

SEC's Chairman To Take New Job

By STEPHEN M. AUG
 Star-News Staff Writer

William J. Casey will leave his post as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission shortly to take another job in the Nixon administration.

Casey conceded in a telephone interview last night, that he has been receiving foreign policy briefings — but he specifically denied a report that he was going to the Central Intelligence Agency.

There has been speculation that Casey — one of the most activist SEC chairmen ever — would become director of the CIA, replacing Richard Helms. Casey said not only is he not going to be CIA director, but he is not going to the agency. He declined, however, to say where in the administration he is going.

Reportedly, presidential adviser Henry Kissinger has been briefing Casey on foreign policy.

Considerable Controversy

Observers note that among the government officials conferring with the President at Camp David over the past weeks was U.N. Ambassador George Bush. Should Bush step aside or be moved to another assignment his job could be filled by Casey.

Various ambassadorial positions overseas — notably that of the U.S. envoy to France — are being weighed and some speculation exists that Casey could be being considered for such duty.

Reports that Casey was going to the CIA arose partly because during World War II he helped coordinate activities of the French resistance incident to the Normandy landings and was chief of the Office of Strategic Services intelligence operations in the European Theater in 1944-45.

Casey, whose Senate confirmation became the subject of considerable controversy after allegations that his private business activities may have violated SEC rules, leaves the SEC at a time when the market and securities industry are in the throes of major changes.

Part of the changes — a whole new format for commission rates, controversies over who may become securities exchange members among others — are the result of decisions made under Casey's leadership.

Casey realizes this, and said in the interview that he has not decided yet when to leave the SEC. He pointed out that there are a number of matters he wants to see completed before he departs.

Sensitive Matters

He pointed out that the five-member agency currently has only three active members. There is one vacancy and Commissioner A. Sydney Herlong Jr., a Democrat, is recovering from surgery.

The vacancy on the agency — which regulates securities markets, and governs the truthfulness of corporate financial disclosures among other things — was created when James J. Needham resigned to become the first fulltime paid chairman of the New York Stock Exchange.

• The SEC staff is expected

soon to develop a white paper on the essence of a central market system — essentially the creation of a truly nationwide securities market. The white paper would be designed to clarify questions raised by the securities industry. The document is expected to be completed by year's end.

Precisely how Nixon could change the complexion of the SEC is difficult to say. Actually, he would have three vacancies to fill: Casey's, Needham's and that of Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, a Republican, who continues to serve although his term expired last June 30. Loomis, however, is expected to be reappointed. He is an SEC career employe and former general counsel.

2 General Aims

When Casey joined the agency will have to find a Democrat and a Republican to fill the two vacant seats. Needham

regulatory agencies may not have more than a bare majority of members from the same political party. Commissioners receive \$38,000 a year, but in many cases, especially when they come from lucrative private law practices — as did Casey — the salary is not the attraction.

When Casey joined the agency nearly two years ago he said he had two general aims: To develop greater clarity in rules that govern securities transactions, and to force corporations to issue better reports. He said he also wanted to mold the computer into the marketplace to develop better communication for trading, quotations and gathering market information.

• At the time he described his role at his old law firm as "a generalist supported by technicians . . . a policy man . . . a grand strategist."

STATINTL

Gravel Refused Invitation to

Hanoi STATINTL

By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Mike Gravel, the maverick Alaska Democrat, was invited to visit Hanoi last spring for talks with North Vietnamese government officials.

No member of the U.S. Congress has ever made such a journey.

Gravel came close to being the first, but changed his mind after the North Vietnamese refused to define the "parameters" of the trip or to let him draw up his own itinerary and agenda.

What the senator specifically had in mind as the goal of his visit—which he now acknowledges was "naïve"—was a unilateral North Vietnamese release of large numbers of American prisoners of war, a gesture he felt could have ended the conflict before last spring's new Vietnamese communist offensive.

Unknown to his Senate colleagues and many members of his staff, Gravel did make a secret weekend trip to Paris in March, in an effort to establish ground rules that he felt would permit him to go on to Hanoi later.

But the senator revealed, in an interview last week, that after extensive discussions with Xuan Thuy, North Vietnamese delegation chief at the Paris peace talks, he "came away frustrated."

"I wanted something concrete for the purpose of my trip" to Hanoi, Gravel said. "I wasn't satisfied with just going. As a United States senator, I couldn't be just a tourist."

Gravel was initially reluctant to discuss details of the still secret episode, lest his decision not to go reflect negatively on the recent North Vietnamese visits of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and actress Jane Fonda.

He said he approved of their trips, but felt that, as a senator, "I have other responsibilities."

The chronology of his aborted visit provides a rare glimpse into the contacts of antiwar groups—and, indirectly, a foreign

government—with a member of Congress.

Gravel's invitation came at a time when he had assumed an outspoken and increasingly controversial role as an opponent of American policy in Southeast Asia.

He had sought to force the Senate either to declare war against North Vietnam or legislate immediate withdrawal of American troops.

At the same time, the Supreme Court was considering a case involving the Justice Department's effort to subpoena a Gravel aide before a Boston grand jury investigating disclosure of the top-secret Pentagon papers. Breaking with precedent and angering his colleagues, Gravel had called a midnight senate subcommittee session in June, 1971, to put substantial sections of the papers on the public record. During a meeting early this year with Al Hubbard, then a national coordinator of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Gravel had let it be known that he might be interested in visiting Hanoi, he said in the interview last week.

He also discussed the matter with Cora Weiss, a leader of the Committee of Liaison, when he was in New York City for a speaking engagement.

Before long, Gravel said, Hubbard was back to him with an invitation to North Vietnam, presumably obtained through the VVAW leader's own contacts in Paris. The invitation was an oral one and never committed to writing.

Although the Hanoi government has long taken the position that any American congressman would be welcome there, it was made clear that Gravel's invitation was as specific as that extended to several American labor union officials, including Harold Gibbons, a Teamsters leader from St. Louis.

As envisioned by VVAW at the time, Gravel's trip would be coordinated with—and perhaps filmed during—a visit of a film crew from the National Educational

The NET group was to be led by Robert Sam Anson, a



SEN. MIKE GRAVEL
... sought 'parameters'

freelance journalist who had once been held captive by Communist forces in Cambodia and who is the author of a recent biography of Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern.

The invitation was vague, Gravel said. His visit was to be "of indefinite duration—a week or two—and the details would be worked out only when I got there." The senator was told he could be accompanied only by one or two staff members.

"I knew I couldn't negotiate, because that would be against the law," Gravel recalled, and he sought to find out whether he could do anything in North Vietnam besides viewing the damage from American bombing and visiting a few U.S. prisoners.

At first, the senator said, the North Vietnamese declined, through the intermediaries, to meet with him in Paris to discuss guidelines for any trip to Hanoi.

But Gravel was insistent, especially because of his declining popularity in Alaska and his worry that this situation might be aggravated by an undefined trip that could be misinterpreted by his home-state opponents.

When the North Vietnamese relented, however, Gravel quietly flew off to Paris on Thursday night, March 9. Only after his return did he tell Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana about the

trip, and Gravel said he has never discussed it with any other senators.

Before going to Paris Gravel obtained "educational briefings" from the Central Intelligence Agency and two non-governmental experts on Vietnam.

(A spokesman for the CIA said last week that such briefings are often provided "as a courtesy to members of Congress, at their own request.")

The senator said he did not contact the State Department of the White House—"although I'm sure they found out from the CIA"—because he felt that officials there would be hostile to his project. "I wanted no aspersions cast on my motivation," he explained.

In Paris, Gravel said, he had no communication with representatives of the United States, South Vietnam or the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the National Liberation Front or Vietcong), but he spent considerable time with the North Vietnamese and with a Vietnamese Catholic priest before returning here on Sunday, March 12.

"I'm sure that French intelligence was aware of my presence," the senator observed, noting that French plainclothes policemen at the gate to the Hanoi delegation "knew who I was."

The North Vietnamese, he recalled, wanted to speak in Vietnamese and have the senator use English. They provided an interpreter. But Gravel, who was born in Massachusetts of French-Canadian parents, "kept going into French, so we could talk directly."

Gravel said he spent almost the full day of Saturday, March 11, meeting with Xuan Thuy. "I found that it

continued

22 AUG 1972

Tom Braden

McGovern's Zig-Zag on Briefings

SEN. GEORGE McGOVERN is a little bit worried about the effect of his refusal to accept a briefing from Henry Kissinger.

McGovern's staff is worried, too. They do not want it to appear that McGovern is unwilling to listen to the facts. But neither do they want Kissinger or President Nixon to be able to criticize McGovern for campaign statements which they might allege are based on secret briefings.

It was this last reason which caused McGovern to turn down the presidential offer. If his refusal seems to evoke a negative public reaction, McGovern can still accept the Kissinger briefing. Meanwhile, he has designated Paul Warnke, formerly deputy to Clark M. Clifford, President Lyndon B. Johnson's last secretary of defense, to accept the briefing on his behalf.

Circumstances indicate, however, that McGovern underwent several changes of heart about the Kissinger briefing. Originally, McGovern accepted the invitation and a date was set in his Senate office. That had to be canceled because it

was scheduled during the week when the nominee was occupied with the Eagleton affair and with choosing a new running mate. Kissinger then suggested another date and got the Warnke nomination in reply.

IT WAS President Nixon's idea that Kissinger should brief McGovern at the beginning of the campaign and that thereafter the job should be taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency director, Richard Helms. Briefings by the CIA have been given to presidential candidates not in office since 1952. In that year, CIA's Office of Current Intelligence briefed candidates Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson. In 1956, the same office briefed Stevenson. In 1960, CIA Director Allen W. Dulles personally briefed candidates Richard Nixon and John Kennedy. In 1964, Republican candidate Barry Goldwater declined to be briefed. But the pattern was restored in 1968 for both Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace though Director Helms did not carry on the Dulles

precedent of doing the job himself.

McGovern's change of mind about the Kissinger briefing avoided what might have been an embarrassing confrontation. It is difficult to imagine Kissinger telling McGovern about the quantity of bombs dropped on Vietnam during a given week without provoking McGovern's sense of outrage.

The senator from South Dakota believes that the Nixon-Kissinger policy of trying to hammer North Vietnam into accepting their terms by turning the country into a bomb pit is immoral. Moreover, he thinks it will not work.

IN ADDITION, he is suspicious of Kissinger's frequent trips to Paris. He sees them as a sign of desperation. If North Vietnam has not accepted President Nixon's terms by October, McGovern thinks it possible that the President and Kissinger will soften their terms, perhaps to the point of tossing South Vietnam's President Thieu overboard. Thus the President could go before the electorate having fulfilled his promise to end

the war. His terms would be McGovern's terms, camouflaged no doubt by language. In any event, such a move would destroy one of McGovern's principal campaign issues and might destroy his chance of getting elected.

