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CHIVE/C-121-67
21 April 1967

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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Reference

SUBJECT : Reactions to CODIB Task Team VII Final Report of 7 April 1967

1. The following are some comments from the CHIVE Task Force on subject report. They deal primarily with the recommendations which begin on Page 14.
2. Recommendation 4 is probably the most important. It contains the greatest unrealized possibilities. It could be moved to first position.
3. Items 1, 2, and 3 do not, as they stand, imply full reciprocity. They could be recast into a single recommendation which would imply reciprocity, and also fix, somewhat loosely, responsibility for action and for any ensuing non-performance. Thus the following could be substituted for 1, 2, and 3:

"That the liaison organization of each agency be permitted to secure from each other agency copies of such telephone books, organizational charts, and other guidance listings and hand-books as are needed to clarify for those analysts whom they serve (a) the analytical capabilities of other units and subunits in the positive intelligence field, and (b) the identities of key analysts both area and functional, subject only to such conditions as the senior officials of those agencies may judge necessary to impose for overriding reasons."
4. Recommendations 5 and 6 are good. Item 5 could be combined with Item 4 if desired.
5. With regard to new recommendations, the suggestion at the end of paragraph 2, p. 5, is vital to growth

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in inter-agency communication. Hence, the following might be appropriately suggested:

"That the respective agencies be encouraged to invite officers from other departments to attend periodic briefings on their organizations and functions; that in the course of managerial reporting to senior echelons within agencies periodic attention be given to reporting on the current state and progress of analyst communication between agencies."

6. Our general reactions are as follows:

a. The directory idea (p. 7f) makes us somewhat nervous. The differing security philosophies of the several agencies make it possible for what is essentially an inventory of intelligence resources to become broadly available. For China (10% of intelligence?) all that is needed to have such a directory now is to compile and disseminate an index to the China Task Force inventory of resources targeted against China. An extension of the inventory to cover the worldwide field could well be done by one man within CIA, working as Charles Otstot has done, without attempting to make it an inter-agency project. Hence, since we have the capability to do it for ourselves if we want it, I think nothing is lost by having the directory left out of the recommendations. Meanwhile, the CHIVE referral service will develop a basis of experience on which to expand later if such is desirable.

b. Preoccupation with Latin America as a test area for TT VII undoubtedly introduced some distortion of the total picture. We suspect that for Latin America the analyst talent is spread more thinly, may be a little more generalized and possibly less "brilliant," more cooperatively minded, and less pressed. Also, they may share a stronger sense of common cause in keeping their area before the community than do their counterparts in the competitively minded components servicing Eurasian areas.

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c. The report does not identify or clarify adequately the respective roles in analyst communications of immediate supervisors, and of control officers. The supervisor sets the climate for liaison; the liaison or control officer may either help or hinder. Some supervisors will only tolerate such contacts as benefit their own organizations, with scant care for the others. Some will give away a lot, to advance the cause. Others are inherently secretive. Some are hesitant and want authorization. Others are courageously permissive. Usually their own experience with counterpart leadership in producing components is influential in their attitudes toward analyst communications. This being so, it reinforces the case for suggesting the recommendation noted under "5" above.



Director
CHIVE Task Force

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		Apr. 67
TO: Chief CODR Support Staff		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
Dan: ocr has no great quarrel with the TTIC Report. The attached may be of background interest to you.		
FROM: [REDACTED]		
ROOM NO.		EXTENSION

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FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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