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20 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: 

SUBJECT: Test Plan dated 6 June 1968

REFERENCE: S-2185/MS-1

1. Since your memorandum was prepared, I have sent you a revised operational test plan. The need for this revision was discussed in detail at our initial OPTEG meeting. It proposes that the initial phase of the CCC operational test and evaluation be confined to the application and usefulness of CCC notations on NSA product. Comments on the revised plan are being developed by CIA. NSA and State have indicated their concurrence. Specific DIA comments on the revised plan would be most helpful.

2. Along this line I wonder if you would identify the basis for your conclusion that the proposed plan is "far too detailed" by indicating which, if any, of the details provided in IHC-D-111/1.1/14 are not essential to the conduct of the operational test called for by USIB-D-39.7/21. You state: "As a minimum, to be effective, such a test, it would seem, would require that all agency personnel involved, i.e., field collectors, dissemination indexers, ADP system analysts, and intelligence research analysts, covering one world area, e.g., Africa South of the Sahara, or the Middle East, or Latin America, would convert to the use of CCC for a given period, say six months." You conclude that "hundreds of people would be involved in such a test." From this complex, intricately qualified, yet unsupported statement of opinion the reader can only infer that, contrary to existing instructions, I have proposed that DIA, indeed the entire intelligence community, commit large numbers of people from all processing levels on a full-time basis for a protracted period of time. Further it implies that regular on-going operations will be replaced in their entirety for this period by an unproven technique. Whatever else it is, this is certainly not the proposed plan on which OPTEG is deliberating. Finally, you state that training and implementation of such a test (your test) will be "prohibitively expensive". This statement ignores comments made by the NSA representative made at the meeting to the effect that the

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additional time it takes a report writer to apply CCC notations to his report is so small as to be essentially unmeasurable, and that training in applying the notations to reports requires a maximum of four hours for the report writers themselves and a maximum of two days (16 hours) for training instructors, who will in turn train report writers.

3. In the proposed test and evaluation plan I suggested a number of ways in which the testing volunteered by CIA, DIA, and State might be done which would result in data and information which OPTEG could collate, analyze, and evaluate from the overall interagency point of view. It was not my intention to, nor did I in fact, call for substantial expansion of present agency commitments to the testing of CCC. For example, the proposed plan calls for determining the adequacy with which CCC notations can be used to represent users requirements. CIA, DIA, and State proposals all incorporate testing this aspect of CCC. This is also true of determining the extent to which the appearance of CCC notations on intelligence documents might facilitate document exchange between agencies and reduce screening time at dissemination points within agencies. The proposed plan calls for determining the impact of having producers apply CCC notations to their products. This objective is included in present CIA and State plans. In addition, State plans include testing and evaluating the suitability of the CCC structure as a basis for organizing small or specialized document filing systems and its suitability in providing a useful arrangement for entries on accession lists, compilations of extracts, etc. The proposed plan calls for determining the extent to which the appearance of CCC notations on intelligence documents can enhance and expedite intelligence research and analysis when new or unanticipated aspects of old problems arise. This derives from USIB-D-39.7/21, 3 May 1967, and the DIA proposal to determine if CCC "provides useful help to research analysts as a quick look-up of document content." Determining adjustments and changes in the CCC which would improve its responsiveness should derive from information and data which would be obtained in determining how well CCC satisfies its basic objectives. The same is true in determining whether improvements resulting from the application and use of CCC are sufficient to justify changes in existing methods and procedures.

4. In the proposed plan I carefully avoided establishing test boundaries (See Section c, paragraph 1.a, IHC-D-111/1.1/14). I hoped that OPTEG could, through careful definition of testing procedures and judicious selection of data and information available

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within the framework of present agency commitments, minimize the impact of the overall CCC test and evaluation and at the same time obtain sufficient reliable data on which to base its evaluations. This responds to USIB recognition that, "Availability of personnel in the operating environment is acknowledged as critical. Every effort should be made to channel the test effort into areas where immediate, increased support to the production analysts and system managers can be anticipated." (See attachment to USIB-D-39.7/21).

5. Turning to your recommendations that NSA conduct the "detailed" test and that CIA, DIA and State, (if willing) proceed with their limited tests, I can only direct your attention to the results of this type of solution when it was embarked on by Task Team I. (See Part VI, Developmental Testing of the Content Control Scheme, CODIB-D-111/1.1/14. The results were inconclusive, ranging from unacceptable for any purpose whatsoever to eminently useful for one or more purposes. I am quite sure that this same dilemma is lurking in the wings should we decide on this course of action. The prospects of successfully weighing different conclusions based on information derived from uncontrolled testing as suggested is not a bright one.

6. It is my hope that OPTEG can in the very near future finalize a realistic operational test plan within the framework of present agency commitments which will result in the collection of adequate data in a controlled fashion which will permit us to draw firm conclusions of the relative usefulness of CCC and to generate practical recommendations for follow-on phases, if any.

[Redacted]  
IHC Support Staff

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for Reference*

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