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SOME CHANGES SINCE RIVERS

Arms and Mr. Hebert

By ORR KELLY
Star-News Staff Writer

In the glacial movement of congressional seniority, it took Eddie Hebert 30 years from the time he entered Congress to become chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and thus one of the half dozen or so most powerful men in Washington.

"There's no kidding. The chairman's got power!" Hebert says.

"An admiral was in here the other day. There was a little 'dilution' going to take place in the Eighth Naval District. The admiral was sitting down where you are sitting.

"And I looked at him and said, 'Admiral, I don't know whether you heard it or not but Mendel Rivers did a year and a half ago. Have you heard? He's dead!'"

"Well, he got the message."

Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., has a particular concern for the welfare of the congressman from Louisiana's First Congressional District.

"The only election I take in is every two years in the First Congressional District of Louisiana when I support the incumbent with vigor," he says.

If you live in Hebert's New Orleans district, you have to be 53 years old to have voted for anyone else who was elected to Congress. He confidently expects to be elected for the 17th time this November—more times than anyone has been elected to public office in the history of Louisiana.

Staying Power

"It is this remarkable staying power that made it possible for Hebert to be there when the chairmanship of the committee opened up with the death of Rivers in 1970. A Louisiana friend has a theory of how Hebert got the chairmanship, and thus his present position of power.

Hebert, a Jesuit-educated Roman Catholic, tells the story this way:

"He says, that Fella upstairs wanted Hebert. He wanted one of His boys to be chairman instead of that Baptist, Mendel Rivers. So what does He do? (Rep. Philip J.) Philbin's in the way. He's blockin'. So He goes over there to Boston, gets that Jesuit (the Rev. Robert F.) Drinan—another one of the boys—to beat Philbin. So that clears the way for Hebert. Then He grabs Rivers and takes him off."

Whether he got there by accident of age or politics or by divine intervention, the way the former newspaperman from New Orleans has chosen to use his immense power in the last year and a half has been interesting and not entirely predictable.

When Hebert came to Congress in 1941 as part of a political deal, he was 38 years old and had behind him a career as a newspaperman in which he had broken a major scandal in Louisiana.

In 1952, as head of the House investigating subcommittee, he conducted a series of widely publicized

procurement mistakes.

"I'm supposed to be the patsy of the Pentagon," he says. "I know that's what people think. But way before Proxmire ever could spell 'waste,' let alone get it in print, I had a chamber of horrors. That was one of the most devastating investigations of the Pentagon that was ever conducted."

In another investigation, he uncovered a scandal in the airframe industry and saw a corrupt labor leader hustled off to jail.

But now that he is chairman, Hebert's investigative zeal seems to have cooled. Instead, he has concentrated on reforms within the committee—a committee on which the chairman has traditionally been a stern autocrat.

Asked in a recent interview what image he would like to create, Hebert replied:

"The image I'd like to have is that I'm fair, that I'm not swayed by partisanship and that I believe in giving every man his day in court. That I'm trustworthy and that when I say something I mean it. I think that's the image I'd want most."

Thus, under Hebert's chairmanship, each member of the committee is allowed just five minutes to question witnesses and then wait his turn again. Each is called in the order of seniority among those present when the session begins. This contrasts with hearings under Rivers, when the chairman did most of the questioning and his friends—including Hebert—did the rest, or with the days of Carl Vinson, who didn't even know the names of the junior members on his committee.

Even with those members of the committee with whom he has the greatest political, ideological and generational differences, Hebert has generally managed to maintain a friendly personal relationship, and he has given some of them important assignments they would not have received under Rivers.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., for example, has been made chairman of the special subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency with the mandate to take a close look at the government's whole intelligence operation.

Hebert's relations even seem to be reasonably good with Rep. Michael Harrington, D-Mass., who is just half as old as Hebert and who has gotten into a couple of rather nasty little exchanges with him in committee sessions.

"I think he would say mine is the minority of the minority point of view," Harrington said.

He agrees that Hebert has made an effort at fairness in running the committee—partly because Hebert has the votes, both in the committee and in Congress.

"But I think there is much more the form of fairness than the substance of fairness," Harrington said. "They can play a pretty rough sub-surface game."

Harrington's complaint is that some staff members and the more senior—and generally more conservative—members of the committee

"I have a feeling that there is a reluctance to share information," he said.

As committee chairman, Hebert dispenses what he calls the "goodies"—generally airplane rides to interesting places. He encourages committee members to travel because "the best way that a man knows what he's doing is to absolutely touch the thing and see it."

Thus, when Harrington, a brand new member of the committee, wanted to go to Southeast Asia, Hebert told him he was welcome to go to South Vietnam—but not to Laos or Cambodia.

"He couldn't understand that," Hebert said. "I said, well, I got enough trouble. . ."

"We fenced for a year on Laos and Cambodia," Harrington said. "Finally, I said surrendered, and would agree to his ground rules."

Even Hebert's critics don't accuse him of using his power to influence the location of military bases or the awarding of military contracts for political purposes—aside from his acknowledged protection of installations already in the New Orleans area.

But the fact that military installations and defense contracts are economically important in many parts of the country has made it difficult—virtually impossible, in any meaningful sense—for the would-be rebels on Hebert's committee to get together in a concerted effort to make major changes in the defense budget in committee.

And yet, it is only in committee that there is a realistic chance to make changes. This year, for example, the committee cut the administration's \$23 billion military procurement and research bill by \$1.5 billion—but Hebert proudly notes that there was not a single change made in the bill on the House floor.

Likes Laird

The committee handles two major chunks of the defense budget each year—the procurement and research budget of about \$22 billion and the military construction budget of about \$2 billion. But it also has a strong influence on the operations and maintenance account, and it sets the pay scales. In effect, it thus has direct or indirect control over the entire defense budget of about \$85 billion.

Hebert's concentration on reform within the committee is probably based to some extent on his general feeling that things are going pretty well at the Pentagon under Defense Secretary Melvin Laird.

"I think Laird's a great man," Hebert said. "I put Laird in the class with Forrestal. Forrestal is my favorite." The late James Forrestal was the first secretary of defense.

But Hebert, who talks with an accent more like that of Brooklyn than the South—would probably run the committee quite differently if Robert S. McNamara were still

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MAY 17 1972

Democratic State Convention To Vote on Vast U.S. Reforms

Delegates to the Democratic State Presidential Convention here Saturday will be asked to approve a platform calling for vast changes in the federal government.

A Platform Committee draft calls for tax reform, congressional reform, legalization of marijuana, abolition of abortion laws, prison reform, an end to government secrecy and political campaign finance disclosure.

Included in the recommendations:

A limitation of \$25,000 in government support payments to any one farmer or corporation.

Legislation eliminating tax loopholes that allow a non-farmer to benefit from tax losses in agriculture.

Increase of farm support prices to 100 per cent of parity with the 1910-14 period as the index years.

Eliminate the seniority system in Congress, prevent any congressman from chairing one committee more than six years and elect chairman by votes of committee members.

Require a congressional committee to hold open meetings unless a majority of the members vote to close the session.

Full disclosure by all public officials of all income from corporate holdings, salaries and bonuses.

Forbid a public official from taking office unless he has disclosed his campaign finances.

Required recognition within 90 days of any new foreign government regardless of the circumstances which brought the government to power.

Closer scrutiny of the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) by the foreign affairs committees of the House and Senate.

Abolishment of executive privilege, the doctrine that the national administrations follow to deny information to Congress.

Withdrawal of all troops from Indochina by the end of the year, and a constitutional guarantee that no person can be required to serve in combat unless Congress has declared war.

Amnesty to draft dodgers and deserters after the withdrawal of American forces from the Vietnam war.

Require that no future military commitments can be made without the consent of Congress.

Abolish wage-price controls or control all wages, income, prices, profits, interests and dividends.

Place an arms embargo on the Mideast.

Increase funding of the Federal Communications Commis-

ion to permit an investigation of American Telephone and Telegraph.

Legislation permitting men and women to take maternity leave and forbidding penalization of job loss, pay or seniority benefits.

A policy that makes drug abuse a social problem rather than a criminal problem.

Funding of research for development of a birth control pill for men.

Financing of public school systems to be shared equally by the federal, state and local governments.

A tax credit for parents of children in private schools.

Busing of school children when it will improve their educational opportunities.

Abolition of the Subversive Activities Control Board and the House Internal Security Committee.

Legislation making it illegal to investigate a person's criminal record once his civil and

legal rights have been restored. Abolition of capital punishment in the United States.

E - 303,041
S - 353,314
MAR 7 1973

CIA Chief Says Police Training to Be Limited

BY MORTON KONDRACKE
© 1973, Chicago Sun-Times

Washington, -- Central Intelligence Agency training for local police, a program with murky origins worthy of the nation's top spy agency, will continue "only in the most compelling circumstances and with my personal approval," the CIA's new director said.

Director James R. Schlesinger's statement was sent to several members of Congress and released by Rep. Chet Holifield, D-Cal., chairman of the House Government Operation Committee.

Holifield had suggested the "compelling circumstances" limit for CIA training and he approved of Schlesinger's adoption of it. Rep. Edward Koch, D-N.Y., who had urged Holifield to investigate the program, said that any CIA involvement in internal affairs is illegal under the

1947 law that set up the nation's foreign intelligence agency.

According to Holifield and others who have received CIA briefings, the police training program started in New York last year at the suggestion of a representative of the Ford Foundation, but an effort by the Chicago Sun-Times to track down the program's origins proved inconclusive.

Wayne Kerstetter, former head of inspection services in the New York department and now director of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation, said that he could not remember who first suggested asking for CIA help in setting up an intelligence evaluation system for New York.

Kerstetter said that his salary in New York was paid by a Ford Foundation subsidiary, the Police Foundation. He said that he did not attend

CIA training sessions and that "I have never in my life met a CIA agent."

Kerstetter's former superior, William H. T. Smith, did attend a training session last September in Arlington, Va.

Smith said that it was his impression that the first suggestion of asking for CIA training came from Don R. Harris, a former CIA analyst serving as a New York police consultant under a grant from the federal government's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).

Harris, who could not be contacted, is chairman of LEAA's Logic textbook on police intelligence systems. He wrote the text with E. David Godfrey Jr., former chief of the CIA's current intelligence office and now public safety adviser to the governor of Pennsylvania.

Godfrey has denied any

knowledge of CIA training for local police, as has another former agency official now in police work, Robert Kiley.

Kiley was special assistant to former CIA Director Richard Helms, left the CIA in 1971 to join the Police Foundation and last year became public safety adviser to Boston Mayor Kevin White.

