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30 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CODIB

SUBJECT: Recommendations for Task Team V Report

It is recommended that:

1. A CODIB working group be established and tasked to design and support the implementation of a program to upgrade the present interagency National Agency Check (NAC) system network. Representatives from DoD, Department of State, FBI, CIA, and NSA should be included and representatives from the Civil Service Commission, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Secret Service (non-USIB but highly involved agencies) should be invited to participate. The tasks should include:

a. Establishment of common data elements as required by the participants in the NAC system.

b. Establishment of a common format acceptable to all users of the NAC system which will contain both human and machine readable information.

c. Monitor and evaluate an experimental link between two or more agencies to test the possible areas of improvement and determine guidelines for the implementation of the full systems.


2. A CODIB working group be established to identify specific possible areas of improvement in the positive biographic area. Representatives from DIA, NSA, Department of State, CIA, and CODIB/SS should be included. A biographic intelligence processing plan should be developed by this group. It should coordinate carefully with the developing COINS effort and the new CODIB Subcommittee on Standardization. The present Positive Intelligence biographic system in each agency should be described. Specific recommendations for

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improvements in the existing systems should be made in such areas as standard data elements, standard request formats, improved communication facilities, exploitation of source materials and maintenance of data bases as Intelligence Community resources.



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MEMORANDUM TO:
Chairman, CODIB

17 June 1966

SUBJECT: Personal Recommendations with respect to Task Team V's Work.

1. The following are recommendations regarding the future course of the military personalities aspect of biographics that I promised 25X1A I would submit to you before taking off for C & GS School :

- a. Establish a committee of substantively qualified people in the respective agencies to come up with standard data fields, transcription systems, standard ranks, position lists, etc. for the purpose of automating as much of this information as possible. COINS may do some useful work here.
- b. Rewrite the pertinent DCID's so that responsibilities for the acquisition, processing, and production of military personality intelligence is clearly and unequivocally fixed. In my opinion, the exploitation of open-source materials for military personalities should be assigned to DOD(DIA).
- c. Direct that all interested agencies in the Washington area be tied into the LDX system by a given date, to include the exchange of biographic information. AHS is still not tied in.
- d. Stop the proliferation of raw intelligence reports throughout the community and direct interested agencies to the specified agency responsible for producing military personality and military biographic intelligence.

2. In my opinion, the PI side of Task Team V did all it could in the time allotted to learn what files existed of value to them, what was in them, and whom to call to get something in a hurry. Work should now continue with attempts at standardization and more precise definitions of responsibility. Please forgive the brevity. I can give fuller explanations on my return early in July.

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CGS-14946

22 April 1966
SS-66/217

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CODIB

SUBJECT : CODIB Support Staff Comments on
Task Team V Report


REFERENCE : CGS/SS-76, 7 April 1966

1. Thank you for sending me reference. I feel that further distribution of this document can only result in a long debate. Nor is this to be a lengthy rebuttal. I would like to comment on some of the basic issues in order to clarify the Task Team's outlook, and to tender some personal observations regarding Task Team efforts in general.

2. I am confident that most members of Task Team V would agree that our report is fairly good in its fact finding and suggestions, pretty weak in terms of action proposals. I am equally sure that the team would agree that the CSS comments are belated, insensitive to inter-agency realities, misleading and inaccurate in several respects, and largely devoid of appreciation for the art of the possible. The team dwelt at great length on many of the issues raised in the attachment to reference. The team collectively decided, for a mix of technical, procedural, environmental and policy reasons, that the best it could do with the time and manpower available was to report as it did.

3. The basic difficulty, frankly, was a lack of problem definition on CODIB's part. The team found itself charged with the requirement to identify the biographic problem and make recommendations. It took the team (composed of people with diverse interests and backgrounds) several months to come up with Terms of Reference which it felt to be responsive to CODIB's vague directions. It took several more months, after the Terms of Reference were approved by CODIB, for the Team to realize that even these terms were beyond its capacity in certain respects. It was crystal clear, as things developed, that a community "biographic plan" was a meaningless phrase.

