also eliminated the most important institutional organs which supported order under the former government.

-- The political left is calling for further purges among the remaining security organizations -- the Security Police and the National Guard. Inevitably, the regime faces the problem of maintaining order against possible unfamiliar challenges and with security forces whose efficiency and reliability is not clearly proven.

-- It is probable that the wide public enthusiasm for the regime manifested so far, together with the loyalty of the army, will enable the junta to deter or cope with any serious challenge. But it is by no means certain, and splits within the military could easily alter this outlook.

7. In the next few months, the leaders who have set out to revolutionize the country will have to determine what institutional role the military is going to fulfill in the new political system.

-- Spinoia's intention to move toward free elections in a year or so would seem to require a temporary, custodial role by the

military while preparations are made to turn the government over to elected civilian politicians.

-- The military leaders, however, would probably feel compelled to take some restraining measure and perhaps tighten their control instead of loosening it if they perceive a serious threat of political upheaval, particularly involving leftists and communists. (The interim President will have the same strong power as ex-President Thomaz to use to crack down if the situation gets out of hand.)

-- At a minimum, the military will retain a watchdog stand over the developing situation and will not concede the strong influence it has traditionally held in Portuguese political affairs. Furthermore, if no significant progress is made toward military disengagement on the African front, military dissidence may again well up against the government in power.

8. The military have also assumed political control in the African provinces of Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. They have ousted the provincial governors and, in Mozambique, disbanded the legislature.

-- Thus far, the military leaders in the provinces have supported and followed instructions from the junta in Lisbon, but how long they will continue to accept faithfully such direction is open to question.

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-- In each province, the armed forces now contain a large percentage of local personnel whites and blacks. Although they are Portuguese in culture and training, their futures are tied more to their provinces than to the Metropole.

9. In addition, military service in the provinces has provided opportunities for a number of senior Portuguese military commanders, as with General Spinoia, to obtain a taste for political power. Indeed, General Kaulza de Arriaga, former Military Commander in Mozambique, had been considered as a competitor with Spinoia for the presidency.

-- Kaulza, or others like him, might conceivably try to seize authority in the potentially rich provinces of Angola and Mozambique. Supported by the provincial military forces and Portuguese colonists, they could attempt to dictate the degree of "federation" they would be willing to retain with the Metropole.

-- South Africa and Rhodesia might be willing to back such locally-controlled regimes in Angola and Mozambique in an effort to develop a stronger position in the future economic development and exploitation of these areas, and, more importantly, help to insure that these regimes would continue to prosecute the counter-insurgency campaign.

THE NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Structure

10. The junta's plan is to serve for about three weeks to allow time for appointment of a provisional government. Until a government is chosen, a delegate of the junta will be in charge of each ministry. The provisional government, Spínola says, would serve for one year during which preparations would be made for the election by secret ballot and universal suffrage of a constituent assembly and a new president.

11. The junta will choose the president of the provisional government who is expected to have the same power granted that office by the present constitution. Spínola is likely to be selected and he could be expected to be a candidate when and if the permanent government is set up. There probably will be a prime minister although this is not yet confirmed. With Spínola as president, the prime minister would likely be subordinate to him, and thus the interim government may bear strong resemblance to the regime de Gaulle established in France in 1958. Spínola has already let it be known that military officers will occupy only the service ministries. Reportedly the junta will become a Council of State to advise the president. Junta members have already been appointed to head the joint armed forces staff and to be chiefs of the three services.

Support and Opposition

12. The lifting of the restrictions on political activity has set in motion the rebirth and realignment of political and social forces -- a kind of instant liberalization in which inexperienced political forces will compete for power under untested conditions and ground rules. The outcome is necessarily very uncertain.


The Left's Initiative

13. So far, the leftist forces have been clearly in the lead. The Socialists, Communists, and some liberals quickly formed a coalition, the Portuguese Democratic Movement, as a vehicle for consolidating the forces of the left. Left wing activists from the movement have been involved in widely publicized actions such as encouraging workers to take over labor organizations, some newspapers, and a wide range of other institutions. But to date they have been careful to proclaim that they are acting to ensure adherence to the principles of the junta.

14. But rivalries are already beginning to appear as factions of the left maneuver for power, and it is possible that the initial "popular front" efforts may be superseded by separate campaigns for power. Socialist leader Mario Soares and Communist chief Alvaro Cunhal in fact began to compete for leadership of the left as soon as they

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returned to Portugal from exile. Soares is reported to fear the competition of the better-organized Communists and is working to build up his own party's organization.