Kiley and another former Police Foundation official now in Boston, Mark Furstenberg, said that they could find no trace that Boston police received CIA training, but an aide to Holifield said that the CIA had named the Boston department as a beneficiary of the program.

According to the aides, the CIA said that Boston police participated in a two or three-day training session.

Holifield said that nine departments received such training in such techniques as record handling, clandestine photography, surveillance of individuals and identification of explosive devices.

In addition, he said, six departments received briefings of an hour or two on specific techniques.

The Chicago police department is known to have received advice on a technique for determining if a suspect has handled metal objects.

The correspondence between Rep. Holifield and Schlesinger did not reveal who in the CIA made the decision to assist local police.

The CIA had defended the decision on the ground that police training was not explicitly forbidden by the 1947 National Security Act, and was implicitly authorized by the 1966 Omnibus Crime Control Act.

In his letter to Schlesinger, Holifield suggested that to avoid controversy the agency should discontinue training

"except in unusual or compelling circumstances."

In a House speech commenting on Schlesinger's response, Holifield said that "provision for assistance in exceptional circumstances is warranted, in my judgment."

"I can conceive that in special situations, such as those involving foreign criminals or international drug traffickers, the President might call upon the CIA to assist in a particular effort, and the director should not be completely stopped from providing such assistance."

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MAR 9 1973

Patrolmen Ask

CIA Runs Police?

By ROBERT F. HANNAN

The head of the Boston Police Patrolmen's Assn. told the City Council yesterday he believes that CIA-oriented persons and not Commr. Robert diGrazia run the police department.

Chester Broderick, head of the patrolmen's group, said, "It's coming to light that Central Intelligence people are infiltrating police departments throughout the country. That is a fact now."

Mayor White's advisor on police matters, Robert R. Kiley, a former CIA employe who refused to attend the council committee hearing, termed the Broderick accusations "intently absurd."

He said diGrazia and diGrazia alone is making policy decisions for the department.

(In Washington yesterday, it was learned that James R. Schlesinger, the new director of the CIA, has ordered the agency to stop training local police officers except in the "most compelling circumstances," and even then only with "my personal approval.")

(Schlesinger's order was revealed in a letter he wrote U.S. Rep. Chet Holifield (D-Calif.), chairman of the House government Operations Committee, which was prompted by disclosures that CIA agents had helped train police officers in New York, Boston and other metropolitan areas.

(A clerk, following Schlesinger's lead, told a House speech he had asked the new CIA director to discontinue the training of local police.)

Broderick testified at a council hearing to explore reasons why a 163-page report, "Crime in Boston," was "suppressed" or not circulated after printing by Kiley.

The police patrolmen's leader said his men are disturbed that Kiley, professing to have no law enforcement experience, dictated that the report not be given administration blessing.

Kiley said he found the statistical material on crime incidence was not of much value as presented. But he denied "suppressing" the report, 300 copies of which were printed and mostly disseminated to agencies. The report was compiled by Mayor White's Safe Streets Act bureau.

Broderick said the mayor and Kiley set police aims for the police department. He said he knows that veteran superior officers on the force have been left out of decision making. He said he believes that includes Supt.-in-Chief William J. Taylor.

"We're afraid of what will result. In two years when they're all gone, we'll be left with their Bay of Pigs," Broderick said.

He added: "Some of them were formerly connected with the CIA which had the Bay of Pigs." He said he still wonders "if they are on the CIA payroll."

Broderick said the arrival of Kiley, assistant Garry Hayes; Mark Furstenberg, director of planning and research; Philip Marks, an aide to diGrazia brought from St. Louis County, Mo.; and Robert Wasserman, with the Mayor's Safe Streets Act painted up his theory.

Kiley and Wasserman had been with the Police Foundation in Washington.

Public Service Committee Chairman Christopher A. Lanncha asked Broderick, who just received a copy of the police report, to read it, discuss it with association officials and report back views at a later hearing on the matter.

STATINTL

Letters To The Editor

One Who Was There Assesses the CIA's Job in Laos

A brief article in The Washington Post of December 27 quoted Congressman G. V. Montgomery as saying "What I know about Laos is that the CIA has done a pretty lousy job and has been ineffective."

One could answer such an assertion by simply saying that as the chairman of the House Select Committee on U. S. Involvement in Southeast Asia, he should know more about Laos than that, particularly when what little he knows is manifestly wrong.

I spent 17 years as a CIA employee and left in early 1968 because of my basic opposition to United States involvement in Southeast Asia. My last four years in the agency were totally involved with Asian affairs. My knowledge of what CIA has done and has not done are obviously more detailed than Mr. Montgomery's, but it seems to me that if he is going to make public statements, he should at least take into consideration facts which have been well publicized.

It is clear (at least to me) from the Saigon dateline on the piece in question, that the congressman arrived at his remarkable conclusion after discussion with military sources in Vietnam who have been itching for at least six years to expand their own operations into Laos. Their desires in this direction must increase daily as the American role in Vietnam winds down. If they don't find something new, the time may come when they have no war at all to fight.

In order to assess CIA performance in Laos it is necessary to know what it was asked to do.

CIA involvement in Laos stems from the agreement by the U.S.A., and other powers involved, to withdraw all foreign troops from Laos. The agreement was signed in 1962. It became apparent immediately thereafter that the North Vietnamese, in violation of the agreement, were continuing to send irregular forces and supplies to the Communist Pathet Lao. Their purpose was clear—to establish a Communist government in Vientiane which would allow the North Vietnamese free access to the portion of the Ho

Chi Minh trail in Laos and the road across central Laos to Thailand. The government of the United States decided to mount an operation to thwart the North Vietnamese purpose. Because the Geneva agreement precluded the use of U.S. military forces or advisers, CIA was designated as the executive agent to handle the training and support of the non-Communist Meo tribes who lived in and around the Plain of Jars. The Meo force was the only army in Laos capable of stopping the Pathet Lao (supported by the North Vietnamese) from quickly over-running the Plain of Jars, which was essential to the Communist purpose.

The point to remember here is that the decision to act was a U.S. government decision; not one arrived at by CIA. I think the decision was wrong, just as I think almost every other decision with regard to our involvement in Indochina has been and continues to be wrong. That is not the point under discussion.

The question is: what kind of job did CIA do with the task assigned it in Laos?

The answer, based on any comparison with the U.S. military effort in Vietnam, would have to be. *A spectacular success.*

My personal knowledge of the operation ended in mid-1967, the last time I visited Long Tieng, the seat of the headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo leader. At that time there were roughly 35,000 Meo tribesmen under arms fighting daily with the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese irregulars. This force had been fighting successfully for five years and inasmuch as they held Long Tieng until a few days ago, continued for another four years to beat off a vastly superior Communist army. The CIA contingent supporting them in Laos and in Thailand did not exceed 40 Americans, plus a small air contingent which air-delivered supplies and personnel. Imagine 40 Americans in support of 35,000 friendly tribesmen. Compare this with the situation in Vietnam in 1967 when we had about 400,000 U.S. troops fighting for, and supporting, an army of roughly 1 million Vietnamese, and they were losing at

every turn. Had the U.S. Army had the responsibility for the support of the Meo, we probably would have had a minimum of 15,000 U.S. troops in Laos. Naturally that figure would have included cooks, bakers, pastry chefs, many chauffeurs for the many generals, PX managers, laundry officers, radio and television station personnel, motion picture projectionists, historians, social scientists, chaplains and a variety of similar types essential to the conduct of a war by the U.S. military, but which the CIA operation with the Meo seemed to be able to forgo.

For eight years this ragtag force defended its area of responsibility, protecting the backside of the South Vietnamese—with no U.S. troops fighting at their side, not to say in front of them as in Vietnam. They accomplished this with the support of a handful of Americans and with the loss of perhaps three or four American lives.

Can anyone seriously suggest that this was a lousy job?

In fairness to Congressman Montgomery, it is not entirely his fault that he is not fully informed. The role of the CIA with the Meo has been an open secret for years; known to Lao of high and low degree, foreign journalists, diplomats in Vientiane and almost anyone else with the interest to find out. Given this situation it would be comic if it were not tragic that the Executive branch of the U.S. government was willing to share this secret with Lao generals known to be trafficking in opium, but not with the Congress of the United States.

Perhaps someday Mr. Montgomery and his colleagues in the Congress will establish a real CIA watchdog committee, long overdue, which will give the agency the scrutiny required. When that is done I am sure a substantial number of lousy operations will be uncovered. I am confident, however, that when they take a long hard look at the CIA operation with the Meo in the general context of the war in Southeast Asia, there will be general approval.

THOMAS F. McCOY.

Washington.

The CIA's New Cover

The Rope Dancer
by Victor Marchetti.

Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., \$6.95

Richard J. Barnet

I

In late November the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a series of "senior seminars" so that some of its important bureaucrats could consider its public image. I was invited to attend one session and to give my views on the proper role of the Agency. I suggested that its legitimate activities were limited to studying newspapers and published statistics, listening to the radio, thinking about the world, interpreting data of reconnaissance satellites, and occasionally

publishing the names of foreign spies. I had been led by conversations with a number of CIA officials to believe that they were thinking along the same lines. One CIA man after another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me that the days of the flamboyant covert operations were over. The upper-class amateurs of the OSS who stayed to mastermind operations in Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and elsewhere—Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald—had died or departed.

In their place, I was assured, was a small army of professionals devoted to preparing intelligence "estimates" for the President and collecting information the clean, modern way, mostly with sensors, computers, and sophisticated reconnaissance devices. Even Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now be as much a museum piece as Mata Hari. (There are about 18,000 employees in the CIA and 200,000 in the entire "intelligence community" itself. The cost of maintaining them is somewhere between \$5 billion and \$6 billion annually. The employment figures do not include foreign agents or mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-man hired army in Laos.)

A week after my visit to the "senior seminar" *Newsweek* ran a long story on "the new espionage" with a picture of CIA Director Richard Helms on the cover. The reporters clearly had spoken to some of the same people I had. As *Newsweek* said, "The gaudy era of the

adventurer has passed in the American spy business; the bureaucratic age of Richard C. Helms and his gray specialists has settled in." I began to have an uneasy feeling that *Newsweek's* article was a cover story in more than one sense.

It has always been difficult to analyze organizations that engage in false advertising about themselves. Part of the responsibility of the CIA is to spread confusion about its own work. The world of Richard Helms and his "specialists" does indeed differ from that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organizations, in spite of their predilection for what English judges used to call "frolics of their own," are servants of policy. When policy changes, they must eventually change too, although because of the atmosphere of secrecy and deception in which they operate, such changes are exceptionally hard to control. To understand the "new espionage" one must see it as part of the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence, is a global strategy for maintaining US power and influence without overtly involving the nation in another ground war.

