

STATINT
30 NOV 1972

A Bad Deal that May Not Work

I. F. Stone

-Washington

I

The pending cease-fire agreement, as so far disclosed by Hanoi and Washington, is like a delicate watch, intricately fabricated to make sure it won't work. No agreement ever had so many ingenious provisions calculated to keep it from succeeding. If by chance one spring doesn't break down, there is another in reserve that almost surely will, and if by some unforeseen mishap that one also should work, there is still another which will certainly go blooey sooner or later.

The fragility of the agreement to end the second Indochinese war is put in better focus if one compares it with the cease-fire which ended the first, at Geneva in 1954. The only signed document that emerged from the Geneva conference was a cease-fire agreement between the military commands on both sides. It was accompanied by a final declaration which nobody signed and to which the United States and the separate state the French had created in the south objected; then as now the puppet was more obdurate than the master.

The first Indochinese war ended, as the second seems to be doing, with a cease-fire but no political settlement. The prime defect, the "conceptual" flaw, to borrow a favorite word of Kissinger's, lay in the effort to end a profoundly political struggle without a political settlement. A cease-fire then, as now, left the political problem unresolved and thus led inevitably to a resumption of the conflict. It will be a miracle if the new cease-fire does not breed another, a third, Indochinese war.

A political solution was left to *mañana* and "free elections." But the Geneva cease-fire agreement, disappointing as its results proved to be, was far more precise in its promise of free elections than is the new cease-fire. It set a firm date—July, 1956—for the balloting; specified that the purpose of the elections was "to bring about the unification of Vietnam"; provided for the release within thirty days not only of POWs but of "civilian internees"; and provided for the release of political prisoners by defining civilian internees as

... all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.¹

Nobody knows how many thousands of political prisoners are in Thieu's jails. The most famous is Truong Dinh Dzu, the peace candidate who came in second in the 1967 presidential election, the first and only contested one. Thieu's most notorious instrument for these round-ups was Operation Phoenix, which the CIA ran for him. A Saigon Ministry of Information pamphlet, *Vietnam 1967-71: Toward Peace and Prosperity*, boasts that Operation Phoenix killed 40,994 militants and activists during those years.² These are the opposition's civilian troops, the cadres without which organizational effort in any free election would be crippled. Arrests have been intensified in preparation for a cease-fire.

The fate of the political prisoners figured prominently in the peace negotiations. The seven-point program put forward by the other side in July of last year called for the dismantling of Thieu's concentration camps and the release of all political prisoners. The eight-point proposal put forward by Washington and Saigon last January left their fate in doubt. It called for the simultaneous release of all POWs and "innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina." The ambiguous phrasing seemed designed to exclude political since these were neither "captured" nor, in the eyes of the Thieu regime, "innocent."

The new cease-fire terms do not bother with such ambiguity. Dr. Kissinger in his press conference of October 26 seemed to take satisfaction in the fact that the return of US POWs "is not conditional on the disposition of Vietnamese prisoners in Vietnamese jails." Their future, he explained, will be determined "through negotiations among the South Vietnamese parties," i.e., between Thieu and the PRG. So the political will stay in jail until Thieu agrees to let them out. This may easily coincide

with the Second Coming. This is only one of the many built-in vetoes by which Thieu can block free elections and a political settlement.

The new cease-fire agreement gives him far more power than he would have had under the proposals he and Nixon made jointly in January. Under Point 3 of those proposals, there was to have been "a free and democratic *presidential* [my italics] election" in South Vietnam within six months. One month before the election, Thieu and his vice president were to resign. The president of the senate was to head a caretaker government which would "assume administrative responsibilities *except for those pertaining to the elections*" (my italics).

Administrative responsibility for the election, according to those Nixon-Thieu terms, was to be taken out of the hands of the Saigon regime and put in those of a specially created electoral commission "organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the date of the agreement."³

Finally the joint proposals of last January indicated that the electoral commission would be free from the inhibitions of the Thieu constitution, under which communist and neutralist candidates can be declared ineligible. According to those proposals, "All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates."

How much weaker is the setup under the new cease-fire agreement. There is no provision for Thieu's resignation before the election. The existing government is no longer excluded from responsibility in holding the elections; no clear line is drawn between what the Thieu government can do and what an electoral commission will do: what happens if the latter is reduced to observing the irregularities of the former? Thieu will continue to be in control of the army and the police, and there is no way to keep him from using them to harass the opposition and herd the voters.

Instead of an electoral commission, the new agreement would set up a tripartite Council of National Reconciliation and Concord for much the

29 NOV 1972

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601

Laos: New facts on secret war

By Richard E. Ward
Second of a series

Clandestine sabotage, combat and espionage missions have been conducted in Laos and Cambodia by U.S. military personnel, despite White House denials and contrary to congressional prohibition.

Such missions are top-secret actions directed by the Studies and Observations Group of the U.S. Army Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon and generally known by its initials, MAC-V SOG. The most comprehensive picture of these activities available, based on testimony of former participants in these missions, known as Command and Control operations, is contained in a series of three articles by Gerald Meyer, published in the Nov. 5, 10 and 12 issues of the St. Louis Post Dispatch.

Unless otherwise indicated all material in this article is based on the articles by Meyer, a regular staff member of the Post Dispatch, who interviewed former Special Forces members, helicopter pilots and others who took part in the Command and Control operations during the 1960s and into 1972.

The Post Dispatch's informants, whose names were not revealed to protect them from possible prosecution, stated that the clandestine commando raids were still in progress as of August. One informant said that in August when he left Bien Hoa, one of the Command and Control bases, more than 100 Army Special Forces were stationed there and reinforcements were being sent from Okinawa.

The commando raids in recent years, utilizing Army personnel who generally command teams composed of mercenaries from Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, were also sent into North Vietnam and liberated areas of South Vietnam. There is evidence that the Air Force has operational jurisdiction over a similar program based at Nakon Phanon, Thailand, just across the Laotian border.

Commando raids were ordered by

Washington against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the early 1960's, as documented in the Pentagon Papers, but which provided few details. The present program, apparently undergoing a partial "Vietnamization," is an outgrowth of the original escalation of CIA-Special Forces missions in Indochina ordered by the Kennedy administration.

Although the Post Dispatch does not mention the CIA, it is clear that Studies and Observations Group is a CIA operation. The informant most knowledgeable about SOG, a Special Forces officer, was described by correspondent Meyer as fearful of being jailed or fined, saying: "If I talked to you and got caught, I could get 10 years in prison and a \$10,000 fine."

The Special Forces officer said that the connections between Command and Control and the 'MAC-V SOG' organization in Saigon were so highly classified that we would not risk commenting on them," wrote Meyer.

Despite his reluctance to talk the officer explained that the Command and Control operations were "formally" under the direction of the Fifth Special Forces Group until January 1971, when the Fifth Special Forces officially was described as having been withdrawn from Vietnam. Actually, according to Meyer, "numerous Fifth Special Forces were left behind at Command and Control bases throughout South Vietnam" and various efforts were employed to conceal their continued presence. They were forbidden to wear the green beret and Special Forces insignia while they remained in Indochina.

Symbolic of the Command and Control operations, was a gestapo-like insignia, used by one of the units, a green-bereted skull with blood dripping from its teeth. This was the emblem of Command and Control Central. There were at least two other main units, Command and Control North and Command and Control South. The North, Central and South referred to the base areas of the commando teams.

Apparently most of the operations under the Command and Control program, at least in recent years, took place in southern Laos. However, after the U.S.-Saigon invasion of Cambodia and subsequent Congressional prohibition against use of U.S. ground troops in Cambodia, it is safe to assume that the secret U.S. missions were increased in the latter country.

Airborne bandits

Typically, Command and Control missions comprised several U.S. officers or NCO's commanding a mercenary team which would land in Laos or Cambodia, and "aimed at taking prisoners, gathering information and disrupting communist activities." The commandos would be transported in four helicopters, while four helicopter gunships would provide air cover, at least initially. Two other aircraft, one acting as a commando post and a second as the forward air controller, were also involved in missions.

One Special Forces veteran, who participated in Command and Control raids from Danang, said he had taken part in missions in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. "He said they were for the purpose of gathering intelligence, rescuing other American missions threatened by North Vietnamese forces, destroying supplies and disrupting enemy communications facilities."

Command and Control Central, operating out of Dakto and Kontum, near the tri-border area of South Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, was used for raids deep within the two latter countries.

"A Special Forces soldier formerly assigned to Command and Control Central said that the group's missions were handled by about 150 Americans and from 300 to 400

Montagnard tribesmen. Men participating in missions first were transported to Dakto and then sent by helicopter across the borders, he said.

"The missions were rotated among the men and casualties were severe, the man said. . . . Such teams usually included two or three American leaders and about half a dozen Montagnards.

"Dakto was the starting point also for large 'hatchet forces,' with larger numbers of Americans and Montagnards. . . .

"Less frequently—apparently only about once every six months—very large groups of Americans were sent across the borders on so-called Slam (Search, locate and annihilate) missions. More than 100 men sometimes participated in such missions. . . .

"Some penetrations into Laos apparently were quite deep. Both the Special Forces (two of Meyer's informants) said the U.S. operated a radio relay station on a mountain top about 30 miles inside Laos.

"This station, called the 'Eagle's Nest,' was used to transmit messages between South Vietnam and Command and Control teams operating beyond the mountain top in the Laotian countryside."

The radio station, whose exact location was not specified, could have been located near the Bolovens plateau, in Southern Laos, where the Pathet Lao told this correspondent in 1970 there was a secret U.S. base. The Pathet Lao liberation forces captured

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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001000170001-5

STATINTL

Demonstration Threat

CIA Cancels Campus Session

The threat of a demonstration has forced the Central Intelligence Agency to cancel a recruiting session here, a spokesman for the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) said yesterday.

The recruiting session was originally scheduled for today in the economics department, but was officially cancelled last Tuesday when a sign appeared in the department saying the recruiter would not be meeting with students, the spokesman said.

He said the CIA had not recruited directly in the economics department for the past few years. Angered by this year's scheduled

recruitment in the department itself, "some graduate students felt they had to express their disagreement with the CIA," the spokesman said.

Leaflets were distributed by URPE calling for a demonstration today outside the office in which the recruiter was scheduled to meet with students. Because of the cancellation notice, the URPE demonstration was also cancelled.

According to the URPE spokesman, an unnamed source in the economics department revealed to the radical group that the CIA cancelled the recruiting session because of the planned demon-

stration.

"Those of us in URPE wish to register our disgust at the economics department's complicity with an agency that engages in activities such as political assassination, hero in trafficking, and the overthrow of progressive governments around the world," he said.

G.F. Break, chairman of the economics department, called the student pressure "entirely unjustified."

Robert Decker, assistant to the chairman in the economics department, said the recruiter will meet with department administrators to discuss placement for economics students in the CIA.

15 NOV 1972

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01

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What role for Saigon police?

STATINTL

By Michael T. Klare

Under the terms of the peace settlement announced by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger on Oct. 26, all U.S. military personnel are to be withdrawn from South Vietnam within 60 days of the signing of the agreement.

Although many provisions of the treaty require clarification, the impression one gets from reading the published text is that the entire U.S. warmaking machinery will be removed from Indochina. It is for this reason that documents recently acquired by the Guardian on the U.S. "Public Safety" program are cause for special concern.

These documents, the Agency for International Development's (AID's) "Program and Project Presentation to the Congress" for fiscal 1972 and 1973, indicate that Washington would like to maintain an elaborate police-support apparatus in Vietnam for some time to come.

This apparatus, supervised by AID's Office of Public Safety in the State Department, is administered as part of the foreign aid program and thus is not identified as a military program. Nevertheless, the Public Safety program is directly tied to the war effort, and is considered a major part of Operation Phoenix—the CIA's effort to destroy the political structure of the National Liberation Front (in Pentagon parlance, the "Viet Cong Infrastructure," or VCI).

According to the AID documents, which the Vietnamese are no doubt aware of, the purpose of the program is to assist "the Vietnamese National Police (NP) to maintain law and order and local security in pacified areas, combat smaller VC elements and deny resources to the enemy." An added function is to help Saigon dictator Nguyen Van Thieu consolidate his control of urban areas by suppressing dissent and crushing all opposition to the Saigon regime.

"The development of an effective National Police and the institutionalization of law enforcement," AID reports, "are important elements in pacification and long-term national development."

Launched in 1955

The Public Safety program in South Vietnam was launched in 1955, when 33 American police instructors arrived in Saigon under the cover of the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) to train Ngo Dinh Diem's palace guard and secret police in modern counterinsurgency techniques.

In 1962, the program was expanded under President Kennedy's orders, and administrative responsibility shifted to the U.S. Operations Mission. In 1967, as the pace of the U.S. war effort was accelerated, Public Safety operations were placed under Pentagon jurisdiction through the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program (CORDS).

The resident U.S. police staff was enlarged with each of these administrative changes; beginning with a staff of six men in 1959, the Public Safety program in Vietnam expanded to 170 men in 1966 and 196 in 1972.

These "Public Safety Advisors," recruited primarily from the FBI, the CIA and military police units, work closely with the National Police Directorate and Internal Security Bureau in Saigon, the National Police "Special Branch" (political police), and with Operation Phoenix personnel assigned to the hundreds of provincial and district "interrogation centers" where political suspects are routinely beaten and tortured before being shipped to Con Son prison island.

These advisory activities are accompanied by lavish subsidies and grants of police materiel, which have turned the South Vietnamese police apparatus into one of the largest and most heavily-armed paramilitary forces in the world. Under Diem, the National Police force numbered only 19,000 men—a number which at that time was considered sufficient to justify pinning the label of a "police state" on the Saigon government.

Since 1962, however, the U.S. has financed a sixfold increase in NP strength—to 114,000 men on Jan. 1, 1972. U.S. support of the NP under the AID program amounted to \$85 million between 1961 and 1971 and additional millions of dollars were provided by the Department of Defense under Vietnam war appropriations. The cost of the Phoenix program, estimated at \$732 million, is totally borne by the CIA.

It is clear, from the documents made available to the Guardian, that U.S. aid to the Saigon police apparatus may well increase in future years, if the battle shifts to a political struggle between Thieu and his many opponents. In the preface to the Fiscal Year (FY) 1972 AID presentation, it was stated that:

"As one aspect of Vietnamization, the Vietnamese National Police are called upon to carry a progressively greater burden. They must share with the Vietnamese armed forces the burden of countering insurgency and provide for daily peace and order—not only in the cities, but throughout the countryside. It is planned to increase police strength from about 100,000 at present to 124,000 during Fiscal 1972 to allow assumption of a greater burden in the future. The U.S. plans to make commensurate assistance available."

Specifically, AID listed these "activity targets" for the Public Safety program in FY 1972:

"Provision of commodity and advisory support for a police force of 122,000 men by the end of FY 1972, increasing the capability of the police to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure in coordination with other Government of Vietnam security agencies (under Operation Phoenix); assisting the National Identity Registration Program (NIRP) to register more than 12,000,000 persons 15 years of age and over by the end of 1971; continuing to provide basic and specialized training for approximately 20,000 police annually; providing technical assistance to the police detention system, including the planning and supervision of the construction of 34 jail facilities during 1971; and helping to achieve a major increase in the number of police presently working at the village level."

The Fiscal 1973 program sets the same overall objectives, but calls for a vast increase in the number of NP officers assigned to the village police posts—from 11,000 in 1972 to 31,000 by the end of 1973.

To finance this massive effort during the FY 1971-1973 period, AID asked Congress for an appropriation of \$17.9 million, of which \$13.6 million would pay the salaries of the nearly 200 Public Safety Advisors, \$3.3 million would go for commodities (ID systems, radios, patrol cars, tear gas, etc.), and \$613,000 would be used for training several hundred Saigon police officers in the U.S. and other "third countries."

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001000170001-5

Core of Vietcong Surviving War

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Nov. 4—Despite years of fighting that have largely shattered the Vietcong guerrillas, the Communists in South Vietnam have managed to preserve the core of their political apparatus with what many well-informed Vietnamese and American officials believe to be a dedicated cadre of 40,000 to 60,000.

Those knowledgeable sources feel that the Vietcong political organization will pose a formidable threat to the Saigon Government under a cease-fire. The organization is spread throughout the country and includes local village operatives, secret agents in Government-controlled areas and political officers among the guerrillas, who form the Vietcong's military arm.

The continued existence of the Vietcong's political apparatus appears to be a major reason why President Nguyen Van Thieu and many other Vietnamese are nervous about the peace settlement worked out by Hanoi and Washington.

"The Vietcong have lost many of their best cadre and they aren't 10 feet tall any more," said an American with a decade of experience in Vietnam. "But their organization," the American went on, "is built on the hard bedrock of discipline and shared sacrifices. The survivors are tough."

A '72 Tactic: Restraint

One of the clearest indications of the continued strength of the Communist political apparatus is that despite the intensive fighting this year, the number of defections from the Communist ranks is half that of last year. There have been 8,237 defectors so far this year, against nearly 16,000 at this time in 1971.

To intelligence analysts, this suggests a high level of discipline among the Vietcong and confidence that they are winning. Some American analysts now say, in fact, that Hanoi's strategy this year was designed to take advantage of the Communist political strength. With its vast offensive, employing North Vietnamese troops, Hanoi hoped

settlement and turn the military struggle into a political struggle.

The analysts say that Hanoi this year carefully preserved its cadre of secret agents in Government-controlled areas by not trying to stir popular uprisings to accompany the offensive. During the Communist Tet offensive of 1968, thousands of cadres were killed when they came out in the open to lead what they thought would be mass revolts.

As one intelligence officer explained Hanoi's 1972 policy: "The war was a stalemate that neither side could win. They figured that if they could get the United States out, they stood a better chance of winning the peace."

Some high-ranking American military and intelligence officers, however, do not agree that the Vietcong have maintained political strength. This view, which is known to have been transmitted authoritatively to Washington, is that the Communists are badly weakened militarily and politically and are practically suing for peace.

Whatever the case, there is no doubt that the Vietcong, or National Liberation Front—the Communists never refer to themselves as Vietcong—are weaker in some ways than they were in 1965, when they came close to taking over the country without large-scale North Vietnamese help. The North Vietnamese invasion this spring indicates that.

Militarily, intelligence sources report, the Vietcong now have to rely on North Vietnamese troops to keep the traditional Vietcong guerrilla units up to strength. In some famous battalions with Vietcong names, only the guides and a few of the officers are native southerners, the intelligence sources say.

Moreover, American analysts say, whatever independence the southern Vietcong once had has been lost over the years as Hanoi has taken control.

Political Links Strong

The Vietcong cadres are almost all members of the People's Revolutionary party, the southern branch of Lao Dong, the North Vietnamese Communist party, and reportedly get their orders through the agency known as COSVN. This, usually spelled out as the Central

would be better translated as the Central Committee's Office for South Vietnam, American intelligence sources say.

The office is believed to be located in Kratie Province in northeastern Cambodia, a sparsely populated and heavily forested region long under Communist control. The top officials, most of whom are thought to be North Vietnamese, are the leaders of the People's Revolutionary party and also members of Hanoi's elite Politburo or of the larger Central Committee, according to American analysts.

For example, Phan Hung, who is believed to be the head of the office, is also the ruling secretary of the party and a member of the Hanoi Politburo. He is a North Vietnamese. His second-in-command, who uses the pseudonym of Muoi Cuc, is also a northerner and a member of the Central Committee.

American officials say that the Vietcong's titular leaders such as Nguyen Huu Tho, chairman of the front, or Huynh Tan Phat, the Secretary General of the front, have become progressively less powerful.

Most experts agree that one reason for the Vietcong's military decline is the enormous shift of South Vietnam's population away from the countryside and into safe urban areas to escape the war. At least a third of South Vietnam's villagers are estimated to have left their homes, often depriving Vietcong units of bases for recruitment, supplies or taxation.

Some allied officials are concerned that this trend may be reversed under a cease-fire and that thousands of villagers may come home — providing the Vietcong with a renewed source of power.

But no matter how badly the Vietcong have been hurt militarily, several recent American studies have shown that their political organization remains intact.

The organization withstood the vaunted Phoenix program, established by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1967 specifically to eliminate the Vietcong cadre. Though more than 20,000 were killed under the Phoenix program and another 40,000 jailed or persuaded to defect, officials connected with it admit frankly that it has been a failure.

A recent study for the Rand Corporation found that in Dinh Tuong Province, in the

Me-kong delta, the Vietcong have preserved a core of about five cadresmen per village. "Despite the decline in military capabilities," the study said, in part, "the N.L.F. in Dinh Tuong has managed to keep the nucleus of its movement intact."

The study also found a large measure of "latent support" for the Vietcong among villagers. This continuing sympathy for the Communists, the study reported, was not in evidence where the Saigon Government forces were strong, but it could easily reappear, should Saigon weaken.

For example, the study noted that before the 1968 Tet offensive, many Vietnamese and American officials thought that the Vietcong in Dinh Tuong were on their way to defeat. But, once the Communists gave their sudden order to attack, "almost the entire rural population in the province was mobilized and coordinated in support of the attack," the study concluded.

The highest cadre concentration, according to Vietnamese and United States intelligence estimates, is 25,000 in the Me-kong delta, Military Region IV.

These sources report that the second largest number of Vietcong, about 15,000, are in the Central Highlands and central coast, known as Military Region II, and most of them are concentrated in Dinh Dinh, Province.

The situation in the northernmost region of South Vietnam, Military Region I, has been complicated this year by the invasion across the demilitarized zone and by the North Vietnamese reportedly taking large numbers of people north for indoctrination.

The area around Saigon, Military Region III, has always had the lowest number of Vietcong cadre, analysts say, because of the numbers and alertness of the Government police in the capital. But while there are fewer than 10,000 Communist party members and cadresmen in the Saigon area, they are said to be the best in the country.

Over the last few years, the Vietcong organization in the city of Saigon has appeared to be steadily losing power. Despite orders in captured Communist documents calling for terrorist acts in Saigon this fall, in the past month there were only three very minor incidents. The Saigon city apparatus is also reported to have been criticized for failing to produce its quota of taxes and supplies.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001000170001-5

Phoenix program under House inquiry

By Richard E. Ward

A congressional subcommittee has charged the Pentagon with failure to investigate charges of war crimes carried out under the U.S.-sponsored Phoenix program in South Vietnam.

The criticism of the Pentagon was made in a report by the House of Representatives Foreign Operations and Government Information subcommittee, which noted that many of the so-called "Vietcong" killed under the Phoenix "pacification" program were innocent civilians. The report also expressed reservations about U.S. support for a program that "allegedly included torture, murder and inhumane treatment of South Vietnamese civilians."

The report, not approved for public release by the parent Government Operations Committee, was summarized in an Oct. 3 UPI dispatch. According to the news agency, the Department of Defense refused to investigate the charges when they were brought to the attention of high officials.

Public release of the cautiously worded subcommittee report has apparently been delayed because members of the full committee are less than enthusiastic about confronting the issue of U.S. war crimes. In July 1971 at the time of hearings that constituted the basis for the report, two subcommittee members, Rep. Ogden R. Reid (D-N.Y.) and Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) charged outright that the Phoenix program had been responsible for "indiscriminate killings" and the illegal imprisonment of thousands in South Vietnam.

In September of this year, during a hearing before the Senate Refugee

subcommittee, a top Defense Department official described the Phoenix program as an intelligence operation. He was challenged by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) in a surprisingly sharp interchange. Kennedy asked how the more than 20,000 "Vietcong" were killed and the witness insisted that the deaths occurred during "military" operations.

'Intelligence operation'?

During the 1971 hearings the House subcommittee heard testimony from William E. Colby who headed the "pacification" effort from mid-1968 to mid-1971. Colby stated that under the Phoenix program 20,587 members of the "Vietcong" infrastructure were killed from 1968 through May 1971.

Colby, who had been a top CIA official before serving in Saigon on assignment from the White House, insisted that the Phoenix program was "entirely a South Vietnamese operation," although he conceded it had been originated by the CIA.

Colby tried to portray the U.S. role as primarily an "advisory" one, but he also admitted that U.S. personnel participated in the naming of suspects and the capture of prisoners. Admitting "occasional" abuses—the assassination of civilians—had occurred, Colby stated that "we put a stop to this nonsense" in collaboration with the Saigon authorities.

With a facade of candor, Colby's testimony actually was riddled with lies about the Phoenix program, which was initiated under President Johnson and expanded by the Nixon administration. Essentially, the Phoenix program attempted to identify and then assassinate cadres of the National Liberation Front, the political leaders on a local level of the

anti-U.S. resistance in South Vietnam.

The program had access to secret CIA funds as well as large appropriations from the U.S. military and economic assistance programs. Assassination teams of mercenaries and U.S. agents who compiled lists of persons to be assassinated were secretly funded.

These aspects of the Phoenix program were revealed in testimony before the same House subcommittee in August 1971 by K. Barton Osborn, who served as an intelligence agent assigned to provide information to the Marines and who also worked for the CIA Phoenix program. Based in Danang, Osborn supervised agent networks for 15 months beginning in 1967.

Osborn contradicted Colby's disclaimers of direct U.S. responsibility for the Phoenix program and made it clear that U.S. personnel participated in murders and tortures. He said U.S. "advisors" were really directing the program.

Osborn also described atrocities he witnessed, including seeing Vietnamese pushed from helicopters, a practice known as "airborne interrogations." He also described how Marine intelligence officers held a Vietnamese woman prisoner in a small cage at their headquarters and starved her to death, refusing to give her either food or water.

These and other examples given by Osborn provide only a small glimpse of the war crimes committed by the U.S. in South Vietnam. The atrocities were an intrinsic part of the Phoenix program directed by the highest U.S. authorities on White House orders. Obviously the Defense Department is not going to investigate these war crimes.

STATINTL

ceutary," presumably including napalm-type weapons which the U.S. has defined as being outside the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Then there is \$7.8-million for "Miscellaneous Defensive Equipment," a category that received only \$900,000 in 1970. Obviously, these vague categories can conceal a multitude of materials.

(Anyone who doubts the military capacity for blatant evasion of Presidential directives might refer to an official government history, *Science and the Air Force*, published in 1966. At one time, the book points out, the Bureau of the Budget decreed that the Air Force could no longer spend money on basic research. Research spending was continued nonetheless—by charging the costs off to development of a new bomber. "For all the Budget Bureau knew," the book gloats, "the \$4.7-million it approved was for research connected with the development of this aircraft, clearly within the realm of applied research. But in reality, this money was handed over to OSR [Office of Scientific Research] to use, as originally planned, for basic research.")

While Mr. Nixon may well be credited with cautious good intentions concerning CBW, the military apparently is having trouble kicking the habit. It is puzzling that the administration itself chooses to interpret the 1925 Geneva Protocol as exempting tear gases and herbicides; in this regard McGeorge Bundy, in the course of his continuing descent from the hawkish role that he occupied as President Johnson's national security adviser, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1971:

"Useful as herbicides and tear gas have been in particular situations in Southeast Asia, I know of no senior military commander who would claim that in the wide perspective of the course of the war as a whole their value has been at all critical. In General Westmoreland's authoritative book-length report on his military operations between January 1964 and June 1968, there is only the briefest reference to herbicides and riot control agents. Seen in perspective, they are clearly marginal instruments."

As far as herbicides are concerned, Bundy's point is supported by a still-unreleased study of herbicide usage in Vietnam, conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers. The three-volume work, one volume of which is classified secret while the others are in the "official use only" category, indicates that commanders in Vietnam place little military value on the use of herbicides. Although the battlefield use of tear gas may figure in War College scenarios, experience in Vietnam has demonstrated that the enemy can easily equip his troops with, or train them to improvise, breathing apparatus that renders the gas ineffective. Why, then, does the military persist in retaining the option for herbicides and tear gas, continue to reinforce its capability for chemical warfare, and though the matter is uncertain, to dabble further with biological agents?

The answer is twofold: As Soviet-American arms agreements tend toward effective restrictions on the development of ultimate weapons, the military value of other weapons systems rises commensurately, just as the banning of firearms would elevate the military value of bows and arrows. And, as is clear from public indifference to the savage air offensive that has replaced American ground operations in Vietnam, the problem is not to avoid war; rather, it is to avoid shedding any great amount of American blood. Hence, in the age of the nuclear standoff, the Pentagon is looking hard for highly lethal, non-nuclear, low-manpower systems that satisfy both military necessity and public opinion. And CBW, Presidential protestations notwithstanding, fits in nicely with that quest.

Negotiations for arms-control agreements with the Soviets have frequently foundered on the issue of inspection, with the U.S. in-

sisting that its own inspectors, or perhaps an international group, have the right to conduct on-the-spot checks of compliance. Yet back home, the U.S. government seems unconcerned about verifying whether its army is in fact abiding by Presidential directives to engage only in "defensive" research. The Executive's disregard for Congress in military and foreign affairs has been so thoroughly demonstrated as to eliminate any realistic prospect for defective Congressional scrutiny. When Congress has questioned the military use of weather, modification in Southeast Asia, for example, Defense's long-standing reply has been, in effect, that it is none of your business.

If there is ever an inspection agreement with the Soviets on CBW, it will have an ironic benefit: The American public will have reason to believe government accounts of what is going on in U.S. military laboratories.

AID TO THIEU

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, there has been a great deal of controversy over whether or not the United States should continue its programs of military and economic aid to the South Vietnamese Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu. It is a question of central importance to the peace negotiations in Paris, and the answer finally given will be crucial to the direction U.S. foreign policy following in the future.

In spite of the great importance the resolution of this issue one way or the other will have, very few Americans are actually aware of the extent of this aid or the purposes it serves. Recognizing this lack of information, Le Anh Tu and Marilyn McNabb of National Action/Research on the Military-Industrial Complex have prepared a special report entitled "Aid to Thieu", which traces the history of U.S. aid to South Vietnam as well as the ongoing day-to-day programs in that country which U.S. dollars finance. I think members of the Senate and their constituents will find this report of interest, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AID TO THIEU DEADLOCK ON AID

The Paris peace talks often ridiculed as "propaganda forums," have actually revealed many areas of agreement. The United States, the Saigon government, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam¹ (called the "Vietcong" in the American press) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ("Hanoi") all agree in principle to the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the release of war prisoners, internationally supervised free elections, and even to a coalition government.

Yet the talks are deadlocked. One question remains unresolved: should the U.S. continue its aid to Thieu? The PRG insists that this aid must be stopped. The U.S. is equally stubborn. Both parties feel that their vital interests are involved on what might appear to be a minor issue.

To clarify the dispute over aid to Thieu, this paper will review U.S. assistance programs in South Vietnam. Special attention will be paid to projects that are considered to be of high priority by the U.S. We will attempt to describe the effects of these pro-

grams on the Vietnamese people for whom they are designed, and to determine how much the U.S. has spent on these projects. The U.S.-sponsored programs are well known to Vietnamese but not so familiar to American citizens who pay for them.

Our main source of information is the hearings held each year in Congress to examine how American taxpayers' dollars are spent in Vietnam. Supplementary sources include U.S. government publications and news reports from Saigon and Western newspapers.

2. THE SPRING ROUND-UPS

Most news reports on the spring 1972 offensive told of dramatic military clashes. Less mention was made of certain actions taken by the Thieu government which were made possible only by U.S. aid.

While U.S. bombers were pounding the contested and "enemy"-controlled areas of Vietnam, Thieu's police, accompanied by American advisers,² were rounding up thousands of suspected "Communist sympathizers" in the so-called "secure" areas.³ The spring offensive increased the regime's fear of trouble from internal dissenters. On May 25, 1972 the Buddhist Student Association in Saigon announced the arrest and imprisonment of the entire leadership of many student organizations and civil rights groups in South Vietnam.⁴ Relatives of known political activists have also been taken into custody, and held as hostages.⁵

A former New York Times Saigon correspondent and veteran observer of the war, Tom Fox, describes the far-reaching effects of this crackdown:

"Nearly everyone known to have been an outspoken critic of the Thieu government—and not protected by international recognition—has suffered at the hands of the powerful National Police in recent weeks.

"In Hue alone, more than 1500 have been arrested and most have been taken to Con Son prison island, an island which for decades has confined critics of French and American supported governments. Women and children have been rounded up among the 'political suspicious'—and taken by police to Con Son.

"We've arrested the entire student body of Hue," Hoang Duc Nha, President Thieu's press secretary recently stated flatly. . .

"In many cases people have been arrested solely because they have relatives in the NLF or in North Vietnam. . .

"A lower house Deputy from a Delta province said the police have come into villages and picked up men in their eighties who have not left their home for years, forcing them into small prison cells. Even village and hamlet chiefs and officers in the Saigon army are being arrested and interrogated," he added."⁶

The ground for these arrests, having "Communist sympathies," are broadly interpreted. They extend to all political opponents of the Thieu regime, especially those having credibility and influence with the general populace. Those arrested include student organizers, religious leaders, and newspaper editors.