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4. As team thinking coalesced, it became clear to all that it was beyond the powers of such a task team to analyze the problems of each agency in detail. Consequently, the team unanimously endorsed the following wording (page 12, para. 9, page 16, para. 5):

"It was not possible for the Team to consider specifically the relative merits of: (a) the improvement of the manual systems within each agency, (b) the potentials in automation of the index systems within each agency, and (c) the system efficiency that might be realized by the institution of a machine language communication system between the various agencies. These are tasks requiring management supported feasibility studies, dominated by the professionals within each agency, in terms of the unique history and problems of each."

5. But let's go to the heart of the matter. I wonder to what extent CODIB, a committee which reports to another committee, can determine in the first place, and enforce in the second place, rules and standards which have to be applied and interpreted deep within line organizations which pay only token attention to inter-agency committee pronouncements. Can an inter-agency study group ever penetrate even a single organization's workings to the point that it understands the nature of the data, the mission and functions, the dollar and personnel resources, the informal organizational structure and other ingredients which have to be grasped before practical suggestions for change can be made? I find an almost unanimous negative to this question in talking to professional intelligence officers and managers throughout the community, including several of the persons who now serve, or have served, as CODIB members.

6. Reference paper indicates little awareness of the fact that this task team represents, in microcosm, the real world of inter-departmental dynamics. There are problems and differences in each agency which virtually force the individual on a task team to follow the dictates of his own organization, giving either lip service to, or sideways endorsement of, statements of community principle or techniques which may serve his cause.

7. This is neither good nor bad: it is. I feel personally that the better the communication between professionals with management/operational (as opposed to staff) responsibilities, the better our chances of having less lip service and more sideways (or even direct) endorsement of, and follow through on, systems

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integration in the common interest. As matters stand, the very people who are attempting to identify and solve problems in their own agencies are being diverted to unrealistically broad study problems. The more task forces, committees, study groups, etc., dedicated to standardization, data sharing, community "compatibility" and so forth, the more we deplete our already over extended manpower resources throughout the community.

8. What, then? At worst, it should be possible to organize periodic exchanges of user groups, managers and technicians in various subject areas. At best, an inter-departmental staff group such as the CSS might be able to identify discreet problem areas which involve such a glaring diffusion of responsibility, or duplication of processing, that concrete changes in mission and work can be documented and implemented. Just organizing the community to do these apparently simple things will take all the attention, time and staff available.



Chief, DDP Systems Group

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Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01439A000300040011-5

CSS/MM-76
7 April 1966

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CODIB

SUBJECT: Task Team V - Biographics, Final Report

REFERENCES: (a) USIB/D-39.7/5 16 March 1964
(b) USIB-D-39.7/6 6 May 1964
(c) CODIB-D-III/I.5/3 19 January 1965
(d) T/V/W-1 16 October 1965

1. In reference (a) CODIB recommended that USIB approve the establishment of an ad hoc task team to "develop a biographic intelligence processing plan." In reference (b) USIB approved this CODIB recommendation. Thus, in 1964, it was obviously the feeling of both CODIB and USIB that there was a need for a biographic intelligence processing plan. Task Team V was established to accomplish this task.

2. The Task Team apparently understood its assignment, at least in the beginning, because reference (d), an early version of its Terms of Reference, gave the following as its Objective: "To develop a plan to facilitate the processing and production of biographic intelligence information within the Intelligence Community." Later, with the approval of CODIB, the Task Team changed its objective, as given in reference (c), to the following: "To identify means for improving the storage, retrieval and exchange of information from the major name files and related data files in the Intelligence Community." However, the Team was reminded by CODIB Support Staff representatives several times during its deliberations of its original purpose as approved by USIB.

3. The Final Report of Task Team V does not fulfill the task for which it was created as stated in reference (a). In our opinion it falls far short of achieving the objective as stated in reference (c), the approved terms of reference for the Task Team.

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4. Our detailed comments specifying the reasons for arriving at the above conclusion are given in the attachment to this memorandum.