So much for the way McGovern sees Kissinger. Kissinger, on the other hand, views McGovern as the man who stands between himself and a negotiated settlement. The President's latest terms are the best that have ever been offered. Kissinger expected North Vietnam to accept them. Kissinger believes that the only reason the enemy continues to refuse them is the possibility that George McGovern will be elected and offer better terms.

McGovern and Kissinger are acquaintances who see each other occasionally in Washington. But events have made them natural enemies. Each believes that the other is dead wrong. Each believes that the other is secretly plotting his downfall. Under the circumstances, perhaps it is just as well that a formal confrontation will not take place.

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17 AUG 1972

McGovern Disputed By White House On Briefings Offer

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House and Sen. George McGovern were at odds yesterday over whether the Democratic presidential candidate should receive personal briefings on the international situation and whether such briefings are worthwhile.

The White House labeled McGovern's complaint that administration briefings "go wide of the mark" as itself wide of the mark because it said he hasn't received any official briefings.

McGovern told a news conference in Youngstown, Ohio, Tuesday that he had declined a presidential offer of intelligence briefings because he found those he had received from presidential aide Henry A. Kissinger "interesting, but they haven't shed any new light on the Vietnam problem."

The Democratic candidate said he had responded to President Nixon's offer of briefings by asking that they be given to Paul C. Warnke, an assistant secretary of defense in the Johnson administration, and that the White House had named Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., to brief Warnke.

Responding to McGovern's comments, White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler read a cable from Kissinger, now in South Vietnam, saying he last met McGovern at a dinner with approximately 30 people in January.

Kissinger said he had conferred in his office twice with McGovern, the last time in March 1971. McGovern had told his news conference he had met Kissinger "a number of times."

In a letter to the President Aug. 7, McGovern said: "I appreciate your offer to keep me currently informed of national security developments, including those relating to the war in Southeast Asia, during the course of the campaign in the fall."

But, McGovern said, he could accept no restrictions on his right "to speak out on the issues or to make use of information and advice which I may obtain from independent sources."

"On this basis, I welcome and accept your offer," McGovern said. "To facilitate regular and secure communication in the context of a hectic campaign schedule, I would like to appoint Mr. Paul Warnke ... to be my representative at briefing sessions."

On Aug. 11, Kissinger wrote to Warnke saying that "the President has directed" that Haig "initiate a series of regular briefings for you on national security issues."

There is known to have been a debate in McGovern's office over whether he should accept the President's offer in any way. Some of his advisers urged that since foreign issues are the central ones in this campaign he should avoid any chance of having his hands tied.

They pointed out that the briefing of presidential candidates began in World War II and continued in the Cold War period when there was general bi-partisan agreement on foreign policy.

Franklin D. Roosevelt saw to it that his challenger in 1944, Thomas E. Dewey, was fully briefed on foreign policy matters. Dewey, for example, was told about plans to develop an atomic bomb well over a year before the public received such information.

In 1948, Dewey was again the Republican nominee and President Truman saw that Dewey was fully informed on foreign policy matters.

"One of the things I tried to keep out of the campaign was foreign policy," Mr. Truman wrote in his memoirs. "There should be no break in the bi-partisan foreign policy of the United States in any way, particularly during a national election."

"I even asked that a teletype machine be set up on the Dewey train so that the Republican candidate personally could be informed on all the foreign developments as they progressed, and I did so, because I did not want to encourage the possibility of a partisan, political approach to foreign policy."

Briefings were regularly provided presidential candidates in the 1950s and 1960s, with the exception of 1964 when Republican Barry Goldwater declined an offer of briefings from President Johnson.

One of the better known briefings was held Aug. 12, 1968, just after Richard M. Nixon was nominated by the Republican convention when President Johnson asked him to fly to the LBJ Ranch in Texas.

McGovern to Get Briefing on War

By SAUL KOHLER
Newhouse News Service

Sen. George McGovern will accept a White House briefing on foreign policy and the Vietnam war, despite warnings from his staff that President Nixon "is not the Wizard of Oz" and the intelligence community is far from infallible.

The briefings were offered to McGovern immediately after last month's Democratic convention. The date was set for the candidate to meet with Dr. Henry Kissinger, White House foreign policy adviser.

But that turned out to be the day on which McGovern held his historic meeting with Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton, his former vice presidential running mate, and the Democratic standard bearer asked for a postponement.

McGovern adviser, Fred Dutton, said: "The whole myth that the President has much more information is bunkum. The press is on top of it as much as the intelligence community.

"So long as the candidate knows this and keeps in mind that as a United States senator he knows a good bit himself, he'll not fall into any traps."

Dutton said that because of his own political activity in the McGovern campaign, he would not attend the briefings, and that the senator probably would be accompanied to the White House by retired Gen. James Gavin and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke.

Dutton said he doesn't believe that a briefing by Kissinger, no matter how intense, would inhibit McGovern from commenting on the administration policy in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

"After all, they're not going to turn over the code keys for the nuclear devices," he commented.

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Good Safeguard

The offer of President Nixon to provide Democratic presidential nominee George McGovern with intelligence briefings is not a new thing. Other presidents have done the same for their adversaries, but it is nevertheless a matter of choice on the part of any incumbent president.

The offer is courteous, ethical and serves a public purpose.

Should matters of international concern be in delicate flux during an election campaign, any presidential challenger should know. This could help prevent harm being innocently done to diplomatic negotiations or to other matters of national security.

The briefings involve some political risk to the incumbent. By giving his opponent secret information on matters under government control, the challenger could turn that information to his own advantage.

When Thomas E. Dewey was running against Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II, he learned through his own sources of the breaking of the Japanese military communications code. When the administration learned he had that information, Gen. George C. Marshall asked Dewey not to use the information in the campaign. He did not do so and he subsequently lost the election. Whether he could have used it to his own advantage is not certain, but in any event he did not do so.

The briefings as offered by Nixon will not be cursory. Presidential Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler has said Sen. McGovern would be kept "fully apprised" of foreign developments throughout the campaign. The briefings are expected to be conducted by Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or by members of Henry Kissinger's National Security Council staff.

While such briefings for presidential aspirants are not unusual here, the practice seems unique to this country. No other government in the world provides political challengers with information during an election campaign. That, in itself, is a tribute to the kind of government we enjoy in this country and the kind of men elected to the presidency, in both parties.

Summary: The practice of briefing presidential nominees is an excellent example of fair play and serves also as a national safeguard.

Summitry Business Mostly Hard Work

By DON BACON

Journal Washington Bureau
MOSCOW—The weather was perfect, and with everything in bloom, Moscow's beauty was at its peak. So President Nixon most days walked from his residence in the Kremlin to the office where he met with Secretary General Leonid I. Brezhnev of the Soviet Communist party.

The idea of an American president living inside the Kremlin walls took some getting used to, both for the Russians and Americans. To see the Stars and Stripes waving from a pole over the Grand Kremlin Palace was even more mind-boggling.

But the Nixons settled into their palace digs with remarkable ease, and by week's end seemed to be enjoying all that royal splendor, which has been preserved as a mockery to the past by the Soviet government.

THE AMERICAN press saw little of Nixon during the week and had to piece together his activities from reports provided by those close aides who hovered around him and tended to his needs.

When Nixon was not meeting with Brezhnev or with the Soviet "Big Three," he worked alone in a relatively modest office at his guest quarters. He worked at a walnut desk, dictating into a machine brought from the White House and making last touches on the important speech he was to make over Soviet television.

Even with the President in Moscow, routine work of the White House must go on. A part of every day had to be set aside for worldwide intelligence briefings, Vietnam War reports, review of bills and resolutions passed by Congress and other government matters that would not wait until he returned home.

NIXON ALSO received staff briefings daily, and frequently summoned his foreign policy adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, for private discussions, presumably on negotiating strategy.

ternoon, Nixon would again be alone. Sitting back in one of the modernistic chairs in his office, he would study the summit briefing books—14 of them packed in two brown leather suitcases—which had been prepared in Washington.

One of those books, it may be assumed, was labeled "Brezhnev" and contained every significant fact that the Central Intelligence Agency had been able to gather on the Soviet boss.

It would include personal data and psychological impressions for Nixon to study and later weigh as he met across the negotiating table. Brezhnev would have prepared himself likewise.

MUCH OF the business of summitry is really just hard work and intense preparation. The Russians have been masters of the game for centuries, the Americans singularly unsuccessful at it.

"Summitry," noted London's Sunday Telegraph last week, "is not, at the best of times, a form of diplomatic prowess at which the American's excel. And this, to say the least, is not the best of times."

Nixon has long been aware of the U.S. experience in summitry and had vowed to make this important conference produce something positive.

GOOD WILL and hopeful atmospherics, he said, mean little; the only significant thing, for the long term, is whether the two sides can come to substantive agreements on the issues that divide them.

All of the agreements announced last week, important as they are, will mean little if Nixon and the Soviet leaders have failed to create at least some measure of trust in each other.

Trust comes extremely hard for the inherently suspicious Soviets. Nixon won't break down their barriers entirely, but he may have made progress in that direction. By all odds, his effort here has been the most serious and well prepared of a U.S. president in decades.

STATINTL

Kissinger Under Attack By House Foreign Panel

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 29 — Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security, came under severe criticism today from members of Congress who accused him of pre-empting the State Department's traditional role in formulating United States foreign policy.

Representative Wayne L. Hays, Democrat of Ohio, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, charged that Mr. Kissinger had "taken over the policymaking functions of the State Department."

"He and his ever-growing National Security Council staff are making policy," Mr. Hays charged. "He's flown off on 12 or 14 secret trips. He's got a string of 25 or 30 starlets he takes out. He seems to pack 36 hours into every day where the rest of us have only 24."

Mr. Hays' comments came as William B. Macomber Jr., deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, appeared before the subcommittee to ask authorization for a \$563.4-million budget for the department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973.

Double Approval Needed

This was the first time that the department has been obliged to seek authorization from Congress for its annual operating budget as well as requesting appropriations of the funds themselves.

The new requirement results from an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, sponsored by J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. Fulbright has long sought

to make the State Department as responsive to the two Congressional committees principally involved with foreign policy as it has traditionally been to the two appropriations committees whose members are normally less versed in foreign affairs.

Much of Mr. Fulbright's insistence has been based on mounting irritation over Mr. Kissinger's persistent unwillingness to testify before Congress—except in strict privacy and informally. From the tone of remarks made at the hearings, the Senator's irritation appears to be shared by several senior members of the House subcommittee.

Would Restore 'Primacy'

Sub-committee members repeatedly called on Mr. Macomber to help strengthen the State Department's "primacy" in foreign policy and, by implication, to stave off what many called the National Security Council's inroads into the foreign policy process.

