

~~SECRET~~

CODIB-D-111/17/7
10 October 1966

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST COMMUNICATION

FINAL REPORT

Group I

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET~~

EDIT COPY

1076

D
R
A
E
T

S-E-C-R-E-T

T/VII/R-2/2
19 July 1966
10 October 1966

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Committee on Documentation

SUBJECT: Final Report of CODIB Task Team VII, Analysts
~~co-analyst~~ Communication

1. Transmitted herewith is the report of Task Team VII, ~~Analyst~~
~~to~~ Analyst Communication.

2. It will be noted that the Task Team concludes that the situation with respect to analyst-to-analyst communication is more satisfactory than had first been presumed when the Task Team was constituted. This generally, more satisfactory situation, it is believed, can be attributed to the increasing maturity and sophistication of the Intelligence Community in general, to the strengthening, over the past years, of the various organs of coordination, particularly USIB and its committees, and to a growing realization on the part of each agency of the benefits to be derived from cooperation and collaboration. It is primarily these factors, rather than the existence or non-existence of specific facilities, that govern the extent and effectiveness of analyst-to-analyst communication.

[Redacted]

Chairman

25X1A

Attachment: A/S

[Redacted]

*CIA,
3 Support Staff.*

25X1A

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group 1

S-E-C-R-E-T

D
R
A
F
T

T/VII/R-2/1
19 July 1966
To be taken into

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST-TO-ANALYST COMMUNICATION

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
A. Scope of the Problem.....	1
B. Purposes Served by Analyst-to-Analyst Communication.....	2
C. Existing Practices and Facilities.....	4
D. Impediments to Analyst Communication.....	7
E. Possible Means of Improvement.....	11
1. Identification of Appropriate Analysts in other Agencies.....	11
4. Augmenting Secure Telephone Facilities.....	14
6. Use of Television Techniques.....	16
F. Conclusions.....	17
G. Recommendations.....	18

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Handwritten signature

A. Scope of the Problem

1. In accordance with its Terms of Reference (CODIB-D-111/1.7/2), Task Team VII considered the problem of communication between analysts who, in their respective agencies, are engaged in the production and coordination of positive intelligence. It did not address itself to the problems of communication between analysts in different components of the same agency or to ways and means of improving communication between intelligence analysts and collectors.*

2. In approaching its problem, the Task Team initially sought to obtain an understanding of the actual, present situation with respect to analyst-to-analyst communication. Since actual day to day practices are greatly affected by the working habits of analysts and are, to a high degree, subjective matters, a comprehensive survey of all analysts concerned, through a questionnaire technique, was considered not warranted. Instead, the Task Team members discussed analyst-to-analyst communications with representative analysts in their respective agencies. These personal interviews were guided by a series of questions which the Task Team had developed in advance.

3. The intelligence organizations thus surveyed were the producing organizations in Washington, D. C., specifically: the research offices in INR, most of the offices under ~~DDI~~ ^{the DDI} in CIA, and ~~DIAPP-1~~ ^A and

*It should also be noted that, by its Terms of Reference, Task Team VII is not concerned with problems of information handling, processing, identification, recording, storage, and retrieval, as such.

S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 2 -

elements of ^ADIAPP-2 under the Assistant Director for Processing in DIA. For practical reasons, the Task Team concentrated on a single geographical area (viz., Latin America) and discussed all aspects of analyst communication with a substantial number of individuals working in this field. However, it also discussed the problem of improving analyst-to-analyst communication with a broad spectrum of intelligence officers in other geographic and functional areas and took their views into account in preparing this report. Total coverage, in the view of Task Team VII and of the officers consulted, was sufficiently inclusive to validate the views set forth herein.

B. Purposes Served by Analyst-to-Analyst Communication

1. Analysts in one agency communicate with analysts in another agency for two major purposes: (a) to exchange views and judgments and (b) to obtain information. Both purposes may be involved in any particular instance of analyst-to-analyst communication.

2. When analysts communicate to exchange views and judgments they are usually concerned with current developments, but from time to time they also discuss other topics of mutual interest. In either case, the analysts are typically "opposite numbers" or counterparts--that is, they work in essentially the same area or functional specialty in their respective agencies and are familiar with the current information pertaining to their speciality. Thus, communication is generally initiated to get a counterpart's interpretation of the facts, or to check one's own interpretation, rather than to acquire additional data or background information.