5. We recommend the following course of action:

a. CODIB should not forward this report to USIB. To send it to USIB as CODIB's response to the original requirement would, in our judgement, reflect very adversely on CODIB.

b. CODIB should now make up its mind whether in 1966 it wants a biographic intelligence processing plan, as it apparently did in 1964. If it does not, then it should find some method of getting off the USIB hook for such a plan. We do not believe that sending this report forward without considerable modification will even do that. If CODIB does want such a plan, then some method must be found to provide the necessary resources to achieve it.

c. Assuming that CODIB does want to develop a biographic intelligence processing plan, we recommend the following:

(1) Establish a task group to develop a processing plan for the positive intelligence biographic activities with members assigned full time to the project until the report to CODIB is completed. (We recommend this course because the Positive and the CI/Security biographic systems are indeed separate systems with different requirements, data bases and organizational channels). The first task of this group would be to describe adequately the present positive intelligence biographic systems in each agency. This would then be used as the basis for making recommendations for improvement.

(2) Establish a separate task group to:

(a) Plan for the immediate implementation of a telecommunication network for transmission of requests and responses in machine language between agencies in the National Agency Check system.

(b) Concurrently with the above, develop standard rules for recording of personal names

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and other identifying data to be used in inter-agency queries and responses.

(c) Describe adequately the present CI/Security systems in each agency.

(d) Develop recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the NAC system.

(e) Operate full time until the above tasks are completed.

(3) In order to coordinate the efforts of these two task groups and to preclude domination of either group by any one agency, we recommend that the Chief of both task groups be a member of the CODIB Support Staff.

Chief, CODIB Support Staff

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Attachment: A/S

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - Secretary, CODIB
- 1 - Chrono
- 1 - CSS

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CSS/MM-76
7 April 1966
Attachment

CODIB SUPPORT STAFF COMMENTS ON
FINAL REPORT OF TASK TEAM V - BIOGRAPHICS*

1. Perhaps the major deficiency in the Final Report of Task Team V is that it does not present a sufficiently comprehensive picture of individual biographic intelligence processing organizations. Thus it is neither a useful tool for users/researchers of biographic information nor does it provide an adequate basis for sound recommendations for improving the systems. In fact, some of the recommendations (i.e., 3, 7, & 8) are presented without any discussion from which such recommendations could arise. Recommendations 5 and 6 would give to the CODIB Support Staff the task of finishing the work for Task Team V, i.e., completing the description of the present systems in sufficient detail to be useful as a research tool or in making recommendations for improvements.

The Task Team V Report does not respond to its own Terms of Reference.
2. Other deficiencies discussed below are referenced to specific paragraphs of Task Team V Approved Terms of Reference (CODIB-D-111/1.5/3, 19 January 1965).


a. (Para B. 1)** The files of Project White Stork (FTD), Cross Check (FTD/LOC), and Passport and Visa (State) are "significant indexes" and are "routinely consulted" but no information is contained on them in the report. Also the team's definition of what constitutes a significant index actually eliminates a number of biographic files which are important to the Community.

b. (Para B. 2. a) Figures on size (and activity rates) are given by organization rather than by individual index or biographic file within each organization. In many cases there may be only one index, but in several instances there are actually a number of different indexes, e.g., CIA/SR, CIA/BR, NSA/OCR. There is no way of telling this from the figures given.

*T/V/R-1, 1 February 1966

**See Annex 6 of the Report for copy of Terms of Reference.

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c. (Para B. 2. b) The only information contained in the report in response to this paragraph is a column in Annex 3 which indicates whether the individuals whose names are in the indexes are "predominately US, foreign or both." There is no other information on the "types of personalities covered: percentage of foreign vs. U.S. citizens, scientists, military, political, communist party, maritime, foreign intelligence services, agents, etc." There is no mention of what nationalities are represented in any index.

d. (Para B. 2. c) There is no information on the "depth of search on name variants" in any of the indexes. The only information on depth of search is the average number of searches per request, as shown in Annex 3, Col. 8. One cannot tell whether this indicates search on name variants, name variations or both.

