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REMARKS OF
ALLEN W. DULLES
AT THE
TENTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE

8 May 1953

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Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by your welcome. This is the first time I have had the honor of addressing you as the Director of Central Intelligence. The last time I was here, I was on the verge of it, but I had not yet been confirmed and taken over my office. As far as I know, I am here from now on until they throw me out. I plan to devote the balance of my time to doing what I can to build up the Agency; to build up its esprit de corps, its morale, its effectiveness, and its place in the Government of the United States.

From time to time, I have received presents from visiting dignitaries, very small presents. The other day, I received rather an unusual one from the head of a friendly service. It was a long package which I opened in his presence. I was somewhat surprised to find that the present was a boomerang. I asked him whether he thought I should accept the boomerang as the emblem of office. He said, "Oh, this boomerang is all right. It only comes back half way." I have adopted the symbol of the "boomerang-only-comes-back-half-way" for the moment. Occasionally I find the boomerang comes back all the way. But we're trying to cut down the number of occasions when that happens.

In my experience in intelligence work, I have been impressed with two primary factors: one is the character of personnel; the other is the training that such personnel receive. There is no alternative, no substitute for either. Intelligence, above all professions, is no assembly-line business. It requires unique attributes of mind and character. I hope to do everything possible to try to find out, with the help of those working with me, who among you (and I hope it will be practically all of you) have those attributes of mind, ingenuity, resourcefulness, perseverance, and patience, which are the essence of a good intelligence officer.

One of the hardest things in intelligence work, for Americans particularly, is the question of security. I realize many of your problems in explaining to outsiders what you do--how in your ordinary social life can you appear to tell what you are doing without really doing so?--and I've been looking into that because I don't think as yet we've handled that properly. I hope to get out some other regulations on this subject, as soon as we've explored it further, because I think there have been a good deal too many rigid rules without the flexibility that is necessary to permit you to be natural in your ordinary contacts without giving away any of the secrets of your work. In the work I

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did in Switzerland, I found that it was very desirable to have a perfectly legitimate and natural story; it was a little bit near the truth, but it put the inquirer off on the wrong scent. If I had tried to pretend that I was doing something totally different from what I was doing, I never would have gotten away with it.

I plan to do everything I can to build up CIA as a career service. It is not easy, but it is possible. We've already made real strides in that direction. Intelligence is a kind of career in which satisfaction has to come largely from the work itself. But I can assure you that in the long run, that is the greatest satisfaction one gets out of any career. It's not the ephemeral self-advertisement that one may get.

We are working now in the most difficult era that intelligence has ever known. It was child's play to get intelligence during the war compared to getting intelligence today from behind the Iron Curtain. There are new difficulties because some of the most important targets are in the scientific and technical fields, which makes it harder and harder for the ordinary individual to be able to operate. But that difficulty is, and must remain, a challenge to us all.

I can assure you that intelligence in this government has come of age; it has found its position; its importance is recognized; it is being supported. Each week, I give the intelligence briefing for the National Security Council; that privilege, which I exercise to some extent on behalf of the intelligence community indicates the importance which the highest officials of government place on the intelligence phase of their work. Policy cannot be established firmly unless it is established on the basis of fact.

Finally, I want to say that, as your Director, I propose to see that the rights of the individual employee are protected and I shall see to it as a high privilege and a high duty.

I was told that really what you wanted today was to fire some questions at me. I'll do my best to answer all your questions, but if any of them are not answerable, I shall see that they are referred to our very able Inspector General for study and later answer.

Question: How do you evaluate the present intelligence support that we are giving to the National Security Council? Is it as good as you would like to have it?

Answer: If we are ever satisfied with our intelligence coverage, then something is wrong. One never has all the facts; all one can do is approximate. I won't say that I am wholly satisfied, because if I were satisfied, then I would not be urging on to even greater efforts those who are furnishing the information. No, I'm not wholly satisfied, but I feel that, given our capabilities, we are giving the National Security Council a good coverage of fact on the basis of which to firm up policy.

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Question: In view of the fact that most well-known Republicans are known for their rather conservative viewpoints relative to world affairs, in your opinion will these conservative leanings have any effect upon our estimating function?

Answer: If we allow ourselves to be influenced in our estimating by political or other considerations such as right-wing or left-wing tendencies, then we are failing in our work. Politics plays no role in this Agency. Anybody that wants to get into politics actively or to have any political activity, had better leave, right away quick, because I won't tolerate that; I won't allow myself to do it; I won't allow anybody else to do it while in the Agency. Obviously, you can exercise your right to vote, but I don't want politics coming into this Agency. We're going to keep this Agency out of politics, as far as I'm concerned, and we're going to keep politics out of our estimating.

Question: The CIA organization is functional, but 90% of our problems are regional and deal with capabilities or intentions of particular countries. Wouldn't we, therefore, be better off with a regional set-up so that we could go to one place for the answer to the average question instead of going to half a dozen functional places at the present time?

Answer: Well, I don't think one has to go to half a dozen. I do often find that I go to two places. Let's take a question like Iran. I want to get ideas about Iran from the fellow that is carrying on the operations in that area, collecting intelligence from that area, and then I also want to get, as a check on him, the views of the person who is studying reports and looking at the problem in the broad perspective. I find that if I get those two angles on the subject, I am pretty well advised as to what the situation is. Now I realize that there are many elements that feed up to each of those two individuals, let us say, in his own side of the shop. I don't think you could wisely put those two sides of the shop together, because the operational fellow tends to have an operational view of things, and it's well to temper that with the view of the person who looks at it from the broad historical and research angle.

Question: Would you say that the Central Intelligence Agency will be a permanent governmental function, even if the USSR has a modified change of heart and begins to behave itself?

