

Executive Registry

108-644

JOHN ALEX McCONE
612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET
LOS ANGELES 90017

6 February 1968


Dear Dick:

Arleigh Burke has asked me to comment on a series of articles on the Cuban Missile Crisis by Mario Lazo for possible publication in the Reader's Digest.

I have written my views on the articles and attach a copy of the letter. I can add nothing to what I have said in this letter, copy of which I have also sent to Dean Rusk.

Feeling that someone on your staff might at some point get into this question, I attach the complete file, including the chapters written by Mario Lazo which were forwarded to me by Arleigh Burke.

Warm personal regards,



Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

McCone

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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| UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET |
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |

Remarks:

Wasn't this Kirk's great friend?

STAT

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

| | |
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| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE |
| Richard Helms, The Director <input type="checkbox"/> | 8/2/68 |
| UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL |
| SECRET | |

Mr. Abel

JOHN ALEX McCONE
612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET
LOS ANGELES 90017

Executive Registry
108-54442

23 February 1968

Mr. Mario Lazo



Dear Mr. Lazo:

This is a hurried reply to your letter of 12 February. In fact I am dictating this letter to you as I drive to the airport.

Understandably a book written by a man of your knowledge and connections and standing undoubtedly will be a valuable contribution to a public understanding of the developments in Cuba both before and after the Castro takeover. Also a discussion of the missile crisis quite naturally must be included in such a book. However, one is tempted -- very tempted -- to adopt the position that a military attack by air or indeed an invasion would be the best course to follow, but I am personally convinced that history would have dealt harshly with the United States had such action been taken.

I am confident that time will see Cuba restored to the community of nations of the Western Hemisphere and that she will again occupy her rightful position of importance and influence. I look upon the present period during which Cuba is going through the greatest of agony, with sadness, but I do not despair of the future.

With respect to the references to me personally, I am aware that a great deal has been written in periodicals and in books, including the book by Mr. Abel; therefore I take no exception to the references made to me with respect to the fears that I harbored long before the mid-range missiles were discovered; the warnings I issued and the fact that I, with others, took a "hard line". By that I mean that I felt that in one way or another the missiles must be removed if the United States was to remain secure.

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

McCone

Mr. Mario Lazo - 2

23 February 1968

I was convinced that the course adopted would in all probability accomplish our purposes and, furthermore, knew that if it did not then such actions as might be necessary to remove the threat would be taken. A sentence expressing my support of the actions taken would be satisfactory and you may, if you wish, add some reference to the possibility of further actions if the quarantine failed.

I would be delighted to see the final draft of your chapters and will look forward to reading your book. I have distributed only one copy of the chapters and that is in the hands of Mr. Helms, Director of the CIA -- with whom you are undoubtedly in touch. Incidentally, he and his associates in that organization hold you in the highest esteem.

I am leaving this morning for three weeks in the Bahamas and while I would be delighted to see you, such a meeting would have to take place late in March.

Yours very truly,



John A. McCone

STA

MARIO LAZO



Executive Registry
68-644/1

STA

February 12, 1968

The Honorable
John A. McCone
612 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90017

Dear Mr. McCone:

Last Thursday I called Arleigh Burke to say I was about to write you that my wife and I would be glad to fly out to Los Angeles in case you would like to talk to me personally. He had just received your letter of February 6th., which he read to me over the telephone. I am afraid you have been unnecessarily disturbed over the material sent you. Permit me, please, to give you this background.

My plan originally was to write a book in Spanish which would be sold in Latin America as a paperback. Then one of my friends, a former client, suggested that it also appear in Portuguese for Brazil. He is the President of one of the largest American companies there and has a man who is qualified to make the translation. Finally the idea surfaced to have the book appear in hard cover in English. It has been completed except for the chapter on the Missile Crisis which will be one of about 25 chapters, perhaps 2 out of 26.

The book covers the Cuban events of the past decade but it has a lot to do with the history, culture and traditions of Latin America generally. Many of the leading personalities who participated in the Cuban events, both Cuban and American, are personal friends of mine. I have 3 chapters on the Bay of Pigs, the material for which I researched for five years. My conclusions are very different from those reached by Lyman Kirkpatrick. I am convinced that the invasion plan was a masterful plan and should have succeeded. We had many dealings with Castro and I once heard him say the invasion plan was excellent.

There was never any intention to publish the material you have in its present form. What you have was written hastily, as a first draft, and intended really to be a target to draw criticism. Nothing will ever be published over my name if I can be shown that it is not the truth. I have always felt that the greatest homage one can pay to truth is to seek it and adhere to it.

STATOTHR

MARIO LAZO

STA

February 13, 1968

The Honorable
John A. McCone
612 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90017

Dear Mr. McCone:


There are two items I forgot to mention
in the letter I sent you yesterday:

1. Your views on the material
Arleigh Burke sent you are fully
known to the owners of the Reader's
Digest. There was no hurry but I
wrote them as soon as I heard
from Arleigh.
2. Although there is very little
possibility that anything of mine
on the missile crisis will appear
in any magazine, I do not see how
I can leave a corrected, documented
account of it out of my book. Of
course I will be more than glad to
include the remarks you suggest --
that you were a member of the Execu-
tive Committee, supported the course
agreed upon, expressed no dissent and
feel in retrospect that a delicate
situation was handled properly.

The sole purpose of sending you the material
was to have the advantage of being able to incorporate
any suggestion you might care to make.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,


Mario Lazo

*I have sent copies of these letters
to Arleigh.*

TAB

JOHN ALEX MCGONE
612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET
LOS ANGELES 90017

November 3, 1967


Dear Dick,

Attached are two documents prepared by George Lenczowski, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Both relate to the current situation in the Middle East.