e. (Para B. 2. d) There is no information presented on the "major requesters (against each index) or the proportion of requests from each."

f. (Para B. 2. e) There is practically no discussion of the "methods of communicating requests and responses" other than a statement (p 11 para 5) that "there are literally dozens of name check request forms now being utilized by the various agencies," and that "certain basic data such as name, place of birth, date of birth, service serial number, social security number, sex, etc., were included on each form." The Team "considered a study of the need for a single name check form to be used by the various agencies," but then considered it "more important to examine the data elements used and what rules should be applied to their control." The Team did nothing further about either of these problems except to propose an approach to recording of personal names. From the absence of discussion on communication of requests by electrical/electronic methods and from Recommendation 2 (page 4), one could assume that telecommunication facilities are not now being utilized. However, the Army counterintelligence and security records facility at Ft. Holabird has been receiving requests and transmitting responses in machine language over telecommunication links for several years. Air Force and Navy counterintelligence and security records are now being merged with the Army records in one facility to serve all of DoD via telecommunication links.

g. (Para B. 2. f) Annex 4 contains a listing of the data elements that may be recorded by each agency. However, the report contains no information regarding the rules applied to the recording of data elements in any agency or even whether there are any rules.

h. (Para B. 2. g) There are no "descriptions of input, maintenance and search processing" as practiced by each system or agency.

i. (Para B. 2. h) There is no discussion of "requirements for submission of requests" to any index.

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j. (Para C. 1) The report does not "examine costs, methodology or prospects for biographic systems now undergoing mechanization." Nor does it examine these factors in sufficient detail to be helpful to an agency which may be considering automation. It does mention (p 1 para 2) that there are "profound, complex problems and significant costs," but it does not examine these problems carefully nor even mention the costs.

k. (Para C. 2) The report states (p 2 para 9) that "the central problem in any large name index used for name searching is the way in which personal names are recorded, filed, and searched," and then presents, in Annex 2, a "Proposed Approach to the Machine Recording of Personal Names." Beyond that, however, it does very little to "identify the basic problems to be faced and areas where policy decisions are required by each agency in planning for mechanization."

l. (Para C. 3) This is a very important paragraph in the Terms of Reference, and the report pays very little attention to it except to note (p 2 para 9) that "the success of an improved interagency name check exchange system based on telecommunications coupled with computer search requires a common approach to recording of personal names and certain additional basic identifying data." It does not specify what the additional data are nor make any attempt to arrive at a common approach to any data elements other than name.

m. (Para D) The report does not "outline policy objectives for the Community" (except perhaps for Recommendation 1, and that has already been a USIB policy since August 1962 as stated in USIB-D-39.5/15). It does not give "generalized projections of cost, manpower and time required to meet these objectives," nor does it "include specific guidelines for agencies to follow in systems planning and development."

3. In short, it appears to us that the Terms of Reference, which the Team spent a great deal of time preparing, were practically ignored.

3.4. Below are comments on each of the Recommendations contained in the report. (pp 4-5)

a. Recommendation 1. The essentials of this recommendation have been USIB policy since 1962, not only for mechanization of biographic indexes but other areas as well. Why ask USIB to approve now what it already approved four years ago? Furthermore, many of the agencies which have biographic responsibilities are now moving rapidly toward mechanization. A notable exception is FBI, which is giving very serious thought to the problem but is prevented from doing much because of budgetary considerations. It may be true that "no major name index in the Intelligence Community has yet been fully automated," and "therefore, proof of success has not been conclusively demonstrated." (p 2 para 8) However, these statements are somewhat misleading. There are several name indexes outside of the Intelligence Community which have been fully automated and which are conclusively successful. One of these, the National Drivers Registration Service (NDRS), Bureau of Public Roads, Washington, D. C., with an index of about three million records,

