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Palestinians' Munich disclaimer taken with a grain of salt

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Beirut, Lebanon

The belated statement by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) disclaiming responsibility for the Munich attack by the Black September organization is a formal and tactical move that should not be taken too literally.

Much of its significance turns on the meaning to be given to the word "responsibility." If this is taken to mean "with the prior knowledge and the prior approval of" then the PLO can truthfully deny its responsibility.

It had no prior knowledge because Black September is the one Palestine guerrilla group that has managed to maintain tight secrecy around itself and its operations, and it is well known that there is little or no secrecy in the PLO. And there would not have been prior approval, for the young men and women in Black September broke away simply because of what they felt was the pussyfooting moderation of the older organizations grouped in the PLO. (Till as late as 1969 Al-Fatah, the largest group, was insisting that its attacks should be on military targets and personnel.)

But if "responsibility" means "with the approval of," then the PLO was telling a tactful tactical untruth in disclaiming responsibility because Palestinians at all levels — from university professor to truck driver —

approve of Black September unanimously, proudly, and defiantly.

This approval, subsequent to the event, is certainly felt, privately, by members of the PLO executive committee which issued the disclaimer.

After all, only one Arab ruler, King Hussein of Jordan, has expressed disapproval of Munich.

There are, of course, precedents for such formal disclaimers. The State Department would deny responsibility for some of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency's undercover operations. And, more apropos, the Jewish Agency in the 1940's always denied responsibility for the violent acts of the Stern Gang and the Irgun Zvei Leumi, though it is now known, backed by a decision of the Israeli Supreme Court, that they were all part of a single overall organization. The PLO is thus simply stating its position for the record.

The Israelis are unlikely to believe it because Tel Aviv newspapers are issuing what they claim to be lists of the names of leaders of Black September which link that group which Al-Fatah. But these are no more than guesses and part of the propaganda game.

More important is the fact that in its last few meetings, the PLO executive committee made progress, though painfully slowly, toward the unification of its various groups.

7 AUG 1972

Intelligence Men Move Into State Dept.

By Jack Anderson

An estimated 1,500 intelligence agents have quietly infiltrated the State Department where they carry on their spying activities in diplomatic garb.

Operatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency have taken over many key posts.

This has caused considerable grumbling and grievances among old-line foreign service officers. They have charged privately that promotions have been rigged, transfers arranged and even a few resignations forced to clear foreign service officers out of the way so intelligence agents can take over their jobs.

One grievance case, hushed up by the State Department, involves foreign service officer Charles Anderson, who claims he was bumped from his political job in Sofia to make room for a CIA agent. When Anderson complained about the transfer, he got a low efficiency rating for his pains.

Anderson refused to comment, but his friends told us about his grievance. Other

State Department sources described how the cloak-and-dagger boys were moving into the diplomatic service. The 1,500 figure came from personnel officers. An official spokesman, however, refused to comment on the number of CIA and related spies in the department.

Bank Benefits

The nation's tax laws have sprung so many leaks that half the money due the government now escapes into the pockets of the privileged. Treasury experts claim the tax rate could be cut in half, without reducing federal revenue a single cent, if Congress would only plug the tax loopholes.

Instead, Congress keeps poking new loopholes in the laws until the taxpayers have their dander up.

Few special interests have wangled more benefits out of Congress than the banking lobby. Banking legislation is handled by the Senate and House Banking Committees, which always seem to be dreaming up new benefits for the banks.

For Tuesday, Senate Banking Chairman John Sparkman

(D-Ala.) has scheduled a closed session to consider the latest bonanza for the banks. This bill, carried on the Senate docket as S-3652, was actually drafted by the American Bankers Association.

A Senate staff study, dated Aug. 1 and stamped "Confidential," calls the bill "the most unconscionable example of special interest legislation (we) have seen" recently.

The staff estimates that the bill "could cost the states as much as a billion dollars a year in tax revenues and possibly more."

Citing figures supplied by the Federal Reserve Board, the memo alleges that the average business firm has a relative state and local tax burden four times greater than commercial banks. It adds:

"Once state legislatures wake up to this great disparity, they might very well seek to raise the low level of taxes paid by banks. If banks were taxed at the same rate as other business firms, state and local tax revenues would be increased by \$2.2 billion."

This bill, warned the memo, would block the states from charging banks the same tax rates as other businesses.

A spokesman for the American Banking Association acknowledged that S-3652 had been drafted by the bankers but claimed it merely clarified recommendations made by the Federal Reserve Board. The bill was introduced, he said, by Sen. Wallace Bennett (R-Utah) at the request of the bankers.

Political Potpourri

George McGovern, in his search for a new running mate, first tried Ted Kennedy, then Hubert Humphrey. Both men turned him down but offered to campaign for him... Humphrey found his old friend McGovern despondent over the ordeal of choosing a running mate... McGovern never asked his former running mate, Tom Eagleton, for his opinion on a successor. But privately, Eagleton told us he thought former Democratic Party Chief Larry O'Brien was the best available man... McGovern was uneasy, incidentally, that headstrong members of the Democratic National Committee might not accept his recommendation and might put up their own candidate for Vice President.

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on 16 of the issues, I believe, and we accepted 11. We think the ones we got them to recede on were perhaps more important than the others. We had to compromise on something, and this is one of the things we reluctantly compromised on.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Speaker, the chairman has explained the problems in this conference report. I rise in support of this report on the conference with the Senate to resolve differences in the authorizing legislation for the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Peace Corps.

I am pleased to report that your conferees were generally successful in protecting the House position.

We had a vigorous discussion of the Senate language establishing a grievance procedure for foreign service personnel. While I agree that a grievance procedure should be established, I am pleased that the Senate conferees agreed to let us handle the legislation in a more orderly manner. Our subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations began hearings this week and will continue them on July 18, following the recess.

However, I am not pleased with the necessity of our acceptance of the Senate proposal for a Study Commission relating to foreign policy. We did succeed in improving the Senate language, but I find little merit in the proposal. It is not at all clear to me what useful purpose this Commission is supposed to serve.

This is the first time funds have had to be specifically authorized for the Department of State and USIA as required by a provision of last year's Foreign Assistance Act. The authorization for State Department includes funds for administration of foreign affairs, international organizations and conferences, educational exchanges, and migration and refugee assistance. These amounts total \$648,354,000, of which \$85 million is to assist in the resettlement of Soviet Jewish refugees in Israel.

The USIA authorization amounts to \$200,249,000 for fiscal year 1973. Of this amount, \$194 million is for salaries and expenses, including the funding of various media programs. The remaining funds are largely for international exhibitions.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would receive an authorization in the amount of \$22 million for the 2 fiscal years, 1973 and 1974. The recent SALT agreement is, I believe, ample evidence of the value of ACDA's work.

The Peace Corps authorization is for \$88,027,000, the amount agreed to by both the House and the Senate.

I urge approval of this conference report, in spite of my reservations concerning the creation of another commission whose function is of dubious value, in my judgment.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM).

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise in support of the conference report.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this conference report. I believe the conferees have done a fine job under the circumstances.

I am, of course, gratified that adoption of this conference report will represent final action by the Congress in approving the \$85 million of aid to Israel to help with the resettlement of the Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union which I proposed, along with Congressman HALPERN and many cosponsors in H.R. 13022 on February 8, 1972.

I sincerely hope that the Appropriations Committee will act promptly to provide the funds required to carry out this authorization.

Mr. MAILLIARD. I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York.

(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, as a conferee on this conference report, I rise to support it, but I do so with some reluctance. My reservations about the report have to do with the proposed study commission relating to foreign policy. I might point out that one House conferee did not sign the conference report at all—Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin. I do not wish to speak for him, but I know he, too, has serious reservations about the wisdom of authorizing a commission of this kind. I would like to suggest that the Appropriations Committee take a very close look at what is proposed, take a close look at what a commission of this kind would get into, and how much it would cost.

The chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee said that none of the House conferees is very happy with the proposal, and the gentleman from California said that at least the commission will die in 1974. My view is that we should really not allow it to be born. The very broad mandate which it is given has to me the earmarks of a fishing expedition. It takes the form of a little Hoover commission with 12 members, eight of whom are to be appointed by the legislative branch of the Government.

Take a look at the language regarding what should be its duties. I refer to the language on pages 9 and 10. It begins at the bottom of page 9:

It says: "The Commission shall study and investigate." I am not sure what that means. Is to study something else than to investigate? It goes on: "the organization, methods of operation, and powers of all departments, agencies, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the United States Government participating in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy." It goes on to say the Commission "shall make recommendations which the Commission considers appropriate to provide improved governmental processes and programs"—I am not sure what that means.

The specific recommendations have to do with "the reorganization of the departments, agencies, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the

executive branch participating in foreign policy matters. I suppose anyone who has taken a look at the broad field of the executive branch of the Government would recognize that shifts in responsibility might be made. The President has suggested certain shifts and consolidations within the executive branch, but in the field of foreign policy I would suppose there is not going to be any major restructuring of any Government departments or agencies.

We are supposed to authorize this Commission to make recommendations with respect to "more effective arrangements between the executive branch and Congress, which will better enable each to carry out its Constitutional responsibilities." Well, Mr. Speaker, I know that there are Members of the other body which have a kind of persecution complex with respect to the executive branch in the field of foreign policy. It may be they want some kind of instrumentality to help define what the relationships should be between the executive branch and the legislative branch in this area, but I would think this search for "more effective arrangements" is going to be a difficult responsibility.

What are we aiming at? What kind of more effective arrangements between the executive branch and the Congress could a commission suggest that we legislators might not think of if we do not think the relationships are good?

They are also supposed to make recommendations for "improved procedures among departments—to provide improved coordination"—I suppose it was just an accident that they speak of improved procedures to provide improved coordination. No one doubts there is need for coordination in the field of foreign policy within the executive branch. Indeed, this conference report pinpoints a major responsibility in the Department of State by designating a new position of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. In the field of foreign economic policy, there is unquestionably need for additional coordination and control with respect to the foreign policy questions, but I doubt very much whether any commission is going to throw much light on what should be the proper relationships between the various agencies of our Government.

The responsibilities in subparagraphs (4) and (5) on page 10, include "the abolition of services, activities, and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of foreign policy"—that could point in any direction or in no direction. What activities of the Federal Government in the field of foreign policy are not necessary to its efficient conduct? I suppose there must be some. The Senate must have had something in mind, or the sponsors of this proposal must have had something in mind, in making this suggestion.

In sum, what I am saying, Mr. Speaker, is that we need to be careful about a proposal of this kind, because the field is so big, because the responsibilities of both the executive and legislative branches of our Government are so intermixed that a commission with the best of intentions might muddy the waters.

And if a commission were to do a thorough job, they would require, I would


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DIPLOMATIC NOTES

The Ten Commandments of
the foreign-affairs bureaucracy

by Leslie H. Gelb
and Morton H. Halperin



THE AVERAGE READER of the *New York Times* in the 1950s must have asked: why don't we take some of our troops out of Europe? Ike himself said we didn't need them all there. Later, in 1961, after the tragicomic Bay of Pigs invasion, the reader asked: how did President Kennedy ever decide to do such a damn fool thing? Or later about Vietnam: why does President Johnson keep on bombing North Vietnam when the bombing prevents negotiations and doesn't get Hanoi to stop the fighting?

Sometimes the answer to these questions is simple. It can be attributed squarely to the President. He thinks it's right. Or he believes he has no choice. As often as not, though, the answer lies elsewhere—in the special interests and procedures of the bureaucracy and the convictions of the bureaucrats.

If you look at foreign policy as a largely rational process of gathering information, setting the alternatives, defining the national interest, and making decisions, then much of what the President does will not make sense. But if you look at foreign policy as bureaucrats pursuing organizational, personal, and domestic political interests, as well as their own beliefs about what is right, you can explain much of the inexplicable.

In pursuing these interests and beliefs, bureaucrats (and that means everyone from Cabinet officials to political appointees to career civil servants) usually follow their own version of the Ten Commandments:

1. Don't discuss domestic politics on issues involving war and peace.

On May 14, 1954, President Truman held a meeting in the White House to discuss recognition of the

new state of Israel. Secretary of State George Marshall and State Undersecretary Robert Lovett spoke first. They were against it. It would unnecessarily alienate forty million Arabs. Truman next asked Clark Clifford, then Special Counsel to the President, to speak. Arguing for the moral element of U.S. policy and the need to contain Communism in the Middle East, Clifford favored recognition. As related by Dan Kurzman in *Genesis 1948*, Marshall exploded: "Mr. President, this is not a matter to be determined on the basis of politics. Unless politics were involved, Mr. Clifford would not even be at this conference. This is a serious matter of foreign policy determination . . ." Clifford remained at the meeting, and after some hesitation, the U.S. recognized Israel.

The moral merits of U.S. support of Israel notwithstanding, no one doubts Jewish influence on Washington's policy toward the Middle East. And yet, years later, in their memoirs, both Truman and Dean Acheson denied at great length that the decision to recognize the state of Israel was in any way affected by U.S. domestic politics.

A powerful myth is at work here. It holds that national security is too important, too sacred, to be tainted by crass domestic political considerations. It is a matter of lives and the safety of the nation. Votes and influence at home should count for nothing. Right? Wrong. National security and domestic reactions are inseparable. What could be clearer than the fact that President Nixon's Vietnam troop reductions are geared more to American public opinion than to the readiness of the Saigon forces to

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defend themselves? Yet the myth makes it bad form for government officials to talk about domestic politics (except to friends and to reporters off the record) or even to write about politics later in their memoirs.

And what is bad form on the inside would be politically disastrous if it were leaked to the outside. Imagine the press getting hold of a secret government document that said: "President Nixon has decided to visit China to capture the peace issue for the '72 elections. He does not intend or expect anything of substance to be achieved by his trip—except to scare the Russians a little." Few things are more serious than the charge of playing politics with security.

Nevertheless, the President pays a price for the silence imposed by the myth. One cost is that the President's assumptions about what public opinion will and will not support are never questioned. No official, for example, ever dared to write a scenario for President Johnson showing him how to forestall the right-wing McCarthyite reaction he feared if the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam. Another cost is that bureaucrats, in their ignorance of Presidential views, will use their own notions of domestic politics to screen information from the President or to eliminate options from his consideration.

2. Say what will convince, not what you believe.

In the early months of the Kennedy Administration, CIA officials responsible for covert operations faced a difficult challenge. President Eisenhower had permitted them to begin training a group of Cuban refugees for an American-supported invasion of Castro's Cuba. In order to carry out the plan, they then had to win approval from a skeptical new President

Know Your Environment

(Or Bureaucratic Survival
For Fun and Profit)

DAVID D. NEWSOM



In the field, Foreign Service officers receive tantalizing hints of the complexity of foreign policy making. They deal with members of the country team representing other agencies. They witness the sometimes tortured replies which come back to requests to the Department. In the field, diplomats have been protected by the fact that the Department had the ultimate responsibility. They make recommendations; they could indulge in advocacy, but in most cases theirs is not the final word. In the Department there is no recourse. How can FSOs best contribute to that leadership in foreign affairs for which we in the Department are responsible?

First, it is essential to understand the environment. Don't rail against the complexity. It is there. Learn its demands and requirements.

The President of the United States needs answers in times of crises. He needs recommendations for longer-range problems. He needs them quickly, concisely, and

accurately. He needs them within a broad framework of his own policies and politics. Furthermore, the field of foreign policy—while of great importance to him—is only one of several critical areas in which he must make decisions involving domestic policies, other international obligations, public mood and public opinion, the Congress, the personalities around him, his own broad objectives. He and the men around him have no time for patience, for prolonged arguments or for costly mistakes.

The Secretary of State and the Department beneath him must

provide prompt, intelligent and effective responses in the field of foreign affairs that will mean success both internationally and domestically or the President will look elsewhere. That is what contemporary controversy about State is all about.

This broader view seems to come hard to an FSO. They resent those looking over their shoulders whom they classify as outsiders or "politicals." FSOs forget that, even though professionals, they are part of a system based essentially and happily on a democratic political process. They are not truly sensitive to the fact "the outsider" may have corresponding doubts about the professional. The career man is not associated with an administration, has not faced the battering of a political campaign, and does not depend upon the political success of an administration for his future.

In Washington, therefore, Foreign Service officers have no special status. They are, in fact, members of a group which traditionally in the White House and by the political level of the Department is often regarded with suspicion and doubt. To be effective in Washington, they

must prove their understanding of the environment. FSOs need not be a part of it, but must recognize it and work with it. The Foreign Service is accepted and succeeds only to the

Mr. Newsom has been Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs since July 1969. An FSO since 1947, Mr. Newsom is a member of the Board of the Foreign Service and President of the

Association. He has served at Karachi, Oslo, Baghdad and as Ambassador to Libya. He received the National Civil Service League Career service award in 1971.

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Decline and Fall at Foggy Bottom

By ROBERT KEATLEY

WASHINGTON—The Japanese have demanded equal time and will get it: Henry Kissinger, at liberty between Mexico and Moscow, will soon spend three days in Tokyo explaining U.S. policies to business and political leaders there.