S-E-C-R-E-T

3. Communication for the second purpose, on the other hand, usually involves analysts working in different areas or specialties. For example, a political analyst may need detailed information about military matters or a Latin American specialist may require statistical data which other agencies regularly compile. When an analyst needs information on a subject outside his field he initially seeks assistance from his colleagues in his own agency, but in many cases he knows in advance that the kind of information sought can be obtained only from knowledgeable officers in other agencies. The information itself is sometimes obtained orally, in which case analyst-to-analyst communication has served its purpose without any documents being obtained; however, communication may also be little more than an inquiry about the information sought and the information itself may be acquired in the form of a memorandum prepared specifically for the purpose of answering the inquiry or by reference to documents which the analyst obtains through normal channels.

4. The Task ^{Team} Force found that analyst-to-analyst communication is generally not undertaken to avoid duplication of effort. In the current intelligence field, analysts recognize that each agency will decide whether or not to publish its interpretation of current events on grounds other than the avoidance of duplication. It is established practice, of course, for designated intelligence officers to coordinate items in the daily ~~Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB)~~ ^{issuances of the office of} ~~with their opposite numbers,~~ ^{Current Intelligence} but communication between analysts for the express purpose of obtaining ^{formal} concurrence on a current intelligence topic is otherwise very rare. Moreover, ^{informal} communication between analysts is not the normal procedure

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 4 -

for producing a coordinated intelligence estimate or an agreed judgment. The well-known mechanisms for producing NIEs and USIB Committee papers may involve analyst communication in an incidental way, but the group discussion of a common draft, in this context, is primarily for coordination purposes and not for the type of analyst communication that is addressed in this report.

C. Existing Practices and Facilities

1. There is considerable variation in the extent to which analysts know their counterparts in other agencies, and various ^{other} intelligence offices, who are sources of information in related fields. As a general rule, those who have been in intelligence for many years have a wide range of contacts whereas those who are relatively new do not. However, much depends on the characteristic habits, and particular circumstances of the individuals involved.

2. Contacts are sometimes established through one or more of the Intelligence Community mechanisms--e.g., the USIB substantive committees, representatives meetings on NIEs, coordination of the Central Intelligence ~~Agency~~ ^{Agency's} *meetings daily and special issues,* various task teams set up from time to time, and the NIS program. But to a large extent, analysts develop their contacts on an individual basis, often on their own initiative and sometimes aided by suggestions from their predecessors, colleagues, or immediate superiors.

3. An analyst who wishes to communicate with an analyst in another agency has available to him a number of facilities to assist in effecting such communication. Most obvious, of course, is the telephone

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 5

National Military Command Center (NMCC)

(black and gray). To supplement the telephone, there are secure teletype links between the agencies, and the MDX which connects NSA, the operation centers of CIA and State, and the NMCC. The analyst can also call upon established liaison services for assistance in establishing the desired contact.

4. Both the frequency and agency pattern of analyst-to-analyst communication vary markedly. For example, most INR offices tend to have more contact with CIA components than with DIA, some rarely consult with CIA analysts except those in OCI, and in a few instances it was said that the initiative was more often taken by OCI. In part, this pattern reflects the fact that interagency communication occurs more frequently for the purpose of exchanging views on current intelligence ~~items~~ *matters relating to an analyst's primary field, with opposite numbers*. When the purpose is getting timely information on matters outside of an analyst's field, the agency ^{yes} and persons contacted *considerably, depending* ~~depends primarily~~ on the particular subject in question.

vary

5. The extent and frequency of analyst-to-analyst communication also ~~varies~~ ^Y markedly with the intensity of activity in a given area or subject and the interest shown in such activity by higher authority. When activity and interest are at a high pitch, as, for example, in the case of the Dominican Republic, ^{crisis} or with regard to Communist China, analyst-to-analyst communication takes place constantly. On the other hand, in areas or subjects which are quiescent, analyst-to-analyst communication may be very infrequent. This is, of course, perfectly normal behavior. It does, however, point up the fact that under circumstances in which analyst-to-analyst communication is important,

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 6 -

present facilities do suffice to establish and maintain such communication, and conversely, in those instances where analyst-to-analyst communication is infrequent or absent, it is likely that such communication is not necessary, even though it may be in general terms, desirable.