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15. The Communists can also count on funds from abroad. They maintained a better party machinery during the repression under the former regime. They claim to have made converts within the Armed Forces Movement which would give them some influence with the junta, but there is no independent evidence of this. The real test will be which party develops the best appeal to the voters in the period prior to the free elections the junta has promised to hold.*

Center and Conservatives

16. The Portuguese people are generally conservative but political life under the old regime left a vacuum of organized political parties of a conservative or moderate type which is still apparent. The moderate forces in the center are expected to announce formation

* Portuguese communist party membership prior to the coup was variously estimated from 1,000 - 5,000.

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of a new political party soon. The Catholic groups that became moribund under the previous regime can also be expected to become active again. With the abolition of Caetano's official political organization, National Social Action, its conservative members may eventually organize a party, but it would have little influence now.

The Far Right and the Forty Families

17. The far rightists -- some senior military officers under the old regime and political types who were prominent in Salazar's administration -- have been effectively neutralized by the sweeping away of the old government. But there is a special case as regards the group of 40 families who control most of the country's wealth and thereby played a decisive role in the exercise of political power under the old regime. Although many of them could be expected to disapprove of the liberalization measures, there is evidence that some of them were impressed by Spínola's thesis that the overseas policy of the old government was unrealistic. At least some members of this group probably were knowledgeable of the coup and may even be cooperating with the new regime.

Other Groups

18. The dismissal of the university rectors and the reopening of student organizations shut down by the former regime will win at least initial support from students and intellectuals for the new

regime.

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19. The workers are enjoying their new-found freedom and are busy ousting officials of the labor organizations whom they long felt were more responsive to the government and management than to labor. The management of several newspapers, the national airline TAP, and the Ministry of Labor have been forced out by employees who subsequently obtained acquiescence of the junta in the changes.

20. The enthusiasm of the workers and impatience to reorganize could easily get out of bounds. If widespread disorder were to erupt, the new regime would be forced to institute controls that would alienate labor and drive workers into the radical leftist parties. The fact that May Day passed without serious incident will give the new government a breathing space to begin installing the new social system it has promised.

Representation in the New Government

21. A key question now is what political participation the junta will allow in the provisional government.

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The junta probably has some misgivings about including the Communists, but apparently believes that it would be better to let them share responsibility in the new government than to leave them on the outside to criticize and plot against it.

22. The junta could, of course, choose a provisional government of non-political technocrats, but this would not encourage the kind of broad participation in the new society that it wants. The only groups likely to be excluded are the violent revolutionaries to the left of the Communists and right wing figures like monarchists or active supporters of the Caetano regime. The precise composition of the provisional government will offer one indicator of how free a campaign will be permitted in the elections which the junta has promised within a year.

LIKELY POLICIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

23. Spínola's policies and priorities will be determined by

-- the necessity of creating a new state to replace the structure erected by Salazar and Caetano.

-- the demands of the African problem.

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Spinola has stated that the domestic situation will receive first priority. Leftist demands for immediate action to end the African wars and pressures from left and right for a voice in determining policy could upset this timetable.

Domestic Priorities

24. Creation of a new provisional government is the first order of business. The provisional government will promulgate measures to guarantee the new freedoms announced by the junta. Included are:

- measures to guarantee freedom of association and expression.
- laws to assure independence of the judiciary.
- free labor union activity in accord with special laws.
- new economic policies, emphasizing measures to help lower income groups and to fight inflation and the high cost of living.

These intentions have at least for the time being bought the new government support from the left and time to get organized and formulate specific programs.

Foreign Relations

25. General Spinola, having to devote himself to the dismantling of much of the Caetano regime, liberalization at home, and the colonial problem has given little indication of the new government's foreign

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policy other than to state publicly that Portugal's international agreements and treaties will be honored. He [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] desires closer ties with the US, wants to end Portugal's isolation from the rest of the world, and believes that the policies he will pursue will make it much easier for Portugal's friends to support her (an apparent reference to African policy). While the foreign policy directions to be taken by the new regime will become clearer when a government has been named, Spinoza's preliminary statements seem to point to no abrupt changes in foreign policy and:


- continuing membership in NATO.
- more active relations with Western Europe -- especially economic.
- emphasis on bilateral relations with the US.
- a broadening of the focus of Portugal's foreign policy to encompass more "normal" interaction with Third World governments and perhaps relations with Communist countries.