From Japan's viewpoint it seems only fitting. After all, the Chinese were awarded three visits by the senior White House adviser and the Russians will soon get their turn—so why not the Japanese too? Japan is dismayed by some American diplomatic tactics, and leaders want an explanation from someone who, in their eyes, really counts.

For Mr. Kissinger, it's an opportunity to do vital service. Japan remains the main U.S. friend in Asia, as the President repeatedly states, and so reassuring Tokyo is important work. Though the White House aide has limited respect for Japanese sophistication in foreign affairs, his usual erudition and intellectual brilliance may well calm Tokyo's assorted fears.

But back at the State Department the diplomats are increasingly dismayed. The coming Kissinger journey is just one more sign—in case another is needed—that foreign policy has become a White House preserve, and that influence of the department and Secretary of State Rogers is often marginal at best.

Two Questions

Much has been written about this shift of authority from Foggy Bottom, as State's neighborhood is rather inelegantly called. So perhaps two questions should be raised: Who really cares? And what difference does it make?

Well, some people do care a great deal. Foremost, of course, are the foreign service officers themselves. About 3,000 strong, at home and abroad, they joined the diplomatic ranks under the illusion they would help steer the ship of state. Now they often find themselves shuffling papers for Henry Kissinger, deeply suspicious that the White House is burying them in busy work while it makes the decisions on its own. They have little sense of participation, and a spreading belief that their chosen profession has grown irrelevant.

Assorted internal bureaucratic problems add to their gloom. The service is top-heavy with rank just when its overall size is shrinking for policy and budgetary reasons; this means fewer promotions and fewer challenging jobs to go around. Moreover, the genial Mr. Rogers displays only intermittent interest in the bureaucracy he nominally heads. His loyalty is basically to Mr. Nixon. Many diplomats think he just doesn't care much about State's complex problems, and many subordinates complain that he doesn't work hard enough.

But outside these directly affected bureaucrats, there seem to be few worries. Sen. Fulbright and a few other legislators talk occasionally about putting affairs of state back in the State Department. And some Capitol Hill staffers—former foreign service officers among them—also wring their hands, while the State Department press corps frequently revives the issue. But it seems doubtful

say that the power transfer is not a matter of great public concern.

So what does it matter? Can critics prove that U.S. foreign policy is bad because State's experts often neither devise it nor execute it?

Doing so would be difficult. Even some of the most righteously indignant diplomats concede admiration for the main lines of Nixon foreign policy. He is pulling troops from Southeast Asia rather than sending more in. (The current air buildup is dismissed, too lightly perhaps, as a temporary aberration). Two decades of misguided China policy have been reversed, and to popular acclaim. More serious negotiations, about more things, are now under way with the Soviet Union than ever before. Meantime, relations with Western Europe—still the prime U.S. foreign policy concern—seem smoother than during the 1960s. Indeed, many argue that policy is now more innovative precisely because it has been wrested from a sluggish State Department.

This transfer wasn't a simple matter of a nimble Kissinger out-flanking a lethargic Rogers, as some would have it. Mr. Kissinger is a rather cunning bureaucrat in his own right, with proven ability to operate within the framework of President Nixon's work style and prejudices. But as the principals explain it, the power shifted basically because Mr. Nixon wanted it to.

He sees management of the federal bureaucracy as a key problem of any presidency. Bureaucracies, he thinks, spend too much time administering themselves and protecting their own interests and not enough in creating and administering innovative policies or in responding to the President's desires. Mr. Kissinger seems to share this view.

Mr. Kissinger, for example, believes the policy meetings he heads are leaner than those run by senior State Department officials. In his view, he is ruthless about who can attend; State lets in anybody with a marginal interest in the subject at hand. His meetings end with crisp decisions; State's ramble on to mushy compromises. When appropriate, he give Mr. Nixon a range of options to choose from; State too often serves up a bureaucratic consensus for the Chief Executive to ratify or reject in its entirety.

Close observers believe there were other, more personal, reasons that Mr. Nixon wanted foreign policy shifted to the White House.

They think the President has held a grudge against State ever since Alger Hiss days, when he attacked the department vigorously. Intensifying that grudge may be galling memories of the 1960s, when Mr. Nixon, a political loser, traveled widely. Sometimes he got off-hand treatment from U.S. embassy personnel who saw him as a has-been; he is not a man to forget such slights. The President may also still see himself as a poor California boy battling an entrenched Eastern establishment.

More generally, Mr. Nixon is said to consider the entire federal bureaucracy a Democratic enclave opposed to Republican rule, a result of the FDR days. "He also believes but think in sweeping, global terms," says one

foreign service officer, who adds candidly: "He is often right about that."

Long-Range Considerations

All these reasons may explain why State has suffered even if foreign policy has not, at least not so far. Yet there are some longer-range considerations that suggest the Nixon-Kissinger management could eventually do disservice to the national interest.

For one thing, many thoughtful officials believe policy revolves too much around the person of Mr. Kissinger—no man to allocate authority and acclaim to others. Despite heroic workdays, he just doesn't have time for everything, and important matters can slide while his attention is focused on the crisis of the day.

For example, South Asian policy may have gone sour partly because the White House worried mainly about strategic arms limitation talks and China, ignoring early warnings from State. By his own admission, the senior advisor has little interest in international economic problems; he has tended to slough them off. Even Mr. Kissinger's own staff grumbles about its inability to get his attention when some alleged crisis preoccupies him; the system funnels everything to him and has no other outlets.

Likewise, the Security Council system has grown complex partly because the Nixon-Kissinger team believes State incapable of initiative and action. Yet this alternate structure seems sure to stifle innovation; despite the administration's talks about seeking "options," the structure it relies most upon often chokes off backtalk and rival policies. For some, it seems an attempt to cure State's stodginess by guaranteeing that it will grow even more dull.

Diplomats wonder if encouraging such mediocrity is really what the White House wants. Unless some practices are changed, they see a foreign service stripped of its best men (many now seem to be seeking other work), leaving plodders charged with representing U.S. interests abroad. Some even say the quality of young people seeking jobs at State has dropped. This doesn't bode well for important international negotiations, nor for the vital flow of information needed for policy-making. Bad intelligence can only lead to bad policy, these diplomats contend.

Finally, State's denizens grumble because outsiders so clearly realize where power now lies. The Japanese, for example, weren't satisfied with the visit last March of Assistant Secretary Marshall Green, the top Asian hand at State. In requesting a higher-powered personage, they didn't ask for Mr. Rogers; they asked for Mr. Kissinger.

Time and Trends

The problem is that the White House adviser hasn't time for all who demand his attention—even if he had the urge to see them. Meantime, the structure designed for such business calls, over at State, is under-used.

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BY STEWART ALSOP

THE GHOST AT FOGGY BOTTOM

WASHINGTON—Secretary of State William Rogers is an able and likable man, but there is beginning to be something faintly translucent about him. Despite his claim a few days ago that he was “not dispirited” and that in Peking he did not feel “excluded at all,” there is a certain ghostliness about the Secretary since the Peking journey.

A major political figure in this cruel town becomes ghostly as soon as it is generally believed that he is on his way out. A chief subject of speculation in Washington now is not whether but when Secretary Rogers will leave the State Department, and thus he has become a ghost.

Secretary Rogers was already, as in the children's game, two-thirds of a ghost before the Peking trip. He began to look a bit translucent long ago, when it first became evident that Henry Kissinger had far more real influence on foreign policy than the Secretary of State. But it was Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai who really made Rogers a ghost.

It has been widely assumed that his old friend, President Nixon, humiliated the Secretary of State for reasons of his own when he excluded him from the key meetings with Mao and Chou. But that is not really how it happened. What really happened is that the President, as soon as he realized that Rogers was in an embarrassing position in Peking, made a real effort to save his Secretary's face; but the Chinese refused to cooperate with the face-saving effort.

SURPRISE

On the same day the President landed in Peking, he was summoned to a meeting with Mao. Henry Kissinger—and no one else—was invited to the audience. The President, taken by surprise, acquiesced. He also acquiesced in the arrangement for the negotiating session starting the next day, in which he and Kissinger met with Chou En-lai, while Rogers was assigned to confer fruitlessly with the newly appointed Chinese Foreign Minister, who ranks low in the party hierarchy.

When the President realized that the exclusion of Rogers from the key meetings was being interpreted at home as a humiliation for Rogers, he set about trying to restore his Secretary's prestige. He suggested a meeting between Rogers and Mao, but he got a flat answer, and Rogers had to be satisfied with a pro forma hotel meeting with

Chou, plus a conversation on a plane.

The President had naturally expected that he would himself have a final, wrap-up meeting with Mao, if only for ceremonial purposes. He made it clear that in a second meeting he expected Rogers to accompany him. Again, the answer was dusty—and there was no second meeting.

In short, there seems in retrospect to have been a conscious intention on the part of the Chinese to exclude the American Secretary of State from serious negotiation, and thus downgrade him. There are several theories to explain this intention. One is the obvious one—the Chinese believed that the real power of decision lay with Nixon and Kissinger, not with Rogers.

SECRECY

The Chinese may also have been determined to keep the meetings as small as possible because they wanted to keep the substance of what was discussed as secret as possible—especially from Moscow and Hanoi. They knew that bringing in Rogers meant bringing in the State Department—and the State Department might leak. They may also have been concerned that stories picturing Mao as old and unwell—which he is—would emerge from any larger meeting.

In any case, it was the Peking mission that made Rogers one of Washington's ghosts. To see why he has become ghostly, it is only necessary to imagine President Truman taking Sidney Souers—the Kissinger of that era—into major summit negotiations and not Dean Acheson; or President Eisenhower taking Robert Cutler and not John Foster Dulles. Acheson or Dulles would have resigned on the spot.

This difficult exercise in imagination also suggests the low estate to which the Department of State has fallen. It has never been lower—not even when Joe McCarthy was snapping at Acheson's heels. In those days there was at least no doubt who was the real Secretary of State and where foreign policy was really made.

The low estate of the Department of State is a most serious matter. The United States does, after all, need a foreign office to carry on its relations with other countries. The State Department has been ailing for years, but it is now moribund. Arthur Schlesinger wrote that President Kennedy “used to divert himself

with the dream of establishing a secret office of 30 people or so to run foreign policy while maintaining the State Department as a façade in which people might contentedly carry papers from bureau to bureau.” The State Department is now precisely such a “façade”—except that the paper carriers are by no means contented. This is not surprising. There are many able people in the State Department. What keeps able people in Washington is power, a commodity as important in Washington as money in Wall Street. The State Department has been drained of all real power, which is why it is moribund.

It cannot now be revived by William Rogers. Rogers, has introduced useful reforms in the department. He has performed usefully in other areas too—notably on Capitol Hill, where he has been an expert pourer of oil on troubled waters, and in the Middle East, the one foreign-policy area in which his influence has been real. Moreover, the President is clearly determined to “tilt” toward Rogers, in an effort to patch up his prestige.

REVIVAL

But it is universally assumed that Rogers will leave the State Department fairly soon, although probably not before the election. It is this universal assumption that accounts for the Secretary's ghostliness. A chief subject of speculation is the identity of his successor. Most of the speculation centers on Nelson Rockefeller or Elliot Richardson.

Rockefeller and Richardson are both strong-minded men. Neither would be inclined to play second fiddle, and both would try hard to revive the State Department. What the State Department needs for its revival is a Secretary of State with the absolute confidence of the President, unlimited energy and toughness, total mastery of the bureaucratic machinery, and great expertise in foreign policy.

This is a tough bill to fill, and neither Rockefeller nor Richardson entirely fills it. There is one man who does—Henry A. Kissinger. Admittedly, it is a bit difficult to imagine a Secretary of State with a German accent, however faint. Admittedly, Henry Kissinger is not wildly popular in the State Department. But it is hard to think of anyone else who could make the State Department what it clearly ought to be and isn't—one of Washington's true centers of power.

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Rogers Defends State Department Policy Role at Senate Hearing

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate concern over the "erosion" of the State Department's theoretical primacy in foreign affairs was disputed and brushed aside yesterday by Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

"I am perfectly satisfied with the way it is operating," said Rogers. The State Department is "happy to play a role" in foreign policy, and "Mr. Kissinger has a role," said Rogers, but "the people elected the President" to "make foreign policy."

Rogers refused in that fashion, to debate whether he is being overshadowed by presidential security adviser Henry A. Kissinger. That conformed with his insistence on Monday that, "I didn't feel excluded at all" during the President's trip to China.

As a result, Rogers' words deflected the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday from its own groping efforts to enhance the State Department's share in formulating foreign policy.

The committee, headed by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) held its first hearing on \$563 million requested in authorization funds for the State Department as required by a rider it attached to last year's foreign aid act. A major purpose, as Fulbright noted yesterday, is "restoring Congress' proper role in the making of foreign policy."

With Kissinger beyond the official reach of the committee because he is a White House adviser, Fulbright and other senators hoped Rogers would join in seeking to strengthen State's hand in policy making. In theory, that would strengthen the role of Congress, because State is obliged to be more responsive to Congress than is the White House.

Rogers, however, pronounced himself quite satisfied with the status quo.

He disclaimed any concern

about having State Department positions lost in the National Security Council staff machinery that Kissinger controls. If anything develops "contrary to what I think should be done," said Rogers, "take it up with the President."

"The system is working very well," Rogers insisted. "The foreign policy is very effective."

Rogers also came under close questioning yesterday about the need to jettison what several senators called remnants of the cold war.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), commending the President's China trip, said it is time to eliminate all vestiges of the "China demon fixation" in U.S. policy. Church said there is "no relic" that more deserves being "tossed in the ash can" of history than the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty of 1954.

The SEATO treaty is "a corpse," said Church, long abandoned by France, Britain and Pakistan; invoked as "an after thought" to help justify U.S. involvement in the Indochina war, but now deserving "decent burial" to avoid use in other entanglements.

Rogers, however, told Church "your timing is particularly unfortunate."

Following the President's China trip, said Rogers, the United States is now reassuring its Asian allies that it will abide by all its "commitments." To abandon the SEATO treaty now, said Rogers, could be "quite danger-

ous" and would suggest "a 180-degree turn" in U.S. policy.

Church countered that since ancient Rome, "no other country in history has undertaken so many formal commitments as the government of the United States—to 44 countries."

Rogers also was challenged by Fulbright and Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) on administration support of funds until June 1973 for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. They were previously financed covertly by the CIA. The dispute is in a Senate-House conference, with the Senate favoring funding only until June 30 of this year.

The U.S.-China communique, pledging peaceful co-ex-

istence, Fulbright said, "is quite inconsistent with what you are doing in Russia." The broadcasts beamed into the Soviet Union, said Fulbright, continue "old, obsolete programs created at the beginning of the cold war, at the height of the McCarthy period."

Fulbright claimed that continuation of such broadcasts could result in "a lack of credibility" about U.S. intentions to negotiate in the strategic arms control talks (SALT) and to reduce tensions. Rogers disagreed. He said he sees the radio as no "interference in the internal affairs of other countries," and he expressed optimism for a SALT agreement this year.

During the hearing, Ful-

bright suggested various approaches for strengthening the State Department's position in foreign affairs, including a "unified budget for foreign affairs." Rogers said that would be "too complex." Fulbright noted that other agencies, including CIA and Defense, have "seven or eight times as many people in our embassies as the State Department does." Rogers said State has only 16 per cent of its own employees in embassies overseas, and State's total employees were listed at 13,236

Rogers disagreed, however, with Fulbright's claim that the growing National Security Council structure, which Kissinger heads, has overstepped its intended authority.

STATINTL

View from the fudge factory

By David K. Willis

Washington

It looks the same, outwardly — endless antiseptic corridors; subdued lighting; anonymous doors opening into hushed offices; the flags and the globe and the slippery floor of the diplomatic entrance on C Street. . . .

This is home to that body of men and women whom Franklin D. Roosevelt called "cookie pushers," and whom John F. Kennedy characterized as "those people over there who smile a lot"—the professional diplomatic corps of the United States.

But the "fudge factory" (as the State Department has ingloriously been dubbed) is not the same at all, really. To a visitor returning after several years, it is even more subdued than it was in the late '60's. It feels even less in the mainstream of U.S. policymaking than it felt in Lyndon Johnson's day; morale is low, and the talk of the building is often about what might be done to redress the balance.

The thoughts come thick and fast as President Nixon's party heads to Peking. Diplomats at the State Department welcome Mr. Nixon's initiative toward the People's Republic. They want to see it succeed. Some of them helped in preliminary staff work, writing papers for Dr. Henry Kissinger and his national security staff. And yet, even those officials who would normally expect to know the ins and outs of evolving U.S. strategy toward Peking were frank to admit in private conversation a few days ago that they did not know the exact state of play.

It hardly needs restating: Major American foreign policy is formed and executed largely in the White House these days. The Kissinger staff, according to a late report, numbers 46 assistants, with 105 administrative personnel. Both Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger like to plan quietly—and to move quickly. Neither demonstrates much regard for the diplomatic bureaucracy. They ask it questions, but not for crucial policy recommendations—or so one is led to understand. They do not ignore it entirely, but neither do they keep it informed of just who is saying what to whom when Dr. Kissinger makes his dramatic, secret journeys: to Peking, to Paris.

