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7 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

THROUGH: Assistant Director for National Estimates *SN*

SUBJECT: Military Geography as Essential Intelligence
for Counterinsurgency

REFERENCE: USIB-D-63.6/1, dated 30 April 1962, subject:
Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency

1. The JCS memorandum that forms the main substantive content of USIB-D-63.6/1 purports to indicate "the essential elements of information relating to any country or area in which an insurgency or incipient insurgency exists." It makes no mention, however, of physical environmental factors as essential elements of information required for counterinsurgency programming and operations.


2. We assume that this gap can only be the result of an unintentional oversight on the part of the drafters of the JCS memorandum. The experiences of counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, the Philippines, and currently in Laos and South Vietnam, provide ample evidence of the essentiality of information concerning terrain, natural vegetation, climatic conditions, settlement patterns, and other elements of the environment for counterinsurgency actions.

3. It is recommended that when the reference paper is considered by USIB, a proposal be submitted to add to the JCS-proposed list of Essential Elements of Information for Counterinsurgency Actions the following item:

What are the characteristics of the significant physical environmental factors of the country that must be known for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations?

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND REPORTS:


DIA review(s) completed.


JAMES A. BRAMMELL
Chief, Geographic Research

Enclosure: Referenced Document

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TALKING PAPER FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIAAP-1 5-8

SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency Actions

1. Agenda Item No. 5 USIB-D-63.6/1 "Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency"

2. Background:

Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Staff (SACSA) developed a list of "Essential Elements of Information for Counterinsurgency". He requested DIA, Tab A, to consider the list in the development of a comprehensive counterinsurgency intelligence requirement and that the answers be applied to a list of 39 countries. General Krulak also submitted the list to the Special Group (CI) where it was noted. General Taylor, as Chairman of the Special Group (CI) forwarded the requirements (less 12 countries) to USIB for appropriate action (Tab B). DIA has likewise forwarded (Tab C) General Krulak's letter to USIB noting that the list of questions is the same, but the countries are different. An interim reply (Tab D) has been furnished General Krulak and also a copy was provided to the members of the USIB (Tab E).

3. Discussion:

The following possibilities are discussed:

A. Establish a new production program or special task force to meet this requirement. NSCID 3 states "In the event that a requirement is established for which there is not existing production capability, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the USIB, shall determine which of the departments and agencies of the intelligence community can best undertake the primary responsibility as a service of common concern". Based on the above, the Director, CIA could assign this as a project for a task force effort to produce and maintain country studies covering only the essential elements of information required.

B. Produce the required information within the framework of existing production programs. There are now in existence intelligence production programs capable of providing much of the information required. Modification to increase timeliness, scope and orientation of such programs possibly would suffice to meet the expressed requirements.

(1) The terms of reference for the NIS "The Standard Instructions" provide for the coverage of the information in the areas of interest indicated by Gen. Krulak. Chapter I is a brief of all the chapters in the NIS; hence it should make an appropriate vehicle in which to ensure

that his questions are answered. Chapter I's have not yet been completed on all countries in which Gen. Krulak expressed interest; further some of those that are completed are several years old. Consideration has been given by the NIS Committee to an increase in Chapter I production. In this way information from a basic intelligence standpoint would be maintained more up-to-date and the few countries which have not as yet had initial coverage would be scheduled. It would be appropriate to ask the NIS Committee to make recommendations on measures to meet Gen. Krulak's requirement through the NIS program by increasing timeliness or reorientation. The intelligence community is devoting approximately 1000 man-years (the military over 500) to the production of basic intelligence through the NIS. It is supposed to meet fully the requirements of the Dept. of Defense in strategic and high level operational planning.

(2) Most of the countries Gen. Krulak listed have been addressed by the Board of National Estimates (BNE); however, some of the specific questions of interest have not been addressed. The terms of reference determine the scope of NIE's, SNIE's. Consequently, the list of questions could be furnished the BNE for use, as appropriate, in developing future terms of reference for estimates.

(3) Since these production requirements will ultimately result in collection requirements if and when the producer determines that gaps exist, it would be appropriate to alert the collectors to possible future requirements in this area of interest. By forwarding a copy of Gen. Krulak's questions to the Chief of Mission in each of the 39 countries, this would be done. The Director, DIA could likewise furnish a copy of the questions and countries to the U and S Commanders with the contemplated UNIB actions in order to keep them informed as to the emphasis that is being placed in this area.

4. Points at Issue:

Should the national intelligence production effort be tailored to meet solely this requirement or should this requirement be met along with other requirements in the finished intelligence product?

If this requirement is met within the framework of existing production programs, will it be done through modifications to the NIS, the NIE (SNIE) or both?

What emphasis will be placed on the collection of this information where gaps appear?

What emphasis will be placed on the production of finished intelligence to meet this requirement?

5. Recommendations:

The following recommendations are made:

A. The USIB request the Chairman, NIS Committee to make recommendations on measures to meet this requirement through the NIS program.

B. The USIB provide the Board of National Estimates with a copy of Gen. Kralak's questions and list of countries for use, as appropriate, in developing estimates.

C. The USIB request Director of Intelligence and Research, Dept. of State to furnish Chiefs of Mission in the 39 countries with the list of essential requirements and the contemplated actions to meet these requirements.

D. The Director, DIA provide the U & S Commanders with the same information.

E. Director, Central Intelligence Agency draft appropriate reply to Gen. Taylor.

F. Director, DIA provide appropriate follow-up reply to Maj. Gen. Kralak.

6. Army, Navy and Air Force have all assigned this action to Collection. Action officers all believe that the requirement should be met within existing programs.

Prepared by Capt. Ralph E. Styles
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Coordination

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GENERAL US DOCTRINE ON COUNTERINSURGENCY
(INTERNAL DEFENSE) OPERATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

11

	<u>Page No.</u>
I. THE PROBLEM	1
II. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Purposes of Paper	1
B. Terminology	2
C. Scope of Paper: Types of Insurgency	3
III. THE SITUATION AND THE THREAT.	5
A. The Situation.	5
B. The Causes of Insurgency	6
C. The Threat: Communist Doctrine and Tactics.	10
IV. THE CENTRAL FRAMEWORK OF US POLICY AND STRATEGY	13
A. US Policy and Objectives Toward Modernizing Societies.	13
B. The US Interest in Internal Defense.	15
C. US Counterinsurgency Objectives.	16
V. GENERALIZED CONCEPT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF US RESOURCES	17
A. The Local Problem	18
B. The US Problem.	19
C. A Generalized Concept of US Joint Operations	20
VI. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE	23
A. The Broad US Purpose.	23
B. The US Posture Toward Non-Communist Insurgency.	28
C. US Involvement in Communist-Directed Insurgency.	31
D. The Critical Sectors.	34
E. Intervention vs. Cooperative Involvement.	40
F. The Ultimate Target--People	41
G. Counter-Ideas and Counter-Organizations	42
H. Strategic Assignments (Roles and Missions.	43
I. Offensive Countermeasures Against DVM- Type Aggression	50
J. The Role of Allies and International Organizations	50
K. Unresolved Doctrinal Issues	50
VII. OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE: LINES OF ACTION	51
VIII. ROLES AND MISSIONS.	51
IX. CONCLUSIONS	51

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8 May 1962

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GENERAL US DOCTRINE ON COUNTERINSURGENCY
(INTERNAL DEFENSE) OPERATIONS

I. THE PROBLEM

To (a) provide a generalized concept, and the accompanying non-technical doctrinal guidance, for the employment of US resources to prevent and defeat Communist-directed insurgency in the less developed world, and (b) delineate the roles and inter-relationship of the executive agencies of the US Government (Departments of State and Defense (JCS), AID, CIA, USIA) which are engaged in meeting this element of the Communist threat to US interests.

II. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSES OF PAPER

The Basic National Security Paper (BNSP) details US policy and objectives toward the underdeveloped world but does not explicitly fill the gap between policy and applied action in the field of counterinsurgency, i.e., the doctrinal gap of a body of working principles intended as guides for translating policy into purposeful action.

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A purpose of this paper is to fill this gap insofar as possible (we are not yet in a position to be dogmatic in a field of as many variables as counterinsurgency). A second purpose is to give general doctrinal guidance to US activities and to define, insofar as possible, operational roles and missions for the arms of US policy which cope with Communist-directed insurgency.

These of necessity must be empirical undertakings. It is easier to settle on policy than to devise doctrinal guidance on how to execute it. But a beginning must be made and certain doctrinal signposts are evident. Others will doubtless appear as we get on with the tasks which lie ahead.

B. TERMINOLOGY

Counterinsurgency and internal defense are used interchangeably in this paper, each to mean the entire range of strategic and tactical responses to any form of subversive political activity, agitation, civil rebellion, revolt, or insurrection designed to weaken and/or overthrow an existing government or occupying power which the United States supports.

Conversely, insurgency is also used as a word-of-art to cover the entire spectrum of subversive activity, including armed insurrection, aimed at overthrowing a friendly government supported by us. Insurgency thus does not include political opposition conducted within constitutional norms but does include incipient or

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latent dissidence susceptible of unconstitutional expression or inimical manipulation.

Internal defense is used throughout as roughly synonymous with internal security and is believed to be a preferable usage to either counterinsurgency or to internal security for two reasons: It is more psychologically palatable abroad, and it contains more positive connotations of the totality of the national effort required to safeguard the modernization process against the inroads of Communism or other forms of inimical extremism.

Internal war is used throughout in its broad connotation and also as a synonym for the Communist usage of "wars of national liberation."

DVN-type aggression is intended to mean the sending of uninvited arms and men across international boundaries and the direction of internal (guerrilla) war from outside a sovereign state (e.g., the current activities of North Vietnam against South Vietnam and Laos).

Throughout, all uses of the terms underdeveloped or less developed world or nations, or modernizing or transitional societies, refers to free world areas as opposed to countries modernizing under the Communist model.

C. SCOPE OF PAPER: TYPES OF INSURGENCY

This paper by definition concentrates on Communist-directed insurgency and insurgency which might furnish Communist footholds.

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- 4 -

It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that Communist-directed insurgency is only one of four types of insurgency which affect US interests toward modernizing societies. The other three types are these:

1. Insurgency which is wholly national in origin and support. Here the US interest lies in remaining aloof; or in covertly employing our resources to deny Communist or inimical foreign support of the insurgency; or, if we do not support the government, in covertly assisting the insurgents.
2. Inimical non-Communist foreign-supported insurgency (e.g., Arab pressures on Israel, Indian support of Nepalese insurgents, or Rhodesian support of Katangan mercenaries).
3. Foreign and/or US-supported insurgency in pursuit of US interests.

Insurgency in all its forms thus affects US objectives for good or bad, depending on its origins, intensity, purposes, and leadership. This paper proceeds on the assumptions that Communist-directed insurgency is the basic threat to US objectives throughout the underdeveloped world in the 1960's; and that when insurgency is inspired, directed, or captured by Communism or its proxies, it will invariably challenge US interests and generally require the application of US resources in conjunction with those of the society under attack.

III. The Situation

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- 5. -

III. THE SITUATION AND THE THREAT

Doctrine on counterinsurgency must begin by considering the reasons why the underdeveloped world is vulnerable to insurgency, the role of insurgency in Communist strategy, and the threat which Communist-directed insurgency poses to US and free world interests.

A. THE SITUATION

The central forces at work and juxtaposed in varying degrees of intensity throughout the underdeveloped world are (a) the stresses and strains of the modernization process--the revolutionary breaks with the traditional past and the uncertain and uneven progress toward new and more modern forms of political, social, and economic organization; and (b) the contest between Communism and the Free World generally for primary influence over the direction and outcome of the modernization process.

It is central to our problem that modernization generates targets of exploitable Communist opportunity and that all developing countries are therefore susceptible to Communist subversion and insurgency in varying degree. Dissidence, dissatisfaction, and disequilibrium are the minimum concomitants of a modernizing society, especially a loosely-structured society with weak governmental institutions.

These are the vulnerabilities of modernizing societies on which Communism and other enemies of controlled revolutionary progress prey in an effort to subvert and redirect modernization to their

- 6 -

to their purposes. Furthermore, Communism exerts appeals to certain innovators and intellectuals within the new countries: it represents a proven route to modernization if human liberties and consumer wants are disregarded.

In some areas the threat of insurgency is active (e.g., Laos, Vietnam, Colombia); in others it is incipient (e.g., Northeast Thailand, Northeast Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela); and elsewhere it is and will remain at least latent until each modernizing nation develops a firm national unity, a popular consensus in support of the general purposes and direction of the national government, and a capability to defend itself internally.

Each modernizing society is to some extent unique in its culture, origins, structure, aspirations and progress toward modernity. It is therefore difficult to generalize on the modernization process: it must be studied in the geographic, historic, ethnic and political context of the individual society. Yet certain generalizations bearing on the causes of insurgency can safely be ventured.

B. THE CAUSES OF INSURGENCY

All insurgency, to succeed, must have an active indigenous base and some form of political direction and structure; and advanced stages of insurgency will have both an active domestic base of popular support and a politico-military structure, i.e., a proto-government in opposition to the central government which either competes with it for support or resists its writ (e.g., Laos, South Vietnam, Colombia).

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- 7 -

Insurgency is grounded in the allegiances and attitudes of people within a modernizing society. Its origins are domestic and its support must remain largely domestic if it is to succeed without resort to large-scale foreign support of a type which could change its character and scale. The causes of insurgency are therefore really the inadequacies of the local government to requite, contain or remove popular or class dissatisfactions released in breaking from the traditional mold and social structure. In the interim between shattering the old mold and consolidating a viable modern state of popularly accepted and supported institutional strength, the modernizing state exposes its vulnerability to insurgency most acutely.

Politically and socially, a typical transitional society will exhibit many of these divisive forces and attitudes at work:

Deep rifts between the urban centers and the rural masses, complicated by an essential lack of communication between the central government and the countryside; lack of social cohesion stemming from inequities of the old class structure and often exacerbated by racial problems, social discrimination, and religious differences; mass illiteracy but, nonetheless, the dim stirrings of hope among the underprivileged for a better life and greater participation in the society; an inadequate educational system; weak governmental institutions and administrative capacities, an inadequate civil bureaucracy, and semi-corrupt political leaders; a government which is not or cannot be, adequately responsive to the aspirations of

- 8 -

aspirations of the people; a political process in which the military are the ultimate arbiters of power, often in league with the traditional oligarchs; fragmented political parties, which complicate the formation of stable governments and the functioning of representative institutions; no firm sense of purpose, direction or achievement; a frustrated and articulate segment of the youth and liberal intelligentsia (often foreign-educated) which aspires to more radical solutions to speed modernization; a developing middle class which cannot yet control the political process and extremes of Right and Left which contest its rise to political and economic power.