6. Communication is usually by phone. In many cases there is insufficient time to go to another agency to discuss current developments and, when information is sought, it is typically needed very promptly. However, much depends on the habits of the individuals involved. Thus, a small proportion of the analysts make a point of meeting with their counterparts periodically to discuss matters of mutual interest, ^{including} ~~other~~ ~~than~~ current intelligence items, while others expressed the hope that circumstances would permit more informal exchange of ideas but felt that the pressure of work always interfered. The nature of an analyst's job also has a direct bearing on his communication practices. Economists, for example, tend to maintain contact with a large number of individuals in both intelligence and non-intelligence agencies, and to communicate with them by phone not so much because of the pressure of time but rather because that method is the most efficient way of getting bits and pieces from widely scattered sources.

7. Liaison arrangements tend to be used more for document procurement than for establishing contact with knowledgeable individuals in other agencies. In this connection, analysts felt that improvement was needed in facilities for rapid document transmission and some expressed the hope that the LDX system would eventually permit rapid

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 7 -

transmission of facsimilies throughout the intelligence community. It was noted that analysts frequently need to see actual documents in order to discuss matters effectively over the phone, that reading excerpts from documents is often impractical, and that teletype transmission is cumbersome.

D. Impediments to Analyst Communication

1. Although virtually every aspect of analyst-to-analyst communication can be improved in some respect, the Task Team found that existing practices were actually working better than was initially expected. The principal impediments appear to be the differences, and changes, in the organization structures of the intelligence agencies, difficulties in utilizing available secure communications facilities, and the pressure of work loads. A lesser impediment arises from security considerations discussed in paragraph 5.

2. Organizational differences complicate identifying appropriate officers in other agencies. INR is organized on a geographic basis; DIA's Production Center is organized primarily on a functional basis; and CIA's production element is organized partly on a geographic basis and partly functionally. The Task Team found, for example, that analysts in INR and their geographically organized counterparts in CIA are for the most part well known to each other. Similarly, where DIA Production Center and CIA have comparable functional elements (e.g., the Military Economics Division in DIA and the Military Economic Research Area in CIA) the analysts know their counterparts and contact them directly whenever circumstances warrant doing so. They sometimes

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 8 -

need assistance when their counterparts are not available, when they need to direct their inquiry through the chain of command, and when they seek information in fields which neither the analyst nor his counterpart follows in depth. Differences in organizational structure also make it difficult to determine who is the counterpart of a division or branch chief and whether there are several components of another agency that might profitably be contacted. Finally, the new analyst often needs assistance in identifying both his counterparts and sources of information in other agencies. The latter problem is essentially an internal matter, but the Task Team believes it would be useful to encourage agencies to invite officers from other departments to attend periodic briefings on their organization and functions.

3. The Task Team found that most analysts preferred to communicate by personal face-to-face discussion. There was agreement, however, that time and distance factors greatly limited the opportunities for personal meetings, and that reliance must be placed on mechanical means, primarily on the telephone. The ordinary black phone should not, of course, be used for any classified discussions or to transmit classified information; yet it is well known that the black phone is widely and extensively used to discuss classified matters. On the other hand, the black phone system is the only system that is fully accessible to analysts. Moreover, the present, existing secure telephone systems are far more sophisticated than the analysts require under normal circumstances. Their needs for the most part can be met by some system that will enable communication no higher than SECRET.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 9 -

4. The gray phone, which may be used for discussions through TOP SECRET and including Special Intelligence, is extensively employed as a means of analyst-to-analyst communication. Unfortunately, the gray phones are limited in number, particularly in State, and access to the gray system requires a special clearance, which numerous analysts, particularly in INR and DIA, do not have. Teletype links and LDX are occasionally used for analyst-to-analyst communication, especially in a "crisis" situation when responsible analysts are physically present in their respective operations centers. For day-to-day communication between analysts, however, these mechanisms are cumbersome and time consuming, and necessitate the analyst leaving his desk and files. Moreover, with respect to the LDX, intelligence use of the system must give ground to priority operational use.

