

PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR.
12TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
AND
COMMITTEE ON
MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES

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House of Representatives

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TAB A.

March 5, 1975

25X1

[Redacted]
NIO/SSEA, Room 7E 47
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

25X1

Dear [Redacted]

I am circulating this paper proposing factual data to the other members of the delegation for review and comment. I would very much appreciate it if you would have your staff check for any factual inaccuracies and return their comments to me by tomorrow afternoon at 3:00 p.m.

I would also appreciate your noting any information which you feel should bear a security classification.

Thank you,


Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.

PNMcC:jj

Enclosure

25X1

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Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Not Used

TAB B

Office of the Director

March 6, 1975


The Honorable Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. McCloskey:

We have checked your paper on Vietnam for factual inaccuracies in those areas where the intelligence community has competence. Our comments are attached.

One general note of a factual nature: many of the facts and figures in the paper which concern the South Vietnamese side are not primarily within the purview of the intelligence community and are not the result of analysis performed by us. Figures on South Vietnamese casualties, military strengths and order-of-battle, and ammunition stocks on hand now are essentially given to us by the non-intelligence components of the Department of Defense, or (in the case of casualties) by the South Vietnamese themselves. We have checked these figures as best we could in the time available, but we do not vouch for their complete accuracy.

I recognize that you have not asked for my comment on any part of the paper other than the factual data. Nevertheless, I cannot let this letter go to you without commenting on the last paragraph (bottom of page 10 and top of page 11). Large numbers of dedicated and honest professionals in the U.S. intelligence community will regard the last paragraph as unjust and untrue criticism of their efforts over the years. To one who is perhaps overly sensitive, the paragraph seems slanted toward blame of the intelligence organs of the government. First, the word "intelligence" appears -- gratuitously and inaccurately in my opinion -- in the subtitle of the paragraph. Second, the last sentence singles out the intelligence community in a way which is unfair. Is this the note on which you really want to end the paper?


National Intelligence Officer
for South and Southeast Asia

25X1

SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ON PAPER

1. Page 1, first paragraph, line 2: add after "20 million each," the words, "growing at about 3 percent a year."

2. Page 1, paragraph 2. Change first sentence to read: "South Vietnam has a GNP of \$3.1 billion, as compared to North Vietnam's GNP of about \$2.0 billion. Delete last sentence of paragraph 2.

3. Page 1, first Table: Under FY 1974, military aid, according to our figures, should be 1.0 billion US\$ vice 1.2 billion.

4. Page 1, sentence above second table: Change to read: "For North Vietnam, in the calendar years 1972-1974, the total estimates ..."

In this second table on page 1, change FY 1973 to CY 1972, FY 1974 to CY 1973, and FY 1975 to CY 1974.

5. Page 2, first paragraph, last sentence above table: Change to read: "U.S. and South Vietnamese estimates of those killed ..." (These are not intelligence estimates -- they are provided to the intelligence community by the South Vietnamese and the non-intelligence components of the Department of Defense.)

6. Page 2, paragraph just below the table: Change "... U.S. intelligence estimates..." to "South Vietnamese estimates, accepted by the U.S."

7. Page 2, second paragraph below the table. The reference to Cambodia here is a non-sequitur. Bombing in Cambodia did not have an effect on casualties in South Vietnam.

--Sixth line in paragraph: We have not specifically checked all the figures in this table with the Defense Intelligence Agency. They look okay, but we cannot vouch for the total accuracy of each figure.

8. Page 3, top four sub-paragraphs: In each case, for security reasons, it would be better not to identify specifically the ARVN regiments. So identified, the specific casualty figures are CONFIDENTIAL. The first one could read: "An ARVN regiment operating in the richest . . ." The second subparagraph might read: "An ARVN regiment presently serving in Quang Nam Province, south of Danang . . ." The other two cases could be similarly changed. Any other wording is also appropriate at the unclassified level, so long as it eliminates the specific unit designators.