Some diplomats, unsurprisingly, don't like it at all. No one man, or two men, no matter how brilliant, can cover every nuance in dealings with nations such as China or North Vietnam, they say. Others are seriously concerned with the quality of recent appointments to the rank of ambassador: former Treasury Secretary David Kennedy to NATO, for instance (considered by some too old, by others too inexperienced); Borg-Warner's Robert Ingersoll to Tokyo (recognized as a gracious businessman, an expert in business, but largely inexperienced in Japanese affairs outside business, and a newcomer to Asian diplomacy in general); and a newcomer to Asian play what the professionals consider an enormously significant part).

Granted, it is said, that Mr. Nixon has disliked the Foreign Service since 1954 when the Republicans came to power with a fistful of new slogans such as "massive retaliation." And Mr. Nixon was right: The professionals didn't like him, or President Eisenhower, or John Foster Dulles. But those days have gone. The world has changed.

Issues are increasingly complex. The bureaucracy of State and the Central Intelligence Agency does possess expertise, built up over the years. True, bureaucracy grinds slowly—and true, it needs shaking up from time to time: prodding, cajoling, pushing. Yet, by cutting State out from the crucial decisions, the view maintains, the White House runs clear and definite risks, both now and for the future.

How, then, to marry professional expertise to the need of the White House to move fast and flexibly? One answer: the White House could cut in six or seven top professional diplomats on China and Vietnam strategy. This could serve several purposes, it is said: ensure that all policy bases are covered; prevent further atrophy of State, which is becoming more and more cautious about making firm recommendations to Dr. Kissinger's people ("Where is Henry right now, while we're talking?" asked one source with a grin; "in Pyongyang? Could be . . ."), thereby lowering its standing in the White House still more. It could even help prevent "leaks" from the bureaucracy of the kind that Mr. Nixon detests. Where no one knows anything, the argument runs, disgruntlement can lead to erroneous speculating to friendly journalistic ears; it is safer, paradoxically, if a few people know a lot.

Professional diplomats have deep respect for Dr. Kissinger, and, they say, for Mr. Nixon's approaches; privately, however, many feel that the quality of the national security staff does not equal the best men in State. The professionals acknowledge that State needs to find ways to keep secrets better—to show Mr. Nixon that it can indeed be trusted.

It asks for the chance.

David Willis, Monitor American news editor, was this newspaper's State Department correspondent for four years from 1965.

13 FEB 1972

Hopes Pinned on Vast Reform at State Dept.

BY PAUL HOUSTON

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—As is the practice of diplomats, William B. Macomber ushered the visitor away from his desk and over to the more relaxed setting of couch and side chairs.

"Somebody said the only thing that had changed in American diplomacy over all these years was the invention of the telegraph," Macomber laughed. "Well, now we have about 400 other things."

Macomber, deputy undersecretary of state for management, is in charge of implementing a vast reform program that rather desperately seeks to restore to the State Department some measure of its old clout—if not its former preeminence.

New Catchwords

Hence, Foggy Bottom has some new catchwords:

—"Openness" (seeking more contact with the rest of the foreign affairs community);

—"Creativity" (encouraging more dissent from the official line);

—"Democratization" (ridding foreign missions of the hierarchal structure topped by an authoritarian ambassador);

—"Functional specialization" (turning all-purpose diplomats into political, economic, administrative and consular—visa-stamping—specialists).

After World War II, the accelerating complexity of international affairs brought many other government departments (Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, etc.) and agencies (for intelligence, foreign aid propa-

ganda) into the foreign policy arena in a big way. State was slow to learn that it was losing prominence by dealing with these "interlopers" at arm's length.

Security Council Rises

Meanwhile, Congress in 1947 established a National Security Council to review, coordinate and control American foreign policy. This led to the eclipse of State's traditional quarterback role in the foreign policy process.

It is the hope—some say the vain dream—of many in the foreign service that reforms will persuade future presidents to have the State Department take over some of the National Security Council's duties. There is not much belief that President Nixon will change his preference for a National Security Council directing foreign policy under a special assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.

Charles W. Bray III, 38, is one of the aging "Young Turks" who prodded the State Department into instituting a massive introspective study that led to the reforms.

"Historically," he says, "the foreign service has been a very closed corporation with a highly paternalistic system of internal administration.

"To some of us the department's isolation from the American mainstream, and its declining influence in Washington, were intolerable."

As one indication of changing department attitudes, there was a time when Bray's foreign service career was in doubt. His agitating almost got him exiled. But then, as reform became the "in" thing, Bray rose with uncommon swiftness last February to become the department's spokesman at daily press briefings.

As might be expected, the reforms have not been universally cheered.

"A lot of schisms have been created," complains a former high official who

recently retired. "A lot of the old corps spirit has been not only permitted to die but encouraged to die."

What rubs old guardsmen most is the development of a collective bargaining unit among foreign service officers and the establishment of strong employe grievance procedures.

One disgruntled senior official says, "There's a great deal of outcry for rights and benefits, but there is very little talk of duty."

400 Changes Made

Despite these criticisms, the reforms seem to have gained wide acceptance in a bureaucracy that must have the biggest group of frustrated intellectuals in government.

Macomber, noted that 400 recommendations for change have been implemented out of 500 put forward in an inch-thick plan 17 months ago.

He cites the following changes as "solid and significant, although not the millenium":

—Modern management techniques have been instituted using systems analysis and interdisciplinary teams of senior officials. The aim is to identify priority issues, assign the right kind of manpower to each issue and review policies periodically in toughminded adversary proceedings.

Computer Indexing

With the microfilming and computer indexing of 25,000 documents requiring action at the State Department every year, it is hoped there will be no repeats of the kind of embarrassment that hit the department in 1967 during the Arab-Israeli six-day war.

American officials could not find the copy of a crucial letter former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had written to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in 1956. Sheepishly, the State Department had to ask Israel to dig up the letter.

—New ideas, divergent opinion and "creative dissent" have been encouraged, Macomber says, through the use of special message channels, new staff functions and something called the Open Forum Panel. At weekly, closed-door meetings of the panel, younger officers take issue with various American policies and advance their views in papers to the Secretary of State.

—A complete overhaul of the controversial "selection out" and promotion system also is aimed at encouraging officers to take unpopular positions.

Automatic Retirement

Formerly, a lower or middle-grade officer had to think twice about sticking his neck out, because if he failed to win a promotion to the next grade within a certain number of years, he was involuntarily retired without a pension.

The system, when fairly administered, was invaluable in shedding dead wood. But it was widely judged to be unfairly arbitrary in many cases—including that of Charles Thomas.

After Thomas, the father of three, was selected out at the age of 46, he had no success with 2,000 job applications (being over-qualified or over-age). Last May he shot himself to death.

The suicide stirred a furor and prevented former State personnel director Howard P. Mace from being confirmed by the Senate as ambassador to Sierra Leone.

Now, after a junior officer passes a certain low threshold, he is guaranteed tenure of 20 years plus a pension—and may gain promotions in competition with others in his specialty.

A major problem remains, however, and it will be aggravated by the tenure system. State is topheavy with senior officers who must retire early. The lack of room at

STATINTL

4 FEB 1978

Rogers Eases Cut of Personnel In Intelligence From 33% to 13%

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3—Secretary of State William P. Rogers has reversed a decision to cut the State Department's intelligence branch by approximately a third, department officials said today.

They said that, as modified, the reduction would be limited to approximately 13 per cent and would involve a shift of 45 intelligence specialists from a total of 300. The specialists, who are preponderantly Foreign Service career officers, will be shifted to other State Department assignments.

Career diplomats who have recently retired and others with extensive experience in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research say that the cuts will force further diminution of long-range political and economic analysis in favor of concentration on current crisis reporting.

They predicted diminished attention in the future to Latin America, Africa and such "fringe" areas as Scandinavia in favor of concentration on the Soviet Union, China and other crisis areas.

The chief function of the intelligence and research bureau, these sources said, is to collate and analyze for the Secretary of State and his senior policy-making officials information from all sources bearing on foreign political and economic developments. The sources include reports from 120 United

States diplomatic missions overseas and from the Central Intelligence Agency, satellite photography and electronic interceptions.

The bureau, which is headed by Ray S. Cline, a Harvard-trained historian and former deputy director of the C.I.A., briefs Secretary Rogers on global developments once a week and briefs the four under secretaries and the assistant secretaries in charge of geographic bureaus daily.

A State Department spokesman who confirmed that a cut of 30 per cent in the Intelligence Bureau had been under active consideration insisted that the reversal of the decision had been made solely by ranking departmental officials based on internal discussions.

Other sources disclosed however, that reports of the planned cuts had attracted the attention of the White House, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board headed by Adm. George W. Aderrson and members of the intelligence community. The reversal followed.

The cuts reflect a White House order last August to reduce personnel levels throughout Government by 5 per cent. The State Department, with an over-all strength of 23,500—half American citizens and half foreign nationals—is trying to limit cuts overseas and make the bulk of the planned reductions here.

See Also Fudge, Verb Transitive

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUDGE FACTORY. By John Franklin Campbell. Basic Books. 298 pp. \$6.95.

AARON SEGAL

Mr. Segal is associate professor of government at Cornell University.

We are living through the end of the American Empire. It is a painful process, still far from complete, that drastically alters the relationships between this country and the rest of the world. We are used to calling the shots. We have inherited from the days when we were indisputably on top a grotesque machine for making foreign policy that Joseph Kraft wittily dubbed "the foreign affairs fudge factory."

The late John Franklin Campbell was a product of that fudge factory and one of its most intelligent critics. He had a vision of a world in which the United States was neither dominant nor isolated, and in which its foreign policy was subject to rational control and direction. A graduate of Harvard and Berkeley, he entered the U.S. Foreign Service in the halcyon Kennedy days when the United States still had a sense of world mission. His rapid career rise contradicted the normal pattern of a diplomatic corps that has many of the symptoms of a gerontocracy. He served as an assistant to Under Secretary of State George Ball, and then had an assignment as U.S. consul general in Asmara, Ethiopia. His superiors had him marked out for still better things and choice Washington posts were offered to him.

John Campbell was a man of exuberant humor. He took a temporary leave of absence from the State Department to write this book and to edit the new and lively anti-Establishment quarterly, *Foreign Policy*. His journalistic talents as well as his comic sense found their appropriate exercise in exploding the pomposities of the bureaucracy in which he had served his apprenticeship. Yet he fully intended before his unexpected death at 31 to return to the State Department and a diplomatic career. Unlike many of his contemporaries who abandoned liberalism and its ideals of public service in disillusion, John Campbell was committed to gradualism and to working within the system. His mind focused on the machinery and how to reform it, and he has left us a sturdy and useful book on the subject.

It is clear that the State Department has lost control over foreign policy. Despised by the Populists as a haven for incompetent snobs, raked over by every-

one from the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy to the organization experts, bereft of friends in Congress, and with a budget inadequate for its mission, the State Department fights to get an occasional word in edgewise on foreign policy matters. Outweighed by the CIA, the Pentagon, the Defense Department, the National Security Council, and thirty other agencies of the federal government who have permanent staff overseas, it has reacted to its loss of political importance with a singular bureaucratic stunt: it has enormously expanded its staff. The result is an organization that must be cut in half if it is ever to function effectively.

As an insider, at once committed and detached, Campbell analyzes the evolution of the foreign policy-making machinery during the growth of the United States as a global superpower. He traces the effects of numerous commissions, studies, reforms, and Presidents which amount to the steady erosion of the power and authority of the State Department, and the substitution of Presidential policy making through the White House entourage; the last Secretary of State who had the ear of a President was John Foster Dulles. One result is an over-emphasis on military and defense considerations, which are in any case more than adequately represented in the National Security Council and other White House channels.

Indeed, the State Department was never in the bidding for control of the new instruments of foreign policy: in Campbell's terms, the economic bureaucracies and the intelligence and propaganda complexes. The CIA and the Defense Department, to name only two of the agencies involved, have a global intelligence apparatus which dwarfs that of State and which is in no way responsible to U.S. ambassadors. The Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture Departments have taken international economic policy away from State. Even the less glamorous task of exporting the American image has been captured by the United States Information Agency. In spite of its being out of a job the State Department carries on its personnel numbers game, and uses its resources chiefly in make-work.

Campbell's response to these conditions was a program to resuscitate the State Department and make it once more an important instrument of foreign policy. He proposed a leaner department that would control a single U.S. foreign affairs budget, with all overseas representation and administration wanted to move it closer to the White

House, physically and spiritually, abolish USIA and turn over U.S. cultural programs overseas as well as the Peace Corps to quasi-independent agencies. The competing intelligence networks would also be made subject to State Department control and direction, and the National Security Council be confined to narrow military issues. Foreign economic policy would be coordinated in a sub-department of State.

It is odd that so astute an observer should propose to renovate State through executive action while bypassing Congress, and fail to discuss the question of the caliber of the Secretary of State compared to that of other Presidential appointees. Unable to gain Congressional or popular support, State is in fact incapable of reforming itself and unwilling to allow others to do the job. At bottom, then, this thoughtful, sensible book tells us how to tinker with the machinery but leaves aside the question of where the vessel should be headed. The foreign affairs fudge factory remains intact because we are not yet ready to abandon the global remnants of the American Empire in favor of new relationships. Probably that policy will have to change before we can expect the house that it built to fall to the ground. On the other hand, the example of the Byzantine Empire shows that the trappings of power, including the hordes of redundant civil servants, often outlive the imperial substance. When the substance itself is fudge, who can say how long the trappings can carry on with their fudging of foreign affairs? □

Cruise Director On the Titanic

By THOMAS MEEHAN

STATINTL

SO, what sort of propaganda about the United States are the Commie ratfinks of the Kremlin dishing out these days to the Russian people? Perhaps only Richard Helms and Harry Schwartz know in detail, but it has lately been stated in Moscow by Pravda, the Communist party newspaper, that "the well-known American journalist Art Buchwald" turns out his satirical columns about the Nixon Administration under instructions from the Federal Government, "as a deliberate safety valve to reduce the impact of such

THOMAS MEEHAN is a frequent contributor to The New Yorker and to this magazine.

developments as Negro and student riots." In short, Pravda was suggesting that Buchwald is in the pay of the White House, which should certainly come as news to President Nixon, who is known to have been exceedingly annoyed by several of the satirically barbed columns that Buchwald has written about him. Says Buchwald of the charge that he's secretly on the Government payroll, "True—I'm an agent of the C.I.A. And every third word in my columns is part of a coded message to one of my fellow agents in Moscow."

Oddly enough, Buchwald's columns are often reprinted in Russian newspapers, although they're usually run there not as comic flights of fancy about Nixon & Co. but as straight news dispatches from Washington. A while ago, for instance, Buchwald wrote a column in which he revealed that a top-secret Government study, the Dawk Report, had recommended that the State Department be shut down because its duties had been taken over by "the Defense Department, the C.I.A. and Henry Kissinger," and Russian readers were presented with this as the truth. Buchwald, of course, gets no money for his columns, and he has no publisher who print them without bothering to ask his permission, but high Wash-

ington officials have nonetheless complained to him about the fact that his columns are being used by the Soviets as anti-American propaganda. "I have a two-word answer to White House types who come to me with that complaint," says Buchwald with a smile, "and my answer is, 'Stop them.'"

That Pravda should single out Buchwald for special mention as a tool of the White House is indicative of how enormously famous Buchwald has become both in the United States and abroad during the last several years. Indeed, as his syndicated column of mild-mannered satire on politics, domestic goings-on, and assorted other aspects of contemporary American civilization appears three times a week in some 500 newspapers (400 in the United States and another 100 in foreign countries), Buchwald today is by far the country's best known and financially most successful writer of humor. So, what is this 5-foot-8, bespectacled, somewhat plumpish, cigar-smoking agent of the C.I.A. really like?

AT 9:30 A.M. on a recent Friday morning, Buchwald ambled into his office, which is Suite 1311 on the 13th floor of a new office building at 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, not far from the White House, and consists of a small outer reception room, where his secretary has her desk, and a book-lined inner room, where he does his writing. (Pravda notwithstanding, Buchwald has yet to be invited to the White House, and his chances of getting an invitation in the near future don't look terribly good.) Buchwald smilingly greeted his secretary, Margi Collenberg, and then roamed inside to his desk to read The Wall Street Journal. At home, in his minimansion in the fashionable Wesley Heights section of Washington, and during the 15-minute cab ride downtown, he'd already seen The Washing-

ton Post and The New York Times, and so getting through The Wall Street Journal completed his morning stint of catching up with the news.

Unlike most Washington-based journalists, Buchwald does no leg work to gather material for his column. "I never talk to anybody. Facts just get in my way," says Buchwald. So, he instead gets just about all of his ideas for columns from reading newspapers, or from scanning such magazines as Newsweek and Time, or from watching TV news programs. As he goes through newspapers and magazines, he frequently clips a story that he senses might be a taking-off point for one of his columns and he then either places the clipping in a file folder or more often simply stuffs it into his shirt pocket. That is the extent of his research operation. Indeed, his staff consists entirely of Miss Collenberg, an attractive, somewhat Junoesque ash-blonde of 27 who is originally from New Orleans and is a graduate of Pembroke College.