Economically, the society may exhibit these divisive forces and attitudes:

Widespread poverty and an inequitable distribution of wealth and income; an inadequate system of land tenure and agricultural production, with little progress toward land reform or the development of a sturdy peasantry; an inadequate and unbalanced industrial structure with no coherent plan for economic growth which will confer equitable social benefits; inadequate economic and social infrastructure; inadequate ability to mobilize domestic resources or to marshal and re-invest savings; balance of payments difficulties; overdependence on exports of primary products; dissatisfaction with foreign private investment yet great dependence on foreign capital assistance for economic growth; inadequate urban housing, especially low-cost housing; an inadequate tax and tax collection system; an unhealthy concentration of wealth

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- 9 -

of wealth and economic power in an upper class or in a few individuals or families; large-scale unemployment and underemployment, including the dangerous youth segment of the educated unemployed.

Militarily, most modernizing states are vulnerable in these respects:

They have underestimated the internal threat and overestimated and overprepared for an external threat; they do not have an adequately balanced military-police structure to maintain internal security in both the cities and the countryside (in many Latin American countries, military units cannot leave the cities lest a security vacuum be created); the military--because of excessive demands on the budget, repressive measures, participation in unpopular or oppressive governments, or lack of good works--are estranged from the people; and, the military have not made the contribution of which they are capable in promoting nation-building and social cohesion (civic action, good works in the countryside, statecraft in government, training of conscripts in literacy and vocations).

Psychologically, few of the modernizing states have won the battle against the blandishments and false hopes aroused by Communism among the students, educated youth, intelligentsia, the rural dispossessed and the urban underprivileged. Except in a few of the modernizing states with charismatic, articulate and social-minded leaders (e.g., Nehru), there is an abysmal
psychological gap

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psychological gap between the central government and the masses, the students, the laborers and those who for various reasons feel estranged from the government and the society as a whole. Where the central government is lagging behind the tides of popular discontent, this gap is a very dangerous vulnerability.

This partial enumeration of vulnerabilities illustrates the magnitudes of the Communist threat in canalizing and directing popular disaffection for subversive ends.

Nor is this the whole story. Too rapid a tempo of modernization can be as dangerous as too little movement unless the new institutional mold is strong enough, and its leaders wise enough, to contain the powerful new social thrusts released in the process (e.g., the non-Communist social revolution of Bolivia in 1952). Just as failure to move rapidly enough encourages popular opposition and the aspirations of alternative leadership, which often takes power through a violent "social revolution" (cf. Mexico in 1910, Bolivia in 1952, Egypt under Nasser, Cuba in 1956, Iraq in 1958), so does movement forward sow the seeds of future crisis as the underprivileged reach out for more.

Thus the modernization process is uncertain and treacherous and few societies have attained modernity without bloodshed and reliance on authoritarian techniques at some point enroute.

C. THE THREAT: COMMUNIST DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

The Communists make no secret of their intention of expanding control to those societies of the Free World which they can subvert (Czechoslovakia),

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- 11 -

(Czechoslovakia), take over through internal war (China), or capture from within after an essentially nationalistic social revolution (Cuba). We must start from a premise that Communism threatens all modernizing societies.

A second premise is that the Communists by doctrine and practice are equipped to press their objectives along the whole of the insurgency spectrum: they study and exploit the vulnerabilities of societies, they are expert in political maneuver from indigenous footholds, and they understand and practice the various forms of internal war.

They regard all modernizing societies as candidates for internal war at some stage of their development, which will be the final stage in the class struggle within the society. They plan to set the stage for these "wars of national liberation" and to support them; and these wars, we have been told publicly, are the "just" and "sacred" wars which they must support in order that the society may eliminate all foreign influences and leave Communism in control of the modernization process.

Communism has from its origins posed this threat. But the threat is more credible and poignant as of today for two reasons:

First, the number and diversity of the modernizing societies have proliferated enormously (This imposes additional burdens on those, like ourselves, who would permit the new societies to perfect existing institutions and to fashion their own system and pace of modernization,

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- 12 -

modernization, instead of ruthlessly imposing the predetermined institutional blue-prints of Communism).

Second, in view of the general strategic stalemate and the dangers of direct Bloc-Western military confrontations, the Communists' "wave of the future" strategy is now based primarily on insurgency rather than overt aggression across international borders. (This accords with the general lesson of history since the Korean War and a probable Communist assessment that "wars of national liberation" can be supported without running the unacceptable risks of Western nuclear retaliation).

A further aspect of the Communist threat is doctrinally important: Consolidating and exploiting active domestic insurgency bases, both in the cities and the countryside, are valuable means of accomplishing two Communist purposes: Building power bases for future political takeovers, and arresting a state's forward movement.

Hence, urban strongholds within disaffected student and labor groups, and guerrilla bases in the countryside may be developed, held and utilized not for purposes of an immediate drive to power but for purposes of sowing confusion, adding to the drain on domestic resources, and widening the base of political power for an ultimate assault on the state when the time is deemed right.

The guerrilla is especially suited for this purpose: A guerrilla expresses action emotions and therefore has a strong psychological appeal to a part of the populace even when he opposes a moderately unpopular regime; he strikes at the economy and social cohesion of
a country

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- 13 -

a country and thereby weakens the government; in suitable terrain, he occupies the attention of many times his number in conventional soldiers who may further contribute to the government's unpopularity by reprisals, inept tactics, or failure to think back to first causes; and he is a costly thing to eliminate.

The Communists have thus refined subversive insurgency as an instrument of political warfare which can be destructively applied to underdeveloped countries at almost all points of vulnerability. And in organizing massively for subversion in all forms, they also systematically seek to align themselves with the three great forces at work in modernizing societies--nationalism, anticolonialism and the revolution of rising expectations. Their threat is formidable and all-pervasive, but it cannot succeed without the support of people. It can be blunted and defeated only if we and other free nations make it crystal clear in action and deed that Communism can never align with the finer instincts of human nature because it is not a political system which fulfills the aspirations of men who prefer to find their own independent ways in a world community of free nations.

IV. THE CENTRAL FRAMEWORK OF US POLICY AND STRATEGY

US policy and strategy toward the Communist threat are designed to safeguard the modernization process in order that the deeper aspirations of men and nations to remain free and to fashion their own ways of modern life may be fulfilled.

A. US POLICY AND OBJECTIVES TOWARD MODERNIZING SOCIETIES

The BNSP is our guide for US policy and objectives toward the underdeveloped world.

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- 14 -

Our broad interests in the underdeveloped world are three:

--We have a political and ideological interest that the free modernizing nations evolve in directions which will afford a congenial world environment for fruitful international cooperation and our own way of life.

--We have a military interest that their manpower and resources not fall under Communist control and that they maintain the minimum essential military capabilities to preserve their internal security and independence from DVN-type aggression, or to combine with foreign assistance in meeting overt external aggression.

--We have an economic interest that their resources and markets remain available to us and to the other industrialized nations of the Free World.

Doctrinally, our strategy points toward extricating ourselves from being wholly reactive to Communist initiatives by getting on more positively with the constructive tasks of encouraging and safeguarding the modernization process. This requires our recognizing that assisting modernization (the positive thrust of US policy) and assisting in its defense are two sides of the same coin.

The task of safeguarding the modernization process involves assisting transitional nations upward through the modernization barrier with all available resources and counsel at our disposal, and acceptable to them, while simultaneously improving their capabilities of internal defense across the entire spectrum of politico-military activity.

Our objective

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- 15 -

Our objective is that modernizing countries remain independent of Communism, and free from Communist footholds (especially in the critical rural, student and labor union sectors), in order that they may progressively assume roles of dignity and responsibility in an expanding world community of free nations and pluralistic values; and our purpose is to assist them to become free and unified nations capable of internal defense, governance by consent, and self-generating economic growth within indigenous modernization systems representative of their own cultures and aspirations.