Representative John Buchanan, Republican of Alabama, asserted that the State Department had "declined in power and prestige." Representative Donald M. Fraser, Democrat of Minnesota, called on the department to upgrade its role in political and military affairs to offset what he termed the Defense Department's "scare" tactics.

"I've become a great defender of the Central Intelligence Agency in recent years," Mr. Fraser said, "because every time I get briefed on strategic weaponry the C.I.A. gives the impression of being more-balanced and objective than the Pentagon. The Pentagon is always trying to scare you. They always put forward the worst imaginable case."

STATINTL

28 FEB 1972

**HENRY J. TAYLOR**

The Sino-Soviet Border Issue

President Nixon knows that his leverage on the Soviet Union by his Peking trip has several unrevealed limitations. The first is the U.S.S.R.'s widely reported fear of China on Russia's 4,150-mile border.

Mr. Nixon regards this as hokey, hokus, hokum.

In only the 31 years, between 1870 and 1901, Great Britain acquired 4.7 million square miles of territory; France, 3.6 million; Germany, one million; Belgium, one million — 77 times Belgium's own size. Most of these were in Africa and Asia. But Russia had been in there carving up China for nearly two centuries.

The result is today's 4,150-mile Russian-Chinese border, the longest in the world. It runs something like the distance from New York to Honolulu.

✓ **WHAT PRESIDENT NIXON** obtained from Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms' final briefing at the White House before he left is that Mao's military position on the Russian border is much weaker than supposed.

War starts with terrain. The Soviet axis for its position opposite China is Khabarovsk, 400 miles north of Vladivostok. The border friction incidents have been concentrated in Heilungkiang Province and along the Ussuri River, which is a part of the border.

MR. HELMS told President Nixon that the Soviet has 22 crack divisions on this border, controlled from Khabarovsk. Nine are mechanized. The terrain, he said, is excellent for their deployment. We hear much about Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers. But Mr. Helms emphasized that the Soviet has a large and extremely effective tactical air force for troop support as well. Mao has none.

What Mr. Nixon is trying to determine in the border issue is: Who is provoking whom?

China can do the shouting and talking and street demonstrating, as for a long time. But President Nixon believes that if anybody is really picking a fight in this situation the weight of evidence is that the one who would pick a fight as a precaution against the future is the U.S.S.R.

John Tunney, Kennedy's Friend In Muskie's Corner

By JACQUES LESLIE

WASHINGTON.

A FEW days after John Tunney was elected to the United States Senate, he was walking through the Capitol building when he ran into a senior Senator from one of the Southern states. The Senator, who was with a group of his constituents, introduced his colleague-to-be from California: "Gentlemen, this man has just been elected to the United States Senate, and I'm sure you all know his daddy, who used to be the heavyweight champion of the world. I'd like you all to meet Senator Dempsey."

The slip's implication that Tunney's

JACQUES LESLIE was until recently a freelance in Washington, D.C. Now with The Los Angeles Times, he will leave shortly for an assignment as a correspondent for the paper in Saigon.

success is based on faded memories of his father is one that many of his critics would agree with. According to their line of reasoning, Tunney is the son of a famous boxer who diverted the spotlight from his father to himself. Tall, handsome and athletic-looking, married to an attractive Dutch woman who has just launched her own rock 'n' roll singing career,* the son appears in society pages as much as in news stories; though glamorous, his critics suggest he is intellectually second-rate, as befits the son of a boxer, a "political lightweight," to wrap up the metaphor.

*Mieke Tunney has cut a rock 'n' roll record entitled, "Habit of Love."

Another of his possible shortcomings is expressed by Representative James Corman, a California Democrat who supported Tunney in the Senate primary and says: "If I had to pick a weakness, it's that he tends to vacillate. I think John considers it a weakness not to take a stand on things. He considers it a weakness not to take a stand on facts. Because of those two things, he tends to change his mind too quickly."

Tunney has changed his mind on two key issues, Vietnam (he is now a firm dove) and the SST (after first coming out against, then in favor, he finally voted against it). His change of heart on the SST in particular tends to bear out what Corman says. During his Senate campaign, Tunney said that he was opposed to the SST, then, after the election, he held aerospace hearings in Los Angeles and came out in favor of it. He says now, "I am afraid that I was somewhat confused. . . . At those hearings we had one witness after another come forward and say that the SST should be built and that it was going to be great employment for California and that the environmental problems could be resolved, and that it was economically feasible. . . . But when I got back here I realized after reading the Senatorial hearings that it was not a good program and that we should use the \$290-million elsewhere."


Tunney explains his change of heart on Vietnam this way: "When I went to Vietnam [as a Congressman] in 1965, I didn't know anything about the war. And I didn't know anything about the Vietnamese people. Before going over, I had the State Department, the C.I.A. and the military brief me on it, and I went there with what I thought was a fairly decent matrix of information upon which to build. When I got over there everything that I heard was the same as the Stateside briefings. It dovetailed and seemed to me to be representative of the truth. And I therefore came back a flaming hawk.

When I got back here in the Fall in 1966 and began to get very concerned about it at

that time—not so much concerned with whether we ought to be over there or not, but very concerned about the way we were handling the situation. It was more a question of methodology than ultimate goals. I felt that we were making terrible mistakes. I also began to realize that we weren't being told the truth, because Bernard Fall had such a reservoir of knowledge that he could take the statements that were being made and explain them in context, with a perspective. And then in '67 I began to seriously doubt the wisdom of our being there. John McAlister [now a political science teacher at Stanford University and author of "Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution"], who was on my staff as a research assistant, and I began seeing a good deal of each other. He was sharply critical of the war. So in '67 I began to really change, and in '68 I campaigned as a dove." . . .

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Newsweek



Nixon's super-secret memorandum criticising CIA

STATINTL

New York, Monday

Newsweek magazine said yesterday President Nixon had written a super-secret memorandum sharply criticising the U.S. intelligence network for a series of five recent failures.

The latest issue of the magazine said the real reasons for Mr. Nixon's re-organisation of U.S. intelligence activities spelled out in meticulous detail in the top-secret document.

Newsweek said the presidential memo rebuked U.S. intelligence for runaway budgets, for supplying more facts than analysis, and for just plain faulty intelligence.

Mr. Nixon, the report said, singled out five main failures: — Failure to predict the ferocity of Liberation Army resistance to the Laotian campaign earlier this year;

— Misinformation that led to an elaborately-planned commando raid on an empty prisoner of war camp at Son Tay (which, says Newsweek, still rankles the White House).

— Incorrect estimates of the number of Liberation Army weapons and supplies flowing through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville;

— Belated discovery of surface-to-air missiles that suddenly sprouted in the Middle East ceasefire zone last year;

— and an eight-month delay in the strategic arms limitation talks while the White House tried to sort out intelli-

well the U.S. could detect possible Soviet violations of any arms control agreement.

Newsweek also described how the Central Intelligence Agency planned and carried out the overthrow of Antoine Gizenga's Congolese government.

At one point, according to the magazine's account, a crate of Kalashnikov rifles meant for the rebels — and disguised as Red Cross packages for refugees — was allowed to drop and break open while being unloaded from a Czechoslovak ship in Khartoum.

Newsweek said a CIA agent later successfully stole from a courier at Khartoum airport a suitcase containing 330,000 U.S. dollars. This had been supplied by the Soviet KGB and was also bound for Gizenga's troops, it said.

Referring to how Mr. Nixon receives his daily intelligence briefing, Newsweek said that early every morning a black

Plymouth car from the CIA delivers a stiff, grey, legal-sized folder marked 'President's daily briefing' to the White House.

Only three other copies of the report are delivered — one to Secretary of State William Rogers, one to Defence Secretary Melvin Laird, and one to Attorney-General John Mitchell.

But the President does not bother to read his copy of the top secret report. Instead, he asks his advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to summarise it for him, Newsweek claimed.

C.I.A. - A SECRET ARMY FOR SUBVERSIVE WARFARE

STATINTL

They even speculates on life of world figure!

(PIERRE NORD, an internationally known expert on espionage, describes subversive war — the ultimate weapon — in his book "L'intoxication" (Editions Fayard). It is a document, a first-hand memoir. In it, he traces the development of the great contemporary affairs and evokes little-known facets of the 1939-1945 world conflict and the subversive, revolutionary, ideological cold war that has changed the face of the world since 1945 . . . Here are passages from his chapter on the United States Central Intelligence Agency — C.I.A.).

culates the length of the remaining life-span of foreign personalities who interest the United States. Its doctors say they do not bother with leading American figures: that is false on the face of it because it is the latter who determine everybody's future.

As for the private lives and financial affairs of these personalities, the C.I.A.'s leading legal experts, accountants and police officers often know more than their colleagues in the subject's homeland.

A very select company of sociologists, economists, historians, geographers, financiers, political experts and enigmas interpret an enormous mass of information collected on each antagonistic, neutral or allied state.

The C.I.A.'s headquarters is sheltered from the curious in a 125-acre park at Langley, Virginia, twenty minutes by car from the White House. Information has assumed that the President of the United States runs the secret services himself (!) and is as close to the other user of its services, the Pentagon, joint headquarters of the American General Staff and the U.S. Department of Defence.

The results of these space eyes, translated into film and tape recordings, graphs and summaries, allows the directors to count Soviet missiles stockpiled at Sverdlovsk, or to determine the advanced state of the next Chinese nuclear experiment, or to hear Moscow's orders to its submarines cruising along Florida's coast, or to follow the countdown of Soyuz rocket "Number X" at Baikonour in the farthest reaches of the Soviet Union as easily as they can check the progress of their own Apollo "Number Y" at Cape Kennedy. All instantly

evaluated in terms of numbers: the C.I.A.'s WORKING STAFF.

The C.I.A. declares some 20,000 permanent employees and some writers have put the total at 60,000 — divided more or less equally between the "blacks" who operate under cover and the "whites" who check in at Langley and its branches every day and cannot conceal themselves.

The C.I.A. director, head of American secret warfare, espionage activity and subversion in foreign countries, is assisted by two other men: the chiefs of the Intelligence Division and Plans Division, and he knows what combination of electronic brains and robots! **SPYING IN LUXURY OF ELECTRONICS**

A SECRET "ARMY"
It is openly reported that the American secret service is an army of hundreds of thousands of men. That is plainly an exaggeration: but it would be less so if the venal foreign agents on the monthly payroll and freelance spies were counted.

"BLACK" agents get data at its source overseas under cover as tourists, journalists, businessmen or diplomats. These are the real secret agents. The "WHITES" include a technological elite of researchers, scientists, chemists, metallurgists, mathematicians, biologists, electricians, electronics experts, photographers, doctors, foresters, dietiticians and even magicians.