But we cannot comprehend recent developments in the "intelligence community" without understanding what Mr. Helms and his employees actually do. In a speech before the National Press Club, the director discouraged journalists from making the attempt. "You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men." The same speech is made each year to the small but growing number of senators who want a closer check on the CIA. In asking, on November 10, for a "Select Committee on the Coordination of United States Activities Abroad to oversee activities of the Central Intelligence Agency," Senator Stuart Symington noted that "the subcommittee having oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency has not met once this year."

Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and veteran member of the Armed Services Committee, has also said that "there is no federal agency in our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA." Moreover, soon after Symington spoke, Senator Allen J.

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STATINTL



JOHN P. ROCHE

The Secret War in Laos

STATINTL

The "Secret War" in Laos popped up again in the Senate in a dialogue between Sen. Allen Ellender, chairman of the five-man committee that oversees U.S. intelligence operations, and Sen. J. W. Fulbright.

Fulbright inquired caustically whether Ellender was aware that the CIA had a private army in Laos, whether the watchdog committee was privy to the operation. Ellender's reply was a bit confused — the old protege of Huey Long is now 81 — but it could certainly be construed as a denial of knowledge.

Fulbright and his friends, who have been attacking executive autonomy, scored a rhetorical victory, though from another perspective one might argue that if the Senate "watchdog" goes to sleep, it is hardly a reflection on the President.

✓ **HOWEVER**, the most interesting aspect of this exchange is that no literate American needs a watchdog committee to fill him in on the CIA's activities in Laos. All he needs is \$12.50 to purchase Arthur J. Dommen's "Conflict In Laos: The Politics of Neutralization" (Praeger), published last spring. If he is not feeling that strongly about the subject, he can probably get the book from a public library.

✓ As indicated here before—in connection with the "Pentagon Papers" — there is an enormous and detailed corpus of scholarly writing on Indochina that makes most sensational "revelations" about American policy old stuff to anyone who has taken the trouble read. To cite but one example, the only thing the "Pentagon Papers" tell us about the anti-Diem coup that Robert Shaplen omitted in Chapter VI of his "The Lost Evolution" (1965) are the exact names of the players (which Shaplen, of course, knew but left out on prudential grounds).

✓ To return to Laos, Dommen has provided readers with an inch-by-inch development of American involvement. His central thesis is that the reasonable policy for Laos is neutralization under Great-Power auspices, that (with a certain amount of wobbling) this became American and Soviet policy by 1962, but that Hanoi simply would not co-operate. As he carefully documents, from the day Ho Chi Minh and his cadres launched their insurgency against the French, the North Vietnamese set their sights on the creation of a Communist successor regime for the whole of Indochina, that is, for Annam, Tonkin, and Cochinchina in Vietnam proper, and for Laos and Cambodia.

TEMPORARILY FRUSTRATED at Geneva in 1954 because neither Moscow (which had a private deal under way with the French to scuttle the European defense community) nor Peking (which was licking its wounds from the Korean War) would support their demands, the North Vietnamese quietly proceeded to build up their forces for another round.

This involved securing the lines of communication to South Vietnam or — in terms of the topography of Indochina — the Laotian Panhandle, subsequently notable for the Ho Chi Minh Trail. And, as base areas for the Laotian guerrillas, the Pathet Lao, as well as North Vietnamese regulars, they took de facto sovereignty over the two Northern Laotian provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly.

But what interests us is the American response. Without going over familiar ground, it is fair to say that Dommen has missed nothing significant that occurred prior to 1969 (when I left the White House and access to intelligence materials). The whole story is there including the wild siege of Phou Pha Thi, the mountaintop in Sam Neua, where the U.S. had installed a beacon (right in the enemy heartland) to guide the bombers heading for North Vietnam. Also for the first time due credit has been given to Vang Pao and his Mee Army—usually dismissed as "mercenaries"—for their courage and tribal patriotism (Laos is not a "nation").

Whether our course of action was correct or incorrect is open to argument. Many of Dommen's criticisms are devastating, but he is always fair-minded in pointing out that — whether we should or should not have reacted as we did — we were up against an enemy demanding and planning total victory.

I just hope that if any of you have a senator or representative who is wandering around complaining about the "Secret War in Laos," you will send him this book for Christmas.

Despite Its Being in the Telephone Book

CIA Is an Unlisted Number When Congress Dials

By Flora Lewis

SO FAR as I've found in a lot of traveling, the United States is the only country in the world which lists its central intelligence agency in the telephone book, and enables anyone to call up and speak to the director's office.

But an extraordinary exchange on the floor of the Senate recently made clear how little else the people who put up the money for intelligence know about how it's spent. The debate took place on the day the military appropriations bill was finally passed so it attracted little attention, but it was revealing.

It was provoked by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) who offered an amendment providing that not more than \$4 billion in the defense budget could go for the intelligence services, including the CIA, the National Security Agency and the intelligence branches of the various armed services. Symington's point was not only to set a limit, but to set a precedent.

CONGRESS does appropriate all the money that goes to intelligence, but it doesn't know how much, or even when and how. That's because it is hidden in the defense budget, with the result that Congress doesn't really know just what it is appropriating any military money for because it never knows which items have been selected for padding to hide extra funds for intelligence.

Evidently, Symington believes that the actual amount spent is a little over \$4 billion, instead of the \$6 billion reported in the press, because he wasn't trying to cut intelligence funds except for CIA payments to Thai soldiers in Laos. He is one of the nine senators entitled to go to meetings of the Appropriations Subcommittee on the CIA, supposedly the confidential watchdog over the agency. As he pointed out though, there hasn't been a full meeting all this year.

What he wanted to do was to establish that Congress does have some rights to monitor the intelligence empire which it created by law, and he was driven to the attempt because of exasperation at President Nixon's recent intelligence reorganization. It was an-

nounced to the public as an upgrading of CIA Director Richard Helms and a better method to avoid waste and establish political control.

Senator Symington and many other well-informed CIA watchers in Washington, are convinced that Helms has been kicked upstairs. The result, they believe, will be an increase in military influence over intelligence—which has been recognized as a danger throughout the history of intelligence because it tends to become self-serving, the doctor diagnosing himself according to the therapy he likes.

There is also a concern that the reorganization, which makes the President's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger top dog over intelligence, will centralize the system so much that it will become a tool for White House aims, not an outside source of technical expertise.

Responsible political control over the intelligence community's actions, as distinct from its factual and analytical reports, is necessary and desirable. But despite the public impression, in the last few years the CIA has been the most honest source of information for Congress on sensitive issues such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, while the Pentagon, State and White House have dealt in obfuscations. Whatever his Department of Dirty Tricks might be doing, Helms has been more straightforward with his secret session testimony or what is really happening in these unhappy places than the people who do have to explain and justify their funding to Congress.

BUT, as the Senate debate showed, that isn't saying very much. Sen. Allen Ellender (D-La.), who heads the CIA subcommittee, pointed out that 20 years ago only two senators and two congressmen were allowed to know what the CIA was spending, and now there are five on each side of the Capitol.

He implied that they also knew what the CIA was spending its money for. Sen. Wil-

Ham Fulbright (D-Ark.), had the wit to ask if that mean Ellender knew, before the CIA set up its secret army in Laos, that this was the purpose of the appropriation. Ellender said, "It was not, I did not know anything about it . . . it never dawned on me to ask about it."

Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), had the humor to point out that there has been a lot in the press about the CIA Laotian army in the past couple of years, and asked whether Ellender has now inquired about it. Ellender said, "I have not inquired." Cranston pointed out that since nobody else in Congress has Ellender's right to check the CIA, that meant nobody in Congress knows. Ellender replied, "Probably not."

Symington's amendment was defeated. But at least the record is now clear. A recent Newsweek article quoted a former CIA official as saying, "There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive closer scrutiny and 'control' than the CIA."

"The reverse of that statement is true," said Symington, "and it is shameful for the American people to be misled." The record proves him right.

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STATINTL

DAYTON, OHIO
JOURNAL HERALD

DEC 1 1972
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Intelligence Priorities

... Congress must monitor CIA operations

President Nixon's irritation at the quality of information coming to him from the nation's fragmented intelligence apparatus is understandable. However, his efforts to streamline operations, while welcome, are not without hazard to the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government.

The President has given to Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinating responsibility and some budgeting authority over the diverse intelligence community. Coordination and economy both seem desirable. The various intelligence agencies employ about 200,000 persons and spend about \$6 billion annually.

To the extent that the President has made the intelligence operation more efficient and responsive—as indeed it should be — he has increased the security of the United States. But he will also have further eroded Congress' role in formulating national policy if the legislative branch of government does not balance executive access to unlimited intelligence data with more intensive congressional scrutiny of and control over the nature and scope of intelligence activities.

A special congressional watchdog com-

mittee is supposed to review CIA operations and funding. Unfortunately, it seldom meets except to confer congressional blessings on CIA affairs. This congressional abdication of its responsibility for exercising a positive role in the formation of national policy reduces it to a rubber stamp for an omniscient executive. This has virtually been the case in foreign affairs since the National Security Act of 1947 unified the services and created the National Security Council and the CIA.

An efficient intelligence operation is vital to the interests of the American people. But the operation does not always serve the interests of the people when it strays into political and military activities such as the formation of coups d'etat, direction of clandestine wars and the practice of political assassination.

President Nixon's changes appear to offer increased efficiency, and in Helms the President seems to have a supervisor who is pre-eminently concerned with gathering and evaluating intelligence data. But only a vigilant and responsible Congress can serve to restrain the executive branch of government from abusing the vast power and influence available to it through these necessarily covert intelligence activities.

SYMINGTON'S SHOT IN THE DARK

Spy spending still top secret

(UPI)—The Senate refused yesterday to limit U.S. intelligence agencies spending after a rare open discussion on how Congress supervises the secret spy network.

The proposed \$4 million ceiling, an amendment by Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., to a defense money bill, was rejected 56 to 31.

Sen. Symington, a former secretary of the Air Force, said that tho he served on the armed services and foreign relations committees he had no idea how much is spent on intelligence gathering. He said the \$4 billion limit was just a shot in the dark.

LESS SCRUTINY

"The point," he told senators during the dinner-hour debate, "is that we do not have the facts required to allocate the resources of the country."

"There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA," Sen. Symington said, and the same is true of other intelligence agencies of the government."

As a case in point, Sen. Symington cited the central intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee headed by Sen. John Stennis.

He is one of five senators entrusted with the details of the intelligence budget, it came out during the debate.

Another of the five, Sen. Allen Ellender, D-La., chairman of the appropriations commit-

tee, acknowledged that intelligence outlays were hidden by padding out line item appropriations in various bills.