5. The Task Team found that security considerations constituted another factor inhibiting analyst-to-analyst communication. The obvious security considerations--i.e., ^{the} ~~what~~ level and type of clearance ~~has~~ another analyst possess^{es}--can be dealt with, albeit with some delay, through normal security channels. In some areas, for example among analysts working on Latin America, this is a relatively minor problem, since ~~it or other~~ specially compartmented intelligence ^{of various kinds} contributes less significantly in this area than in others. Analysts have expressed concern, however, over the problem of "sensitive" material which, although not specially classified, is given limited and restricted

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 10 -

Special Report and

dissemination. State "LIMDIS" cables, CIA intelligence information, reports are examples of this type of material. There is no means by which an analyst in State can know whether the analyst he wishes to consult in CIA or DIA has seen, or is authorized to be informed of, an important "LIMDIS" cable. Obviously, in some circumstances, this kind of uncertainty reduces the usefulness of analyst-to-analyst communication and consultation.

Check
 Fed
 mind back
 on CIA
 clarity of
 language
 ?

6. The Task Team has the impression, from its survey, that apart from the inadequacy of the existing telephone system, the greatest impediment to analyst-to-analyst communication is simply the work load and time factor. Again and again analysts acknowledged the desirability of more frequent consultation with their opposite numbers in other agencies, but confessed that they could not spare the time and effort.

7. In summary, the Task Team found that:

- a. Present facilities and procedures do, in fact, enable an analyst in one agency to identify and make contact with an analyst in another agency.
- b. Present facilities and procedures, however, are in some instances, cumbersome, and time consuming, and the cumulative effect of these inadequacies does act as a definite impediment to useful analyst-to-analyst communication.
- c. The two areas in which improvements should be sought are (1) means of identifying analysts by knowledgeability and areas of responsibility; (2) means of augmenting secure telephone or other types of oral communication facilities.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 11 -

E. Possible Means of Improvement

1. Identification of Appropriate Analysts in Other Agencies

a. The Terms of Reference for Task Team VII directed it "to determine, ~~inter~~alia, the feasibility of establishing a centralized Intelligence Community Directory Service as an aid in any program for improvement." In its exploration of this matter, the Task Team made the following assumptions concerning such a Directory Service:

(1) a. The Directory Service would function in a manner analagous to a telephone information service rather than take the form of a published directory.

(2) b. The Directory Service would cover INR, the production offices of CIA, the Production Center of DIA, and the Production elements under the Assistant Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence of DIA. Because of security and other complications, NSA would not be included initially, nor would other production offices located outside the Washington area, such as, for example, FTD.

(3) c. The Register would be organized on the basis of subject specialization, and show, for each subject, the appropriate analyst in each agency, his telephone number (gray and/or black), his organizational location and his office address.

(4) d. The analyst identified for each subject specialty would be the responsible analyst, rather than the most knowledgeable. In the great majority of cases, the responsible analyst is the most knowledgeable. The exceptions to this generalization would be extremely difficult

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 12 -

to identify, and even when identified, there would remain administrative and perhaps security complications if an analyst in one agency were able to deal directly with the most knowledgeable but not responsible individual in another agency.

b. 2. A number of problems arise in connection with a Directory Service of the general character indicated above.

(1) ~~A~~. The Directory will necessarily be organized by subject. There are, however, inconsistencies among the agencies as to nomenclature of subjects, and as to the degree to which subject fields are subdivided. It is possible, of course, to devise a subject breakdown for the proposed Register which would make provision for the variations among agencies, through cross references, special subdivisions, etc. The servicing of inquiries to the Directory, however, would probably require an individual at least of junior professional grade who was thoroughly familiar with the details of the subject arrangements of the Register, and the internal organization of the agencies concerned.