"In Longxuyen Province, an area dominated by the Hoa Hao religious sect, several hundred university students held a rally to protest a decree under which most of them would be drafted. Although anti-American banners were displayed—"The students and people will not die for the interests of the imperialists"—the police did not intervene. Later, however, leaders of the rally were reportedly arrested.

"Other arrests of student leaders appear to have had little to do with public demonstrations.

"A Roman Catholic priest in Saigon said he conservatively estimated that nine local leaders of the Catholic Labor Youth Movement had been arrested and that half a

¹Footnotes at end of article.

29 AUG 1972

Frankie Fitzgerald: In Hardcover

By Myra MacPherson

She had all these handi-caps.

First, she was independently wealthy and her background was super WASP. Her mother was famous, glamorous and influential. Her father was a top CIA spook, one of the most powerful and least publicized of high government officials.

And so, when Frances "Frankie" Fitzgerald—daughter of Marietta Tree, the first American woman to serve as an ambassador at the United Nations, and CIA deputy director Desmond Fitzgerald—went to Vietnam to free-lance about the war in 1966 at the age of 25, some of the male journalists there wondered at her seriousness and were, to put it mildly, skeptical.

"I expected her to be everything I wouldn't like but she turned out to be great—and ended up with insights I'd wished I had," said one reporter who was there that year.

Today, her book that took four years to write, "Fire in the Lake," is being touted by numerous reviewers as one of the most penetrating analyses of our involvement in Vietnam. It is a book that seeks to document with fact after fact how we destroyed a country to "save" it from Communism. It is a book she got by ignoring the battles and talking to the survivors of them, as well as researching an ancient culture to show why Westerners have misunderstood Vietnamese motives and actions.

The woman behind the book is 31, blonde, 5 feet 9 and gives an appearance of diffidence bordering on insecurity, as well as extreme intelligence. There is more than a trace of the well-bred, inbred schoolgirl; she uses "one" not "you" ("One is very impressed at first, about covering a war") and answers, "Am I shy? Oh yes!"

She grew up in that rarest of New York worlds run by her "terrifically high-powered" mother, the mother of her second husband, English multimillionaire Ronald

Tree. Home was an intellectual salon; there were her parents' friends such as Winston Churchill and Adlai Stevenson. It was a life of fashionable boarding schools and Rolls Royces.

Although receptive and interested in what others have to say, she volunteers little about herself or that life. One friend said, "I like her tremendously, but I've never seen Frankie really relax." She is uncomfortable and guarded when discussing herself—"It's not that interesting a subject." The answers are perfunctory.

Was her mother a model for her life? "No, not consciously, although it never occurred to me not to have a career." What of her father, who died in 1967 and to whom the book is dedicated along with French sociologist and Vietnam expert Paul Mus. "(Her father) was terrifically witty. As a child I saw him on holidays, once a year or so, then more as I grew up." What does her mother think of her book? "She likes it—funny enough." High school was Foxcroft—"very conventional girls from Grosse Pointe and Long Island and so on."

She was graduated from Radcliffe in 1960, went to Europe, wrote a little fiction. "I always thought being a novelist was the greatest thing on earth—but I thought of being the *novelist* rather than doing the writing. Journalism seemed rather secondary, one down not as good, somehow." But now she feels more comfortable with non-fiction.

"With non-fiction, something's out there, one only has to describe it. The idea of inventing something, as in fiction, is mind-boggling."

Still, her favorite reading is fiction—"What I read endlessly is Victorian novels, mostly Dickens."

(In an interview, her mother once said that "Frankie reads everything. She's high-brow and has perfect taste." Of Frankie and her half-sister, model Penelope Tree, the mother said, "I hope they become interested in reading because my husband and I did not fill

up their leisure time with activities—Girl Scouts' or ballet. The girls never took lessons in anything, with the result that the poor things have few of what are called 'accomplishments.' They don't play the piano or card games or golf.")

Today Frankie says she swims, plays tennis and skis "badly" to unwind after eight-hour writing stretches.

When she went to Vietnam in 1966, it was to write for magazines and there was not a book in mind. She was liked by reporters for uncomplainingly doing what the other journalists did—such as traveling into deserted regions—and for her ability to laugh at life there.

She remembers, with a smile, about being detained for hours by the American military—"their charge was, finally, that our press cards weren't laminated."

Articles grew into the book and when she went back this year before completing it, she was thoroughly disillusioned and more convinced that America must get out and that internal revolution is the only answer there. "Nobody's ever tried letting them run themselves."

One of the most devastating things that happened to the country, she feels, is our pacification policy. One program, the Phoenix program, was aimed at "capturing the political agents" of the NLF; but, she writes, "the United States succeeded in fashioning much the same instrument of civilian terror that the Diem laws for the suppression of communism had created in 1957-58. The only difference was that given... the participation of statistics-hungry U.S. intelligence services, the terror was a great deal more widespread than it had been before."

The other day Miss Fitzgerald described with the same sort of cool empathy that marks her book, a prisoner of the Phoenix program she talked to this year.

"They were so proud of their successes in the prison that they allowed me to talk to this old man, a victim of water torture. They forced

water mixed with soda into him until he gagged. I saw him right after—with the water coming out of his eyes, nose and mouth. Well, when I got back to the American advisers and told them, they said, 'I bet he really fed you a line, you know they lie like anything.' It was unbelievable."

She feels that Sen. George McGovern's plan to end the war in 90 days if elected would secure the release of our prisoners. "It would, absolutely. It's very simple. They (the Viet Cong) are willing to make it very simple." President Nixon doesn't see this, she feels, "because he wants to win that's all," a ludicrous position, she feels.

She worked briefly for McGovern, running a congressional district during the New York primary. "It was a strain on me, doing that work, I don't like organizing that much."

While reviewers drag out the superlatives about her book, printed in part in the New Yorker, Miss Fitzgerald is more modest.

"It's not a scholar's book. I make a whole lot of large generalities that no proper scholar would do. Some Chinese scholars would probably huff and puff about certain things. My idea was to sort of overemphasize the contrast (between their culture and Westerners) if necessary."

She is vague about future goals—"after five years, I've suddenly got to change subjects"—and is writing some magazine articles on politics. She does not think of trying television although it might be "fun." "Oh, I just don't think I'd be very good." Besides there is that Puritan code that anything which is work is painful. "I don't consider anything working except writing—maybe because I hate it so much."

She adds, "Up to now, my goal has been to have something in hardcover." She paused. "I don't think there are any real official mountains like that left that I have to get over."

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001000170001-5

to Communist strongholds in the An Lao Valley for political indoctrination. The stories were reminiscent of atrocities committed by both sides during the long war, including the Communists' slaughter of 2,700 civilians in Hué during the 1968 Tet offensive. But after interviews with numerous refugees, NEWSWEEK's Ron Moreau reported last week that the extent and the significance of the Binh Dinh killings may have been inflated.

Allegations: There was little doubt that the Communists had, in the merciless tradition of this war, consolidated their control of part of Binh Dinh by executing some civilians. But the evidence, so far, did not support the almost gleeful talk among American officials of a "blood bath" in Binh Dinh. "In my interviews," Moreau reported, "I could not substantiate these allegations of mass murders. In every case in which people actually saw

villagers probably welcomed their deaths." Among those slain in the province were members of the Phoenix program, the CIA-supported campaign to eliminate local Communist cadres by arresting them or killing them. Over the years, Phoenix has caused widespread resentment among some of South Vietnam's people, who charge that innocent civilians were sometimes killed. Nguyen Thi Thap, the widow of an executed Phoenix operative, told Moreau: "The people said my husband should die. After he was dead, the people seemed pleased."

Feuds: Other executions were aimed at settling ancient feuds among the country's anti-government factions. At a refugee camp, a young girl named Nguyen Thi Nong described how her father, a secretary of the Dai Viet political party, met his fate. The Communists and the

A Family Affair

In the dark of night, the people of Hoai Xuan village were ordered to assemble for a trial. The Communists had just seized control of Binh Dinh province on the central coast of South Vietnam, and the hour had come for punishing the "people's enemies." As some 300 villagers gathered, a local government official in charge of military affairs, Phung Sao, was brought before them. What, the Communist guerrilla leaders asked, were Phung Sao's crimes? Hesitantly, a few villagers stood up. He took bribes, one offered. He raped women, said another. He murdered Communist revolutionary cadres, added a third. The proceedings ran on for nearly an hour before a Communist official intoned: "The people have decided that Sao should be executed for his crimes against the people." Immediately, Sao was shot to death.

When U.S. officials in South Vietnam began to seek out the press two weeks ago with stories of such executions, they seemed to lend support to President Nixon's contention that if the Communists triumphed in Indochina, they would "massacre the civilians there by the millions." Although far from that figure, the statistics cited by American officials were chilling enough. The calculated murder of some 250 government officials and policemen in Binh Dinh had been confirmed by eyewitnesses, they maintained. What's more, the number of executions might be as high as 500, and an additional 6,000 supporters of the Saigon government had been marched on



Barbara Gluck Trester

Binh Dinh refugees: An ailing woman is carried from home

the executions, only one or two government officials were killed. As the plight of the refugees worsens and as people rehash these stories, the killings become embellished. But in checking on many of the cases mentioned to me by U.S. officials, I found that the stories differed as to the number of people killed—and many deaths appeared to have been counted more than once." Some U.S. military officers in Binh Dinh supported this view. "Certainly," said one, "the Communists did execute local officials, but probably 25 people were killed and reported ten times over."

The victims were carefully chosen. Most of them seem to have been government officials; none were soldiers. And in some cases the villagers were not at all distressed by the executions. "It is true that many government officials were very corrupt and were disliked by many people," said one Hoai Duc village official who fled before the Communists captured his hometown. "That does not mean that they should have been killed, but some

Dai Viet have been at each other's throats since the 1930s, and when the Viet Cong marched into Binh Dinh last spring, Miss Nong's father told them: "I have fought you for years and can't live under your regime." Without a trial, a local guerrilla gunned him down.

Because they had such a parochial flavor, the killings in Binh Dinh province did not seem to offer conclusive evidence, one way or the other, about the prospects for a general blood bath in South Vietnam if the Communists ultimately win a military victory. In fact, there was reason to believe that the province was something of an anomaly. "Binh Dinh," cabled Moreau, "has a special problem: that of civil strife, old grudges and blood feuds. 'Atrocity stories' are not to be found in areas currently occupied by North Vietnamese regulars, who have no particular grudge against local people. All of the Binh Dinh killings were carried out by local Communist cadres, and all the gossip and hatred of a small town is made of these old grudges."

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001000170001-5

BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

M - 237,967
S - 566,377

AUG 9 1972

Slaughter of the peasants

Vietnamese commanders, North and South, have a peculiar way of winning the hearts and minds of the peasants in their divided and devastated nation.

One would like to believe that there are killings enough in the ebb and flow of this terrible war to satisfy even the most lustful. But we see now in the reports of the slaughter of 1000 to 2000 fleeing South Vietnamese peasants by North Vietnamese artillery on a highway leading out of the rubble that used to be Quang Tri that this is not quite so.

It may be argued by Hanoi that the slaughter was one of the accidents of war, just as Washington also argues that the bombing of the dikes and the killing of civilians in North Vietnam are accidental incidents in the bombing of military targets. It may be true that the 130 artillery shells fired over the heads of the peasants fleeing in a column four miles long, were actually fired at South Vietnamese emplacements. But up to 2000 innocent men, women and children were left sprawled in death all the same.

And although the argument may have to be accepted that wholesale slaughter in this instance was unintended, there is no such excuse for the earlier slaughter of civilians by Communist troops in doubly tragic Binh Dinh Province far to the south, as was reported last week.

We advisedly say doubly tragic, for the peasants in this area have been slaughtered indiscriminately by the South Vietnamese executing Communist sympathizers and the

Communists executing Saigon sympathizers. The difference is only in numbers, not in atrociousness. The Communists cannot now be excused for the cold-blooded and on-the-spot execution of 250 to 500 Saigon officials and others in the latest Red foray into the province merely because South Vietnamese counter-terror teams executed almost 10,000 civilian Communists in the same province over the last 14 months in the infamous "Phoenix" program financed by the American CIA. The dead are dead no matter who kills them. Nor do their deaths deprive them of the innocence in which they went to it.

President Nixon has expressed the fear that an American pull-out on North Vietnamese terms would precipitate a bloodbath in South Vietnam as the Communists wreak vengeance on the Saigon regime and its sympathizers. It is perhaps trite though terribly true to suggest that such a bloodbath, were it to come to pass, could scarcely be worse than the plague of death from American bombs and American shells dropped and fired from the most terrifying air and sea armada ever assembled to destroy a peasant civilization. But one would think that the way to avoid it, if it can be avoided, would be for Washington to accommodate itself to Hanoi's demand for a political settlement of differences now rather than later.

Clearly, so long as the war goes on, atrocities will continue on all sides. And there can be no excuse for them no matter who commits them.

STATINTL

MILWAUKEE, WISC.

JOURNAL

AUG 8 1972

E - 359,036

S - 537,875

Vietnam Horror Still Worsens

Horror is the word for the Vietnam War. The latest outrage has been committed by the Communists. Intelligence officers and interviews with witnesses in Binh-dinh Province report that as many as 500 South Vietnamese officials were slain in cold blood by Communist invaders. That is a repetition of the wholesale executions carried out in Hue during the 1968 Tet offensive. The brutality was most severe in Binh-dinh in retaliation for the executions of Communists there in the Phoenix operation, which was carried out by teams organized by

the CIA. A House subcommittee was told some time ago that 9,800 Communists and sympathizers were killed in that operation.

All this comes on top of the terrible bloodletting and disruption suffered throughout Indochina by both sides day after day. There is abundant blame for both North and South. It augurs a general bloodbath if either side should win, if winning is any longer possible. The way to peace and an end of the killing and the terror must be found through political settlement at the peace table. When in the name of humanity will both sides see that?

Averting Reprisals

Joseph Kraft

"DON'T you think we know that every family in the South has worked with the Saigon government? Don't you think we know that almost all the young men fight in the Saigon armies? Don't you think we see the dangers of a blood-bath?"

That comment was made to me by a North Vietnamese official in Hanoi a couple of weeks ago, and I was reminded of it by the recent news that the Communists had murdered several hundred South Vietnamese officials in Binh Dinh Province.

For the fact is that a gruesome round of bloody reprisals is becoming practically inevitable as the Vietnam war winds to its close. It can be averted only by deliberate arrangement. But while Hanoi says it wants to make such arrangements, the attitude of Saigon and Washington is in doubt.

The reason reprisals are so likely is that the war in Vietnam is not a classic fight between two countries, as President Nixon would like us to believe. In such a war, the end would see each country go back to its own territory.

THE FIGHTING in Vietnam, however, is much more like a civil war. Families are divided, and villages, provinces, and cities. As a result, especially furious passions—the kind of passions formed in the United States by the civil war or in India by partition—have been generated.

The object of the fighting, moreover, is not to win territory. It is to gain the support of the local population.

In pursuit of such support, South Vietnam and the United States have launched the famous pacification program pushing out administrative control from Saigon to the remote countryside. One feature of pacification is the so-called Phoenix program designed to eliminate—sometimes by assassination—suspected Communists.

Much of the American bombing of South Vietnam fits into the same pattern. The purpose is not to eliminate enemy soldiers or strong points. It is to deny the enemy access to the local population. It is a means of using terror to keep people from living in areas where the enemy would be bound to penetrate.

Against the combination of pacification and bombing, the Communists have used classic tactics. They have moved in the fashion of the resistance forces that fought the Nazis in occupied Europe.

They have struck out by terror—including judicial murder, sometimes—against those cooperating, or collaborating, as they like to call it, with the central government. That explains the murders now uncovered in Binh Dinh province.

THE UPSHOT is a cycle of violence. The more pacification spreads and the more bombing is conducted, the more the Communists are prone to use terror tactics against South Vietnamese officials. There has developed a built-in mechanism for reprisal.

Measuring respective guilt in meting out portions of blame within this cycle of action and reaction would defy the wisdom of Solomon. Perhaps all that can be said, in these circumstances, is that to talk about morality is, on either side, a shameful hoax.

But something can be done about the future. Something can be done to limit the reprisals that have not yet taken place.

The Communists have shown a consistent interest in such damage-control measures. Virtually all their peace packages contain some provision for preventing reprisals. When I was in Hanoi, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh indicated the North Vietnamese wanted to arrange a settlement in slow stages, put into effect in such a way that passions could be eased.

To be sure, all the North Vietnamese suggestions for limiting reprisals imply first a change of regime in South Vietnam. It is impossible for Washington and Saigon to meet these suggestions on the terms posed by the other side.

But it is not enough for Washington and Saigon simply to beat their breasts about Communist atrocities. Since one stroke of violence leads to the next, Washington and Saigon have an obligation to act in a way that limits, rather than promotes, violence. They have an obligation to come forward with proposals that minimize the danger of reprisals.

This obligation is particularly heavy on the United States. For one matter in which we are all agreed is that, except for American intervention, the war would have been over long ago.

STATINTL

6 AUG 1972

Bloodbath in Binh Dinh...

The public execution of an estimated 250 to 500 Saigon officials and others by Communist forces during their occupation of Binh Dinh Province adds another sordid chapter to the bloody history of the Vietnam war.

The executions, reported by allied intelligence officers and corroborated in on-the-spot interviews by a Times correspondent, expose once more the ruthless brutality which the Communists exhibited at Hue during their 1968 Tet offensive. Such barbaric tactics serve to undermine the prospects for a political accommodation in South Vietnam—the kind of accommodation the Communists say they are seeking in Paris.

Binh Dinh has also been a principal target of the infamous "Phoenix" program, under which South Vietnamese counterterror teams—recruited, organized, supplied and paid by the C.I.A.—have sought to "neutralize" Communist cadres throughout the country. According to testimony before a House subcommittee last year, 9,820 civilian Communists were executed under this program in a fourteen-month period.

Both sides have committed calculated atrocities in South Vietnam, over and beyond the indiscriminate slaughter that inevitably results from the massive American bombing and Communist shelling that have dominated the latest round of fighting there. Bloody reprisals, like those that followed the unsuccessful Communist coup in Indonesia seven years ago, are indeed a gruesome possibility for postwar Vietnam, no matter which side "wins." But they can hardly be more terrible than the bloodbath the Vietnamese are suffering each day that this brutal war continues. The sooner both sides move toward a negotiated settlement, the better the chances will be for a relatively bloodless reconciliation.

GRADUATION QUIZ

OR

A R E Y O U R E A D Y T O B E A S O L D I E R ?

MATCH THE HEROES WITH THEIR ATR(CITIES):

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| 1. Adolf Eichmann | A. Bangla Desh bloodbath |
| 2. Nelson Rockefeller | B. massacre at Wounded Knee |
| 3. William Westmoreland | C. Project Phoenix |
| 4. Yahyah Khan | D. Attica |
| 5. George Custer | E. Auschwitz |
| 6. The CIA | F. My Lai murders, etc.
defoliation of Vietnam
the electronic battlefield
Conson tiger cages |

THE ATTACHED WAS ON THE BULLETIN BOARD OF
THE DINING HALL AT SWARTHMORE COLLEGE ON
9JUNE.

**Exclusive
interview**

Madame Binh

answers Nixon's lies

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian Staff Correspondent

Paris
President Nixon's advisor Henry Kissinger has visited Moscow, Peking and Paris in search of—as Nixon always puts it—a peaceful settlement to the war in South Vietnam and bearing “generous” offers of peace.

He has had 13 private sessions with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's delegation in Paris, but he has never deigned to talk with those primarily concerned with the struggle in the South—represented in Paris by Nguyen Thi Binh, Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and head of its delegation in Paris.

There are undoubtedly elements of male chauvinism in this, but it is primarily the arrogance of the super-power psychology at the White House. An arrangement between “equals” with the other super-power, the Soviet Union could be tolerated. Next best would be a deal with People's China—at least a major power. But it was too humiliating to talk even with the DRV.

Each of Nixon's negotiators in Paris, from Henry Cabot Lodge to William Porter, have exhausted the language of contempt to make this clear. As for the PRG, it was seen as far beneath the contempt of the U.S.

It was with this in mind and due to the deliberate distortions of the PRG's views by Nixon and Kissinger that I put some questions to Nguyen Thi Binh:

Are you prepared to meet with Kissinger or some other competent U.S. negotiator and within the framework of the PRG's 7-point peace plan discuss the following concrete points:

- (1) The question of the safe withdrawal of the remaining 60,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam?
- (2) The question of the release of U.S. POWs in South Vietnam as well as the captured pilots held in the DRV?
- (3) Questions relating to President Nixon's concern about the “imposition of a Communist regime in Saigon?”
- (4) Assure that there will not be a “long night of terror” in South Vietnam as Nixon expressed it on May 8 or a “bloodbath” as he expressed it in his April 28 speech?

Nguyen Thi Binh answered with the following:
“In order to deceive American and world public opinion, Nixon persists in repeating his lies and slanders, trying to justify his new extremely grave acts of war. We have many times declared and we repeat once again that as evidence of our good will and our sincere desire to arrive at a peaceful solution to the problem of South Vietnam, we are ready to engage in private conversation with U.S. representatives so they may still better understand our peace proposals. We are ready to discuss all matters concerning a solution.

continued. “However, I would like to clarify for American public opinion some of the points you have raised:

“Regarding the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in complete security. On Sept. 17, 1970, in our 8-point peace plan, as on July 1, 1971 in our 7-point peace plan, we clearly stated that after the U.S. fixes a definite date for the total withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from South Vietnam, the parties concerned could agree on necessary measures to guarantee the security of U.S. troops during their withdrawal.

“Thus, if the list of soldiers and pilots captured, killed and wounded gets continually longer this is precisely because Nixon has refused to fix a concrete date for total withdrawal, refuses to negotiate responsibility on the basis of our reasonable proposal and continues to utilize U.S. troops and pilots in acts of war against our people.

“Regarding the freeing of U.S. POWs. This problem has also been dealt with exhaustively in our peace initiative. If until this day captured U.S. military personnel have not been able to return to their homes and their number increases all the time, this is also because Nixon refuses to fix a definite date for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops, refuses to discontinue his support for dictator Nguyen Van Thieu's clique and continues to wage war against our people. These captured military personnel are in fact prisoners of the policy of ‘Vietnamization.’ They are prisoners of Nixon and Thieu. If the U.S. had replied seriously to our 7-point peace plan, the POWs would long ago have returned to their families.

“Regarding the political regime of South Vietnam. There never has been a question for us of imposing on South Vietnam any sort of regime whatsoever other than one chosen by the South Vietnamese people. Still less do we wish to impose a communist regime as the Nixon administration continues to maintain. On the contrary, it is the U.S. that stubbornly continues to impose on the South Vietnamese people the pro-American, anti-communist, belligerent, dictatorial and fascist regime of Thieu.

Elections—with Thieu machinery

Nixon's proposals about ‘new presidential elections’ in South Vietnam, while Thieu's machinery of dictatorship remains means nothing other than a repetition of the one-man electoral farce of October last year. The National Liberation Front and the PRG have consistently advocated the formation of a truly representative government in South Vietnam, which would be mandated to organize really free general elections in South Vietnam to commit a free choice of representatives of a political regime. In the light of the present realities in South Vietnam, such a government cannot be any other than one of national concord, comprising three elements as we have proposed.” (That is, representatives of the PRG; of the present regime in Saigon; and of the people.)

The PRG
“It seems to me that the American government is presently well informed regarding our peace plan,” she

continued

sionable and the less-gifted even more so. It is therefore imperative that this particular group have teachers with great expertise, patience, and warm, reassuring personalities. Mrs. Degason exemplifies these qualities to the finest degree.

Her city, State, and the children she has helped all owe her a great debt of gratitude.

FEDERAL HEALTH PROGRAMS

SPEECH OF

HON. CARL ALBERT

OF OKLAHOMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, the people of the United States surely rank their personal health of utmost importance among their many needs.

This is true in every corner of the country, from our smallest rural communities to our largest industrial cities. It is true of rich Americans as well as poor Americans. It is true among all ages of our people. It is even true of Democrats and Republicans alike.

Together, we need to achieve the goal of better health throughout the lives of all the people of this Nation.

Is there a national health crisis? There is indeed.

What do we need to do about it?

We need to work toward preventive health care for all Americans. We need to train young men and women in the many health professions—and we need to train them now, before the already serious shortages in health personnel become critical. We need to advance the knowledge of medicine through research that is simultaneously broad and specific. We need to make more health services available to more people. We need to reduce the high costs of curing illness. We need to give extra support to those health-care institutions and training facilities that are in financial distress.

On the part of the Federal Government, these needs can be met only through the authorized programs of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Yet with its proposed budget for fiscal year 1973, the Nixon administration would let all too many of these needs go unmet.

President Nixon may have acknowledged a national health crisis in his public speeches, but he has not taken it into full account in his budget recommendations. There is too little evidence in this budget that the President ranks concern for health as highly as the general public does.

In the proposed 1973 budget, health manpower programs are severely curtailed. Grants for building or modernizing hospitals, community clinics, and health schools are all but eliminated. Worthy programs to combat mental illness and alcoholism are not allowed to grow. Important health services, designed to deliver adequate care to all Americans, are held in place or actually reduced, considering increased operating costs and Federal pay raises. Most of the research institutes are given increases that amount to only half the annual inflation rate for health research.

If the goal of better health for all Americans is to be achieved in our day, or in our children's day, then the Congress will have to show more concern for Federal health programs in the coming fiscal year than the Nixon administration has shown. It is a duty that cannot be ignored by the Members of the House. It is our responsibility to the health and well-being of our people.

PLEA FOR NATIONAL REPENTANCE

HON. BELLA S. ABZUG

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 11, 1972

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, this morning, I was privileged to receive a most eloquent "Plea for National Repentance" over the inhuman terror we have wrought in Southeast Asia. This statement is being circulated in petition form and will be presented to Congress at a later date. I include the item in the RECORD at the conclusion of these remarks.

I am also including "War Is Peace," a paper on the President's latest escalation by Fred Branfman. Mr. Branfman, who is director of Project Air War, is one of the foremost experts on our air tactics and weaponry in Indochina, and I commend his paper to you.

The articles follow:

A PLEA FOR NATIONAL REPENTANCE AND A PETITION TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

Whereas, millions of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians have been maimed and uprooted from their homes and more than one-half million killed;

Whereas, more than 50,000 Americans have been killed in Indo-China and 300,000 have suffered casualties;

Whereas, the lands and cities of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have been devastated by napalm, defoliants, bombs and all the vast arsenal of the automated air war;

Whereas, the lives of United States prisoners held by the North Vietnamese are now threatened by the further escalation of the war;

Whereas, the war waged by the United States in Indo-China wastes our human and material resources and weakens our security rather than insuring it;

Whereas, the United States armed forces continue to impose upon the people of Vietnam the Thieu government dictatorship, thus depriving the Vietnamese people the inalienable right of freedom;

Whereas, the peace of the whole world is threatened by the recent escalation of the war by the United States, including the mining of Vietnam harbors, thus risking the beginning of World War III;

We, the undersigned citizens of the United States repent of our own complicity in this sin against the Providence of God and this crime against humanity; and we call for a national time of mourning and repentance.

We petition the Congress of the United States to take its proper responsibility for ending participation by the United States in the war in Indo-China by cutting off funds used for the prosecution of the war, that sanity and justice may be restored in the foreign relations of the United States government.

WAR IS PEACE

(By Fred Branfman)

(NOTE.—Mr. Branfman spent 4 years in Laos from 1967 through 1971. He is cur-

rently director of Project Air War, a research group in Washington, D.C. He is editor of *Voices From The Plain of Jars*, to be published this month by Harper and Row.)

"All entrances to the North Vietnamese ports will be mined . . . United States forces have been directed to take appropriate measures within the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies. Rail and all other communications will be cut off to the maximum extent possible. Air and naval strikes against military targets in North Vietnam will continue . . . You want peace. I want peace . . . and that is why, my fellow Americans, tonight I ask you for your support of this decision—a decision which has only one purpose—not to expand the war, not to escalate the war, but to end this war and to win the kind of peace that will last. With God's help, with your support, we will accomplish that great goal."—Richard Nixon, May 8, 1972.

George Orwell predicted that the leaders of major powers would come to wage war by machine and call it peace; that they would annihilate distant and unseen societies from the air even as they constantly reiterated their earnest desires for peace at home.

On May 8, 1972, Richard Nixon announced the most serious and dramatic set of escalations in the Indochina war, removing the last remaining restraints on automated war observed by his predecessor; at the same time, he used the terms "peace" or "ending the war" on 19 separate occasions in a 17-minute talk.

He didn't quite claim that "war is peace." But then he did not have to.

His speech was one of the most striking attempts to rewrite history in recent memory. Virtually every sentence in it contradicted the written record, ranging from the writings of Lacouture and Fall, to the Pentagon and Kissinger papers, to today's newspapers.

Two tons of bombs were exploding every 60 seconds as he solemnly declared "I, too, want to end this war;" mines were being laid in and around Soviet vessels as he called upon the Soviet Union not to "slide back into the dark shadows of a previous age."

It is as much in wonderment as dismay that one turns to an analysis of some of the more striking distortions and outright falsehoods of this remarkable speech:

1. INVASION—"FIVE WEEKS AGO! ON EASTER WEEKEND, THE COMMUNIST ARMIES OF NORTH VIETNAM LAUNCHED A MASSIVE INVASION OF SOUTH VIETNAM"

The very basis of the 1954 Geneva Settlement on Vietnam is that Viet Nam is *one country*. There is no reference to a "South Vietnam." The 17th parallel, far from being an "international border" as the President claimed in his April 28 speech, was merely a temporary military demarcation line. Point 6 of the Joint Declaration by the 9 powers guaranteeing the settlement specifically states that: "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." This line was only in force for 300 days following July 21, 1954, and was meant merely to mark time until a 1956 election which would unite Viet Nam. When the Diem regime did not allow this election, the 17th parallel lost any legal, political, or moral meaning. The cancellation of the elections threw the issue of who would rule in Viet Nam back to the Vietnamese themselves.

2. ORIGINS—"WE AMERICANS DID NOT CHOOSE TO RESORT TO WAR—IT HAS BEEN FORCED UPON US"

In fact, the United States did indeed unilaterally choose this war two decades ago, when the Truman Administration decided to pay ¾ of the costs of the war for the French between 1950 and 1954. And the Geneva Accords were barely signed when in August 1954, while Mr. Nixon was vice-

How We Sank into Vietnam

Joseph Buttinger

One of the most puzzling questions future historians will have to deal with is why the United States ever got involved in the contemporary struggle for Indochina that has been going on since 1945. Did the considerations that determined the course of American foreign policy after World War II make this involvement inevitable or could it have been avoided in spite of the tensions that arose after 1945 between the West and the so-called Communist bloc? On this point, opinions will probably always remain divided, but those who believe that no other course could have been chosen without damage to the West or the United States would do well to consider the following:

(1) no Indochina war would have taken place if France had not insisted on reestablishing its control over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos after these countries had gained independence following the Japanese surrender in 1945;

(2) it is questionable that the United States would ever have reached the point of even considering intervention in Vietnamese affairs if it had refused from the beginning to support the reestablishment of French rule in Indochina.

It is indeed one of the important conclusions of the Pentagon Papers "that the Truman Administration's decision to give military aid to France in her colonial war against the Communist-led Vietminh 'directly involved' the United States in Vietnam and 'set' the course of American policy."¹

Yet this decision was made only in 1950, after the victory of Communism in China and the recognition of Ho Chi Minh's regime by the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would never have come about had it not been preceded by the decision made by the victorious Allies at the Potsdam Conference of July 17 to August 2, 1945, which gave the French not only a free hand but also Allied support for the reconquest of Indochina. This Potsdam decision, supported only by the British under both Churchill and Attlee, might not have been taken if President

Roosevelt had still been alive. It was opposed by Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-shek and certainly not favored by Stalin. Vigorous American opposition to it would probably have led to the acceptance of Roosevelt's concept of a United Nations Trusteeship for French Indochina as a first step toward full independence.

Surprisingly on this crucial point the conclusion of the Pentagon Papers is that Roosevelt "never made up his mind whether to support the French desire to reclaim their Indochinese colonies from the Japanese at the end of the war."² In view of the forceful statements Roosevelt made against the return of the French to Indochina to his Secretary of State Cordell Hull and to his son Elliot, as reported in their memoirs,³ this conclusion must be regarded as erroneous.