He said he could not reveal how much is spent on intelligence because "that's a top secret."

Sen. Ellender conceded he did not know in advance about the CIA's financing of any army in Laos.

Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the foreign relations committee, argued that such lack of congressional knowledge demonstrated the need for more accountability.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is the CIA going off and conducting a war of its own," Sen. Fulbright said. He disputed Stennis' contention that revealing the total budgets of intelligence agencies would disclose any military secrets.

"I don't believe it is tragic" for the Senate to demand the information thru such a device as the Symington amendment, Sen. Fulbright said. "The Senate is due an explanation."

Sen. Symington at one point shouted "I can be trusted" in expressing his frustration over being kept in the dark.

Sen. Stennis argued that Congress itself had set up the agencies.

He told senators: "You're just going to have to make up your mind that you can't have an accounting — shut your eyes and take what comes."

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS, MO
POST-DISPATCH

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NOV 11 1971

Demands Hearings On Intelligence Changes

By LAWRENCE E. TAYLOR
A Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 11 — Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, called yesterday for congressional hearings on the Nixon Administration's reorganization of American intelligence operations.

Symington said in a Senate speech that although many questions about the restructuring were unanswered, one thing was clear: The White House "does not consider either the organization or the operations of the intelligence community to be matters of concern to the Congress."

The changes ordered last Friday by President Richard M. Nixon brought American intelligence and spying operations under closer control of the White House. There were reports, however, that the move had been made, in part, because of what Symington termed "general unhappiness about various specific intelligence estimates."

"Unfortunately, however, it has been impossible for the public, or even concerned members of Congress, to obtain enough information on this subject for informed judgment," he said.

Symington said he had asked for hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or by its subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency. He is a member of each.

The intelligence shake-up last week provided a stronger role for Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and created several new groups to assess and direct intelligence operations.

Among them was the establishment of a "net assessment group" within the National Security Council. There were indications that one of the group's chief concerns would be an evaluation of the balance between the United States and Russia in terms of weapons, economics and politics.

In recent months Government experts have disagreed on the balance of power between the two nations. Department of Defense analysts, including Secretary Melvin R. Laird, have contended that the USSR was gaining strength rapidly. The CIA, on the other hand, had appeared more skeptical about Russian power and capabilities.

Mr. Nixon said that the reorganization was ordered after a full study by the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said the reorganization was "a further erosion of congressional control over the intelligence community."

He pointed out that Henry A. Kissinger, placed in charge of the review group, was insulated from congressional scrutiny in his position as the President's national security adviser.

Symington, in his address, said that the changes could be constructive, but, he said, Congress should not be eliminated from the picture.

He said that he would not accept the proposition "that our only current and continuing responsibility is to appropriate whatever number of billions of dollars the executive branch requests to handle this work."

Instead, Congress needs answers to such questions as what were the deficiencies in the U.S. intelligence operation, in what way should it be made more responsive and what is implied by the White House reference to "strengthened leadership" in intelligence?

Symington questioned how Helms's leadership role would be "enhanced," as the White House contended, "by the creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs (Kissinger), on which new board not only sits

the Attorney General but also the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

"Has this new White House committee been given authority or/and responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA; and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency?" Symington asked.

"How can the integrity of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility for the most critical aspects of intelligence analysis is taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in a combination of military professionals and the White House staff?"

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601

Fulbright, Symington Hit Kissinger Powers

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) expressed concern yesterday that new powers given to Henry A. Kissinger over U.S. intelligence operations might be used to deny information to Congress.

In part this is the latest version of a running controversy over what some senators see as the ever-growing power of the President's influential national security adviser, who is beyond the reach of Congress.

But it also represents suspicion that the White House may be creating new barriers for which could restrict Congress access to dicing intelligence evaluations.

Symington, on the Senate floor, called for hearings to examine the purpose and consequences of the Nixon administration's reorganization of the control structure for the national intelligence systems, announced last Friday. He protested that there was no advance consultation, and that "the Executive Branch does not consider either the organization, or the operation, of the intelligence community to be matters of concern to the Congress."

Congressional access to information about U.S. intelligence activities is "already severely restricted far more than other aspect of the federal budget," Symington protested.

It may be that the reorganization "is a constructive move" to eliminate duplication and waste, said Symington, and that should be examined. However, he said, the new plan will lead to "the creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the president for national security affairs (Kissinger) . . ."

This arrangement, Symington said, can bring the most important aspects of intelligence production and coordination "directly under the White House" and "thus within the scope of what the President believes he can deny to the Congress through the exercise of executive privilege."

Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told newsmen that Kissinger's new authority represents "a further erosion of congressional control over the intelligence community." Fulbright earlier this year introduced what was dubbed "the Kissinger bill," to set up new rules to limit the exercise of executive privilege, which the President can invoke to keep Congress from questioning Kissinger and other White House advisers.

Symington said that last Saturday he wrote Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, urging hearings on the intelligence shift be held before either that committee or its Subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency.

As a senior member of both groups, Symington disclosed yesterday that despite claims that there is constant congressional supervision of the CIA, the Senate CIA Subcommittee "has not met once this year."

Symington is the only congressman who is a member of both the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I agree that the foreign aid program needs a very careful review next year, when we reconvene.

I also agree that certain things need to be done. I agree that there should be reform. Meanwhile, I want a program that will help people.

Ninety-three percent of the funds spent in the foreign aid program are spent within the United States. They involve the labors of 5,000 companies and over 60,000 people, many of whom would be out of work by the ending of such a program arbitrarily or by its excessive diminution.

This is a program to help people. That is why the AFL-CIO is interested in it and has long been interested in it.

It is a program to help people, too, in the other countries of the world. It is a program to help children through UNICEF. It is a program to help the developing countries by means of the developing funds, the multilateral funds, and many of the bilateral funds.

It is a program by which we are enabled to keep our promises and our treaties. It is a program by which we have undertaken to see that, as we withdraw from a long and unpopular war, we do not leave those who remain totally abandoned, utterly unprovided for, and, further, embittered at the ingratitude of the United States.

As a Nation, we have made our covenants. We have given our bonds. We have furnished our assurances to the other peoples of the world. If, for no other reason, we will have to continue the program. Then after we do, let us, by all means, review it. After all, any program that has been in existence for 25 years can stand review.

Let us see if we cannot get one which is less expensive, one which is less costly in the misunderstandings it brings about, one which is more fully in the enlightened self-interest of America, and one which does more fully meet the modern problems of the rest of the world, rather than being structured on the basis of the problems of the world as they were 25 years ago.

I think that the Senate in a spirit of conciliation and compromise is about ready to adopt the proposed new foreign aid program. I think the Senate is perfectly capable of writing a good and a new one. I think we can write it on Capitol Hill. I think that we know our job and are prepared to perform in accordance with it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what the Committee on Foreign Relations reported was a less expensive program. What the administration wants is a continuing resolution, which would be a more expensive program. Furthermore, the program has turned into an arms sales and an arms grant program, by means of which we shift, to a large extent, obsolete weapons of various kinds to various countries and, in that way, build up a dependency, a process which I think is open to question. This country has become the largest arms dealer in the world.

I think it is about time to put a stop to this kind of program and to call it

what it is. That is the purpose of the two bills which will be before the Senate today and tomorrow. I am only sorry that the proposals were not broken down into three parts—economic, humanitarian, and military. This was attempted. Unfortunately, the votes were not present to operate on that basis.

I hope, and I am very sure, the Senate will take a close and a hard look at the proposals now before it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I should like to associate myself with the words of the distinguished majority leader.

In listening to the news media last night and this morning, many high officials in this administration were lecturing the Senate as to its recent actions on foreign aid. I, for one, do not intend to be sandbagged by any heavy onslaught against the decisions of the Senate.

I also believe it is about time we recognize that the American taxpayer cannot afford to spend tens of billions of dollars to destroy many of these countries—only recently we started on another one, Cambodia—and then spend tens of billions of dollars bringing them back to some form of reasonable economic stability.

I would like to also associate myself with the remarks of the majority leader with respect to the continuing resolution. In my opinion, at this point and under these circumstances, a continuing resolution would be an abandonment on the part of the legislative branch of its prerogatives and responsibilities under the Constitution.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. In accordance with the previous order, the distinguished Senator from Missouri is now recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last Friday the White House announced that the President had ordered a reorganization of the intelligence community. I ask unanimous consent that their press release to this end be printed in the Record at the conclusion of these remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as reported by the press, the administration's plan creates an "enhanced leadership role" for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, turns more of the operating responsibility for that Agency over to the Deputy Director, who is a lieutenant general in the Marine Corps, and creates or reconstitutes a variety of boards, committees, and groups who are charged with important responsibilities within the intelligence community.

The reported aim of the reorganization is to improve the "efficiency and effectiveness" of U.S. intelligence activities and press comments on this move include references to alleged concern over the size

and cost of intelligence operations; also to general unhappiness about various specific intelligence estimates. Such reports have been officially denied, but it is acknowledged that this reorganization is the result of "an exhaustive study" of the U.S. intelligence activities.

It could be that the reorganization announced last week by the White House is a constructive move. In recent years there has been a growing belief that there was heavy duplication and therefore waste within the overall intelligence community. Unfortunately, however, it has been impossible for the public, or even concerned Members of Congress, to obtain enough information on this subject for informed judgment.

By the same token, it is equally impossible to determine, at least at this time, whether the organization changes now decreed will accomplish their stated purposes, or to determine what will be their practical effect.

One thing is clear, based on the manner in which the reorganization was handled and announced; namely, the executive branch does not consider either the organization, or the operation, of the intelligence community to be matters of concern to the Congress. To my knowledge there was no advance consultation whatever with the Congress regarding this reorganization, or even any advance notice of what had been decided.

In 1947 the Central Intelligence Agency was established by act of Congress. Its powers and duties are specified by law. Its Director and Deputy Director are subject to confirmation by the Senate.

Last year the Congress appropriated an amount estimated by the press to be between \$5 and \$6 billion for the activities of this Agency and the other component parts of the intelligence community.

As one Member of the Senate, I will not accept the proposition that the role of Congress in organizing the intelligence community ended 24 years ago with the passage of the National Security Act, or that our only current and continuing responsibility is to appropriate whatever number of billions of dollars the executive branch requests so as to handle this work.

Last Saturday, when I learned from the press about this intelligence reorganization, as ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services, I wrote the chairman of that committee, requesting hearings either by the full committee or by the CIA subcommittee, of which I have been a member for some 15 years. In that letter I presented the fact that this subcommittee has not met once this year.

This latest reorganization on the face of it raises questions about past, present, and future performance of our multi-billion dollar annually intelligence community; questions such as:

If it has been inefficient, what and where were its deficiencies?

