

FROM THE DESK OF *Please Draft for George Bush's*
RALPH M. GOLDMAN, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY 94132

Signature
Executive Registry
(415) 469-1178
75-9969

November 28, 1975

Dear Ambassador Bush:

The attached comments may interest you in the light of your new responsibilities.

May I also wish you good luck in a most difficult situation.

Cordially,

Ralph M. Goldman

*San Francisco State University*

1600 HOLLOWAY AVENUE • SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94132

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

November 24, 1975

25X1
Mr. Thomas A.
Executive Director
The Arms Control Association
11 Dupont Circle, N.W., Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Tom:

Is it possible to find a small corner of ARMS CONTROL TODAY for the communication of "wild ideas" among our colleagues? Particularly wild ideas that may have some timely impact?

My own wild idea is stimulated by the Nation's current concern over what to do with and about the Central Intelligence Agency. The resolution of this issue is likely to have consequences for arms control policy for decades to come, let alone for the future safety of the world. By stating my own recommendation below in simplistic terms I am simply trying to do what academics are paid to do, that is, illuminate and challenge some of the underlying assumptions that guide political policy and behavior.

Briefly, my recommendation is that the Congress rewrite the CIA statutes to require that Agency to make public reports of all -- repeat, ALL -- its intelligence hypotheses and findings. These could take the form of periodic -- weekly, monthly, and annually -- public reports to the President, with copies required to be sent to either the Secretary-General of the United Nations or a revived United Nations Military Staff Committee.

What this proposal does is challenge the presumed need for secrecy in international intelligence activities. Is not intelligence secrecy an obstacle to the achievement of our national goals of nonviolence and safety in inter-nation relations? My own view is that secrecy is profoundly counterproductive of these goals. Secrecy sustains attitudes and policies of distrust. Secrecy encourages and even legitimizes aberrant military adventures (Bay of Pigs, the assassination involvements, etc.). Secrecy prevents accountability and responsibility in public policy implementation. Secrecy assumes that we and others have "cards" to hide that at some strategic moment may be used to trump the adversary, a fear that has -- happily -- prompted the hot-line agreements, the SALT talks, the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, etc.


What happens if we opt for total publicity of our intelligence findings and speculations? Would this be undressing before the enemy and thereby revealing our weakness? How could the strongest nation in the world answer such a question in

the affirmative? Would such public intelligence reporting undress the enemy, in fact the whole crowd, and reveal not only weaknesses but also a few of their blemishes? I would hope so! This would be as American as apple pie and Water-gate. It would initially annoy every national leader in the world, but it would ultimately relieve them of the onerous and risky responsibilities of "having secrets."

In short, by outlawing intelligence secrecy and requiring the CIA to "go public" we can, in one stroke, change the nature of the arms race and start opening up the entire international diplomatic environment to the kind of open politics at which we as a Nation are so talented. In effect, the Central Intelligence Agency could thereby become the unofficial intelligence arm of the United Nations. The Agency itself could be preserved fairly intact, although its mission would surely require a new style of leadership and new bureaucratic attitudes. And, most important, world opinion would acquire a new informational basis -- the CIA -- from which to develop political pressures and policies that could constrain the arms race without risking the security of any nation or the international system.

Our colleagues should, I believe, carefully examine the substance and implications of this apparently bizarre proposal. I feel that the time is ripe for a significant shifting of gears in the arms race and for innovative arrangements in the intelligence field.

Cordially,


Ralph A. Goldman

RMG:lb

P.S. I hope you will not mind if I share this letter with a number of colleagues at this time.

Biographical Note: Ralph M. Goldman

Professor, Department of Political Science, San Francisco State University (1962 to present). Formerly: Director of Institute for Research on International Behavior (1964-1967), Associate Dean for Faculty Research (1965-1967), Political Science Department Chairman (1971-1974), San Francisco State University. Research Associate, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (1953-1956).

Has taught at Michigan State University (1957-1961), University of Chicago (1961-1962), University of California at Berkeley (1963), Stanford University (1966).

Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Chicago, 1951.

Author: BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1973), a textbook in American Politics; CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS (1972), an introductory textbook in political behavior; THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1966). Co-author or co-editor: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS (1960); PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS IN 1952 (5 vols., 1954).

Author of more than 30 articles in scholarly journals, encyclopedias, and collected works. Established fields have been American national politics, especially party and electoral behavior. Currently engaged in research on international conflict, particularly at the United Nations, arms control processes, and world party movements.

Married. Born: May 14, 1920. Wife is elementary school teacher and art historian. Son and daughter are teen-agers attending college.

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Remarks:
*Per request from Comb. Bush,
pls draft reply for his
signature. We will put in final.*

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12 Dec
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