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receives up to 100,000 requests per day and responds within 24 hours. Most of the members of the Team visited the NDRS and were aware of its capabilities. The point to be made here is that success in this field has been achieved and we should press forward rather than adopt a go-slow or wait-and-see attitude. The report could have pointed out that there are still about eight million typed biographic index cards being created each year and that to convert just these cards to machine language will cost the agencies approximately \$800,000. Most of this annual cost could have been saved if the agencies had converted to machine-language recording procedures. The longer they wait the greater will be the loss in conversion costs. TELEGIB

b. Recommendation 2. In our judgment ^{clearly (no)} it is a needless exercise to "request each agency to study the feasibility of establishing telecommunication links within the National Agency Check Complex." The feasibility of such links is already well established. The Army has been receiving requests on IBM cards from its field offices via transceiver for several years. Transit time has been reduced from days to minutes. A network similar to the Army system could be installed now between all agencies in the NAC system in a matter of days using existing telephone lines, for the vast majority of the requests and responses. All it takes is a desire on the part of the agencies to do so. There is no need ~~whatever~~ to wait for a feasibility study by each agency or for any agency to complete, or even start, the mechanization of its internal system before establishing telecommunication links for transmission of requests and replies in machine language between agencies. It appears obvious from the report that something should be done now to improve the response time which averages about nine days between any two agencies. The time required to obtain responses from all agencies which receive a typical request averages much greater than nine days, even for those cases where all responses show that there is no derogatory information on record (no-record responses). This response time could easily be reduced to one day with the use of readily-available equipment and at no significant increase in cost over the present archaic system. (Rental of eight terminals and the connecting lines should not exceed \$3,000 per month.) Furthermore, since the requests and responses would be transmitted in machine language, there should be additional savings. The machine language cards could be used by the requesting agency either in a machine index or a manual index, and there would not be the additional expense later of converting to machine language when the system is mechanized. There would be no need to type the requests on one of the dozens of request forms now being used. One keypunching would provide both an index card and a request card. If the receiving agency has a mechanized index, it would not have to convert ~~the~~ typed requests to machine language before processing. The report states (p 2 para 7) that "it is difficult to measure the actual loss to the government...because of the slowness of the [present] system." It thus implies that these losses are substantial. Therefore, it seems to us that we should recommend that the agencies press forward now with ~~haste~~ to implement a system for transmission of requests and responses in machine language between agencies, at least those in the NAC system. An effective system could have been in operation years ago. In our judgment any further delay is ~~not only~~ unwarranted, but ~~unconscionable~~.

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c. Recommendation 3. We agree wholeheartedly with the idea that the LDX (or similar) system should connect agencies in the Washington area engaged in production or use of positive Biographic Intelligence. However, there is no discussion in the report of what the LDX system is, where it is now installed, what the costs are, what its advantages are, what improvement could be obtained by its extension, what use rates could be expected, etc. The report does state (p 16 para e) that "the present communications between agencies is not adequate for quick exchange of classified information," but this hardly seems sufficient background discussion for arriving at Recommendation 3.

d. Recommendation 4. We feel strongly that the agencies should agree now to a standard method of recording personal names and other identifying data elements before mechanized systems now under development or contemplated in several agencies get locked in concrete so hard that it will be difficult at best and perhaps impossible to get them to change to a standard method. We further believe that the Intelligence Community should lead other government agencies in this regard rather than have standards developed under BoB sponsorship imposed upon us. If we had standards, it might be possible to get them accepted by the rest of the government. Why should we take such a laissez-faire attitude on these problems when the report itself says (p 11 para 5) "those considerations [data elements used and what rules should be applied to their control] become increasingly critical as the agencies move toward greater use of machine language." Now is the time to act, not some years hence when it will be too late or at least very expensive.