In what sense does it need to be more "responsive"?

What is implied about the past by the reference in the press release to the objective of insuring "strengthened leadership" in the future?

Dossier on the

C.I.A.

by William R. Carson

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. --ex-President Harry S. Truman.

NOTHING has happened since that pronouncement by the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's development. As currently organized, supervised, structured and led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness. Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine operations. Possibly its reputation, regardless of the facts, is now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So American taxpayers provide upwards of \$750,000,000 a year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or to what extent the CIA fulfils or exceeds its authorized intelligence functions.

The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and legitimate activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does raise a very real problem of the proper place and control of agents who are required, or authorized on their own recognizance, to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage but it can be -- and has been -- perverted to hide intelligence activities even from those with the constitutional responsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this indecision.

What we need to do is to examine how the U.S. gathers its intelligence, and consider how effective its instruments are and what room there is for improvement. Every government agency... the CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society

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representative of the unending gambitry and bigger than life human aspect of espionage and secret operations. At this level the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote noted in his *Handbook for Spies*, the average agent's "real difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administrative details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking life."

As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in 1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On arrival he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test does and was wired up, and the technician plugged the machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it blew out all the hotel's lights. The ensuing confusion and darkness did not cover a getaway by the trio. They were discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies.

By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the CIA set off a two-stage international incident between England and the United States, caused the Secretary of State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state, made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation wherein the United States Government lied in public -- and was caught!

STATINTL



CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPENDING STATINTL

Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an un-informed Congress and an uninformative CIA.

In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted.

The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this year's impetus.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his briefing on a staff report. (*Weekly Report* p. 1709, 1660, 1268)

He told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war."

As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Senate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing.

If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, then what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? (*Secrecy fact sheet, Weekly Report* p. 1785)

A Congressional Quarterly examination of the oversight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Congress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands of four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees—Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago.

The CIA Answers to...

As established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was accountable to the President and the National Security

Council. In the original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination.

To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intelligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organization in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a select group of ranking members of Congress. (*Congress and the Nation* Vol. 1, p. 306, 249)

THE SENATE

In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straightforward. Nine men—on two committees—hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis.

Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations.

Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA budget, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations.

No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Woodruff said the material covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour."

Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

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DISPATCH

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S - 318,040

AUG 22 1971

Low-Profile Michigan Solon Selected to Investigate CIA

Dispatch Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — If the best qualification for a super-sleuth is to be inconspicuous, then the government's hush-hush intelligence network had better watch its secrets.

They'd better watch them—because if all the 535 members of Congress were assembled together, Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., might be the least noticeable. And Nedzi has just been named to explore the intelligence network's hidden operations.

NEDZI IS a small, plump man with scanty hair, although only in his mid-40s, of paddling walk rather than purposeful stride, whose somewhat moonlike face is marked customarily by a somewhat bewildered expression.

He is, moreover, a dove. Members of the House establishment regard him as a rebel on the House hawk-like Armed Services Committee.

Thus it was that when Committee Chairman F. Edward Hebert, D-La., suddenly named the Michigan lawmaker, a veteran of less than 10 years in Congress and only the ninth-ranking member of the committee, as the House overseer of the intelligence establishment, there were gasps of amazement from all over.

TRADITIONALLY, the subcommittee that oversees Central Intelligence Agency operations is headed by the full committee chairman.

Presumably, that was the way it would be under Hebert, because the CIA traditionally



LUCIEN NEDZI

had been a part of the defense establishment, its ways not to be questioned too deeply.

So Nedzi's selection was a shock—at least to those who did not know Hebert once was an investigation-minded New Orleans city editor who directed the first expose of the Huey Long empire.

AN EVEN GREATER surprise was when Hebert expanded the subcommittee's authority to include oversight of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the super-secret National Security Agency.

Nedzi's record on the Armed Services Committee has not been of the kind that had endeared him to the more senior, and generally more conservative, members of that panel—he had, as a matter of fact, been one of a quintet including Ohio's Charles W. Whalen Jr., R-Dayton, who had repeatedly infuriated Rivers, Hebert's predecessor

Nedzi has cosponsored an unsuccessful end-the-war

amendment, has opposed the BL bomber and the Safeguard missile system.

SO WHY DID Hebert jump Nedzi over several of his seniors? "Because he is an honest man, and will do an honest job," said Hebert.

Nedzi's explanation was that Hebert was interested in having "a review in this area . . . we understand each other. I know where he

stands and he knows where I stand. I have never deceived him and he has never reflected deception to me. He feels that we need to call a spade a spade and he feels I'll do just that."

Hebert may be right. Nedzi's fellow subcommitteemen are four hawkish establishment men—Melvin Price of Illinois and O. C. Fisher of Texas, Democrats, and William G. Bray of Indiana and Alvin E. O'Konski of Wisconsin, Republicans—all of whom rank Nedzi in seniority.

NEDZI COMES to his new job with little knowledge about the intelligence field. This could be a help in impartial inquiry, because in the past, only senior members of the Armed Services Committee knew and rarely let their juniors in on the secrets.

Nedzi had brief exposure to the intelligence field as a member of a subcommittee

looking into the Pueblo affairs. He had met CIA Director Richard Helms. But he has never had any direct contact with CIA. He does not know Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, nor Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the National Security Agency.

Thus, he comes to his newly assigned task with clean hands and an open mind. But he knows what he wants to find out.

HE WANTS TO know if individual rights are being protected—that is, have the intelligence agencies cut out their domestic intelligence activities. He will check to see if it is proper for CIA to manage secret operations such as those in Laos and other covert operations not related to intelligence gathering as such; if there is too much overlapping and too little coordination between intelligence operations and if enormous budgets for these operations channel information to proper authorities at the right time; if the whole system of security classification should be revised; and what is the real and definitive basis for arriving at decisions in national intelligence estimates.

There may be nothing wrong with the overall intelligence operation.

But if there is something wrong, those responsible had better not put in Nedzi's seeming vagueness any faith that he will not uncover their secret faults.

BENTON HARBOR, MICH.
NEWS-PALLADIUM

E - 27,329

AUG 20 1971

Congressman Nedzi Has Monumental Task

Congressman Lucien Nedzi of Michigan may yet wind up with the biggest bureau in Washington. The Wayne county Democrat bids fair to have need of more detectives than J. Edgar Hoover, more lawyers than the Justice department, and more scientists than NASA.

Nedzi has taken on a monumental task. He will be the House Armed Services Committee's watchdog on the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

On assuming his new duties, Nedzi said his primary goal will be "to reconcile the public's right to know with national security."

It's going to be tough enough to ferret out just what it is the CIA, the DIA and NSA are

doing; he'll need plenty of super-sleuths for that.

But that's the straightforward, easy part of his job. It's when he finds out what the secrets are that Nedzi will have a really big job. He'll have to decide whether to bare the secrets to the public.


First, he'll need the expert advice of scientific experts so he won't be giving the Russians some new piece of military technology they didn't already have. Then he'll need the lawyers to tell him whether he's acting legally.

The case of the Pentagon Papers made it clear some regulatory agency needs to weed out the secret files every so often. But it looks like Congressman Nedzi will soon find the job is more than one man can bear.

AUSTIN, TEX.
STATESMAN

E - 31,388


AUG 19 1977



'GOOD MAN' -- New watchdog over the Central Intelligence Agency for the House of Representatives, Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., is one of the lower chamber's prominent doves. Labeled a "good man" despite their divergence on the war issue, Nedzi was named chairman of the intelligence supervisory subcommittee by F. Edward Hebert, D-La., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

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HUBERT H. HUMPHREY



Our National Security

John Roche is on a brief vacation, but he will continue to write his columns, with prominent political figures occasionally contributing guest columns. Today's contributor is Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, D-Minn., former vice president and now a leading Democratic Presidential hopeful.

We have witnessed in recent years a gradual and potentially dangerous isolation and insulation of power within the Executive branch of government.

I am particularly sensitive to this situation, having served in the United States Senate for 16 years and as vice president for four.

Nowhere is the tendency toward isolation more apparent than in the field of national security. I believe it is at least in part responsible for some of the divisiveness and the search for scapegoats generated by the recent publication of the "Pentagon Papers."

WE SIMPLY HAVE NOT HAD the mechanism for adequate consultation between Congress and the Executive branch in the formulation of national security policy.

The President and key government officials meet occasionally with the leaders of Congress on an informal basis. There are several congressional committees that deal with some aspects of national security. But decision-making is fragmented.

I have proposed that we end that fragmentation and provide for closer consultation by establishing a permanent joint congressional Committee on National Security.



The News and the American

THE PAGE OPPOSITE

Thursday, August 12, 1971 ★ IIC

The committee would have these main functions:

○ First, to study and make recommendations on all issues concerning national security. This would include review of the President's report on the state of the world, the defense budget and foreign assistance programs as they relate to national security goals, and U.S. disarmament policies as a part of our defense considerations.

○ Second, to review, study and evaluate the "Pentagon Papers," and other documents, whether published heretofore or not, covering U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

○ Third, to study and make recommendations on government practices of classification and declassification of documents.

○ Fourth, to conduct a continuing review of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the departments of Defense and State, and other agencies intimately involved with our foreign policy.

THE UNIQUE FEATURE of the committee would be the composition of its membership. It would have representation from those individual and committee jurisdictions that have primary responsibility in military, foreign relations and congressional leadership.

It would include the President Pro Tempore of the Senate; the Speaker of the House; the majority and minority leaders of both houses, and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the committees on appropriations, foreign relations and armed services and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

It would not usurp the legislative or investigative functions of any present committees, but supplement and coordinate their efforts in a more comprehensive framework.

Nor is it designed to usurp the President's historic role as Commander-In-Chief, nor to put the Congress in an adversary relationship with the Executive branch.

IT IS, RATHER, A NEW BODY, to be composed of members of both parties and both houses of Congress, that will make possible closer consultation and cooperation between the President and the Congress.

The concentration of power within the Executive branch is quite understandable considering our experience in World War II and afterward. But times change, and so must our institutions and responses.

I cannot help but believe that if the Congress had shared more fully in momentous decisions, like those in Vietnam, we would be less divided as a nation by

A new framework for the formulation of national security policy, I believe, can bring us closer to the ideal we all share for lasting peace.

STATINTL

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STATINTL

DOVISH NEDZI'S NEW JOB

Overseer to Lift CIA's Lid

By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer.

Shortly after Congress returns from its August recess, five congressmen will turn off the George Washington Memorial Parkway at an unmarked exit, swing back across the parkway on than overpass and suddenly emerge into a spacious, tree-dotted parking lot surrounding a gleaming white building.