There has been much speculation about the question whether American massive military intervention in Vietnam might not have been avoided if President Kennedy had been alive. It is unlikely that this question will ever be answered with any degree of certainty. But it is probable that Vietnam after 1945 would have experienced a period of peaceful evolution toward independence, under a regime not unlike that of Tito's Yugoslavia, if Roosevelt had lived and succeeded in imposing his anticolonial solution for Indochina. Nor is it far-fetched to assume that Roosevelt would not have disregarded the appeals of Ho Chi Minh, in at least eight letters to Washington in 1945-46 for United States and United Nations intervention against French colonialism.⁴ "There is no record . . . that any of these appeals were answered."⁵ Not until publication of the Pentagon Papers did the American public hear of the existence of these letters.

Yet the Truman administration's policy toward Vietnam remained ambivalent for at least the first three years of the Indochina war. On the one hand, the U.S. "fully recognized France's sovereign position," as Secretary of State George Marshall said in a still secret State Department cablegram sent to the U.S. Embassy in Paris; on the other hand,

Duplicity on Vietnam

The comments on "Nixon's Peace Spectacular" in the March *Progressive* were excellent. It is a bit misleading, though, to emphasize that "virtually every item in his plan had previously been proposed by the United States, and all had previously been rejected by the other side." The important point is not that the proposals have all been rejected in recent years; the important point is that nearly every item was *accepted*—by Ho Chi Minh, in 1954. It is our steadfast refusal to observe that agreement that makes it difficult for the Vietnamese to believe us now.

We now offer to repeat some of the promises which we have been *imposing*—but repeat them in greatly weakened form, under circumstances which make them worthless.

The Vietnamese are acutely aware—even though we like to forget—that international agreements involving the United States are made meaningless by the activities of the CIA, which operates in complete disregard of international law, specific treaties, declarations of principle, or tradition. In 1954, it violated the Geneva accords as soon as they were signed, by smuggling in tons of prohibited military supplies, sabotaging North Vietnamese railways and bus lines, and hunting down those who had been prominent in the struggle for Vietnamese independence.

At present, the CIA is placing major emphasis on "Operation Phoenix"—a program for subsidizing the assassination of individuals suspected of being part of "the Vietcong infrastructure." On July 19, 1971, William E. Colby, who had directed the program for the CIA, testified that it had killed 20,587 suspects since 1968, and that the program was being stepped up. Presumably, therefore, we have managed to murder at least 30,000 Vietnamese by now.

Since Vietnam is less than one-tenth the size of the United States, this is equivalent to slaughtering more than 300,000 Americans, as far as political impact is concerned. Would Nixon really insist that the 1972 election was a fair one if the Democrats were allowed to assassinate the 300,000 most prominent Republicans before November?

William Palmer Taylor
Hamilton, Ohio

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001000170001-5

CIA Agent Blamed for My Lai Error

WASHINGTON —

Author Seymour M. Hersh said an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency misled the planners of the 1968 attack on My Lai by telling them they would find a Viet Cong battalion there. The agent denied it.

The assault units met only old men, women and children in the South Vietnamese village. Many were killed by the American troops.

Hersh, who won a Pulitzer Prize for breaking the My Lai story, identified the agent in a new book as Robert B. Ramsdell, now a private investigator in Orlando, Fla.

"Ramsdell refused to speak specifically about the information he provided Task Force Barker before the My Lai 4 operation, but acknowledged that his intelligence undoubtedly was a factor in the planning for the mission," Hersh wrote in "Cover-Up," published Sunday by Random House.

Denies Charges

In a telephone interview, Ramsdell denied Hersh's allegations and said that although he was working for the CIA in the My Lai area at the time of the killings, he had nothing to do with intelligence reports to the Americans.

Of his role in the CIA, Ramsdell said, "My function was with the Vietnamese. I had very little to do with the Americans."

He said that information gathered by the South Vietnamese was at times relayed to U.S. troops, but added that he doubted those reports could have become the basis for the misleading information fed to planners of the My Lai assault.

Viet Cong Sought

In the My Lai court-martial of Lt. William L. Calley Jr. and others, there was testimony that the attack was made in the belief the village was the home of the 48th Viet Cong Battalion, which previously had inflicted heavy damage to American units.

The source of that belief was alluded to only as "intelligence reports."

Hersh said: "The link between Ramsdell and the poor intelligence for the March 16 operation was never explored by the Peers panel (the exhaustive Army investigation headed by Lt. Gen. William R. Peers). For one thing, none of the high-ranking officers on it had any reason to suspect that Ramsdell was poorly informed about Vietnam."

Ramsdell was sent into Quang Ngai Province, on Feb. 4—40 days before My Lai—to run the clandestine Operation Phoenix, Hersh wrote.

STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Rep. Reid May Quit GOP Over Veto

By Jack Anderson

Rep. Ogden Reid (R-N.Y.), whose forebears helped found the Republican Party 100 years ago, has made a slashing attack on President Nixon that raises the possibility Reid will leave the party.

Reid, a grandson of a GOP vice presidential candidate, accuses Mr. Nixon in a forthcoming article in Redbook of "utterly and completely untrue statements" that "distorted" the facts on Reid's controversial day-care bill.

Unlike mavericks like Rep. Pete McCloskey (R-Calif.), Reid's Republican credentials are formidable. He was President Eisenhower's Ambassador to Israel, publisher-editor of the Republican New York Herald-Tribune, and a member of Gov. Nelson Rockefeller's cabinet.

Yet the vehemence of his attack on Mr. Nixon has intimates whispering that he may kick over a century of GOP blood lines and join the Democrats.

Reid's \$2.1 billion bill to provide day-care centers for working mothers was sabotaged by the White House, then vetoed by the President after it passed the House.

"In his veto message," writes Reid, President Nixon "so distorted the facts about the program as to leave the American public with a vague feeling that day care is some

kind of Communist plot to snatch children from their parents, destroy the family and infiltrate the country with four-year-old revolutionaries."

The President indulged in "fear tactics," said Reid. "It is utterly and completely untrue that, as the President charges, day care under our bill would diminish parental authority."

The congressman, generally as cool and sleek as a seal, said President Nixon killed day care to appease "his right-wing supporters." Reid wrote passionately:

"Presumably he finds such federal expenditures as \$5 billion annually on highways, \$5.5 billion on farm subsidies, \$3.5 billion on space exploration and \$1.5 billion on civil works produce greater benefits for the country than helping our children grow into productive adults."

Footnote: Reid gave some clue to his disaffection when he recently charged the Nixon administration, with allowing 347 price increases while it was granting only 57 wage hikes. He also criticized the administration over its "Phoenix" plan in Vietnam for assassinating alleged Vietcong leaders.

Pompidou-Brandt Feud

An awkward confrontation between France's President Georges Pompidou and West Germany's Chancellor Willy Brandt, according to secret intelligence reports, took place not long ago in Paris.

The Central Intelligence Agency reported that the talks "were outwardly friendly, but a tough position was taken on substantive issues and no significant agreements were made."

"A heated exchange took place after the Brandt-Pompidou dinner," states the secret report, "when (German) Economics and Finance State Secretary Johann Baptist Schoellhorn told Pompidou that France was profiting from and encouraging the inflation afflicting other European countries."

"Schoellhorn went on to tell Pompidou that the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) was not in accord with this policy and was not about to assist France in its pursuit."

"According to members of Brandt's party, Brandt stood by and visibly enjoyed Pompidou's discomfiture. Schoellhorn supported his accusations with details which Pompidou was unable to refute."

"The Brandt-Pompidou meeting got off to a bad start when Pompidou opened the proceedings by launching a strong attack on FRG Economics and Finance Minister Karl Schiller's economic policy, which Pompidou said benefited only the U.S."

Public vs. Polluters

A bipartisan band of House conservationists has rallied to pass a clean water package instead of the public works com-

mittee bill that loosens federal pollution controls.

The environmentalists, led by Reps. John Dingell (D-Mich.), Henry Reuss (D-Wis.) and John Saylor (R-Pa.), would set 1981 as a "zero discharge goal" for water polluters.

They want tougher federal controls and favor citizen court suits to block big polluters.

The showdown between the clean water men and the supporters of the public works bill is expected shortly, with a bitter floor fight almost certain.

Cuban Rebuff

Red China's invitation to the United States to play ping-pong began what both countries hope will be an era of better feelings.

But when a private film group in New York invited Cuban film directors to attend a festival for Cuban films, the State Department huffily refused to let the Cubans enter the United States.

Nazi Hunter

Dr. Zoltan Deak, of New York City, died recently in the midst of helping us seek out ex-Nazi supporters in the councils of the GOP. The Hungarian-American lapsed into a final coma moments after telling his wife to urge us to keep up our work on the World War II right-wingers.

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ported. Repair, the durability of which is uncertain, cost an average of \$170-\$20 more than the average trade-in value of a 1965 model.

Last Nov 16, after the safety agency made an initial finding of a safety defect, GM said it would send a voluntary safety-defect notification—but refused to bear the cost of correction.

Starting Dec. 5 GM mailed out 756,000 notifications. As of two weeks ago, Douglas Toms told a Senate Commerce Committee hearing, only 32,000 Corvairs had been taken to Chevrolet dealers for correction and repair. Some 68,000 letters were returned as undeliverable, 84,000 recipients said they were not Corvair owners, and 23,000 owners said they will not take their Corvairs in.

Toms said he is favorably inclined to the Nelson-Mondale bill. The Commerce Department opposes it.

INTELLIGENCE: OUT OF CONTROL

Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, an interesting, thought-provoking article entitled "GI Spying: Out of Control?" written by one of the better informed newspapermen on the subject of military matters, George C. Wilson, appeared in the Washington Post last Sunday.

The article could well have been entitled "Intelligence: Out of Control."

In a box adjacent to the article, Chairman ELLENDER, of the Senate Appropriations Committee, is quoted as stating, "it is criminal" to spend so many billions of dollars to gather too much information for anybody to read; and I was glad to note that this box also states that Representative NEDZI, of the House Armed Services Committee, is planning "a review of government intelligence operations this year for the House Armed Services Committee." Such a review is long overdue.

I ask unanimous consent that the article and two letters written to me by former members of the military who were involved in intelligence matters and who were interviewed by Mr. Wilson in connection with the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 27, 1972]

GI SPYING: OUT OF CONTROL?

(By George C. Wilson)

One night late in August, 1967, an American submarine surfaced off the North Korean coast to launch a South Korean spy in a rubber boat. His mission was to establish himself as a permanent resident in North Korea and send back coded observations to the South.

Someone on the submarine watched the agent paddle toward the North Korean shore. Then the sub submerged out of sight again. The agent was heard from for only a brief period after landing in North Korea, presumably because he was captured. If he was indeed captured, it was likely the North Koreans tortured him.

Was that agent's trip necessary? Did Congress at the time know that the United States was supporting hundreds of South Koreans spying missions against North Korea? And was this American involvement part of the reason North Korea snatched the USS Pueblo off Wonsan in 1968?

Eight former Army intelligence agents who have been pondering these and related questions since leaving the service decided to speak their mind in hopes of forcing re-

forms—or at least some public dialogue. They argued in interviews with The Washington Post that right now there is not enough public accountability for Army military intelligence operations overseas. The consequences, they said, range from wanton waste of life to gross inefficiency.

While such specific charges cannot be proven by hearing only their side of the story, the former agents did show in their interviews that Army intelligence operations overseas go far beyond the battlefield. Similar disclosures of the extent of domestic surveillance by the Army aroused wide public criticism in 1970-71.

"Some of the programs of Army intelligence are morally outrageous," said Robert J. Donia, 26, a former high school teacher who served as a sergeant in the Army's military intelligence branch from 1969 to January, 1972. He now attends the University of Michigan graduate school.

"The scope of military intelligence operations should be a matter of public record." (When queried by The Post, the Army refused to tell how much it is spending now or has spent in the past on its military intelligence activities.)

Donia—limiting himself to completed operations in hopes of staying within the bounds of security—said that "in the mid- to late 1960s" there were 50 to 200 American-supported infiltration attempts from South to North Korea every year, with the submarine mission one of the most dramatic. Most of them were across the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea.

Donia said the sources for those figures were the records he studied while attached to the 502d Military Intelligence Group in Seoul. The same records, he said, showed very few South Korean agents came back.

"One operational plan that I saw," said Donia in contending that the high-risk missions seemed to have little military value, "called for the agent to infiltrate through the DMZ. Once he got over the DMZ, which took him three or four days, he was to move to a headquarters element of a North Korean battalion; enter a BOQ (bachelor officers quarters) clandestinely; steal a North Korean major's uniform, and return back across the DMZ."

Such missions, Donia said, were coordinated through the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Operations Group. He added that South Korean agents often were told to undertake such dangerous missions to clear themselves of suspicion of disloyalty or criminal charges.

North Korea complained vociferously about such spying missions, both at Panmunjom and in radio broadcasts. In what the former Army agents believed was a response to these complaints, Gen. John H. Michaelis, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army headquartered in Seoul, suspended American support of such activities in August, 1970. According to an Army agent who just returned from Korea, that order has been lifted. But he said getting missions approved is more difficult than in the Korean spying heyday of the mid-1960s.

BREAKING A PROTEST

James S. Sensenig, 23, of Lancaster, Pa., said he was dismayed to see the U.S. Army showing the same avid interest in the surveillance of civilians in South Korea as it had displayed under its own domestic surveillance program in the United States. Sensenig had served as a sergeant in the latter program before working for the Eighth Army Intelligence Group in Korea in 1971. The difference, he said, was that the South Korean Army and CIA collected the information and turned much of it over to the U.S. Army.

"I was shocked to see the U.S. Army routinely collecting information on South Korean students even though they posed no imminent danger to the U.S. Army," he said.

"When the very first student voiced his anti-Korean government feelings—or anti-

American for intelligence) was right there getting information from the ROK police," Sensenig said.

The Eighth Army's Military Intelligence Group also collected biographical data on South Korean politicians and kept track of their comings and goings, according to the former Army agents.

Similarly, U.S. Army intelligence-gathering in South Vietnam encompassed such domestic activities as anti-war groups. Keith W. Taylor, 25, also a graduate student at the University of Michigan, said he learned this to his horror while running a net of intelligence agents from his cover office (the door was labeled Economic Research Team) in Gladinh, Vietnam. Taylor's outfit was the 525th Military Group, 5th Battalion. His identification there was GS-9 civilian working for the Army.

Taylor, a sergeant fluent in Vietnamese, learned through his net in February, 1970, that a pacifist group headed by a woman Buddhist lawyer, Ngo Ba Thanh, was going to hold a meeting in Gladinh 10 days hence. He wrote up the report for his American commander, only to learn the information got into the hands of Saigon government riot police, who brutally smashed the meeting.

Taylor saw no military threat to the U.S. Army nor anybody else to justify the suppression. Instead, he saw the meeting as "a cry of anguish from the hearts of all these people whose lives had just been totally destroyed by this war just going on and on." Taylor said he wrote no further reports on such protest groups. "I sympathized with these people completely," he said.

"I really believed inside me that everything we were doing in Vietnam was wrong," said Taylor of his service there from December, 1970, to July, 1971. "And if you can speak of morality anymore, it was immoral."

He told of buying South Vietnamese spies who needed the money to live because the war had driven them from their farms and into the cities where they drifted as street people; of agents he knew who infiltrated the Vietcong but were found out and killed long after they had unsuccessfully asked to be rescued; of "Catch 22" type missions which both the American dispatcher and the South Vietnamese agent knew to be just that.

On that last point, Taylor cited an agent sent to plant and activate a disguised radio beacon when Vietcong were sighted moving rockets through the countryside. American bombers, alerted by the radio beacon, would raid the spot. "The agent knew as well as we did that the bombers would drop their bombs before he could get away. The job never came off."

South Vietnamese spies working in the countryside outside Saigon were paid between 300 and 400 piasters by the Americans for every item the Army military intelligence office deemed important enough to type up as a report. "I decided," said Taylor, "since nobody read the reports we did get from the countryside, that I would publish all of them so the farmers working for us would get their money. That was my humanitarian contribution."

If Taylor was against the war, found his intelligence work immoral and so empathized with the Vietnamese people that he wants to spend the rest of his life teaching their history—why didn't he quit his Army job on the spot?

"I did my job in MI out of loyalty to my friends in the Army," Taylor answered. "That was the one thing that bound me in."

Now that he is out of the Army, Taylor wants to make amends somehow. In that sense, he and the other seven agents who bespoken their fears are Vietnam war casualties of a special kind, looking for relief through expression.


THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

Of the eight former Army agents, four let their names be used, including one of the

EARTH
March 1972

STATINTL

THE SELLING OF



Text by Morton Kondracke
Photography by Dennis Brack & Fred Ward

Viet Prisoner-Rescue Unit to Be Disbanded

Fate of Secret Squad Parallels That of Other Clandestine Operations in S.E. Asia

BY GEORGE McARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—A secret command of American soldiers specially trained for prisoner rescue raids in hostile territory is scheduled to be disbanded some time this month.

According to an officer long involved in clandestine operations, the move will take from the U.S. command in South Vietnam its last cloak-and-dagger outfit specifically honed to fight its way in and out of prisoner camps.

(The secret unit being disbanded was trained for use in the jungles of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and not for such spectaculars as the unsuccessful raid on Son Tay in North Vietnam in November, 1970.)

Scattered Around

Though there are plenty of toughly skilled Americans in South Vietnam to mount such raids if the chance arises, they are scattered among many units. There are also small outfits—like Navy seal teams—available for such things, but they are not specifically trained and kept in readiness for prisoner rescue grabs.

Consequently the stand-down of the secret prisoner rescue group has stirred heated words within the headquarters of U.S. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams.

Abrams, who has an ill-concealed suspicion of the value of elite units superimposed on the Army's regular structure, has reportedly resisted arguments to go lightly on the withdrawal of such outfits.

Since the prisoner rescue unit was formed after the big influx of American troops in 1965-66 it has not succeeded in res-

cuing a single American prisoner held by the Viet Cong, though it has helped snatch a small number of South Vietnamese captives from jungle camps.

The unit had a parallel mission of saving downed pilots in cases where ground commandos might be required in addition to the crews of Air Force rescue helicopters known as Jolly Green Giants. If any such operation was ever mounted it has not been revealed. Some officers hint, however, that some operations of this type took place.

Not Many Captives

One reason the unit has few successes to its credit is that it was used sparingly and under the strictest limitations. To avoid endangering the lives of any captives with "fishing expeditions," special raids were ordered only when intelligence turned up hard and immediate information on the location of Viet Cong POW camps. Thus, while the unit had few successes it could equally boast few failures in the sense of botched or sloppy efforts.

The number of American captives in Viet Cong camps is also very small. Casualty figures list 463 Americans missing in South Vietnam. The United States claims 78 of these were known from various sources to have been alive at the time of their capture and were consequently listed as war prisoners. Of these, however, only 20 have been acknowledged by Viet Cong propaganda broadcasts as prisoners.

The justification for the

special prisoner-rescue commando of a relative handful of men is therefore small in the face of the overall troop withdrawal demands—the U.S. force level is now 127,000 men and the current goal is 69,000 by May 1.

The withdrawal, however, underscores the unpublicized decline in all clandestine operations which has paralleled the pullout of regular troops.

CIA Cutback

This actually began about 1969 when the Central Intelligence Agency began to sharply trim its involvement in many programs. Part of this was caused by Abrams, who disliked having Army types under CIA command as was the case in several areas. At any rate, the CIA began to withdraw provincial agents from the Phoenix program—aimed at rooting out and killing Viet Cong "Phantom government" officials—and quit funding (and controlling) such programs as the training school at Vung Tau which turned out government Revolutionary Development cadre.

Though the CIA's tentacles still reach all the sensitive areas of control in South Vietnam, the emphasis now is less on "operational" areas and more on pure intelligence gathering.

Paralleling the CIA's appreciably lower silhouette, the Green Beret troopers of the 5th Special Forces Group were pulled out a year ago—their clandestine operations being absorbed by an outfit known as SOG—the Studies and Observations Group. SOG is a cloak-and-dagger grabbag at Abrams' headquarters, incorporating a dozen or so outfits which do everything from super-secret long-range patrols to analyzing documents and interrogating top-rank prisoners.

Less Visible

The operations of SOG are noticeably less visible today than they were a

few years ago when a subsidiary unit known as the B-57 Detachment precipitated what became known as the Green Beret case. That case—which involved the execution of a suspected double agent—blew the cover on how extensive clandestine operations had grown in South Vietnam. It also caused a number of heads to roll within the U.S. establishment and resulted in a general hunkering down of cloak-and-dagger types.

Military spokesmen say that a number of SOG personnel have been dribbling out for several months. Its future will probably be sharply diminished within the next several months when the troop withdrawal program enters its final phase.

Paralleling these declines in the "secret war" is the increased use of sensors and computers requiring fewer men in the field and more brainpower at headquarters.

Long-range patrols into Cambodia, Laos and even North Vietnam have been virtually eliminated by the seeding of the Ho Chi Minh Trail with electronic sensors. Much of the computerized analysis on the readouts from these sensors is now done from a secret Air Force establishment in Thailand and not in South Vietnam (though the results are still channeled into 7th Air Force headquarters at Tan Son Nhut where the air war continues to be run).

While clandestine operations on the ground have lessened, the Air Force has also cut the number of planes that were part of the "secret war." These planes were in conglomerate outfits known as special operations squadrons. They included everything from helicopters for dropping penetration agents to radio-packed executive jets equipped to pick up agents deep in enemy land. The squadrons also

Chomsky: Viet war source of cheap labor market for U.S.

By BILL MORLOCK

The war in Vietnam is being waged to provide the American corporate structure and its junior partner, Japan, with a cheap imperialistic labor market, Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said at the Honeywell Project's corporate war crimes investigation Monday.

"Corporations have found it lucrative to build factories overseas where the labor is cheap and pollution control is not necessary," Chomsky told the audience of about 400 at Newman Center. "Overseas overhead is low because of cheap labor and this results in high profit return to this country," he added.

Chomsky said the top 80 American corporations had such a large international investment that they derived nearly 50 percent of their total profit from overseas.

"Workers in South Korea work six days a week for American corporations," Chomsky said. "Women are paid 11 cents an hour and men 17 cents."

Corporations use the cheap foreign labor to build components which are exported and the finished product is assembled in the United States, he said.

"Harvard economist Arthur Smithies reported to the Institute of Defense Analysis that in 10 years the war will be over and Vietnam will be ready for corporate development," Chomsky said.

"Smithies' report says that the war has contributed to the necessary infrastructure with the harbors, airfields and urbanization created by the military," he added.

Other features of Smithies' report were: the denial of foreign investment other than American for Vietnamese redevelopment; the principal investment by the Americans will be the most important factor in the speed of Vietnamese development; and social welfare in Vietnam must be avoided because it will cause an increase in wages, Chomsky said.

"Lacking the genius of Japan," he said, quoting Smithies, "Vietnam must look outside her own sources for development."

Japan also views Southeast Asia as a potential labor market that can be shared with the United States, Chomsky said.

"The Japanese press says the conflict in Vietnam has yielded to positive influences," Chomsky said. "The press said that the war had created a talented labor market of construction workers in many fields—bridge construction, building construction and the like. Their talents have been acquired by working on construction projects for the U.S. military."

Both the U.S. and Japanese labor markets are becoming expensive, Chomsky said. Corporations find more profit in making their products or component parts in a cheap labor market and importing them than building them here in an expensive one at home, he added.

"This creates a surplus of labor population in the U.S.," he said. "What do you do with the surplus? Put it on welfare, though that isn't a good alternative."

Imperialistic exploitation not only creates a problem with surplus "in home labor forces," it requires a military force which will control the dominated nations, he said.

"This is an odd war for an imperialistic nation because it uses conscripts from its own population," Chomsky said. "Most countries, like the French before us, relied heavily on mercenary forces. France, for instance, maintained control of Indochina with only 50,000 troops," he added.

To change Vietnam so it will suit U.S. corporate needs will necessitate the importing of the Vietnamese political structure, Chomsky said.

"Operation Phoenix, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) project, has already neutralized 42 percent of the South Vietnamese opposition by assassination," he said. "Phoenix also maintains a policy of torture and police repression to control the political structure of the nation," he added.

The military has succeeded in destroying the fabric of Vietnamese society by relocating the rural population so that now 80 percent of the nation is urbanized, Chomsky said.

"The Asian Development Bank report projects that by 1973 the Viet Cong opposition will have been reduced to a police problem," he said. "And by 1975 only 25,000 troops will be needed for control and they will remain there indefinitely," he said.

American troops are being withdrawn and replacing them is a new automated air war which will serve to control Indochina and promote the welfare of supporting corporations, Arthur Kanegis, spokesman for the National Action Research on the Military Industrial Complex, said.

"Far from winding down, the war is only being made less visible," Kanegis said. "Instead of a ground war with American troops and casualties, it is an automated air war with American planes and bombs."

General William Westmoreland told a military-industrialist gathering in October 1969 there were three reasons for the "change-over" to automatic warfare, Kanegis said.

"In the words of Westmoreland, the American people are questioning the role of the Army more than ever before," he said. "Secondly, the trust and confidence that have traditionally motivated the soldier are being questioned. Thirdly, according to Westmoreland, 'the U.S. faces an elusive and cunning enemy that has made the U.S. Army almost a giant without eyes.'"

Westmoreland said that the only alternative was to replace the man with a machine wherever possible, Kanegis said.

Westmoreland's automated warfare distinctive, he said. "First, electronic sensors,

STATINTL

THE CIA: A VISIBLE GOVERNMENT IN INDOCHINA

STATINTL

Fred Branfman and Steve Cohn
New York, N.Y.

"The CIA may or may not be an invisible government here at home ... but to those close to the war it is one of the most visible — and important — governments in Indo-China today."

As American soldiers are withdrawn from Indochina, the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) is increasing. The C.I.A. may or may not be an invisible government here at home. **BUT** to those close to the war, it is one of the most visible — and important — governments in Indochina today.

CIA Secret Army

As we shall explain further in weeks to come, the C.I.A.'s budget in Laos and Cambodia exceeds those of the Laotian and Cambodian Governments by 20 or 30 to 1; the C.I.A. recruits, supplies, and directs a polyglot "Secret Army" of 100,000 men that does most of the front-line fighting in these two nations; C.I.A. photo interpreters and intelligence operatives control targetting, the most important part of the air war; C.I.A. political operatives are the main day-to-day intermediaries between the U.S. Government and local Lao and Cambodian politicians and generals.

And, of course, normal espionage, sabotage, assassination, and extortion — the C.I.A.'s standard fare anywhere — continue as usual (see Pentagon Papers memos No. 15 and No. 22 for Colonel Lansdale's descriptions of such activities as long as 10 and 20 years ago.)

In South Viet Nam, the C.I.A. role is also rising. The "pacification" program has taken on greater importance under Richard Nixon, and this of course is under the direct control of the C.I.A. through the deputy ambassador for pacification, always a C.I.A. man.

Phoenix Project

The key aspect of pacification is the Phoenix Project, an admitted program of murder and torture of civilians suspected to be working for the National Liberation Front. Since Phoenix's inception, it openly admitted that the C.I.A. has killed and abducted more civilians than even the U.S. Government claims have been similarly mistreated by "Viet Cong terrorists" (see accompanying chart).

In discussing the role of the C.I.A. in Indochina today, let us note at the outset that this is not an aberration: the C.I.A. devotes most of its budget

(Reprinted from the American Report: Review of Religion and American Power, Vol. 2, No. 11, Dec. 10, 1971, published by Clergy and Laymen Concerned, a non-profit national committee, 637 West 125 St., New York, N.Y. 10027)

and personnel to waging political and military warfare in all corners of the globe, with only a small percentage going into strict intelligence-gathering.

Carefully Cultivated Myth

This is not generally known, of course, for one of the most carefully cultivated myths in America today is that the C.I.A.'s main job is to prepare intelligence estimates for the President — the only job it is legally mandated to perform.

Whether in a recent Newsweek cover story on C.I.A. chief Richard Helms, or in a speech by Helms himself to an association of newspaper editors earlier this year, the theme is constantly repeated that the C.I.A.'s major role is merely to provide estimates of things such as Russian missile strength or morale in North Viet Nam.

In fact, nothing could be farther from the truth.

Highly informed sources reveal that of 18,000 people employed directly by the C.I.A. today, no more than 2,000 are actually involved in intelligence gathering and analysis. The vast majority are engaged in C.I.A. covert operations stretching from Bolivia to the Congo to Iran to Viet Nam.

Four Major Divisions

The C.I.A. is divided into four major divisions:

- (1) The DIRECTORATE OF PLANS (cover name for the division of covert operations or clandestine services) — 6,000 people;
- (2) The DIRECTORATE OF SUPPORT (the division providing logistics support to the Directorate of Plans) — 6,000 people;
- (3) The DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY — 4,000 people;
- (4) The DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE — 2,000 people.

Thus fully two thirds of the C.I.A.'s direct-hire employees — and a far higher percentage of its estimated two- to six-billion dollar budget — go to waging political and/or military warfare.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Cables Show Doubletalk on VC

By Jack Anderson

The secret cables from Saigon show that U.S. officials have been talking out of both sides of their mouths about their campaign to wipe out the Vietcong infrastructure.

The idea was to kill, capture or convert the key people who operate the Vietcong underground inside South Vietnam. This grim missionary effort is known delicately as Operation Phoenix, named after a mythical bird which rises from its own ashes.

But the Phoenix program, according to the classified cable traffic, hasn't gotten off the ground. Ellsworth Bunker, the American Ambassador in Saigon, has reported to Secretary of State Bill Rogers that the operation "has not appeared to have significantly weakened" the Vietcong infrastructure.

Bunker's cable is dated Aug. 30, 1971. The date is significant. For a few days earlier, Ambassador William Colby and Assistant Defense Secretary G. Warren Nutter made public statements saying exactly the opposite.

Colby, who headed the pacification program in Vietnam, testified on July 19 before the House Foreign Operations subcommittee. Suave and solemn as an undertaker, he praised the Phoenix program.

It "has reduced the power of the VCI (Vietcong Infrastructure), he said, and "is an essential part of the Government of Vietnam's defense." American support, he declared, "is fully warranted."

The VCI, he said, "operates under considerable limitations" and has been reduced in some areas "to skeleton status." As statistical evidence, he reported that 9,331 VCI were "neutralized during the first five months of 1971. This included 3,650 killed, he said.

Secret Reports

Bunker's secret Aug. 30 cable, however, tells a dismayingly different story. Although the Phoenix program "routinely exceeds its goals of neutralizations (deaths and arrests)," confided Bunker, it "has not appeared to have significantly weakened the VCI."

Giving the classified statistics on VCI strength, he reported: "June strength (of) 61,994 was down 341 from May. The drop in strength for the first half of 1971 is about 10 per cent. Even if this figure is reliable, it is not a significant decrease in view of the urgent GVN (Government of Vietnam) efforts directed against the VCI in 1971.

"Sixty thousand members of an underground organization in a population of 18 million represents one VCI for each

300 people. This has apparently been adequate to keep the VCI viable and enable them to make their presence felt."

A few weeks before Colby bragged to Congress about the success of the Phoenix program, his top aide in Gia Dinh province, David McKillop, reported grimly: "We have not scratched the surface of the Urban VCI network of the Shadow Supply System."

In a confidential report from Binh Duong province, Lt. Col. Gerald Chikalla informed Colby that Operation Phoenix "was killing off the little fish but missing the sharks.

"There has developed the tendency to place more importance on volume rather than on quality neutralizations," reported Chikalla. "Much of this can be attributed to U.S. guidance and influence and Quotas."

Another reason for Phoenix's failure was the unwillingness of the Vietnamese to turn in their sons and fathers to the Saigon government. As Lt. Col. Jack Cantrell put it in a classified report from Binh Tuy province:

"The major reasons for lack of success include: (a) The inherent distaste of the people to indict (inform on) relatives, friends or personnel with political implications. . . (Phoenix) is a U.S. innovation that has been bought officially by

the Vietnamese but which does not get the priority attention in action at any level that it gets on paper."

Similar admissions of failure came from Lt. Col. Gerald Bartlett in Hau Nghia province.

Yet Colby suppressed these unfavorable reports and gave Congress a fabricated, favorable account of the Phoenix program. He was supported by the Pentagon's G. Warren Nutter, who wrote a similarly glowing letter about Operation Phoenix to House Foreign Affairs Chairman Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) on Aug. 21.

Once again, we have caught government officials in a flagrant deception. They twisted the facts, apparently, in order to win congressional support.

Gift from Agnew

Vice President Agnew is a man often accused of a lack of sympathy for the black and the poor. But you'd have a hard time convincing Ray May, the rugged outside linebacker of the Baltimore Colts.