There is nothing in the papers that will be new to your area specialists, however, I thought they might add to your very considerable inventory of information on the Middle East situation and related problems.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,



Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80B01086A000900220030-7

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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80B01086A000900220030-7

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE SECURITY AGENCY
 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE SECURITY AGENCY

OFFICIAL TRAINING SHEET

| TO | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS |
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| CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION | SIGNATURE |

Remarks:

Does this give you any concern?

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

EA/DCI

9/1/67

67-3914

15 August 1967

*✓
caref*

Mr. Terence M. Lee
612 South Flower
Los Angeles, California

Dear Terry:

Under separate cover I am sending you
the book which is mentioned in the attached
letter which you may wish to acknowledge.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Executive Assistant

25X1A

Enclosure

Distribution:

- 0 - Addressee w/basic letter and book under separate cover
- 1 - ER
- 1 - EA/DCI

STAT

O/DCI/[Redacted] (15 August 1967)

23 AUG 1967 10 18 AM '67

M. J. Corde

STAT

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80B01086A000900220030-7

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80B01086A000900220030-7

B
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Executive Registry
67-3184

JOHN ALEX MCGONE
612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET
LOS ANGELES 90017

June 27, 1967


Dear Dick,

Coro Foundation is a local San Francisco/Los Angeles organization that does nothing but train young men and women to serve in Government positions -- Federal, State or local.

I suggest you pass this on to your personnel people who might not be familiar with this source (although a limited source) of administrative personnel with some training.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,



Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

CLASS OF SERVICE
 This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL
 CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

R. W. MCFALL
 PRESIDENT

| SYMBOLS |
|------------------------------------|
| DL = Day Letter |
| NL = Night Letter |
| LT = International Letter Telegram |

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

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RICHARD KEATINGE M C CORO FOUNDATION BANQUET (DELIVER BEFORE 6PM)

ELDORADO ROOM THE MUSIC CENTER LOSA
 ATTN MANAGER

THE GROWTH AND NATIONAL ACCLAIM GIVEN CORO FOUNDATION IS INDICATIVE OF ITS SUCCESS. BUT THERE IS STILL A GREAT NEED FOR OUR CITIZENS TO BE MORE AWARE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT AND PROGRAMS THAT FURTHER THIS AIM MUST BE ENCOURAGED. ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA, I EXTEND TO CORO FOUNDATION APPRECIATION OF ITS SERVICE AND BEST WISHES FOR MANY MORE YEARS OF SUCCESSFUL ACTIVITY. TO THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA CORO INTERNS WHO ARE THIS EVENING CELEBRATING THE COMPLETION OF MANY HECTIC, EXASPERATING, BUT EDUCATION AND REWARDING MONTHS OF CORD ASSIGNMENTS, I EXTEND BEST WISHES AND MY HOPE THAT THEY WILL ENTER PUBLIC LIFE AND GOVERNMENT

SF1201(R2-65)

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA .



Since 1947 in San Francisco and since 1958 in Los Angeles, Coro Foundation has conducted its Internship in Public Affairs - the oldest continued internship of its kind in California.

Of the more than 300 graduates, some 55% are directly employed in government, political work and public affairs. But this is only part of the story. Other graduates, whether housewives or stockbrokers, are almost without exception, active citizens serving on school boards, state and local commissions, etc.

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Government Service | 33.1% | 33.1% |
| Business, professions, journalism | 23.8 | |
| LL.B. & Ph.D. Candidates | 8.3 | |
| Homemaking and volunteer work | 9.2 | |
| Civic & professional organizations | 11.3 | 11.3 |
| Teaching & educational administration | 7.7 | 7.7 |
| Party officials, campaign specialists | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Deceased or unaccounted for | 3.3 | |
| | <hr/> 100.0% | <hr/> 55.4% |

CORO FOUNDATION

RECORD OF
GRADUATES

LOS ANGELES

SAN FRANCISCO

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GEORGE AIASSA, '48
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FRANKLIN D. ALESHIRE, '48
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City of Palm Springs

KAREN J. BAUCUS, '66
Social Worker
County of Los Angeles

MARVIN R. BAXTER, '63
Investigator
District Attorney's Office
Fresno County

MICHAEL A. BEDWELL, '58
City Manager
City of Menlo Park

ROBERT F. BEYER, '64
Admin. Asst. to City Manager
City of Menlo Park

EVERETT P. BRANDON, '58
Director, Econ. Opportunity Council
City & County of San Francisco

F. JAMES BROWNE, '56
Community Relations Officer
Bay Area Rapid Transit Distr.

MALCOM K. CARTER, JR., '59
Admin. Analyst
East Bay Municipal Utility Distr.

ROBERT M. CHRISTOFFERSON, '55
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City of San Dimas

MARIE BERTILLION COLLINS, '59
Deputy District Attorney
County of Alameda

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Administrative Assistant
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JOHN E. DE VITO, '47
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Contra Costa County Water Distr.

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Deputy City Administrator
City of Santa Maria

LESLIE L. DOOLITTLE, '61
Administrative Officer
City of Morgan Hill

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Deputy City Attorney
Honolulu, Hawaii

L. DALE FLOWERS, '65
Ass't to County Chairman
Republican Central Comm., S. F.

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Administrative Assistant to the
County Executive
County of Sacramento

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City Administrator
City of Union City

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County of San Diego

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City of Berkeley

ALFRED A. HODDER, '59
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City of Rolling Hills Estates

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City of Beaumont

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City of Richmond

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So. Calif. Rapid Transit Distr.

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Admin. Asst. to City Manager
City of Arcadia

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City Manager
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City Manager
City of Palo Alto

WILLIAM H. PARNES, '50
City Manager
City of Livermore

ROY R. PEDERSON, '60
City Manager
City of Porterville

CECIL S. RILEY, '55
Assistant City Manager
City of Oakland

JOHN K. ROBINSON, '52
Planning Commission Vice Chmn.
City of Mill Valley

EDMUND C. SAJOR, '56
Ass't to the Gen. Mgr.
Bay Area Rapid Transit Distr.