The central focus of this policy is to assure an environment of sustained progress toward higher standards of economic welfare, social justice, individual liberties, and popularly based governments--an enterprise in which the risks and responsibilities will normally be shared with other nations and international groupings, including the United Nations, though in terms of financial assistance and military support, ours will doubtless remain the dominant role in large parts of the world in the decade ahead.

B. THE US INTEREST IN INTERNAL DEFENSE

As long as the Communists and their partisans and proxies continue to exert external and internal pressure on free societies, we must devote attention and resources to the defense of these societies because (a) a sense of security, and (b) a demonstrated capacity to

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- 16 -

capacity to defend its vital interests are minimum conditions for the creative modernization of any free society.

Since Communist policy is systematically geared to create and exploit vulnerabilities offered by political unrest, economic sluggishness, diplomatic disarray, and military weakness within the free community, we must, in addition to maintaining a full spectrum of military capabilities which will make the Communists hesitate to employ force at any level (including guerrilla warfare and urban insurrection), seek to minimize the emergence of circumstances and situations which permit Communist pressures and manipulation, with special attention to those sectors in which the Communists traditionally devote major efforts--the countryside, the students and educational system, and the labor unions.

In this endeavor, the preventative aspect of US and indigenous capabilities cannot be overemphasized. It is in the long run far less costly materially and in terms of damage to the society to prevent insurgency than to defeat it after its appearance. The dreadful arithmetic of counter-guerrilla operations, where history indicates 10 to 15 soldiers are required to cope successfully with each guerrilla, is something which every modernizing society should make efforts to avoid at all costs.

C. US COUNTERINSURGENCY OBJECTIVES

The over-all US purpose in the field of counterinsurgency is to assist the transitional states to develop balanced capabilities for the total

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- 17 -

for the total defense of their societies against internal and external threats, this to be done with minimum demands on domestic resources required for internal development.

To this end, US internal defense objectives are:

1. To contribute to the systematic immunization of vulnerable societies not yet seriously threatened by Communist subversion.
2. To assist countries where insurgency is incipient (e.g., Thailand, Brazil) to defeat the threat by removing its political, social and economic causes before the insurgency becomes active.
3. In countries where insurgency is active (South Vietnam, Colombia), to assist the government under attack with military as well as non-military means, consistent with the US interest as determined in each case.
4. To minimize the possibility of direct US military involvement in internal war by maximizing indigenous capabilities of countering and defeating insurgency.
5. To minimize the risk of escalation (without deferring to this risk) of insurgency toward conventional or nuclear war.

V. GENERALIZED CONCEPT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF US RESOURCES

In countering insurgency, the major effort, in terms of US interests, must always be indigenous. We have noted that insurgency is a uniquely local problem affecting the aspirations and allegiance of local people. In putting down insurgency, it is only the local government which

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- 18 -

government which can remove its causes, win back the support of the insurgents, and strengthen the society's cohesiveness. In internal war it is always better for one national to kill another than for a foreigner--especially one with a different skin coloration--to do so.

The active participation of non-indigenous (especially US) forces in internal defense operations can be counterproductive in that it (a) dilutes the nationalist appeal, and hence the acceptability, of the local government, (b) makes the United States a more obvious target for anticolonialism than it already is, and (c) permits the Communists more easily to associate themselves with the forces of nationalism and anti-Westernism.

The US effort abroad must therefore relate primarily to advice, assistance and the training of indigenous capabilities. We must always begin this effort by knowing what the local problem is and learning to see its distinctive local context.

A. THE LOCAL PROBLEM

The local problem is that modernization generates insurgency in some form and poses cruel choices of tempo and of how best to reconcile opposing forces at work within the society--of bringing tolerable order and unity out of relative dishevelment as smoothly and securely as possible. This is nothing less than the problem of building and defending a nation against its internal tensions and upheavals and those incited from abroad.

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A large part of the local problem is that the new leaders have an imperfect view of the consequences of their acts and an imperfect vision of where to lead and how to get there. Their inexperience contributes to their difficulty in seeing the totality of their national problem, since the society is in flux and also under attack: the forces of flux open the avenues of attack and forward movement will depend on the skillful employment and orchestration of all constructive national capabilities, energies and resources, both creative and defensive.

A major contributing source of this difficulty is their imperfect understanding of the political structure of insurgency, even armed insurgency, and their failure to appreciate that a creative combination of politics and force (active or potential) is required to eliminate the root causes of insurgency as opposed to the mere, and often temporary, repression of its symptoms.

B. THE US PROBLEM

The US problem is to involve ourselves constructively and acceptably in the local problem in order that we may cooperate with and assist the local government in resolving as wide a range of subsidiary problems as possible. This requires our developing and refining several capabilities on the part of our Country Teams:

..An ability to acquaint ourselves thoroughly with the totality of the local problem in all its distinctive qualities (its stage of modernization, the points of strength and weakness, the sources of

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- 20 -

sources of dissidence, the external vs. the internal threat, the probable consequences or action or inaction).

..An ability to assist the local government, together with the society's innovators and constructive alternative leaders, to see more clearly the interaction of modernization and insurgency and the blend of politics and force required for an adequate internal defense capability.

..An ability to convince the local leaders that within transitional societies insurgency is part of the political process and must be dealt with in this context rather than as a compartmentalized problem for the police or the military.

..An ability to coordinate and orchestrate US resources, and to develop techniques adapted to the unique local context, toward the end of strengthening the local capability of defense against insurgency with minimal damage to the society and the momentum of modernization.

C. A GENERALIZED CONCEPT OF US JOINT OPERATIONS

Though the US contribution should be ancillary and as inconspicuous as possible, each operational arm of US policy represented at the Country Team level has unique and indispensable capabilities and resources to employ in supporting the counter-insurgency operations of a friendly government. What is needed is more precise advanced planning and preparation for the contingencies of their use, greater coordination in

SECRET

- 21 -

coordination in their use when emergencies arise, and greater sophistication in applying our resources in a variety of distinctive situations and contingencies. In short, though we may generalize on strategy, we should not generalize on tactics, which must always be tailored to the local situation.

Abroad, the US concept of joint US counterinsurgency operations in a society whose government accepts our involvement in its problems, and our assistance in their solution, should be to pool US resources in reaching a joint determination on the critical vulnerabilities of the society; to refine our judgment on this determination by discussing these vulnerabilities, and what can be done about them, with the local government and, as appropriate, others within the society; and to apply US resources as necessary, in coordination with those of the local government, on the basis of a common plan, if possible. But, in any event, on the basis of a coordinated US plan of action in which each US resource will maximally contribute to the cohesiveness and internal defense capabilities of the society.

US Country Teams should prepare and have before them at all times two "terrain" or "situation" maps--one which represents the long-term development plan of the country, i.e., where the country plans to go along the modernization spectrum in the next three to five years; and one which plots the "counterinsurgency geography" of the country, i.e., a country plan which plots the vulnerabilities that the country's modernizing activities will foreseeably ameliorate or exacerbate.

Ideally, these

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- 22 -

Ideally, these maps, especially the strategic development plan, should be prepared in concert with the local government. But regardless of local cooperation, it is essential that our Country Teams jointly prepare such documents since, in their absence, we have no clear picture of our strategy in a particular country and no frame in which to coordinate US resources.