Richard Habes — the new C.I.A. boss.

The C.I.A. directors — surrounded by luxury and calm in their Langley office, dressed in shirt-sleeves and slippers if they like their ease — can exploit the labours of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its satellites carrying out patrols for them in the stratosphere at 40,000 miles an hour; the Midas II detecting missiles, the Samos series and other systems taking photographs. Tomorrow, the orbiting space stations will be the only category which can be

WHO CAN say how many are work in Indochina alone? It would be well below the mark if scientific and industrial workers who conceive and build the espionage machinery were counted.

And this is no joke. Going even farther: The Americans and the Soviets moreover have been experimenting in thought transmission, and what has filtered through of the first results could shake the most rational mind.

HOW CLOSE TO DEATH?
But it is certainly the medical service which is the Agency's avant garde. Among its

Being the most expensively paid in the world, they appear qualified enough to conclude "Here is what this country will do in such circumstances"

STATINTL

Clifford's Assignment: 'Give Me the Lesser of Evils'

This is the 10th of 15 excerpts from former President Johnson's book, "The Vantage Point," an account of his presidency, to be published shortly.

"THE MAKING OF A DECISION" VIETNAM 1967-1968 (Part Two)

The two weeks before and two months following Tet represented a period of activity as intense as any of my Presidency. My advisers and I followed developments in Vietnam on a daily, sometimes hourly, basis.

I had decided by this time to send General Wheeler to Saigon for consultations with Bunker and Westmoreland. I thought we would benefit from a full assessment by this level-headed and experienced soldier. I asked him to go over the entire situation with Westmoreland and to form his own judgment of what should be done. I instructed him to find out what Westmoreland felt he had to have to meet present needs, and what he thought future needs would be for troops, equipment, or other support. Finally, I wanted Wheeler to find out how the South Vietnamese army was performing and what additional help we could provide to enable it to fight more effectively and improve more rapidly.

Wheeler and Westmoreland undoubtedly presumed that a large buildup of our armed forces was possible, if not likely. They also anticipated a high-level review of our war strategy. This had influenced their suggestions as to what could be done to strengthen our position in Vietnam.

Their preliminary proposal was that we consider assigning about 100,000 men over the next two months, prepare another 42,000 by September, and program a final group of 55,000 by the end of 1968. The total to be readied for possible assignment was slightly more than 205,000.

At the February 27 meeting McNamara presented three options for consideration. One was to accept the Wheeler-Westmoreland proposal. This would require an increase in military strength of about 400,000 men, he said, and an expenditure of an additional \$10 billion in fiscal 1969. The second option was to accept the Wheeler-Westmoreland proposal with a new peace initiative. At

that point Rusk stated that if we made a peace proposal, it should be specific. He suggested that we might stop bombing at the 20th parallel, or stop bombing altogether if Hanoi would withdraw military forces from Quang Tri province, just below the DMZ. McNamara's third option was to maintain the status quo on troop commitments and change our strategy, protecting only "essential" areas and reducing offensive operations in unpopulated regions.

I returned to Washington at 2 a.m. on February 28. Wheeler arrived from Saigon four hours later, and we met for breakfast.

It was Wheeler's judgment that Westmoreland needed a reserve force of "about two divisions." He recommended that we seriously consider the three-phase increase he and Westmoreland had worked out.

I asked Secretary McNamara how we could raise the troops to meet the Wheeler-Westmoreland proposal, if we decided to do so. McNamara said that we would have to call up about 250,000 reserves for all services, mostly for the Army. We would have to extend enlistments by six months for men already in service. He estimated that we would have to increase our budget by \$10 billion in 1969 and by \$15 billion in 1970. I asked him whether he accepted the forecast that we would have to expect to give up territory if we did not send men in the numbers being discussed. McNamara said he disagreed. He thought that adding 200,000 men would not make a major difference, since the North Vietnamese would probably add men to meet our increase. He believed that the key was the South Vietnamese army—how fast it could be expanded and how well it would fight.

I told my advisers that I was not prepared to make any judgment at that time. We needed answers to many questions. I asked Clark Clifford to head a group to consider these demanding problems. The last thing I said was: "Give me the lesser of evils. Give me your recommendations."

I know that one of the first things the Clifford group had done was to make a sharp distinction between present needs and capabilities and the longer-run question of strengthening our overall military position during the next year. The full report I received at the meeting of March 4 made that distinction clear. A copy of the

group's written report was distributed to everyone at the table. The report first described the Wheeler-Westmoreland proposal for troop increases and Wheeler's suggestions for building up our strategic reserves at home. By calling up reserves, increasing draft calls, and extending terms of service, the total package would have increased our armed forces by 511,000 men by June 30, 1969.

The Clifford group recommended: an immediate decision to send approximately 23,000 additional men to Vietnam; a strong representation to the South Vietnamese urging them to improve their performance; early approval of a reserve call-up of about 245,000 men; reserving judgment on the total 205,000 package and examination of requirements "week by week"; an in-depth study of possible new "political and strategic guidance" for our operations in Vietnam and of our overall Vietnam policy; "no new peace initiative on Vietnam."

On bombing policy, opinions in the Clifford group were divided. Some wanted a "substantial extension of targets and authority" including mining Haiphong harbor; others proposed only a "seasonal step-up through the spring," without new targets.

The report and its attachments addressed the various questions I had raised in my directive of February 23. Some questions were answered in detail; others required additional study and analysis. As I read the Clifford group's report and its attachments and listened to the discussion around the Cabinet table, I detected among a few advisers a sense of pessimism far deeper than I myself felt. I had much greater confidence in Westmoreland and his staff in Vietnam than many people in Washington, especially Pentagon civilians. I also had more confidence in the ability and determination of the South Vietnamese people to defend themselves. On the other hand, I was deeply conscious of the growing criticism we were receiving from the press and from some vocal citizens.

The aspect of the Clifford group's report that troubled me most was its totally negative approach to any possible negotiations. On the basis of remarks made earlier by Rusk, McNamara, and

continued

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Washington report

'Missing' Red China officer now in Moscow, but why?

STATINTL

WASHINGTON — A strange new note has been added to the mysterious disappearance of a number of high-ranking Chinese Communist military officers.

One of the most important of this group was spotted in Moscow recently by a highly reliable source for the Central Intelligence Agency whose information has been extremely accurate in the past.

The "missing" Chinese officer is Gen. Holung, one of China's 10 field marshals before the People's Liberation Army dispensed with ranks during the nation-shaking "Cultural Revolution."

Before his mysterious disappearance several months ago, Holung was the commander of the First Field Army, one of the five in the Chinese People's Liberation Army. It is located in the strategic northwest region of China and consists of a force of more than 350,000 military personnel.

Exactly what Gen. Holung is doing in Moscow or how he got there is still a mystery in intelligence circles here. All the CIA's source in Moscow was able to provide officials here was definite proof that the Chinese officer spotted was Holung, and that he was with a group of high-ranking Russian military officers.

Still missing and unaccounted for are 73 other senior military Chinese officers of general rank who have been missing since the "Cultural Revolution". Among these officers is Gen. Chen-i, commander of the powerful Third Chinese Communist Field Army, which controls the East China Sea region of China.

Known to be friendly to Gen. Holung and toward the

By
Paul A.

Scott

Press
Writer
Special



Soviet Union, Chen-i is believed to still be alive and also in Moscow although the CIA has not yet been able to confirm this.

Holung's unexpected appearance in Moscow could mean one of several things.

One group of CIA experts believes Gen. Holung defected to Russia and is now working with the Kremlin for the overthrow of ailing Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist Party chairman, and Lin Piao, the deputy party chairman and defense minister.

The "defector" theory is based on recent information that Russia has set up a Chinese Communist government in exile in Moscow and is now recruiting supporters of deposed head of state Liu Shao Chi to fill its ranks.

Another group within the CIA contends that Holung is on a secret mission to Moscow for the Chinese military leadership. To support this theory, they stress that there has been no official Peking announcement of a replacement for Gen. Holung as the commander of the First Field Army.

The recent appearance in Peking of Yeh Chien-ying, an area commander under the "missing" Gen. Chen-i, has raised questions about the role that he might be playing in the new government in the Chinese Communist capital.

Gen. Yeh is a close friend

of Premier Chou En-lai, according to Chinese Nationalist diplomatic sources here. The New China News Agency, official organ of the Chinese Communist government, described Yeh as now being a member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and as vice chairman of the Central Military Affairs Commission.

His emergency in Peking, coinciding as it does with the continued "disappearance" of Marshal Lin Piao, the designated heir of Mao, has increased speculation here that he was summoned to the Chinese capital to represent the military in the talks now under way with Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's chief foreign policy adviser.

Before departing for Peking, Kissinger was given a CIA briefing on the background of Gen. Yeh and his rising importance within the Chinese military leadership and his close relationship with Chou En-lai.

CIA Director Richard Helms also asked Kissinger to determine, if possible, whether the President's proposed visit had anything to do with the political power struggle now under way in Peking.

The request was the result of a British intelligence estimate passed on the the CIA that the Nixon trip had acted as a catalyst among the leaders of the Peking regime, upsetting the political equilibrium of the government by splitting the military men, who now dominate the power structure, into two camps.

One group of military men, according to the estimate, would go along with the orderly management of China's

economy and bureaucracy, and use Chou's brand of international diplomacy to secure massive trade and aid from the U.S. The other group wants to stick with Mao and Lin Piao. They favor a strict conformity with Mao's thoughts, and the succession of Lin Piao to Mao-like leadership after Mao's death as provided for in for in the Communist Party Constitution of 1969.

If these supporting Mao and Lin Piao win out in the political struggle, it is the conclusion of the British intelligence estimate that the Nixon trip will be canceled. President Nixon and his intelligence advisers are hopeful Kissinger's visit to Peking will shed some new light on who is really running China.

In briefing congressional leaders on his upcoming Moscow trip, President Nixon reported that Soviet Foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko had suggested he visit Russia in July.

In proposing May instead, the President stated: "I told Gromyko that July would be too close to the star of the 1972 presidential campaign." The Democrats hold their party's national convention in Miami in July.

Rallies criticizing Pakistan for the situation in the Eastern part of the country are being held throughout Russia, according to the CIA. This is being taken as a sign at the White House that Russia is planning to step up its military aid to India.

Ex-President's Personal Record

STATINTL

Johnson Saw Need to Grasp Reins of Power Firmly, Quickly

By Lyndon B. Johnson

In spite of more than three decades of public service, I knew I was an unknown quantity to many of my countrymen and to much of the world when I assumed office.

I suffered another handicap, since I had come to the Presidency not thru the collective will of the people but in the wake of tragedy. I had no mandate from the voters.