JAMES R. SCHONING, '66
Area Director
Rep. Central Comm., L.A. County

WILLIAM L. SCHREIBER, '64
Staff Assistant, Personnel
City of Sunnyvale

MICHAEL F. SILBERSTEIN, '64
Ass't to City Manager
City of Tiburon

KENNETH H. SMITH, '48
City Manager
City of El Cerrito

WILLIAM B. STURGEON, '62
Ass't District Attorney
City & County of San Francisco

HOWARD D. TIPTON, '59
City Manager
City of Glendora

ROBERT G. VOLLMER, '53
City Manager
City of Palos Verdes Estates

RAYMOND W. WARD, '60
Assistant General Manager
Oakland-Alameda Coliseum

SAUL M. WEINGARTEN, '50
City Attorney
Cities of Gonzales & Seaside

STEPHEN S. WEINER, '64
Economic Analyst
B.A.R.T.D.

HORACE B. WHITE, '51
Ass't to the County Exec.
County of Sacramento

RAYMOND H. WINDSOR, '63
Administrative Assistant
City of West Covina

ARLENE J. WILLITS, '64
Administrative Assistant
City of Hayward

MORGAN S. WOOLLETT, '63
Assistant Planner
City Planning Department, Oakland

IN ADMINISTRATIVE, LEGISLATIVE & POLITICAL AFFAIRS

AT THE STATE LEVEL

GLENN Y. ALLEN, '51
Associate Administrative Analyst
Joint Legislative Budget Committee

JACK B. JOHNSTON, '50
Personnel Officer
Water Resources Department

RAYMOND L. ROEDER, JR., '63
Administrative Assistant
Office of the Speaker
Calif. State Assembly

JUDSON C. CLARK, '63
Consultant,
Comm. on Government Organization
California State Assembly

EDWARD J. KUSHNER, '64
Ass't Program & Activities Mgr.
A.S.U.C.L.A.

PHILLIP H. SCHOTT, '62
Chief Administrative Officer
Rules Committee
Calif. State Assembly

ROBERT M. CLARK, '63
Area Field Director
Republican State Central Comm.

KRIST A. LANE, '65
Assistant Administrative Analyst
Joint Legislative Budget Committee

JOHN M. SMART, '57
Principal Higher Educ. Spec't
Coordinating Council for
Higher Education

HAZEL E. CLIFFORD, '63
Ass't Field Secretary
Lt. Gov. Robert H. Finch

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California State Assembly

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Assistant Administrative Analyst
Joint Legislative Budget Comm.

ROBERT L. COATE, '49
No. California Vice-Chairman
Democratic Central Committee

BYRON P. LEWIS, '61
Associate Personnel Analyst
Trustees of the California
State Colleges

RAYMOND R. SULLIVAN, '63
Consultant, Assembly Comm. on
Revenue & Taxation
California State Assembly

WILLIAM C. DILLINGER, '48
Chief, Information & Education
State Department of Fish & Game

DAVID A. LIGGETT, '65
Area Field Representative
Republican State Central Comm.

DONALD R. TEST, '65
Administrative Assistant to
Hon. Gordon W. Duffy,
Assemblyman, 35th District

THOMAS J. DOOLEY, '56
Principal Administrative Analyst
Joint Legislative Budget Comm.

ROBERT H. MENDELSON, '61
Administrative Assistant to
Hon. J. Eugene McAteer, State Senator
14th District

KAY GANNON THOMSON, '64
Admin. Assistant for the
Centennial Fund Program
Univ. of Calif. at Berkeley

DIANE G. FEINSTEIN, '56
Vice Chariman,
Calif. Women's Bd. of Terms & Parole
Department of Corrections

ERIC A. MOHR, '50
Supervising Transportation Engineer
California State P.U.C.

MILTON VON DAMM, '60
Ass't to the Vice President,
Educational Relations
University of California

R. WILLIAM HAUCK, '64
Senior Associate
Opinion Research of California

ROBERT M. MONTILLA, '48
Ass't Administrator
Youth & Adult Corrections Agency
State of California

ROBERT G. WALTERS, '60
Deputy Director
Office of Economic Opportunity
State of California

F. PATRICK HENRY, '48
Senior Planning Analyst,
Office of the Vice Pres. for
Physical Planning & Construction,
University of California

LOUIS R. NEGRETE, '58
Consultant, Assembly Committee on
Military & Veterans Affairs
California State Assembly

THOMAS R. HOEBER, '65
Assistant Director
Assembly Office of Research

VIGO G. NIELSEN, '65
Assistant Deputy Controller
State of California

DONALD D. WEDDLE, '60
Field Representative
Hon. Jesse M. Unruh,
Speaker of the Assembly

JAMES C. HURST, '64
Exec. Ass't to Director
Commerce Department
State of Michigan

O. James Pardau, '60
Consultant, Assembly Committee on
Nat'l Resources, Planning & Public Wks.
California State Assembly

GUNTHER J. ZORN, '62
Personnel Officer
State Dept. of Mental Health

IN WASHINGTON and in other U.S. GOV'T POSITIONS

THOMAS C. BENDORF, '54
Ass't to the Vice President
Eastern Region - Lockheed Aircraft

GEORGE W.F. CLIFT, '57
American Consulate General
Guayaquil, Ecuador

ANNE F. COLLINS, '62
Administrative Assistant
Economic Devel. Institute
World Bank

HELEN DEWAR, '58
Reporter
Washington Post & Times Herald

H. GLEN FISHBACH, '52
Chief Administrator
Peace Corps, Iran

CAPT. DONALD M. GRAYDON, '59
United States Army
Viet Nam

SAMUEL T. HATA, '62
Fiscal Management Officer
East-West Center, Hawaii

JOHN E. HEAN, '48
Management Analyst
Department of Public Health
District of Columbia

DAVID JOHNSON, '51
Chief
Educ'l Opportunities Grants Branch
Office of Education, H.E.W.