Only after they have parked and entered the building will they see their first solid evidence — inlaid into the floor in a giant seal — that this is the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Heading the little group of congressmen will be Rep. Lucien Norbert Nedzi, a 46-year-old Democrat who has represented the eastern portion of Detroit since 1962, and who has just been named — to the surprise of many — as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on central intelligence.

Nedzi's record has not been the kind that would, on the surface, endear him to the more senior — and generally more conservative — members of the committee. He co-sponsored an end-the-war amendment in the House, has opposed the B1 bomber and the Safeguard missile defense system, and is one of a tiny group of rebels on the 41-man committee known as the Fearless Five.

Why did Rep. F. Edward Herbert, a Democrat from Louisiana, choose Nedzi for one of the most important subcommittee assignments — a post traditionally held by the chairman himself?

Nedzi Explains Choice

"The chairman was generally interested in having a review of this area," Nedzi explained in an interview. "My experience with him has been excellent — we understand each other. I know where he stands, and he knows where I stand. I have never deceived him and he has never reflected deception to me.

"He feels that we need to call a spade a spade and he feels I'll do just that."

Nedzi comes to his new assignment — which will cover all intelligence agencies, not just the CIA — with few preconceptions and, in fact, no preconceptions of the field.

"The senior members were on the Central Intelligence subcommittee and we were not privy to their deliberations. We had absolutely no information on the budgets of the agencies or what they were up to. Periodically, we got intelligence reports," Nedzi said.

The five-man subcommittee was, in the past, made up of the chairmen of the full committee and the two senior members from each party. The senior members serving with Nedzi will be Reps. Melvin Price, D-Ill., O. C. Fisher, D-Tex., William G. Bray, R-Ind., and Alvin E. O'Konski, R-Wis.

Nedzi had some brief exposure to the intelligence field when he served on a special subcommittee looking into the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo by the North Koreans.

Has Met Helms

He has met Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, on several occasions when Helms has appeared before the committee and he thinks highly of him. But Nedzi has never visited the CIA, has never called on the CIA for a special intelligence briefing, and does not know Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the super-secret National Security Agency.

The only time a top intelligence official has appeared in an open hearing in the last decade, was on June 2, 1961 when Helms, then No. 2 man in the CIA, testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee. Normally, Helms and other CIA officials not only testify in closed hearings but their names and the name of their agency are deleted before a transcript on the hearing is made public.

Sets Priorities

Despite his lack of experience in the area, Nedzi has a pretty good idea of the areas he would like to explore and he listed them this way:

1— Is there too much overlapping of functions among the CIA and the State and Defense Department intelligence operations?

2 — Are the budgets the proper size — and does all the information get to the man who needs it when he needs it?

3 — Are individual rights being protected? Nedzi is aware that military intelligence people have been told to cut out their domestic intelligence activities, but he wants to make sure the new rules are being obeyed.

4— Is it proper for the CIA to manage operations such as those in Laos?

"There is a question of whether we should be involved in such operations and the further questions of whether this agency is the proper one to do it," Nedzi said.

5— Should the whole system of security classification be revised?

"That this is a difficult area, I realize," Nedzi said, "and I'm not sure we're going to be able to come up with a Solomon-like decision."

6— How are the national intelligence estimates arrived at? What really is the basis for arriving at decisions?

Since his selection for the new job announced earlier this week, Nedzi said, his phone has been constantly busy with callers volunteering information about U.S. intelligence operations.


"We will give them an appropriate audience," he said. "We are hearing from people with all sorts of axes to grind. We'll screen them all for substance, but no one is peremptorily dismissed."

NEW YORK TIMES
4 AUG 1971Notes on People*New C.I.A. Watchdog*

F. Edward Hébert, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has appointed an active antiwar Congressman, Lucien N. Nedzi, a Michigan Democrat, chairman of the House subcommittee that keeps an eye on the Central Intelligence Agency.

Why? "Because he's a good man, even though we're opposed philosophically," said Mr. Hébert, who instructed Mr. Nedzi "to make periodic inquiries into all phases of intelligence activities within the Department of Defense and within the agencies established under the National Securities Act."

Mr. Nedzi said that Mr. Hébert, a Louisiana Democrat, had placed "no restrictions of any sort" on him, even though he's been highly critical of the war in Vietnam and Pentagon policies.



United Press International
Lucien N. Nedzi

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503
S - 867,810

AUG 4 1971

Dove to Keep an Eye on CIA

One of the most active doves and Pentagon critics in the House has been named chairman of a super-secret subcommittee charged with keeping tabs on the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D., Mich.) said one of the first things he will do is visit the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley, Va.

After that, said Nedzi, he hopes to hold public hearings on U. S. intelligence gathering activities.

The subcommittee Nedzi is taking over was considered so vital by Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D., S. C.) that the late chairman of the Armed Services Committee always reserved that chairmanship for himself.

Besides the CIA, Nedzi will have jurisdiction over the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, two hush-hush branches of the Pentagon.



Rep. Nedzi

9 AUG 57

Pentagon Critic Named To Keep Watch on CIA

One of the most active doves and Pentagon critics in the U.S. intelligence-gathering activities.

House has been named chairman of a super-secret subcommittee charged with keeping tabs on the CIA and other intelligence agencies. He was appointed by the hawkish chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., said one of the first things he is going to do in his new job is visit the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley.

After that, said Nedzi, he hopes to hold public hearings on

As an eight-year member of the full committee, Nedzi has attended briefings by CIA directors from time to time.

The subcommittee he is taking over was considered so vital by Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., that the late chairman of the Armed Services Committee always reserved that chairmanship for himself. Not only did Rivers' successor, Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., pass up the post, but he expanded its jurisdiction.

Besides the CIA, Nedzi will have jurisdiction over the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, two hush-hush branches of the Pentagon.

Nedzi said in an interview Hebert had placed "no restrictions of any sort" on him, though he added it remained to be seen what the future would hold.

Why did Hebert pick him?

"Because he's a good man," said Hebert. "Even though we're opposed philosophically," he said, he has come to respect Nedzi's ability in pressing his case.

STATINTL

Hawk Appoints Dove Head of Sensitive House Intelligence Panel

Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — In an unexpected and potentially important move, the conservative, hawkish chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has appointed a liberal dove to head the super-sensitive Subcommittee on American Intelligence Operations.

The new subcommittee chairman is Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D., Mich.), who became deeply disillusioned by the Vietnam war and recently sponsored unsuccessful legislation calling for a pull-out by the end of the year.

Nedzi was notified of his appointment by Committee Chairman F. Edward Hebert (D., La.), who put no strings on Nedzi's ability to probe into the operations of all intelligence organizations, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council.

Hebert sent Nedzi a formal "mandate" to make "periodic inquiries into all intelligence activities."

Despite the fact that Hebert, as the full committee chairman, maintains an ex-officio seat on the subcommittee and other members are conservatives, it will be the first time in recent years that perhaps the most sensitive subcommittee in the

House will be headed by a liberal.

Until his death earlier this year, former Committee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers (D., S. C.), who was extremely conservative, maintained tight control of the intelligence subcommittee and kept liberals off.

Hebert, for a time, put the full committee in charge of intelligence supervision, but he recently decided to reappoint a subcommittee.

Although Nedzi declined to say what inquiries he will pursue, he has publicly challenged the basis for national intelligence estimates the Pentagon has used to ask for new weapons systems.

Hebert appointed Nedzi, in Congress since 1961, over seven other senior committee members. It was speculated that Hebert, in addition to Nedzi's reputation for hard work and competence, is seeking more harmony with the moderates and liberals on the committee.

Others who will serve on the subcommittee with Nedzi are: Melvin Price (D., Ill.), C. C. Fisher (D., Tex.), Alvin E. O'Konski (R., Wis.) and William G. Bray (R., Ind.).

STATINTL

DETROIT, MICH.

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S - 578,254

JUL 29 1961

NEDZI GETS POST

House Dove Heads
Spy Watchdogs

BY SAUL FRIEDMAN

Free Press Washington Staff

WASHINGTON—In an unexpected and potentially important move, the conservative, hawkish chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has appointed a liberal dove to head the supersensitive subcommittee on American intelligence operations.

The new subcommittee chairman is Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., who became deeply disillusioned by the Vietnam war and recently sponsored unsuccessful legislation calling for a pullout by the end of the year.

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Until his death earlier this year, former committee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers, D.-S.C., who was extremely

conservative, maintained tight control of the subcommittee and kept liberals off.

Hebert, for a time, put the full committee in charge of intelligence supervision, but recently decided to reappoint a subcommittee.

Why he would choose Nedzi, who has been critical of intelligence estimates on the Vietnam war and on Soviet military strength, was a mystery that had House members buzzing Wednesday when they learned of the appointment.

Sources close to the situation suggested it was an indication that Hebert and other committee conservatives have become concerned at the secrets the Executive Branch has been keeping from Congress and at the extent of American interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

ALTHOUGH Nedzi declined to say what inquiries he will pursue, he has publicly challenged the basis for national intelligence estimates which the Pentagon has used to ask for new weapons systems. He may therefore be expected to renew his challenge in the subcommittee, which almost always meets behind closed doors.

Nedzi, in Congress since 1961, was one of the original members of the "Fearless Five," a group of liberals on the generally conservative committee who fought against increases in defense spending and weapons like the anti-ballistic missile.

Hebert appointed Nedzi over seven more senior committee members. It was speculated that Hebert, in addition to Nedzi's reputation for hard work and competence, is seeking more harmony with the moderates and liberals on the committee.

Others who will serve on the subcommittee with Nedzi are: Melvin Price, D-Ill., O. C. Fisher, D-Tex., Alvin E. O'Konski, R-Wis., and William G. Bray, R-Ind.

Nedzi named chairman


House unit to probe U.S. intelligence net

By RICHARD A. RYAN
News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — How do the many government intelligence agencies function? How does the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) differ from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)?

How are the many agencies funded? Whom do they investigate? Do they overlap and duplicate their efforts?

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Detroit Democrat, intends to seek the answers to these and other questions about the supersecret intelligence organizations.



Rep. Lucien Nedzi

Nedzi yesterday was appointed chairman of a new intelligence subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The subcommittee was organized and its chairman appointed by Rep. F. Edward Hebert, Louisiana Democrat, chairman of the parent committee.

Serving with Nedzi will be the two ranking Democrats and Republicans of the Armed Services Committee — Democratic Reps. Melvin Price of Illinois, and O. C. Fisher, of Texas, and Republican Reps. Alvin E. O'Konski, of Wisconsin, and William G. Bray, of Indiana.

"WE KNOW we are spending billions in the field of intelligence," Nedzi said in an interview after his appointment, "but no one really knows how much. The budgets for the various agencies are not a matter of public knowledge.