Only if we proceed in this fashion, with each component of the Country Team knowing the other's business and capabilities, will we be able to match the objective studies which the Communists make of local vulnerabilities and the versatility of Communist personnel in politics, psychological operations, and insurgency.

These projections will serve other indispensable purposes:

1. Their preparation and periodic updating will make all members of the Country Team more acutely aware of the state of health of the local political organism: individually and as a team, we will learn to look through a society instead of at it.

2. Our increasing ability to spot the malfunctions of the local political organism should sharpen our ability to forecast dangerous trends and suggest remedies. Our diagnosis of the local fever chart will suggest the main outlines of how US resources should be employed to anticipate insurgency, prevent deterioration, or prepare for serious trouble ahead. It will give us the indispensable knowledge required to assess programs suggested by the local government or to persuade the local government to different courses of action.

3. Agreement

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SECRET

- 23 -

3. Agreement at the Country Team level on these matters will greatly facilitate the coordination and approval of country strategies at the national level in Washington.

Coordination of this effort at the Country Team level will be the responsibility of the Ambassador. At the national level, the employment of US resources in specified critical countries will be coordinated by the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). In countries which are not specified as critical, the Department of State will coordinate plans and resources at the national level under procedures which should urgently be refined (see Section VI).

VI. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

Against the foregoing analysis of US policy and the complexities of the modernization process, this section seeks to fix the strategic framework in which all components of the Country Team should act integrally in making their unique and interrelated contributions: it is the body of common doctrine which should generally guide the formulation of programs and their execution, as contrasted with operational guidance to components of the Country Team (Section VII).

A. THE BROAD US PURPOSE

1. Area of competition with Communism. A fundamental objective of US strategy in the 1960's must be to perfect capabilities of offsetting or countering the Communist threat at all levels of violence--through the thermonuclear deterrent as well as in tactical nuclear, conventional

SECRET

SECRET

- 24 -

nuclear, conventional limited, guerrilla and other forms of ambiguous politico-military warfare--and to confine the struggle to political and socio-economic competition. This will require adequate personnel, properly trained and broadly knowledgeable of the range of US capabilities, to cope with sub-conventional violence in cooperation with modernizing societies. If Khrushchev's and Mao's strategy in the underdeveloped world is to be aborted, major changes will be required in ours at the sub-Korean level of conflict.

2. The US interest in assisting free modernizing societies to maintain adequate counterinsurgency capabilities stems from (a) our national objective of keeping them independent of Communism and free to develop in their own ways, and (b) our recognition that all modernizing societies face internal threats in varying degrees because of the interaction of modernization and insurgency.

3. The central US purpose is to assist governments responsive to our influence with program guidance and US resources which will counter, or preferably prevent, insurgency while, at the same time, looking to first causes and effecting the necessary internal reforms to remove them.

4. Stability of modernizing societies. The principal areas of political and social conflict with Communism will be the underdeveloped areas. Here our central problem is to assist countries in remaining

SECRET

SECRET

- 25 -

in remaining free to fashion their own modernization systems under conditions of reasonable stability. Their stability, in turn, will depend on their achieving relative security against internal and external threats and their developing governments which respond to the aspirations and needs of their peoples. To the extent we assist in this process, we simultaneously improve their capabilities of internal defense.

5. The central focus of US resources in the long run is not to fight Communism as such but to develop ways in which our programs can make free governments secure against domestic enemies and politically attractive to a working majority of their people. This done, we will accept the strategic gamble that the new states will opt to remain independent of the Communist system and will progressively lean toward the Western way of life and its values.

6. The central focus of US counterinsurgency programs should, at every level of violence, be to combine civil and military (police) capabilities for purposes of defeating the insurgency and to contribute to the cohesiveness of the society by encouraging the local government to redress the legitimate grievances of the insurgents. Insurgency can seldom be uprooted unless this is done. All forms of violence should be dealt with in this manner, and while they are in an elementary form, before they degrade into armed insurgency or guerrilla warfare. In this process of putting down violence and also eliminating its causes, there

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- 26 -

causes, there will rarely be a pure civil or military action: each will interact with the other in support of the common purpose.

7. Correct counterinsurgency programs will advance US foreign policy objectives in a vulnerable society and should be designed to do so. Counterinsurgency strategy should always interact on modernization strategy and be utilized to advance and stabilize the modernization process. The preventive (defensive) aspects of our diplomatic, military, economic, informational and covert programs which point directly at preventing or defeating Communist-directed insurgency involve broader objectives; since each is intended to safeguard and permit social, economic, and political progress in the country involved, each is closely related to the totality of US foreign policy toward the country.

8. The basic US posture must be that of guardian of the modernization process rather than, as all too often in the past, that of custodian of the status quo. We must never commit ourselves wholeheartedly to a regime simply because it is anti-Communist. Our purpose is to defeat Communism through the progressive modernization of societies which are vulnerable to Communism as long as they remain politically dishevelled, economically stagnant, and socially divided.

9. Short-run relations vs. long-range purposes. If we are to induce the tough structural changes in the existing order required in many states (e.g., Iran and many Latin American republics), we must not sacrifice long-range purposes to short-run relations with the transitional

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SECRET

- 27 -

the transitional oligarchies. We must bear in mind that the oligarchies have no rational alternative to going along with our policy of the progressive liberalization and modernization of transitional societies. We must give hardnosed realism priority over diplomatic niceties and be prepared to risk the displeasure of governments and classes currently holding power. And we must use our varied array of overt and covert resources more imaginatively and effectively than in the past to influence change in directions which serve long-range US interests.

10. Alliance with modernization. Our aligning US foreign policy with the major forces of modernization at work within under-developed countries means that we must come to terms with the major forces at work within these countries: nationalism (often of an irrational and irresponsible type), anticolonialism (which includes the problem of powerlessness adjusting to the Great Powers of the Free World in new relationships), and the revolution of rising expectations. It must be a major US purpose to coordinate counter-insurgency programs on a pragmatic basis to deny Communist exploitation of these forces.

11. Fuller capitalization on US advantages. Certain Communist asymmetries which now work against us can be counterbalanced if we more systematically employ US resources to capitalize on four advantages we hold over the Communists: (a) our ability to involve ourselves more deeply and cooperatively in the internal affairs of
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SECRET

- 28 -

the new states on matters affecting modernization and internal defense; (b) the fact that we do not threaten their independence or freedom to fashion their own modernization systems and that, therefore, our long-range interests basically coincide with theirs; (c) our willingness to assist them in an empiric quest for modernization within the framework of their own unique problems, culture and aspirations (our fully exploiting this advantage will nevertheless entail adjustments in US attitudes toward mixed economies, state-owned enterprise, the role of private capital, and reliance on authoritarianism during modernization crises); and (d) the demonstrable failures of Communism in enlisting the deep-seated incentives which appeal to human nature--notably the failure of Communism to solve the problem of agriculture.

B. THE US POSTURE TOWARD NON-COMMUNIST INSURGENCY

1. The initial US response. The United States cannot afford to be against violence or revolution, per se, as historic agents of change. The right to change governments, economic systems and social structures by revolution is recognized in international law and the use of force to overthrow non-Communist governments is not always contrary to US interests. Situations will doubtless arise where we shall want to support (or inspire) internal movements against established governments or colonial powers.

Where there is no provision for a peaceful transfer of power, a change brought about through force by non-Communist elements

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SECRET

- 29 -

may be a preferable alternative to prolonged deterioration of governmental effectiveness or to a continuation of a situation in which increasing discontent and repression interact to breed each other, thus building toward a more dangerous climax (e.g., Batista's Cuba, Trujillo's Dominican Republic, Angola).

