

~~TOP SECRET~~

19 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DD/I (Planning)

SUBJECT : U. S. Intelligence 1965-1970

Unfortunately due to being away from the office on an Air Force Panel meeting last week, I was unable to get the promised memorandum up to you. I have gone over the paper a number of times and would now like to offer the following points for your consideration.

III. Personnel and Organization

I agree generally with paragraph A. but would like to point out two factors. By 1970 the U. S. intelligence organization undoubtedly will be a highly professional one, but by then most of us who have had a broad rather than a narrow compartmented experience in intelligence, some of us starting well before World War II, will have been long gone from active work. Unless the community, and more particularly the Agency, makes a conscious and successful effort to develop breadth of experience in intelligence as opposed to highly specialized competence in narrow fields, the over-all National organization may suffer seriously. We have mentioned this separately in connection with the IG Report on the Agency Career Service Program.

Paragraph A., in the last sentence, also mentioned the rotation practice. [redacted]

[redacted] However, rotation in military intelligence has very serious drawbacks; the most important of which are (a) personnel are not in the business long enough to acquire real competence, and (b) rotation causes limitation on access to sensitive material and thus impairs the all-source approach to problems on the part of the military agencies.

Paragraph B. cites the stability of the organization as being a factor that would permit increased knowledge of the general functioning of the community. I am inclined to disagree with this as indicated in

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the paragraph above because our tendency to strict compartmentation and specialization is fostering an unawareness of the general operation of intelligence among the upper echelons which will have to take over management within a very few years.

The assumption of the opening of paragraph C. may be wishful thinking. If there is no easing of international tensions, the tendency irrespective of the political orientation of the Administration may be to increase the dollar expenditure on Defense per se with increased dollar stringencies, making any increase in intelligence personnel strength very dubious. If the opposite should happen and tensions were materially reduced through disarmament, etc., we might be faced with Congressional pressure to reduce expenditures for intelligence as a no longer critical factor in National security. This sort of thing has happened before.

IV. Collection

The opening of paragraph A. presents the same general concept of the future that I recently encountered in the Reconnaissance Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board; i. e., that we are coming into an age of "information plenty". This may well be, but if it is true, we will be facing possibly even greater intelligence problems than we encountered during the period "information dearth". As we develop more sophisticated collection means, particularly technical ones, we are continually running the danger of surfeiting the analysis system. Various panaceas have been suggested, usually computers in one form or another, but it has always seemed to me that the critical factor is the one you mentioned lightly in subparagraph 2., that of real emphasis on the requirements problem so that the intelligence community asks with emphasis only for those items of information which it really needs. This is a subject on which I could expatiate at great length, but I am sure you are as aware of it as I am.

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VII. Specific Problems

On subparagraph A., I have no comment, only a question on the last sentence. I am curious as to why you feel that in this period we will have a considerably improved capability in the field of strategic warning.



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Scientific Intelligence

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