(2) ~~B~~. If it is to be useful, the Directory must be kept current, not only in respect to reassignments of individuals, but also as to reorganizations in the agencies, changes in responsibilities, physical moves, and changes in telephone numbers. On the basis of the difficulties encountered in maintaining the normal telephone information service, which is concerned only with individuals on a name basis, it will be a formidable task to ensure the necessary discipline and

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 13 -

promptness, on the part of the various agencies in ^{providing} ~~exchanging~~ the needed data. Without such discipline and promptness, a directory service would lose much of its usefulness.

3. A Directory Service as outlined in para. 1 above raises security problems both in CIA and DIA. Informal conversations with CIA's Office of Security indicate that, from a security point of view, approval would not be given to a Directory Service of the kind described above which would service all inquiries received on the unclassified (black) telephone. The alternatives appear to be (1) to provide service to inquiries on the gray (secure) phone only, and/or (2) to provide service only to specified points of contact in each of the agencies concerned. Either of these alternatives, or both, would in the view of the Task Team, considerably reduce the use of the Directory Service by analysts. All analysts who do not both possess the necessary special clearance and have access to a gray phone would be forced to go through third parties to obtain information from the Directory Service.

4. The Task Team has attempted to arrive at a rough estimate of the cost of a Directory Service. The development of a suitable system of subject matter categories, the development of a satisfactory form to be used by the agencies in reporting their analysts both initially and on subsequent changes, and the collation and organization of the information, would, it is estimated, require the services of two professional and two clerical personnel for six months. Thereafter, the Directory could be maintained and serviced by one professional and one clerical. Thus, in rough approximation, it will cost \$18,000 to

S-E-C-R-E-T

establish a Directory Service, and \$18,000 per year to maintain and service it. Not included are indirect costs, e.g., preparation of reporting forms in the agencies concerned, overhead, hardware, etc. The above, in the view of the Task Team, is a minimum estimate; the actual direct cost might be considerably greater.

c. 3. It should be noted that no enthusiasm for an Interagency Directory Service was expressed by the analysts interviewed by the Task Team members; on the other hand, many of them felt that presently available facilities could be supplemented by better access to organization charts and to the telephone directories of the other agencies (particularly CIA). There is serious doubt, therefore, that a Directory Service would be used by analysts in preference to other available means for identifying and locating analysts in other agencies.

2. Augmenting Secure Telephone Facilities

a. 4. Since so much analyst-to-analyst communication is conducted over the phone, it would be desirable to provide better facilities for discussing classified information. Ideally, every analyst should be able to discuss classified information over a secure phone located at his own desk, where he has ready access to his working files. A less ideal provision, but nonetheless, a very helpful one, would be one secure phone for each small group of analysts who normally work together--a section or subunit typically numbering, say, 4-5 analysts. If an analyst has to go to his Division Chief's Office or to a special area several hundred yards away from his desk to use a secure phone, a significant psychological impediment is created, in addition to the practical inconvenience to the analyst.

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 15 -

~~h.s.~~ The Task Team investigated the possibility of extending existing secure telephone systems to accommodate the needs of analysts.

(1) ~~s.~~ With regard to the "gray" telephone system, it was found that little significant expansion would be possible for the following reasons: (A) Access to the gray system is limited to personnel possessing a special clearance which numerous analysts in INR and DIA do not possess; (B) Security requirements limit the locations in which gray phones may be placed; (C) Installation of additional gray phones is physically difficult and very expensive, primarily because of the necessity of using steel conduits for the lines; ^{and vaulted areas for phone locations;} (D) Circuits between agencies are in some instances already close to the limit of their capacity. ^{Estimated by NSA is targeted beyond 1968.} ~~Estimated by NSA is targeted beyond 1968.~~

(2) ~~s.~~ A secure voice communications system is currently being installed in CIA, State, and Defense as an adjunct to the National Command System. This secure voice system can carry conversations classified through TOP SECRET. Information furnished to the Task Team indicates that this system could theoretically meet the needs of analysts, even though, as presently being installed, it is intended primarily for command and control purposes. The cost for installing each line of this system, however, is \$12,000-\$18,000. Thus, to meet the less ideal provision for analysts--one secure line for each 4-5 analysts--would, in the case of INR alone, for example, require about 40 lines at a cost of at least \$480,000, plus line rental fees of about \$14,000 per year. Even if cost factors on this scale were not a consideration, the Task Team understands that technical factors, such as limitation of "frame" space in existing telephone facilities, would

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 16 -

preclude any large-scale expansion of this system to meet analysts' needs.