A few people were openly bitter about my becoming President. They found it impossible to transfer their intense loyalties from one President to another. I could understand this, altho it complicated my task. Others were apprehensive. This was particularly true within the black community. Just when the blacks had had their hopes for equality and justice raised, after centuries of misery and despair, they awoke one morning to discover that their future was in the hands of a President born in the South.

Yet in spite of these yearnings for a fallen leader, in spite of some bitterness, in spite of apprehensions, I knew it was imperative that I grasp the reins of power and do so without delay. Any hesitation or wavering, any false step, any sign of self-doubt, could have been disastrous.

Averaged 4 Hours Sleep

During my first thirty days in office I believe I averaged no more than four or five hours' sleep a night. If I had a single moment when I could go off alone, relax, and forget the pressures of business, I don't recall it.

On Saturday morning, Nov. 23, I walked into McGeorge Bundy's office in the basement of the White House and received an international intelligence briefing from John McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. On that sad November morning in 1963 the international front was about as peaceful as it ever gets in these turbulent times. The world, it seemed, had ceased its turmoil for a moment—caught in the shock of John Kennedy's death.

President Kennedy had kept me well informed on world events, so I was not expecting any major surprises in that first intelligence briefing.

Only South Viet Nam gave me real cause for concern. The next day, Nov. 24, I received my first full-dress briefing from Henry Cabot Lodge, who had just returned to Washington from his post as ambassador in Saigon. But compared with later periods, even the situation in Viet Nam at that point appeared to be relatively free from the pressure of immediate decisions.

The most important foreign policy problem I faced was that of signaling to the world what kind of man I was and what sort of policies I intended to carry out.

Met with De Gaulle

On Monday, Nov. 25, I met with President Charles de Gaulle of France. Just a few hours before our conversation, I received a report from Paris of a recent meeting between De Gaulle and an allied ambassador. They had discussed what the European response would be to the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

"The Vantage Point," former President Lyndon B. Johnson's own story of his five years in the White House, is one of the key books of our time. In this highly personal record, and in this, the second in a series of 12 excerpts, President Johnson recalls the days of transition after he took office on that grim November day in Dallas.

President de Gaulle, according to the report, had said that the United States could not be counted on in such an emergency. He mentioned that the U. S. had been late in arriving in two world wars and that it had required the holocaust of Pearl Harbor to bring us into the latter.

With this account fresh in my mind, I met with the French president. I thanked him for crossing the Atlantic to express the sympathy of France in our hour of sadness.

The general spoke of the affection that both he and the French people had felt for John Kennedy. He then went on to say that the difficulties between our two countries had been greatly exaggerated, and that while changing times called for certain adjustments in our respective roles, the important thing was that Frenchmen knew perfectly well they could count on the U. S. if France were attacked.

I stared hard at the French president, suppressing a smile. In the years that followed, when De Gaulle's criticism of our role in Viet Nam became intense, I had many occasions to remember that conversation. The French leader doubted—in private, at least—the will of the United States to live up to its commitments. He did not believe we would honor our NATO obligations, yet he criticized us for honoring a commitment elsewhere in the world. If we had taken his advice to abandon Viet Nam, I suspect he might have cited that as "proof" of what he had been saying all along: that the U. S. could not be counted on in times of trouble.

Having met with the leader of France, our oldest ally, I turned to our relations with an adversary: the Soviet Union. On Tuesday morning, Nov. 26, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan came to my office. I knew that I was dealing with one of the shrewdest men ever to come up thru the Communist hierarchy. One of the few surviving Bolsheviks with real power, Mikoyan had been brought to Moscow by Stalin in 1926, had escaped innumerable purges and had demonstrated an uncanny ability to survive and to associate himself with the right faction at the right time.

Not All Pleasantries

We talked for 55 minutes and the conversation was not all diplomatic pleasantries. I remembered how Nikita Khrushchev had misjudged President Kennedy's character and underestimated his toughness after their 1961 meeting in Vienna. That misjudgment, many people believe, led Khrushchev to test the U. S. with a new crisis in Berlin. I considered it essential to let Mikoyan understand that while the U. S. wanted peace more than anything else in the world, it would not allow its interests, or its friends' and allies' interests, to be trampled by aggression or blackmail.

12 SEP 1971

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'Unidentified' Sources Blow Their Cover

BY HELEN THOMAS
UPI Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The so-called "backgrounder" for newsmen is taking a beating in Saigon these days—much to the amusement of White House reporters who must maintain the myth of an unidentified "spokesman" or "a White House official" in many news stories on top policy.

More and more the cover is being blown off the background, source, and soon it may become a thing of the past as a mode of transmitting important, but unattributable information.

Three weeks ago, U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker summoned a select group of reporters to the American Embassy to answer questions "on background" on his "neutral" involvement in seeing that there would be a contested election in South Vietnam Oct. 3. The statements he made, ascribed to an "informed source," were easily identifiable and quickly blasted by President Nguyen Van Thieu's opponents, Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky.

Flat Attribution

In follow-up stories, American newspaper correspondents flatly attributed the statements to Bunker.

The same was true on a "backgrounder" Ky gave to a group of reporters during which he threatened to "destroy" Thieu and raised the possibility of a coup. Soon after Ky was identified as the source of the threats.

Despite the precariousness of the "background" briefing these days, it is still used at the White House. But few of the world's chancelleries are fooled when a "high Administration" spokesman speaks out on China, Cuba, the Soviet Union or touchy relations elsewhere in the world. They assume, quite rightly, that it is the President's national security affairs adviser, Henry A. Kissinger.

Reporters would prefer to have the information straight — and attributable. But they settle for less when the White House is willing to give a candid assessment of its policy.

Also interesting to note is the number of times flat denials of news stories are put in the realm of "off-the-record" by the White House.



STATINTL

DOVISH NEDZI'S NEW JOB

Overseer to Lift CIA's Lid

By ORR KELLY

Star Staff Writer.

Shortly after Congress returns from its August recess, five congressmen will turn off the George Washington Memorial Parkway at an unmarked exit, swing back across the parkway on then overpass and suddenly emerge into a spacious, tree-dotted parking lot surrounding a gleaming white building.

Only after they have parked and entered the building will they see their first solid evidence — inlaid into the floor in a giant seal — that this is the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Heading the little group of congressmen will be Rep. Lucien Norbert Nedzi, a 46-year-old Democrat who has represented the eastern portion of Detroit since 1962, and who has just been named — to the surprise of many — as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on central intelligence.

Nedzi's record has not been the kind that would, on the surface, endear him to the more senior — and generally more conservative — members of the committee. He co-sponsored an end-the-war amendment in the House, has opposed the B1 bomber and the Safeguard missile defense system, and is one of a tiny group of rebels on the 41-man committee known as the Fearless Five.

Why did Rep. F. Edward Hebert, a Democrat from Louisiana, choose Nedzi for one of the most important subcommittee assignments — a post traditionally held by the chairman himself?

Nedzi Explains Choice

"The chairman was generally interested in having a review of this area," Nedzi explained in an interview. "My experience with him has been excellent — we understand each other. I know where he stands, and he knows where I stand. I have never deceived him and he has never reflected deception to me.

"He feels that we need to call a spade a spade and he feels I'll do just that."

Nedzi comes to his new assignment — which will cover all intelligence agencies, not just the CIA — with few preconceptions and, in fact, with no edge of the field.

"The senior members were on the Central Intelligence subcommittee and we were not privy to their deliberations. We had absolutely no information on the budgets of the agencies or what they were up to. Periodically, we got intelligence reports," Nedzi said.

The five-man subcommittee was, in the past, made up of the chairmen of the full committee and the two senior members from each party. The senior members serving with Nedzi will be Reps. Melvin Price, D-Ill., O. C. Fisher, D-Tex., William G. Bray, R-Ind., and Alvin E. O'Konski, R-Wis.

Nedzi had some brief exposure to the intelligence field when he served on a special subcommittee looking into the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo by the North Koreans.

Has Met Helms

He has met Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, on several occasions when Helms has appeared before the committee and he thinks highly of him. But Nedzi has never visited the CIA, has never called on the CIA for a special intelligence briefing, and does not know Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the super-secret National Security Agency.

The only time a top intelligence official has appeared in an open hearing in the last decade, was on June 2, 1961 when Helms, then No. 2 man in the CIA, testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee. Normally, Helms and other CIA officials not only testify in closed hearings but their names and the name of their agency are deleted before a transcript on the hearing is made public.

Sets Priorities

Despite his lack of experience in the area, Nedzi has a pretty good idea of the areas he would like to explore and he listed them this way:

1— Is there too much overlapping of functions among the CIA and the State and Defense Department intelligence operations?

2 — Are the budgets the proper size — and does all the information get to the man who needs it when he needs it?

3 — Are individual rights being protected? Nedzi is aware that military intelligence people have been told to cut out their domestic intelligence activities, but he wants to make sure the new rules are being obeyed.

4 — Is it proper for the CIA to manage operations such as those in Laos?

"There is a question of whether we should be involved in such operations and the further questions of whether this agency is the proper one to do it," Nedzi said.

5 — Should the whole system of security classification be revised?

"That this is a difficult area, I realize," Nedzi said, "and I'm not sure we're going to be able to come up with a Solomon-like decision."

6 — How are the national intelligence estimates arrived at? What really is the basis for arriving at decisions?

Since his selection for the new job announced earlier this week, Nedzi said, his phone has been constantly busy with callers volunteering information about U.S. intelligence operations.

"We will give them an appropriate audience," he said. "We are hearing from people with all sorts of axes to grind. We'll screen them all for substance, but no one is peremptorily dismissed."

STATINTL

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SUN-TIMES

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Adlai backs policy of not beating Nixon to Peking

By Thomas B. Ross

Sen-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.) said Friday that the State Department has advised China against admitting any senators or congressmen prior to President Nixon's visit. He felt "sure" Peking would comply.

Stevenson indicated support for the State Department policy and said he had passed the word to Peking that he did not think it would be "appropriate" for him to visit China until after Mr. Nixon's trip.

The senator applied for a visa a few hours before the President made his surprise July 15 announcement that he plans to go to China before next May.

To talk to CIA

Stevenson called a press conference to make a formal announcement of his plans to take a 25-day trip to Asia and the Soviet Union starting Wednesday.

His Asian stops will be Hong Kong, Thailand, South Vietnam and Japan.

Stevenson said he intends to concentrate on political and economic, rather than military, problems. However, he said he will discuss the war in Laos with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency at the CIA headquarters at Udon in northern Thailand.

In Saigon, he said he hopes to see President Nguyen Van Thieu, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and Gen. Duong Van (Big) Ming, who, with Ky, is threatening to challenge Thieu

in next October's presidential election.

