


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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE



SP - 70/75
20 May 1975

Office of the Director

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: DoD/ISA's Response to DDI Report

Ed —

1. Attached is a memorandum addressed to me from James Wade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, containing his appraisal of the DDI report on perceptions of the US-Soviet strategic balance that you forwarded to him on 4 April 1975. For what should be obvious reasons, I believe the memorandum should have been addressed to you.

2. Wade, as you may know, is a personal SALT colleague of long standing and as such I feel obliged to respond orally to his letter. Subject to your approval, I would like to be able to tell him that the DDI [redacted] will be in touch with him and/or Mr. Charles Sorrels to get their views on how best to guide the work of the Analytical Support Center for the ultimate benefit of all.

3. I am making this suggestion because I believe that the DDI report appears to have fallen somewhat short of what Sorrels might have been led to expect. I'm thinking, for example, of what you wrote in your memorandum to me of 3 January 1975: OPR and/or OCI would be asked to amplify and expand the FBIS compilation of foreign reactions through the survey of other sources. I am mindful of your 4 April 1975 covering memorandum which states that such undertaking "yielded few additional details". But basically I am in agreement with the point in your January memo, that the problem of developing a methodology for dealing with the complex subject of perceptions needs to be addressed by an organization such as the Analytical Support Center, and in talking with Wade I would seek to reinforce that point.

4. Wade would probably also be interested in the status of the OPR study of Western Europe attitudes toward detente. Your 3 January 1975 memo also noted that this study might answer some of Sorrels' questions.

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SUBJECT: DoD/ISA's Response to DDI Report

5. Please let me know whether it is acceptable to you for me to talk to Wade along the lines indicated.



25X1

Howard Stoertz, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

Attachment:
Memorandum as stated

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SP - 70/75

SUBJECT: DoD/ISA's Response to DDI Report

Distribution:

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOWARD STOERTZ, JR.
National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic Programs
Central Intelligence Agency


SUBJECT: FBIS Analysis of Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet
Strategic Balance

I appreciate your interest in improved understanding of the perceptions of the state and trends in the strategic balance held in key countries such as West Germany, the UK, France, and Japan.

The report completed by FBIS under the management guidance of the Office of Political Research, provides interesting reading but lacks analytical depth and deals with a disappointing fraction of desired product outlined in the proposed outline which we as consumers prepared last December. (Attached)

As an experiment in consumer articulation of needs and responsiveness of one part of CIA, the experience was not encouraging.

Again, your personal support in this effort was much appreciated.


James P. Wade, Jr.
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Attachment: a/s

Copy to: LTG Wilson

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OUTLINEStudy of Perceptions of the Strategic
Balance Expressed in Other Nations, 1972 & 1974Time Frame

The study will initially concentrate on the time periods of 2-3 months before and after the SALT I Moscow Summit in May, 1972 and the Vladivostok Summit in November, 1974. In its second phase, the study should cover the 1972-1974 period, to provide a firmer basis for establishing trends in the perceptions, and the factors which stimulate and shape statements of perceptions of the current and expected state of the strategic balance.

Countries covered

The nations included in the study would be West Germany, France, UK, (perhaps one country among Norway, Denmark, and Sweden), Japan, PRC, and perhaps Israel and Egypt.

Sources: The stated perceptions by political elites and general public noted and analyzed would be drawn from opinion surveys, major media, government, and other institutional sources such as the IISS in London. Media in West Germany, for example would include Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Der Spiegel (e.g., an interview with the Foreign Minister). Government statements would include formal documents (such as West German Annual Defense Report or British White Paper) and statements by major leaders, publicly and privately, to US officials reported through State Department and other cables.

Purpose

The principal purpose of the study is to provide some detailed factual basis for discussion and analysis of the nature and trends in the perceptions of foreign political elites and general publics of the current state (1972-1974) and expected trends in strategic balance.

The study should determine what aspects of the strategic balance are important as bases for perceptions of the strategic balance. Specifically, it should identify factors (such as static measures) or events which prompt and shape statements of perceptions of the strategic balance; such as the Summits in May, 1972 and Nov, 1974, demonstrations of technology and force capability such as Soviet MIRV tests, CSA drop of MINUTEMAN and resupply to Israel, declaratory policy such as Posture Statement and budgetary actions such as Congressional approval of FY 1975 strategic R&D initiatives.

The study should include the implications explicitly and implicitly drawn by the foreign observers of the state and trends in the strategic balance for the credibility of US deterrent posture, for desired relations with the US, for their own nation's defenses and behavior, and for Soviet propensity to take risks and press for advantage.