May has adopted three teen-aged black youths and plans to convert his Kansas ranch into a home for disadvantaged city boys.

Not long ago, May received a handwritten note from the Vice President. "Ray, congratulations," it said. "Perhaps this will help a little." Enclosed was a crisp \$100 bill.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

WALTER SCOTT'S Personality Parade

Q. Is there any agency of the U.S. Government which has been authorized to include political assassination in its practices?—M. Wilson, Austin, Tex.

A. The one U.S. agency which uses political assassination as a weapon is the Central Intelligence Agency. Many of its men in Vietnam have assassinated civilian Communists in an effort to destroy the Vietcong infrastructure. Operation Phoenix run by the CIA established a new high for U.S. political assassinations in Vietnam, largely in response to enemy terrorist tactics which also include assassination, kidnapping, terrorism of all sorts.

30 DEC 1971

The CIA's New Cover

The Rope Dancer

by Victor Marchetti.

Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., \$6.95

Richard J. Barnet

I
In late November the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a series of "senior seminars" so that some of its important bureaucrats could consider its public image. I was invited to attend one session and to give my views on the proper role of the Agency. I suggested that its legitimate activities were limited to studying newspapers and published statistics, listening to the radio, thinking about the world, interpreting data of reconnaissance satellites, and occasionally

publishing the names of foreign spies. I had been led by conversations with a number of CIA officials to believe that they were thinking along the same lines. One CIA man after another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me that the days of the flamboyant covert operations were over. The upper-class amateurs of the OSS who stayed to mastermind operations in Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and elsewhere—Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald—had died or departed.

In their place, I was assured, was a small army of professionals devoted to preparing intelligence "estimates" for the President and collecting information the clean, modern way, mostly with sensors, computers, and sophisticated reconnaissance devices. Even Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now be as much a museum piece as Mata Hari. (There are about 18,000 employees in the CIA and 200,000 in the entire "intelligence community" itself. The cost of maintaining them is somewhere between \$5 billion and \$6 billion annually. The employment figures do not include foreign agents or mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-man hired army in Laos.)

A week after my visit to the "senior seminar" *Newsweek* ran a long story on "the new espionage" with a picture of CIA Director Richard Helms on the cover. The reporters clearly had spoken to some of the same people I had. As *Newsweek* said, "The gaudy era of the

adventurer has passed in the American spy business; the bureaucratic age of Richard C. Helms and his gray specialists has settled in." I began to have an uneasy feeling that *Newsweek's* article was a cover story in more than one sense.

It has always been difficult to analyze organizations that engage in false advertising about themselves. Part of the responsibility of the CIA is to

spread confusion about its own work. The world of Richard Helms and his "specialists" does indeed differ from that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organizations, in spite of their predilection for what English judges used to call "frolics of their own," are servants of policy. When policy changes, they must eventually change too, although because of the atmosphere of secrecy and deception in which they operate, such changes are exceptionally hard to control. To understand the "new espionage" one must see it as part of the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence, is a global strategy for maintaining US power and influence without overtly involving the nation in another ground war.

But we cannot comprehend recent developments in the "intelligence community" without understanding what Mr. Helms and his employees actually do. In a speech before the National Press Club, the director discouraged journalists from making the attempt. "You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men." The same speech is made each year to the small but growing number of senators who want a closer check on the CIA. In asking, on November 10, for a "Select Committee on the Coordination of United States Activities Abroad to oversee activities of the Central Intelligence Agency," Senator Stuart Symington noted that "the subcommittee having oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency has not met once this year."

Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and veteran member of the Armed Services Committee, has also said that "there is no federal agency in our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA." Moreover, soon after Symington spoke, Senator Allen J.

world in revolution

STATINTL

*ASIA***VIETNAM-CAMBODIA**

President Nixon was busy stepping up the war last week, sending Asian client troops into battle on three fronts. Inside Cambodia about 20,000 Phnom Penh troops were thoroughly defeated; on the Cambodia-Vietnam border some 25,000 Saigon soldiers couldn't find the "enemy" alleged to be operating there; and in South Vietnam some 15,000 Saigon troops were sent into the Central Highlands on Nov. 27. Reports of the drive were not published until several days after it occurred and a week afterward there was still no word on its results. (Under new press rules put into effect Nov. 30 in Saigon, no news of the war may be published unless it is released by high U.S.-Saigon officials or their spokesmen.) American pilots reported last week that for the first time since 1965, North Vietnamese MIG fighter planes fired air-to-air missiles at U.S. B-52 bombers. The pilots' report—not confirmed by

GI TOLL: 359,467

The following casualty figures for Indochina are based on U.S. government statistics. They are lower than U.S. casualties reported by the liberation forces. Figures are from Jan. 1, 1961 to Nov. 27, 1971. Figures in parentheses are for the week Nov. 20 to Nov. 27. Killed: 45,613 (9); "Non-combat" deaths: 9954 (7); Wounded: 302,283 (78); Missing, captured: 1617.

the U.S. command—said North Vietnamese Russian- and Chinese-built MIGs had made about 10 passes in the last two weeks at U.S. bombers flying over Laos. Said a senior pilot in Saigon in an interview with the New York Times, "I'd say the MIGs represent a serious new threat, not a potential threat but a real one."...With Indo-chinese doing all the fighting, U.S. troop withdrawals are continuing. By Nov. 30 there were 182,400 GIs in Southeast Asia. The last of the Navy's "Seals" are also leaving Vietnam. The operations of this special unit were stopped, according to the Times, "because some members

of the commando teams in the field have become afraid their activities might bring down on them the kind of prosecution that convicted Lt. William Calley in the massacre of civilians at Mylai." The "Seals" work included support of the CIA's infamous "Phoenix" program. A sign posted by the "Seals" at one of their bases on the Mekong Delta said: "People who kill for money are professionals. People who kill for fun are sadists. People who kill for money and fun are Seals."...At a meeting of the China-Cambodia Friendship Association in Peking Nov. 9, 13th anniversary of the independence of the Kingdom of Cambodia, a report on the excellent battle situation and high morale of the liberation forces was made by Ieng Sary, special envoy of the Cambodian government in exile. He said, "Under the leadership of the National United Front of Cambodia...our people are determined to unite on a wide scale, wage resolute struggle, overcome all difficulties and hardships, win more and greater victories, make no compromise or retreat, wipe out the enemy, smash the enemy's espionage activities and psychological warfare and defend the liberated areas. Imbued with firm revolutionary optimism, the Cambodian people and the people's armed forces of national liberation are confident of the inevitable defeat of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh traitorous clique."

U.S. Plan Fails to Wipe Out VC Cadre

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Dec. 13 — The Phoenix program, devised four years ago by the CIA as the way to wipe out the Vietcong's political infrastructure, remains today one of the most notable failures of the war.

This is the view expressed by many senior members of the U.S. establishment here, sometimes in the boldest possible terms. "It's a lousy failure," one top-echelon American said loudly at a reception the other night.

Despite the recognized importance to the Saigon government's future of eliminating the Vietcong's clandestine political apparatus, it is apparently no longer considered an achievable goal.

The Vietcong infrastructure consists of enemy agents responsible for recruiting, collecting taxes, spreading propaganda, infiltrating legitimate groups and generally undermining government influence. The cadre of about 70,000 called VCIs are homegrown and deeply rooted.

This summer the U.S. and South Vietnamese officials decided to offer bounties as high as \$11,000 for high-ranking VCIs. The plan was never carried out, sources said, because it was realized that it wouldn't work.

"The Vietnamese are never going to turn their own people in," said an American with many years of experience in Vietnam, "and they certainly won't take sides politically until the outcome of the war is absolutely clear."

"Survival (in South Vietnam) has often meant and largely still means sitting on the fence," explained one young official.

Advisers Withdrawn

For some months now, American military advisers to the program have been gradually withdrawn, officially as part of the overall phaseout. A small complement of men from the Central Intelligence Agency will remain.

But considering the importance attached to Phoenix as recently as a year ago and the fact that only a few hundred Americans were involved even at the peak, the pullout at this stage is seen by many observers as an admission that there is simply very little more that can be done.

"The military didn't know how to advise the program and the Vietnamese didn't want to learn," said an American civilian who has watched Phoenix closely.

Official Vietnamization figures show that about 20,000 agents are "neutralized" (killed, captured or rallied to the government side) each year. But Americans acknowledge that practically all of this probably inflated figure were low-level village and hamlet operatives and the basic leadership still remains.

A very small percentage of even these are killed or captured because Phoenix intelligence ferreted them out. What usually happens is that persons rounded up in routine military operations are subsequently listed as VCIs.

"Statistics show that for every one neutralization of a previously identified VCI we are neutralizing four that were not previously identified," the senior American adviser in Binhduong Province wrote recently.

Phoenix (known properly by its Vietnamese name Phuong Hoang — all-seeing bird) has been in trouble from the start. It was drawn up by the CIA as a "systematic effort at intelligence coordination and exploitation"

— a way to prevent clumsy overlap. It was turned over to the Vietnamese in 1968.

Agents were to be identified, apprehended and punished by local authorities.

War critics in the United States promptly attacked

Phoenix as a counterterror organization, utilizing assassination and torture as its principal tools. Periodically, abuses.

These reports, along with the cloak and dagger aura of CIA involvement and specially trained and paid Vietnamese agents known as PRU (provincial reconnaissance units), gave the program a sinister reputation that overshadowed its continuing inability to accomplish the job it had been assigned.

"The most important thing about Phoenix," one official commented early in 1970, "is that it is not working."

Reason For Trouble

One reason frequently offered for Phoenix's troubles is that it involves an extraordinarily complex meshing of information and personnel from any number of Vietnamese military, paramilitary and civilian groups.

Leadership is nominally vested in the national police and its elite special branch. In fact, the military often predominates. The interest and personality of the province chiefs and their principal aides are also instrumental.

Information is gleaned from a variety of sources, including armed sources, gauda teams, revolutionary development, cadre and plain villagers. The data is collected and maintained at district and province intelligence and interrogation centers.

Raids are entrusted to the PRU, the CIA-sponsored squads who are the action arm of Phoenix. Sometimes militia units and the police are also involved. American helicopters are used frequently to ferry the PRU.

'Undisciplined Country'

In cases where wanted VCIs are apprehended, trials are conducted by provincial security councils, made up of the province chief, various police and military officials and whom ever the province chief selects.

In practice, all this turns out to be a haphazard business. Among other things, frequently bribe their way out,

province and police officials misuse their authority to settle grievances and innocent people are jailed or worse.

In Angiang, the country's most pacified province, a man was recently truncheoned to death before it was discovered that he had been picked up by mistake. The killer was an enlisted man in the militia assigned to the local intelligence unit.

The case was reported in the Vietnamese press and informed U.S. sources said a sergeant had acted on his own without authority and would be tried later.

How many of these incidents go undiscovered is anybody's guess. "This is an undisciplined country at war," said a high-ranking U.S. pacification official, "and Phoenix is about what you'd have to expect."

Phoenix: a Controversial Viet Program

BY STEWART KELLERMAN
UPI Staff Writer

SAIGON--It was a rainy evening and the villagers huddled in their wet straw huts warming themselves by smoky fires. Outside, two young Vietnamese crawled through knife-sharp elephant grass to the outskirts of the village.

One of the youths buried an olive-painted claymore mine in the red-brown mud of the only trail leading into the village. The other strung a wire to a plunger hidden behind a clump of bushes.

The two young men--on the payroll of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)--could soon hear the splash of footsteps as the local Communist political leader returned home to spend the night with his family.

They waited patiently, rubber sandals sunk in the mud. The moment the Communist leader reached the mine, they pushed down on the plunger, shattering the evening calm with a deafening roar.

The killing was the work of the Phoenix Program, an allied project aimed at wiping out the political leadership of the National Liberation Front (NLF) with some of the same terrorist tactics the Communists have used against Saigon government officials.

U.S. Involvement

A U.S. Army intelligence officer described the incident to newsmen but demanded the names, location and date be kept secret. His caution was typical of American officials with knowledge of one of the most controversial and least understood programs in Vietnam.

Reliable American sources said the United States, which thought up Phoenix almost four years ago, is still deeply involved in it.

Aside from CIA participation, the U.S. Army has helped set up a massive intelligence apparatus which critics claim has given the Saigon government "big brother" power over much of the population. The sources said U.S. Army intelligence officers also sit unofficially on boards determining the fate of suspected Communists.

Officially, the object of the Phoenix Program is the "neutralization" of the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI), bureaucratic jargon for the Communist shadow government in South Vietnam.

Reason for Killings

The program, started by South Vietnam in 1968 with the encouragement of U.S. intelligence experts, claims to have neutralized \$3,899 Communists since then--20,936 killed, 40,880 jailed and 22,083 talked into switching sides.

Allied officials working in the Phoenix Program usually say the killings have been the result of suspects resisting arrest.

"We don't want to kill any of them," one U.S. adviser said. "We want live ones. A dead man is just a statistic. He can't give us any information. And we have to bury him."

U.S. officials working in related programs and some former Phoenix advisers, however, occasionally tell a different story when speaking anonymously.

"Of course we're killing a lot of VC and torturing a lot of them," one American said. "What else can we do? We're just doing the same thing to the enemy as they're doing to us."

Communist terrorists have made life just as dangerous for government officials. The Saigon government has reported Communist terrorist incidents last

year alone, principally against local officials and their relatives.

It was suppertime in a small, rice-farming village in the central highlands of South Vietnam.

The kitchen sounds--scrapping of pots, clinking of glasses and clacking of plates--drowned out the noise of two young Communists walking toward the village.

Family Gunned Down

The two youths, dressed in black pajamas and carrying Soviet-made rifles, walked down the only path leading into town, their rubber tire sandals slapping against the earth.

Without hesitation, they pushed open the door of the biggest building--an unpainted wooden shack where the Saigon government village chief had just sat down for supper with his wife and two children.

The young men then mechanically emptied their rifles into the room and casually walked out of the village, leaving behind four bodies slumped across the table between pieces of broken dishes and glasses.

It was one more Communist terrorist attack against local government officials, village councilmen and ordinary civilians in South Vietnam. Dozens of terrorist attacks take place every day across the country.

"It's easy for somebody to stand up in Congress back in the States and complain about how immoral the Phoenix Program is," one U.S. official said. "But once you've seen the VC gun down village chiefs, kill innocent women and children, you don't feel that way anymore. They're just animals and they've got to be destroyed."

"The only way to fight these animals is to kill them," a U.S. police adviser said. "It's too bad but we haven't done enough killing around here lately. We only got four of them

Controversial Group

Without a doubt, the most controversial men on the Phoenix team are the PRUs, members of province reconnaissance units organized and financed by the CIA, according to allied intelligence sources.

The sources said the PRUs, mainly former criminals and Communists recruited from jails, are the triggermen for the program's political assassinations. They said the PRUs are also used to arrest especially dangerous suspects and to administer the roughest tortures.

At the start of the program, the typical assassination squad would be made up of four PRUs and two Americans, the sources said. Nowadays, however, the PRUs usually work alone.

They said the PRUs used to get paid piece rates--that is, by the head. But the CIA switched them over to straight salaries--substantially higher than pay scales for South Vietnamese soldiers and police.

Program Aim

Linh is a poor farmer. He grows rice on an acre of land near the South China Sea. He lives with his wife and three children in a cramped hut made of straw and mud.

Linh--like millions of others--has been forced by the South Vietnamese government to spy on his own family for the Phoenix Program.

"I don't want to get into trouble," Linh said through a translator. "That's why I tell the government what they want. I don't tell them everything, of course. Just as much as I have to."

The Phoenix Program has tried to get a gia truong (family head) like Linh to report in every hut, house and shanty in South Vietnam. They're the lowest rungs on a mas-


Newsweek

22 November 1971

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0

November 22 1971 / 50 CENTS

Newsweek



Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0

U.S. INTELLIGENCE: CONSPIRACIES, SUBVERSION, ESPIONAGE

PART II

To be sure, the CIA concentrates first and foremost on actions against the countries of the socialist community and the progressive regimes in young national states. Another major target of its subversive activity is the Communist and Left organizations in the capitalist countries, which the monopolies and hence intelligence regard as a force potentially dangerous to the very existence of imperialism and its mainstay the United States. Furthermore, it is a task of the CIA to counteract the national liberation movement in the colonial countries, where the United States still hopes to step into the shoes of the outgoing old colonial powers, to retain these countries within the capitalist system. Finally, much attention is paid to the states of Latin America. Regarding this continent as its strategic rear, the United States employs the combined forces of diplomacy, intelligence, the police apparatus and the Pentagon to stabilize the reactionary regimes there and thereby to preserve the domination of its monopolies.

Suffice it to enumerate some of the aggressive foreign policy actions of the United States in the past two decades to see that the CIA is working precisely in this direction: the intrigues of U.S. intelligence in Iran; the military putsch in Guatemala; the deposition of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos in 1958, the armed intervention against people's Cuba; the coup d'etat in the Dominican Republic; the anti-government conspiracy in Iraq; the military coup in Brazil; the preparation of armed intervention against Vietnam; the coup in Cambodia and this is a far from complete list.

PENTAGON INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Pursuing their aggressive ends, the U.S. ruling circles are seeking as much information as possible about the socialist countries and above all the Soviet Union. The intelligence services of the Western powers are sparing no effort to obtain information about the military-economic potential of the USSR and its Armed Forces, about the internal situation in the Soviet Union and the

latest achievements of Soviet science and technology.

Speaking of the position of military intelligence, i.e. of the Pentagon's organ, in the intricate system of U.S. intelligence services, it should be noted that immediately after the end of World War II, referring to the experience accumulated, it started laying claims to the leading role among all the intelligence organizations of the country. Inasmuch as after the establishment of the CIA Allen Dulles strove to "politicize" the entire strategic intelligence and turn the CIA into an organ not merely co-ordinating intelligence activities but making "big policy", the Pentagon openly voiced its resentment of this line. For some time the struggle among the different intelligence organs was waged "in camera", within the bounds of the Intelligence Community, but before long it emerged to the surface. The military had the upper hand: in August 1961 the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was

States was accompanied by the expansion and consolidation of military intelligence.

THE "BRAIN TRUST"

The DIA is the supreme organ, the "brain trust" of U.S. military intelligence. Just as the intelligence organs of the three armed services, the DIA sees its principal task in obtaining information about the military-economic potential and armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty states. According to the DIA statute endorsed by the Secretary of Defense, the chief of the DIA is subordinated only to him personally and to the Intelligence Board. It is to supply intelligence information to military institutions (through the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and to the Secretary of Defense (through the latter's secretariat).

Although the DIA is vested with certain rights in regard to the military intelligence services, the latter have retained independence in the fields of direct interest to them (except through the system of military attachés, which in 1965 passed to the jurisdiction of the DIA.

Evidently this is in large measure due to the increased role of the American military, naval and air attaches and military missions, who together with their official personnel make up the basis of the modern legal foreign apparatus of U.S. military intelligence. This function of military attachés has been particularly widely developed in the practice of the U.S. diplomatic service.

The department directing the work of military attachés forms a part of the DIA apparatus. It works out its instructions and gives assistance to the attaché system in close contact with State Department offices. At present attachés of the Defence Department are

accredited to 92 countries, with larger states having attachés of all three armed services. For instance, air attachés are to be found in 67 countries, and in 24 of them they are senior attachés. The question of which attaché is to be senior is decided by the secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, depending on which armed service in a given country is of greater interest to the United States. As General MacClaskey writes, since Russia's air power is of the greatest interest to the United States, the U.S. air attaché holds seniority there.

The DIA widely applies data processing techniques. At the beginning of 1963 a special centre for the automatic processing of intelligence data was set up. Attached to the DIA is the military intelligence school es-

17 NOV 1971

STATINTL

Nixon fiddles while Vietnam burns

By Richard E. Ward

Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

Theatrical gestures have become the hall mark of the Nixon administration: grandiose pronouncements or actions designed to project a public image quite different from actual U.S. policy.

The administration's longest running play goes by the name of "Vietnamization." Since he ran for the presidency in 1968, Nixon has been pledging to end the war in Indochina. Needless to say, "Vietnamization" has not been a drama of peace; it has been act after act prolonging one of the most barbarous wars of aggression in history.

The White House has focused a spotlight on its troop withdrawals in the hope that the applause would detract from U.S. efforts to strangle the liberation struggle in Vietnam, the continuation of bombing, extension of full-scale wars of devastation to Laos and Cambodia and its backing for the fascist Saigon regime.

Now the administration is apparently going to announce further troop withdrawals in Nixon's address to be made on or before Nov. 15. If the press reports are accurate—and there have been no denials from the White House—Nixon will announce the "end" of the U.S. ground combat role in Vietnam by the end of this year or nearly 1972 and further troop reductions, "leaving a residual force of about 40,000 men—air crews and advisors for South Vietnamese forces," according to a Nov. 8 Washington Post report on Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's recent visit to Saigon.

"In a Honolulu stopover en route to Washington," the Post added, "Laird told newsmen he did not want it 'misunderstood' that U.S. military men would lack adequate protection.

"As we turn over air, artillery and logistical responsibilities [to Saigon], it is necessary for us to protect the American forces now serving in these capacities," he said. In other words, the U.S. "advisors" will continue to engage in combat activities and the "tremendous progress" of Saigon's military forces, claimed by Laird, is a pure myth.

Other American press accounts, also based on administration briefings, have spelled out further details of U.S. plans for the coming

regimes in Cambodia and Laos, including air support, maintenance of U.S. air bases in Thailand and U.S. naval activity off the coasts of Vietnam and Cambodia, the continuation of U.S. bombing throughout Indochina and the continued use of clandestine CIA personnel as combat "advisors" and the "accelerated pacification" and "Phoenix" programs in South Vietnam.

U.S. goal still victory

In summary, on the eve of the expected White House announcement on the ending of U.S. ground combat in Indochina, the Nixon administration, by its acts and statements, shows that it is still harboring hopes that with its puppet and mercenary forces and U.S. air and logistics support, the U.S. can gain a military victory or at least a position of strength sufficient to force the liberation forces in Indochina to accept U.S. neocolonialism in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.


These aims have been underscored by the conduct of the U.S. delegation here at the peace talks under Ambassador William J. Porter, who has been the most arrogant and bellicose of any American delegation chief to date. At the most recent session of the talks on Nov. 4, Porter delivered a long diatribe trying to justify the U.S. position, claiming that the Vietnamese liberation forces were responsible for the U.S. "Vietnamization" program. This is the logic of Nazi Germany which justified its aggression by pretending that the European peoples that refused voluntarily to submit to German domination during World War II were responsible for the Nazi attacks and SS and gestapo atrocities.

Also at the Nov. 4 session, the U.S. press spokesman, Stephen Ledogar, responding to a journalist's question, said Porter's statement followed White House instructions to the letter. Ledogar himself went even further in his attacks against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Provisional Revolutionary Government delegates by calling them a bunch of "clowns." In line with this arrogance, the U.S. has not yet tabled a single proposal in the 134 sessions of the quadripartite Paris talks that could form the basis for genuine peace negotiations.

6: THE PACIFIC

The First World War ignored it. The Second World War started elsewhere and only ended up here. But the Third World War has several times looked like both starting and ending in this vast no-man's land between the super-powers. The gaping emptiness of the Pacific is deceptive, for, as the pictures below demonstrate, every country in it and around it is raked by the crossfire of the great contenders for world leadership, who snipe from the two sides of the ocean. The Indo-Chinese, Korean and Vietnam wars have been the most tragic results of the confrontation, but there are others - many others. In the sixth instalment of our *Planet Earth* survey of the world, the Pacific is examined by Richard West.

Japan



Japan will outgrow the United States economically by 2000 A.D., according to Herman Kahn, the modish 'futurologist'. World-famous for cameras and transistor equipment, the Japanese economy owes its success to still greater achievements in heavy industry, especially steel, shipbuilding and, more recently, automobiles. With 10 per cent. of her young men at university, Japan is educationally ahead of Britain and the United States, and draws on an army of technologists.

The four giant cartels or *zaibatus* that dominate Japanese industry have been criticised for crushing initiative and competition. And although Japan pays lip service to free trade and private enterprise, she has entrenched herself behind

tariff walls, and has blocked foreign ownership of her industry. The Americans own a controlling share of only one industry - Coca-Cola. The Japanese regard capitalism, especially the company they work for, with the same fanatical love that they once offered the Emperor and the army. The bigger the company, the more love and respect it commands, so that sometimes the host at a business dinner will seat the guests at table according to the distributed capital of their firms. About half the marriages in Japan are arranged by the bridegroom's boss, who sometimes takes precedence over the parents at the wedding.

In relation to the whole of Asia (excluding the eastern USSR), Japan occupies 1.4 per cent. of the land and has 5 per cent. of the population. Yet the Japanese produce 75 per cent. of Asia's steel output and 95 per cent. of its motor vehicles. Japan has two-thirds of all Asia's telephones, one-third of its radio sets - and 89 per cent. of all the continent's TV sets.

The price of economic growth has been the desecration of a graceful, cultured country. Hills have been flattened and seas filled in to make room for petro-chemical plants, overspill towns, motorways and express railway lines. "All the smoke coming up from the works sends our spirits soaring to the mountain tops," sing the workers at the Yawata Steel company. The rest of the population choke from smog which

has made Tokyo and Osaka airports the most dangerous in the East.

In the uninterrupted urban complex that stretches from Tokyo to Osaka, the human beings exist in noisy, nerve-wracked squalor. Crowded into insanitary homes or the dormitories run by their company, the Japanese seek escape through alcohol, television or *ero-ductions*, the sex films specialising in torture and disembowelment.

Yet although Japan suffers from some of the horrors of capitalistic development, it is extremely little Americanised. Through all the years of American occupation, few Japanese mastered English or wanted to copy the culture of their conquerors.

The traditional Japanese shyness, such a form of suppressed aggression, makes it hard for them to get on with the extrovert and easy-going

Americans. Japanese men, and perhaps some Japanese women, do not envy the sexual equality of America. While Japanese wives stay at home in the evening, Japanese men go from the office to bars, night clubs or, if they are rich enough, geisha houses to flirt with one of the million professional female hostesses. Rush-hour going home starts three hours after the offices close.

The party of business, the Liberal Democrats, have never been seriously challenged during their 21 years of power. Having lost their old reverence for the Emperor, the Japanese are not inclined to seek a political strong man. The Liberal Democrat premier, Eisaku Sato, does not aspire to be more than a chairman of a committee. There is much rivalry within the Government, often involving a conflict of business interests, but the opposition Socialists have never looked menacing. As long as the economy grows and there is no real unemployment, a proportion of the working class will be satisfied with the Government. The ferocious para-military student revolutionaries, who used to run through the streets in chanting, snaking processions, have been quietened down somewhat by the still more ferocious riot police.

There have been recent signs of a right-wing revival of the military and aristocratic tradition. These sentiments have contributed to the electoral success of the Komeito Sokagakkai, a kind of Buddhist Moral Rearmament. Puritanical in its social attitudes, it also plays on the greed of its followers, encouraging them to believe that regular prayer will bring them business, or even improve their averages at baseball. In contrast to Komeito Sokagakkai, which was pacifist in conception, a military, neo-fascist movement has recently sprung into prominence with the sensational suicide, by disembowelment, of the novelist Mishima. His death, which has inspired a morbid cult in a country already prone to sadistic fantasy, may come to be seen as a passing sensation. But this reminder of recent bloody history has influenced current arguments on Japan's defence role today.

The Japanese armed forces are some quarter of a million strong and three times that number of volunteers respond to recruiting posters like that on page 77. There is a grow-

Phoenix

(part II)

Spy net engulfs all S. Vietnam's citizens

by Stewart Kefferman
 In Saigon

INH is a poor farmer. He grows rice on an acre of land near the South China Sea. He lives with his wife and three children in a cramped hut made of straw and mud.

Linh—like millions of other—has been forced by the South Vietnamese Government to spy on his own family for the Phoenix programme, a controversial allied drive using torture and assassination to destroy the Communist political leadership in South Vietnam.

"I don't want to get into trouble," Linh said through a translator. "That's why I tell the government what they want. I don't tell them everything, of course. Just as much as I have to."

The Phoenix programme has tried to get a *gia truong* (family head) like Linh to spy in every hut, house and shanty in South Vietnam. They're the lowest rungs on a massive intelligence apparatus providing reports on suspected leaders of the Communist National Liberation Front (NLF).

The *gia truongs* don't get any money for their information—just prosecution as suspected Communists if they fail to report accurately on the actions of their families.

Allied sources said the Phoenix programme also employs a large network of paid informers—national police undercover men, civilian secret agents, army intelligence agents, and

of gunmen organised by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The reports from informers move up through channels to hundreds of District Intelligence Operations Commands (DIOCs), the hubs of the Phoenix programme. Each DIOC is manned by South Vietnamese soldiers, police and psychological warfare specialists as well as an unofficial member from the U.S. army, American sources said.

U.S. intelligence officers said the DIOCs use the reports to prepare "target folders" on suspected political leaders of the Vietcong, the Saigon government's name for the NLF.

The officials said green sheets of paper in the folders are used to list such items as physical descriptions, friends and visiting habits of suspects. Pink sheets are used for copies of all agent reports on suspects.

South Vietnamese Phoenix officials said informants are graded on a scale ranging from A (completely reliable) to F (reliability cannot be judged). They said information provided by agents is grade from 1 (confirmed) to 6 (truth cannot be judged).

DIOC members—after deciding a suspect is likely to be a Communist leader—meet to decide how he should be "neutralised." The suspect can be assassinated, arrested or talked into switching sides.

A former U.S. Phoenix coordinator (adviser) said most DIOCs require at least a C3 rating—agent fairly reliable, information possibly true—before "targeting" a suspect for as-

The field police, strike arm of the national police, are usually used for arrests. CIA-financed PRU's, members of Province Reconnaissance Units, are used to kill suspects, according to allied intelligence sources.

But in Vietnam, no operation is water-tight. Allied intelligence officers said most Communist political leaders find out—through information leakage—that they've been targeted for assassination or arrest and go into hiding before the government can get to them.

They said the Phoenix programme then issues wanted posters showing mug shots and offering small rewards for information about the whereabouts of suspects.

The programme recently began a trial project in a few provinces offering bounties euphemistically called "maximum incentive awards" of several thousand dollars for really high Communist leaders—dead or alive.

After a suspect is arrested, the next step is a trip to a Province Interrogation Centre (PIC) also organised by the CIA, according to allied sources.

A former U.S. Phoenix adviser said torture is used at all PICs although interrogators usually use psychological rather than physical techniques. A couple of favorites are:

○ Cover a suspect's face with a wet washcloth. Pour soapy water over the cloth each time he refuses to answer a question. The water isn't supposed to hurt him, but it gives the suspect the impression he's drowning.

○ Tie a suspect to a chair and attach wires to a 12-volt car battery. Shock the suspect every time he refuses to answer a question. If he's really a tough customer, apply the wires to the genitals.

When the questioning is over, the suspect is brought before a province security committee headed by the local province chief.

The committee has the power to sentence a suspect in secret trials to a maximum of two years in prison. The sentence, however, is renewable indefinitely as long as Vietnam is at war.

U.S. sources said the suspect cannot question his accusers or even find out who they are. "It's pretty much up to the province chief," one American official said. "If he's a good man there'll be a fair trial. If he's not, there won't."

"I think it's safe to say that when it's all over not many people get off," one current Phoenix adviser said. "Just about everybody who makes the whole route winds up in jail."

Many Refugees Neutral About Vietcong

Survey of Attitudes Is Made by Americans

By GLORIA EMERSON
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 25 — An official American survey of attitudes among refugees has found that many take a neutral view of the Vietcong and that they consider living conditions under Communist control to be reasonably good.

The 181 refugees interrogated, from a group believed to number almost 80,000, are from the U Minh Forest, where a campaign to clear out enemy concentrations has been under way since December, 1970. The Government puts the number of refugees at 45,000.

Government assistance is considered inadequate by some of the refugees interviewed, according to the survey. The death and destruction caused by frequent military activities by allied forces — which means troop movements, artillery strikes and bombing — were major reasons why many had fled their homes.

The report on the findings points up the complexities of dealing with the refugee problem despite the long-established apparatus and the benefits ostensibly provided.

Long a Vietcong Base

The U. Minh area, long a base for the Vietcong guerrillas of South Vietnam, is at the southern tip of the peninsula in three provinces. It is a complex of dense jungles, open cultivated land, winding streams and straight canals.

The survey and report were done for the Pacification Studies Group, which is attached to Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, the American agency that conceived of the pacification programs and supervises them.

