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May 22, 1957

TO : Governor Stassen

FROM : William A. Tidwell

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Working Paper Partial Provisions

I am uncertain concerning the Soviet reaction to the formula contained in the May 20, draft. It may be too obviously a formula to satisfy the propaganda position that they have built up on this point. On the other hand, I doubt very much that they would let this one point stand between them and an agreement otherwise acceptable to them.

It seems that the draft adequately provides for the essential items in United States policy. I particularly like the formulation in paragraph (f) which permits the use of nuclear weapons in "individual or collective self-defense".

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TO : Governor Stassen

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FROM : William A. Tidwell

SUBJECT: Points to Clarify for the NSC

1. Without knowing the detail of recent discussions in Washington, I cannot suggest what points should be included in your formal presentation to the NSC. I believe, however, that you should include some of the following points and be prepared to discuss any of them if they arise:

I. Soviet Motivation

- a. Strategic
- b. Political
- c. Economic

II. U.S. Benefits

- a. Security from surprise
- b. Reduced Burden
- c. Effect on world opinion toward the U.S.
 - 1. India
 - 2. Western Europe
 - 3. etc.

III. Benefits to Allies

- a. U.K.
- b. France
- c. Germany
- d. Other NATO
- e. Japan

IV. Possible Problems

- a. Weakening of NATO
- b. Domestic apathy
- c. Effects on U.S. weapon development
- d. Need for revising U.S. military policy
- e. China

V. The U.S. Proposal

- a. Inspection provisions
 - 1. Relative gain for U.S.
- b. Effect of inspection on U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Union
- c. Relative power and security at each stage
 - 1. Force levels
 - 2. Conventional armaments
 - 3. Nuclear weapons

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2. In discussing the inspection provisions, it might be worth making the point that the U.S. has many other sources of information and that the U.S. would base its future decisions on all the information at its disposal — not just on the information obtained from the inspection system.

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OUTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS
PROPOSED PARTIAL DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT

I. COVERAGE PROVIDED BY AREAS SPECIFIED FOR AERIAL INSPECTION
AND GROUND CONTROL

See maps and attached C/CI memorandum.

II. EFFECT ON WARNING

A. Aerial inspection of area described would help considerably if provisions were satisfactory regarding nature and frequency of aerial inspections.

B. Ground control would also help if objects of control are widely enough defined and the inspectors were given sufficient freedom of movement and adequate communications. The effectiveness of radar coverage should be explored.

C. Even complete aerial inspection under maximum desirable conditions would not guarantee protection against surprise attack.

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III. QUESTION OF SATISFACTORY INSPECTION SYSTEMS

Certain

- A. No really 100% system of inspection appears possible.
- B. USSR unlikely to accept inspection systems which we would like to have, even if we were prepared to accept one less than perfect (i.e., the best possible).

C. We would have to decide what degree of inspection we would be satisfied with, for each stage and type of control established (i.e., nuclear, reduction of forces, reduction of armaments, etc.).

D. For specific comments relative to inspection, see attached O/SI memorandum.

IV. THERE WOULD BE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES FOR THE US, EVEN UNDER A
~~LESS-THAN-SATISFACTORY~~ INSPECTION SYSTEM

A. We would get more intelligence information, and would be giving up little information which the USSR does not already have.

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B. We have already a powerful deterrent force; even if the USSR diverted nuclear material from peaceful uses, or otherwise engaged in minor violations of the agreement, it would still be deterred.

C. If the USSR accepted a disarmament agreement similar to that outlined, the Soviet leaders would have great difficulty maintaining the theory of a capitalist camp determined to destroy the "socialist" camp. As a consequence, the unity of Soviet bloc and discipline in the USSR would tend to disintegrate. A "thaw" would develop whether Soviet leaders wanted it or not.

V. THE PROPOSAL HAS CERTAIN POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES

A. The initiation of nuclear disarmament as outlined depends upon an inspection system regarding the production and use of nuclear material. Announcement of an agreement on a disarmament plan which did

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not involve pre-agreement upon an inspection system covering at least the first stage would arouse popular hopes and thus encourage acceptance of an unsatisfactory inspection system at a later date.

B. The proviso for unilateral denunciation at any time is not as happy as appears at first glance; it would be onerous for the US to denounce the agreement, even in part, except upon the most flagrant and obvious Soviet violations. These would be hard to detect and make stick with world opinion.

C. The Soviet proposals regarding troop strength reduction still look more generous.

PERCENTAGE TOTALS SOVIET FORCES IN PROPOSED INSPECTION ZONES

	<u>Groundforces</u>	<u>Airforce</u>
ZONE 1	17 %	25 %
(Far East and Arctic)		
Aerial inspection plus ground control posts		
ZONE 2 A	20 %	17.5%
USSR only-aerial inspection plus grown control posts		
ZONE 2 B	22 %	23.3%
USSR only-ground control posts only		
SATELLITES	18 %	9.4%
(Aerial inspection and ground control posts)		
TOTAL	<u>77 %</u>	<u>75.2%</u>