Portugal and Europe


26. Western European governments outside Iberia undoubtedly approve of the junta's actions and program so far. Movement toward accommodation in Portugal's African territories would remove the basic

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cause of tension between Lisbon and the NATO capitals -- and western European governments generally -- and eliminate a perceptible strain on the Alliance. And liberalization at home would bring Portugal into the western European mainstream. The other capitals, however, will be waiting to see whether the regime will be able to implement liberalization measures both at home and in the provinces. Meanwhile, certain European governments and parties will be hoping to influence the course of events by aid and support to Portuguese political factions -- particularly the socialists. West European governments will be hopeful and tolerant of Portugal's problems for a considerable time, but full acceptance will depend on how well the new regime looks like following its promises.



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Portugal and the US: The Azores Negotiations

28. Spinoła wants close Portuguese-US ties, but he has not yet focussed on the Azores base negotiations and probably wants to postpone them. It is not yet clear whether his policy of self-determination for the territories will de-couple arms-for-Africa demands from the negotiations or if, on the other hand, such arms will continue to be part of the quid and justified as protection for the territories' inhabitants as they are prepared for self-determination.

29. Whenever serious talks do begin, however, the Portuguese price for renewal of US base rights will probably be high,

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[REDACTED] Furthermore, they may expect additional reward and support in return for the commitment to grant self-determination to their African territories. If domestic problems monopolize the government's attention it may press for postponing the Azores Base negotiations indefinitely.

THE AFRICAN NETTLE

The Outlook in Lisbon

30. General Spinoia's announced guidelines are:

- the future of the overseas territories will be "whatever the nation desires."
- the solution to the overseas war is political and not military.
- to establish a dialogue with African liberation movements provided they accept a ceasefire.

His personal preference would be to offer a federation of Portugal and its overseas territories with considerable autonomy and equality to the individual components. Over time he would be willing to allow the territories "self-determination" in deciding to remain in the federation.

31. Spinola's policy on Portuguese Africa is the crux of both the junta's relationship with the emerging left at home and with the international community. Forces on the political left in Portugal, the insurgent movements in the territories, the neighboring African countries and even apparently some of the coup members have adopted positions ranging from immediate grant of independence to intermediate measures leading to that end, such as immediate ceasefires followed by negotiations with the insurgents leading rapidly to independence.

32. The initiative on this matter is still with the junta. If Spinola's momentum on this issue were to stall -- by a continuation of the wars and an unacceptable postponement of self-determination -- the resultant loss of initiative could seriously undermine the future of the new regime, both at home with the left and abroad with sympathetic and hostile countries alike.

The Outlook in Africa

Reaction to Date

33. The Spinola regime has won initial support from the establishment in the African territories. The military there has especially welcomed the coup as a signal of the beginning of the end of Portugal's three stalemated and debilitating wars in Africa. Civilian sentiment is more mixed. Portuguese white settlers will be fearful of abandonment

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by Lisbon. Most politically conscious blacks are probably cautiously optimistic but wary of creating a white backlash. The Portuguese army in the territories has many local whites and blacks. Differing racial sentiments have not so far interfered with the army's reliability or support for the junta in the territories and probably will not so long as Lisbon appears to be moving toward some accommodation. Failing this, splits along racial lines could eventually develop in the army.

34. The African liberation movements and the black African governments that have supported them have welcomed the downfall of the Caetano government but they are under no illusion that the Spínola regime is prepared to meet their demands for independence. They will not give up their insurgencies, though they may prove willing to talk at the same time. Lisbon may decide on some phased withdrawal of troops from the Metropole, with more locals filling in, but the political process is likely to be drawn out and a Portuguese military presence continued indefinitely -- certainly in Angola and Mozambique.

35. A number of black African governments have expressed interest in facilitating negotiations between the new regime and Portuguese African liberation movements. The African leaders who have supported the insurgents are showing an interest in playing an intermediary role

in any negotiations. The African nations probably will seek to align their policies toward the new regime during the meeting of the African Liberation Committee scheduled for mid-May. The approach is likely to be along the lines of the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto which was endorsed by the OAU and subsequently by the UN General Assembly. Among other things, the African governments declared in the Manifesto that they would urge the resistance movements to use peaceful means of struggle if conditions changed to make possible "peaceful progress to emancipation." The Africans, however, will not be satisfied with rhetorical gestures and in exchange for any assistance they give in brokering between the parties will want evidence that Lisbon is moving toward eventual independence for the territories.