Each case of latent, incipient, or active non-Communist insurgency must therefore be examined on its merits in the light of US interests before we become involved on either side. We must avoid jumping to easy conclusions that the insurgency is Communist-inspired, remembering that the Communists will seek to exploit purely nationalistic breakdowns of order and that many legitimate nationalistic protests for social improvement need not get out of hand or become exploitable Communist targets if the local government takes timely political corrective action.

Our initial role should be that of counseling the local government to examine objectively the grievances of insurgents, even those under Communist influence, before resorting to force, unless there is no practicable alternative.

2. Repression vs. reform. If force is required, we must make it clear that the mere repression of insurgency at most usually does no more than buy time which, unless put to political advantage, may work in favor of the dissidents or of their Communist mentors on the sidelines. It is always better to uproot insurgency than merely to repress it,

SECRET

SECRET

- 30 -

repress it, especially when the insurgency is aligned with a popular cause. In the transitional societies, insurgency is a time-hallowed form of political expression and often the only available political pressure which can be brought to bear to effect needed reforms. It should be so regarded by the local government.

3. Persuasion of governmental leaders. It is vital that US Country Teams develop insurgency maps into country plans in order that they may assess what position we should take when insurgency occurs. For situations will doubtless arise when we may wish overtly or covertly to throw our support behind the insurgents in an effort to bring pressure on or to replace the local government. When insurgency can be anticipated, US diplomacy and other resources should seek to keep the governmental leaders from delaying until a real crisis is upon them, in which case their alternatives are more limited and the use of force will be more imperative.

The persuasion of local leaders to act in the interests of their society before the Communists obtain footholds is a complex and subtle business and cannot succeed unless we know the facts and are willing to contest certain facts that the local government may wish to sweep under the rug. It is therefore essential that

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SECRET

- 31 -

our Country Teams determine where the points of strength and vulnerability lie. This done, we can determine how to strengthen those elements which most effectively support our objectives and how best to ease the tensions which have created the vulnerabilities.

C. US INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNIST-DIRECTED INSURGENCY

1. The scale of US involvement at the level of force should be as limited as possible and ancillary to the indigenous effort. It is important for the United States to remain in the background, and where possible to limit its support to training, advice and material, lest we prejudice the acceptability of the local government and complicate its task of gaining the allegiance of the insurgents, and lest we expose ourselves unnecessarily to the "colonial coloration" of Communist propaganda.

2. US strategy toward insurgency. Where insurgency is latent or incipient (a Stage I situation), the US strategy should be directed toward its elimination lest it provide Communist footholds and escalate into active insurgency (a Stage II situation). In a Stage I situation, every effort must be made to immunize the critical sectors from Communism and to eradicate Communist footholds therein (see following section).

Where Communist influence or control is established in a Stage I situation, steps should be taken to eliminate it through practicable reform measures and informational programs designed to evidence the

SECRET

SECRET

- 32 -

evidence the concern and interest of the central government (e.g., the programs now underway in Northeast Brazil).

In Stage II situations the US involvement will be intensified, indigenous force will be required, and the offensive support capabilities of the US military and of CIA may be necessary adjuncts to the local effort. In these situations, US programs should be designed to make the indigenous military response as rapid and incisive as possible on the hardcore insurgents and to parallel this with reforms directed at ameliorating the insurgency.

3. The Philippine model. The Philippine campaign against the Huks, as led by Magsaysay, is a model of countering insurgency, winning the allegiance of the domestic popular base from the Communists, and destroying the foundations of Communist-directed guerrilla action. Magsaysay's strategy of the closed fist of force and the extended palm of conciliation and reform reveals what can be accomplished by an enlightened, energetic and imaginative central government which combines force with reform in defeating insurgency. It is a pattern of action which should be implanted, with whatever local modifications are necessary, wherever possible to other vulnerable underdeveloped countries facing the reality or threat of Communist-directed insurgency.

It should also be studied in detail by all US civil and military officers concerned with counter-insurgency operations as
a model of

SECRET

SECRET

- 33 -

a model of how US resources--civil, military and covert--can inconspicuously, yet vitally, support an energetic domestic effort.

4. Coordination of civil and military resources. Anticipating, preventing and suppressing Communist-directed insurgency requires a blend of military and non-military capabilities and actions to which each US agency at the Country Team level can and must contribute. In the battle of safeguarding the modernization process, carefully evaluated intelligence, the ability to penetrate the enemy's strongholds, the training of adequate and balanced military and police capabilities, developmental assistance and advice, information programs designed to ameliorate and bring understanding to local problems--these are all indispensable components of an effective "development diplomacy" adequate to the problems of the 1960's.

Preventing and defeating Communist-directed insurgency is therefore a total program for the local government--with its positive and defensive sides--and for US resources in support thereof. Success will depend on a careful evaluation of known facts and on a unifying concept of operations based on a country plan tailored to the local context in which applied civil and military resources interact and overlap.

D. THE CRITICAL

SECRET

SECRET

- 34 -

D. THE CRITICAL SECTORS

1. The vital sectors within modernizing societies on which US programs must be orchestrated are the rural sector; the labor front; the student and youth organizations, including the educated unemployed; the communications and informational media; the military-police; the civil bureaucracy; the various middle-class elites (entrepreneurs, artists, academicians); and the political parties, including often a legal Communist Party but invariably an illegal Communist apparat operating underground or through various fronts. The Communists seek to subvert all these sectors but are generally less successful than we in exerting major influence over governmental leaders, the civil bureaucracy, the military and police, and the middle class in general, including the centrist political parties.

2. The critical sectors from the standpoint of US interests are generally the countryside, the students and youth (including the educational system), the labor unions and educated unemployed, and the communications and information media. This is not to say that the other sectors are entirely secure or that greater US across-the-board efforts are not required. But in the typical underdeveloped country, disaffected middle class or Communist organizers are most likely to organize insurgency within the ranks of the peasants, laborers, students, and the unemployed and underprivileged in general.

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- 35 -

3. Urban vs. rural sectors. Insurgency must be guarded against in both the cities and the countryside. In loosely-structured countries where the cities are beachheads for the outside world, the economy is predominantly agricultural, the central government has not gripped and led the peasantry, a passive, detached rural population, capable of being terrorized or enflamed, is the more important and rewarding target for Communist political activity (e.g., South Vietnam, Northeast Brazil). In these situations, the battle must be joined at the village level, which normally represents the lowest social and political organizational level.

Discontented urban populations may be the more fertile ground for Communist activities if the country is in the uneasy throes of early industrialization and urbanization (e.g., Egypt, Iran) or is undergoing a political and social renovation from the evils of dictatorship and mismanagement (e.g., Venezuela).

Or the Communist thrust may come through the exploitation of rural minorities which may have footholds in provincial capitals (e.g., the Kurdish minorities in Iraq, Iran and Turkey).

4. Special Problems of the Countryside. The underdeveloped world is predominantly agricultural, with 75 per cent of its people living on the land, often under feudal or semi-feudal conditions (e.g., Ecuador, Peru), yet not immune from the modernizing

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SECRET

- 36 -

influences of the cities and the Communists--who place a high priority on organizing peasant land-reform leagues even in the more enlightened of the modernizing societies (e.g., India). The fact that the Communists have for so long held a virtual monopoly of urging land for the peasants suggests the necessity of our placing land reform, community development, and increased agricultural productivity at the top of our agenda for counter-insurgency programs. But there are other cogent reasons.