At about a quarter to 10 on this particular Friday, Miss Collenberg trooped into Buchwald's inner office—the door to which, even when he is writing his column, is never closed—and placed a stack of some 20 letters, the morning mail, before him. Buchwald receives an enormous amount of mail from his millions of readers, and he frankly finds most of it a time-consuming pain in the neck to answer. "I could be a son-of-a-bitch and not answer reader mail, but I somehow can't quite bring myself to do it," says Buchwald, and so he spends about half of each of his working days in the office answering letters from readers. People often send Buchwald amateur manuscripts, most of which are painfully lame attempts at humor, and to the writers of these he has contrived a pair of standard replies: either "Your sample of humor was magnificent—but don't quit your job" or "The humor piece you sent me is funnier than anything I've ever read by Rus-

U.S. Diplomats in Vietnam Said to Face Moral Issue

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29—Assignments to Vietnam—particularly to the pacification programs there—have caused many young career diplomats to face a serious “moral dilemma,” according to an article in the December issue of the Foreign Service Journal.

The critical question, the article says, is how far they should go in exposing incidents “which they knew to be wrong.”

One Foreign Service officer, now back from Vietnam and on his way to another overseas assignment, is reported by the article to possess a file of “documented atrocities, including photographs.”

“He has written extensive reports on these apparent war crimes he investigated in Vietnam,” the article states. “As far as he knows, no action has ever been taken to punish the guilty,” it says.

The article, which is entitled “Vietnamization of the Foreign Service,” goes on to say that the owner of the file will not make his information public because he is a “supporter of the President’s Vietnam policy and fears the effect on that policy of additional war crime controversy.”

He is also “aware of the negative result disclosure would have on his career prospects,” the article states.

Press Reports Cited

State Department sources said that the alleged atrocities were investigated by the department and were also reported in the United States press on Jan. 12, 1970. They are said to have concerned the South Korean “Tiger” Division, one of two South Korean infantry divisions serving in Vietnam, and not United States forces.

A State Department spokesman said that “implications in the article that United States forces were involved or that there was a cover-up by the State Department are just plain inaccurate and misleading.”

A Pentagon spokesman said that officers in its Southeast Asian section had not been able to obtain a copy of the article of the Foreign Service Journal and thus could not comment.

“When we’re given the facts,” a Pentagon spokesman said, “we always look into atrocity charges.”

The magazine article is signed with the name “John Claymore,” a pseudonym, the journal explains, for a former diplomat who served in Vietnam and whose primary reason for subsequently resigning from the Foreign Service was “disagreement with United States policy on Southeast Asia.”

Congressional and diplomatic sources have identified the author as John D. Marks, who served in the pacification program in Vietnam from 1966 to 1968 and later resigned to become a foreign policy consultant to Congress. Mr. Marks has confirmed his authorship.

The Foreign Service Journal has a circulation of approximately 10,000 copies throughout the executive branch and in Congress. It is published monthly by the American Foreign Service Association, a voluntary group comprising approximately 8,000 active and retired Foreign Service personnel.

The article notes that nearly 3 million Americans have now served in Vietnam, including career diplomats, or approximately 20 per cent of the Foreign Service.

Approximately 350 — the great majority of them junior officers—have been assigned to the pacification program, known as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. They have functioned as advisers to the South Vietnamese civilian and military administration — trying, the article says, to make the Government of South Vietnam “a viable force in the countryside.”

Generation Gap ‘Sharpened’

Service in Vietnam, the article says, is a unique experience. In no other country have perhaps 20 per cent of the foreign service officers experimented with soft drugs, but “that is the case in Vietnam,” it asserts.

“And in no other country,” it adds, “do foreign service officers have their own personal automatic weapons and receive training in how to fire a grenade-launcher before they go.”

The article says that the Vietnam experience has “sharpened the generation gap” between young and older diplomats. The younger officers, it says, often returned disillusioned with what they regard as deliberate suppression by senior officers of criticism either of the Vietnamese authorities or of the United States military.

The political section of the huge United States Embassy in Saigon is especially subject to criticism on these grounds, the article asserts.

“Almost all foreign service officers who served in the pacification programs and most junior members of the embassy staff itself give examples of how their reporting was distorted and suppressed in Saigon in order that the embassy might be consistent with the prevailing ‘line’ in dispatches to Washington,” the writer declares.

Combat Experience

“Statistics they knew to be merely worthless were constantly being quoted by the President of the United States as an indication that progress was being made in Vietnam,” it says.

Other points made in the article included these:

“While there was no clear State Department policy, most Foreign Service officers in the field were expected to bear arms. Many participated in combat operations and even called in air strikes or artillery fire on enemy positions;”

“The State Department decided during President Lyndon B. Johnson’s second term that it must contribute 150 diplomats to the approximately 1,000 United States personnel—military as well as aid, intelligence and other civilians—in the CORDS program. Its policy of making duty in the pacification program mandatory for junior officers split the Foreign Service until it was scrapped last August. Now as the United States presence in Vietnam is reduced, only volunteers who have previously served in at least one other diplomatic post are being sent.”

“A few Foreign Service officers have resigned as a result of disagreement with the Vietnam war, but “they are definitely the exception and in each known case they have been very junior officers.”

The article maintains that “the experience of the Foreign Service per-

sonnel for Vietnam, “the majority enjoy the experience once they go.”

Living conditions often are pleasant and, the article says, they find “the country and especially the women fascinating.”

When these officers are assigned elsewhere, it states, “the return to a more traditional Foreign Service assignment is often a letdown.”

STATINTL

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Murrey Marder

A Double Setback at State

SECRETARY OF STATE William P. Rogers attempted at year's end to lift the crumpled morale of the Foreign Service out of a slough of gloom with a burst of holiday praise.

If effusive words alone could suffice, the Secretary, who is a professional optimist, would have accomplished a small miracle. But to diplomats to specialize in soft verbiage to cloak hard realities, the warm commendation of the Foreign Service for "outstanding work" carried about as much comfort as a diplomatic communique expressing "agreement in principle."

This has been "a good year in terms of foreign affairs" said Rogers on Thursday, brimming with enthusiasm over his listing of "very substantial accomplishments." But for members of the American Foreign Service, it has been indeed been a poor year.

The main body of professional American diplomats at State was frozen out of most high strategy-making in 1971, they ruefully concede.

Even Rogers himself received only the most fleeting mention in the White House citations of the year's foreign policy accomplishments, in comparison to the great pre-eminence accorded to presidential national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger. Rogers even ran a distant third in personal attention on the White House accounting to the space and prominence given to presidential counsellor Robert H. Finch's "mission to six nations in Latin America."

Is the conduct or state of American foreign policy really affected by who re-

ceives what attention in the White House pecking order, or by whether the Foreign Service happens to be happy or glum? The blunt answer is that in many respects it matters little or not at all in national dimensions. What does matter to the nation is whether its resources in diplomacy, as in other fields, are used fully and wisely.

FROM their own viewpoint, which is not wholly impartial, a very large number of the most experienced professionals in the American Foreign Service deplore what they regard as the wholly inadequate use being made of their talents.

This past year brought a double blow. The State Department long had been eclipsed in this administration by the Kissinger operation in the White House; suddenly State was preempted from another, unexpected direction—the Treasury Department, where free-wheeling Secretary John B. Connally suddenly vaulted into a dominant position across the economic-foreign policy horizon.

State found itself not only operating on the fringes of high strategy, but performing what one chagrined diplomat called a "sweeper's role": sweeping up and trying to piece together the shards of allies' egos shattered by the shock of the administration's bold ventures in China and in international monetary and trade policy.

A minority inside the State Department responds, as one expressed it, "So what? What is so bad about being a 'service' organization? If the President wants to centralize all policy-making in the White House, and assign chores to

the State Department, that's his prerogative. Every President has his own ideas about how he wants to operate; that's his choice."

What is lost in this process, others protest, is not only morale but the full range of expertise and balance that can be brought to bear on a given international problem, uncolored by the political-centered focus of the White House.

It is the prerogative of the White House to accept or reject this advice, it is argued; what is important is that the President have access to it. Dr. Kissinger maintains that this is precisely what is provided for in his elaborate National Security Council system. But the reality, insiders protest, is that the most important policy decisions never enter that elaborate mechanism.

With a critical election year ahead, the process of policy making is shrinking with increasing secretiveness into the confines of the White House. What is emerging is soaring optimism in place of realities about the outside world. This, too, is not without precedent in an election year. The risk comes, as the Johnson administration discovered, when the optimists let themselves be engulfed by their own product.

"CORDS comes home to Washington,

Pacification has just begun,

Still so many hearts and minds to be won."

—from "Songs to Alienate Hearts and Minds By"

Vietnamization Of the Foreign Service

NEARLY three million Americans have now served in Vietnam. Of these, about 600 have been Foreign Service officers.

Thus, roughly 20 percent of the Foreign Service has been exposed to many of the stimuli which have turned "nice" kids from Middle America into peace freaks, hawks, junkies, and even assassins.

For the FSOs, however, the experience generally has not had the radicalizing effect that it has had on many of the military men. The FSOs tended to be older and less malleable than the American soldiers in Vietnam, and their personal thought processes were more subtle and less striking than those of the GIs. Some FSOs were essentially untouched by the whole experience, reacting no differently than if they had been in Paris or Rome. But for most, and especially the young, Vietnam meant change. It meant a violent breaking away from the traditional diplomatic life and an exposure to the realities of war.

About 350 FSOs have been assigned to the Pacification program (CORDS). They functioned as advisors to the Vietnamese civilian and military administration in an effort to make the Government of Vietnam a viable force in the countryside. Few, if any, had any back-

JOHN CLAYMORE

John Claymore is the pseudonym of a former FSO who served in Vietnam. The primary reason for his resignation from the State Department was disagreement with US policy on Southeast Asia. He is not using his real name because of a limitation on publishing in his current job, but he would be glad to correspond or meet with anyone interested in discussing his article.

ground for this assignment; yet most have acquitted themselves well, within the context of the programs they were working in.

Nevertheless, FSOs have been affected by the same pressures that have been widely reported in relation to the military.

Many served in proto-combat roles with command responsibility. While not participants, they received reports of war crimes and what often seemed like the unnecessary loss of human life. Some were faced with the moral dilemma of how far they should go in exposing incidents which they knew to be wrong.

One FSO currently serving in Washington possesses a file of documented atrocities including

photographs. He has written extensive reports on these apparent war crimes he investigated in Vietnam. As far as he knows, no action has ever been taken to punish the guilty. Because he is a supporter of the President's Vietnam policy, and because he fears the effect on that policy of additional war crime controversy, he has not chosen to make his information public. He also is undoubtedly aware of the negative result disclosure would have on his career prospects.

His example is extreme, but it points up the fundamental proposition that serving in Vietnam is not like serving elsewhere.

With respect to no other country could it be said that perhaps 20 percent of the FSOs had experimented with soft drugs, but that is the case in Vietnam. And in no other country do FSOs have their own personal automatic weapons and receive training in how to fire a grenade launcher before they go.

Vietnam is different.

VIENTNAM has undoubtedly sharpened the generation gap between young and old FSOs. In some of the junior grades, a disproportionately large number have been to Vietnam. Almost all return with a

continued

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Newsweek

STATINTL

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The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory

By John Franklin Campbell.
292 pp. New York:
Basic Books. \$6.95.

By PHILIP M. STERN

Initially, this book arouses considerable expectations. Dealing with the State Department and its organizational foibles, it comes extravagantly recommended by such foreign-policy luminaries as George Kennan, George Ball and John Kenneth Galbraith. And it begins auspiciously with some graphic examples of bureaucratic foolishness of the kind that impelled columnist Joseph Kraft to christen the Department a "fudge factory"; examples of the kind that could only have come from a State Department insider—as John Franklin Campbell was for nine years (he is now on leave, and is managing editor of Foreign Policy). One's hopes rise. Tune in 272 pages later, and you are tempted to conclude that this is an earnest study of matters of the most massive irrelevance—irrelevant, at least, to the foreign-policy questions of any real consequence.

Take, for example, the author's first three areas of suggested reform: Yes, the State Department is an obese bureaucracy that would probably improve if drastically thinned; yes, the Department should be charged with making an overall foreign policy budget for all United States agencies; yes, it might be better if the high command of a streamlined State Department moved back to its historic offices next to the White House, so as to have more influence there. But the Department's size, Washington address and budget powers are utterly peripheral to such questions as:

How a group of supposedly intelligent and moral men could have devised and stub-

bornly pursued an irrational and immoral policy in Vietnam; and how they could have haggled for 10 weeks over the shape of the Paris negotiating table—and then have negotiated on a casual once-a-week basis for three years while hundreds of Americans and thousands of Vietnamese were dy-

Philip M. Stern is the author of "The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial."

ing between one meeting and the next.

Why the self-proclaimed Leader of the Free World has embraced such repressive autocrats as Franco, Diem, Ky, Thieu, Chiang, Stroessner and Papadopolous while self-righteously (if not childishly withholding recognition from Castro and, until recently Mao (who governs one-fifth of the world's population).

Why the SALT-talk minut has been so maddeningly slow, dealing, as it does, with an arms race that could annihilate us all.

Why the Alliance for Progress never became more than a diffidently supported United States slogan—and why, indeed, the United States weighs in so consistently on the side of the elitists and against the populists around the world.

It would be unfair to lay all of the above solely at the door of the State Department. Obviously, the Pentagon, the C.I.A., and, more important, Congress and the White House figure significantly in major decision-making. But the State Department rarely inveighed forcefully (and almost never effectively) against such foreign-policy nonsense and the explanation does not lie in the Department's size, location or budget processes. Yet Mr. Campbell is far more concerned with organizational lines and boxes and management techniques than with policy.

Greece and the Alliance for Progress rate only one-word mentions; but you'll find extensive discussions of the recruitment and deployment of State Department personnel, and about the virtues of "program budgeting." Mr. Campbell casts admiring glances at

ert McNamara and his Pentagon "whiz kids" who, with all their computers, slide rules and super-techniques, miscalculated the cost of the war by \$16-billion in 1965 and 1966. When decision-makers tolerate errors of that enormity, the budget-making process that concerns Mr. Campbell shrinks to peripheral importance.

Why did the State Department bureaucracy go along with our immoral war policy? One learns less about that question from Mr. Campbell's book than from a Time magazine report of "The Rules of the Bureaucratic Game," as recounted by two ex-Pentagon officials who participated in the Pentagon Papers study: Morton Halperin, one of the analysts, and Leslie Gelb, the study's director. Rule One: "You don't resign, you don't carry your case to the public." Gelb observes that while George Ball appears to have "felt very strongly" about the war, he "didn't take the next step" (of resigning publicly) "even though his departure in itself would have had an enormous impact." (Think of the reverberations if the doubtful Robert McNamara had resigned with a blast!)

Rule Three says, "Argue to convince, not to be candid." In pursuance of this rule, Halperin comments, many of the official memoranda unveiled in the Pentagon Papers were not believed even by those who wrote them. Under such ground rules, even the best-organized State Department would be hard-pressed to produce an honest policy.

But Rule Two is the most insidious: "If you disagree with the bureaucracy's shared images, you must hide it, or no one will take you seriously." That describes the root problem: institutional incest. State Department meetings are endless but (as the Pentagon Papers suggest) the deliberators almost never question basic premises. From my own brief tenure at State, I can testify to the utter inconceivability of anyone ever, ever shaking awake a Department meeting with a loud [choose your own expletive]. If that sounds frivolous, just open the Pentagon Papers at random (as

I just have) and consider whether such an irreverent expletive might at least have discouraged the muddy meaninglessness of the following Department memorandum: "In general the working group is agreed that our aim should be to maintain present signal strength and level of harassment, showing no signs of lessening of determination but also avoiding actions that would tend to prejudice the basic decision."

But the discussions within State are comfortably closed; the policy-makers are spared any challenge by the sharpest of outside critics. Secrecy shields them from being held publicly responsible for the immoral and perhaps illegal policies they devise under "Top Secret" stamps. But the question of secrecy and the outrageous over-classification of documents rate no mention in Mr. Campbell's book.

Indeed, if anything, Mr. Campbell seems to want foreign policy-making to be more, rather than less, of a closed-circle, inner-club affair. Everyone other than State Department careerists of long standing gets a fishy stare. The author bemoans, for example, the dilution of the small and exclusive cadre of Foreign Service Officers (F.S.O.'s) by the infusion, in the fifties, of several thousand civil servants who did not wear the F.S.O. Old School Tie; he dismisses the Peace Corps program and its young volunteers as satisfying more a domestic political than a foreign policy need. But above all, Mr. Campbell wishes that politically appointed officials, especially on the White House staff, would keep their amateurish hands out of foreign policy-making.