"I want to review their physical operations and determine the scope of their activity. And I think it is appropriate to inquire whether we need all that intelligence."

The veteran Detroit legislator said he is certain there is duplication of effort among the CIA, DIA and the intelligence arms of the military services.

As a member of the subcommittee that investigated the Jan. 23, 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans, Nedzi said it was apparent from facts uncovered then that there was much duplication of effort.

"We also learned that much of the information gathered by the Pueblo never reached the people it should have reached," Nedzi said.

The congressman feels the intelligence sub-

committee in Congress in that it must "reconcile national security with basic constitutional rights."

Military intelligence activities came under Senate scrutiny earlier this year when John M. O'Brien, a former Army intelligence agent, said in a letter to Senator Sam Ervin, North Carolina Democrat, that the Army had kept several political figures under surveillance for alleged anti-war activities.

AMONG THOSE mentioned by O'Brien were Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III, Illinois Democrat, who was Illinois state treasurer at the time, and Rep. Abner J. Mikva, Illinois Democrat.

The Army denied the charges but Ervin conducted Senate hearings on the whole question of military surveillance.

The extent of the surveillance was underscored by a former Air Force intelligence sergeant who testified that of the 119 persons attending an anti-war demonstration on Sept. 1, 1969, outside Carson, Colo., 53 were intelligence agents or members of the press.

Assistant Defense Secretary Robert J. Froehle told the committee that the DIA had cards on 25 million "personalities" and on 760,000 organizations and incidents.

The new subcommittee, Nedzi said, is required to make periodic inquiries into all aspects of intelligence activities and, when appropriate, make legislative recommendations.

The subcommittee also will look into the whole problem of classification of official documents, Nedzi said.

"WE WANT to find out what is required from a national security standpoint in the way of classification," Nedzi said. "It may be that more information can be given to the public without jeopardizing national security."

Document classification became a national issue with the publication of the Pentagon papers.

This is the first subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that Nedzi has chaired. The Detroit congressman fell out of favor with the former committee chairman, L. Mendel Rivers, for repeatedly opposing the autocratic chairman on military bills.

When Rivers, who died earlier this year, was committee chairman, he personally headed what was then known as the CIA subcommittee. Its activities then were limited and secret. When Hebert ascended to the chairmanship, he reformed it, but at the same time gave it a much broader scope.

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A Little More Candor With Congress Wouldn't Hurt the National Security

BY ERNEST CONINE

No doubt Richard Nixon's instinct, like that of any President faced with the same situation, is to resist the growing demands that "his" CIA be required to give Congress the same kind of intelligence reports and estimates that it gives him.

Just one secrets-spilling blabbermouth on Capitol Hill could do incalculable harm to the national interest. Besides, presidential proposals are involved.

The thought occurs, however, that the Administration might be better advised to recognize that frustrated senators and congressmen have a point.

Congressmen Can't Vote Intelligently If the Facts Are Kept Secret

How can they be expected to vote intelligently and responsibly on presidential proposals in the fields of foreign policy and national security unless they have reasonable access to the intelligence on which these proposals are based?

How can they know whether an appropriation for a new ABM site or for more Pershing missiles is really needed unless they—or colleagues whom they trust—know something of what the Executive Branch knows of Soviet missile deployment?

The answer is that they can't.

It should be understood, of course, that the CIA is exposed to congressional scrutiny of a sort now.

Just about any House or Senate committee, can, upon request, obtain a closed-door briefing from CIA Director Richard Helms and other top officials of the agency.

The CIA's supersecret budget is reviewed in both houses by special panels drawn from the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. Since 1967 certain members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also have been invited to sit in on these watchdog sessions.

There has always been a certain dissatisfaction with this setup, and this dissatisfaction is growing.

In the first place, the CIA briefings are given not as a matter of congressional right but of presidential courtesy. Many disgruntled lawmakers are convinced, in any event,

that these sessions should be more frequent, more thorough—and the results made more readily available to congressmen and senators who are not members of the select panels.

Take the situation of Sens. Alan Cranston and John Tunney. They represent 20 million Californians who obviously have a stake in issues involving war and peace, and the setting of a proper scale of national priorities.

Neither, however, sits on any of the committees which deal with foreign policy and national security. When the time comes to vote on something like military appropriations or sense-of-Congress resolutions about Vietnam, they have no direct access to pertinent classified information.

Instead, as a practical matter, they must either accept or ignore the word of colleagues whose committees deal with foreign policy and national security questions on a regular basis.

And, except for the foreign relations committees, these are pretty well stacked with people who believe in a strong defense establishment—and are, therefore, not inclined to pass along intelligence which might support a contrary viewpoint.

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) has introduced a bill which would require the CIA as a matter of law, rather than of presidential discretion, to supply "Congress, through its appropriate committees, the same intelligence conclusions, facts and analyses that are now available to the Executive Branch."

These intelligence materials, in turn, would be made available to any member of Congress who asks for them.

The trouble is, of course, that a secret which is made available to upwards of a thousand people (including staff employees) will not remain a secret very long. Certainly not when these people are in the profession of politics, and certainly not when a lot of them, like Sen. Mike Gravel of Alaska, might feel morally obligated to decide for themselves what should be released.

The best solution, one suspects, is a change which would broaden the kinds of people on Capitol Hill with access to CIA intelligence, without greatly increasing their numbers.

In that context, former Vice President Hubert Humphrey has come up with an attractive alternative.

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continued.

Congress Turns to the CIA

STATINTL

Congress, in its continuing Vietnam-inspired effort to break the Executive's near monopoly of powers in foreign affairs, is now tackling the Central Intelligence Agency. This is understandable, and was to be expected, too. The agency's powers are great—or so one suspects; no one representing the public is really in a position to know. Yet because it operates under virtually absolute secrecy, it does not receive even that incomplete measure of public scrutiny which the Defense and State Departments undergo.

The proposals in Congress affecting the CIA fall into two categories. Those in the first category start from the premise that the CIA is essentially an operations agency and an ominous one, which is beyond public control and which must somehow be restrained—for the good of American foreign policy and for the health of the American democratic system alike.

So Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent CIA from financing a second country's military operations in a third country (e.g., Thais in Laos) and to impose on the agency the same limitations on disposing of "surplus" military materiel as are already imposed on Defense. The thrust of these provisions is to stop the Executive from doing secretly what the Congress has forbidden it to do openly. Unquestionably they would restrict Executive flexibility, since the government would have to justify before a body not beholden to it the particular actions it wishes to take. The advantage to the Executive would be that the Congress would then have to share responsibility for the actions undertaken. Since these actions involve making war and ensuring the security of Americans, if not preserving their very lives, we cannot see how a serious legislature can evade attempts to bring them under proper control.

Senator McGovern's proposal that all CIA expenditures and appropriations should appear in the budget as a single line item is another matter. He argues that taxpayers could then decide whether they wanted to spend more or less on intelligence than, say, education. We wonder, though, whether a serious judgment on national priorities, or on CIA's value and its needs, can be based on knowing just its budget total. In that figure, critics might have a blunt instrument for polemics but citizens would not have the fine instrument required for analysis.

In the House, Congressman Badillo recently offered an amendment to confine the CIA to

gathering and analyzing intelligence. This is the traditional rallying cry of those who feel either that the United States has no business running secret operations or that operational duties warp intelligence production. The amendment, unenforceable anyway under existing conditions, lost 172 to 46, but floor debate on it did bring out a principal reason why concerned legislators despair of the status quo: Earlier this year House Armed Services chairman Hebert simply abolished the 10-man CIA oversight subcommittee and arrogated complete responsibility to himself. Congressman Badillo is now seeking a way to reconstitute the subcommittee. This is a useful sequence to keep in mind when the agency's defenders claim, as they regularly do, that CIA already is adequately overseen by the Congress.

Between these proposals and Senator Cooper's, however, lies a critical difference. Far from regarding CIA as an ominous operational agency whose work must be checked, he regards it as an essential and expert intelligence agency whose "conclusions, facts and analyses" ought to be distributed "fully and currently" to the germane committees of Congress as well as to the Executive Branch. He would amend the National Security Act to that end. His proposal is, in our view, the most interesting and far-reaching of the lot.

To Mr. Cooper, knowledge is not only power but responsibility. A former ambassador, he accepts—perhaps a bit too readily—that a large part of national security policy is formulated on the basis of information classified as secret. If the Congress is to fulfill its responsibilities in the conduct of foreign affairs, he says, then it must have available the same information on which the Executive acts—and not as a matter of discretion or chance but of right. Otherwise Congress will find itself again and again put off by an Executive saying, as said, for instance, in the ABM fight, "if you only knew what we knew . . ." Otherwise Congress will forever be running to catch up with Executive trains that have already left the station.

The Cooper proposal obviously raises sharp questions of Executive privilege and of Executive prerogative in foreign policymaking—to leave aside the issue of keeping classified information secure. But they are questions which a responsible Congress cannot ignore. We trust the Cooper proposal will become a vehicle for debating them in depth—and in public, too.

COLUMBUS, OHIO
DISPATCH

E - 223,673
S - 318,040

JUN 13 1971

Oversight of CIA Is Vital

AMERICANS are fully aware their government, like every other nation, has an intelligence gathering apparatus and while the whole business of spying is inherently evil, it is necessary.

The primary U.S. spy group is called the Central Intelligence Agency and it operates pretty much in the dark as it seeks to provide its own unique kind of shield against any threat to this nation's security. Because of the very nature of the spy business, the CIA writes its own rules and laws and they very well may be in conflict with established statutes and mores.

EVEN THOUGH the CIA necessarily must operate in its own shadowy sphere, it requires financing. That comes from the American taxpayer, yet these funds are entirely secret, being seeded here and there in various departments of the federal budget.

Congress does attempt to maintain some contact with the CIA's doings through a little-known Senate watchdog subcommittee established in 1955. But this panel has met only three times in the last two years and not once so far in 1971.

A RECENT closed door session of the entire Senate delved into the doings of the CIA in Indochina. It was then re-

vealed the CIA, using American tax money, had been financing 4,800 mercenaries from Thailand to cross their border and fight Laotian and North Vietnam Communist troops in Laos.

Sen. Clifford Case of New Jersey is incensed by the revelation, contending this activity is not only a violation of a 1970 congressional ban against such incursions but is an example of the CIA "setting major policy."

THE INCURSION aspect of the Thai-Laos operation is nothing new on the CIA agenda. Witness history's recording of such places as the Bay of Pigs and an earlier bit of action in Guatemala.