Land reform can or cannot contribute to increased agricultural productivity, depending on how effectively it is administered from the standpoint of credit and technical assistance. But it can be made to contribute to increased agricultural productivity and the latter is a strategic objective for modernizing societies in order to (a) create market relations between the cities and the countryside, thus strengthening the cohesiveness of the society, (b) provide a base of rural purchasing power for urban manufactured products, and (c) ease the country's balance of payments problem by contributing to its agricultural self-sufficiency.

Regardless of whether the country is adapted to guerrilla warfare, we should therefore place special emphasis on land reform and increased agricultural production in order to seal off the countryside from Communism and bring the normally conservative peasant, which Communism has

SECRET

SECRET

- 37 -

Communism has traditionally used but distrusted, into the mainstream of his society and its market economy.

Community development is a vital adjunct to the political and social development of a loosely-structured country for the reason that it takes government to the countryside and establishes channels of communication and response between the rural sector and central government. It is thus a reinsurance policy against insurgency in the countryside and a mechanism for making government responsive to the people's needs.

For these reasons, US strategy should emphasize defense of the countryside through sound land reform, increased agricultural productivity, and community development programs. This process can be helpfully accelerated, as it has in many countries (e.g., Mexico, Turkey) by civic action programs on the part of the local military, thus carrying the central writ to the country in expressions of interest and concern of a type which strengthen a society.

5. Special urban problems. Within modernizing societies, labor and youth will continue to present problems of dissatisfaction and disaffection, as they have in most countries, including the Soviet Union. Yet a great deal more can be done to focus US programs and resources on explaining to both the trials and troubles of the modernization process and the pitfalls of turning to Communism as an alternative to fighting for progress as loyal nationalists.

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SECRET

SECRET

- 38 -

We must especially devote more attention to the educational systems of the new states, to assist them in improving the quality of their curricula and teachers, and in supplying textbooks which will prepare students for the modern democratic world. The dissidence of the urban discontented can also be ameliorated considerably through emphasis on the types of programs envisaged under the Alliance for Progress (e.g., low cost housing, potable water supplies, sanitation measures, construction of schools, etc.).

The importance of youth and labor to US interests is illustrated by a recent despatch from Embassy Quito which states that the students' and labor federations of Ecuador--a country on the brink of insurgency--are more politically powerful than any one of the existing political parties.

6. Assets on which to build. While getting ourselves in shape to deal more effectively with the critical sectors, we must not neglect to build more constructively on those assets which now generally lean toward US objectives--the military and police, the civil bureaucracy, the middle class generally, and the political leadership.

We should find ways of making greater use of our ability to train indigenous officers corps in nation-building and statecraft, bearing in mind that our military train more foreign nationals
in military

SECRET

SECRET

- 39 -

in military sciences than all other US government training programs combined. Our strategy should be to make the local military and police surrogates of US-Free World interests and officers with whom we can cooperate fruitfully in the politico-military intricacies of safeguarding the modernization process. Such would create an asymmetry in our favor which could go farther than we have gone in the past to offset Communist advantages of being able to operate through indigenous political parties.

It is similarly strategically critical that we devote more attention and resources to training civil bureaucrats in administrative practices and problems of modernization.

7. The middle class. Ours is predominantly a middle-class society and our strategy vis-a-vis the modernizing societies is in actuality one of converting them into open, permissive middle-class societies. We have not in the past always clearly seen this as our real purpose. We have too often been timid in risking the disfavor or enmity of oligarchic leaders who, though they claim us as brothers, have no appetite for our advice.

In a society which is in flux, we must accept the fact that we cannot please all classes or all persons; what we must therefore do is to remain true to ourselves and project the image of a liberal democracy

SECRET

SECRET

- 40 -

democracy in action which stands for the strengthening of the middle class in all sectors of modernizing societies, and in the countryside as well as in the cities.

Similarly, vis-a-vis a government which may veer dangerously toward Communist norms in its socialist experiments, we must be patient and understanding, bearing in mind that excesses often correct themselves (e.g., India, Guinea) and that no nationalist government can survive indefinitely or without trouble on a completely conservative political program. In these situations, we still must act with confidence according to our own standards, keep to our middle-class strategy, and take care that we do not drive the government farther to the Left, or into dependency on the Bloc, by cutting off avenues of assistance and advice (e.g., our support of Bolivia since the 1952 revolution).

E. INTERVENTION VS. COOPERATIVE INVOLVEMENT

"Development diplomacy" differs materially from traditional diplomacy as practiced with the advanced countries of the North, or with hostile states. The essence of development diplomacy is that we develop the capability and the capacity to involve ourselves deeply in the internal affairs of modernizing states in order to assist them with advice and resources.

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SECRET

SECRET

- 41 -

While we will continue to eschew unwanted intervention, we must bear in mind that the doctrine of non-intervention applies only to unwanted or unwelcomed forms of intervention, notably armed intervention. There is no doctrine against the deep and intricate involvement of one or more states in the modernization and internal defense problems of another, though obviously the practitioners of development diplomacy must proceed in recognition of the sensitivities of the host government. This is an additional reason why US representatives abroad must be grounded in the factual terrain of the society in which they serve.

F. THE ULTIMATE TARGET--PEOPLE

In countering insurgency, but especially in suppressing internal war, we must keep in mind the ultimate and decisive target: the people, who are more decisive to the outcome than the territory captured or the insurgents killed. In internal war, society does not retreat to the sidelines and leave the battle to the soldiers: society itself is at war and the resources, motives and targets of the struggle are found almost wholly within the local society. The terrain on which the ultimate battle is won or lost is the support of the people.

Viewed in this light, insurgency and internal war--if they cannot be avoided by timely political action--offer opportunities to strengthen the society and point it toward modernization with greater social immunization against

SECRET

SECRET

- 42 -

immunization against Communism (e.g., the Philippine model, Malaya). It is just as important to attack the inner political and psychological structure of insurgency as it is to attack its exterior manifestations of violence, and the attacks should always be mutually reinforcing in dangerous situations.

G. COUNTER-IDEAS AND COUNTER-ORGANIZATIONS

Because insurgency, especially Communist-directed insurgency, is always rooted in attitudes and a political structure, there is need, in the political struggle against Communism, both for counter-ideas and counter-organizations. For ideas to have political force, they must be supported by some form of organization--something the Communists understand well. Some form of organization which permits outlets for confused emotions and somewhat inchoate political aspirations is especially important to overcome the feeling of rootlessness of people who have been uprooted from their traditional way of life and are caught in the flux of modernization, industrialization and urbanization. This explains part of the appeal of Communism in transitional societies.

US programs and resources should be more systematically geared, therefore, to the development of counter-ideas and counter-organizations. All arms of US policy represented abroad can contribute to this strategic objective, but especially our military and police training missions, CIA and USIA.

H. STRATEGIC

SECRET

SECRET

- 43 -

H. STRATEGIC ASSIGNMENTS (ROLES AND MISSIONS)

1. The Country Team concept. The Country Team, headed by the Ambassador as the President's principal representative in a country, is the forum for preparing and coordinating the execution of counterinsurgency programs abroad for these reasons:

a. The modernization process in underdeveloped countries involves the entire range of governmental and public activity: it is the purpose of government and ubiquitously affects the internal and external policies of the state in its relations with its own people and with the outside world. Everything we do will affect this process in some way. It is therefore vital that we coordinate the US effort in modernizing societies on the basis of a central US strategy which will be a combination of the country's development plan and a country plan for coping with the country's vulnerabilities to insurgency.

b. The country plan should evolve toward a US strategic plan for seeing the country through its difficulties with minimum risks of insurgency--a combination of the type of counterinsurgency plan developed for South Vietnam and of the type of strategic plan we are seeking to develop in key Latin American countries to determine how US resources can be brought to bear on key points of leverage to induce progress toward Alliance for Progress goals. This is a matter to which

SECRET

- 44 -

to which all US agencies at the Country Team level must contribute both in preparation and execution.

c. The Country Team mechanism should therefore be systematically employed for developing country plans and coordinating the employment of US resources in their execution. It should similarly be utilized as a forum in which to educate all participants in the complexities of the others' business, thus achieving a greater coordination of effort and approach to the local government, together with a greater versatility of personnel.