MARSHALL KELLEY, '49
Financial Manager
Office of Post Comptroller
Fort Meade, Maryland

PETER A. LAUWERYS, '63
Director
Farm Workers Opportunity Project
Oxnard, California

C. JEREMY LEWIS, '57
Field Representative
Congressman Jerry Pettis
33rd California District

TINA LOWER, '52
Assistant to Director
Nat'l Instit. of Public Health
Washington, D.C.

TAD MASAOKA, '50
Intergroup Relations Advisor
Dept. Housing & Urban Development

PATRICIA M. MC FEELY, '64
Pacific Coast Reg. Office Field Rep.
Community Action Program
Office of Economic Opportunity

BARBARA J. MONAT, '62
Personnel Specialist
Internal Revenue Service

EDWARD J. NICHOLAS, '65
E.D.P. Specialist
Republican National Committee

LT. COL. ROGER L. RANCK, '49
Executive Officer, Director of
Surveillance & Reconnaissance;
Asst Chief of Staff for Intelligence

HENRY SAMORISKI, '49
Consultant to Rep. of Indonesia
A.I.D., State Department

ALEX A. SILVA, JR., '62
Administrative Assistant
Nat'l Instit. of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

RONALD F. THAHELD, '57
Program Coordinator
Mid-Willamette Valley
Community Action Program, Oregon

HERBERT G WEGNER, '52
Latin American Regional Director
CUNA-AID
Canal Zone, Panama

SUSAN E. ABEL, '65
Executive Secretary
Calif. Conservation League for
Legislative Action

GORDON BLACKLEY, '62
Mgr. of Chapters & Memberships
Bldg. Contractors Assn. of Calif.

ROBERT J. BLOOM, '62
Attorney
Legal Aid Society
New York, New York

JAMES H. BOWHAY, '56
Regional Representative
Council of State Governments

MICHAEL F. DILLON, '63
Field Representative
Calif. Taxpayers Assn.

MARK GALLON, '59
Dir. of Special Events
City of Hope

DANIEL P. GOODWIN, '59
Administrative Assistant
The Salvation Army Youth Center

MICHAEL R. GORDON, '65
Program Director
Junior Statesmen of America

SIDNEY C. MC CAUSLAND, '65
Administrative Assistant
Oregon Research Institute

PAUL MALDE, '52
Regional Manager
Calif. State Chamber of Commerce

BENJAMIN S. NEUFELD, '55
Executive Secretary
Nat'l Council on Ag. Life & Labor
Washington, D.C.

W. KENNETH NORRIS, '49
Executive Director
Calif. Agricultural Conference

THEODORE W. PAULSON, '60
Executive Secretary
Dominguez Industrial Council

MORTON RAPHAEL, '59
Associate Director
Bay Area Health Facilities Planning
Association

EDWARD J. REITH, '53
Executive Director
Peninsula Manufacturers Assn.

PAUL J. RICHARDS, '59
Executive Secretary
San Joaquin Co. Econ. Devel. Assn.

FRANCIS H. ST. DENIS, '59
Administrative Assistant
Hospital Council of So. Calif.

GROVER SIMMONS, '58
Regional Manager
Governmental Relations
Calif. Assn. of Manufacturers

DOUGLAS E. STWEART, '62
Dir. Community Relations
Planned Parenthood, Inc.

THOMAS W. SULLIVAN, '47
Assoc. Director
United Crusade, Sacramento

BARBARA T. WILLIAMSON, '55
Staff Associate
Taconic Foundation, N.Y.

IN PROFESSIONAL & CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS


February, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Helms via
Admiral Taylor

Attached is a proposed response to Mr. McCone
about recruiting at the Coro Foundation.

Recommend your signature.

STAT


R. L. Bannerman

3 Aug. 67
(DATE)

Executive Registry

67-3498

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

21 July 1967

✓
Mr. John A. McCone
Joshua Hendy Corporation
612 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90017

Dear John:

Rather than attempting to cover these points with you on the telephone, I am sending along the paper itself, which should be easier for you to handle. It is unclassified, as you will note, and was written at my request for a talk with you.

I assume that this is what you wanted.

Cordially,

Richard Helms

Attachment - 1

ER *✓*

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *McCone*

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR DCI's USE IN CONVERSATION
WITH MR. McCONE

1. I have had my people examine your proposal about a buffer zone running along the Egyptian-Israeli border. The reaction of most was that this would be a very difficult thing to get the Egyptians to agree to, because it would involve Egypt in giving up sacred Arab soil and would mean at least passively admitting the end of belligerency toward Israel. Some thought that the Egyptians would almost automatically look on a buffer zone proposal as a Western attempt to trick them into doing something which was favorable to Israel.

2. Despite the political difficulties, it deserves further study. If such a buffer zone proposal were to be put into effect, the Egyptians would have to gain from it in some manner or at the very least not appear to lose. You mentioned that matters could be arranged so that the Egyptians would get considerable profits from the oil pipeline to be built across this buffer zone. This would be one element. The political angle is more important. For example, the major Arab participation in this international project might help; so would the incorporation of a slice of Israeli territory in this buffer zone. (The Israelis would probably refuse, though.) This could not run all the way from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean because at the lower end any strip of territory would have to include the Israeli Port of Eilat and that would be out of the question. The proposal would be more acceptable to the Egyptians if it came from European sources rather than from the United States.

3. The Egyptians are probably aware that the Israelis themselves have talked of building a pipeline from Eilat to the Mediterranean. Your proposal could be put to them as a way in which they could prevent Israel from building that pipeline, thus getting the profits from it themselves.

4. On the pipeline itself, the key question is whether it is more economical to bring oil around Africa in large tankers, say, 100,000 tons and up, than through the proposed pipeline. You may have examined this yourself, but I should think that the oil industry would be able to give various cost figures.