'A special interest'

Stevenson said he has "special interest" in the political scene in South Vietnam since he fears, after an investment of 50,000 American lives and \$200 billion, the U.S. involvement will end in what is "perceived to be a crooked election (with) a U.S.-dictated outcome."

Stevenson said he intends to enter the Soviet Union from the east, stopping in Siberia at Khabarovsk and Irkutsk before going on to Moscow and Leningrad. He expressed the hope of arranging a meeting with Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin and other high Soviet officials.

He is scheduled to return directly from Russia to Chicago on Aug. 29. He will be accompanied by Thomas Wagner, his administrative assistant, and John Lewis, director of the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University.

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Many In Congress Happy To Stay Ignorant Of Secrets

Some Want Information, But House Voted To Keep Status Quo

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Does Congress really want to know everything the United States government does?

On balance, the answer is probably no, despite a renewed drive in Congress to dislodge foreign policy secrets from the executive branch.

Resolution Rejected

In fact, the House last week rejected, 261 to 113, a resolution asking the State Department for documents related to U.S. bombing and CIA operations in Laos.

Representative Joe D. Waggoner, Jr., (D., La.) said during the debate: "There are some things that some people in this country had better not know for the security and future well-being of this country. Therefore, they [the administration] must keep some information from me and they must keep some information from you for the benefit of the future security of this country. It is better that information as a rule be overclassified than underclassified."


Mr. Waggoner also expressed a widely held view that some members of Congress, if given secret information, could not resist the temptation of leaking some of it "to the New York Times or some other whistle blower."

The debate underscored a tacit assumption long held in Congress that the country is better served if legislators—except for a select few—are not told of everything the United States has done or is currently doing in the field of foreign affairs.

Being Challenged

This assumption, however, is now being challenged, unsuccessfully in the case of the House resolution asking for more information on Laos.

But an even more sweeping bill has been introduced in the Senate by John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.), who wants to give every member of Congress regular access to all intelligence reports and documents prepared for the executive branch by the CIA.



SENATOR COOPER
Seeks more disclosures

Mr. Cooper is one of the most highly regarded members of the Senate, and this is a factor of some importance in its club-like atmosphere in which the success or failure of a bill can hinge on who its sponsor is.

But Senator Cooper—a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee—must get his bill through the Armed Services Committee, which together with the Appropriations Committee has jurisdiction over the CIA. And even without national security considerations, congressional committees instinctively resist encroachment upon their areas of competence.

The last time an attempt was made to break the Armed Services Committee's lock on the CIA was in 1966, when then Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (D., Minn.) made a comparatively modest proposal to create a special CIA committee, made up of representatives of Armed Services, Appropriations and the Foreign Relations committees.

The late Senator Richard B. Russell (D., Ga.), then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, blocked the bill from coming to a floor vote on a procedural point, effectively killing the measure.

The Cooper bill is not likely to get far in the legislative process either. Aside from the jurisdictional problems, most members of Congress appear to be ambivalent about being told too much.



RICHARD HELMS
Knows all the secrets

Leverett Saltonstall, a Massachusetts Republican, was quoted recently as saying when he was a member of the Senate: "They [the CIA] do things I'd just as soon not know about."

Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, at least once a year gives separate intelligence briefings to small groups within the Armed Services and Appropriations committees in both houses of Congress and even to the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even though it does not have direct jurisdiction over the agency.

The annual briefings, according to congressional sources, consist of "around-the-world" assessments of the United States' military and intelligence posture. Other special briefings might deal with such topics as deployment and strength of Soviet nuclear missiles.

George H. Mahon (D., Texas), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, and F. Edward Hebert (D., La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said, as did Senate sources, that Mr. Helms has never refused to answer a question during these briefings.

Mr. Hebert said there was only one exception, when he instructed Mr. Helms not to answer a question put to him by a member of his panel.

"I took it on my own responsibility," Mr. Helms said, "and, of course, I won't tell you what the question was."

Senate sources indicate that senators, too, impose a certain amount of self-censorship during these intelligence briefings. One source said he has never heard a question pertaining to the so-called "dirty tricks" aspect of CIA operations.

"For example," he said, "we've never asked, 'Mr. Helms, how many people did you lose in your clandestine service last year?' Maybe we should ask it, but we never have."

But it is virtually impossible to ascertain precisely what even the select few who attend CIA briefings know about the agency's activities.

As Mr. Mahon, the Appropriations chairman, notes, he picks only those "who won't talk." Then, he refused to say who they are.

He said he was opposed to the Cooper bill, saying, "If you give it [CIA information] to every member of Congress it would be like giving it to the New York Times."

Chairman Hebert of Armed Services questioned the need to know everything.

"I don't know everything," he said, "and I'm not bitching about it."

On the other side of the issue, critics of the present system say that congress had deliberately remained ignorant to avoid responsibility.

Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) said during the House debate last week: "I fear Mr. Speaker, that many of us did not want to know all of the facts of our involvement in Vietnam in 1965 or 1968 or even yesterday. I think that the Congress has remained much too long in self-imposed insulation . . . We feared that more knowledge would mean more responsibility for us."

Others argued that the information the House was seeking was already well known to the enemy so it could not be withheld for national security reasons. As the House vote indicated, they represented a minority view.

For the moment, at least, the House appears to share fully in executive branch secrets.

C.I.A. Says Plan Seeks to Embarrass U.S.

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 8—The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Nixon that the new Vietcong peace proposal is aimed at embarrassing the United States "both at home and overseas" and encouraging the opponents of President Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam.

Other negative comments on the plan were contained in a detailed analysis submitted to Mr. Nixon and other top Administration officials last Friday a day after Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the chief Vietcong delegate, offered her proposals at the Paris talks.

The agency's evaluation, according to senior Administration officials, was one of several top-level studies of the Communist plan on which President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers based their decision to instruct the United States delegation in Paris to seek further clarifications today from the Communist side in "restricted sessions," or private talks.

Reservations Expressed

The evaluation as well as the parallel studies prepared in recent days by the State and Defense Departments and the National Security Council staff have expressed numerous serious reservations about the Vietcong plan.

But all the studies also found new elements in the plan. The C.I.A. paper, for example, noted that "it softens" the Communist position on the American prisoners of war and presents "two new nuances" on the South Vietnamese political settlement. For this reason, senior officials said, the Administration chose to seek to engage in what officials here termed "meaningful negotiations."

Senior officials emphasized that they did not consider the fact that the Communists had not responded immediately to the proposal for "restricted" sessions, made today in Paris by David K. E. Bruce, the chief United States negotiator, as an outright rejection.

They said that "something resembling a negotiating process may be in the making."

At San Clemente, Calif., where President Nixon and Mr. Rogers conferred for the third time this week on strategy in the Paris talks, a White House spokesman, Gerald L. Warren, said that Mr. Bruce was attempting to start "meaningful negotiations."

The State Department press officer, Charles W. Bray 3d, said here about the Bruce proposal that "we regret that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong did not respond affirmatively to this suggestion but continue to hope that they will do so."

Nixon Expected to Wait

Highly-placed officials indicated their belief that President Nixon would refrain from publicly expressing his views on the developments in the talks until the situation became "much clearer" through public or private exchanges in Paris.

They said that only after such clarifications would Mr. Nixon address the nation on the state of the negotiations. They recalled that last year he had waited nearly three weeks after the Communists presented their peace plan on Sept. 17 before making his counter-proposal on Oct. 7.

"At this stage, we are not prepared to reject or to accept anything as a package," a senior official said. "We are looking and we are probing because this is the business of diplomacy."

Other officials said that the negotiating situation would be reviewed again when Henry A.

Kissinger joins Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rogers in San Clemente on Sunday. The next scheduled session of the Paris talks is next Thursday.

Mr. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, visited Saigon last weekend and is to confer with Mr. Bruce in Paris on Saturday.

Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, whose agency was reported to have drafted the first analysis of the Vietcong plan, participated in the discussions on the United States response to the Communist proposals after he flew to San Clemente with President Nixon and Mr. Rogers last Tuesday.

Officials familiar with various Administration evaluations of the Vietcong plan said that the C. I. A. analysis was "perhaps the most pessimistic—but also the most realistic—of the lot."

Its over-all conclusion, contained in the first paragraph of the document, said:

"The Vietcong's new seven-point proposal softens the Communists' position on the prisoner-of-war release but retains and amplifies a very tough line on United States disengagement from the war. In

addition, it repackages Hanoi's demands for a political settlement in South Vietnam in a superficially more attractive form."

New Nuances Recognized

The analysis recognized, however, that "there are two new nuances in the Communist position on a political settlement in South Vietnam."

The principal features of Mrs. Binh's plan were the Communist readiness to start releasing United States war prisoners as American troops begin withdrawing from Vietnam after a date "in 1971" is set by Washington, and the dropping of the Communists' long-standing insistence on a coalition regime in Saigon as the condition for a political settlement.

But after analyzing the plan, the C. I. A. offered this assessment of the Communist motives in presenting their July 1 proposals:

"The Communists doubtless hope that their initiative on the prisoners—coupled as it is with a restatement of their basic position on United States withdrawals—will make things awkward for the United States Government both at home and overseas."

"They may also believe that their political proposals will appeal to many in the United States who are looking for a face-saving way out of the war. They probably are also hoping that the new proposal will fuel worries in Saigon about Washington's longer-term support."

"The new formula for a political settlement in South Vietnam, by its fuzziness and air of reasonableness, is designed both to encourage individuals in South Vietnam whose support of the war is wavering and to give some ammunition to those who are already working to build an anti-Thieu, anti-war constituency."

Coincidence of Beliefs

This aspect of the analysis was known to coincide with the belief in other Administration quarters that the Communist peace plan was launched, at least in part, to influence the outcome of the October elections in South Vietnam, where President Nguyen Van Thieu is seeking re-election.

In this context, the analysis noted that "among other things, the Communists seem intent on creating the impression that the election of Big Minh could prove an initial step toward peace."

"Big Minh" is Gen. Duong Van Minh, a potential but undeclared presidential candidate

upon whom Hanoi and the Vietcong had looked with favor in the past.

The analysis said that the Vietcong plan's first "new nuance" was that instead of demanding a coalition regime in Hanoi, it "simply demands that the United States 'cease backing the bellicose group' headed by Thieu."

The other nuance, it said, is that the Communists no longer ask a "three-segment" regime, including Communists, but a broad "government of national concord" to be negotiated by the Vietcong with a "post-Thieu administration."

"The Communists seem to be trying to leave the impression that the form of government is open to negotiation," the document said. "Moreover, the language of this section—and indeed much of the statement—is cast to convey an image of

conciliation and reasonableness without committing Hanoi to anything specific."


The analysts also warned against pitfalls in the Communist proposal for releasing the American prisoners in exchange for the withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam under a set deadline. This has appeared to be the most attractive aspect of Mrs. Binh's peace package.