Marked "For Official Use Only," the study is in an idiom meant for United States officials. A summary says:

"Living conditions of the people in the past while under VC control were considered reasonably good. Few of the refugees considered themselves to have been living in want. The people's attitudes toward the VC while under their control were largely neutral, while feelings about their future reception in GVN [Government of (South) Vietnam]

were basically hopeful. Government assistance has been provided to over a third of those interviewed, but it has been invariably late and usually considered inadequate. Their attitude toward the GVN has been generally favorable although they do not credit GVN with doing much for them beyond providing security."

'No Sense of Urgency'

On the question of initial Government assistance to the refugees, the report says: "As in the past, no sense of urgency was felt by the Government."

"Due to the high mobility of the refugees, a 'Let-the-dust-settle-first' attitude aptly describes the initial feelings of many officials about future assistance," it continues. "Lack of sufficient social-action cadre and the generally slow procedures of the services complemented this attitude."

In Thoibinh District in Anxuyen Province, for example, 20 per cent of the beneficiaries failed to show the first time for payments of a 30-day rice allowance, the report notes, explaining that there were "numerous problems": failure to register the refugees, compiled the necessary official documents and notify the refugees when and where to appear.

"Many of these refugees were out working to support themselves," the report says.

When the second payment session arrived, after ample notification, the report says, "many of the refugees who show the first time went away disappointed — someone else had gotten their payments."

While the report says that life under Vietcong control in the U Minh area was difficult for a majority of the refugees interviewed, "a surprising number, 37 per cent, considered it to be good or better."

The area was a major stronghold of the Vietminh, who fought the French. From 1940 to 1954, under Vietminh control, living standards rose to a level where the people could be termed well off, the report says. From 1954 to 1966 the area was a major training and supply center for the Vietcong.

Long exposure to one form or another of Communist control did not seem to worry the people as long as they were able to make a living. As for the future, two-thirds of them worry over their ability to earn a living, while concern about security is found only among half this number, the report says, adding that 93 per cent

U.S. Advisers Voicing Doubts on Saigon's Desire to Push Operation Phoenix

Special to The New York Times

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 25 — Many American advisers in the provinces are voicing doubt about the willingness of Vietnamese officials to carry out the controversial program known as Operation Phoenix, whose purpose is to weed out Vietcong political leaders.

"In this province the Government will not allocate even a pencil, paperclip or piece of paper on a regular basis to the program," according to Russell L. Mcerdink, senior American adviser in Phuyen, on the central coast.

"It would seem that the problem is common," he said in a confidential report on pacification in Military Region II, a coastal and highland area north of Saigon.

"The low quality of personnel assigned to the program must also be considered something other than 'coincidental,'" he added.

Who Is Being Fooled?

He said it was the prerogative of the Government in Saigon to withhold support from the Phoenix Program, but, he added, "certainly the United States Government should not give the Government of South Vietnam the satisfaction of thinking it is 'fooling' the Americans."

The Phoenix Program, conceived by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1967, was turned over to the South Vietnamese in principle the following year. Americans have since pushed the program, providing advisers and funds as a primary means of seeking out the Vietcong.

Since South Vietnam has not given the program the emphasis some American officials feel it should have, they are considering a reorganization of it program and its basic concepts in the hopes of salvaging it.

Lack of interest in or distaste for the program is not limited to Vietnamese in Military Region II.

Lag Traced to Saigon

"There seems to be a decrease in the interest and emphasis in the program," wrote the senior American adviser in Quangnam Province, which is in the northernmost military region of South Vietnam. He traced the declining interest to Saigon, where the failure to

stress the program's importance has resulted in the removal of many Vietnamese once vitally involved in it. Men trained exclusively for the program are being removed without replacement, the report on Quangnam said.

The senior province official in Baclieu Province, on the southern coast, reported that the Phoenix program was effective against low-level Vietcong but "ineffective against the hard core" of the leadership.

Experimental Rewards

Last August, in an attempt to bolster the program, the United States and the South Vietnamese Government decided to begin experimental cash rewards in four provinces, paying up to the equivalent of \$11,000 for certain key leaders. It is doubtful that the rewards are effective.

Last May the senior American adviser in Binh Tuy Province, 75 miles west of Saigon, said the primary reason for the lack of success was "the inherent distaste" of people for inducing relatives, friends or people with political connections.

Quota for Each Province

Under the Phoenix operating plan, each province receives a quota of Vietcong to be "neutralized" each month, which can mean arresting a man, taking him into the Open Arms program, which accepts defectors, or killing him.

The quota system led to criticisms here and in Congressional hearings in Washington.

"Volume rather than quality neutralization" became the pattern, a senior adviser wrote. A senior adviser wrote, discussing the quotas. "Much of this can be attributed to U.S. guidance and influence and quotas," he added.

Testimony in Washington disclosed that American aid to the program from 1968 to May 1971, amounted to \$732-million. Current contributions have not been disclosed.

that the "current SALT talks may lead to dangerous technological and political imbalances which may leave us without the means to defend ourselves against Soviet attack."

Congressman Philip Crane (R-III), who took part in the colloquy, observed that America's leaders no longer tell us that our country is the world's most powerful. It isn't, of course. The U.S. has 1,054 intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union has 1,500 ICBM's.

Rep. Crane commented: "It is as if Americans awakened one morning to find that all of their confident assumptions about their country were no longer true, as if they discovered that not only could their country not fulfill its commitments to others, but could not even defend itself."

It is to be hoped that the U.S. public will heed these warnings. Happily, the special order arranged by Congressman Spence and his associates indicates a bipartisan rally in support of stronger defenses. But presidential leadership is needed if the anti-defense lobby is to be overcome. This presidential leadership has been lacking the last 2½ years.

President Nixon undoubtedly erred early in his term when he accepted the strategic doctrine of nuclear "sufficiency" proposed by his chief foreign policy adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger. In the years after World War II, the U.S. sought military supremacy. This supremacy deterred Soviet nuclear aggression. Now, our supremacy in arms is gone. The USSR is moving ahead in every type of weapons system. The Kissinger doctrine of "sufficiency" is proving to be our undoing. More and more, it is clear that Mr. Nixon has received bad advice from Dr. Kissinger—advice dangerous to the American people. It is imperative that Mr. Nixon disengage with Dr. Kissinger and start listening to concerned members of Congress and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the real experts who are the President's authentic military advisers according to the law of the land.

In the meantime, the American people can be thankful that there is a substantial number of congressmen who take seriously their responsibility to alert the nation regarding the deteriorated condition of the country's defenses.

PHOENIX PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

HON. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, September 15, 1971

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, during the recent debate and passage of the foreign assistance bill, one of the questions of the so-called Phoenix program in South Vietnam was discussed. Several allegations were confusing if not inaccurate.

I have recently received a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. G. Warren Nutter, which I believe very adequately sets the record and the facts straight on this matter and I would like to take this opportunity to read his letter into the Record.

But before I do that, I would like to note that as the chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee I am personally aware of the program and have also discussed it on numerous occasions with Ambassador Bill Colby who, until recently, was in charge of Phoenix.

Phoenix operates on the district and province level in South Vietnam with U.S. support and is designed to gather, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence on the identity and movements of members of the Vietcong, the so-called Vietcong infrastructure. These are nonmilitary figures who govern parts of Vietnam still controlled by their movement and who slip in and out of Government controlled and contested areas. And I want to stress, Mr. Speaker, that this information and intelligence data is used to neutralize this Vietcong effectiveness not for "assassination and torture" as was alleged here on the floor in support of an amendment whose aim was to withdraw U.S. support from this program. The letter received from Mr. Nutter which I believe sets this matter straight stated:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., August 21, 1971.

HON. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Record of August 3, 1971 (page H7761-2) reports an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act offered by Mr. Reid of New York, which was defeated by voice vote. This amendment would have barred any assistance under the Act to any nation for programs which encompass the assassination or torture of persons, or which violate the standards set forth in the Geneva Conventions. In his remarks submitting the amendment (copy attached), Mr. Reid made reference to the Phoenix Program of the Government of Vietnam, which is supported by the United States.

Ambassador William F. Colby, cited by Mr. Reid, has suggested that clarification would be appropriate of certain aspects of the Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Program in reference to Mr. Reid's remarks and the testimony received by the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Government Operations subsequent to Ambassador Colby's appearance there on July 19, 1971.

As described in some detail in Ambassador Colby's testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1970, the Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Program of the Vietnamese Government was effectively begun in July 1963, as the result of a Vietnamese Presidential directive. United States support of this program has been principally advisory in nature, directed at improving the intelligence methods, the apprehension techniques, the legal procedures and the detention arrangements involved in the struggle of the Vietnamese against the Viet Cong infrastructure, or clandestine, subversive and terrorist apparatus. As testified by Ambassador Colby, unjustified abuse occurred in this struggle in the past, and could occur at present, but the Phoenix Program does not encompass or condone unjustifiable abuses in any way, and in fact is designed to eliminate them. United States policy in this regard was set out in MACV Directive 525-36 of 18 May 1970 (copy attached) which formalized an earlier memorandum of 15 October 1969 cited in Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings February 1970, page 725. The Vietnamese Government in its Community Defense and Local Development Plan for 1971 includes the following provision in its Annex I covering the Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Program:

"In order to gain the confidence of the people and their support for the Government's program to neutralize the VCI, all personnel working with Phung Hoang must closely adhere to the policy of treating the population and the VCI detainees with a sense of high respect for the law and not abuse their authority in their performance

of duty. Consequently, Phung Hoang committees of all echelons must concentrate on the following points in 1971:

a. Cooperation and coordination with village, hamlet, ward, and quarter officials when performing missions in their areas, to include notification of these officials regarding the disposition of any people arrested.

b. Screening should be performed quickly, humanely, and fairly with emphasis on immediate release of innocent people without causing them undue trouble and annoyance.

c. Perfection of target dossiers. Arrests are to be made only when sufficient evidence and accurate information is available.

d. Province and City Security Committees must meet at least once a week (or more often depending on requirements) to consider detainee cases and sentence the VCI as appropriate.

e. Notification of detainee disposition must be made to the appropriate government echelons and agencies to ensure effective monitoring."

As indicated in the Department of State's opinion, filed with the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in response to its request of Ambassador Colby on July 19, 1971, the Phoenix Program is not violative of the Terms of the Geneva Conventions. Although certain aspects give concern in their field of due process, the Vietnamese and American Governments, working together, have brought about a number of improvements in its procedures and are cooperating in the formulation and application of additional measures to bring greater effectiveness to the struggle against the Viet Cong infrastructure and to ensure that the program meets high standards of justice. Reports of unjustified abuses precluding the implementation of the Phoenix Program or involving US or Vietnamese military intelligence or combat operations should not be mistakenly ascribed to the Phoenix Program of the Vietnamese Government nor to US support thereof.

In summary, the struggle between the Viet Cong infrastructure and the Vietnamese Government is an integral part of the overall struggle against the Viet Cong. The Phoenix Program has brought about improvements in the effectiveness and propriety of the Vietnamese Government's conduct of this struggle. United States support of this program is conducted under the same restraints as support of other Vietnamese military and civil programs.

Sincerely,

G. WARREN NUTTER,
ASD-ISA.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. REID OF NEW YORK

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:


"Amendment offered by Mr. Reid of New York: Page 12, line 13, strike out the quotation marks and the period immediately following such quotation marks.

"Page 13, after line 13, insert:

"(x) No assistance shall be furnished under this Act to any nation for programs which encompass the assassination or torture of persons, or which violate the standards set forth in the Geneva Convention."

Mr. REID of New York. This amendment is simple, I believe. It is directed to insuring that there are no programs through which the United States provides funds to any nation which encompasses as a program, the assassination or torture, or programs which violate the standards set forth in the Geneva Conventions.

More explicitly, my amendment would require that no U.S. funds would be furnished to programs which are characterized by a pattern of assassination or torture or other violations of the Geneva Conventions, to



Editorials

Murders by interrogation.

A recent United Press International photo (See Page 1) shows Cambodian soldiers checking the identification of Vietnamese residents of the village of Kbal Kralong, 34 miles north of Pnom Penh. The photo caption says that "all 53 villagers, including seven women and five children, were arrested as 'Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers.'" These 53 remained in Cambodia last year after most Vietnamese had fled to South Vietnam during the U.S.-Saigon invasion.

Testimony taken at a hearing before a House Operations subcommittee Monday, at about the same time that the "Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers" were being interrogated in Cambodia makes one wonder.

How many of the 53 remained alive after their credentials were checked? How many of the seven women? How many of the five children? How about the two- or three-year old tot, at the right front of the photo? Is it still alive?

At the House subcommittee hearing, K. Barton Osborn, private first class in Vietnam in 1957 and 1958, said that none of the Vietnamese he had seen detained for questioning had ever lived through the interrogations.

Michael J. Uhl, former first lieutenant in the American Division, testified that most suspects were captured during sweeping tactical operations and that all persons caught were classified as "Viet Cong."

This slaughter program has not ended. The new assassination rates introduced by the CIA's Phoenix organization in South Vietnam are for 1971 murders.

Since the Pentagon is paying for the identification check of Vietnamese in Cambodia, is there really any reason to believe that the purposes are not the same as in South Vietnam, or that the results are, by and large, any different?

President Nixon must be compelled to order the Pentagon to stop these murders. This slaughter program lends a new weight and urgency to the peace demonstrations on Hiroshima Day this weekend and the upcoming October Moratorium -- to the fight to set the date for prompt withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina.

3 AUG 1971

STATINTL

USED CIA EXPENSE FUNDS**Ex-Army Spy Tells of
Viet Draft Bribing**

BY THOMAS J. FOLEY

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—A former undercover Army intelligence agent told lawmakers Monday that he used an unlimited CIA expense account to bribe a Saigon draft board and keep an invaluable South Vietnamese youth acting as an interpreter in his spy ring.

The testimony by K. Barton Osborn, 26, described his 13 months in Da Nang, supposedly as a civilian assigned to help in the Vietnam pacification program but actually setting up a spy ring.

From the expense funds—with no accounting necessary—Osborn said he was able to retain his South Vietnamese interpreter who was about to be drafted. Osborn said the youth gave the money to the draft review board in Saigon and stayed out of the army.

The agent, at the time a private first class trained

at Ft. Holabird, Md., testified before the House government operations subcommittee, which is studying U.S. aid programs in South Vietnam.

Osborn, now a graduate student at American University in Washington, D.C., repeated testimony he had given before anti-war groups about witnessing torture and assassination of Viet Cong suspects by U.S. soldiers.

In appearing under oath before the House group, Osborn and Michael J. Uhl, another former intelligence agent, became the first Vietnam veterans to testify before a congressional committee about atrocities they themselves had witnessed.

They told how they had seen U.S. military personnel push suspected Viet Cong out of helicopters to intimidate other prisoners and get them to talk.

They also said that members of an interrogation group at the Da Nang Marine base accidentally killed one prisoner when,

trying to force him to talk, they went too far and punctured his eardrum and brain with a pointed piece of wood.

Osborn testified that his interpreter, a Chinese woman, was shot through the neck by a U.S. Army captain, whom he did not identify, as she was on her way to lunch. He said he believed the captain shot the woman because of his "complete disdain" for Orientals.

"When I asked him why he did it, he said the woman was only a slope anyway and that it didn't matter," Osborn testified.

Viet Cong suspects, Osborn said, were turned over to groups called "provisional reconnaissance units," which were primarily Vietnamese personnel with U.S. advisers. They were part of the Phoenix program which was designed to root out the Viet Cong infrastructure and which Osborn characterized as a "sterile depersonalized murder program."

He said suspects often were turned over to the units for interrogation without investigation or verification of charges. Once in the interrogation process, Osborn testified, "They all die." He said he never saw a suspect who ever lived.

For the first time, Os-

born revealed details of the training and operations of Army intelligence.

He said he operated a 50-man spy ring out of a counter-insurgency unit in the Marine Corps base outside Da Nang. He said the marines never knew he was an Army private first class and that it took him six weeks to win their confidence so they would use information he gave them of Viet Cong activities in the I Corps area.

Osborn said he was paid once a month by an administrative captain who passed the money under the table during lunch at the Navy officers' club in Da Nang.

But, he said, he had an unlimited expense account from the CIA to set up the spy ring for ferreting out Viet Cong suspects in the I Corps area.

3 AUG 1971

STATINTL

PHOENIX PROGRAM DETAILS

'Sterile, Depersonalized Murder' Plan

By MARY McGRORY
 Star Staff Writer

In 1968, when he was 21, K. Barton Osborn, a reddish-haired young man with long sideburns and a quick mind, was a big operator, James Bond style, in DaNang, South Vietnam.

He was only a PFC, but 50 Vietnamese agents were in his network, and he had no superior officers to report to, and nobody questioned him. He used a cover name and had four separate sets of papers identifying him as a civilian with the Department of the Army, a GS-9 with AID, an infantry lieutenant and a sergeant, B-5.

He got his pay from an Army captain, wearing civilian clothes who passed it to him under the table at a Navy Officers Club.

He had been trained at intelligence school in "illegal but condoned" methods of under-cover work at Fort Holabird, and he never heard of the Geneva Convention and the treatment of civilians which he still confuses with the Geneva Accords, which in 1954 were supposed to end the Vietnam war.

His agents fingered villages and villagers for extinction, the former by B-52 strikes and artillery fire, the latter by death, often after torture.

A major at the C.I.A. operation headquarters in DaNang provided him with unlimited funds for "incentive gifts" to his agents—cigarettes, whiskey, and for his principal agent—whom he was subsequently instructed to eliminate with extreme prejudice (he refused)—a motorcycle.

The major at the C.I.A. was the coordinator for the Phoenix program, a grisly operation which the House subcommittee on Foreign Government Operations is desperately trying to uncover and stop.

According to Ambassador William J. Colby, until recently in charge of the parent program, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, run jointly by the U.S. and South Vietnam, the purpose of the exercise is "to provide permanent protection to the villagers.

Permanent protection of a sort has been conferred on 20,578 Vietnamese. At least it is permanent. 20,578 have been killed under the program. This year, through May, the State Department admitted reluctantly, 3,650 have died. One is reminded of the official report of Mylai—in which it was recounted that the "civilians had been assisted to safety."

Osborn, who is now a student at American University, says that Phoenix is nothing but "a sterile, depersonalized murder program."

Abuses Admitted

Colby, testifying before the committee on July 19, cautiously conceded "unjustifiable abuses," since corrected by the two governments. Osborn and a fellow rebuttal witness, former 1st Lt. Michael J. Uhl, say the program has been "intensified" under Vietnamization.

Colby was categorical about one thing: Americans play only a supporting minor role in the bloody business. They help with the "collection of information against V.C. suspects, with the filling out of dossiers, and "working but techniques" for the handling of them.

"The American," Colby said emphatically, "would not be the man who reached out and grabbed the fellow."

But the Americans, according to Osborn, gave the orders and not only grabbed the fellow, but pulled the trigger.

A Marine first lieutenant gave the order to push a Vietnamese detainee, beaten and bound, out the door of a helicopter flying over DaNang. This was what was called "an airborne interrogation."

"This happened, not once, as an aberration," Osborn said, "but twice."

He watched a Vietnamese woman starved to death in a cage at a Marine interrogation center. When he inquired about her, he was told "she had died of malnutrition."

"They Were Embarrassed"
 He saw a prisoner who had a fever driven into his car — they hit the brain too soon

and killed him. "They were embarrassed," he said.

Osborn's Chinese interpreter, a woman, was shot, casually, in the back of the neck by an Army captain, who yearned to be an agent handler, and thought the woman was "dangerous." The incident was not reported. "She was only a slope," the captain said afterwards.

As for the process of detention, interrogation, trial and disposition described in detail by Ambassador Colby, neither Osborn nor Uhl had ever seen it happen.

"I never knew of a detainee to leave the interrogation center," said Osborn. "The majority were tortured to death."

He never tried to tell a superior officer. He knew they didn't want to know of the atrocities occurring in the field.

Congress hasn't wanted to know either. Uhl and Osborn told their stories to an ill-attended meeting called by the Commission for the Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes last winter. They told them again to Rep. Ron Dellums "informal" hearings on atrocities right after the Vietnam Veterans Against the War held their encampment.

The hearings before Rep. William E. Moorhead's subcommittee were the first legitimate forum granted them. If Moorhead and the other indignant doves — among them Ogden Reid, R-N.Y., and Paul J. McCloskey, R-Calif. — try to go higher and call the commanding officers, they will run into jurisdictional problems with the House Armed Services Committee. If they call AID and State Department officials they will be told that they knew nothing of such abuses and that besides, atrocity is not the "official policy" of the U.S. — in sharp distinction to "the other side." Reid says that it's hard to tell the difference, really, between their terror and ours.

U.S. Defense Department to pay?Big rewards offered
for Viet Cong 'bosses'

By Daniel Southerland

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Saigon

The Saigon government's failure to capture many high-level members of the Viet Cong political underground is one of the main reasons for a new high-rewards system being set up here.

Rewards systems have existed here in the past, but none has matched this one. The payoff could now go as high as the piaster equivalent of nearly \$11,000 for information leading to the capture of a given high-ranking member of the Viet Cong "infrastructure."

The new rewards project will be part of the Saigon government's Phung Hoang, or "Phoenix," program which is aimed at destroying the Viet Cong political and administrative apparatus. The controversial Phoenix program has strong U.S. backing, and it is understood that funds for the new "high-value rewards" program are to come from the U.S. Department of Defense.

The new program is expected to start within the next few weeks, with pilot projects in one province in each of South Vietnam's four military regions. If successful on this basis, it will be expanded nationwide to all 44 provinces.

'Phantom government'

Lists of the "most wanted" members of the Viet Cong "phantom government" in the four selected provinces have already been drawn up for approval by Saigon. Only 10 high-ranking Viet Cong political cadre are to be "targeted" in each province.

The rewards have to be high, officials say, because a person who gives information leading to the arrest of a high-level Viet Cong cadre might be forced to leave his home and reestablish himself and his family at another location because of possible reprisals from the Viet Cong. The rewards will range from one million to three million piasters (\$3,636 to \$10,909).

Phoenix operations have been a disappointment to many officials and military men because they have failed thus far to result in the capture of anything more than a very small percentage of the highest-level members of the Viet Cong political underground.

But officials here resent the charge which has been leveled by several U.S. congressmen that Phoenix is an "assassination program" directed at civilians. They say that most members of the Viet Cong "infrastructure," such as administrative cadre or tax collectors, while classified as civilians because of their functions, usually carry weapons. But the officials say that such persons are much more valuable to the government if they are captured, not killed.

Bounties to increase

Under the new rewards system, bounties paid to military or police units for the capture of an individual are to be increased, and the amount to be paid for the capture of a man is to be twice that paid for a "kill."

"When they target a man, they always try to capture him because of the information he might have," said one official.

Ambassador William E. Colby, former head of the U.S. side of the "pacification" program in South Vietnam, recently told a congressional subcommittee that 66,932 persons had been counted as killed, captured, or defecting to the Saigon government in Phoenix operations from 1968 to May of this year. The figure includes 20,587 listed as killed.

But Mr. Colby maintained that assassination is not an aim of the program.

"In the course of normal military operations or police actions to apprehend them, however, members of the infrastructure have been killed as members of military units or while fighting off arrests," Mr. Colby said.

According to a news report from Washington, a still-classified General Accounting Office report says that \$80 million in U.S. funds have been devoted to the Phoenix program in the past three years, mostly from the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Several hundred American military personnel are engaged as advisers to the program, but the number is decreasing.

VIETNAMIZATION: THE REALITY AND THE MYTH

The consequences for South Vietnam of a precipitous U.S. withdrawal would be catastrophic. That's why we're leaving this place gradually.

—A U.S. general in Saigon

Despite such assurances, the U.S. is getting out of South Vietnam the same way it got in—without excessive thought for the consequences. But by now, with the Vietnamization program more than two years old, the consequences are becoming visible. Out in the boon docks, the few remaining U.S. combat units huddle in the security of their outposts, only occasionally staging cautious “search and evade” forays into the jungle. And in Saigon, the U.S. command proudly reports ever lower American casualties. (Last week, eleven GI's died in combat, the lowest weekly toll in nearly six years.) But of all the symptoms stemming from the U.S. pullout, none is more telling than the new mood that now pervades the U.S. mission in Saigon. Suddenly, even the most convinced optimists are talking about the threat of serious military “slippage.”

And with good reason. As the U.S. has cut its troop level by more than half (down to about 230,000 soldiers), the enemy has increased his by a third. As a result, at least eight of South Vietnam's 44 provinces reportedly face an immediate threat of heavy Communist attack (map). And nagging doubts still remain as to the quality of ARVN leadership. “As usual, we've been guilty of self-delusion,” said one U.S. Embassy official in Saigon. “Vietnamization was the theme upon which we were going to slide out of this mess. And nobody wants to recognize the fact that Vietnamization does

not reflect the reality on the ground.”

That reality is not very encouraging. With some exceptions, there has been a gradual deterioration of security throughout South Vietnam's four military regions. In MR-I, which comprises the country's five northernmost provinces, some 55,000 North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong guerrillas now prowl almost at will. Recently, Communist troops have been constructing at least one new supply road deep into Quang Tri Province along the Demilitarized Zone. And as the Communists have stepped up their activity, U.S. withdrawals have proceeded apace. Just last week, the last U.S. combat unit was pulled out of Quang Tri. To fill the gap, the ARVN command was forced to rush in 30,000 reinforcements. “Whatever it takes to secure that area,” said one U.S. official, “the ARVN will have to provide it themselves. It's a straight shot from there to Hue or Da Nang. If the ARVN can't hold the North Vietnamese off, then we're going to have a brand-new DMZ.”

Friendly: The situation is not much better in the central highlands of MR-II. There, the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade is on its way out, as is a Korean division that has guarded the approach to the coastal plain. Left behind, however, are several North Vietnamese divisions and a population remarkably friendly to the Communists. In Binh Dinh Province alone, estimates put Viet Cong sympathizers at more than 300,000—nearly one-third its population. And throughout the region, Communist cadres have made it increasingly difficult for Saigon to recruit village and hamlet officials.

In an effort to stem this tide, Washington recently dispatched John Paul Vann,


a former Army colonel who is credited with “saving” the Mekong Delta from Communist domination, to head the pacification program in MR-II. Yet even Vann admits: “Here, we don't have pacification. We have military occupation of the countryside.”

Link: In fact, it is only in the Mekong Delta and in areas near Saigon that U.S. officials find cause for optimism. But even in those relatively pacified regions, isolated Communist strongholds remain—a fact that could spell trouble in the future. It is no secret that the U.S.-sponsored Phoenix Program (which is aimed at uprooting the Viet Cong underground and which has recently come under fire in Congress for practicing selective political assassination) has been less than a success. And some experts believe that if the guerrilla bands currently holed up in the delta's U Minh Forest ever manage to link up with local Communist sympathizers, the security picture there could suddenly get drastically worse.

That still seems a distant possibility—but a possibility nonetheless. At present, what worries military planners more than almost anything else is the fact that, even when the ARVN has superiority on the ground, it still waits for American air cover before it attacks. That cautious approach has worked up to now, but as U.S. helicopters and fighter-bombers are withdrawn along with American ground troops, the South Vietnamese will have to fight by a brand-new set of rules. And in the view of many observers, the ARVN—which was trained as a conventional, U.S.-style army—may not be able to make the change at this late stage of the war. Even Gen. Creighton Abrams has appeared to join the ranks of the skeptics. Two months ago, after the South Vietnamese only narrowly managed to avert disaster by retreating, under heavy U.S. air cover, from the Cambodian town of Snoul, Abrams snapped: “Dammit, they've got to learn they can't do it all with air. They've got to do it on the ground with infantry. If they don't, it's all been in vain.”

Desertions: Compounding Saigon's problem is the fact that the U.S. pullout has set in motion other painful changes in tactics. To fill the vacuum left by U.S. ground units, the South Vietnamese have had to shuttle troops from pacified areas to trouble spots. And that has not proved easy. Remarked one observer: “Consider the problems involved in moving the ARVN Ninth Division from the delta to the DMZ. First, the very idea of serving in such a dangerous area is not going to appeal to the troops. There should be a few desertions because of that. Besides, most Ninth Division soldiers were recruited from the delta. They have farms and families there and work their crops. A





Fenza & Berkovitz

A deteriorating picture

few more desertions. On top of that, many officers are going to have to give up lucrative--and often shady--local businesses they've worked hard to build. More desertions. It will be a wonder if enough troops ever get to the north to actually fight the enemy."

Both South Vietnamese and American military men are aware of all these problems, and many of them still persist in the belief that the ARVN will be able to go it alone. In addition, some take comfort in the thought that, at least until the 1972 election is imminent, the U.S. will leave in Vietnam enough of a residual force--perhaps as many as 70,000 men--so that it will be able to help the ARVN out if it gets in deep trouble. But even if so large a U.S. force does remain, its potential usefulness is debatable. "We're not doing anything worthwhile with the troops we have here now," scoffed one U.S. officer. "How in hell can we help with a much smaller force?"

Many experienced military men, in fact, believe that the U.S. residual force may only aggravate Saigon's security problems. Says John Paul Vann: "When a major U.S. unit gets out of an area, there is a greatly reduced level of activity by both friendly and enemy units." And former Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway pointed out in the current issue of the quarterly *Foreign Affairs*: "So long as we retain a residual force [in South Vietnam] ... our men will be mortared, shelled or otherwise attacked. And so long as they are attacked they will counterattack with fire and movement--and the war will drag on, not end."

Vietnam:

This 'Phoenix' Is a Bird Of Death

SAIGON--When a top American pacification official heard that Gen. Duong Van "Big" Minh had charged his political rival, President Nguyen Van Thieu, with using the Phoenix counter-insurgency program to suppress political opposition, he laughed. "If that's what Big Minh thinks," the American said derisively, "he doesn't know the Phoenix program, because it isn't good enough to do that."

That is only partly true. The Phoenix program may not be good enough to carry out its mission of rooting out the communist underground in South Vietnam, but it does have powers that William E. Colby, the former chief of the American pacification effort in Saigon, was called upon to defend last week at a hearing before the House Foreign Operations subcommittee in Washington.

Operation Phoenix (in Vietnamese, Phuong Hoang, the mythical bird that brings tidings of peace) was founded by the Central Intelligence Agency in late 1967, when it was decided that killing enemy troops would not win the war so long as the Vietcong political organization, or infrastructure, remained intact.

Basically, the program is designed to identify specific members of the infrastructure and either persuade them to defect to the Government or capture them for trial and imprisonment. And if they resist the special police and troops used for Operation Phoenix, Mr. Colby explained, they can be—and often are—killed.

So far, more than 20,000 people have been killed under the Phoenix program, including at least 1,600 so far this year. Publicly, these have all been Vietcong, who were specifically "targeted" for capture and who resisted; in many cases, American officials admit privately,

"They just put a name on a dead body and call it one V.C. neutralized."

For example, the classified Phoenix catalogue of Vietcong agents killed lists an inordinate number of "nurses." One pacification aide in the Mekong Delta region explained bitterly that this was a convenient way for province officials to account for the women killed in raids on suspected Vietcong hideouts.

This problem is made worse, many Americans feel, by the quota system for "Vietcong neutralizations" that is imposed on the Phoenix program. In 1970, the target was 1,800 "eliminations" a month, or 21,600 for the year. The Phoenix operatives made the quota with a respectable margin: 22,341 killed, captured or "rallied" in 1970. "The Vietnamese will match any quota you give them," an American official said when he looked at these figures.

Who are these statistics? So far as the dead are concerned, it is impossible to know for sure. They are supposed to be the enemy tax collectors, the political cadre and propaganda teams, the spies and the communications agents who make up the enemy underground.

The Americans acknowledge that, inevitably, some of the dead were also in no way connected with the Vietcong, but were merely the personal enemies of a province chief or some other influential official. Others, like many of the "nurses," were probably wives or children caught in the crossfire. Such deaths are part of the "unjustifiable abuses" that Mr. Colby acknowledged in his testimony.

Among the Vietnamese, the principal criticism of the Phoenix program is coming from those opposition members of the National Assembly's lower house who will run for re-election late next month. Like General Minh, their objections are not based on the killings so much as on the program's ability to jail any person without evidence or without his being charged—and then to imprison that person for up to two years without a trial.

The power to do this rests, with a province's Security Council, composed of the province chief, his deputy for security, the province's top police officers and other ranking officials, all appointed by the province chief. The C.I.A., which operates in

Vietnam under the sobriquet of Office of the Special Assistant (O.S.A.), turned the main responsibility for Operation Phoenix over to the South Vietnamese early in 1968, once the basic organization had been complete.

But each province has two O.S.A. officers to advise the provincial Phoenix program, to arrange special air transportation and, like everything else in Vietnam, to pay for the special mercenary troops, called P.R.U. (Provincial Reconnaissance Units), who carry out most of the Phoenix raids.