5. In the matter of international facilities other than a pipeline, you are no doubt aware that this is one of the most barren and arid spots in the world. There is very little rainfall, and only a small population, along the northern coast between El Arish and the Gaza Strip. There is some underground water flowing ^{north} down from the mountains ~~to the south~~. Any extensive agriculture work would require either large scale de-salinization or the discovery of underground water resources in quantities considerably larger than those known to exist. An Egyptian drilling program in recent years has brought in some more water from artesian wells. This could support some more people at substance levels, but not very many. The shortage of water would of course affect any other international facilities -- educational, research, free port, or whatever -- which might be constructed in this twenty mile buffer zone. Water problems of course are not insoluble. Kuwait supports a population of nearly one-half million almost entirely on de-salted sea water.

6. In many ways a buffer zone along the Syrian-Israeli border would be easier to deal with in physical terms. This in an area which has a population, in normal times, of about 100,000 people. It has a certain amount of farm land, but it is by no means one of the more fertile parts of Syria. It would be entirely feasible to have surface connection between Northern Jordan and the sea through Lebanon through this area. This would be of benefit to Jordan because of assured access, even if longer than the direct route West from Aman, given Jordan's usually bad relations with Syria.

Executive Registry
67-3311/A

14 JUL 1967

Handwritten mark
Mr. John Alex McCone
612 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90017

Dear John,

STATINTL

I have checked into the question of the delay in contact with [redacted] which you referred to in your letter of July 7. There has in fact been an administrative delay which is now resolved and the appropriate office will very shortly be getting in touch with [redacted] as you suggested.

STATINTL

I much appreciate your interest in this matter and thank you for calling the problem to my attention.

With warm personal regards,

/s/ Richard Helms

Sincerely,

Handwritten notes:
JUL 14 10 53 AM '67
JUL 14 10 53 AM '67

Handwritten signature:
[Signature]

STATINTL

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FROM: C/CA Cord Meyer, Jr.

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

2 February 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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STATINTL

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22 July 1963

Dear Mr. McCone:

I enclose the report of the committee of consultants which you appointed to examine the estimative process in the light of the Cuban experience and to make recommendations for improving it.

Sincerely yours,

/signed/

JOSEPH R. STRAYER
Dayton-Stockton Professor of History
Princeton University

Contents:

Introduction
Recommendations
Annex A, "Preconceived Notions"
Annex B, Rejected Proposals

INTRODUCTION

1. On 17 May, 1963, the Director of Central Intelligence asked Professors Robert Bowie of Harvard, Klaus Knorr of Princeton, Joseph R. Strayer of Princeton, and Col. George Lincoln of the U. S. Military Academy to examine the estimative process in the light of the Cuban experience, and to make recommendations for improving it. Professor Bowie received a form of consultant's contract not compatible with his other commitments and this mistake was not corrected in time to make it possible for him to serve on the committee. The other three members of the committee met for three days (8, 9, and 10 July 1963), in the office of ONE, exchanged draft proposals during the next week, and met again on 18 July to discuss the final form of their report.

2. It is obvious that no thorough investigation of the estimative process could be made in this brief period. A number of estimates dealing with Cuba and the USSR were read, two development files were studied, and a few members (or former members) of ONE were interviewed. As consultants, the members of the committee have read, over the past few years, a number of estimates, both in final and in draft form. In addition, Dr. Strayer was a member of the Board of National Estimates from July 1953 to September 1954. Nevertheless, none of us feels that he is in any position to make emphatic and final judgments about existing estimative procedures.

3. Two of the committee believe that a study in depth of the estimative process by a small group of informed outsiders (not ourselves, we hasten to add) might yield valuable results. Such a study would require access to all constituents of the intelligence community and knowledge of personnel as well as procedures. It would take several weeks, if not months. For these reasons the third member of the committee believes the project is not feasible, and he doubts that it would be useful.

4. The discussion and suggestions which follow are only opinions offered by partially informed outsiders. Perhaps we are fairly typical consumers, and our report might be taken as representing the reactions of some consumers to estimates. But we should emphasize that we have not studied the problem in depth, and that therefore many of our suggestions may be superfluous, impractical, or just wrong-headed. We should also emphasize that our suggestions deal almost entirely with details of procedure, and that even the best procedure will not guarantee good estimates. The essential thing is to find and retain men who have wide knowledge, broad vision and good judgment. As long as the intelligence community has such men it will do a good job, whatever its procedures.

COL. GEORGE LINCOLN

KLAUS E. KNORR

JOSEPH R. STRAYER
CHAIRMAN

RECOMMENDATIONS

The best way to remedy any deficiencies which occur in the estimative process is to have full and careful discussion of each problem. In theory the present machinery should ensure such a discussion. In practice, we believe that there are some obstacles and we offer the following suggestions as means of reducing or removing these obstacles.

1) Cut down the number of coordinated papers.

Men who have too much to do in too short a time may not see all possibilities or sense the full impact of changed conditions. Pressure to meet deadlines forces limitation of discussion. Effort devoted to trivial papers means less time and energy for major problems. It would require more knowledge than we possess to determine what papers should be eliminated, but we suspect that many "country papers" fall in this category. We also suspect that requests for coordinated papers are made, and accepted, too easily. But in any case, there is overloading and it has bad results.

(Note that we do not recommend any increase in personnel. The number of people now involved in the estimative process is about as large as can be used efficiently. More people would simply mean more specialization and more meetings. What is needed is the

discuss it. This can be done only by a small group of carefully selected men).

2) Make sure that there are always men with a wide variety of views and experience on the Board of National Estimates. The present distribution of membership on the Board seems well designed to achieve this end. As we understand it, it includes a core of men with long experience in intelligence, other men who have worked in the foreign or armed services, and a younger group who will move on to other positions after a few years on the Board. We suggest that it might be helpful when there are vacancies to add two or three rotating members who would serve for only a year or so. These men could be borrowed from other branches of the government or from universities. If properly selected, they could contribute new ideas and encourage re-examination of accepted formulae.