2. Coordination at the national level. A similar need for coordination exists at the national level. The Special Group (C-I) fulfills this need in respect of countries certified to it as critical. The Task Force mechanism under the chairmanship of the Department of State is a partial answer to the need. But beneath the level of criticality with which the Special Group (C-I) and the Task Forces are concerned, there are a wide range of countries whose insurgency problems are dealt with on a less urgent and effective basis from the standpoint of coordination. The Department of State should therefore take a lead in devising more effective methods of coordinating at the national level/^{those} counterinsurgency programs recommended to it by the Country Team.

3. Strategic roles of the Country Team. Strategically, the Country Team should strive toward these capabilities in support of the Ambassador's

SECRET

SECRET

- 45 -

the Ambassador's and Department of State's over-all responsibilities for the conduct of US foreign relations:

a. Adequately trained personnel generally indoctrinated in the entire range of problems confronted by the various US agencies in a modernizing society, including the problem of subversive insurgency.

b. Carefully evaluated intelligence on a society's points of strength and vulnerability and on its leaders, innovators and dissidents, including Communists and Communist organizers and fronts. All US agencies can make unique inputs to our intelligence map of a society.

c. The widest possible contacts with all sectors of the society, including the opposition. All US agencies should systematically widen contacts in the sectors of their principal interest.

d. A capacity to understand and to discuss the country's problems in depth with all classes of people. A consistent dialogue on the country's problems should be a strategic purpose of all US agencies, both because it will divulge attitudes and intelligence and because it will assist us in mastering the complexities of the local scene.

e. A capability of coordinating US resources in support of centrist political groupings capable of assuming political power and of transferring it through orderly processes.

f. An ability

SECRET

SECRET

- 46 -

f. An ability to work with the local government in explaining its programs and problems to the people at large.

g. An ability to influence the local military toward a balanced mix of external and internal defense capabilities which will assure a total defense of the society with minimum drains on local resources.

h. An ability to influence the critical sectors susceptible to Communist influences in Free World values and purposes vis-a-vis their society.

i. An ability to influence political and social development more effectively through developmental and military assistance and training.

4. Department of State. In the field, the Ambassador and Department of State personnel attached to his staff should take the lead in encouraging and perfecting the strategic roles of the Country Team, as enumerated above, and in giving tactical counsel to other US agencies. The Ambassador and one or more counterinsurgency specialists assigned to his staff should also take the lead in putting together the country plan, in coordinating its execution, and in integrating the plan into the totality of US foreign policy as maintained and coordinated at the country level by the Ambassador.

5. The Department

SECRET

SECRET

- 47 -

5. The Department of Defense. The strategic role of Defense, in cooperation with AID and CIA, is to assist the local country in developing a balanced security force, with minimal demands on internal resources, which will give the country a sense of military (police) security against internal and external threats. Defense (AID, CIA) can make further strategic contributions of great importance by (a) formulating ways of training the local military in the complexities of the modernization process and of the inter-relationship of modernization and insurgency; (b) encouraging the local military to get into the business of nation-building (civil action, carrying the writ of the central government to the countryside, literacy campaigns, economic development and infrastructure, training of conscripts in literacy, vocational and civics); (c) training the local military to be dual purpose forces with a central focus on internal defense where the external threat is not credible (e.g., Latin America); and (d) orienting the local military toward what we want most from them in most modernizing societies (reinsurance against a Communist takeover, restraint on civil authority, and maximal understanding of the constructive roles they can play in assisting the civil authorities to modernize their countries).

6. AID and

SECRET

SECRET

- 48 -

6. AID and Defense provide the training and the economic, military and technical resources and materiel on which we must principally rely to achieve our policy objectives. AID, in addition, has the strategic function of coordinating developmental and military assistance within the framework of the local country's development plan and the US country plan; it also has training responsibilities in technical fields, including public safety (police techniques). AID's strategic roles--as yet largely unfulfilled--include how to employ US resources to induce self-help and political development as well as economic growth; how to utilize its involvement within the internal development process more effectively to stimulate an internal anti-Communist dynamism toward modernization; and how to evaluate and feed its enormous intelligence collection potential into the US country plan.

7. CIA, in addition to the invaluable covert support which it can give to US civil and military efforts to support the modernization process, should provide carefully evaluated intelligence for the country plans, infiltrate and maintain surveillance on insurgent and Communist activities, and maintain covert offensive operations in coordination with Defense and as approved by the Country Team and Washington.

8. USIA can play a more creative and imaginative role than it has in the past in advising the local government on how to communicate

more

SECRET

SECRET

- 49 -

more effectively with the people, on how to conduct psychological operations vis-a-vis insurgents, and in supporting the local government in explaining the problems of modernization in simple and understandable terms. These purposes are doubtless of greater importance to US interests than "selling" the traditional US image of an affluent and philanthropic society.

In the new societies, it is urgent that the mass of the people understand what the modernization process is and the extent to which its success depends on local effort (self-help) and understanding. Freedom from colonial rule was equated with the millenium by millions in the underdeveloped world and their disenchantment has rubbed off on their governments and has been enflamed by Communist promises. If we are to make a start at counter-meas and counter-organizations to combat Communism more effectively, it should start in all critical sectors with objective explanations of what modernization in freedom can mean as against modernization under Communism. The failures of Communism in the agricultural sector, and its basic distrust of the peasant, should be carefully explained at the village level. The strategic theme might be to align the local government, and ourselves in support thereof, with what might be called the Human Choice, i.e., the right of the people of a society to fashion their own modernization system somewhere between the extremes of US private enterprise and Communism.

I. OFFENSIVE

SECRET

SECRET

- 50 -

I. OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST DVE-TYPE AGGRESSION

Where Communist-directed insurgency in a country is given direct material and human support from an adjacent Communist-controlled area, the United States and the local government should consider the employment of feasible countermeasures to make support from the sanctuary difficult or unprofitable or unacceptably risky.

[Perhaps this is place to insert BNSP discussion of this subject.]

J. THE ROLE OF ALLIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Wherever possible, we should increase the effectiveness of our own resources by employing them in concert with allies (former metropolises) and international organizations.

K. UNRESOLVED DOCTRINAL ISSUES

[To be developed after other elements of paper are settled. Among those which come to mind are: (a) Problem of coordination at the national level, (b) more sophisticated political training for the foreign military, (c) offensive counter-measures (tooth-for-eye doctrine), (d) the imponderables in the modernization process (what we don't know about it), (e) new operational concepts for AID/USIA in the counterinsurgency field, and (f) new analytical concepts--along lines of S/P strategic studies in Latin America--for utilizing economic aid to promote political and social development.]

VII. OPERATIONAL

SECRET

SECRET

- 51 -

VII. OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE: LINES OF ACTION

/To be picked up from the Kitchen-Moses paper, perhaps with some incorporations from the Bissell Report/

VIII. ROLES AND MISSIONS

/Kitchen-Moses paper, perhaps amended with agency inputs to Special Group (C-1)/

IX. CONCLUSIONS

/May not need/

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