The Vietnamese side of Operation Phoenix is run by the secret police, called the Police Special Branch, which is entirely distinct from the regular national police.

The provincial P.S.B. Phoenix branch runs special Phoenix interrogation and operations centers in each district, which usually have a young American Army lieutenant as an adviser. This permits the C.I.A. to say that it has no agents below the province level, but the district advisers push the total American involvement in the program to more than 300 agents, officers and advisers.

From the district headquarters, a kind of floating Vietnamese informant and agent net spreads out into the villages and hamlets. Not surprisingly, the P.S.B. refuses to say how many Vietnamese work for the Phoenix program.

At high-level United States insistence, an "inventory" of all those imprisoned under the Phoenix program is being conducted. American officials contend they do not know how many such prisoners there are, for they are scattered in jails and interrogation centers all over the country. The purpose of the inventory, they say, is to weed out the real Vietcong suspects from those who were framed or otherwise imprisoned unnecessarily.

Like the official who scoffed at General Minh's charge, few Americans believe that the Phoenix program is very effective. Under it, nearly 60,000 persons have been killed, captured or have defected, but the United States Embassy's continuing studies show that the enemy's political organization is intact in most of the country.

U.S. Aide Defends Pacification Program In Vietnam Despite Killings of Civilians

By NEELY DELANEY Jr.
Special to The New York Times


WASHINGTON, July 19—The former head of the American South Vietnam acknowledged today that the agency's anti-subversion program had resulted in "occasional" political assassinations and the killing of civilians suspected of being Vietcong agents.

But the official, William E. Colby, told the House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee that the benefits derived from the program—Operation Phoenix—In uprooting Vietcong intelligence apparatus "more than overcome these occasional abuses."

In prepared testimony, Mr. Colby gave the number of people killed under Operation Phoenix since 1968 at 20,587, of whom 3,560 were killed from January through May this year. For earlier periods the number of deaths were put at 2,589 for 1968, at 6,137 in 1969 and at 8,191 last year.

Two Republican Representatives, Ogden R. Reid of Westchester and Paul N. McCloskey of California, charged that Operation Phoenix had been responsible for "indiscriminate killings" of civilians and the imprisonment of thousands of others in violation of the Geneva Convention.

Mr. Reid contended that "it is far from an ideal program even in a war situation." He said that "no court anywhere would uphold the practice of imprisoning a civilian—Vietcong or otherwise—without a trial, denying him right to counsel and without acquainting him with the nature of the charges against him."



The New York Times
William E. Colby

Mr. Colby said the United States should continue its support of Operation Phoenix as "an essential part of the war effort" whose effectiveness had been proved in "neutralizing" the Vietcong underground.

'Not an Ideal Program'

"It is not an ideal program," Mr. Colby said, "but there are some other things that are not ideal that we are associated with in Vietnam. The Phoenix program is not a program of assassination. In the course of normal military operations of police actions to apprehend them, however, VCI [Vietcong infrastructure] are killed as members of military units or while fighting off arrest."

Asked by Mr. Reid whether "unjustifiable abuses," such as assassinations, had been brought to his personal attention, Mr. Colby replied affirmatively. He said that "in collaboration with the Vietnam authorities, we put a stop to this nonsense."

South Vietnam in 1967 and 1968 was in a "wild and unstable period and a lot of things were done that should not have been done," Mr. Colby said. "We have been trying to get it stopped with some measure of success," he declared.

A former senior official of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Colby resigned his post in March, 1968, to join the staff of the executive office of the President. He was promptly assigned to Saigon as deputy to Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, who was then head of the United States Military Assistance Command and director of the pacification and development program.

Formerly in Diplomatic Service

Mr. Colby served during World War II in the Office of Strategic Services. He was twice parachuted behind German lines—once in France to disrupt communications and later in Norway to blow up a vital railroad line. After the war he held United States Embassy posts in Stockholm, Rome and Saigon before joining the Central Intelligence Agency.

The main thrust of his argument today was that operation Phoenix was "entirely a South Vietnamese program" although originated by the Central Intelligence Agency and supported since its inception by United States military and a few

civilian personnel and backed by funds from the Defense Department, Agency for International Development and the C.I.A.

The United States role in Operation Phoenix, he said, is entirely advisory except for the use of military personnel in preparation of dossiers against suspected Vietcong agents and leaders and employment of troops to run them to ground. After capture, the prisoners are turned over to South Vietnamese authorities, he said.

When Mr. Reid and Mr. McCloskey pressed their complaints, Mr. Colby argued with quiet persistence that Operation Phoenix was "designed to protect the Vietnamese people from terrorism and political, paramilitary, economic and subversive pressure from the Communist clandestine organization Vietnam."

16 JUL 1971

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0160

House Unit Discloses Civilian Killings in U.S.-Backed Program

By FELIX DELANEY Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 15 — Previously classified information read into the record of a House Government Operations subcommittee today disclosed that 26,843 nonmilitary Vietcong insurgents and sympathizers were "neutralized" in 14 months through Operation Phoenix, a counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam financed by the United States.

The total number, it was said, was made up of 9,820 "killed," 7,751 "sentenced" to prisons and 9,272 "rallied" — the United States military term for being "induced to rally to the [Saigon] Government" after having been identified as serving the North Vietnamese intelligence apparatus.

Calendar Year Calculated

The figures, which were declassified and provided by the State Department to Representative Ogden R. Reid, Republican of Westchester, were recited during questioning of Robert H. Nooter, assistant administrator of the Agency for International Development.

The 14-month period, beginning January, 1970, was described in a State Department memorandum to Mr. Reid as "the 1970 pacification year."

Using the same set of figures, Mr. Reid calculated a "neutralization" figure for calendar 1970 of 22,341. He said that of this number, 8,109 were listed in the "killed" category.

How many of the total neutralization figure for calendar 1970 were listed in the "sentenced" and "rallied" categories was not shown in the State Department memorandum.

Mr. Reid did cite separate category figures for the first two months this year, however, and said that if they were projected on an annual basis they would show 27,011 Vietcong neutralized, including 9,774 "killed," 8,076 "sentenced," and 9,161 "rallied." The actual figures for January and February of this year were given as 1,629 "killed," 1,345 "sentenced" and 1,527 "rallied"—a total of 4,502.

The State Department memorandum mentioned that the program's goal last year was 1,800 per month to be "rend-

ered ineffective or neutralized," or 21,600 for the twelve months.

The memorandum said the neutralization goal for the year beginning last March "is down to 1,200 per month, of whom half or 600 should be in the sentenced category."

The South Vietnam Government's master plan of pacification, including the Phoenix program, uses the term "quotas" for neutralization rather than "goals." Its quotas for each of the four military regions add up to 14,400 neutralizations on a 12-month basis this year and stipulate that in each area one half of the quota is to be filled by those "sentenced."

The State Department memorandum was silent on Mr. Reid's contention that many if not most of the Vietcong listed in the "killed" category were actually victims of "planned murder" of civilians in violation of the Geneva convention.

Purpose of Program

The three-year-old Operation Phoenix, part of the Vietnam pacification program, was designed to combat the effect of underground Vietcong operations in South Vietnam.

A still-classified General Accounting Office report has placed at \$80-million the amount of United States funds devoted to the operation in the last three years, mostly from the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Representative Reid read the State Department figures into the record of the subcommittee hearing after failing to obtain responsive answers to questions put to Mr. Nooter.

"I am shocked and dismayed," Mr. Reid said, "that Gen. Creighton W. Abrams—presumably on instructions—has endorsed and called for the implementation by United Vietnamese plan embodying the elimination or neutralization by killing or capture of a quota of 14,400 members of the Vietcong infrastructure in 1971."

He continued: "Assassination and terror by the Vietcong or Hanoi should not, and must not, call forth the same methods by Saigon, let alone the United States, directly or indirectly."

"A great number of Vietcong," he said, "while insurgents, are nevertheless civilians, and thus specifically protected from assassination under the Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war."

"The Administration," the Congressman declared, "must totally disassociate itself from this Phoenix program and insist unequivocally that Saigon stop dead in its track this mechanism for civilian murder or stand criminally condemned before the world."

From other sources, Mr. Reid cited figures showing that United States military personnel engaged in Operation Phoenix in October, 1970, totaled 441—156 lieutenants and the rest majors or higher-ranking officers. Such personnel do not actually apprehend Vietcong or shoot them while trying to escape, the sources explained, but only "identify or finger" the men.

The subcommittee has called for testimony Monday by William E. Colby, retiring deputy to General Abrams.

STATINTL

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M - 846,132
S - 1,407,549
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\$1.7-Billion of War Funds Unaccounted For in Audit

Congressional Agency Unable to Learn How Most of \$2.1-Billion Authorized for Pacification in 1970 Was Used

By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 9—The General Accounting Office, the Congressional watchdog agency, has reported that it is unable to determine how \$1.7-billion of \$2.1-billion authorized for the pacification program in South Vietnam was spent or committed during the three-year period ended July 30, 1970.

The office made its report in a 160-page survey entitled "Background Information on United States Participation in Pacification and Development Programs in Vietnam," sent to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and several Congressional committees on July 1.

The General Accounting Office auditors, who made their survey in Vietnam, said that the specific obligations of the pacification program that they were able to find accounted for only \$339.2-million of the total of \$2.1-billion authorized for the fiscal years 1968, 1969 and 1970.

And, they said, \$65.5-million of the \$339.2-million had been spent for purposes that they had not been able to determine, which was taken to mean that the money was spent for projects other than those for which it had originally been designated.

The United States agency responsible for the over-all pacification in Vietnam is called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. Its responsibilities include the care of refugees and other war victims. Operation Phoenix, which is designed to eliminate the Vietcong sub-

versive apparatus, also comes under the agency.

The funds for CORDS come principally from the Defense Department although the Central Intelligence Agency and the Agency for International Development contribute to them.

The accounting office survey said that the \$65.5-million of the \$339.2-million of the obligated money "was not used in CORDS and was subsequently used by the contributing agencies for other purposes."

It said it could "not determine" what these purposes were.

In fiscal language, obligations are the commitment or actual expenditure of authorized funds.

The survey has offered no conclusions as to the discrepancy between the funds authorized for CORDS and those actually obligated.

But in the section on "village self-help" programs, one of the CORDS operations, the document listed "misappropriation of funds" among the problems facing the agency. The report said, however, that from a political viewpoint the village program "has experienced a degree of success."

The survey said that "we have learned that internal audits and inspection had generally not been conducted" by CORDS.

It noted that while there are 12 "auditing groups within the executive branch for CORDS review," only two of them "had performed reviews" since the formation of CORDS in 1968.

"We also found that many of the responsible officials in the directorates were unaware of amounts obligated under their programs and in some instances did not know the amounts in their budgets," the survey said of the Saigon agency.

The survey added that "in the three fiscal years ending on June 30, 1970, CORDS received

"We obtained obligations about \$339.2-million," it reported.

But the accounting office said that "we were unable to obtain obligations for \$1.7-billion of the \$2.1-billion."

It reported that the Defense Department had contributed 86 per cent of this total. The Central Intelligence Agency provided 5 per cent and the Agency for International Development 9 per cent. The C. I. A., however, has refunded some of the

money spent by A. I. D. on its behalf on unspecified covert projects.

The accounting office said that the bulk of the CORDS authorization was budgeted for "hardware" and military and auxiliary equipment for South Vietnamese military organizations.

Under Operation Phoenix, CORDS is increasing the South Vietnamese national police from 100,000 to 120,000 men this year.

House of Representatives

WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1971

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.
Rev. James Clark Brown, the First
Congregational Church, San Francisco,
Calif., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray.

Let us remember the words of our Lord
Jesus Christ when He said: "Those unto
whom much has been given, of them will
much be required."

O God, mighty, merciful, mysterious,
before whose judgments nations and
individuals rise and fall, inspire the
leaders and people of this land that we
may more faithfully know and do Thy
holy will. O God, there is a hunger in our
land; a hunger for moral heroes; for
men and women whose passion is to bring
into being the kind of world where every
privilege and dignity which is enjoyed by
the few may be made available to be en-
joyed by all people. To that end, direct,
comfort, and guide Members of the Con-
gress.

"O Thou, whose Spirit first fashioned life,
Intending all creation Thy love to
share,

Use us, O God, to do Thy work
Until the earth be fair."

Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has ex-
amined the Journal of the last day's pro-
ceedings and announces to the House
his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands
approved.

There was no objection.

THE REVEREND JAMES CLARK BROWN, OUR CHAPLAIN FOR TODAY

(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was
given permission to address the House
for 1 minute, and to revise and extend
his remarks.)

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I am
proud today that our opening prayer has
been given by an Oklahoman whom I
have known for many years, a young man
who grew up in Okmulgee County in the
city of Henryetta, and who once served
here in the House of Representatives as
one of the staff rendering faithful service
to this country.

Today James Clark Brown is minister
of the First Congregational Church of
San Francisco, and carrying on there a
great ministry.

Many Washingtonians will remember
him as the pastor for a number of years
of the Cleveland Park Congregational
Church here in Washington, D.C. With
his wife, Verne, and their lovely children,
David Edmond and Edith Louise, he is
doing a great work in the State of Cali-
fornia.

Again I say I am proud and pleased
that that he could be with us today in a
place he has always loved, to lead the
House of Representatives in today's
devotions.

A SALUTE TO WADE LUCAS

(Mr. HENDERSON asked and was
given permission to address the House
for 1 minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)

Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Speaker,
scarcely a day goes by without our na-
tional news media publicizing a conflict
between Indians and civil authorities
over the title to Federal property, alleged
violations of legal or moral commitments
or other basic differences of opinion.

It is refreshing to know that on Satur-
day of this week, Mr. Wade Lucas, a con-
stituent of mine will be visiting Niagara
Falls, N.Y., as a guest of the Tuscarora
Indians. While there, he will be made an
honorary chief and, with the authority of
Gov. Robert Scott of North Carolina, will
sign a formal peace treaty with the Tus-
carora Indian Nation.

I might add that Wade Lucas, unlike
so many "Honorary Chiefs" we see at
campaign time, is not a politician run-
ning for office and seeking to court favor
with Indian voters. Instead, Wade is a
retired newspaperman with no aim or
purpose in mind other than to cement
a personal and official friendship with
these Indians which dates back to Mem-
orial Day more than 8 years ago when
he visited the Tonawanda Reservation in
an official capacity as public information
officer for the State of North Carolina
under the administration of Gov. Terry
Sanford.

The Tuscarora Indians of the Tona-
wanda Reservation are a lot like many
other Americans of all races and creeds
throughout our Nation. They respond
warmly to a genuine show of friendship
and interest. Wade Lucas' longtime per-
sonal friendship with them is the kind
of "people to people" relationship which
will solve our international differences
if they are ever to be solved.

INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATION INCREASING FEDERAL SHARE OF EMPLOYEES' HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his remarks
and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I am
pleased today to introduce a bill calling
for increasing the Government's share of
the Federal employees' health benefits
program.

Under the present cost-sharing system,
the Federal Government pays 40 percent
of the basic cost of the health insurance
of Federal employees.

This 40-percent figure was reached
only last year. The House of Representa-
tives had passed legislation calling for
increasing the Government share to 50
percent, but after considerable pressure
from the administration, including the
threat of a Presidential veto, House-
Senate conferees agreed to a reduced
figure.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the attitude
of the administration may have changed
in the course of the past year. On Febru-
ary 18 of this year, President Nixon called
for private employers to provide 65 per-
cent of the cost of basic health insur-
ance coverage for employees as of July 1,
1973, and 75 percent of the total cost
3 years later.

The President based this appeal on
the need to spread health insurance cov-
erage to more of the Nation's citizens.

Mr. Speaker, I fully agree with the
President on this matter.

Further, I believe it to be fully con-
sistent and proper for the Federal Gov-
ernment to lead the way for the private
sector in meeting the President's goal of
75 percent of the costs for employees'
medical insurance.

I hope that the Retirement, Insurance,
and Health Benefits Subcommittee,
which I chair, will hold hearings on this
important legislation in the very near
future, and I am hopeful of administra-
tion support for this proposal, which in-
corporates the President's own sugges-
tions.

DIRECTING THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO FURNISH TO THE HOUSE CERTAIN INFORMATION RESPECTING U.S. OPERATIONS IN LAOS

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I call up
House Resolution 492 and ask for its
immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as fol-
lows:

H. RES. 492

Resolved, That the Secretary of State, to
the extent not incompatible with the public
interest, is directed to furnish to the House
of Representatives, not later than fifteen
days following the adoption of this resolu-
tion, any documents containing policy in-
structions or guidelines given to the United
States Ambassador in Laos for the purpose
of his administration of those operations con-
trolled or directed by the country team in
Laos, between January 1, 1964, and June 21,
1971, particularly with regard to—

- (1) covert Central Intelligence Agency op-
erations in Laos;
- (2) Thai and other foreign armed forces
operations in Laos;

H 6377

in the future, it will be decided upon later through consultation by the liaison personnel of two sides."

¹¹ "A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of America," *People's Daily*, March 8, 1963.

¹² Speech made by Chiao Kuan-hua, Peiping's "vice minister" of foreign affairs, at a cocktail party hosted by the Yugoslav "embassy" in Peiping on November 27, 1970.

¹³ Mao Tse-tung, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," *Selected Works* (Foreign Language, Peking, 1961), Vol. IV, p. 415.

¹⁴ The 13 "theories" include those of "limited sovereignty," "socialist big family," "justified aggression," and "economic unity."

¹⁵ Speech by Yugoslav "ambassador" to Peiping at a cocktail party on November 27, 1970.

¹⁶ A dispatch filed by the Agence France Presse from Belgrade on January 5, 1971. Yugoslavia and Albania were locked in a feud over the question of Stalin. In 1958 the two sides exchanged charges d'affaires. Since the Czech incident in 1968 the relations between the two countries have gradually improved.

¹⁷ "Revolutionary Storm of the Polish People," *People's Daily*, December 22, 1970.

¹⁸ NCNA dispatch from Peiping on December 21, 1970.

¹⁹ "Welcome the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and Canada," editorial, *People's Daily*, October 14, 1970.

²⁰ Edgar Snow, a pro-Communist American journalist, and author of *Red Star Over China*, in a telegram sent from Peiping to Milan on February 3, 1971, mentioned some production figures which he said had been disclosed to him by Chou En-lai. For the last ten years, the Chinese Communists have not revealed any production figures. The figures revealed by Snow greatly exceed even the most optimistic estimates made by the free world.

²¹ According to an Agence France Presse dispatch from Peiping on October 25, 1970, an NCNA correspondent wrote a long article pointing out that the Japanese are not satisfied with their pre-war imperialist status. They are now trying to join the club of "superpowers" consisting of "U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism."

²² Mao Tse-tung, "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and Their Running Dogs," *Peking Review* (special issue, May 23, 1970), p. 9.

²³ This point was stressed by both Lin Biao and Chou En-lai in their speeches during the "National Day" celebrations on October 1, 1970. However, earlier on July 14, 1970 Chou in an interview with French correspondents already pointed out that the time when big countries can dominate the world had already passed and could never return.

²⁴ Speech by Ceylonese minister of trade at a reception on January 15, 1971, in honor of Pai Hsiang-kuo, Peiping's "minister" of foreign trade, who led a trade delegation to visit Ceylon.

²⁵ See the "Joint Communiqué Between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan," November 14, 1970.

²⁶ The Chinese Communists opposed the application of principle of "peaceful coexistence" to the relations between the "oppressed people and the oppressing people," between "the oppressed country and the oppressing country," and between "the oppressed class and the oppressing class." (See "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," *op. cit.*) Even while chanting the slogan of "peaceful coexistence," the Communists never forget to stress the necessity to oppose the "aggressive policy and war, policy of imperialism." Actually, this is a united front tactic against "imperialism."

²⁷ *Peking Review*, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²⁸ Two dispatches filed by NCNA from Tokyo on October 24, 1970.

²⁹ NCNA dispatch from Peiping, November 9, 1970, the Pakistan president arrived in mainland China on November 10 and stayed there until November 14.

³⁰ "All Anti-U.S. Imperialism Forces in the World Unite!" editorial, *People's Daily*, January 21, 1964.

³¹ An AP dispatch from London on December 9, 1970 disclosed that during the previous year at least five Soviet trade officials, three Polish foreign officials and several unidentified Communist delegates were ordered by the British government to leave Britain.

³² "What Does the Conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers Show?" *People's Daily*, February 2, 1971.

³³ See NCNA report from Peiping on February 2, 1971, concerning the coup in Uganda.

³⁴ A CNA dispatch from Hongkong on January 30, 1971 cited some figures from an article by Harvard economics professor concerning the economic situation on mainland during the past 10 years. He said that even the highest estimate would put development rate of Peiping's agricultural and industrial production from 1957 to 1967 at an yearly rate of only 3 to 3.5 per cent, while the economic growth of the most of other Asian countries has already reached the rate of 7 to 9 per cent.

³⁵ See note 25.

³⁶ See news reports and statements issued by Peiping following its nuclear tests as well as the editorial of the *People's Daily*, August 1, 1970.

³⁷ NCNA dispatch from Peiping on December 5, 1970. The diplomatic personnel were "ambassadors" from Mauritania and Mali and the charge d'affaires from Guinea.

³⁸ NCNA dispatch from Peiping on January 2, 1971.

³⁹ NCNA dispatch from Peiping, January 27, 1971.

fits of an end to our involvement in and over Indochina by December 31, 1971, conditional solely upon the safe return of our prisoners of war. Arguments favoring this view already have been made by a number of our colleagues, however, and accordingly, I would like to limit my testimony today to an issue which is equally important, the obligation of the House to be fully informed by the Executive Branch on the great issues of foreign affairs, and particularly the intervention by the United States in the affairs of foreign nations, either by covert CIA-operated action as in Laos or military intervention as in Viet Nam.

There is reasonable disagreement in the House over what our course of action in Southeast Asia should be. There should be no disagreement, however, on our need to know, and our right to know, all of the facts which may bear on our ultimate decision.

It is true that Congress is not suited to negotiation and day-to-day decision making in intelligence and military operations. We do hold, however, the sole constitutional power, and I might add, constitutional responsibility, for providing for the common defense, declaring war, funding the standing army, but for a period not to exceed two years; we in the House of Representatives who face our constituents every two years, not four or six, must initiate the revenue measures necessary to support the nation's expenditures for war and foreign operations of every kind.

All of these provisions were clearly intended by the framers of the Constitution to give Congress the controlling decisions in matters of war and peace. We make the laws; the President as Commander-in-Chief only executes those laws.

If Congress is to make wise decisions, however, we must be fully informed. We cannot authorize a war without complete information; we should not permit a war to continue without complete information.

The recent excerpts from the Pentagon documents published in the *New York Times* and other newspapers bring home to us most forcefully that we have not met our constitutional obligations to keep fully informed. Who amongst the Members of the House were aware, for example, that country team members in Viet Nam aided and encouraged the overthrow of Premier Diem in 1963?

Who amongst our Members knew the true facts of U.S. military and covert activity in and over Laos, and in the coastal waters of North Viet Nam prior to the Tonkin Gulf incidents of early August, 1964? Or that during October, 1964, prior to the re-election of President Johnson over Senator Goldwater, that

"Two of the teams (of U.S./South Vietnamese agents operating inside North Viet Nam) carried out successful actions during October. One demolished a bridge, the other ambushed a North Vietnamese patrol."

(This quote was taken from a State Department memo, dated November 7, 1964, for Assistant Secretary of State Bundy, and is noted at page H5107 of the Congressional Record of June 14, 1971).

If these facts had been known to the Congress, would it have affected subsequent votes on appropriations for Viet Nam, or the approval of escalation of the war implicit in the House appropriations process?

What would have been the House's reaction, for example, had we been fully informed in March, 1965, before U.S. troops were sent to Viet Nam, that our true goals in Viet Nam were those described by Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton in a memo to Secretary McNamara in March, 1965:

"70%—To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).

"20%—To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

CONGRESSMAN PAUL McCLOSKEY'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUB- COMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PA- CIFIC AFFAIRS

HON. DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR.

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1971

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, our colleague from California (Mr. McCloskey) testified before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. His testimony related to the need for Congress to be fully informed, and described a series of incidents where the executive branch over the years, had withheld information from the Congress or deliberately deceived the Congress. While reasonable minds may differ as to the course this Nation should now pursue with respect to terminating our involvement in Vietnam, I believe all of us can agree on the need for Congress to demand that it be fully informed on all aspects of the situation in Southeast Asia.

For this reason, I am inserting in the RECORD Mr. McCloskey's testimony in full:

STATEMENT OF PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR., BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JUNE 29, 1971

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I had hoped originally to testify before you today with respect to the Viet Nam Disengagement Act of 1971, urging the bene-

1 JUL 1970

Colby, U.S. Chief of Pacification for Vietnam, Gives Up Duties

and Returns Home

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, June 30—William E. Colby, the chief of the American pacification effort in South Vietnam, gave up his duties today and flew home to Washington because of the illness of a daughter.

Announcing the departure of one of the most important American officials in the country, the United States Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, said: "We are losing the services of a great public servant."

He added however, that Mr. Colby would be given a new assignment.

In one of the most crucial jobs in South Vietnam — some call it the "worst job in the country"—Mr. Colby has been always on the go, flying about the country to see for himself whether the efforts at security and development were working. In the more than three years he spent here, he traveled by motorcycle through the delta, by jeep in the jungles, by sampan on canals and by helicopter to every province.

Mr. Colby, who was given the personal rank of Ambassador by President Johnson, is the third ranking American official here, behind Mr. Bunker and Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the military commander. He directs the operation known as Civil Operations and Rural Support, or CORDS, and the key American program for advising the South Vietnamese on virtually all aspects of life in the countryside, from security to economic, social and political measures.

He had been expected to leave about the same time as Mr. Bunker—sometime after the South Vietnamese presidential elections in October. General Abrams may also depart before next spring.

'A Great Loss'

"Colby's departure will be a great loss," one of his aides said today. "He was the most inspiring officer of the Government in Vietnam. He inspired us to work harder because he himself never quit. He drove himself and never seemed weary.

"There is no one whose presence was more vital to the policy of trying to assist the Vietnamese to pick up the load for themselves."

George D. Jacobson, Ambassador Colby's deputy, named acting chief of the paci-



The New York Times

QUITS VIETNAM POST: William B. Colby, chief of American pacification effort, cited daughter's illness as cause for leaving.

fication program. Mr. Jacobson, a former army colonel, has served as assistant chief of staff for CORDS since December, 1968, when Mr. Colby was promoted from that job to direct the operation.

Soft-spoken and even-tempered, Mr. Colby established a highly-organized system. He received reports daily from his field teams, stressing that he wanted "problem reporting" as well as "progress reporting."

Changing Problems

The problems and the programs changed each year. After the Communist Tet offensive in 1968, the effort focused on restoring Government control and, in effect, reoccupying the country. Later the emphasis shifted to strengthening the territorial forces to free the regular South Vietnamese Army for border protection and other duties.

At the same time, Mr. Colby and the South Vietnamese worked closely in trying to develop an effective program, Phoenix, to root out the enemy's underground political apparatus. This effort, however, has been one of the major disappointments.

"We are holding our own on the Vietcong infrastructure," an

official said today. "But the other side is still better at improving and expanding it than

our side is at whittling it down. Even so, Mr. Colby tells

visitors that the pacification efforts have made it harder for the Vietcong to operate. The latest efforts, he says, have been directed toward developing a sense of participation among the South Vietnamese people and convincing them "that they can get a fair shake from Saigon."

Such efforts include elections for local councilors and Government grants for projects decided by the villagers themselves.

"The war cannot be won unless the people participate," Mr. Colby has said.

The programs have worked with varying degrees of success and failure and Mr. Colby has often remarked that he was neither an optimist nor a pessimist about the ultimate outcome.

The 51-year-old ambassador was an Army officer with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. He practiced law in New York City and then joined the National Labor Relations Board as an attorney.

He went to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1951 and served as "an attaché" in Stockholm and Rome before coming to Saigon for his first tour from 1959 to 1962, during which he rose to be chief of the Saigon station. He later worked in Washington as head of the Far East Division of the C.I.A.

1 JUL 1971 STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601F

The Series So Far: From Covert War Covert Warfare Sponsored by U.S. in '64 to Bombin

President Lyndon B. Johnson's Administration, amid his hesitation and reluctance to take final decisions, was sponsoring covert South Vietnamese warfare against North Vietnam starting in February, 1964, and drawing up plans that spring for overt war.

These activities—long before the Aug. 4, 1964, Tonkin Gulf destroyer incident that led to a Congressional vote authorizing "all necessary steps" to aid Southeast Asian countries—were described in the first installment.

The series was based on a Defense Department study, commissioned in 1967 by Secretary Robert S. McNamara to learn how American involvement in Southeast Asia developed. The study ranged from World War II until the start of peace talks in Paris in May, 1968.

There are gaps in the Pentagon study—the researchers lacked access to Presidential files—and in that part of it obtained by The Times—it lacks the chapter on diplomatic initiatives, some of which are continuing.

A Report by McNamara

The first of 13 documents published in the initial installment was a report on Dec. 21, 1963, by Secretary McNamara to President Johnson. This said "plans for covert action into North Vietnam were prepared as we had requested."

"They present," he went on, "a variety of sabotage and psychological operations against North Vietnam from which I believe we should aim to select those that provide maximum pressure with minimum risk."

The "covert military operations," drawn up by the Central Intelligence Agency station and the military command in Saigon, were begun Feb. 1, 1964, as Operation Plan 34A. President Johnson's hope was that they might eventually induce North Vietnam to halt the Vietcong and Pathet Lao insurrections.

Through 1964, they included flights over North Vietnam by U-2 spy planes, the kidnapping of North Vietnamese citizens for intelligence information, commando raids from the sea to blow up rail and highway bridges and the bombardment of coastal installations by PT boats.

Before The New York Times was restrained by Federal court order from continuing with its series on the Pentagon study of the Vietnam war, it had published the first three parts. They dealt with the first years of the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Here is a summary of those three articles and a recapitulation of some of the key documents published with them on June 13, 14 and 15:

'Hired Personnel' Used

They differed from relatively low-level and unsuccessful intelligence and sabotage efforts the C.I.A. had carried out earlier in North Vietnam. The 34A attacks were under the control of Gen. Paul D. Harkins, chief of the United States Military Assistance Command in Saigon, with raids performed by the South Vietnamese or their "hired personnel."

The covert war had a second major segment—air operations in Laos by 25 to 40 propeller-driven T-28 fighter-bombers. These bore Laotian Air Force markings, but were manned in part by pilots of Air America, a C.I.A.-controlled line and in part by Thai pilots under the control of Ambassador Leonard Unger.

Regular United States Air Force and Navy jet planes, code-named Yankee Team, gathered photographic intelligence for the T-28 bombing raids. The reconnaissance moved from high-altitude flights at the start of 1964 to low-altitude sorties in May; in June armed escort jets were added, bombing and strafing when the reconnaissance planes were fired on.

A third element in the covert military pressure was the patrolling by American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Code-named De Soto patrols, the ships collected intelligence on warning radars and coastal defenses.

In a memorandum on Jan. 22, 1964, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contended that "the United States must be prepared to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions" and to "undertake bolder actions," even to "commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam."

Difference of Opinion

The Johnson Administration was convinced from radio interceptions that North Vietnam was directing the Vietcong despite intelligence analyses that argued "the primary sources of Communist strength in South Vietnam are indigenous" arising from social and nationalist aims.

On March 16, 1964, describing a worsening situation, Secretary McNamara urged new plans up to "graduated overt military pressure," ready on 30 days' notice for strikes against North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese Air Force and an American air commando squadron, code-named Farmgate, that operated with South Vietnamese markings.

President Johnson approved the McNamara recommendations at a National Security Council meeting March 17, 1964. On March 20, President Johnson cabled Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon:

"...our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis at present, and immediate problem in this area is to develop the strongest military and political base for possible later action."

On April 17, the Joint Chiefs approved a so-called scenario, Operation Plan 37-64, including escalation steps against North Vietnam up to air attacks and mining of ports, initially by South Vietnamese but possibly using United States aircraft.

Military action was not to begin until after a joint Congressional resolution.

On May 4, South Vietnam's

head of government, Gen. Nguyen Khanh, told Ambassador Lodge he wanted the United States to start bombing and to send in 10,000 troops.

The Pentagon study reported that at a Honolulu meeting on June 1 and 2, 1964, Secretary McNamara said "it might be necessary as the action unfolded . . . to deploy as many as seven divisions" of American troops.

One effort to apportion American aims in South Vietnam was attributed to a memorandum by John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, as follows:

"70 pct.—To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).

"20 pct.—To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

"10 pct.—To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life."