e. Recommendation 5. This recommendation would require the CODIB Support Staff to describe the present biographic systems in each agency in sufficient detail to serve as a useful tool for biographic analysts and other users of biographic intelligence. This, in our judgment, should have been one of the first tasks to be accomplished by the Task Team which, in its early days, had representatives from each of the major biographic collections in Washington. Even at the conclusion of the Task Team's effort, few, if any, members had acquired a detailed knowledge of the "characteristics of each major collection and the procedures and channels for getting service from each." How can we ever develop a biographic intelligence processing plan until we have described, or at least have detailed knowledge of, the characteristics of each of the present systems? The Team report does not even tell us how a single biographic data element is recorded in any one of the biographic collections. We have no argument about the necessity for a detailed description of present systems. The question is how to get it done now. We do not believe that the Task Team approach is a good method. On the other hand, the CODIB Support Staff does not have sufficient resources at present to do the job in a reasonable time. We believe that if the job is to be done at all, it should be done by persons detailed to the task full time until it is completed. Maintenance of the publication, if desired, might then be accomplished by the CODIB Support Staff.

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f. Recommendation 6. If the Task Team believes that it is desirable for "agencies which are developing new computer data files" to be informed of the "format and coverage requirements of others in the community," why did they not examine and report at least some of the formats and coverage requirements while they had representatives together from the major biographic collections in Washington who could have provided much of this information? We believe strongly that all of the agencies should be continuously aware of what each of the other agencies is doing in the biographic field. Format and coverage requirements are only two of the items about which they should be informed on a continuing basis. This kind of information should have been included in descriptions of ongoing systems and incorporated in the Team report. Right during the time the Team was deliberating, several developments were started which will result eventually in computerized biographic data files, e.g., Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, DoD and COINS. Others were already underway, e.g., CIA/RID, CIA/OS, CIA/CHIVE. These developments all appear to be going in their own independent directions without the benefit of any help or guidance from each other or from the Task Team V Final Report.

g. Recommendation 7. This may be an excellent recommendation, but how are we to judge since there is no discussion of it in the text. What are the "needs of the Community?" What is DIA doing now? What use is DIA making of open source material now? What are the deficiencies in the DIA program? How should the program be expanded? We can already visualize Gen. Carroll's reaction to this presumptuous recommendation. It should be backed up with solid evidence that such a recommendation is valid, and not manufactured out of thin air.

h. Recommendation 8. This recommendation would give to another team, or its successor, the task of developing a portion of a biographic intelligence processing plan but does not give it sufficient specifics to enable it to know what is needed. The text states (p 16 para f) that "there is an extensive but insufficiently coordinated effort to bring under control scientific information from open sources" which "results in the creation of a great deal of personality information on scientists at all levels of significance." Other than the statement that this effort is "insufficiently coordinated," there is no discussion of what is being done now, what is wrong with the present system, or what additional is needed. One gets the impression from this statement that lack of coordination may result in a lot of duplicate information. This may be true, but just the opposite may also be true. Who can tell from the report. Neither Task Team III nor its successor should be given this vaguely-defined task until there is a better analysis of what is needed by whom. Even then, assigning it to another Task Team is not the most desirable of several alternatives.

i. Recommendation 9. We believe that there is much need for persons engaged in a common cause to get together periodically to find out what others are doing. One of the most significant achievements of Task

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Team V was that the members got to know each other and something of what was going on in the other agencies. A seminar similar to the one recommended here was a major contributor to this achievement. However, we believe that this mechanism should be an adjunct to, rather than a substitute for, a comprehensive description of the biographic community and a biographic intelligence processing plan.

4.5. As indicated by the footnote on page 2 of the report, much of the reported data is no longer valid. Reference to Annex 3, Biographic Index Facts Summary, indicates that some data in Cols. 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16 and probably others should now be changed. Before this report could reach USIB, more of the data will be invalid. Among other changes, the Army, Navy and Air Force index records are being converted to a standard format on IBM cards and merged. This project, which has been underway since mid-1965, will be finished very shortly if not already. ~~The report certainly should now reflect this development.~~ CIA/RID and CIA/OS, which together were converting to machine records even before the Task Team got underway. State Department Passport and Visa Records, the third largest in the government and which the Team ignored completely, are being automated and will have on-line query capability from field offices. This project has been underway for many months. Secret Service and I&NS both began planning to mechanize several months ago. The report should indicate the status of each of these mechanization efforts.

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