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Interim Report of Task Force VII  
(Analyst to Analyst Communications)

1. As a result of its own deliberations and informal discussions with analysts of varying levels in State, CIA (DD/I) and DIA, the Task Force has reached certain interim conclusions concerning the problem of communications between analysts. These are based primarily on our partial investigation of the Latin American area, but we suspect that they are applicable in large part to other areas of the world as well.

a) There are, in fact, a surprisingly large number of *mechanisms* **ILLEGIB**  
~~ways~~ by which analysts from differing agencies collaborate and communicate. Among these ways are: the USIB committees and subcommittees; the NIE mechanism; the coordination of the CIB; various task forces set up from time to time; informal analysts discussion groups, e.g. Guatemala; and the operation of normal, established liaison arrangements. Through these various *mechanisms* **ILLEGIB** means, analysts identify their opposite numbers in other agencies, exchange information and opinions, and achieve working level cooperation. Nonetheless, there is variation in the application of these arrangements with respect to both geographic and functional coverage. For crisis coverage, analyst communications normally are good; in quiet areas, exchanges are minimal.

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b) The time factor has a very real bearing on the question of analyst communications. This factor also is closely related to the problem of secure communications that is discussed in paragraph e. Thus we find that consultation on current intelligence is very spotty -- timeliness takes precedence over coordination. On the other hand, longer-range intelligence -- with some exceptions ~~is normally well coordinated.~~ *generally better*

*expand - ?*  
*feedback or analyst*

c) The problem of identifying the appropriate analysts in another agency is directly related to the organizational structure of that agency or office. State, which has a straight forward geographic organization, presents little problem in comparison with CIA and DIA, which are organized on a mixed geographic and functional basis. The exchange of current organization charts would be helpful to each agency as a means of identifying the intelligence capabilities of other members of the community. Charts, however, should not be considered a tool for identifying analysts. (See paragraph (d) below). In order to avoid misuse and to overcome problems of security, organization charts should be held only in the top offices of each agency and in established liaison circles.

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d) The problem of identification has two facets. One is the identification of the responsible analyst at the appropriate level in the chain of command; the other is identification of the most knowledgeable or expert person on a particular subject, wherever he may be within an organization. The first kind of identification can usually be done, if necessary, through established liaison channels, albeit these channels are sometimes slow and cumbersome. The second kind of identification, however, is extremely difficult and depends on the variables of individual knowledge or acquaintance. Even within agencies, themselves, (no organized method for this kind of identification exists, except within DIA which has now established a roster of its personnel showing the area or subject specialties and background of each individual. Rosters, however, should be considered to be intra-agency tools, primarily for the purpose of adjusting personnel assignments to meet crisis situations. For inter-agency communications to be effective, command requirements must be maintained. Thus it is the responsible analyst who is the key in this type of communications cycle and not the analyst who might be identified as more knowledgeable.

*DDI test  
last test?*

*future?*

*significant  
etc listing*

*of analyst skills*

For these reasons the idea of an interagency directory seems of dubious value -- even if the many obstacles of its preparation and maintenance could be overcome. Our present thinking on this problem of identification tends in the direction of improved liaison arrangements and the development of more clearly established points of approved contact.

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e) The problem of secure communications between agencies deserves increased attention. It is suggested that the distribution and use of the "gray" line might be examined, with a view to making it more accessible to analysts. Arrangements now under way for secure facsimile transmission between the NMCC and Operations Centers in State and CIA may alleviate this problem to some extent. In this general field particularly, we feel, we shall, as we proceed, need the assistance and expertise of a representative from the NSA.

f) Individual security clearances as a means of promoting security in analyst to analyst communication does not appear to present a problem in Latin America. This may, however, not be true elsewhere where more exotic types of collection efforts are employed.

2. It has often been assumed that existing arrangements for analyst to analyst communication and collaboration were seriously deficient. For the purpose of confirming this assumption, and pin-pointing more precisely the specific areas of deficiency, the Task Force has developed a questionnaire which it is discussing with selected analysts in State, DIA and CIA concerned with Latin America. DIA has completed these discussions and State and CIA expect to do so shortly. The Task Force will then be in a position to direct its attention to specific areas for improvement, if such should emerge.

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