One move at United States request had J. Blair Seaborn, Canadian member of the International Control Commission, pass on a warning June 18 to North Vietnam's Premier, Pham Van Dong, that escalating the warfare could bring "the greatest devastation" to North Vietnam.

Separate from the Defense Department study, which was prepared in 1967 and 1968, was a 1965 Defense Department command and control study of the Tonkin Gulf incident.

In a 34A operation, South Vietnamese naval commandos raided two North Vietnamese islands in the gulf at midnight July 30. On Aug. 2, a De Soto intelligence-gathering patrol by the destroyer Maddox wound up in a clash with North Vietnamese PT boats, which the study said apparently mistook the Maddox for a South Vietnamese escort vessel.

On Aug. 3, President Johnson ordered the destroyer C. Turner Joy to reinforce the Maddox in the gulf. That night, two clandestine 34A bombardments were staged by South Vietnamese PT boats.

On the night of Aug. 4, Tonkin Gulf time, the two American destroyers were attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats, according to the Pentagon account.

At a national Security Council meeting on the afternoon of Aug. 4, Washington time, President Johnson ordered American reprisal air strikes, chosen by the Joint Chiefs from a 94-target list drawn up at the end of the study. The study also asked the Congressional resolution of full military support for South Vietnam.

M - 213,964

MAY 14 1971

Phoenix program cited

McCloskey charges U.S. Viet violations

By Richard L. Strout
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R) of California charges that United States forces in Vietnam are systematically cooperating with South Vietnamese intelligence agencies in the so-called "Phoenix" (pacification) program which includes torture and assassination contrary to America's public professions under the Geneva conventions.

Mr. McCloskey, an ex-marine intends to running on an antiwar ticket against President Nixon, says he has written the latter five letters which have not been acknowledged. The latest specifically deals with his allegations of current, widespread atrocities in Vietnam.

The young first-term congressman traveled recently with Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D) of California to the war zones and comes back with specific photostated U.S. military documents which he charges contradict official declarations that U.S. bombings are not causing refugees to leave villages in war zones on a mass basis.

Mr. McCloskey's charges, which border on the sensational, obviously open up a new phase of his double effort, either to persuade President Nixon to accede to fixing a date for all-out U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, or, by organizing opposition in the Republican primaries, to nominate an antiwar candidate—himself.

Violations charged

Mr. McCloskey charges that the military and diplomatic officials who briefed him withheld pertinent facts or deliberately sought to deceive him and Representative Waldie. Also, that U.S. professions in a letter of Dec. 7, 1970, to the International Red Cross at Geneva by Ambassador Idar Rimestad, accepting as part of America's "residual responsibility" that of working with the Vietnam Government so as to safeguard civilian prisoners under Article 3 of the Geneva convention, are being systematically violated.

Mr. McCloskey's charges were previously put in the Congressional Record, April 22, by Mr. Waldie showing an elaborate

structure under Phoenix (native name, "Phung Hoang") to suppress subversion in so-called pacified areas. The rationale of the program as explained in Army manuals is that the Communist Viet Cong infrastructure is an "inherent part of the war effort" and hence illegal. The instruction manual issued to guide Army personnel says at one point (May 18, 1970):

"Thus they [U.S. troops] are specifically unauthorized to engage in assassinations. . . ."

At another point the instructions say that military personnel who find the type of police activities "repugnant" can be reassigned without prejudice.

Messrs. McCloskey and Waldie said they were astonished to discover that at the critical point in the interrogation process of native suspects brought in from Vietnamese villages, the job of collaborating with local Vietnamese officials passed from the regular military to U.S. civilians in the Central Intelligence Agency.

The so-called Province Interrogation Center is the most sensitive part of the Phoenix program. A U.S. Army manual explains that persons "reasonably believed to endanger the national security" are taken into custody, without normal judicial procedure. The U.S. manual explains that this "emergency political detention [is] necessitated by the need of the State to survive. There is no defined burden of proof as utilized by the courts."

At the province detention center the two congressmen discovered that arrested suspects are subject to interrogation which may last up to 45 days. They assert that the CIA operates the interrogation center under a cover title, "Pacification Security Coordination Division."

Guarded statement

Mr. McCloskey said it was widely reported, and that he believed, that South Vietnamese apply torture to secure confessions at these centers.

In a guarded statement, April 22, Mr. Waldie said that he got evidence in only one instance of "abuses"; the testimony of one American adviser that he had seen a blindfolded detainee being taken into an interrogation center in the hands of the South Vietnamese interrogator.

Mr. McCloskey told a reporter that a rubber house does not leave physical evidence after it is used. At another point the congressmen heard that a rubber hose had been found on the desk of the district intelligence officer.

As to bombing refugees, Mr. McCloskey charges that after being briefed at a six-hour official U.S. session to the effect that mass refugee evacuation is not due to U.S. bombing, he and Mr. Waldie talked independently through translators to representatives of eight villages. They predominantly testified that they had left home after it was destroyed by U.S. bombing.

E & S - 23,001

MAY 12 1972

Waldie Urges CIA Withdraw From Viet Suspect Program

County Bureau

The Central Intelligence Agency should be withdrawn from involvement in the Vietnam "Phoenix" program against suspicious persons, Rep. Jerome Waldie has told Congress.

Waldie, an Ohio Democrat who recently returned from Vietnam with Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-San Mateo), said the operation of the Phoenix interrogation centers puts the United States in a position of giving the South Vietnamese a suppression tool even after the war is over.

In the first of what he said would be a series of reports by the two congressmen, Waldie said the program, designed to flush out both Viet Cong and South Vietnamese political dissenters, is operated by the Vietnamese under American military advisement, except for the final steps, which are operated by the CIA via the American embassy.

"We are leaving a structure that has been defined by American military authorities as part of Vietnamization that produces a great possibility of political suppression in that government when we are no longer a part of it and, in its present operation, clearly presents an actual political suppression," Waldie said.

He said he found "ominous in the extreme" a portion of the program directive to military advisers that the Americans "are specifically unauthorized to engage in assassinations" in connection with the program.

The program describes a series of suspect categories, and on the village and district level advises that information should be collected on people "who make suspicious utterances such as expressions which distort government of Vietnam policies ... false rumors which confuse or create division or hatred among the populace."

The directions to South Vietnamese operators advises they can tell whether their neighbors should be reported if, among other things, they show "hesitation or fearful attitude of a dishonest person."

The district intelligence operation is advised to maintain files of such items as photos of families taken by police in front of their homes, adding that family information "can be useful in exploiting family sentiment to obtain his arrest or afterwards."

Waldie said the lowest group of suspects, those only under suspicion, can be held for months in detention centers for spreading rumors about the government "to cow him into refraining from that sort of action."

At the highest level, the province interrogation centers, the military advisers leave off and the CIA agents take over under the cover of an agency called the Pacification Security Coordination Division, Waldie said.

He added he and McCloskey learned of the CIA involvement in the field, and it was confirmed back in Saigon "after great anguish on the part of our briefing officers, who had been instructed not to reveal that to us."

The entire Phoenix process, he said "does not seem to me to provide much opportunity for even vestigial due process," noting that the detentions can be accomplished specifically when there is not enough evidence to convict of a crime.

"It is incomprehensible that we would permit, advise and suggest to a government that their neighbors who happen to express opposition to the central government should be run through an interrogation process and sentenced for up to six months," he said.

Noting that the CIA does not report to the military but directly to the American ambassador, Waldie said it seems "a mistake of great proportions to include the CIA as advisers and operators of the province interrogation centers."

"I recognize that due process under the conditions of war that exist in South Vietnam cannot be accorded to the extent that we accord them in this country," Waldie said.

But he added that such a program as Phoenix must be monitored "exceptionally carefully".

25 April 1971

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001

Are S. Viets Ready?

STATINTL

"We just need a little more time to train them better," is a U.S. advisers reply.

QUANG TRI, Vietnam — It was just another day and another job for the jeep driver, who had driven the major up the dusty, winding road from Quang Tri to meet the congressmen at the fire support base near the DMZ.

The jeep driver was from North Carolina and bored with the Army, but he liked the look of Vietnam better than he had thought he would ("It's kinda like the hills of eastern Kentucky," he said) and he knew there were worse jobs than driving a jeep.

"It isn't much of a place to celebrate your birthday, but I'm glad to be alive," said the jeep driver, a Spec. 4 named Jackson Wright who will be 21 on May 7. "You'd be surprised at the number of guys who don't come back."

WRIGHT'S counterpart in age and rank is Nguyen Than Nhat, a 21-year-old staff sergeant in the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) who killed two Viet Cong while protecting a supply center on March 7.

Nhat is an interpreter by trade and was only four years old when his family came down from the north in the great refugee exodus of 1954. He was married seven months ago and is not eager for a frontline post.

"I don't want to fight," he says. "But I've got to kill the Communists or they will kill me."

The issue is personal for Nhat, not ideological. He had friends who were killed in cold blood during the Tet uprising in 1968 and he has seen the pictures of the victims massacred by the Viet Cong at Hue.

The number of killed and the attitude which he expresses is

Pioneer Press Washington Bureau reporter Lou Cannon recently visited Vietnam and Laos in the company of two antiwar congressmen, Reps. Paul McCloskey, R-Calif., and Jerome Waldie, D-Calif.

By LOU CANNON

Pioneer Press Washington Bureau
(FIRST OF A SERIES OF THREE ARTICLES)

the legacy of a generation of warfare in Vietnam, and it is expressed almost casually by both sides.

ONCE UPON A TIME, perhaps as recently as the mid-Sixties, opinion surveys in Vietnam showed that a minority of the population was strongly committed either for or against the Communists.

That situation has markedly changed now, in the view of an experienced foreign service officer who has spent nearly a decade in the country and speaks fluent Vietnamese.

While this officer is generally sympathetic to the American intervention, he points out that one result has been to create military and civilian officials at district, province, village and hamlet levels who are intimately involved with the American effort. Most Vietnamese and many Americans, including the foreign service officer, believe that these officials will be marked for extinction if the Hanoi regime prevails.

On the other side, Communists are clearly marked for indefinite imprisonment, if not extinction, by the South Vietnamese government.

Phung Hoang (Phoenix)

program set up by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for wiping out the Viet Cong shadow government may or may not be an improvement over its Vietnamese predecessors. But it clearly provides the framework — as Rep. Jerome Waldie pointed out after an investigation here — for widescale political repression after the Americans withdrew.

NO AMERICAN at any level whom I talked to in five northern provinces or in Saigon expressed the slightest doubt that the United States was on the path to total withdrawal, although opinions vary as widely on the timing of withdrawal as they do at home.

More interestingly, no one in any extended conversation seemed to have a firm idea of what would happen when the United States does withdraw, though enlisted men and lower level officers are decidedly more pessimistic than the Saigon brass about the success of Vietnamization.

"The South Vietnamese can do it," says George Jacobson, the No. 2 U.S. civilian adviser in Vietnam. "We just need a little more time to train them better."

however, many of the ci-

vilians cautiously express a viewpoint closer to that of war critic McCloskey, who asked Jacobson at the same briefing: "If the South Vietnamese troops are as good as you say they are, why can't we leave?"

It is the view of some of the lower level advisers, none of whom are anxious to be quoted about it, that the ARVN and the local regional and people's forces are better than they ever have been before but still are not good enough to withstand the North Vietnamese Army.

"The North Vietnamese are the heirs to this country's revolutionary tradition and will never give up," explains one adviser. "It's questionable whether the South Vietnamese have a will to fight that matches their training, and if they don't there's not much we can do about it."

THIS LACK of confidence by American military men in their South Vietnamese allies is reciprocated by an increasing unwillingness of some local leaders to accept U.S. advice.

"The Vietnamese don't seek our advice anymore than (Chicago) Mayor Daley would ask the advice of a visiting Frenchman," complained a military district adviser in one northern province.

The adviser, however, is encouraged by this tendency, for he views it as a sign that the Vietnamese, at last, may be coming to a realization that the United States is leaving whether they like it or not.

Monday in the Pioneer Effort and Lam Sou.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00100017000145

April 22, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

The National Secretaries Association—International—in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Commerce originated the idea for Secretaries Week. The theme again will be, "Better Secretaries Mean Better Business."

Special committees are established throughout NSA to formulate programs to make Secretaries Week ever more meaningful to secretaries and to the business community. In keeping with the professional objective of the association, chapters of NSA sponsor special educational activities such as seminars, workshops, and study groups available to members and nonmembers alike. Additional recognition is gained for the secretarial profession during the week through public appearances of NSA members at meetings of civic, educational, and professional groups, as well as through open meetings for all secretaries.

This then, for the 20th consecutive year, is Secretaries Week. Nineteen hundred and seventy-one—a time for secretaries to look back on past accomplishments and ahead to future progress.

TWO POEMS BY MARILYN KRANTZ

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 21, 1971

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, the poet's role frequently is to give expression to those sentiments many of us share, but with a style, precision, and talent for language that many of us do not command.

Mrs. Marilyn Krantz, who is the editor of the Northeast and Feltonville Weekly which serves part of my northeast Philadelphia district, is such a gifted poet.

Her poem "Not on a Silver Platter" describes what it has taken to build that tiny but indomitable state, Israel, on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. The poem has been widely read in Philadelphia-area synagogues and before meetings of Philadelphia organizations. Mrs. Krantz says that she hopes the poem expresses Israel's worthiness of our continued support and the continued respect of peoples and nations all over the world. I think it does.

A second poem by Mrs. Krantz, "John F. Kennedy . . . His Message to the World," evokes the memory of our fallen President and acknowledges this Nation and this people's continuing debt to him. This poem won first prize in the poetry contest of the Philadelphia Regional Writers' Conference in June 1964.

With the unanimous consent of my colleagues, I place these two poems on the Record:

NOT ON A SILVER PLATTER
(By Marilyn Krantz)

Israel was not handed over
On a silver platter,
Yet isn't this the truth of all
Things that really matter?

The State of Israel has come
To the Jewish nation
On a platter beset with both
Sorrow and Elation.

Not one ounce of silver's in it,
Nor a single drop of gold,
Yet its value (beyond measure)
Only History can unfold.

It is made of fallen heroes . . .
Of wives' and mothers' tears . . .
Of the Maccabean spirit
Which dates back two thousand years . . .

Of a People's dauntless struggle
To uphold man's dignity . . .
Of willingness to live or die
For Peace, as the need may be . . .

Of moral strength and courage
Voiced in songs both sad and gay . . .
Of stubborn perseverance
Shining forth 'mid skies of gray.

It's blend of countless heartbreaks
And endless hours of toil . . .
Of blood and sweat, prayers and sighs,
All mingled with the soil . . .

Of many busy, vital hands
Moving in harmony:
Planning, working, building the land,
Fighting to keep it free . . .

Molded, too, from that same spirit
Which gave birth to Herzl's notion
Of a Jewish homeland—
And engraved with God's devotion.

No, Israel was not handed over
On a silver platter,
Yet isn't this the truth of all
Things that really matter!

JOHN F. KENNEDY . . . HIS MESSAGE TO THE
WORLD

He stood erect, with youthful smile—
Wise far beyond his years;
His words instilled in young and old
The strength to conquer fears.

He gave his heart and soul to aid
Mankind in time of strife,
And then, as if 'twas not enough,
He gave his only life!

Whisked from our arms, he left his mark
Upon the Nation's heart;
Heaven wept, also—tears and rain
Could scarce be told apart.

Of what great magnitude, his love,
That from lands far-and-wide
Came leaders, shedding differences
To stand, bowed, side by side!

All grieved alike, despite their creed
Or color of their skin;
He proved in death, his theme in life:
That all men are akin.

His voice, through stilled, can yet be heard
In freedom's vibrant song,
Echoing hope's eternal plea
That Right shall conquer Wrong.

For, like the sun which disappears
Behind the clouds at night,
Great men are never really gone
But only out of sight.

THE REVEREND FATHER JOSEPH F.
THORNING

HON. GOODLOE E. BYRON

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 21, 1971

Mr. BYRON. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the House of Representatives on the occasion of Pan American Day was honored to be led in prayer by one of the most distinguished constituents of Maryland's Sixth District, the Reverend Father Joseph F. Thorning, of St. Joseph's-on-Carrollton Manor, Md. This marked

the 28th annual appearance of Father Thorning before the House on Pan American Day.

Father Thorning, known as the Padre of the Americas, has been a personal friend for many years as well as a friend of both my parents. Father Thorning is one of America's eminent scholars in Latin American affairs and is known throughout the hemisphere and in Europe for his efforts on behalf of brotherhood and international understanding in the Americas. I commend his efforts as an example that others should try to emulate. I personally hope that he will return each year for many years to join the House of Representatives in marking Pan American Day.

VIETNAM

SPEECH OF

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 20, 1971

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ROONEY of New York). Under previous order of the House the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, during the Easter vacation my colleague from California, PAUL McCloskey, and I visited Vietnam and visited Laos, and a series of reports will be forthcoming from that visit. Tonight will be the first report, involving a program that is a part of Vietnamization, as is apparently the case, a program designed, in my view, to suppress political dissent in that country at a time when the war is over, as well as the program that is presently in existence in Vietnam during this war period. It is a program that is called the Phung Hoang program, otherwise known as the Phoenix program.

My first introduction to the program occurred upon the initial briefing that was provided Congressman McCloskey and I in Saigon by the CORDS people.

At that time they were giving what they called "neutralization" figures. They reported that in Military Region One in 1971 we had "neutralized" 5,380 members of the Vietcong infrastructure and political dissenters in that country.

The breakdown of the neutralization figures is as follows: "Kills," 2,000. They are obviously "neutralized," the briefing officer said, when they are killed. I suspect that is a fair assessment.

Rallied, 17,000. These are the Chieu Hoi ralliers to the flag of South Vietnam, as they become "neutralized" when they rally.

Sentenced, 1,680. These are people that were sentenced to more than 1 year for their offenses as being identified as part of the Vietcong infrastructure.

Captured, 4,000 people. These are not considered to be "neutralized" because they received sentences of less than 1 year and were not determined to be a

U.S. to Monitor Viet Affairs for Next Three Years

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Nixon administration is launching a pacification project which will keep the U.S. government involved in the affairs of Vietnam for the next three years.

The Navy—on behalf of the administration—intends to spend \$2.4 million a year for the next three fiscal years on an American research team in Saigon to keep track of everything from South Vietnamese internal security to economic development.

The government's contract guide shows that this new effort goes further than the existing one in helping the South Vietnamese police root out suspected subversives and the Vietcong infrastructure.

The progress of pacification would be measured by "mathematical models" and "automated systems" under the terms of the proposed contract—meaning computers would try to assess conditions in primitive hamlets and villages.

Critics of this new pacification measurement plan contend that the personnel who would put together this information for policy makers in Washington would not be fully qualified for such a task because of the low standards set by the Navy.

These critics also say that it is unrealistic to depend on mathematical models to give a true picture of what is going

on in South Vietnamese hamlets.

Chairman Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) is expected to touch on the problem of measuring pacification at a Senate Refugee Subcommittee hearing today.

The Naval Command Systems Support Activity will award the contract some time after the April 26 deadline for bids, under current plans. Such pacification research projects have been under the Army in the past. Naval Command officials said the Navy is directing the effort this time because the money is coming out of the Navy budget.

Here is what the Navy is asking the civilian research contractor to do under the contract proposal—numbered N 00600:

- Hamlet Evaluation System—Areas to be evaluated "are security, enemy infrastructure, Government of Vietnam (GVN) presence, effectiveness of GVN programs, economic activity and economic development . . ."

- Territorial Forces—Measure "combat effectiveness" of Vietnam's 500,000-member territorial forces and identify "problem areas requiring the attention of commanders and their staffs . . ."

- Helping Vietnam's police—The United States would develop an information system for Saigon's Ministry of Interior—the police arm which cracks down on anti-govern-

ment actions and personnel—to monitor, evaluate and improve the implementation of the People's Self-Defense Program . . . The status of organization, manpower, weapons, ammunition and training of forces in each hamlet."

The information would also go to the U.S. Military Assistance Command (MACV) and the CORDS (Civil Operations Rural Development System), both in Vietnam.

- Refugees—A system designed to measure "the progress of the resettlement program" of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees.

- Attitudes—Polls and surveys would be conducted monthly in Vietnam to determine attitudes of the Vietnamese people.

As the Navy said under this heading in the contract guide, "Modifications will be required to provide more sophisticated psychometry, such as stratification and clustering of responses and cross-validation of questions and responses sets."

- Vietcong Infrastructure VCI—In what sounds like a program to dovetail with the controversial Phoenix program to eliminate the VC infrastructure, the contract calls for a system to report on "the location, identification and neutralization of members of the political infrastructure—the VCI." A new feature would be added, as the specifications document states:

"This system is to be redesigned and program to permit the matching of known persons to leadership positions in the organized shadow government at large in a specific geographical area. The present system only accounts for VCI neutralized. The (new) system will be adapted to interface with the National Police Criminal Information System and the Terrorist Incident Reporting System."

National Police—Vietnam's National Police would receive a wide range of information services from the United States, including "tracking and disposition of captured criminals."

HONOLULU, H.I.
ADVERTISERAPR 20 1971
M - 70-135

Vietnam 'alternatives'

More reasonable relations with China may now be one of the United States' hopeful foreign policy goals, but our continuing dilemma remains Vietnam.

For more than a decade the U.S. has suffered from a tendency to delude itself over what is possible and likely in that country.

Although most Americans are weary and want to end our involvement, there remain differences in outlook of those on the scene. Articles on this page by two correspondents—one a veteran hawk and the other younger and less positive—make the point.

AT ANY RATE, it's obvious that even under the most optimistically dovish timetable for getting out, American forces will be in South Vietnam in strength through this year. It could be much longer.

That gives special importance to South Vietnam's upcoming presidential election in October; it will pick the government the U.S. will continue to back.

For varying reasons, most observers feel that President Nguyen Van Thieu is certain to be re-elected, barring some unexpected basic change in conditions such as a military coup.

BUT AT THE same time there's a lot of concern over how the election is carried out. And with good reason because past presidential elections in South Vietnam have ranged from subtle setups to mockeries of "democracy."

Rep. Paul (Pete) McCloskey, the California Republican who is challenging President Nixon, made a couple of points about the present situation when he returned over the weekend from a fact-finding trip to Indochina. He charged:

• That through a priority U.S. program called "Phoenix," the Central Intelligence Agency plays a key role in the "preventive detention" of thousands of political prisoners who hold views contrary to those of President Thieu and the Saigon government. Presumably, McCloskey means there are many non-Communists among them.

• That the U.S. program in South Vietnam includes a "classification attitudinal survey" in which the results of a poll among 1,000 South Vietnamese a month are given only to President Thieu for political purposes.

Similar charges have been made by others, including a group of Vietnamese-speaking former American advisers who Friday opened a campaign in Washington to require "neutrality" in the coming South Vietnam Assembly election in August and the presidential contest in October.

Said a spokesman: "The South Vietnamese people believe that the coming elections will be a fraud, and that a considerable reason for that fraud will be American support for a military government. We don't think they (the South Vietnamese people) by any means favor the National Liberation Front, but they favor peace in an open and honest election."

THIS SEEMS to be the motivation behind a U.S. Senate resolution offered by Senator Adlai Stevenson III and others. They want Congress to set up safeguards, including a commission of its own members, to insure U.S. neutrality and free choice for the Vietnamese people.

That may have some attractions for concerned Americans. But it also has its dangers, including the possibility of more American self-delusion. For there are serious doubts whether "free elections" in the sense we know them are likely or possible in South Vietnam.

Four years ago other American observers went out to give their stamp of approval to elections others felt were superficially clean but clearly controlled towards a Thieu victory.

A critical congressional group might now do a better job. But in a system where Thieu appoints the province chiefs, perhaps the most powerful men in Vietnam, and the military pervades all, it's doubtful how much any Washington group could see, much less do. That's even assuming the CIA and others were truly neutral.

THERE IS A good debate whether such concepts as "self determination" and "a democratic alternative" really are viable in South Vietnam today, any more than they have been in the past.

It is unpleasant if Americans are involved in helping engineer Thieu's reelection. But it might be even more cynical if we certified voting where the results were as pre-ordained as Mayor Daley's victory in Chicago.

It may be comforting for some to talk about having the South Vietnamese people make democratic choices; some future day they may. But that is not how the outcome of this war will be decided when the various sides decide to do so.

For the U.S., the best of poor alternatives at this point is to leave at the end of the year and let the Vietnamese settle a war that we have prolonged to nobody's advantage.

APR 20 1971

CIA Running War In Laos, Waldie Charges

On Return 10-Day Vietnam Trip Ends

By PAT KEEBLE
County Bureau

A 10-day trip ferreting out information on the Indochina war — mostly without the cooperation of American leaders — hasn't changed Rep. Jerome Waldie's feeling that the United States should get out of Vietnam now.

The Antioch Democrat, along with San Mateo Republican Paul McCloskey returned to Washington this weekend after a trip through the northern provinces of South Vietnam and into a Laotian refugee camp.

Among their findings, Waldie said, was confirmation that the Central Intelligence Agency is running the war in Laos, through the American Embassy in Saigon, and also operating "preventive detention" camps in the Vietnam provinces.

He said he is formulating recommendations on the actions of the CIA, particu-

larly as regards the "Phoenix" program of preventive detention.

And he and McCloskey are also passing the word around to other congressmen who want to go to Vietnam that "they're going to have to be more aggressive than they have been in the past if they want to find out what's going on," Waldie said.

"I went over there with a preconceived notion that we should have been out of Vietnam long ago, and nothing I saw changed that notion," Waldie said.

"I am more convinced than ever that there is nothing there for us, no reason to continue to have our kids killed and wounded over there," he said.

The Contra Costa congressman said he felt the embassy was helpful as well as "quite frank and outspoken" until the two lawmakers asked for a report they had heard of on American bombing in Laos. After "incredible efforts at suppressing it," eventually it was given to them.

He said he and McCloskey several times changed itineraries and went to a Laotian refugee camp which had not been on the "recommended" list of the embassy.

"By talking to refugees and by discovery of the report initially denied to exist, we ferreted out that in a country of only three million population, almost a quarter of all their

people," Waldie said.

"And the only indication so far of the motivation of refugees was the American bombing," he said.

"It's possible that from the one report on the impact of bombing practices, coupled with our own survey of the refugee camp we selected, that the sampling is erroneous," Waldie acknowledged. "But the contention of the American officials that all the evidence indicated that bombing was not a factor in refugee motivation simply is not true."

The pair also studied the province interrogation centers and determined after several days that they are run not by the army, as was inferred, but by the CIA.

The centers can hold anybody suspected of being associated with the Viet Cong or even of dissent against the Saigon government for 45 days, before turning them over to Vietnam police and government representatives for sentencing.

"I am going to make a recommendation to the Secretary of State that this is not the

type of structure that we should leave as a model for the South Vietnamese government, designed precisely after the pattern of a communist society," Waldie stated.

"Our objective there was to fight for the right of a nation to be free, but we are establishing an instrument of suppression equal to any found in a communist state," he said.

He said the pair found considerable difference between generals and lower echelon soldiers over what the U.S. should do with the war.

One second lieutenant told them, "When we leave, it will be up to the South Vietnamese army to decide whether they want to win the war or lost it. They may decide it's easier to lose it than to continue fighting and win it."

"He believed we ought to leave and let the South Vietnamese decide what they want to do with their country," Waldie said, adding, "I concur wholeheartedly."

Most of the generals, he added, felt the U.S. should stay "as long as necessary" to keep the North Vietnamese from defeating the South, and would not put a time limit on the war.

The World

Pacification:

It's Being Able to Walk Down A Road Safely

SAIGON — "Pacification will be fully realized not when we will have occupied each inch of earth but when we will have conquered all the hearts and won all the minds."

These words were written in French by Commandant A. M. Savani, head of the Deuxieme Bureau, the French intelligence apparatus, during France's long bitter war with the Vietnamese. He wrote them in September, 1954.

The words have been neatly printed on a card pasted on one of the partition walls that form in the desk of a bright young American who daily works on the hamlet evaluation system (H.E.S.). This is the American method of rating security in South Vietnam which is based on American advisors' reports and, in its final stages, comes out of a computer. The young man is not without a sense of irony.

It is not unwise to remember what Commandant Savani so hoped for when one reads a long, pontifical document called the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan. This means pacification, a network of programs engineered by the United States agency in Saigon called Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, orCORDS.

The programs involve a wide

range of activities, from improvement of economic conditions to administrative training, to strengthening security in the hamlets. A key element is the enlargement of the national police to cope with the Vietcong.

The Saigon Government and the United States have put great stock in the pacification program as a means of spreading their influence in the country. Ambassador William Egan Colby, who heads CORDS, flew to Washington this weekend to testify before Congressional committees.

The crucial goal of pacification is to separate the South Vietnamese, psychologically and ideologically, from the Communists, to pull the South Vietnamese to the side of the Saigon Government, and to get and keep their allegiance and trust so they will stay on that side.

But measuring this allegiance and trust is not as simple as taking the temperature of a feverish man every day and then deciding whether he is cured. There is no way of knowing the final results of pacification because the methods by which the Americans and Saigon Government officials assess their success is often neither honest nor realistic. Sometimes they cannot know but are not permitted to say this.

In too many villages and hamlets, pacification simply means more painful pressures on a people that have already been obliged to bend down too low and too long. While the plans may look perfectly drawn up by the American experts, the men in the small hamlets or villages who carry them out are often greedy buffies, or flawed and fearful people. The loveliest plan in the world cannot cure them.

The great weakness—an almost fatal one in South Vietnam where corruption now flourishes in greater variety than a decade ago—is that pacification is only as good as the

people obliged to carry it out.

If, as in one delta village, the national police collect money by threatening to arrest people as Vietcong suspects, then pacification here is an ugly joke. The people pay, for they

know that under the Peoples Program, designed to weed out Vietcong in the civilian population, there is very little way of proving what you are not when the police point their finger.


If, for example, pacification means providing security but the old men and young boys in the Peoples' Self-Defense Force in another village can pay to get off one night from guarding a road, then pacification here does not work. For it depends on spirit not the cash and, if in still another village, the people are forced to clear an area mined by the Vietcong in order to deprive the Vietcong of a hiding place, then the people who are frightened or hurt will feel that pacification is worse than anything else. You cannot pacify most Vietnamese, of course, by expecting them to put their lives on the line. Only soldiers accept that.

The intensified, accelerated pacification program for 1971 calls for even more organization of the people "in order to develop unity of will and action in the entire nation." It may be far too late for anyone to expect that now just as it was too late in 1953 for Commandant Savani and France to win the same hearts and the same minds.

This is a tired nation, perhaps the most tired in the world, and the Americans here, working with the Vietnamese, seem a little dimmed, a little less hopeful, too. The great and grand goals of pacification still shine brightly for some courageous, committed Americans; but there is still one small thing that four years of pacification, billions of dollars, and thousands of United States advisers have sadly enough not yet brought about:

It is being able to walk down a country road at night, or drive on a highway, without risking your life.

—GLORIA EMERSON



Associated Press

A South Vietnamese peasant waits while a soldier searches his bunker for Vietcong. The Saigon Government's pacification program is aimed at winning "hearts and minds" and separating the people from the Communists.

17 APR 1971

Policy on Weeding Out Vietcong Suspects Assailed

By GLORIA EMERSON
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, April 16 -- Two Congressmen who are opponents of the war in Vietnam today criticized the program designed to weed out and punish Vietcong political leaders and agents in the civilian population.

Representatives Paul N. McCloskey Jr., a California Republican, and Jerome R. Waldie, a California Democrat, produced what they said was a copy of a directive from the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, telling the American advisers to the program, which is called Phoenix, that they were "specifically unauthorized to engage in assassination."

But the operation, the Representatives said, violated "due process of law in the internment and conviction process."

The document, dated May 18, 1970, outlines policy and responsibilities for all United States personnel participating in Phoenix operations or supporting them in any way.

Constraints Cited

"U.S. personnel are under the same legal and moral constraints with respect to operations of a Phoenix character as they are with respect to regular military operations against enemy units in the field," the directive said.

"Thus, they are specifically

unauthorized to engage in assassinations or other violations of the rules of land warfare, but they are entitled to use reasonable military force as necessary to obtain the goals of rallying, capturing or eliminating the VCI [Vietcong infrastructure]."

The four-year-old Phoenix

program has long been criticized by opponents of the American role in Vietnam.

In principle, the Phoenix operation requires local officials, if they feel they have sufficient evidence against a person suspected of any connection with the Vietcong, to arrest him. If the suspect is

not immediately released, he is taken to the provincial interrogation center.

"My objections are these," Mr. McCloskey said, "a man is not confronted with his accuser, he has not the right to counsel. Any three witnesses may speak against him, saying he is VC."