3/c. Within CIA's Headquarters Building at Langley is a "red" automatic dial telephone system, secure through SECRET, which is available to virtually every analyst in the building. The security of this system, however, is dependent upon the fact that it has absolutely no electrical connection with any line running outside the building. To undertake to employ it as the basis for a secure interagency system, therefore, raises what appears to be virtually insurmountable obstacles of both financial and technical nature.

4/a. The more obvious possibility suitable for most analysts' communications problems would be the development of a less sophisticated system^m secure through SECRET that could be based upon the existing, universally accessible, black telephone.

3. Use of Television Techniques

2/b. It has been suggested that closed circuit television techniques might be applicable to certain aspects of analyst-to-analyst communications, particularly in circumstances involving graphic, as opposed to documentary, information or presentation. The Department of Defense has utilized closed circuit television for briefing purposes, and in connection with certain command and control activities. CIA's Imagery Analysis Division (IAD) has developed a closed circuit TV technique for presenting ^{various kinds of} ~~high altitude~~ photography, using standard, commercially available components. Simply stated, a TV camera of the type used for educational TV purposes, is coupled to a high quality microscope, under

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONCLUSIONS

- 17 -

which the photograph is placed. The resultant image obtained on the TV screen is enlarged and clear within the limitations of current commercial TV quality. The Task Team believes that this technique could be developed into a useful means whereby photo interpreters could quickly and effectively communicate with ^{general} analysts--a process which now usually requires the analyst in person to visit the photo interpretation center. The technique may also have a useful application for briefing and for intercommunication purposes in certain types of crisis situations. The feasibility of the technique has been demonstrated by the work of the Imagery Analysis Division; its application, however, to real life situations will require further research. In particular, means for ensuring the security of the video signal, whether transmitted by cable or microwave, must be developed before the system can be used between buildings or agencies.

F. Conclusions

On the basis of its surveys, investigations, and the considerations outlined in the previous paragraphs the Task Team has reached the following conclusions:

1. The variety of mechanisms presently existing provide a workable means for the establishment and maintenance of interagency analyst-to-analyst communication.
2. Liaison facilities can ensure--albeit, on occasion with some delay--that any analyst with a valid reason can identify and make contact with the appropriate analyst in another agency.

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 18 -

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. In total, present mechanisms and facilities for analyst-to-analyst communication are reasonably adequate; improvements could be made; however, ^a (a) by providing more ready means for identifying and locating the appropriate analyst in another agency; ^{and} (b) by providing additional secure telephone facilities for analyst-to-analyst consultation.

4. Taking into account ^{the} ~~its~~ cost, the effectiveness of existing facilities, the probable extent of ~~its~~ use, and the security problems involved, the establishment of an Interagency Directory Service is not warranted.

5. Significant augmentation of existing secure telephone facilities for analyst-to-analyst communication does not appear feasible at this time. The unfulfilled needs for this type of communication can, in large part, be met by facilities that are secure only through SECRET.

G. Recommendations

The Task Team recommends:

1. That CIA, on a periodic basis, make available to other members of the intelligence community listings of its key analytical or production ^{people}, both area and functional.

2. That DIA and State make available to other members of the community increased numbers of their current telephone directories so as to make available one copy to each small group of analysts who work together.

3. That each agency make available to other agencies of the community, on a periodic basis, copies of its organization charts in sufficient detail to make evident the analytical capabilities of major units and subunits in the positive intelligence field.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 19 -

4. That appropriate steps be taken, on a priority basis, to develop a means whereby existing non-secure telephone (black phone) lines, *both within buildings and between buildings,* may be economically converted to secure lines for material up to and including SECRET.

5. That ~~CIA and Defense continue~~ *be continued on* the development of closed circuit television techniques such as those already initiated by ~~its~~ *the CIA* Imagery Analysis Division, with particular attention to solving the security problems involved in using this technique between agencies.

6. That CIA serve as the Executive Agent for 4 and 5 above.

S-E-C-R-E-T