Another question: How representative of the American public are the career officers to whom Mr. Campbell would entrust our foreign policy? While the percentage of Ivy Leaguers has declined from 50 to 25 per cent since the twenties, three quarters of the F.S.O.'s still come from the East and West Coasts. (Where does that leave the South and Midwest?) And as recently as 1961, out of 3,700 F.S.O.'s,

THE INSTRUMENTS OF AMERICAN

FOREIGN POLICY

STATINTL

By Charles W. Yost

THERE are many different ways of conducting a government. In the United States the executive authority is both more formally centralized in the President and more sharply separated from the legislature than in most democracies. This is particularly true of the conduct of foreign affairs, where the authority of the President has been seriously challenged only in those rare instances, such as the Versailles Treaty or the Vietnam war, when he seems to be grossly ignoring or overriding the opinions both of the Congress and of the public.

In general, he has been free to conduct foreign affairs more or less as he chooses, to use traditional instruments, to set up new ones or to carry on diplomacy from his own hip pocket. There is little use arguing whether or not he has the constitutional right to do so. As our government is organized, he has both the responsibility and the power. Critics in or out of the Congress can make things difficult for him, but they can neither conduct foreign affairs themselves nor prevent him from doing so. Of course, a wise President will consult the Congress closely, in fact as well as in form, on matters of major import, which recent Presidents have often foolishly failed to do.

Our concern here, however, is with the instruments which Presidents use for the conduct of foreign affairs. Up until the 1930s the instrument was almost always the traditional one, the Secretary and Department of State, except in those not infrequent cases where a strong President, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, chose to carry on a particular exercise in diplomacy himself, sometimes with the help of a personal adviser or emissary. Nevertheless, as late as 1931, President Hoover, though not himself inexperienced in foreign affairs, relied on Secretary Stimson to deal, in so far as the United States was prepared to deal, with the Manchurian crises.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, just at the moment when the rise to power of ambitious dictators in both Europe and Asia made inevitable much deeper American involvement in foreign affairs, named as Secretary of State, almost entirely for domestic political reasons, an eminent Senator, Cordell Hull, who had unhappily neither the taste nor the talent for the conduct of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, again for domestic political reasons, he remained in office for nearly 12 years, longer than any previous Secretary of State. This did not seriously disturb FDR, who was contemptuous of the diplomatic establishment and overestimated his own capacity to direct domestic and foreign, and later military, affairs personally and simultaneously.

Even Roosevelt, however, while bypassing Hull as much as he could, at first placed his own men, on whom he did to some extent rely, inside the State Department itself—Welles and later Stettinius as Under Secretary, Moley and Berle as Assistant Secretaries, and Bullitt and Kennedy as Ambassadors. On the

WASHINGTON POST

1 OCT 1971

F. Y. I.

From time to time the question is asked why newspapers never seem to get anything right and one answer, of course, is that we try, but that we are only human. Another answer, however—and a better one—is that in the complex and delicate interworkings of the press and the government it takes at least a little cooperation by the government if the public is to get a version of events which can properly be said to be right. As a case in point, we would like, strictly For Your Information, to walk you through a brief case history involving a news story on Page One of The Washington Post, on Sept. 3, and a subsequent article on this page on Sept. 8, both of which asserted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had employed lie detector (polygraph) tests in an investigation of State Department employees. The original story said three or four officials were interrogated in this fashion as part of a government-wide inquiry into a leak of classified information having to do with the American position in the SALT negotiations. Today, in the letters space on the opposite page, FBI Director Hoover states categorically that both stories were “totally and completely untrue” and that “at no time did the FBI use polygraphs, as alleged, in its investigation.” He takes us sharply to task for “this inept handling of information.”

Well, we have looked into the matter and it is clear that we were wrong about the FBI's use of lie detectors. We are pleased to have this opportunity to express our regrets to Mr. Hoover and to set the record straight. But we are not prepared to leave it at that, if only because the implication of Mr. Hoover's sweeping denial (“totally and completely untrue”) is that the original story was entirely wrong—that no polygraphs in fact were used upon State Department employees — and this is clearly not the case. Nor is it quite so certain whose handling of this information was “inept.” The facts are, from all we can gather, that polygraph tests were administered to State Department officials by employees, and with equipment belonging to an outside agency—presumably the Central Intelligence Agency which has these instruments avail-

able for regular use in security checks of its own personnel.

In other words, we had the wrong agency, which is an important error and one we would have been happy to correct immediately, before it had been compounded in the subsequent article on Sept. 8, if somebody in the government had chosen to speak up. But the FBI was silent until Mr. Hoover's letter arrived 10 days later, and Secretary of State Rogers, who was asked about the story at a press conference on Sept. 3 in a half-dozen different ways, adroitly avoided a yes-or-no answer every time. That is to say, he did not confirm the role of the FBI, but neither did he deny it; he simply refused to discuss methods, while upholding the utility of lie-detector tests in establishing probable innocence, if not probable guilt. And that remains the State Department's position, even in the face of Mr. Hoover's denial. No clarification, no confirmation, no comment—despite the fact that the original story in The Post had been checked with the State Department and the role of the FBI had been confirmed by an official spokesman on those familiar anonymous, not-for-attribution terms which government officials resort to when they don't want to take responsibility publicly for what they say, and which newspaper reporters yield to when there is no other way to attribute assertions of fact.

The result of this protracted flim-flam was, first of all, to leave the Justice Department and the FBI falsely accused of administering lie detectors to officials of another agency, and then, with Mr. Hoover's denial, to leave the impression that no polygraphs were used at all, and you have to ask yourself what public interest is served by having this sort of misinformation circulating around, gathering credence. It is not an uncommon practice, of course, for the government, when it is confronted in print with an embarrassing and not altogether accurate news story, to clam up completely rather than help straighten out inaccuracies—especially when clarification risks confirmation of that part of the story which is accurate. But it is not a practice that does much to further public knowledge. And still less does it help the newspapers get things right.

1 OCT 1971

Letters To The Editor

Mr. Hoover on Polygraph Use and Another Letter on Its Effectiveness

My attention has been called to an article entitled "FBI Uses Lie Tests in Probe of Leaks at State" by Murrey Marder in the September 3, 1971, issue of The Washington Post and a column, "Extracting the Truth: Tea Leaves or Polygraph Tests?" by Alan Barth on September 7, 1971. Both of these items categorically assert that the FBI used polygraphs during an investigation of alleged "leaks" of confidential information at the Department of State.

These statements by Messrs. Marder and Barth that the FBI used polygraphs in this investigation are totally and completely untrue.

For the information of your readers, the Department of Justice on July 30, 1971, instructed the FBI to conduct a complete investigation, which entailed some interviews at the Department of State, with regard to alleged unauthorized disclosure of classified information as a potential violation of the espionage laws. We immediately instituted an investigation in compliance with the Department of Justice's instructions. However, at no time did the FBI use polygraphs, as alleged, in its investigation.

Surely, it is in the interest of responsible journalism that the basic facts be accurately and honestly reported. This inept handling of information betrays the sincere desire of your readers for a factual knowledge of the news of the day.

J. EDGAR HOOVER,

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington.

The American Polygraph Association takes strong exception to both the tone and content of the article by Alan Barth on the editorial page of The Post on September 7.

We are disappointed that a paper of the stature of The Post saw fit to dignify with publication the compendium of half truths, untruths, and rather sophomoric sarcasm represented by Mr. Barth's article. We are perhaps naive, knowing that The Post has never been a believer in the polygraph but we assert our profound conviction that you should require factual accuracy, even from writers on your opinion pages.

Mr. Barth closes with the comment that a polygraph test is so insulting, so demeaning, and so humiliating, that anyone who would either administer or submit to such an examination is unfit to represent the United States. Despite his assertion that this can be taken for granted, the APA believes that such strong statements should require some modicum of proof. Exactly why a person is humiliated, demeaned, and insulted by being given an opportunity to establish his innocence of serious charges is beyond our comprehension.

Mr. Barth apparently delights in esoteric knowledge of various forms of ordeal but conveniently ignores the fact that it was just because of such methods of soothsaying that the polygraph was developed. We of the APA would rather stake judgment of our veracity upon the objective analysis of a set of polygraph charts than upon the swirl of tea leaves, even when stirred by a person of

such perception and sensitivity as Mr. Barth.

We find ourselves troubled by vicious attacks such as those by Mr. Barth, because nowhere does he set forth a system to replace the one which he is attacking. He apparently is establishing a new constitutional privilege: The right to lie with impunity. Mr. Barth and others of his ilk would bar effective investigation, would bar psychological testing, would bar polygraph examinations, and would, in general, bar any means thus far developed for getting at truth in matters of controversy.

It is a fact, for example, that even detractors of polygraph testing concede minimal accuracy of the technique to be in the 70 per cent range. Other scientists of impeccable credentials, which far exceed those of the APA and certainly Mr. Barth, have established accuracy of the technique in the 90 per cent range. With all due modesty the APA believes that this may even exceed the accuracy of journalistic reporting.

The recent statement by the Secretary of State that he believes the polygraph can be effective in clearing the innocent but not in identifying the guilty, though somewhat paradoxical, is acceptable to the APA. We have always believed that the greatest service our members can perform is that of assisting persons who are falsely accused in establishing their innocence.

RAYMOND J. WEIR JR.

President-elect,
American Polygraph Association.

Washington.

Fantasies From the Fudge Factory

By William L. Givens

"Throughout the careerist ranks is a wistful yearning for good old days that really never were, a diplomatic Walter Mittyland in which an elite corps of professional diplomats, all looking and acting like George Kennan, have the President's ear . . ."

The author spent 10 years as a foreign service officer.

IF ALL THE foreign service officers who have written Master Plans for reforming the State Department were laid end to end they would reach from Washington to Harvard University, where they would find still more foreign service officers, on leave or retired, writing still more Master Plans.

The latest and by far the best written work yet in this bottomless genre is "The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory" by John Franklin Campbell, a 30-year-old former staff assistant to under secretaries of state George Ball and Nicholas Katzenbach. Campbell is a first-rate journalist and an articulate advocate for the elitist—or, as he puts it, Hamiltonian—approach to the management of American foreign policy. For all its stylistic superiority, however, "Fudge Factory" turns out to be yet another apologia for our careerist diplomatic establishment and a plea to the President to restore the careerists to their "rightful" predominance in the foreign policy process.

It is a familiar refrain. Since World War II, the rationale goes, the State Department has been badly used by a succession of Presidents, most notably Franklin Roosevelt, who distrusted the foreign service ("the profession of perfection") and turned for advice to John Kennedy, who quickly grew frustrated with State's lack of enthusiasm

for his activist policies and depended increasingly upon "a new breed of military strategists and academic social scientists"; and Lyndon Johnson, whose secretive, idiosyncratic ways, fondness for contrived diplomatic spectacles, and repeated tinkering with State's administrative machinery further eroded State's waning influence. Publicly exhorting the State Department to take charge of the foreign policy-making process, Kennedy and Johnson tacitly denied the department the backing it needed to do so, allowed rival agencies to dominate State in the bureaucratic rough-and-tumble, and gradually transferred power to a burgeoning National Security Council staff in the White House.

Streamlining Prescribed

AS A CONSEQUENCE of all this, the careerists tell us, the State Department has lost control of the foreign affairs machinery it is supposed to be running. Its ranks swollen by military, intelligence and economic specialists, administrators, propagandists, and sundry other nondiplomatic outsiders, the department is far too big, both in Washington and overseas, and its authority fragmented among other agencies, most notably the Defense Department and the CIA.

What must be done, Campbell prescribes, is to streamline the State Department by reducing its personnel by half, reorganizing the remainder on leaner lines, and trimming out excess layers and extraneous functions. Overseas missions should be drastically pared, largely at the expense of the other executive agencies, and ambassadorial authority restored over all personnel in each American embassy. State should be given the authority and responsibility to prepare a single, unified foreign affairs budget for the entire government, and to control government personnel assigned overseas by all agencies. Horizontal clearances should be eliminated, and "each matter requiring action should be assigned to a single officer who must himself take responsibility for consulting (but not obtaining clearances from) other interested parties in the decision" to act. Finally, this new, lean State Department should be moved back into the old Executive Office Building, where it was housed in its pre-World II halcyon days, and where it could be closer to the President.

Well, fine. But if it is all so clear and simple, why don't they quit writing plans and do it? The careerists apparently feel it is the President's responsibility. But, alas, the President can't abdicate other duties. All that a President can do for any executive agency is to give

it a clear charter and the authority it needs to carry out its responsibilities. For State, this has been done repeatedly; the foreign service simply has not been up to the task.

There is considerable evidence that the real problem is not State's organization or lack of authority, but the diplomats themselves—that they would be no more competent to manage the new, streamlined State Department they dream of than they have been to run the old one, and that the authority they are pleading for would soon, like Pinocchio's five gold pieces, slip again from their grasp into the hands of predators.

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ITEM: One of John Kennedy's first acts upon taking office in 1961 was to issue a letter to all American ambassadors, authorizing and directing them to "oversee and coordinate all the activities of the U.S. government" in their countries. Through Secretary of State Dean Rusk he expressed the "active expectation" that State would "in fact take charge of foreign policy." President Johnson in 1966 instituted a top-level foreign policy-making body called the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), installed State at the head of it, and directed Secretary Rusk to "assume responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the over-all direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. government overseas," in what was pointedly identified as "formal and specific over-all directive authority from the President."

At the same time there was established in the State Department a country director for each nation, who was to assume the interdepartmental "direction, coordination, and supervisory" role at the working level and serve as a Washington counterpart to the ambassador in the field. Here, in a package, was all the authority a President can convey. But the diplomats were never able to find the handle. Tougher, savvy bureaucrats from the other agencies State was supposed to be leading continued riding roughshod over the department's prerogatives and driving ever deepening inroads into its influence. By mid-1968, the "young Turks" of the foreign service, in that year's version of the Master Reform Plan, were pleading once more for the President to "make clear that he regards American ambassadors as his (their emphasis) personal representatives to exercise, on his behalf, control over all United States government activities in each country."

continued

Use of Lie Tests by FBI Reported in Capital News Leaks

BY ROBERT C. TOTI
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON--FBI agents have questioned State and Defense department officials--and reportedly some in the Central Intelligence Agency and White House -- in search of news leaks in recent months.

At a press briefing Thursday, State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey was asked whether polygraph (lie detector) tests had been used in the investigation.

While confirming FBI activity at his and "other agencies," he declined to say what kind of equipment was used. Phone taps and the taking of affidavits normally would be used in such work.

The Associated Press reported that four State Department officials were given polygraph tests. The department refused to comment on the report.

None Disciplined or Reprimanded

No State Department official had been disciplined or reprimanded, McCloskey said. Other sources said all State Department personnel who were questioned had been cleared.

McCloskey indicated that the investigations began earlier this year and were still going on but he refused to pinpoint the number of subjects of stories under scrutiny as well as the number of personnel who came under suspicion.

It was learned, however, that while several earlier stories drew FBI interest--presumably at White House direction--the most intensive investigation began six weeks ago after publication by the New York Times of an article detailing this country's latest bargaining position at the secret strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

This particular case may have a pedestrian and even bizarre explanation. About the time of the New York Times article, a top-secret document on the talks was distributed in considerable confusion within the State Department, informants said.

Some offices got two, even three copies of a document, when they should have received none. This ubiquitous document contained the

material that was published.

The investigation of this article, however, appears to be the broadest and deepest of its kind in at least a decade. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations both sought the source of news leaks from time to time but never in as sustained or exhaustive fashion as that begun after the July 23 story on the arms talks.

Use of the polygraph, if true, may be a precedent, although there were unconfirmed reports of the detector's use during the Eisenhower administration. The four officials subjected to the test, the AP reported, had all acknowledged talking to the writer of the New York Times article, William Beecher, but all denied giving him the information and were cleared by the device.

Beecher's story said U.S. negotiators had proposed a mutual halt in construction of land and submarine-based missiles and curtailment of antimissile deployments. The State Department termed the article at the time "A most unfortunate breach of security and violation of our understanding with the Soviet Union that neither side will discuss these talks while they are in progress."

Subjects Identified

State Department officials, beyond being investigated, also have been recently warned to be discreet in talking to reporters on particularly sensitive subjects, McCloskey said. He identified these as the arms talks, President Nixon's forthcoming trip to China, and temporarily on the Saigon deliberations on a one-man presidential election.

No written caution has been issued, McCloskey added. But he said he has urged officials to use "common sense" in discussing such topics.

Some offices got two, even three copies of a document, when they should have received none. This ubiquitous document contained the

"harmful to the national interest" by the department and the Administration, McCloskey said. They were unrelated to publication of the Pentagon Papers, informants said.

McCloskey emphasized that no attempt was being made to restrict the access of newsmen to officials. He noted that the department enjoys the reputation of being the most open foreign ministry in the world to the press and intends to remain so.

Informants said that, in addition to State and Defense department officials, certain CIA and White House employees had been questioned by FBI agents. They could not elaborate.

STATINTL

8 SEP 1971

STATINTL

State Dept. Leaks

Were Probed by FBI

By JEFFREY ANTEVIL

Washington, Sept. 2 (NEWS Bureau)—Justice Department agents have been questioning State Department employes about recent leaks of sensitive information to the newspapers, a State Department spokesman disclosed today.