3) Make sure that diverse opinions of other members of the community are fully represented in contributions and coordination meetings. Here our knowledge is limited and our recommendations are only tentative. We believe that

outside CIA than inside. Some representatives apparently have little time to inform themselves or to think about the problems which they are supposed to discuss. We are also uneasy about the tendency to concentrate military contributions in the DIA. There are often sharp differences of opinion among the armed services. Expression of these differences can be very helpful in forming sound judgments.

4) Call in a small group of consultants when difficult problems are to be discussed. We advance this idea with some hesitation and we realize that it might cause more trouble than it was worth. But it might be a way of getting new points of view and of avoiding blind spots. Two or three consultants would probably have a greater impact than a single outsider who might hesitate to contradict the insiders.

5) Indicate in some way when earlier estimates are being quoted or paraphrased. There are many ways of doing this (footnotes, quotation marks, etc.) and any one would be satisfactory. But attention should be called to repetitions, in the hope that this would lead to re-examination of accepted positions.

of U. S. policy and attitudes on the rest of the world. This is a difficult and dangerous task because it can lead to implied criticisms of U. S. policy. But it seems to us that failure to do this is one reason why preconceived ideas (which are still correct) sometimes cause faulty estimates. To be specific: if the Kremlin in the early months of 1962 had reason to think that the posture and resolution of the U. S. were weak, then it should obviously have estimated that the risks of the Cuban adventure were not unduly high. Thus the accepted doctrine that the USSR would avoid grave risks was probably correct; the error was caused by the failure to estimate that the Kremlin estimate of U. S. policy had changed.

7) Make more information about attitudes and methods of foreign intelligence organizations available to estimators. We believe, for example, that the Kremlin attaches more importance to certain kinds of evidence, and less to others, than the U. S. intelligence community would do. We suspect that what information has been acquired about Soviet intelligence procedures is not very widely disseminated. But if the Kremlin does use a peculiar scale

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in weighing evidence and if this is not generally known,

then the result is bound to be a faulty estimate. One reason for inadequate estimates on Cuba in 1962 was that the intelligence community, as a whole, believed that Soviet leaders must realize how dangerous the introduction of IRBM's and MRBM's would be. Better knowledge of Soviet intelligence procedures might have made it possible to suggest that the Kremlin was undervaluing the evidence which should have led it to this conclusion.

8) Keep a constant watch for signs that a mutation in an existing pattern is about to take place. This is probably a superfluous and useless recommendation. Certainly everyone is on the look-out for such signs and it is much easier to identify them in retrospect than at the moment when they occur. Existing patterns can accommodate themselves to a large number of new ingredients and gradual changes bring about only gradual shifts in policy. But there are some new ingredients so large or so sharp that they may break the old pattern and it is not entirely impossible to identify these. Again to be specific, in 1962 the unprecedented situation in Cuba and the Sino-Soviet dispute were probably such ingredients.

9) Make a few validity studies in depth. At present,

validity studies usually involve only a comparison between a new estimate and the immediately preceding estimate on the same topic. Often there has not been enough change in the interval between the two papers to reveal errors or biases. Our experience in studying the Cuban series of estimates leads us to believe that there would be some value in making, from time to time, a validity study of a whole group of related papers. This might expose persistent biases, rigidities, and inconsistencies. We know that one such study of a group of Soviet estimates was made some years ago. We suggest that more exercises of this sort would be useful, but with the caveat that if they became too frequent (say more than one or two a year) their value would sharply decrease. We also suggest that some of these studies be made by consultants, both to reduce the burden on the ONE Staff and to ensure a fresh point of view.

Next to the problem of full discussion comes the problem of communication. It seems to be fairly well agreed that estimates often leave less impact than they should, and that important ideas are missed by hasty readers. Nothing can be done to change the fact that everyone

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in government has too much to read and that hasty readers will always

miss significant points. No one style or form of presentation will be equally effective with all readers. But perhaps something can be done to make it easier for most consumers to read estimates with more understanding.

1) Put key sentences at the beginning of each section of the estimate, e. g. "We believe that the food problem in Cuba is (is not) causing unrest." Reasons for the statement should follow. At present many important statements are made only after a long list of pro's and con's and thus lose their full impact. Conclusions, as now written, do not always remedy this fault. Perhaps a string of key sentences at the beginning of an estimate would be better.

2) Call attention to possible courses of action which might have serious consequences, even if the estimate is that they are highly unlikely. Too many readers think that "probably not" equals "never," or that "the possibility cannot be excluded" actually means that it is excluded. Positive rather than negative formulae would help, but we must confess that we are not very good at devising them. Perhaps a phrase such as "there is at least a twenty per

a little more argumentation showing the advantages which might result from the adoption of unlikely courses of action would make the consumer take them more seriously.

3) Emphasize new ideas or facts. Well informed readers find much that is familiar in estimates, especially in the larger estimates. This lulls them into missing useful new material.* Perhaps some typographical device (e. g. side-lining) could be used to indicate places where significant new ideas and facts are introduced. Or perhaps more of the historical and purely descriptive material could be put in annexes.

4) Make sure that the consumer is reminded of key items in other estimates. This is probably an

*For example, there was a very important change in the Cuban estimate of 19 September, 1962 (SNIE 85-3-62). Up to that time, all estimates and memoranda had asserted that the USSR had little to gain by placing MRBM's or IRBM's in Cuba. SNIE 85-3-62, on the contrary, pointed out that the Kremlin might see decided advantages in such a deployment. But no emphasis was put on the fact that this was a changed estimate and we suspect that few readers noticed the shift. One of our group, reading the Cuban estimates seriatim (which few consumers ever have time to do) still failed to observe the fact that there had been a change on this highly significant point.