But the analysis said that while "the formulation on the prisoner-release question is new," the Communist demand on total United States military disengagement "is as firm as ever."

"Moreover, by including for the first time civilian as well as military prisoners, the Communists are opening the whole thorny problem of the Communist civilian cadre who are now held by Saigon," it said.

STATINTL

8 JUL 1971



STATINTL

Nixon Sees Foreign Policy Aides

By FRANK JACKMAN
Staff Correspondent of THE NEWS

San Clemente, Calif., July 7—President Nixon met with his top foreign policy advisers at the western White House today to discuss, among other things, what the United States response should be to the seven-point peace proposals put forward by the Viet Cong at the Paris talks last week.

White House officials would not disclose the substance of Nixon's 90-minute meeting with Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Central Intelligence Director Richard M. Helms, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Haig, deputy special assistant for national security affairs, other than to

say it concerned "foreign policy matters."

Deputy White House Press Secretary Gerald C. Warren, asked about the U.S. assessment of Hanoi's new "flexible" stance at Paris, would say only, "The United States will continue to seek for serious negotiations in Paris."

Warren said the United States was continuing to "study" the Communists' proposals. "Our position will be presented in the proper forum," he said. The press aide refused to discuss what U.S. Ambassador David K. E. Bruce's reply might be at tomorrow's regular meeting of the Paris talks.

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JUL 7 1971

Meets Midwest Media Leaders

BY ALDO BECKMAN

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

KANSAS CITY, Mo., July 6
—President Nixon came to Kansas City today to discuss his domestic programs with newspaper and broadcast executives from 13 middle west states.

The President talked to the executives near the end of the briefing—one of a number of such sessions he has conducted thruout the nation. Before he spoke, White House Aides Donald Rumsfeld and John Ehrlichman briefed the participants, as did Elliot Richardson, secretary of health, education and welfare.

The President was to fly to the Western White House, in San Clemente, Cal., after today's briefing. He is expected to spend about two weeks there.

Greeted by Policemen

Nixon was greeted at Kansas City's Municipal Airport this afternoon by two Kansas City policemen, whom he had visited in a local hospital during a stopover here for a campaign speech last fall.

Patrolmen Charles F. Robinson and Kenneth M. Fleming, both returned to active duty, were hospitalized last fall with injuries they suffered when a bomb exploded in a neighborhood center sponsored by police in an effort to improve community relations.

Confer With Helms

Besides meeting with news executives here, the President was expected to confer briefly with local Republican officials for a general discussion of next year's election campaign.

Ronald L. Ziegler, White House press secretary, said that Nixon would confer with Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Secretary of State William Rogers on the flight from here to San Clemente. They will discuss Helms' recent trip to the Middle East, Ziegler said, but he refused to give any more details.

STATINTL

CIA Director Joins Nixon On Trip West

By FRANK JACKMAN

Kansas City, Mo., July 6—Central Intelligence Director Richard Helms joined President Nixon aboard Air Force One today to brief the Chief Executive on his recent top secret trip to the middle East.

The CIA chief, who returned to the United States during the holiday weekend, is known to have stopped in Israel for high-level conferences with Israeli officials.

White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler refused to say where else Helms visited, declaring it "the judgment of the agency" that no details be revealed of the spy chief's travels.

Rogers on Board

Also aboard the presidential jetliner for the trip here and then to the Western White House at San Clemente, Calif., was Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Helms is to return to Washington tomorrow, but Rogers will stay in San Clemente throughout the President's visit. Nixon briefed Midwest news executives on do- Helms' conference with Nixon and Rogers prompted speculation that there might be some movement on the Middle East peace front. Last week, so called "personal" suggestions toward a possible plan to reopen the Suez Canal, made by Donald Bergus, American envoy in Cairo, brought heavy criticism from the Israelis.

Turning to another part of the world, Ziegler said the administration, as always, was interested in "serious negotiations with the other side." He was responding to reports that Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, head of the Viet Cong delegation at the Paris peace talks, had indicated that there was nothing rigid about the peace proposals the Communists put forward last Thursday, and that she would gladly meet privately with an American to discuss the plan.

Cites Correct Forum

Asked to comment, Ziegler replied that "the other side knows what the appropriate forum is." He declined to be more specific, nor would he comment on reports of secret U.S. peace probes.

The White House insisted that Nixon's stay in California would be devoted mainly to domestic matters, such as preliminary work on the budget.

But it was notable that Rogers planned to stay in San Clemente that Henry A. Kissinger, Nixon's foreign affairs adviser, was scheduled to arrive on July 11 in

CAPITOL STUFF

By STAN CARTER

Washington, July 6—The Viet Cong's latest peace proposal is a sugar-coated pill with a bitter core. It offers President Nixon what appears to be a painful choice between obtaining the release of American prisoners and keeping his promise to give a non-Communist South Vietnam a reasonable chance to survive.

What to do about the dilemma will be the No. 1 business during Nixon's working vacation in California.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers and CIA Director Richard Helms flew to San Clemente with the President today. Presidential adviser

Viet Cong Offer

Is a Blueprint

For Taking Over

Henry Kissinger will join the policy huddle at the western White House this weekend after discussing the problem with President Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon and with the U.S. delegation at the Paris peace talks.

Meanwhile, Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, the chief American negotiator in Paris, will sound out the Communists at Thursday's session of the peace talks to try to determine whether there is anything negotiable in the seven-point proposal put forward by Madame Nguyen Thi Binh last week—or whether it is a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.

Taken as a whole, Madame Binh's proposal—just as much as previous Red proposals—is a formula for the Communists to take over South Vietnam. The Viet Cong delegate's second point calls for creation of a three-element coalition government, which the Viet Cong would dominate, to "organize" general elections. Her third point would permit North Vietnamese armed forces to remain in the South indefinitely. Her fourth point states that the reunification of North and South Vietnam "will be achieved step by step by peaceful means, on the basis of discussions and agreements between the two zones, without constraint and annexation from either party, without foreign interference."

The new elements are in the first point of the proposal, headed "Regarding the Deadline for the Total Withdrawal of U.S. forces."

After declaring that the United States must stop its policy of training and equipping South Vietnamese troops to gradually assume the burden of the war, must withdraw all troops and weapons, and must dismantle all U.S. bases in South Vietnam, Madame Binh made this offer:

"If the U.S. government sets a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1971 of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, the parties will at the same time agree on the modalities:

"A. Of the withdrawal in safety from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

"B. Of the release of the totality of military men of all parties and the civilians captured in the war (including American pilots captured in North Vietnam), so that they may all rapidly return to their homes.

"These two operations will begin on the same date and will end on the same date."



David K. E. Bruce
He'll test the positions

It's Seen as a Two-Channel Approach

Two things about the Communist proposal have caused excitement in Washington.

The first, of course, is the promise that the PWs would be released simultaneously with the pull-out of American forces from South Vietnam, if the United States accepted total withdrawal this year. Previously, all that the Communists had promised was to "discuss" the prisoner question once the United States set a definite date for total withdrawal.

The other is that the proposal did not specifically link the things that the Communists were demanding that the United States do with the things they were demanding from the Saigon regime. Besides the first point demanding total U.S. withdrawal this year, the only other point calling for American action was the sixth, a demand that the United States pay reparations for war damage to both North and South Vietnam.

"What they are doing," contended former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford, "is setting up two parallel lines of negotiations, saying to the United States, 'We'll negotiate with you on one line and give the prisoners back,' and on a parallel line setting up their idea of the kind of political settlement they would expect to make with South Vietnam."

Would It Be Abandoning the Vietnamese?

Not all U.S. officials are convinced of this, but whether the Communists are prepared to separate the U.S. withdrawal and prisoner issues from a solution to the South Vietnamese internal political situation will be one of the questions Bruce will seek an answer to in Paris.

The offer to trade release of the prisoners for total U.S. withdrawal this year could be a booby-trap all by itself. Pulling out 240,000 Americans and dismantling every U.S. base in South Vietnam in only six months would leave the South Vietnamese standing alone against both the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese a full year before it had been contemplated that they would be trained and equipped to take over the full burden of their defense.

That is the choice which Nixon faces. At the same time, he is under increasing political pressure to at least meet the Communist offer half-way. He is almost sure to make a counter-offer of some kind.

Nixon Voices Faith in U.S. Vitality

By GARNETT D. HORNER

Star Staff Writer

SAN CLEMENTE, Calif.— President Nixon appears confident about what he feels are two of his most nettlesome problems — negativism in the nation and continued involvement in the Vietnam war.

In a discussion with news and media executives in Kansas City, Mo., yesterday, Nixon said the United States is facing the kind of decadence that has destroyed civilizations, but has the courage, strength and vitality to survive.

He said he doesn't expect the Vietnam war to be an issue in his campaign for re-election next year.

Economic Issues

During the talk Nixon also:

- o Said the United States must guard for escalating competition with four other "economic superpowers" in the next quarter-century.

- o Called upon labor and management leaders to be "responsive and responsible" in their wage and price decisions to see that they are not inflationary.

- o Vigorously ruled out wage and price controls because "they cannot work in peacetime."

- o Declared that the United States "has in its hands the future of peace in the world in this last third of a century."

- o Urged Americans not to "let the problems of the moment obscure the great and good things that are going on in this country."

Rogers and Helms

Nixon spoke to editors and broadcast news executives from 13 states during the Kansas City stop as he flew from Washington to his cliffside home here for a two-week stay.

He is prepared to devote most of his time today to studying papers on the budget for the 1973 fiscal year, beginning July 1, 1972, involving basic decisions about domestic programs.

That the President was not neglecting foreign policy issues, however, was indicated by the fact that Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms flew to California with him.

Report on Mideast

Helms was returning to Washington today after reporting to Nixon and Rogers on his recent visit to Mideast countries, including Israel.

Rogers was expected to remain here throughout the President's stay. Henry A. Kissinger, the President's assistant for national security affairs, is to arrive next week to report on his mission to South Vietnam and the Vietnam peace talks in Paris.

In his remarks at Kansas City, Nixon did not mention the latest Viet Cong peace proposal, coupling an offer to release U.S. prisoners as American forces withdrew from Vietnam with other conditions considered unacceptable by the U.S. government.

'We Obscure Our Vision'

In an oblique reference, however, he said, "We are actively pursuing the negotiating channel" to end American involvement in the war.

One of America's difficulties in facing the world today, the President asserted, is that "we obscure our vision with Vietnam."

He said the Vietnam issue certainly will be ended and he posed the rhetorical question of what the world will look like a year from now "as Vietnam moves from our vision, or at least recedes from it."

Revenue Sharing "Essential"

Looking beyond Vietnam, Nixon pointed to four economic "super-powers—" challenging the U.S. He listed them as Western

Europe (with Great Britain in the Common Market), Japan, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

He said passage of his proposals for revenue sharing, government reorganization and welfare reform are essential if the nation is to deal with competition from these powers.