But if the CIA is "setting major policy" by its Indochina program, then Americans are faced with a touchy problem. It well could be a case of one government agency creating a new "front" in one part of Indochina while the President is making a concerted effort to extract the American presence from another, Vietnam.

AN OVERSIGHT of the CIA is necessary. Its secrecy must be protected. But it cannot be permitted to "set policy" while carrying out its intelligence-gathering duties. Policy must be established by duly elected and appointed officials operating clearly in the open.

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HOUSTON, TEX.

CHRONICLE

E - 279,608

S - 333,807

Watchdog Panel Plan Challenged in Senate

BY MILES BENSON

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Washington—When the Senate barred its doors Monday and sat down to hear details of how the United States was financing mercenary Thai troops fighting in Laos, it was the first most senators had heard about the operation.

But a privileged handful apparently had known all about it for more than a year. They just never had told their colleagues.

This incenses Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., who feels his colleagues keep too many "major policy" secrets from each other—and from the public.

Watchdog Panel

The "insiders" were members of a little-known subcommittee set up in 1955 to act as a watchdog over activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The committee has met only three times in the last two years. It is the CIA that has been financing 4800 Thai mercenaries—the State Department calls them "volunteers"—in violation of a 1970 congressional ban, critics contend.

The secrecy surrounding the operation was defended by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., who argues that if all the other senators knew of it, it would not have been a secret.

But Case insists such a major policy move should be public business.

Burying Information

Case challenges the usefulness of the CIA committee, saying that it "serves as a means for burying information rather than bringing it out into the open."

And it's not just the CIA committee, Case contends, that is guilty of such "institutionalized secrecy." Another special panel operating the same way, he charges, is the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

"Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., for instance, never knew anything about the location of missiles around the world until he got on that committee, and he was startled by the information he got," Case declared.

The AEC committee is given access to classified information on the location and power of nuclear warheads the United States keeps at the ready around the world.

"The point is that information on major policy ought to be public information," Case said. "And the public's participation in these matters, through their representatives in Congress, is the real goal we are seeking."

Prior to the closed Senate session on Laos, Case doubted that even the CIA oversight committee had been informed of the mercenary operations.

Case's criticism of the CIA and AEC committees is countered by Jackson, who serves on both panels. He says they work so well that he wants another one set up to oversee the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a proposal he has been quietly pushing.

"These committees were set up on the theory that certain sensitive things should be on a 'need-to-know' basis," he said. "If you let everybody know, there is no longer a secret."

Asked if the CIA committee had been informed of the CIA support for Thai mercenaries in Laos, Jackson replied: "Yes, we were told. They have kept us currently informed."

The CIA oversight subcommittee, chaired by Sen. John Stennis, D-Miss., who also heads the parent Senate Armed Service Committee, has yet to meet this year. It last met March 20, 1970. It also sat Jan. 30, 1970. In 1969 it met only once, on Feb. 21. At each of the three meetings, the only witness was CIA Director Richard Helms. The committee met twice in 1968 and five times in 1967.

Besides Stennis and Jackson, other members of the committee are Symington, Peter H. Dominick, R-Colo., and Barry M. Goldwater, R-Ariz.

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Watchdog' Group For FBI is Urged

U.S. Sen. Henry M. (Scoop) Jackson, D-Wash., has called for a "watchdog" committee to oversee activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to "protect its good name."

Jackson, mentioned as a possible presidential hopeful, made the proposal yesterday at a news conference in the Hollywood Plaza Hotel following a meeting with 10 Southern California labor leaders. He then flew to Palm Springs to meet with other potential backers for a presidential bid, although he still has not announced he will be a definite contender for the Democratic nomination or enter the new Hampshire primary.

"I have great respect for the high degree of professionalism and efficiency of the FBI," said the former attorney and prosecutor. "In light of the controversy that has arisen, in the

best interests of the American people and to protect the good name of the FBI, it would be wise to have a watchdog committee of Congress oversee their activities."

Jackson said his suggestion in no way meant he supported or disbelieved charges of improper investigations leveled at the FBI and its chief, J. Edgar Hoover, recently by Rep. Hale Boggs, D-La., and several Democratic presidential aspirants.

He said he respected Boggs but had seen no proof of his charges of illegal wire-tapping. Jackson said he also "has seen no evidence" that Hoover is too old at 70 to perform his job. Any decision to replace the FBI chief, he said, should be left to President Richard M. Nixon.

The watchdog committee, he said, would be similar to the Joint Appropriations Armed Services Watchdog Committee over the CIA which now audits and supervises the Central Intelligence Agency.

"The FBI has been a highly efficient organization . . . never involved in any scandal," he said. "The accusation is that they have been too efficient."

Jackson also said he would favor United Nations seating for both Nationalist and Mainland China but doubts the issue "can be resolved that easily."

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By BENJAMIN WELLES

WASHINGTON.

[S] CAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it's been," says his wife, Cynthia. "Some days he has on what I call his 'Oriental look'—totally inscrutable. I know better than to ask what's happened. He'll talk when he's ready, not before, but even when he talks he's terribly discreet."

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, apparently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband—at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms's job is definitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington.

Successive budget cuts, balance of payments problems, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.'s public image have all reduced its operations considerably. President Nixon has recently ordered a fiscal and management investigation into the intelligence "community," a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelligence agencies to hide in the bureaucratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs advisor,

BENJAMIN WELLES covers national security affairs as a correspondent in the Washington bureau of the Times.

Henry Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing: intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion—or, sometimes, no opinion—behind a screen of words.

Considered a cold-blooded necessity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be untemperatic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through "front" foundations of the National Student Association, plus private cultural, women's and lawyers' groups, and, finally, two years ago, the Green Berets affair.

The 58-year-old Helms is not, in this, better than most. As the first career intelligence officer to reach the

top since the C.I.A. was created in 1947, his goal has been to professionalize the agency and restore it to respectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to erase the image of the Director as a man who moves in lavish mystery, jettisoning secretively around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of "security," the public's vague fears and Congress's probing questions. If Helms rules an "invisible empire," as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor.

While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occasionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He prefers the Occidental, a tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed entering a private home.

He likes the company of attractive women—young or old—and they find him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer.

"He's interesting—and interested in what you're saying," said Lydia Katzenbach, wife of the former Democratic Attorney General. "He's well-read and he doesn't try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton '43 routine that some of the columnists around town use."

Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press—even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency's ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation's capital.

Yet, if he gives the appearance of innocence—he is witty, gregarious, friendly—the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass of apparent contradictions: inwardly self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, absorbed in the essential yet fascinated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and can recall precisely what for American businessmen, ever more in the first place—what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap

STATINTL

A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE

BUCHE J. MCCARTHY

STATINTL

In 1956, William S. White, a reporter for *The New York Times*, published a book on the United States Senate. The Senate of *Citadel* was a place, according to Mr. White, "upon whose vitality and honor will at length rest the whole issue of the kind of society that we are to maintain." Mr. White, after examining the works and workings of the Senate of those days, found both to be good. He evaluated the members of the Senate and found many of them to be giants among men. He examined the rules of procedure and found them wholly satisfactory and appropriate, if not inspired, and sanctioned beyond time and history.

The popular judgment of the United States Senate today is that it is something quite different from the Senate described by William White. It is charged with failing to meet its responsibilities, as being unresponsive to national needs, confused and incompetent, tangled in its own rules, distinguished principally by its respect for the seniority of its members and its use of the filibuster, and serving at best as a platform from which to launch Presidential campaigns.

The Senate of 1971 is not the Senate of 1956; neither is it the Senate as described in popular criticism. Working under rather difficult circumstances, it has in the last twelve years made a record of positive achievement.

When I came to the Senate in 1959, the reputedly strong men of the past—Democrats like Tom Connally of Texas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator George of Georgia, chairman of the Finance Committee—were gone. And on the Republican side, such stalwarts as Robert Taft of Ohio, Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, Eugene Millikin of Colorado, and others listed by White were gone. It had new leaders, new members, and new problems.

In the years immediately following World War II, the Senate was involved in settling the postwar world: first in ratifying the treaties with Germany and Japan; subsequently in deliberations and activities associated with establishing the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Marshall Plan. These were important tasks that the Senate performed very well.

In this same period, especially after 1948, the Senate was largely immobilized in dealing with domestic problems because nearly every issue—whether it was housing, education or anything touching upon the political, economic or social life of America—became a civil rights issue. And on civil rights the Senate was deadlocked.

Consequently from 1948 until 1959, the House of Representatives generally pushed ahead of the Senate in attempting to deal with domestic problems. A significant change occurred in consequence of the elections of 1958. In that year, ten new Senators, liberal on most domestic issues, were elected to the Senate: Thomas Dodd

of Connecticut, Philip Hart of Michigan, Vance Hartke of Indiana, Gale McGee of Wyoming, Frank Moss of Utah, Edmund Muskie of Maine, Harrison Williams of New Jersey, Stephen Young of Ohio, Robert Bartlett of Alaska and myself. The immediate effect was that the initiative and aggressiveness on most domestic issues shifted from the House to the Senate. Now the Senate began gradually to move ahead of the House in its advocacy of new legislative programs, in increasing appropriations to support established programs, and in facing the civil rights issue.

It was not until the Presidential election of 1964, when in consequence of the candidacy of Senator Goldwater a clear liberal majority of Democrats was elected to the House, that the Congress as a whole was able to deal with the great mass of domestic legislation that had been in need of action, in some cases for nearly twenty years.

The concern of the Senate with domestic problems had both good and bad effects. The good effect was that much necessary legislation was passed. The bad effects were two: first, preoccupation with domestic problems caused the Senate to fail to give proper attention during these years to what was happening to international relations.

A consequence of the Senate's neglect of its responsibility for foreign policy was the gradual usurpation of power in this field by the executive branch of the government, through the growing use of executive agreements and executive actions without formal treaties. In some cases these merely continued wartime relationships, but new commitments—legal or extralegal—were also made during the time that John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State and his brother Allen was head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The second bad effect of the Senate's concern with domestic problems was the change of the structure and operation of the Senate. This occurred especially while Lyndon Johnson was Majority Leader. The Senate was transformed into a kind of upper House of Representatives, with emphasis on committee work, roll calls and quantitative measurements of success. It became more or less a regular practice for Senator Johnson to announce the number of bills passed and to make comparisons with other Congresses, both in terms of timing and the volume of legislative action.

The Senate's influence on foreign policy was further weakened by the development of the cold war into an ideological conflict and the formalization of that ideological conflict in comprehensive treaties like SEATO and in resolutions like that on the Tonkin Gulf in 1964, through which Congressional criticism was not only stifled but Congressional power yielded to the Executive—sometimes even in advance of any defined problem, as in the case of the Middle East resolution passed under President Eisenhower in 1957.