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unnecessary caution, but there is some danger that drafters

of an estimate will assume that consumers remember related estimates as well as they do. For example, in SNIE 85-3-62 a little more emphasis might have been placed on the fact that the estimate of the number of operational Soviet ICBM's had recently been sharply reduced.

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ANNEX A

"Preconceived Notions"

In response to one of the requests put before us, we have examined the estimates on Cuba from January 8 to September 19, 1962. It is generally acknowledged that there was a failure of intelligence, in the sense that USIB did not warn the government that the Soviets might be planning to place offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, and indeed suggested that such a decision was unlikely, though not impossible. This failure has been widely attributed to the presence of "preconceived notions" which prevented ONE, and in fact the entire intelligence community from making a proper judgment. We therefore find it useful to make some observations on the function, utility and drawbacks of such preconceived notions. To do so is in fact indispensable to any search for remedies designed to minimize these drawbacks.

In dealing with a major country, intelligence officers approach their task with a set of expectations of likely patterns of behavior. This is especially true in the case of the Soviet Union, the most frequent target of intelligence. This set of expectations, sometimes called preconceived notions, is based on a professional knowledge of political structures, processes and personalities in the country concerned. It is the distillate of years of experience and has been tested by, and refined through, repeated intelligence estimates. It must be understood

that the formulation of such a set of expectations about a country's likely patterns of behavior is both inevitable and indispensable. It is inevitable that, in doing their job, professionals will, more or less deliberately, build up the set. It is indispensable because the set is a most valuable tool in producing timely, coherent, articulate and, on a probability basis, accurate intelligence. If no pattern can be established, then prediction is almost impossible, and significant variations can be demonstrated only by comparison with an already accepted norm.

Nevertheless, these sets of expectations have their limitations and drawbacks. The history of intelligence is full of instances in which an opponent achieved surprise by adopting a course of action that seemed unlikely in view of the set of expectations dominant among intelligence officers. The Japanese attack in Pearl Harbor is one of the most conspicuous examples. We are not concerned here with what may be called "technical surprise." A "technical surprise" is not incompatible with the prevalent set of expectations. The surprise occurs because the opponent was successful in concealing a particular capability or in keeping a particular course of action secret. We are concerned with an opponent's behavior that surprises because it is incompatible, or seems to be incompatible, with our prevalent set of expectations. There are three possible causes of this type of surprise.

First, the opponent's basic pattern of behavior may change as a result of changes in leadership or various other important conditions,

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and our set of expectations may not register this change quickly and correctly. Our set, in other words, is out-of-date. Intelligence professionals must obviously be on the alert for such changes and, generally, take care that their working set of expectations does not become obsolete, stale or unduly rigid.

Second, the opponent may act irrationally. Irrational behavior is, of course, very difficult, if not impossible to predict. It may take all sorts of directions that make no sense to the rational mind. Only if a country's leadership has a record of frequent lapses into irrationality will this observed fact become incorporated into our set of expectations. But even then the estimate of future behavior will be extremely difficult.

Third, the opponent may adopt a course of action that seems to us to be in conflict with our set of expectations, but actually is not. A set of expectations is based on the attitudes and predispositions that we have learned, strongly affect the opponent's behavior. The important point to note is that attitudes, though they shape behavior, do not determine it. Behavior also depends upon the information which the opponent possesses. It is this information which brings his attitudes into play and which gives him a basis for calculating the advantages and disadvantages of a course of action. Hence, we may go wrong in an estimate, not because our set of expectations is faulty, but because we assume that the opponent acts on approximately the same information that we have. Clearly, to minimize

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this source of possible intelligence failure, we require not only a good

set of expectations but also some idea of the information that the opponent uses in his cost-gains calculus.

We do not think that the failure of the intelligence community to predict the Soviet deployment of medium range missiles resulted essentially from its set of "preconceived notions" about the Soviet Union. In our opinion, the community's set of expectations was, at that time at least, sophisticated and realistic. According to the set, the Soviet Union was considered unlikely to depart from its cautious behavior in the military field or to undertake actions involving a high risk of war with the United States. That this expectation about Soviet behavior was basically correct was, after all, confirmed by the great caution with which Khrushchev acted when the missile crisis broke in October.

Nor do we believe, as some experts have suggested, that the Soviet decision was largely irrational. It is true that the Berlin statement, Chinese criticism, and possible differences of opinion within the Soviet leadership had put Khrushchev under some pressure to score a success in foreign policy. It is also true that during the last year he has seemed somewhat less sure of himself than before and has abruptly reversed himself on several issues. But while he and other members of the top leadership may have been perplexed by current difficulties there is no evidence to suggest that they became reckless gamblers. At the most, they may have been a little more willing to take a chance than

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they would have been under other circumstances. A strong case can
be made for arguing that Soviet behavior was entirely compatible with
rational decision-making.

We believe that more important factors in the Soviet decision
were inadequate information and, resulting from this, an erroneous
assessment of the situation. They did not have the fund of information
about the mood and temper of the US government and people which the
intelligence community thought they must possess. They saw the balance
of advantages and disadvantages differently from the way Washington
officials thought they should see it. It is in this area that the intelligence
community failed although we defer for the moment the question of the
extent to which the community can be held accountable for the failure.