Upholding America's moral strength, the President said it is sometimes questioned because "we tend to allow the problems of the moment to obscure our vision of the future."

"We tend to allow our faults, and we have many, to obscure the many virtues of our society," he said.

Convinced of Courage

Nixon said the enormous strengths of the U.S. can be appreciated only in comparison to other countries. "I am speaking of freedom," he said. "I am speaking opportunity..."

Nixon said the nation is reaching the period comparable to that of Greece and Rome when those ancient civilizations "lost their will to live" and became subject to "The decadence that eventually destroys the civilization."

But he said he is convinced that "We have the courage, the strength out through this heartland and across the nation that will see to it that America not only is rich and strong, but that it is healthy in terms of moral and spiritual strength."

Asserting his belief that the United States "has in its hands the future of peace in the world this last third of a century," Nixon said he knows America cannot play the great role allotted it by destiny unless "this is a healthy land, with healthy environment, a healthy citizenry, a healthy economy..."

C.I.A. SAID TO DOUBT PENTAGON'S VIEW ON MISSILE THREAT

Senate G.O.P. Sources Say Agency Thinks Soviet Silos Are for Existing Arms

PROTECTIVE STEP SEEN

Moscow Is Believed to Be 'Hardening' Installations for Its SS-11's

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 25 — Senate Republican sources reported today that the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that at least two-thirds of the large new silo holes recently detected in the Soviet Union were intended for the relatively small SS-11 intercontinental missile and not for a large new weapon as the Defense Department has suggested.

This assessment casts a different light on Moscow's strategic intentions at a crucial time in the negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve some limitation on defensive and offensive strategic weapons.

It now appears to some arms control specialists that the Soviet Union, rather than seeking to achieve a first-strike capability against the United States with large new missiles, is following the American course of trying to protect its missiles against attack with "hardened" silos.

60 New Silos Detected

Some 60 large new missile silos in the Soviet Union have been detected in recent months by means of reconnaissance satellites. The C.I.A. was said to have concluded that at least two-thirds were intended for the SS-11 intercontinental missile, which is comparable to the Minuteman ICBM of the United States.

Some non-Governmental sources with access to Central Intelligence Agency information said that all but 15 of the new holes were situated in existing SS-11 missile fields.

The Senate Republican sources said they had been informed of the C.I.A. assessment by non-Governmental arms control experts who earlier had been briefed by the intelligence agency. These sources declined to be identified by name.

The Defense Department declined today to comment on the reported C.I.A. assessment because, as a department spokesman put it, "We would not have any comment on a speculative report like that."

But the spokesman said the department still held to the interpretation that the Soviet Union was deploying a modified version of its large SS-9 intercontinental missile or an entirely new missile system.

Much of the concern and speculation over the intended purpose for the new silos has sprung from their unusual size.

According to data obtained by the satellites, the holes were larger than those that had previously been dug for the SS-9, a large intercontinental missile that Defense Department officials have suggested the Soviet Union may be deploying as a "first strike" weapon against the United States's Minuteman force. This in turn gave rise to official speculation that the Soviet Union was planning to deploy an improved version of the SS-9 or perhaps an even larger, more powerful weapon.

Senator Henry M. Jackson, who first disclosed the detection of the new silo holes on a national television program March 7, said at the time that "the Russians are now in the process of deploying a new generation, an advanced generation of offensive systems." The Washington Democrat, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, described the development as "ominous indeed."

The Defense Department took a somewhat more cautious interpretation, saying that it had detected new ICBM construction but was not sure what the Soviet Union's intentions were.

But in a television appearance on March 10, Melvin R. Laird, the Secretary of Defense, said that the silo construction "confirms the fact that the Soviet Union is going forward with construction of a large missile system."

"We cannot tell at this time whether it is a modified version of the SS-9... or whether it is an entirely new missile system," he said.

Secretary Gives Warning

Then, in a speech April 22 before the American Newspaper Publishers Association, Mr. Laird said the United States had fresh intelligence information "confirming the sobering fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a new—and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program."

He warned that if this Soviet missile build-up continued, the Defense Department might find it necessary to seek a supplementary appropriation for more strategic weapons.

Last week, Administration officials were reported to have said that the Soviet Union was pressing ahead with its new missile program so rapidly that test firings of an improved SS-9 or an entirely new and larger missile were expected by this summer.

On the basis of new intelligence information, the C.I.A. was said today to have concluded that the larger holes could be explained not by a Soviet move to a larger missile but by an engineering step intended to protect the existing Soviet missile force.

According to the intelligence agency's analysis, the larger holes can be explained as an effort to "harden the silos, by emplacement of a concrete shell around them, to protect the weapons against the blast effects of a nuclear explosion. The larger hole is required to accommodate the concrete liners, according to the C.I.A. analysis.

Old Missile Fields Utilized

It was said that the first evidence that the Soviet Union might be "hardening" its missile sites rather than developing a new missile system appeared in the fact that the new holes were detected primarily in existing SS-11 missile fields.

If the Soviet Union was deploying a new weapon, it presumably would not situate the new missile emplacements among older missiles, according to the C.I.A. view.

The conclusive piece of evidence was said to have been received early last week when reconnaissance satellite pictures were received showing silo liners arriving at the missile holes. The photographs were said to have indicated that the liners at neither the SS-11 nor the SS-9 sites were big enough to accommodate larger

sites did not seem intended for weapons of altered design.

The United States started hardening its Minuteman silos some years ago as it saw the Soviet Union expanding its ICBM forces, and then began "superhardening" them as the Soviet Union began deploying the SS-9 missile.

Some arms control specialists now maintain that the Soviet Union now is turning to hardening its SS-11 and SS-9 missiles as it sees the United States deploying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, or multiple warheads, known as MIRV's, which potentially could acquire the accuracy to strike precisely at Soviet missile sites.

This was a point made today before the Senate Appropriations Committee by Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., a former official of the C.I.A. and the Disarmament and Arms Control Agency, now chairman of the Strategic Weapons Committee of the Federation of American Scientists.

A hardening of the Soviet missile sites, he observed "would not contribute to a first-strike capability and, if anything, would be an indication that a first strike was not a critical Soviet policy objective."

If it now turns out that the Soviet Union is only hardening the SS-9 and SS-11 missile silos, he said, "We must ask ourselves how many times we are going to allow the 'weaponers' to come before the Congress and the people shouting 'missile gap,' when in reality they are only creating another 'credibility gap.'"

STATINTL

Meo Culpa

Tragedy for the Meo tribes in Laos came unexpectedly in the bright promise of the New Frontier: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." Whether, in January 1961, John F. Kennedy had in mind supporting an obscure former sergeant in the French army, a Meo named Vang Pao, to hold back the Communists in the hills north and east of the Mekong valley, preferably all the way to the China border, is not known. But Laos was much in the news at the time of Kennedy's inauguration. In December 1960 Gen. Phoumi Nosavan and Prince Boun Oum, in a bloody coup, had deposed the left-wing cabinet of Quinim Polsena and chased away Capt. Kong Le and his neutralists. The coup polarized factions and reopened the civil war. The Soviet Union and the US accused each other of supporting contending factions, and Eisenhower reportedly remarked to Kennedy that Laos was then a most crucial problem in foreign affairs. Now, a decade later, the Meo tribe has been decimated; an entire primitive people is facing genocide. How did it happen?

In the first year of the Kennedy era, foreign service officials from every department and agency, spurred on by the attorney general, Robert F. Kennedy, were dragooned into counterinsurgency courses at the Foreign Service Institute. The Pentagon's contribution was the doctrine of "flexible response." The President adopted the Green Berets. The Meos with CIA arms and radio training quickly became the secret toast of the town.

But by 1962 there was concern that as the number of Meo under arms reached the thousands there might be a sharp Communist reaction, and the US might then have the task of caring for and feeding the whole Meo population in Laos—all 400,000 of them. Averell Harriman, then assistant secretary of state for the Far East, was apprehensive, but not enough to try to stop the counterinsurgency delirium. His successor, Roger Hilsman, made it his business to approve the introduction of each rifle and round of ammunition into the Meo areas, determining which side of a given rock the Meos were to choose on a mountain trail, demonstrating his West Point training, World War II guerrilla experience and Department of State control over the operation.

CIA enjoyed its paramilitary role: for once it was safe from Pentagon "help" (read take-over). Overt, acknowledged intervention in Laos by the Pentagon would have violated the 1954 Geneva Accords. Clandestine help, on the other hand, violated only the spirit of the agreement, and, both sides were playing that game. To this day the CIA has been able to maintain operational control of the Meo operation. As Com-

munist pressures on the Meo increased and casualties rose, so did the size of US support that flowed through CIA. Well over 10,000 of "our" Meos were under arms.

William R. Bundy (now editor-designate of *Foreign Affairs*) succeeded Hilsman in 1964, and although he catnapped through the briefings, he was still the resident Laotian guerrilla expert in the Capital. McGeorge Bundy, in his fortress in the White House situation room, scheduled briefings on the situation from returning CIA officers, just in case President Johnson wanted an encouraging word. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara huddled over detail maps of Laos and on occasion planned tactical operations of regular Lao army units and Meo guerrilla bands.

The effort to build a buffer against China through the Meos pitted a primitive, tough people against the more sophisticated North Vietnamese and their local supporters, and we are now witnessing the consequences. Since 1960 "at least 40-50 percent of the men have been killed and 25 percent of the women have fallen as casualties of the war," says Senator Edward Kennedy's 1970 report on refugees. Near the CIA-supported base of Long Cheng, north and east of Vientiane, almost 200,000 Meos depend on air drops of rice (the main task of the US AID mission) for survival. They cannot return to their homes in the hills; the Communists are there. And they cannot survive on the plains because of climate and the competition from the more advanced lowland people. The whole Meo tribe is one vast refugee group.

What has this using of one Asian group to fight another for US ends taught us? Very little. Indeed, "let's you and him fight" has become formal US doctrine. ". . . We shall look to the nation directly threatened," the President said last November 3, "to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense." (i.e., the Meo nation.) And the US, said Mr. Nixon, will furnish "military and economic assistance when requested." (i.e., the CIA, the Department of State's chosen instrument for the Meo operation.) The locals supply the bodies.

Sooner or later, the peoples in the Indochina peninsula will have to bind their wounds. In the meantime, the Meo troops and their families fighting the North Vietnamese are being pushed over the mountain wall into the Mekong valley, refugees of a torn, dying culture. The question now is, as *The New York Times* recently put it, "whether the time has come to move the Meos out of the war while there are still enough men left to assure the nation's survival." It's a grim end to the first clear test of the logic of the Nixon Doctrine.