Answer: I think the CIA is here to stay. I don't think there's any slight doubt on that point. I've had a great deal of contact during these last few weeks with the Congress and every once in a while we get a bit of criticism here and there, but I have never run into anybody in Congress who indicates that the CIA ought to be abolished or done away with or radically changed. Now, we've drawn up a lot of estimates with regard to the peace offensive of the Soviet leaders. In all of them, we have gone back to the words of Lenin, repeated many times by Stalin, that while changes

of tactics and strategic retreats are permissible, just as permissible as advances, the basic policy remains. I don't think, therefore, you need expect, much as we might like it, that this peace offensive will change in any way the workload of this Agency, or its importance.

Question: Do you contemplate any new organizational changes in the Agency?

Answer: I do not for the immediate future. We've gone through a lot of organizational changes. Those were very largely patterned on a report that three of us prepared and submitted several years ago, the Jackson-Correa-Dulles report, that was adopted by the NSC. By and large, the recommendations of that report are carried out in the present organization and I think the thing to do now is to go ahead with the organization that we have and let time tell us whether any further changes or adjustments are necessary.

Question: Is there a movement afoot at the present time, as the press indicates, to sever overt functions from covert functions in CIA?

Answer: I do not believe that that is at all likely. You have probably read in the press about the President's Committee on Informational Activities, I believe it is called--somewhat of a cover name, because that Committee, presided over by Mr. William Jackson, will also deal with the relationship in government of our own activities. We have been in very close touch with that Committee throughout its work. Our representatives have appeared before it. And I would doubt that its report would effect any substantial organizational changes in so far as the relationship of overt and covert intelligence is concerned in our Agency.

Question: Do you feel that in the long run the PM type of operation belongs in an agency like this?

Answer: It is my view that this government cannot effectively carry on covert operations through two different agencies with different controls. It is hard enough to get one covert apparatus organized and functioning in the foreign field. If we had two trying to do it, I think that it would be extremely difficult. The British had this same problem before them when, during the war, they had their covert operations in two different baskets, and they found that wisdom dictated that they be put together. I'm inclined to think that our covert operations should remain under one leadership and that it would be very difficult to separate secret intelligence from secret, covert operations. On the other hand, I do believe that there are certain paramilitary activities which may reach a volume and scope that they belong rather in the Pentagon than with us, and that is a problem which is now under consideration.

Question: Would you please comment upon a recent editorial in the public press which implied that CIA's clandestine activities imperiled the orderly development of the U.S. foreign policy?

Security Information

Answer: I don't agree with the editorial. I think I know the one you refer to. We have quite a problem in dealing with the press. It's more or less my policy to take it in my stride, not to get too excited about it. We're going to be attacked from time to time. If we start to answer attacks directly, even false attacks, I think we'll get ourselves into a lot of trouble. If we answer the false attacks and don't answer the other attacks, then we might be deemed to be confirming certain allegations made about us. I believe in maintaining very friendly relations with the press. I think I have very good relations personally with a large number of people of the press, but I don't propose to get into any newspaper controversies.

Question: In these days of economy, do you feel that CIA could stand a reduction in force without a marked decrease in efficiency?

Answer: In certain areas, yes. I'd like to see us somewhat smaller than we are today. But I don't think that we can do much on that immediately. I think as we all get more professional, we can possibly reduce our numbers. I'm a great believer in small, efficient, well-knit organizations where we don't have too much paper work and where we can put our minds to doing the essential thing that is to be done.

Question: When do we get a new building?

Answer: That's on the very top of the basket. I have canvassed the situation in the Bureau of the Budget; I have canvassed the situation among the Congressional leaders. I find everyone sympathetic, but the question is, what to do. There are two possibilities: one is to find an existing building from which we could oust the present occupants on the theory of the higher sensitivity of our work, and the other is to get the authority and money to build a new building. We're working along both of those lines, and it is the highest priority that I have, because I realize the conditions under which you work.

Question: Is the abundance of military personnel necessary in a civilian organization?

Answer: The percentage of military personnel with us is relatively low, about 10%. I consider them an extremely valuable and indispensable addition to our staff. We have some of the ablest men in the armed services working for us and with us. And I wouldn't change that in any respect. We have very important responsibilities to the armed services in the field of intelligence. Take the situation in Korea today. If we weren't equipped to go in there and work with the armed services and very largely by the use of the people that we have from the armed services, we wouldn't be able to do our job. No, I don't think we have too many. The percentage is about right. I think the caliber is very high.

Question: (1) Why are women hired at a lower grade than men? (2) Do you think that women are given sufficient recognition in the Central Intelligence

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Security Information

Agency? (3) And as the new Director of CIA, are you going to do something about the professional discrimination against women?

Answer: That first question I'll refer to the Inspector General for a report as to whether the facts are true. As to the second question I am inclined to think that they are not. And the third one: If it exists, I shall. I'll give that to the Inspector General too, and get a report on it. I'm serious about this. I think women have a very high place in this work, and if there is discrimination, we're going to see that it's stopped.

Question: You stated upon becoming the Director of Central Intelligence that you'd make every effort to meet as many employees as possible on the "working level." How successful have you been?

Answer: I haven't been very successful so far, but I'm going to be. As you know, there was quite a long while before General Cabell came on board and took over as Deputy. Then with the change of administration there was a tremendous amount of briefing to do. The new officials of government had to be briefed about our activities. The new work of the National Security Council, which is very important, takes a vast amount of time--far more time than it did in the past--because of the briefing that I referred to and because of certain new activities of the National Security Council. So that during the last two or three months, I can assure you that I've been pretty busy. Now General Cabell is on board and I think we're getting the administrative organization working more smoothly and I can assure you that before the temperature gets to 110 in your buildings I'm going to visit them. Try to keep the temperature down.