Questioned by newsmen, the spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, would not say how many State Department employes were involved or whether lie detectors were used. But he said no disciplinary action resulted.

The probe, it was learned, was conducted by FBI agents.

Series of Probes

McCloskey said there was no single investigation but a series of them aimed at specific news stories.

He would not name any of the articles, but other officials said two recent incidents involved separate New York Times' stories quoting from a CIA report to the White House and setting out the U.S. negotiating position at the disarmament talks with the Soviet Union.

Another leak under investigation, sources said, was Jack Anderson's nationally syndicated column quoting from a secret government report on the drunken antics of a U.S. diplomat during Vice President Spiro Agnew's recent visit to Kenya in Africa.

McCloskey also said State Department officials have been told to use "discretion and common sense" in talking with newsmen about sensitive topics such as the forthcoming presidential visit to China.

"The Department has a deep concern when information that could be prejudicial to a national interest in foreign policy is published or broadcast," especially when it has been disclosed "by unauthorized persons," the spokesman said.

He added, however, that officials have not been told to limit their contacts with reporters. He declared that the department offers greater access to newsmen than any other foreign office in the world.

Approved by Rogers

"We have cooperated with agents of the Department of Justice who have undertaken investigations within the Department of State," McCloskey said. He would not say who ordered the agents into the State Department but he said it was done "with the full concurrence and approval" of Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

F.B.I. INVESTIGATES STATE DEPT. LEAKS

Agents Question Personnel — Use of Lie-Detectors on Officials Reported

By FRED P. GRAHAM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 2 — State Department personnel are being questioned by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an effort to determine how recent sensitive information leaked to the press, the department's press spokesman disclosed today.

The spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, said in response to reporters' questions at a press briefing, that the investigation had been prompted by concern that "stories harmful to the national interest" were being disclosed by unauthorized persons.

He repeatedly declined to make a denial when asked about reports that F.B.I. agents were giving State Department officials lie-detector tests in efforts to locate the sources of the news leaks.

Mr. McCloskey said the F.B.I. questioning was being done "with the approval of the Secretary of State," but he declined to say who had ordered it. Powell Moore, an official in the Justice Department's information office, said that the investigation had been ordered by that department's Internal Security Division.

Mr. Moore said that such action was taken whenever there was evidence of violations of the Federal security laws, and that the current questioning had extended to other departments, including the Pentagon. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is an agency of the Justice Department.

The questioning by F.B.I. and the reported use of lie-detectors has touched sensitive nerves in the State Department, where, officials say, the bureau has not been active since it investigated charges of Communist infiltration

raised the late Senator Joseph

The State Department has its own security force that is supposed to investigate security leaks.

In recent weeks newsmen who report on the State Department have found that people there would not see them or answer their telephone calls. Today, at his regular noon briefing, Mr. McCloskey was asked a series of questions about the investigation and other official actions that have apparently prompted officials to close their doors to the press.

Taboos Conceded

Mr. McCloskey conceded that certain subjects had been temporarily placed off limits for discussion with the press by State Department personnel. These include President Nixon's coming trip to China and the one-man election campaign of South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu.

But Mr. McCloskey insisted, "I have told them that people need not close doors or refuse to return phone calls because a subject for a period may be off limits for general distribution." He said there had been no efforts to limit "contacts" between State Department personnel and the press, but only to persuade officials to "use their common sense in dealing with the journalists."

"The State Department has a deep concern, and I would expect the public in general would understand, that information that could be prejudicial to the national interest in foreign policy is not to be published or broadcast," Mr. McCloskey said.

Times Article Mentioned

He said that F.B.I. agents had approached State Department officials "on a number of occasions," but he would not say what news articles had been involved.

Some individuals who were questioned said that the agents asked about an article by William Beecher in The New York Times of July 22, giving details of United States negotiators' positions in the arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union.

Others were asked about an earlier article by Tad Szulc in The New York Times about arms shipments to Pakistan.

Mr. McCloskey said, "To the best of my knowledge, no disciplinary action has been taken against any person questioned." Asked if a reprimand or notation placed in a Foreign Service officer's record was a disciplinary action, he said that such a reprimand would not necessarily be considered a disciplinary action.

He said that officials had been asked to sign affidavits saying whether they had talked to certain reporters.

STATINTL



FBI Uses Lie Tests in Probe of Leaks

at State

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer
FBI agents used lie detectors to question State Department officials recently in an inter-agency investigation of news "leakage" of security information, it was established yesterday.

State Department press spokesman Robert J. McCloskey acknowledged at a news briefing that Justice Department agents investigated inside the State Department and "other agencies."

McCloskey said "this has happened from time to time... when certain information is published" from unauthorized sources that is judged to be "harmful to the national interest."

This is the first time since the era of the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy in the early 1950s that such a practice in the State Department has come to public attention. Many State Department officials are themselves concerned about the intimidating effect of the procedure, and insist it is limited and is no revival of that inquisitorial period in U.S. history.

McCloskey said in response to questions that State Department officials have been advised with renewed emphasis recently "to use their common sense and discretion" in talking with newsmen about sensitive security subjects. But he denied that any "written instructions" have been circulated to restrict press contact with officials.

"We are not trying to restrict access by newsmen," McCloskey said emphatically.

Reports and rumors of the investigations at State have spiraled behind the scenes, however, to the consternation of many ranking officials who are concerned that the inhibitions, real or exaggerated, will damage morale and operations.

McCloskey declined to discuss whether lie detectors, or polygraphs as they are technically called, were used at State. It was confirmed, however, that the instruments, which measure human reactions to questions, were employed in interrogations concerning disclosure of information

tion about U.S. bargaining positions in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, now under way in Helsinki, Finland.

Sources said that a relatively "small number" of employees were involved in the interrogations by FBI agents.

This group, it was said, in turn was narrowed down to a smaller number, "about three or four," it was claimed. They were reportedly asked if they would submit to the polygraph tests, "volunteered" to do so, and "came up clean," in effect apparently clearing the State Department of responsibility for the "leak" in this case.

The degree of voluntarism actually involved in such circumstances is often an open question, officials privately concede. Investigations of this kind often have a dual purpose -- to attempt to find the "leaker," and to serve as a warning to others.

McCloskey said in answer to questions, "We have cooperated with agents of the Justice Department who have undertaken investigations within the department at the same time that agents also were doing the same in other agencies of the government with reference to stories in which sensitive information was disclosed on an unauthorized basis.

"I am not in a position to get into detail on the anatomy of that kind of investigation" or the numbers of persons involved, he said.

McCloskey said these investigations have been conducted with the "full approval and concurrence" of Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Rogers is scheduled today to hold his first full press conference since June 15.

According to other sources, the latest investigation at State, involving the use of lie detectors, was touched off by a story on the nuclear arms talks in the New York Times of July 23 by William Beecher, the Times' Pentagon reporter.

The White House reportedly ordered a full-scale investigation, which spread to State. Top officials expressed indignation over what they called a disclosure of the U.S. position

to the Russians. At that time, State labeled the story "a most unfortunate breach of security."

A Defense Department spokesman declined to comment yesterday on investigations there, or to say whether lie detectors were used at the Pentagon. That practice is said to be more customary at the Pentagon than at State in the investigation of major news "leaks." Normally, the State Department uses its own security agents for such inquiries, officials said.

One administration source said earlier this week that disciplinary action has been taken over the news leak of U.S. proposals in the SALT talks, but he declined to specify the agency involved.

McCloskey told newsmen yesterday that, so far as he knows, the disclosure of the secret Pentagon history on Vietnam, starting in mid-June, was not the take-off point for the current investigating pattern.

A general tightening of access to security information has been evident in Washington for many months, newsmen noted. Officials attribute this to the unusual number of major diplomatic negotiations under way, including the new U.S.-China relations, the SALT talks and negotiations on Berlin, Vietnam and the Middle East. Lower-ranking officials have become doubly cautious about discussing anything.

McCloskey, deputy assistant secretary of state and special assistant to Rogers, is a veteran professional in the press relations field. He indicated yesterday that he had sought to forestall a wholesale tightening of information flow by officials overreacting to limitations on discussing especially sensitive subjects.

"In my experience," said McCloskey, "the policy of this department has been exemplary in terms of our (news) contact. I know of no foreign office in the world where the degree of access is compar-

State Department officials also know, however, that the department carries a special burden, a heritage of the loyalty-security investigations which decimated its experts. An unusually candid self-examination of the department last year by its own officials warned that the investigatory consequences of "McCarthyism on departmental thinking" only began to diminish "during the 1960s" and that even in the 1970s "some of the bitter taste lingers on, however, and still inhibits to some degree the expression of unorthodox views."



STATINTL

CITIZEN JOURNAL

M - 118, 247 1971

State Department Losing Its Influence

By R. H. SHACKFORD
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

WASHINGTON --- Secretary of State William P. Rogers is allowing to stand, without denial, a report he has ordered State Department officials to refrain from putting anything in writing that might embarrass the White House.

This coincides with the fact the State Department's views on a broad range of American foreign policies are being conveyed to the public these days with two simple words -- "No comment."

PART OF this turn of events may be the outcome of the recent publication of the "Pentagon Papers" with their disclosure of embarrassing views held by White House, State Department, Defense Department and CIA officials.

But it also is a result of the exclusion of the State Department from participation in many major decisions.

FRUSTRATED spokesmen for the State Department, who used to pride themselves on not resorting to "no comment" responses even though they didn't say much, now use that phrase in response to questions on almost all important subjects.

Thursday's State Department briefing was typical. Department spokesmen Robert J. McCloskey took the "no comment" route eight times.

ASKED about the report that Rogers has informed department officials not to

that might embarrass the White House, McCloskey snapped: "No comment."

The reporter was referring to a column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak which said the White House was isolating itself from the professional career officers in the State Department.

The column said Rogers had laid down new rules on secrecy as a result of Nixon's passion to keep all the important reins in his own and Kissinger's hands and to smother second-guessing about decisions already announced.

27 AUG 1971

State Dept. gag seen

By R. H. SHACKFORD

Scrpps-Howard Staff Writer

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But it also is a result of the exclusion of the State Department from participation in many major decisions, such as those on China, Vietnam and devaluation of the dollar.

REFUSE TO COMMENT

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Yesterday's State Department briefing was typical. Department spokesmen Robert McCloskey took the "no comment" route eight different times on as many subjects.

Mr. McCloskey's reputation for keep his cool in difficult circumstances also was blown at one point—on the subject of China.

The day after President Nixon announced his plan to go to Peking, the State Department spokesman told reporters the White House had forbidden the department to discuss the subject of China.

A reporter asked Mr. McCloskey yesterday whether there had been any contacts between Washington and Peking officials since the Peking visit of Nixon's national security adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger.

"No comment," Mrs. McCloskey replied.

Asked whether the "no comment" was be-

cause of the White House embargo on discussion of China still stood or because there might have been some contacts, Mr. McCloskey said it was primarily because of the former.

"That means the State Department is still not allowed to talk about China?" a reporter asked.

INTERUPTS WITH SHOUT

After a pause, Mr. McCloskey replied: "All right. I'll let it go."

Another reporter replied: "All right. I'll let it go."

Another reporter started to ask: "Bob, on the same subject . . .?"

Interrupting with a shout, Mr. McCloskey said: "I'll let it go."

Asked then about the published report that Mr. Rogers has informed officials of the department not to put anything in writing that might embarrass the White House Mr. McCloskey snapped: "no comment."

The reporter was referring to a column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak which said the White House was isolating itself from the professional career officer in the State Department.

The column said Mr. Rogers had laid down new rules on secrecy as a result of "Mr. Nixon's passion to keep all the important reins in his own and Kissinger's hands and to smother second-guessing about decision already an-

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THE NATION

State's Secrets

The Pentagon, it seems, was not the only Government department to make a top-secret retrospective study of the nation's decisions in Viet Nam. In 1968 Tom Hughes, then director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, ordered another report, far less voluminous and ambitious but with considerable potential impact.

Composed by two State Department Asia analysts, the study compared the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations' key Viet Nam decisions with the bureau's own major judgments during the same period. In almost every case, the intelligence reports called the shots perfectly about such matters as the ineffectiveness of the bombing campaign, Vietnamese political upheavals and North Vietnamese troop buildups. Daniel Ellsberg is said to have read the study as a consultant for Henry Kissinger in 1969 and reacted: "My God, this is astonishing. I thought the CIA stuff was great, but these papers are even more accurate."

After publication of the Pentagon papers, the two known copies of the State Department study have been locked away, and Ray Cline, the intelligence bureau's current director, has forbidden subordinates to admit their existence.

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Fudge, or Alphabet Soup?

By Kenneth G. Weinberg

The most frivolous and meaningless title of the year award goes to Basic Books for allowing John Campbell's serious and significant critique of the United States foreign policy apparatus to be published under the name of *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* (\$3.95).

Campbell, a foreign service officer in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, has written a detailed analysis of our ever expanding foreign affairs bureaucracy, which he describes as a machine out of control. The State Department, he says, is swollen with civil service elephantiasis and overwhelmed by the more aggressive, more generously budgeted CIA, Pentagon, AID, USAID and various other government agencies and departments. Together, they have preempted the State Department's traditional role as the formulator of our foreign policy.

THE FUDGE FACTORY of the title comes from a 1966 remark of columnist Joseph Kraft who used the term in describing the decline of the State Department. But I suppose there are factories which make good fudge and factories that make bad fudge, efficient fudge factories as well as inefficient fudge factories, and the whimsy of the title demans the deadly serious intent of the text.

Still, gastronomical allusions seem to be irresistible in dealing with the State Department. President Kennedy called it a bowl of jelly and former Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach compared State's policy-making process to a tariff

pull.

Alphabet soup seems more apt. Campbell examines all aspects of our foreign affairs structure with its bewildering array of organizations and acronyms including, but certainly not limited to, AFSA (American Foreign Service Association), ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), AFRES (Armed Forces Radio and Television Service), ISA (Office of International Security Affairs), DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), OMB (Office of Management and Budget) NSC (National Security Council), OPRD (Operations Reduction), SIG (Senior Interdepartmental Group).

Campbell bravely fights his way through this bureaucratic thicket to show how the State Department, rendered weak, frightened and impotent by Joe McCarthy's attacks in the early '50s and by personnel policies which denuded the department of its most promising officers, has in the last 20 years surrendered more and more of its traditional and historic functions to the military, the intelligence agencies and to "little state departments" operating in the White House under the direct control of the President. This

diffusion of power and responsibility has brought us to the point where there is no effective control of foreign policy or of foreign policy personnel.

CAMPBELL warns that unless this bureaucratic monster is brought under control and cut down to manageable size, the cold war, which was the original justification for the piling of structure upon structure, with superstructures and infrastructures, will drag on indefinitely while the State Department struggles with its own topheavy edifice at the expense of diplomacy.

If President Nixon's "era of negotiation" is ever to begin, it must be preceded by severe bureaucratic reform. This message has been delivered before by many others, including Henry Kissinger, McGeorge Bundy, George Ball, George Kennan and John Kenneth Galbraith, but John Campbell has performed a valuable service in compiling the whole chamber of horrors in one book and by suggesting how the demon might be exorcized.

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★ Guidepost

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FUDGE FACTORY. By John
Franklin Campbell. Basic Books.
\$6.95.

The author has tackled two questions: What's the matter with the State Department and the Foreign Service? What can be done about it?

Basically his argument is that America's foreign affairs, since World War II, have become bogged down in a grossly inflated, over-manned bureaucracy that is incapable of making decisions because it has been fragmented into too many participating agencies.

He declares that the State Department has been weak for many years, partly because it has been overshadowed by the foreign operations of the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House, plus about four dozen other agencies that extend their operations into foreign countries; and partly because the White House, for several administrations distrustful of the professional diplomats, has developed an executive staff to handle foreign problems.

Campbell cites numerous re-

ports by commissions and task forces, all the way back to 1947, that have called for reform in the State Department, and he quotes dozens of diplomats, White House aides and former bureaucrats on the massive entanglements of the system. Underlying his analysis of government operations is the idea that American foreign policy no longer is so expansive as it way 25 years ago.

His proposals for reform are keyed to major reductions in personnel, elimination of many agencies, and a sharpening of the State Department's authority, backed up by tighter budgetary control.

Campbell has had more than eight years experience in the foreign service and now is on leave to help start a new magazine on foreign policy.

State Dept. Sets Policy Review

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department announced yesterday the creation of a top-level evaluation group to check into how U.S. foreign policy is being carried out, but with the more basic function of asking the tough question: Does this policy make sense?

The establishment of this Management Evaluation Group (MEG) is part of an overall reorganization of the top echelons of the department announced yesterday.

By coincidence, the formation of the evaluation group follows the massive disclosures about U.S. policy in Vietnam in the Pentagon papers in which a recurrent theme is sounded: that U.S. policy took on a momentum of its own, and the question of whether the policy made sense was lost in the shuffle.