Lisbon's Policies in Africa

36. Lisbon is likely to initiate what it hopes will be highly visible reforms in the territories. But there will be sharp distinctions in how they are carried out in each of the territories because of differing levels of insurgency, varying strength and attitudes of white settlers, and relative importance of the territories to Lisbon. In all three, it probably will appoint more local residents, both black and white, to high-ranking territorial administrative positions previously filled from Lisbon. It also will encourage the development of local black and multiracial political groups. In some cases it may even seek to enter into dialogues with leaders of the insurgency movements.

37. In Portuguese Guinea, where Lisbon has faced its strongest guerrilla opposition, the new government will probably try to de-escalate the conflict quite rapidly. Lisbon's stake in the territory is marginal.

[redacted] General Spinoła maintained discreet contacts with rebel leaders during his tour of duty there, and might attempt to initiate new talks. In the long run, Lisbon might not be averse to cutting loose Portuguese Guinea if it can do so without seeming to be establishing a precedent which Africans can apply to Angola and Mozambique.

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38. In Mozambique, where insurgents are now fighting in five of the territory's ten districts, the Portuguese will face great difficulties if and as they attempt to disengage. The Mozambique guerrillas are well-organized, ethnically cohesive, and have received considerable external support from both African and Communist sources. Their gains have left Mozambican whites and the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia extremely nervous. Thus almost any proffered concessions would risk eroding the confidence of Mozambique's white community. Lisbon has already given some support to a small, recently established pro-Portuguese, predominantly black political party. The junta might continue to encourage this party in hopes of pulling support away from the insurgents, but such a tactic appears of limited promise.

39. In Angola, Portugal's richest and increasingly prosperous territory, Portugal is not likely, because of the near-moribund state of the insurgency, to negotiate directly with the insurgents, but it will attempt to undercut them by increasing the Africans' stake in the territory. The leaders of Angola's 300,000 whites have frequently called for greater economic and political self-determination, but they are likely to resist reforms that promote substantially greater African participation in the public and private sectors. A strong federation with Lisbon would dampen this resistance however. A Rhodesian-style unilateral declaration of independence seems unlikely. Those whites who might opt for such a course of action are probably in the minority and would be deterred by their low chance for success.

The White Redoubt

40. The governments of Rhodesia and South Africa are intensely concerned over developments in the Portuguese territories. Rhodesia's position is the most immediately exposed. With its fractional (255,000) white population and long border with Mozambique, it regards the territory as a buffer against increased insurgency in Rhodesia.

41. The South African government is likely to press the junta to keep military forces in Angola and Mozambique. Pretoria will probably give serious consideration to economic and financial inducements

that might persuade the new Lisbon government not to offer hasty self-determination or independence to Angola and Mozambique.

42. If the new Portuguese government confirms that it will maintain its military position in its African possessions for the time being, present anxiety will ease in Salisbury and Pretoria. If an abrupt military withdrawal seemed imminent, the two would at least consider seizing certain strategic sections of Mozambique.

THE CHINESE AND SOVIET RESPONSES

43. Despite the substantial military and political assistance they have given to the liberation movements in Africa, Chinese and Soviet influence over the movements is quite limited. In some respects, their assistance has been an extension of their own rivalry in seeking to win support from "third world" countries. It also has been subject to restrictions established by the black African governments through which military aid has been channeled over the years.

44. The Soviets have welcomed Spinola's flexible attitude toward the Communist party and may hope the new regime will establish diplomatic ties with Moscow. They may also hope that, over the longer run, political developments in Portugal could cause Lisbon to weaken its military ties with the US. Fundamentally, they probably think that

the continued drag of the African insurgencies will be the most effective force pushing for leftward political change in Portugal itself. This argument would counsel continued support for the insurgents, and the Soviets will probably continue at least the levels they have been giving. The only qualification might arise if they came to believe that more was to be gained with the new Lisbon government than would be lost in Africa by soft-pedaling aid to the insurgents. This might be particularly true if black African leaders came to accept that Lisbon was moving toward independence for the provinces and were therefore less willing to serve as transshipment points for arms to the insurgents. However, this contingency is not very likely nor would it bring the Soviets to cut off aid entirely. It is even less likely that the Chinese would do so.

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