It is fairly clear in retrospect that the intelligence community
both underestimated the gains that Moscow believed it could derive from
introducing offensive missiles in Cuba and overestimated the risks which
the Kremlin thought it ran in adopting this course of action. In reading
the various estimates seriatim, we were struck by the fact that, although
the question of the deployment in Cuba of Soviet medium-range missiles
was raised in a Memorandum to the Director of January 8, 1962, it was
concluded repeatedly until early September that the Soviet Union could
not thereby add substantially to its strategic capabilities. The reason
given was that targets in the United States capable of being reached by
medium-range missiles from Cuba were already covered by ICBM's

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deployed on Soviet territory. Only on September 6 were doubts raised
about this conclusion. The Special NIE of September 19, conceded that
Soviet planners might see some advantage in deploying IRBM's and MRBM's
in Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBM's believed to
be operational in the Soviet Union. The delay in coming to this conclusion
is surprising in view of the fact that it had been estimated several months
earlier that the USSR had only a small number of operational ICBM's. In
this situation one obvious way for the Soviet Union to supplement its small
force of ICBM's was to deploy a proportion of its large supply of medium-
range missiles within appropriate striking distance of the United States.
We are not, in fact, sure that such a deployment constituted, objectively,
a substantial improvement of their strategic position, though Soviet planners,
of course, may well have thought so. We are sure, however, that the Soviet
Union would have gained enormously in prestige and, indirectly, greatly in
the military balance of power and deterrence, if it had succeeded in
installing "offensive" missiles in Cuba and maintaining them there. Soviet
leaders, like all rational leaders, must be expected to accept a higher
level of risk for great gains than for small gains. We note that this was
not acknowledged in the estimates we examined.

Even when it was admitted that the Soviet Union might secure
possible strategic advantages by employing IRBM's and MRBM's in
Cuba(SNIE 85-3-62, September 19, 1962), the conclusion remained that
the Soviets were unlikely to do so because of the risk involved.
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and acceptance of so great a risk would represent a sharp departure from Soviet practice. This was the crucial view that prevented assigning any high degree of probability to the course of action that the USSR pursued. However, this view was justified only if the Kremlin assessed the risk factor approximately as it was assessed in Washington. The intelligence community thought that the risk was very high. It knew it to be so. Yet it is fairly clear in retrospect that the Soviet leaders did not share this knowledge, that they assessed the risk at a lower level and that, given this assessment, their deployment of "offensive" missiles in Cuba, did not seem unduly risky to them. In that case, their action did not, as they saw it, constitute a sharp departure from their normally cautious military behavior.

The extent to which the intelligence community can be held accountable for neglecting the possible gap between their information and our information is not clear to us. Such gaps are a possible source of intelligence failure to which the professional should be alert. In retrospect it would certainly have been better if the possibility of this gap, and its possible implications, had been acknowledged in the estimates. If it had been, it might have qualified the impact of an erroneous conclusion.

On the other hand, it is patently very difficult for our intelligence services to have sufficient knowledge of Soviet intelligence to ascertain or predict intelligence failures in the Soviet Union. Moreover, there

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is reason to believe that much of the intelligence community, including

ONE, is not provided with such knowledge of Soviet intelligence activities, and their organization as is available to a part of the community. Yet this is the kind of knowledge which would have been required for a correct prediction of the Soviet move in Cuba.

Moreover, the intelligence officer is also handicapped in speculating about national differences in estimating the risk of particular courses of action as long as he may not take relevant United States policies fully into account, and have adequate information about these policies and their implementation to the extent that they are known, or must be assumed to be known, to the Soviet Union.

However, even if these handicaps were removed, or at least appreciably diminished, the consumer of intelligence would be wrong to expect the intelligence community to be able in all cases to obtain sufficient information on the opponent's estimates of the advantages and disadvantages of contemplated courses of action. For this reason alone, and not necessarily as a result of "preconceived notions," the best intelligence service cannot help failing from time to time. It would be unfair and utterly unrealistic, in our opinion, to expect otherwise.

On the other hand, the inevitability of occasional failure does not justify either complacency or resignation. No organization stays at the same level of performance over a long time -- if only because

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of changes in personnel -- and there may always be room for improve-
ment. There are good reasons for reviewing institutional practices
from time to time with a view of raising the batting average by a few
per cent.

Rejected Proposals

We have considered, and have rejected as impractical, the following proposals.

1) "Devil's advocates", professional dissenters, etc.

We hope that the intelligence community will always include tough-minded, skeptical individuals who will advance unpopular ideas and who will query accepted doctrine. But any attempt to institutionalize this function would be self-defeating. No one can be skeptical all the time and the views of a man who was being paid to act as a professional dissenter would not carry great weight.

2) Dual or multiple estimates. For example, one group might make an estimate from the Soviet point of view while another estimated the same problem from the US point of view. The difficulty here is what to do in case of disagreement. Either some higher group would reach a final decision, in which case we would be back where we started, or the consumer would make a final estimate, in which case the community would have abdicated its responsibility. Moreover, there is certain artificiality about this procedure which would probably erode its value very quickly.

3) Make more effort to reach agreed language in

estimates, and encourage dissents. It is possible that under pressure of time some dissents which might have been helpful are never made. But while a few footnotes are useful in alerting the consumer to the difficulties of a problem a steady diet of footnotes would blunt his attention. If there were too many points on which agreement could not be reached the consumer would have to make his own estimate and the community would again have abdicated its responsibility. In short, dissents on minor points should not be encouraged, and it seems unlikely that dissents on major points are, or could be suppressed. We note that in the Cuban estimates of 1962 (and in others which we can remember) the worst mistakes were not caused by suppressing disagreements or by watering down correct judgments in order to obtain an agreed text. They were caused by mistaken judgments which were held almost unanimously throughout the intelligence community.

4) Make more effort to keep estimates up-to-date by issuing frequent revisions. Carried to an extreme, this would obviously lead to a confusion between estimates and current intelligence. Even a moderate increase in the number of revisions would probably do more harm than good by forcing estimators to concentrate on minor fluctuations in policy rather

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than on longer range problems. When an estimate has been

overtaken by events nothing can be gained by issuing a hasty revision which simply says that the preceding estimate was wrong. When a situation has gone operational revision of earlier estimates should wait until there are some firm indications of new policies and courses of action. At this point current intelligence will give policy-makers the flow of information which they require. To refer once more to our case study, we doubt that more frequent revisions of the basic estimates on Cuba between 1 August and 19 September, 1962 would have changed the opinions held by the intelligence community in any important way.

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| <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |

Remarks:

Per your request.

ER-9-11-69

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|
| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE |
| J. S. Earman | 9/4/63 |