Ambassador Thomas W. McElhiney, a senior career Foreign Service Officer, has been named to head the group, which is under the office of the Inspector General. According to a departmental press release, the MEG "will be the department's instrument for independent, institutionalized evaluation of the activities of the department and missions abroad." It will also carry on the original functions of the Inspector General's office, to evaluate personnel abroad.

The reorganization grows out of a year-long self-examination, by members of the State Department itself. It culminated in a 610-page report entitled "Diplomacy for the '70s." Since the report was released six months ago a task force under Deputy Under Secretary for Administration William B. Macomber Jr. has been at work to institute management reforms to meet the shortcomings exposed in that report.

It said the State Department had for two decades suffered "intellectual atrophy"

and a hardening of the "creative arteries" through a "crucial" gap in leadership.

The reforms, summed up in a progress report by Macomber, "are practical measures intended not to change the structure, which is basically sound, but to change attitudes and practices to make that structure work more effectively."

One goal is to make room for dissent and to encourage creativity among department employees. In addition to establishment of the group to evaluate U.S. policy, the following other change were announced yesterday:

- Promotion reform. Career foreign Service Officers will be allowed to remain at the same grade without promotion for 20 years. Previously, the so-called selection-out process meant that failure to be promoted every few years spelled dismissal from the Foreign Service.

The selection-out process was blamed, in part, for the suicide of a former Foreign Service Officer, Charles W. Thomas, 48, who was forced to retire without a pension because he was not recommended for promotion. The new system will guarantee that any officer who reaches a certain grade (Class 5) will be given tenure for 20 years, thus insuring that he will receive a pension when he retires. For those who enter the Foreign Service at the lowest grade (Class 8), it takes an average of seven and a half years to reach (class 5).

The change, according to the management reform bulletin announcing the new provisions, "is the initial response to the conclusion . . . that the highly competitive promotion system tends to make caution a virtue, inhibits such qualities as initiative, persistence and creativity, and discourages officers from accepting training, assignment to other agencies, or other types of unusual 'broadening' assign-

ment of senior executives. These initial changes are designed to reduce these pressures during mid-career."

- Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation. This is described as "a systematic process for better identifying issues, interests and priorities for all U.S. government activities abroad, matching resources and policies and periodically reviewing real and potential issues."

The reorganization also calls for a number of changes in titles of some principal department officers that will require congressional approval:

- The Under Secretary (now John N. Irwin II) to be named Deputy Secretary "to reflect not only his position as the Secretary's ranking deputy for the management of the department but also that of principal coordinator in behalf of the Secretary of the overseas activities of all U.S. government agencies."

- Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs to be raised to Under Secretary for Economic Affairs;

- Deputy Under Secretary for Administration to be designated Deputy Under Secretary for Management.

STATINTL

3 JULY 1971

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THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUDGE
FACTORYby John Franklin Campbell
Basic Books, 292 pp., \$6.95*Reviewed by Nicholas King*

What's wrong with the State Department? This question has rung like an echoing gong down the decades. It has been asked by Presidents, by the public, and by almost everyone in the State Department itself. John Campbell's book provides a full and reasoned answer, forthrightly written and convincingly documented. Despite the title, the problem is handled in *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* with sympathy and insight.

The basic malady is the growth of a monstrous foreign affairs apparatus that has overwhelmed the State Department and its control of—and voice in—foreign policy decisions. The Defense Department and the Agency for International Development, for example, have more men in their overseas missions than State, according to the latest available figures. The Central Intelligence Agency's strength abroad is not known, but anyone acquainted



with our embassies is aware that CIA officials, under diplomatic cover, are numerous. They have their own (often overlapping) sources of information, their personal communications, and handsome budgets. Also, based upon outdated ideological or Cold War premises, they usually have their own foreign policy. So do the Labor, Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury departments, which send officials to embassies to represent their domestic interests; all of them are backed up by hordes of weighers, sifters, newspaper readers, and decision-makers back home in Washington. Added to this is the President's foreign policy staff in the White House, a separate bureaucracy instead of, as the author recommends, a small and flexible staff of advisers who could supply the President, the ultimate policy-maker, with what he needs to know.

Yet Presidents desire a strong State Department. A tough Secretary of State could be one of the truly commanding figures in the government, an influence in all projects and expenditures—through his ambassadors—as to who does what out of which embassy.

For several reasons this is not so.

State began to decline in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's time through his use of personal and, to a large extent, military diplomacy. The McCarthy era subdued State's personnel into cautious conformists, relegating some of its ablest officers to oblivion. Morale and performance suffered further from arbitrary reforms from the outside, including efficiency-expert methods that could not possibly assess the quality of professional knowledge, negotiating skill, or political judgment.

Moreover, State's budget and expense account continued to be small compared with many other agencies in the field, as well as the diplomatic services of other big countries. (Not so long ago, the American ambassador in Bonn had at his disposal for personal expenses and entertainment one-third of what the West German ambassador spent in Washington.) State, for instance, must rely on another government agency for financing its communications abroad. And State, in common with other departments, is caught up in the habit of multiplying and complicating its structure with inter-this and inter-that committees, meetings, clearances, and the rest.

John Franklin Campbell would whittle down the size and structure of the department, and he would eliminate its duplicative agencies. The bureaucratic layers inside State and among all the foreign affairs pie-sharers in Washington have created an absurd procedural system, often with the experts at the bottom (as in the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam) while the ideologues and prestige hunters flourish at the top. Mr. Campbell knows that, although bureaucratic methods are necessary to the government's functioning, the fragmentation of authority tying up foreign policy formulation is a fundamental cause of today's confusion and inefficiency. Foreign officials never cease wondering what precise government in Washington such-and-such a duly mandated emissary is speaking for, or on whose exact behalf there he is spending money.

The author of this well-grounded, perceptive study realizes that what is wrong cannot be put right at one stroke, or even by one President. But, basing his thesis on past criticism as well as on his own experience in the Foreign Service, he calls for a number of specific, workable reforms that could gradually bring order, intelligence (in the ordinary sense) and flow to the making of modern American foreign policy.

Nicholas King was press attaché for the State Department in Paris or to that he was an editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune.

STATINTL

THE ECLIPSE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

By Dean Acheson

FOR over a decade it has been received as accepted truth in the highly charged political atmosphere of Washington that the role, power and prestige of the Secretary and Department of State in the conduct of foreign affairs have steadily declined. Accompanying this decline, and accused of causing it, is said to have been an increasing part played by the President himself in this alluring, fashionable and important activity, accentuated, perhaps, by the appearance in the White House of a court favorite—a modern Leicester, Essex or Buckingham—served by over a hundred attendants and constantly advising the monarch on these matters in the antechamber. *The New York Times*, in a series of articles published in January 1971, dates these developments from FDR's time, though adding that the trend was arrested "during the Truman and Eisenhower years [until] the death of John Foster Dulles in 1959."

Opinions have differed widely whether the eclipse noted is total or partial, radical and sinister, or within constitutional limits and historical precedents in relations between presidents and the first state secretary and department created by the first Congress. A great deal of the resulting debate has been based on wholly erroneous ideas of the nature and source of the national power to conduct foreign affairs, so we might do well to get this straight before going further.

II

The Supreme Court has left no doubt that the federal power over external affairs—unlike the power over internal affairs—is not the creature of the Constitution. The Union, it has pointed out, existed before the Constitution, and, with independence from Britain, the power to act "in the vast external realm" passed from the British Crown to the corporate unity, the United States of America. The Constitution strictly limited participation in the exercise of this power. "The President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He *makes* treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it." The Court quotes the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as reporting to the Senate on March 7, 1800: ". . . the President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to the Constitution. The committee consider this responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful discharge of his duty. They think the interference of the Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations calculated

State Department Moving On Declassification Unit

STATINTL

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department, prodded into action by the massive leak of secret information in the Pentagon papers, has speeded up moves to form a committee to authorize disclosure of classified documents.

It was learned yesterday that plans are being discussed to create a review council, staffed by top departmental officials to review methods of declassification and to authorize foreign service officers to give out information they consider to be in the public interest.

The council is expected to be headed by an official at the level of assistant secretary or deputy under secretary.

Leisurely consideration was given to the creation of such a council after the Jan. 15 order by President Nixon to review government procedures for classifying documents. The idea has been under more active review this week. It was suggested that such a council could clear current information for release to newsmen, congressmen or the public if its members decided that disclosure would not be contrary to national security and would not affect foreign governments or intelligence sources.

At best, such an institutionalized procedure could help erode the ingrained reluctance on the part of State Department officials to provide information about current diplomacy, even when such dis-

closures would not affect security interests.

It was not expected that such a council would significantly cut down on the selective release of classified information by those officials who do "leak" classified information, sometimes on orders and sometimes because they believe the disclosure would be useful for any one of a number of purposes.

The council could pass on release of information requested by anyone and could also consider suggestions from foreign service officers who wish to disclose the contents of classified documents in the belief that the advantages of such disclosure outweigh the disadvantages.

Besides this council the State Department is also looking into ways of speeding up declassification of historical documents. A State Department official also said members are still to be appointed to the interdepartmental task force dealing with the Pentagon documents that have been distributed to a number of newspapers.

A State Department official said yesterday that in declassifying documents foreign governments are not normally contacted, even when they are involved as a subject of the papers. If it is a joint agreement that is being declassified, the official said, the government will be contacted. But if the paper is a telegram from a U.S. embassy abroad that contains information provided by another government, that government would not be approached for clearance.

This official said that

foreign governments involved in the Pentagon documents would not be approached.

The British government, meanwhile, said yesterday that it was informing the United States of its "concern" about revelations of diplomatic discussions through publication of the Pentagon papers.

The Foreign Office announced that Lord Cromer, the British ambassador in Washington, "has been instructed to express to the U.S. government the British government's concern at the threat to the confidentiality of diplomatic exchanges in the light of the publication of the papers."

The announcement added, "We are concerned at the status of exchanges of an intergovernmental nature. The point we have made is that there is a general problem which we would like the U.S. government to bear in mind."

Paul C. Warnke, former assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Wednesday said the portions of the Pentagon papers dealing with diplomatic exchanges were of a sufficiently sensitive nature to warrant prior restraint against publication.

The Chinese ambassador to Washington, James C. H. Shen, said yesterday that publication of the documents hampered diplomatic conduct.

"As a government official," Shen said, "I would feel very happy knowing that what I say today in negotiations with American officials would not be published."

WASHINGTON STAR
18 JUN 19712-DAY SEARCHSecrecy at State Dept.
Total on Viet StudyBy GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

Security people in the State Department are still musing over how two copies of the mammoth Pentagon archives on Vietnam policy could have been in the State Department without anyone in authority knowing it.

It took Secretary of State William P. Roger's staff about 48 hours to find the copies of the 47-volume studies.

The reason — they had gone directly into the "personal files" of former Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and William Bundy, key department aide on Vietnam under President Johnson. Two copies — from the 15 made — were sent by the Pentagon by personal courier, outside official channels, to both men toward the end of the past administration in 1968.

The volumes were not registered with the central filing office of the department. They were not gone through by the security office to check whether any documents needed to be duplicated for the department's own files. They were put under lock and key in the filing cabinets of Katzenbach and Bundy, who — in the haste of the transition — neglected to tell their successors of their existence.

Officials say they see nothing peculiar in their procedure. Security was never violated, they say, — in fact, the volumes were so secure almost no one knew about them.

Top officials of the department — and even not-so-top officials — often leave personal files behind containing classified information. They get the same security treatment as State Department files. But he officials concerned have a right to return to these personal files for any memoirs or articles they may be writing.

So it is today with William Bundy. He has been given use of a corner in room 5310 of the State Department.

Something like two of the 10 filing cabinets in the room are his, that is open to him and his secretary, Blanche Moore, whom he has kept on at his own expense.

Bundy is writing a book about the same subject as the Pentagon subject — the history of the policy-making process on Vietnam.

Naturally, these archives would be of great use to him. Bundy, who is now visiting London and works out of the Center of International Studies of MIT in Boston, is reported to make frequent use of his files here. Sometimes he comes to room 5310 three times a week.

When the book is completed, Bundy — like all other former department officials — will have to have it cleared by the Historical Office of the State Department. There its pages will be gone over to make certain no classified material in the personal files is going into print.

3 May 1971



JOURNAL MEMO

CIA STUDY some time back developed likely "scenarios" for thaw in Red China's belligerent stand against U.S. One initial Chinese opening predicted: Reds would invite U.S. ping pong team to tour People's Republic of China. State Department, in written comments, ridiculed the suggestion, JOURNAL has learned from impeccable sources outside of the intelligence community.

ABOUT THOSE CHANGES IN THE
STATE DEPARTMENT

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 25, 1971

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, a very interesting article appeared in the March 20, 1971, edition of *Tactics* magazine dealing with some of the goings on inside the Department of State. Since this article deals with the reform program being carried on within the Department of Government responsible for our foreign policy and since one of the arguments being used by the State Department to justify certain changes in its personnel policy seems to be that the Congress is aware of these changes and has not voiced any objection, I would like to insert this article into the Record to insure that all my colleagues are familiar with the proposed modifications in personnel policy which are under consideration.

The article follows:

TUMULT INSIDE STATE DEPARTMENT

The state of chaos and demoralization that exists among the personnel of the State Department and its associated foreign affairs agencies is unprecedented. Responsible officers are asking whether anyone in authority is able to distinguish between reality and illusion. Under the leadership of William P. Rogers and William B. Macomber, Jr., his deputy undersecretary of state for administration, the State Department is plunging headlong into a personnel administrative system designed to remove any objective control by the Congress, the White House and the American people over the foreign affairs bureaucracy.

The State Department is pushing an "action program" designed to force career, civilian, domestic employees into the foreign service category where they will be totally under the control of personnel immune from any kind of accountability. They will not have to account for their actions to Congress, the Civil Service Commission or the courts if they fire anyone for any reason whatsoever, whether for a legitimate reason or because the employee has discovered gross negligence or subversive behavior, and has refused to collaborate in it.

The so-called reorganization would preserve an Alger Hiss, or an American Kim Philby, in his post, and hush up or eliminate any Olof, Otopka without their having any recourse. Security, in the Orwellian manner, would consider anti-communists, not communists, as the "security risks" who would have to be kept out of State Department jobs.

What this boils down to is preparation by the State Department of a purge program of the few remaining persons who consider loyalty to the nation more important than covering up for the failures or transgressions of the State Department.

WATERFRONT-LIKE DRAWLING

Scenes of turmoil such as one might expect on the waterfront are occurring within the offices of the department. The situation has become so tense that in spite of every effort to hush up the news, at least three reporters have given accounts of the breakdown in decorum and morale. On Feb. 11, in the tabloid *Washington Daily News*, the hush-hush was broken by a Scripps-Howard writer who does not cover the State Department ordinarily.

He was Dan Thomasson, who disclosed that top State Department officials, including Theodore L. Elliot, Jr., executive secretary

reporting directly to Rogers, and John Ray, of the European section, "blew their diplomatic aplomb and wrestled for the microphone amid screams of 'shame,' 'fascism,' and 'is this the kind of democracy we're trying to export?'"

Reporters regularly assigned to the State Department were present, and although this unprecedented affair was indisputably news, they collaborated with State Department officials in the effort at censorship. At least, Russian reporters who cover the foreign ministry in Moscow have the excuse they are not allowed to report certain news. But what alibi have the American newsmen assigned to the State Department? This is a press scandal that editors throughout the country should look into. Why should so-called reporting in-depth, with a few, heroic exceptions, be limited in Washington to what is to be advantage of the reds? This is the double standard presently being observed.

AMERICAN SURVIVAL IS INVOLVED

The wrestling match took place over what on the surface was a minor issue, union representation of State Department employees. Actually, the passions reflected a shattering into public notice of the greatest crisis in American diplomatic organization since the formation of our republic.

The basic issue is whether the State Department and other foreign affairs agencies are subject to the control of Congress and the American people, or is the State Department to run foreign policy in secret, implementing unwritten "understandings" with the USSR and Red China, totally free of any kind of accountability within or outside the government? The State Department is asking for no less than the kind of special status possessed by the CIA, despite the disparity in their roles.

The key lies in the basic attitude toward government of William P. Rogers. History may well record his influence on President Nixon as unfortunate as that of Harry Hopkins and Col. House on other comparatively recent occupants of the White House.

Rogers has developed the doctrine of executive privilege in so extreme a manner as to make it indistinguishable from enlightened despotism. Under this doctrine, Rogers holds that Congress and the American people are not entitled to any information developed within the executive branch unless it decides to release it. The inevitable result is secret government.

Rogers, as a "pragmatist," has come up with a technique for dealing with the pesty Congress and the inquisitive public. The procedure is based on the thesis that the public has no right to this information, but insists on being told, so that it has to be satisfied in some such manner as an image is devised for a public figure that will gain approval, but not really change the man's character.

Under this technique, the executive branch has to maintain a constant flow of information to the Congress, and the public, to satisfy this hunger but not to disclose the essential facts. The enemy, that has its own means of finding out what it wants to know, therefore is better informed than the American people—and the Congress—on our policies. The Kim Philbys, in such an Orwellian complex, are not our security risks; the Otopkas are! This tactic, too, by generating a news-managed flow of selected data, can inspire hearings on the Hill that have the effect of destroying the credibility of members of the Congress.