9. Page 4, second paragraph: Change "U.S. intelligence sources . . ." to read, "U.S. sources . . ."

In the same sentence, change "suspect" to "believe", and delete quotation marks.

10. Page 4, first paragraph under sub-heading 5, Order of Battle: Begin sentence with: "According to data provided by the U.S. Mission in Saigon, the total military . . ." (Apparently most of the figures from this point in the paper on were provided by the Mission. Except as noted below, they are all close to, but in many cases not identical with, those used in Washington. If you add the "according to . . ." phrase cited above, it eliminates the problem.)

11. Page 4, second paragraph under subheading 5: Delete the phrase "as of November 30, 1974" and change the next word from "were" to "are". (The order-of-battle data on page 5 and top of page 6 are not as of November 30 -- they are more recent. In MR 2, for example, there were only three Communist infantry divisions as of that date, not the four cited. In MR 4, there were no organized Communist infantry divisions as of November 30.)

12. Page 5 and top of page 6: The order of battle below the divisional level is CONFIDENTIAL, at least for the Communist forces. Can you get by deleting everything below the divisions, and stating, for example in MR 1 --

NVA/VC: 122,000-138,000 men RVNAF: 158,000 men

including
4 Infantry Divisions
2 Antiaircraft Divisions

including
5 Infantry Divisions

13. Page 6, first two paragraphs under the MR 4 order of battle: The 357 RVNAF tanks, 874 RVNAF armored personnel carriers and 1003 artillery pieces are, we believe, not RVNAF's total inventory. They are probably the numbers assigned to units; there are others in inventory, or down for maintenance, etc. A check should be made with the Department of Defense to verify the correct figures.

14. Page 6, second paragraph from bottom of page, last sentence of paragraph: We would amend this sentence as follows: "The RVNAF's monthly average for 1974 was 17,500 tons per month against the NVA/VC's 310 tons per month." (The latter figure, according to ^{our} data, should be 310 and not 3,120. On a weight basis, ARVN's use of ammunition is far higher than a seven-to-one ratio, because ARVN uses more big artillery and less mortars, rockets, and small arms than the NVA/VC. On the basis of rounds, the ratio is about 12 to 1.)

15. Page 6, last paragraph: Delete the phrase "west of Saigon." The figures apply to all of MR 3.

Add the words, "according to the US Mission in Saigon" to end of paragraph. (Our numbers are slightly different.)

16. Page 7, bottom paragraph: Change first sentence to read: "The South Vietnamese 'controlled' 75 to 80 percent of the land area of South Vietnam, and as of 1 February 1973 92 percent of the population."

Add a footnote appended to this sentence to read: "This includes HES-rated A, B, and C hamlets."

Reason: Many people both in Saigon and in Washington prefer to define "GVN control" as applying only to A and B hamlets. Others prefer to use A, B, and C hamlets. The footnote at least spells out what you are doing.

17. Page 8, top paragraph, line three: Change the words "96 to 98 percent" to "94 percent".

18. Page 8, third paragraph on page: Change beginning of paragraph to read: "By 1 January 1975, the NVA/VC had reduced government control over the population by seven percent, from 94 percent to 87 percent. They have thus far taken 11 district capitals and one provincial capital, and now control all of Phuoc Long Province. They are now threatening Tay Ninh City, and already control much of Tay Ninh Province and most of Binh Long Province. Some U.S. officials estimate that . . ."

19. Page 8, last paragraph on page: Change beginning to read: "For Vietnam's 12,000 villages and hamlets, first the U.S. and then since 1973 the South Vietnamese have maintained . . ."

20. Page 9, second line on page: Change number at end of line from 526,776 to 566,776.

21. Page 9, third paragraph on page: Add an "at least" in front of "10 percent".

22. Page 10, second paragraph: Urge whole paragraph be deleted. It is wholly wrong factually. The NVA/VC outnumbered the South Vietnamese personnel and used more artillery ammunition.

23. Page 10, third paragraph up from bottom of page: Change second sentence to read as follows: "They have infiltrated more than 10,000 new men a month on the average since the ceasefire, they . . ."