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

VETERANS' TESTIMONY ON VIETNAM—NEED FOR INVESTIGATION—CONTINUED

SPEECH OF

HON. MARK O. HATFIELD

OF OREGON

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, April 5, 1971

[The following is a continuation of testimony given by honorably discharged veterans who had served in Vietnam, submitted by Mr. HATFIELD:]

THE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE

Moderators

Jan Crumb, 23, SP/4, (E-4), 18th Aviation Co. (from December 1962 to October 1963).
Larry Rottmann, 25, 1st Lt., Public Information Office, 25th Infantry Division (from June 1967 to March 1968).

Veterans testifying

Ron Podlaski, 24, Sgt. (E-5) 5th Special Forces Group (from April 1968 to April 1969).
Eugene Keys, 25, SP/4, (E-4) 3/4, 25th Infantry Division (from February 1966 to February 1967).

David Chiles, 24, SP/4, (E-4) 3/4, 25th Infantry Division (from January 1968 to December 1968).

Pat Ostrenga, "D" Co., February to December, 25th Infantry Division.

Mike McCusker, 29, Sgt. (E-5) Public Information Office 1st Marine Division (from 1966 to 1968).

Larry Craig, 29, SP/4, Public Information Office, 25th Infantry Division (from 1966 to 1967).

Vernon Shible, 27, SP/4, Public Information Office 25th Infantry Division (from 1966 to 1967).

Alex Priham, 26, SP/4, (E-4) Public Information Office, 1st Logistics Command, Headquarters (from September 1968 to June 1969).

MODERATOR. We feel that particularly after the actions of the last two days in Indochina, and the reaction of Senator McGovern yesterday to information which we brought out on Sunday about a Marine combat regiment operating in Laos in 1969, that we should open today's panel with someone else who has been in Laos, Ron Podlaski.

PODLASKI. My name is Ron Podlaski. I'm from New York. I was a sergeant in the United States Army Special Forces. I served in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969. My testimony will consist of cross-border operations into Laos, Cambodia, using Thailand as launch-bases for Laotian targets, and our involvement in Laos and Cambodia.

MODERATOR. How many times have you been in Laos?

PODLASKI. I couldn't give you an exact figure of how many times I've been to Laos, but I spent one year in Vietnam and that entire year was devoted to running cross-border operations.

MODERATOR. Would you say a half-dozen times or more?

PODLASKI. I'd say at least that many times, not to mention the times that we attempted to get in and were not successful in infiltrating.

MODERATOR. What was the nature of your sort of group?

PODLASKI. We were running long-range reconnaissance patrols. They consisted of two Americans and four indigenous personnel. Our particular team was Chinese Nungs. We

were going into Laos, Cambodia, for intelligence reasons.

MODERATOR. Ron, would you explain what a Nung is?

PODLASKI. Well, Chinese Nungs, our particular team, they came from North Vietnam and their families had fled to the South and they were, mostly Catholics. They were mercenary soldiers, is what they were. They were higher paid than the ARVN army and whoever gave them the most money, that's who they fought for.

MODERATOR. Was yours the only team going into Laos?

PODLASKI. Negative I belonged to C & C North, which was located up around Da Nang, and it was their base camp. We had FOB's in Khe Sanh, Phu Bai, Kontum. There was also C & C South, which had two or three FOB's. I'm not exactly sure. I ran missions for them, TDY, into Cambodia.

MODERATOR. An FOB is a Forward Operating Base?

PODLASKI. Right.

MODERATOR. What do you know about hatchet forces?

PODLASKI. Hatchet forces are company-size, consisting of American advisers with a majority of Vietnamese, possibly Montagnards, possibly Chinese Nungs. They would run company-size operations, cross-border.

MODERATOR. Often?

PODLASKI. My last three months in Vietnam were spent in Kontum, it was the old FOB-2 which was changed to C & C Central (Command Control Central), and they were running hatchet force operations into Laos on quite a heavy basis those last three months.

MODERATOR. Would you explain what C & C North, Central, and South is?

PODLASKI. C & C North stands for Command Control North. It consisted of Special Forces. However, we took commands from Saigon and we had nothing to do with actual special forces command in Nha Trang. We answered to Saigon.

MODERATOR. Where were these operations to take place?

PODLASKI. These operations, well, you would launch from different launch sites near the border, and you'd be infiltrated into Laos wherever they felt there was heavy troop movement. We would take pictures, tell the strength of the troops, their morale, their physical fitness, if they were young, if they were hard-core North Vietnamese or if they were just grabbing anybody, and this intelligence was supposedly fed to conventional units. They could cut these people off as they crossed the border into South Vietnam. However, I don't know of any incident where we were ever listened to. Whatever intelligence we would give to them never seemed to be followed through.

MODERATOR. Ron, the President and other members of the government have said we have never had ground forces fighting in Laos.

PODLASKI. Well, all I can say about that is that the administration has been lying. They've been lying to the President and together they've been lying to you people.

MODERATOR. Ron will be available for further questions. We'd like to go along with the combat veterans of the 25 Infantry Division, who will introduce themselves.

KEYS. My name is Sonny Keys. I was in the Third Squadron, Fourth Cavalry of the 25th Division. I'll be talking about forced relocation of civilians and a convoy of approximately fifty trucks filled with American dead, which the Stars and Stripes reported as "light" casualties.

CHILES. My name is David Chiles. I'm a student at Kent State and I live in Atwater, Ohio. I'm going to be discussing some opera-

tions in the Iron Triangle, the use of American soldiers as guinea pigs to give a squadron colonel a better body count, and an incident I had with some civilians in Saigon. I believe it was June or July we were sent to the Iron Triangle and we took very heavy casualties. We found these ten graves, or what we took to be graves. One day A-Troop called in and used them as body count. The next day, B-Troop called in and used the same graves as body count. So meanwhile, the people that buried these definitely called them in, so you have ten graves that are worth thirty body counts. Vietnam was a very strange war, for the simple reason that the only way your unit was judged by the number of bodies in relationship to your casualties.

One instance I remember, we joined with the 4/23 Mechanized Infantry (oh, by the way, I was with the 3/4 Cav in all of all 1967). They were dragging two Viet Cong behind their tracks, which isn't really unusual. They came in at night and we had a rendezvous. At this time two GI's went over and cut the cars off and put them across the track to dry. And then I noticed two GI's were fighting over these bodies, so I went over to take a closer look and there was a lieutenant observing this. One of them had a pair of pliers, and to my dismay, they were fighting over the rights to the gold teeth of the Viet Cong they had killed. This was kind of a status for them, to see who got the most gold teeth. As I said, we had taken very heavy casualties. I think the only thing that we found there was about fifty bags of rice. It was from New York City and Houston, Texas, is where this rice had originated from. Around September or October our colonel got this fantastic idea to start running convoys at night, from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh, then from Tay Ninh to Dau Tieng. The sole purpose of this was to be ambushed; this is a mechanized unit at night, when you can hear them miles away. His theory was, our fire power was much more superior than theirs. What he forgot to think about is three Viet Cong with RPG-2's and a well placed mine could kill ten GI's and destroy three or four trucks. Meanwhile, while all this is going on, he's riding around in a helicopter and observing this. Now this went on for two or three months, and I think the division finally told him to get himself together, because we were just getting tipped up.

MODERATOR. I understand you have some slides.

CHILES. Yes, I'm going to show those.

MODERATOR. Could we go through the other two fellows' testimony and then come back to your slides?

LARRY ROTTMAN. Just a point of clarification. RPG-2 is a recoil-less projectile round, sort of a crude bazooka, that the VC uses, a shoulder-held weapon that will penetrate eight or ten inches of armored plate. One man can fire one projectile.

OSTRENGA. My name's Patrick Ostrenga and I am currently a student at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. I was a medic with the 25th Division, Second Battalion, Twelfth Infantry, and attached to D-Company. My unit operated around Dau Tieng, which is about forty miles north of Saigon. My testimony concerns mistreatment of Vietnamese civilians, mistreatment of prisoners, and murder of Vietnamese civilians.

MODERATOR. Sonny, could you amplify a little on what you were talking about?

KEYS. The relocation of civilians? Okay. We were in an operation in Ho Bo Woods. I believe it was Cedar Falls or Junction City in January of 1967. We came across a village of women, young kids, and old men—no young men. We surrounded the village, then we forced all the civilians out to an open

16 JAN 1971

Nixon Sending British Expert on New Saigon Study

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 — President Nixon is sending Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on guerrilla warfare, back to South Vietnam next month for an urgent evaluation of the Saigon Government's police and public-safety programs, State Department officials said today.

Other Administration informants said that the British expert would also look into the joint American-South Vietnamese police and pacification activities, which range from efforts to wipe out the Communist political organization in the South to operation of South Vietnamese prisons with United States assistance.

State Department officials said that the proposal for Sir Robert to accept another mission in South Vietnam was made by the Saigon Government with the concurrence of the United States.

They said the request was forwarded by Ellsworth T. Bunker, the American Ambassador in Saigon, in a message to President Nixon earlier this month.

Sir Robert undertook a five-week secret mission for President Nixon last autumn — his

second visit to South Vietnam in a year—but it was not clear for what specific reasons he and his group of British police specialists had been asked to go back after so short an interval.

There was strict secrecy here surrounding Sir Robert's trip. But the speculation in informed quarters is that both Mr. Bunker and the Administration were eager to have an up-to-date independent evaluation of the progress of pacification and related public safety efforts. It is felt such an evaluation is needed before decisions are made on additional withdrawals of American troops from South Vietnam.

Another possible reason for the mission is that the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, which is in over-all charge of pacification, is to be reorganized, effective March 1, as the Community Defense and Local Development Program.

Other informed sources said that both the Administration and Ambassador Bunker still appeared to be troubled by the relative lack of success in the destruction of the secret Communist network in South Vietnam. This has a bearing on the larger aspects of pacification and on the Vietnamization pro-

gram, under which South Vietnamese forces are gradually replacing American combat units.

The problem of the Communist organization in South Vietnam was reportedly a principal theme of the report Sir Robert presented to President Nixon at a secret conference last Oct. 13.

The New York Times last Dec. 2 reported that Sir Robert had gone to South Vietnam on a Presidential mission. The Times article said Administration officials had asserted that his report underlined the failure to eradicate the Communist network.

The next day, however, in confirming the existence of the Thompson report, the White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, said that "the overall thrust of the [New York Times] story, which leads to the impression that the pacification and Vietnamization programs are not doing well, is an incorrect impression."

Mr. Ziegler refused to describe the content of the report on security grounds. In an interview with the Associated Press last Dec. 13, Sir Robert declined to comment specifically on that part of the Times article that dealt with

the failure to destroy the Communist subversive organization. He said, however, that the Vietnamization and pacification policies were "unassailable by the enemy."

In mid-December, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird summoned to Washington the head of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, William E. Colby, to discuss the pacification problems. According to Administration informants, this review included questions about the Communist network raised in the Thompson report.

Officials here said today that Sir Robert's new mission would deal with United States and South Vietnamese "police and public safety" programs.

This appeared to suggest that Sir Robert and his advisers—who were not identified — would concentrate on pacification and, particularly, on the problems of the Communist underground.

The allied program to eradicate this organization is run jointly under the name of Operation Phoenix by the Civil Operations and Rural Development Program and the South Vietnamese National Police Directorate. Although the Civil Operations group is headed by a civilian, Ambassador Colby, most of its personnel engaged in Operation Phoenix is drawn from the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Officials indicated, however, that the Thompson mission would concern itself with other phases of the American and South Vietnamese police and public safety programs.

Both the National Police Directorate and the South Vietnamese prison system are advised and supported by the Public Safety Office of the Administration for International Developmental under over-all direction of Ambassador Colby's group.

Indochina: the second decade

By Richard E. Ward

Measured by the U.S. commitment of combat "advisors" followed by full-scale aggression of ground, air and naval forces, the war in Vietnam--now extended by the U.S. to all of Indochina--has recently entered its second decade. Yet the U.S. is further from military success than ever before.

To understand why tiny Vietnam, with an economic output barely one-thousandth that of the U.S., is successfully resisting the onslaught of the greatest imperial power that ever existed, it is necessary to comprehend the origins of the struggle in Vietnam.

An historical excursion here must be relatively brief and it can only provide a bare outline of what led to this titanic struggle and only a brief glimpse of the forces shaping present realities that make victory certain for the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

It was not until World War II that the histories of Vietnam and the U.S. converged. At the onset of World War II, Vietnam, a country whose culture and national consciousness had been shaped by millennial popular struggles against foreign invaders, was entering its ninth decade of resistance to French colonialism, and was reaching the point when national liberation would soon be a reality. Since 1930, the Vietnamese fight for national independence and freedom was led by the Indochinese Communist party (which became the Workers party in 1950), whose inspiration was Ho Chi Minh, guide of the Vietnamese people through some of their darkest hours and greatest exploits until his death in 1969.

Ho Chi Minh taught that a small country could win and maintain its independence against a large colonial power only if the whole people were united in a common struggle, that they must be prepared for armed struggle which must be preceded by and combined with political struggle; that the people must be prepared for protracted resistance and that their fight must not be based on a narrow nationalism but be part of the worldwide popular struggle against imperialism. These are only a few of the precepts of Ho Chi Minh which have proved themselves in practice and have enabled the Vietnamese to defeat the French. They are still reducing to impotence all the technology of U.S. imperialism.

The lessons of Ho Chi Minh combined the historical drive for freedom of the Vietnamese with an understanding of contemporary political life in Vietnam and the world. By eschewing a narrow nationalism the Vietnamese struggle won the admiration of the popular and democratic forces around the world, including the people of colonial France and the U.S. Despite all the lies, first from Paris and now from Washington, the French and in turn the American people have understood that the Vietnamese have been fighting for democracy and justice in the truest sense of these principles:

Vietnam always won independence in 1945

The Vietnamese overthrew colonialism and its feudal collaborators in their August Revolution of 1945. Following a nationwide insurrection throughout the whole country, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was founded and its administration was established.

The leaders of the DRV made every possible effort short of sacrificing their newly won independence, to reach a peaceful settlement with France in 1945-46. But the French, blind to the Vietnamese devotion to freedom, began an effort at reconquest of their former colony that ended in 1954 at Dienbienphu, the greatest military defeat in French history.

Paris began its war against Vietnam not only because it assumed it had superior military strength but also because it feared that the example of Vietnamese independence would inspire the peoples of other French colonies to seek their independence too. Actually, it was the long, successful Vietnamese resistance that provided the real inspiration, demonstrating that a colonial nation could defeat the larger and stronger army of the colonizers.

Six weeks after France signed the Geneva Agreements with Vietnam, Algeria was aflame in revolt. Many soldiers who went on to struggle for Algerian independence had earlier fought for France in Vietnam in the French Foreign Legion. Some of these Algerians had been taken prisoner by the Vietnamese, but instead of taking revenge, the Vietnamese helped them understand that their country, like Vietnam, was equally a victim of colonialism. Prisoners that understood this were released and returned to their homeland long before the conflict with France was concluded.

It is a little-known fact that Washington has been an implacable enemy of the Vietnamese revolution since 1945. Shortly after taking office, President Harry S. Truman made the decision that the U.S. would support French efforts to reconquer Indochina, a step that President Roosevelt had refrained from taking. At the time, this decision was secret and for several years Washington, while providing material and political support to France, publicly professed to be neutral in the Franco-Vietnamese conflict.

The U.S. position on Vietnam in 1945 and in the years immediately following World War II led the U.S. step by step to increase its aid to France and then to intervene directly in Vietnam. These were not "erroneous" decisions but conscious actions aimed at crushing the revolution in Vietnam.

The U.S. fought against fascism during World War II, but from the standpoint of U.S. history, World War II was also a war of imperialist rivalry. After the war, the U.S. was indisputably the strongest imperialist nation; the forces of revolution were on the march and the U.S. set about to check these revolutionary forces.

Washington's counterrevolutionary strategy

Washington's strategy was not without logic: the U.S. directly aided the counterrevolutionary forces in China, Korea and Europe, disguising its imperialist aims with an anti-communist ideology that posed as the champion of freedom. The second element of U.S. imperial strategy was to restore the strength of capitalism in the European countries. When all the documents are published, it will be crystal clear that there were explicit agreements providing that in return for U.S. aid the European powers were to police the third world and stop the revolution there. In any event, there is sufficient

FEBRUARY 10, 1971

STATINTL

JOHN
CROWN

Thank God for CIA

LAMENTABLY, it has become the accepted procedure and the "in" thing to attack the activities — real and imagined — of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Politicians who tire of that other popular sport — denigrating the Federal Bureau of Investigation — can always fall back on attributing all sorts of dark doings to the CIA.

One of our local worthies, in fact, has attributed his brilliant victory in a legal case to the fact that he implicated the CIA and, according to him, the case was dropped to avoid CIA embarrassment. That should be a landmark case for all aspiring lawyers. Get the CIA implicated and success is assured.

WITH THIS approach to the Central Intelligence Agency, the average citizen might well be forgiven if he gets the idea that the deadliest enemy facing the United States is something called the CIA. It is an organization that is often villified and rarely praised.

Yet if we did not have it — or something identical — our security and our world position would be in a sorry state, if indeed, we existed at all.

The Central Intelligence Agency came into being in 1947 during the Democratic administration of President Harry Truman. It came into being in recognition that the United States and the Soviet Union were the dominant powers in a world that was a jungle and would become progressively more so. No longer was the United States one of an assortment of seven or more "first rate" powers. As the leader of the Western world our global

responsibilities were awesome, as they still remain.

Therefore we could no longer blithely move about in such a world with such responsibilities in the naive hope that all would turn out well. No

No longer can we go on the courtly premise that one gentleman doesn't read another gentleman's mail.

longer could we go on the courtly premise that one gentleman doesn't read another gentleman's mail.

BEING AN open and free society, our operating a covert intelligence organization is not a welcome one to many of us. But it is a choice between being dainty and being realistic. Fortunately the choice was for realism and the Central Intelligence Agency was organized as an arm of government.

As noted earlier, there are those who find great rewards in attacking the CIA. They vary. There are those dreamy-eyed idealists who believe if we were to destroy all our weapons, the magnificent gesture of such an act would lead the remainder of the world to follow suit. At the other extreme there are those who find it to the interests they serve to keep both the CIA and the FBI under constant attack.

And in between those two extremes we have different individuals and different groups who are opposed in varying measures of intensity and for varying reasons to the existence of the CIA.

RECENTLY Sen. Clifford Case of New Jersey saw fit to raise his arms in holy horror (or feignedly so) because the CIA was funding Radio Free Europe.

I fail to see the cause for alarm.

Consider the purpose of Radio Free Europe. Consider what it accomplishes. I can see a connection between it and the CIA — and justifiably so. And I can see where Radio Free Europe serves a larger purpose. Sen. Case must have been hard pushed to get a headline, and experience shows that any senator can get a headline by blasting the CIA.

Consider the plight of poor Teddy Kennedy. After exuding confidence and optimism that he would be re-elected Senate majority whip, the senior senator from Massachusetts went down in abject defeat. So how do you get a headline and divert attention from such ignominy?

You attack the CIA, that's how, and that is what Teddy did recently. With righteous anger (or feignedly so) he accused the CIA of diverting relief money for refugees in Laos to forces fighting the Communist invaders. Bravo!

BECAUSE the CIA of necessity engages in covert operations, it is relatively simple for politicians and lawyers to accuse the CIA of virtually anything they wish. For the CIA to either confirm or deny such accusations could place the organization in a dangerous position. Its operations are of such a delicate nature that it cannot afford to take public stands.

And for my part, I'm overjoyed we have the CIA. Thank God for it.

JAN 26 1971

MY LAI CHARGES DROPPED

Lawyer Says CIA Fearful

By KEN BOSWELL

The Central Intelligence Agency's fear of publicity has been credited with the dropping of charges against members of the U.S. Army by one of the men's attorneys.

But federal sources — with the exception of the CIA itself — have denied any involvement in the case.

Atlanta attorney Charles L. Weltner said Monday that dismissal of murder charges against his client, Sgt. Esquivel Torres, and three other enlisted men came after the attorney obtained subpoenas for three CIA agents to appear in Torres' court-martial.

Charges against Torres, Pvt. Max D. Hutson, Pvt. Gerald A. Smith and Pvt. Robert W. T'Souvas — all in connection with the alleged My Lai massacre — were dismissed Friday by Lt. Gen. Albert O. Connor, commander of the Third Army at Ft. McPherson.



CHARLES WELTNER
Lashes Out at CIA

"I would find it difficult to assume that he (Gen. Connor) decided (to dismiss the charges) without the help of someone in the stratosphere up in Washington," Weltner said Monday.

SEVERAL calls to the nation's capital produced no confirmation of Weltner's charges.

"We never make public statements," said Joseph Goodwin from his Washington CIA office. "We never comment to published reports.

"As the silent service of government, we can't very well talk publicly," Goodwin explained as he referred a reporter to the Department of Justice.

But the Department of Justice denied any inside knowledge of the My Lai incident.

"That's an Army case," a department spokesman told a reporter. "I think you oughta check with DOD (Department of Defense)."

"This is the first I had heard of that," said Lt. Col.

Harry Heath, a Department of the Army spokesman.

"THE BASIS for dismissal as stated by Gen. Connor did not include any reference of any kind to prospective witnesses such as the CIA," Heath said.

Heath, asked if someone higher in authority than Gen. Connor may have been involved in the decision to dismiss the charges, replied:

"I can categorically deny this. Gen. Connor was charged with the disposition of these cases; and as the convening authority and as commanding general of the Third U.S. Army, the decisions he reached were independent decisions made on the best information and advice available to him at his headquarters."

Heath suggested that a reporter contact officials at Ft. McPherson for further confirmation that Connor acted alone in dismissing the charges.

"That (CIA subpoenas) had nothing to do with it," said a spokesman at Ft. McPherson, who also denied the possibility that higher-ranking officers may have been involved.

"THE DECISION (to drop charges) was made before the Department of the Army ever found out about it," he said.

The My Lai case dismissals were not the first time attorneys have claimed a victory through the CIA's determination to stay out of public view.

In 1969, eight members of the Army's Special forces — including Capt. Budge Williams of Athens, Ga. — were charged in connection with the death of a Vietnamese national.

Attorneys got nowhere when they contended that the dead man was a dangerous double

agent whose death order came from the CIA.

But, when one adamant attorney won permission to bring CIA records into the case, the charges against all of the Green Berets were quickly dropped.

WELTNER said he received authorization to subpoena a three CIA men shortly before the charges against Torres were dismissed.

The three agents were James B. May, senior province adviser in Quang Ngai; Robert Ramsdell, a contractual employe and operating head of the committee controlling Operation Phoenix in the My Lai area; and Capt. Clarence J. Dawkins, who was the liaison officer between Operation Phoenix and the Americal Division.

Weltner said he told Army officials that he hoped to show that the CIA had created a "systematic program" for the elimination of "an indeterminate number... in the thousands — of Vietnamese civilians" who were suspected of working with the Viet Cong.

The territory around My Lai was "a place that contained a vast number of Viet Cong infiltrators," many of whom were named on a CIA "black list," Weltner contended.

STATINTL

Stanley Karnow

CIA tells it like it is

Popular mythology, especially in liberal quarters, invariably casts the Central Intelligence Agency in a villainous role in Vietnam. But in fact, the CIA has consistently been the most objective organization functioning out there — particularly in assessing the political realities of the war.

In other words, the CIA has been generally telling it like it is rather than dishing up optimistic reports calculated to please and appease the Establishment in Saigon and Washington.

For that reason, the Agency has incurred the envy of State Department officials, the wrath of senior American military officers and something less than full White House support. And, as a consequence, its presence in Vietnam has been gradually reduced.

There are virtually no CIA men now working at the district and village levels. Instead, the estimated 50 Agency operatives currently stationed outside Saigon are assigned mainly to provincial headquarters, where their jobs are largely ritualistic.

The program designed to identify and uproot the Viet Cong political network in the countryside, known as Operation Phoenix, has been taken out of CIA hands and put under US military auspices. So has the training of the Saigon government's so-called "revolutionary development" cadres.

As run by the American military, pacification appears to be making little real headway. This view was even confirmed recently by Sir Robert Thompson, the Briton considered to be the President's favorite Vietnam expert.

One of the CIA techniques that has never quite satisfied the Establishment has been a tendency to produce qualitative intelligence — anecdotal, descriptive information often too fuzzy to be fed into computers. The Pentagon, in contrast, prefers statistics that can adorn graphs and flip-charts.

In the opinion of many Vietnam specialists, it was the military's quantitative approach that repeatedly created the illusory impression that the war was being won.

The military has also tended to paint a rosy picture of the Vietnam situation in order to bolster its claim to have regis-

tered significant battlefield gains. With less need to justify itself, the CIA has tried to be more level in its appraisals.

A good example of the kind of frustrations the CIA has encountered was described by Neil Sheehan in a recent New York Times dispatch disclosing that the Agency had been rebuffed in its attempts to warn the President that more than 30,000 Communist agents have infiltrated various South Vietnamese government departments.

Though White House sources confirmed the existence of the CIA document, they dismissed it as exaggerated and "overly pessimistic" — apparently because it differed from the more optimistic accounts assuring the President that his policies are resulting in progress.

Similarly, studies undertaken with CIA field participation in two key South Vietnam provinces not long ago have reportedly been shelved because their findings failed to substantiate military assertions that the Viet Cong in those places has been put out of action.

According to these classified studies, Viet Cong political activists are still very much alive in those provinces, even though they have been compelled by increased Saigon government activity to operate more covertly at the present time.

The studies estimate, therefore, that the Communists would show substantial gains in the two provinces even in a free election if they had eight or nine months during a cease-fire in which to reassemble their apparatus and resume their efforts to influence the local population.

Implicit in this investigation is the suggestion that President Nguyen Van Thieu's Saigon regime is at its strongest point at the moment, and would probably perform relatively well were a political settlement initiated quickly.

Moreover, the studies recommend that preparations be made for such a settlement by strengthening the regime's village political structures.

Judging from the fate of these studies, both Washington and Saigon are evidently still persuaded that guns rather than negotiations are the answer in Vietnam. So instead of being hailed as a hero, as in the fable, the little boy who honestly declared the emperor to be naked is being administered a swift kick in the pants.

STATINTL

UPI-52-A

(MY LAI)

WASHINGTON--CHARGES WERE DROPPED BY THE ARMY TODAY AGAINST FOUR OFFICERS ACCUSED OF COVERING UP THE ALLEGED MY LAI ASSACRE.

THE ACTION LEFT ONLY THREE OFFICERS STILL CHARGED OUT OF 13 ORIGINALLY ACCUSED OF SUPPRESSING INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AT THE VILLAGE IN SOUTH VIETNAM ON MARCH 16, 1968. NONE OF THE 13 WAS ACCUSED OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE IN THE DEATH OF CIVILIANS AT MY LAI.

LT. GEN. JONATHAN O. SEAMAN, 1ST ARMY COMMANDER AT FORT MEADE, MD., DISMISSED "BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE." CHARGES AGAINST LT. COL. DAVID C. GAVIN, STAFFORD SPRINGS, MISS.; LT. COL. WILLIAM D. GUINN, GREENVILLE, TENN., MAJ. CHARLES C. CALHOUN, GREENVILLE, S.C., AND MAJ. FREDERIC W. WATKE, OMAHA, NEB. GUINN AND GAVIN WERE BOTH ADVISERS TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, WHERE MY LAI IS LOCATED.

WATKE WAS COMMANDER OF A HELICOPTER COMPANY FLYING CHOPPERS IN AND AROUND MY LAI THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT. CALHOUN WAS EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND OPERATIONS OFFICER OF TASK FORCE BARKER, THE UNIT MADE UP OF CAPT. ERNEST MEDINA'S COMPANY AND TWO OTHER COMPANIES.

OF THE 13 OFFICERS CHARGED LAST MARCH WITH NONVIOLENT CRIMES, THE THREE STILL FACE CHARGES INCLUDE THE HIGHEST RANKING OFFICER INVOLVED IN THE CASE.

HE IS MAJ. GEN. SAMUEL W. KOSTER, WHO COMMANDED THE AMERICAL DIVISION, OF WHICH THE MY LAI UNITS WERE PART, AT THE TIME OF MY LAI.

HE WAS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT WHEN HE WAS CHARGED WITH "FAILURE TO OBEY LAWFUL REGULATIONS AND DERELICTION IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES." KOSTER RESIGNED FROM WEST POINT THE SAME DAY THE CHARGES WERE PLACED.

THE OTHER OFFICERS STILL FACING SIMILAR CHARGES ARE COL. ORAN K. HENDERSON, THEN COMMANDER OF THE 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE, AND CAPT. DENNIS H. JOHNSON, THEN SERVING WITH A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT.

THE CHARGES AGAINST KOSTER AND THE OTHERS GREW OUT OF AN INVESTIGATION BY A SPECIAL PENTAGON PANEL WHICH CONDUCTED SECRET HEARINGS IN WASHINGTON AND ALSO VISITED VIETNAM.

THOSE ACCUSED OF SUPPRESSION OF INFORMATION ABOUT MY LAI WERE TRANSFERRED TO FORT MEADE AFTER THE CHARGES WERE MADE. GEN. SEAMAN WAS THEN ASSIGNED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION -- THE MILITARY EQUIVALENT OF A GRAND JURY PROCEEDING.

AS A RESULT OF SEAMAN'S INVESTIGATION THE CHARGES WERE DISMISSED TODAY AGAINST FOUR MEN, AS WERE THOSE AGAINST SIX OTHERS PREVIOUSLY.

1/6--MB1055A

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0

5 JAN 1971

Saigon due to remodel arrest plan

By Daniel Southerland
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Saigon

The Saigon government is taking steps that could help eliminate one of the most glaring abuses of its controversial Phoenix program, which is aimed against the Viet Cong political and administrative apparatus.

One of the most persistent criticisms of this United States-backed program, which is supposed to coordinate intelligence from several different agencies, is that police and military operations launched under the Phoenix concept result in the arrest and imprisonment of many innocent civilians.

Among these are civilians who have been forced to assist the Viet Cong by paying taxes, or doing jobs such as digging trenches or carrying rice. They are not full-fledged Viet Cong political and administrative cadre. The government calls them "Class C Communist offenders."

Class C civilians

It is the Class A and B Viet Cong, the hard-core, full-time cadre, who are supposed to be the main targets of Phoenix operations. It is they who run the Viet Cong "shadow government" and support Viet Cong military units through recruiting, indoctrinating, propagandizing, collecting taxes, planning assassinations and kidnappings, and organizing supplies.

But government sources say provincial security committees throughout South Vietnam sentence to prison terms each year some 10,000 "Class C civilians. They outnumber all the "A" and "B" category prisoners combined. Thousands of these prisoners are never brought to court trial, and thousands of others have never even been sentenced.

Individual case histories indicate that many who have gone to prison as active supporters of neither the government nor the Viet Cong come out as active backers of the Viet Cong and with an implacable hatred for the government. This is partly because of the Viet Cong indoctrination and partly because Viet Cong indoctrinational efforts inside the prisons are very effective.

The government apparently decided all the arrests were doing more harm than good, and the Ministry of Interior recently called a meeting of the agencies and ministries concerned with security to discuss plans aimed at reducing the arrests of Class C civilians.

Actually, there are already regulations on the books that are supposed to provide for lenient treatment of such civilians, particularly when they were forced to do something for the Viet Cong against their will. But the regulations have not been working.

The government plans to launch a nationwide publicity campaign and training courses for government cadre, aimed at reducing the arrests and getting the cooperation of those now assisting the Viet Cong.

Difficulties seen

But the government may run into difficulties at the implementation stage. Earlier government efforts to get local authorities to reduce the number of Class C arrests have failed. The new plans do, however, have top-level backing from Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem and presumably also from President Thieu. Officials appear to be more sensitive than before to the problems involved.

Interior Ministry officials, for instance, say the money being spent to detain and feed thousands of "C" category civilians could be better used for economic, educational, and social-reform programs and that a reduction in the arrests of such civilians would go a long way toward improving crowded conditions in many prisons where the majority of the prisoners are Class C.

Another consideration

There is another consideration: Not only are the prisons crowded, but prison authorities also are running into increasing disciplinary problems with the prisoners.

Ever since international attention focused on the conditions in the maximum-security cells, or so-called tiger cages, on Con Son Island last July, growing numbers of prisoners throughout the country have been striking and protesting. At Con Son the problem has grown particularly acute.

The government action regarding arrests came when the Phoenix effort against the Viet Cong underground is coming under increasing scrutiny as one aspect of the government's pacification program, which is not getting the desired results.

Few officials in Saigon are prepared to go