The procedures and philosophy behind this resemble, in the Anglo-Saxon world, the conflicts between the Stuart Kings and the British parliament. The result was the destruction of both the executive and the legislative branches, and the creation of the heavy-handed, Cromwell dictatorship.

COULD BECOME ELECTION ISSUE

On Feb. 23, 1971, in an unusually long comment in the *Washington Sunday Star*, Philip Shandler, a reporter on federal employee matters, stated that the issues at the State Department already have "embroiled top administration officials in an intensive debate, the outcome of which could become an issue in next year's presidential election."

The article, that warranted news space but was limited to Shandler's "The Federal Spotlight" column, dealt only with the issue of "how much freedom should the State Department have—in contrast to other government agencies—to assign its employees? Executive Order 11491 issued by Nixon little over a year ago, provided for grievance appeals by employees to a third party, the Labor Department.

"The State Department last fall, however, requested exemption from the order for foreign service employees . . . The department sought to preserve the present system of in-house appeals to a board of high-level department officials."

What Macomber wants is to block any sort of review of personnel policies outside the department. Otopka had the right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, and there also is the Department of Labor. By exempting the foreign service from the executive order, the labor department would be excluded. By converting Civil Service employees to foreign service status, the Civil Service would be excluded. Only Rogers and Macomber would decide who was hired, fired, transferred, promoted, downgraded or re-assigned.

Not only the present foreign service, but the entire State Department would be converted into a new CIA-type organization, with no ties to Congress, other executive departments, the courts or the American people. All of this would be put across without any act of Congress!

Originally, Macomber tried to carry out this operation by direct appeal to the Federal Labor Relations Council, on Oct. 14, 1970, asking it to approve exemption of the entire foreign service from the executive order when it was next revised.

The alert intervention of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), which demanded a public hearing by the council, blocked this quickie operation from succeeding. A public hearing took place on Nov. 16, when the AFGE and other groups marshaled a set of Constitutional, legal, administrative and political arguments that overwhelmed those presented by Macomber.

On Jan. 30, the Federal Labor Relations Council sent the White House its opinion on the request indicating the options available to the President, and recommending that he reject it. This would not affect other changes in the executive order that would add efficiency and precision. Nixon is said to want this done.

Macomber was informed by "an unimpeachable source" at the White House of the council's adverse action. He was told that if he could get agreement within 48 hours from the American Foreign Service Association, which the State Department controls and uses as a front, he might salvage or even recoup his losses. On the Jan. 30-31 weekend, Macomber and members of the AFSA board worked out a paper agreement to this end.

The AFSA board had no right to make such an agreement because its rank and file members at a meeting on Nov. 4 had specifically resolved that the board hold no secret meetings with Macomber.

"DEAR BILL" LETTERS EXCHANGED

Therefore, to conceal violation of this order, Macomber on Feb. 1 wrote a "Dear Bill" letter to William C. Harrop, AFSA board chairman, proposing the agreement they already had negotiated. On the same day, Har-

**PASSPORT OFFICE
HAS SECRET FILE**

**243,135 Names in Computer
—Applications Screened**

By BEN A. FRANKLIN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10—The United States Passport Office acknowledged today that it keeps a secret, computerized file of 243,135 Americans whose applications for passports may be of interest to it or to Government law enforcement agencies. Persons listed in the file may never be aware of it.

The existence of the file was disclosed by Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr., the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, who is a persistent critic of what he considers Government surveillance and file-keeping abuses.

In a speech last night before a symposium at Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pa., Senator Ervin said he had discovered the Passport Office file through a reply to his subcommittee's questionnaires. He called it more proof that uncontrolled and undercover Government surveillance was a serious threat to the exercise of the First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom to associate.

File Is Defended

In an interview today Miss Frances Knight, the Passport Office director since 1955, said, "A passport is a United States document addressed to foreign Governments in which we are saying, 'This person is an American citizen.'"

She said that "a vast majority"—perhaps 90 per cent—of those listed in the file were persons of "questionable citizenship" about whom it was her obligation to be curious and cautious in issuing an official document.

A spokesman for Senator Ervin, however, said today that the State Department had reported to him in writing that the largest group of names on the list was in the "known or suspected Communists or subversives" category and that the number of names under "doubtful citizenship" ranked second. The number in each of these categories was not immediately available.

"We are guarding the integrity of the passport by verifying United States citizenship," Miss Knight said. But she excluded the names of 243,135 persons from the list.

Miss Knight said she had been ill for the last three weeks and away from her desk. Until she summoned aides to her office this afternoon, she said, she was unaware that Senator Ervin had made official inquiries about the file or that it was a matter of controversy. The State Department's reply to Mr. Ervin's questionnaire was dated Jan. 4.

Hearings Start Feb. 23

Senator Ervin has scheduled nine days of public hearings before his subcommittee starting Feb. 23 on what he has called the growth of "police state" surveillance and dossier-keeping on perhaps 50 million Americans, most of them accused of breaking no laws.

The North Carolina Democrat, a former judge on his state's Supreme Court, said last night that while there might be legitimate reasons for maintaining portions of the Passport Office file, many of the justifications for it given to his subcommittee by the State Department were "beyond any reason whatsoever."

He said a State Department reply to a subcommittee questionnaire listed these categories:

Q "Individual's actions do not reflect to the credit of the U. S. abroad (1,020 persons)."

Q Defectors, expatriates and repatriates whose background demands further inquiry prior to issuance of a passport.

Q Persons wanted by a law enforcement agency for criminal activity.

Q Individuals involved in a child custody or desertion case.

Q Delinquents or suspected delinquents in military service.

Q "Known or suspected Communists or subversives."

'Orange Card'

Senator Ervin said other categories included simply "orange card" and "miscellaneous."

"I don't know what 'orange card' means, and I don't think they know either," he told the Dickinson College gathering.

Asked if he thought the Central Intelligence Agency had inserted names in the file, Mr. Ervin said, "I can't prove it but I suspect the C.I.A. gets just about anything it wants."

He said the State Department had acknowledged maintaining a secret surveillance file of passport applicants in which "the individual is not told that he is in the file" until and unless "adverse action" is taken. It was not clear today how this would operate in actual practice.

Miss Knight said her office would merely report quietly to "the interested agency"—the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a state law enforcement

agency with a fugitive warrant, for example — that a person listed in the file had applied for a passport.

Whether "adverse action" would ensue was none of her interest, she said, and she would not notify the subject of his listing in the file.

Miss Knight said she would not necessarily notify anyone that he was included in the file even if the "adverse action" were taken in her own office, through the denial of a passport.

STATINTL

Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over Intelligence Setup

Following is the fifth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — President Nixon has become dissatisfied with the size, cost and loose coordination of the Government's worldwide intelligence operations.

According to members of his staff, he believes that the intelligence provided to help him formulate foreign policy, while occasionally excellent, is not good enough, day after day, to justify its share of the budget.

Mr. Nixon, it is said, has begun to decide for himself what the intelligence priorities must be and where the money should be spent, instead of leaving it largely to the intelligence community. He has instructed his staff to survey the situation and report back within a year, it is hoped—with recommendations for budget cuts of as much as several hundred million dollars.

Not many years ago the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence bureaus were portrayed as an "invisible empire" controlling foreign policy behind a veil of secrecy. Now the pendulum has swung.

The President and his aides are said to suspect widespread overlapping, duplication and considerable "boondoggling" in the secrecy-shrouded intelligence "community."

In addition to the C.I.A., they include the intelligence arms of the Defense, State and Justice Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. Together they spend \$3.5-billion a year on strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, Communist China and other countries that might harm the nation's security.

When tactical intelligence in Vietnam and Germany and reconnaissance by overseas commands is included, the annual figure exceeds \$5-billion, experts say. The department spends more than 80

per cent of the total, or about \$4-billion, about \$2.5-billion of it on the strategic intelligence and the rest on tactical. It contributes at least 150,000 members of the intelligence staffs, which are estimated at 200,000 people.

Overseeing all the activities is the United States Intelligence Board, set up by secret order by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 to coordinate intelligence exchanges, decide collection priorities, assign collection tasks and help prepare what are known as national intelligence estimates.

The chairman of the board, who is the President's representative, is the Director of Central Intelligence, at present Richard Helms. The other members are Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Ray S. Cline, director of intelligence and research at the State Department; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, head of the National Security Agency; Howard C. Brown Jr., an assistant general manager at the Atomic Energy Commission, and William C. Sullivan, a deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Intelligence men are aware of the President's disquiet, but they say that until now—half-way through his term—he has never seriously sought to comprehend the vast, sprawling conglomeration of agencies. Nor, they say, has he decided how best to use their technical resources and personnel—much of it talented—in formulating policy.

Two Cases in Point

Administration use—albeit, tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance planes to help police the Arab-Israeli cease-fire of last August is considered a case in point. Another was poor intelligence coordination before the abortive Sontag prisoner-of-war raid of No. 21, at which time the C.I.A. was virtually shut out of Pentagon planning.

By contrast, the specialists point out, timely intelligence helps in decision-making.

It was Mr. Cline who spotted the sign of a Soviet nuclear submarine buildup at Cienfuegos,

Cuba, last September. suspicions, based on the arm of a mother ship, plus two conspicuous barges of a type used only for storing a nuclear submarine's radioactive effluent, alerted the White House. That led to intelligence behind-the-scenes negotiations and the President's rewarning to Moscow not to service nuclear armed submarines "in or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the intelligence community resist talking with reporters, but in views over several months with Federal officials deal daily with intelligence matters, with men retired from intelligence careers with some on active duty indicate that President Nixon and his chief advisers appreciate the need for high-grade intelligence and "consume" eagerly.

The community, for instance, has been providing the President with exact statistics numbers, deployment characteristics of Soviet missiles, nuclear submarines and airpower for the talks with Russians on the limitation of strategic arms.

"We couldn't get off ground at the talks with this extremely sophisticated formation base," an official commented. "We don't give our negotiators round figures

—about 300 of this weapon. We get it down to the '284 here, here and here.' When our people sit down to negotiate with the Russians they know all about the Russian strategic threat to the U.S.—that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence has its drawbacks, some sources say, for it whets the Administration's appetite. Speaking of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, a Cabinet official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

Estimates in New Form

In the last year Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have ordered a revision in the national intelligence estimates, which are prepared by the C.I.A. after consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some on future Soviet strategy have been ordered radically revised by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present Soviet capabilities allows Henry and others to criticize us for some spanginess about predicting future Soviet policy," an informed source conceded. "It's pretty hard to look down the road with the same certainty."

Part of the Administration's assault on the intelligence put and organization of the

Helms Said to Rate High

Sources close to the White House say that Mr. Nixon and his foreign-policy advisers—Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—respect the professional competence of Mr. Helms, who is 57 and is the first career head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in June, 1966, Mr. Helms has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening discipline and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and among the public. His standing with Congress and among the professionals is high.

According to White House sources, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mr. Helms added authority to coordinate the activities of the other board members. He is reported to have declined.

A major problem, according to those who know the situation, is that while Mr. Helms is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board, the board has about 10 per cent—\$500-million to

Foreign Policy: Decision Power Ebbing at the State Department

After two years in office, President Nixon has fashioned his own style in foreign policy and in the use of his staff. Correspondents of The New York Times have explored this foreign policy machinery, the power of the President's advisers and the impact of Washington's major institutions on foreign policy decisions. The role of the State Department is explored today in the first of a series of articles.

By TERENCE SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 17—The Department of State, once the proud and undisputed steward of foreign policy, has finally acknowledged what others have long been saying: that it is no longer in charge of the United States' foreign affairs and that it cannot reasonably expect to be so again.

By its own admission as well as the testimony of its critics, the department has been losing ground in the bureaucracy for a generation. In the opinion of many people in the department and outside, the erosion has accelerated, sharply during the first two years of the Nixon Administration.

As President Nixon pledged during his campaign, he has gathered more and more of the business of foreign affairs in the White House. He has taken a personal hand in both the broad scope and mechanical details of foreign policy, from proclaiming the Nixon Doctrine on the American stance abroad to composing the Government's official condolences to France on the death of de Gaulle.

The centralization of the formulation of foreign policy in the White House has been a characteristic of the nuclear age, when the issues have become so complex and the consequences of error so grave. It has, in fact, been the pattern since the days of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Particularly strong Secretaries of State resisted the trend during the Truman and Eisenhower years, but since the

death of John Foster Dulles in 1959, Presidents have dominated the foreign-policy scene.

The centralization has been most striking under President Nixon, who regards foreign affairs as his field of special competence. His detailed personal involvement has often been at the expense of the State Department. The 1970 message on the state of the world was a case in point.

The idea for a major year-end summary of the Administration's view of the world situation originated, with some prompting from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the State Department. Secretary of State William P. Rogers planned to deliver it himself at the end of 1969.

Each geographic bureau was called upon to submit material. The project generated considerable enthusiasm because it presented one of those rare opportunities for people at the working level to play a direct role in phrasing the nation's public position.

Rogers Team Was Absent

Before the compilation was finished the White House staff learned of the project, saw the possibilities in it for Mr. Nixon and pre-empted the idea. The department's draft was then turned over to the national-security staff, which wrote an expanded 40,000-word version for release under the President's name.

When Mr. Nixon signed the document in a White House ceremony last February, Henry A. Kissinger, his special assistant for national-security affairs, stood at his side, flanked by others on the White House staff. No State Department representative was present; Secretary Rogers and his aides were in the Ghanaian capital, Accra, at the time — about as far out in left field as they could be.

"The whole incident rankled," an assistant to the Secretary recalled later. "We all felt cheated on that one."

Increasing White House control of foreign affairs is one of a range of factors that have caused the 1,000-man State Department to slip from its once-proud position among equals in foreign affairs.

As it is now, it not only stands second, but such a weak

second that it is often unable to assert leadership over other departments, even on secondary matters. The influence of such agencies as the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency has risen, meanwhile, until it has approached that of the State Department.

Poor Coordination Results

That would pose no problem if the White House was able to orchestrate all aspects of foreign policy. Large as its staff has become — Mr. Kissinger has 110 people — it cannot do so, and in the secondary areas where it counts on the State Department to follow through, coordination is often poor because other agencies have developed the habit of taking their case directly to the White House.

On more than one occasion, as a consequence, the Administration has spoken with conflicting voices. Even the United States Information Agency, an offshoot of the State Department, has begun articulating an independent line.

It adopted a far firmer stand than the department, for example, in its broadcast commentaries last summer on Soviet "duplicity" in the Middle East — just at a time when the department was relying on quiet diplomacy to persuade the Russians to rectify violations of the Suez Canal cease-fire.

Reminded in an extraordinary memo from Secretary Rogers that U.S.I.A.'s Congressional charter requires it to clear policy with the State Department, Frank Shakespeare, its director, replied that he reported directly to the White House.

A conflict arose recently over the Administration's attitude toward the West German Government's controversial policy of improving relations with Eastern Europe. The official United States view, as outlined repeatedly in public by Mr. Rogers, is unqualified endorsement. But Mr. Kissinger and other members of the White House staff recently undercut that by disclosing personal reservations to several visiting diplomats and to newsmen.

Furor in West Germany

The result was a furor in Bonn. The West German Government dispatched a high-level emissary to Washington to find out what the American position was. Significantly, the envoy went to the White House for his answer and expressed deepening

himself satisfied that all was in order.

Despite the transfer of many foreign-policy functions to the White House, the State Department still conducts the great bulk of day-to-day business with the rest of the world. In such areas as Africa and Latin America, indeed, the department makes policy simply because the White House is too absorbed with other matters.

A departmental proposal to strive for closer communication with some of the left-leaning governments of North Africa recently became policy because the White House had been too busy with the Middle East crisis to review it.

The department is organized into five geographic bureaus, each headed by an assistant secretary and composed of "country directors" who are supposed to coordinate all the communications and issues between the United States and a given country. It is a focal job, and a strong country director, if he is left alone, can have a major impact on policy in the course of routine business, such as recommending aid levels and initiating exchange programs.

The system breaks down in the case of countries such as Cambodia and Jordan, where the White House has a strong interest and tends to take over during a crisis. The country director's influence is also reduced in places like Korea and Taiwan, where the United States maintains large military missions and the impact of the Defense Department is correspondingly great.

A major change in the amount of aid provided under the military-assistance program, for instance, greatly affects relations with the United States. And it is the military who determine the rate of assistance.

The diminished role of the State Department is not a new phenomenon, but it has reached a point where its officials acknowledge it in public. "Diplomacy for the 70's," a 610-page critique of its shortcomings published last month, speaks of the "intellectual atrophy" that besets the department and adds:

"With the exceptions of an active period at the end of the nineteen-forties, the department and Foreign Service have languished as creative organs, busily and even happily chewing on the cud of daily routine, while other departments, Defense, C.I.A., the White House staff have made important, innovative contributions to foreign policy."

Among the major elements of the situation are the following:

Continued