

29 SEP 1971

CIA Seeks Men For Laotian War, McCloskey Says

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington -- Representative Paul N. McCloskey (R., Calif.) yesterday accused the Central Intelligence Agency of recruiting American mercenaries to fight in Laos.

The accusation was based on information from an electrical engineer who reported he was told at an Oakland (Calif.) employment agency that such jobs were available at \$1,000 a week.

Not Verified

Mr. McCloskey, a critic of the administration's war policies who will challenge President Nixon in the New Hampshire primary, admitted he personally had not checked out the charge.

Independent inquiry suggested the incident indeed took place, but the employment agency president said he doubted whether his Oakland office manager, since fired, would have mentioned either mercenaries or the CIA.

Clarence C. Holben, of Lafayette, Calif., the engineer, insisted that he did.

Contacted at his home, Mr. Holben recalled visiting the Oakland office of Overseas Services in April or May and being told he could earn \$1,000 a week working for Air America, an ostensibly private airline operated by the CIA, handling logistical support for guerrilla operations in Laos.

Worked At Laboratory

Until June 30, Mr. Holden was employed at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore which is run by the University of California.

Discouraged by the interviewer's comment that "I might come back in a box," Mr. Holben said he never asked for detailed job specifications but "got the picture of running around with a gun slung over your shoulder."

Richard Lester, president of the Los Angeles-based Overseas Services, said it was "unlikely any office manager would even know what Air America does for a living."

He said the company places about 1,000 persons a year in jobs in 134 countries. It has filled slots for Air America, he added, but only pilots and [aviation] technicians, not troops.

"McCloskey is blowing smoke," Mr. Lester added.

Almost An Aside

Mr. McCloskey's charge was made at a breakfast meeting with reporters yesterday during which he criticized the administration for "concealment and deception" in its relations with Congress.

At one point, almost as an aside, he observed that "we caught the CIA in Oakland recruiting mercenaries to fight in Laos."

He seemed surprised when the reporters pressed him for details, conceding he had not followed through on the allegation because "it's so consistent with their [the CIA's] procedures."

It developed the information had been sent not to Mr. McCloskey but to Representative Jerome R. Waldie (D., Calif.) in a letter dated July 11 from a constituent who knew Mr. Holben.

A spokesman for Mr. Waldie said as far as the congressman was concerned, the letter contained "unverified information" and that he had turned it over to Mr. McCloskey for checking.

SEP 29 1971

C.I.A. IS ACCUSED BY REP. MCCLOSKEY

Recruits U.S. Mercenaries for Laos, He Says

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 28— Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr. of California said today that the Central Intelligence Agency was recruiting Americans to become combat mercenaries in Laos.

"We caught the C.I.A. a couple of months ago recruiting people in Oakland," he said.

Officials of the intelligence agency privately dismissed the charge.

Mr. McCloskey, a candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination, made the allegation to reporters during a breakfast meeting at which he asserted that the Nixon Administration habitually engaged in "concealment and deception."

The charge was based on the account of a job-seeking engineer from California who told of being offered "\$1,000 a week and a box to come home in" when he answered a newspaper advertisement for overseas work. Mr. McCloskey conceded that he had not made an attempt to verify the allegation since learning of it in July.

The engineer, Clarence C. Holben of Lafayette, Calif., said in a telephone interview today that he went last April to the Oakland branch of Overseas Services, a Los Angeles-based job placement company, after finding that he was to be laid off by the Atomic Energy Commission's radiation laboratory in Livermore.

Decided to Stay Home

He said that the branch manager had told him he could make "real money" if he would sign on with Air America, a flight charter company that works for the Intelligence Agency in Southeast Asia. Mr. Holben said he was told that if he took the job he would actually be working for the C.I.A. He added he turned down the chance because, "at 47 I can't visualize myself running around with grenades and

According to Mr. Holben, the job was only one of several suggested by Overseas Services, whose Oakland representative pointed out a number of places on a map and said, "we've even placed people at the [United States] Embassy in Moscow."

At the Oakland office of Overseas Services today, the present manager, Kenneth McDonald, said it was "news to me" and that he had "never seen anything for the C.I.A."

But Mr. McDonald, who took over the office only two weeks ago, said he could not discount the possibility that Mr. Holben's account was correct. He said that he himself once had sought a job as a pilot with Air America with the understanding that "they have some divisions that get a little rough once in a while." He said he was rejected because he wears glasses.

"I don't know what's wrong with McCloskey," Mr. McDonald added. "People are shooting at other people all over the world."

He said his predecessor in the Oakland office, whom he identified as Grant Bryan, was recently dismissed and could not be located. Richard Lester, president of Overseas Services, said he did not know where to find Mr. Bryan.

Mr. Lester said that his company had helped to place hundreds of pilots and technicians with Air America, one of 1,000 or more American companies to which his concern submits resumes for job applicants. "But never a mercenary," he said.

Officials of the C.I.A. declined to speak for the record, but one official commented privately of Mr. Holben and his account: "What would we do with mercenaries in Laos? All the fighting there is done by Meo tribesmen. Is he Meo tribesman?"

Mr. Holben's account was first related to Representative Jerome R. Waldie, Democrat of California, by a constituent acquainted with the engineer. Mr. Waldie passed it on to Mr. McCloskey.

Mr. Holben said that neither Congressman had got in touch with him. He added that reporters were lucky to find him today because he was leaving California tonight for a new job — running a sporting-goods store in Lake Havasu City, Ariz.

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Drug Addiction Afflicts Children Of U.S. Officials in Southeast Asia

By THOMAS MARLOWE
 Special to The Bulletin

Vientiane, Laos — Last spring, two American teen-aged dependents of foreign aid employes were caught mailing 20 kilograms of pure heroin through the Army Post Office here.

The drugs were destined for Saigon, to be picked up by other dependents for use or sale.

As a result, no one under 18 years of age is now allowed to mail anything larger than a letter through the Vientiane APO. Dependents over 18 can be prosecuted if caught mailing drugs.

Several days later, the son of an embassy official admitted confidentially that "I was all ready to mail 10 pounds of heroin to the States."

"I had it all packed and a buyer waiting at the other end," he said. "But it is just too risky now. The APO is checking every package."

Heroin and other drugs are not only deeply entrenched in the American military, but in much of the American civilian community in Southeast Asia. Centered in Compound

Among those who will probably return to the United States with a habit are American teen-aged dependents of civilian and military officials.

Many live at K-M6, a compound outside of Vientiane for American officials and their families. At the K-M6 high school one ninth-grader said: "Almost everyone past the sixth grade smokes grass

here. A lot of the older kids are using speed and heroin."

The hard drug problem in Laos has its roots in the so-called "fertile triangle" which borders Burma and Thailand. More than half the world's poppy crop is harvested there each year.

Problem in Thailand

The poppies are harvested primarily by Meo tribesmen.

Some of the opium is reported to find its way to the secret Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Cheng,

where it is said to be transported via planes of the CIA-subsidized Air America to Bangkok, Saigon, Hong Kong, and even San Francisco.

Americans in Laos are not the only ones hit with the spreading drug problem. In Thailand, at least one American student at the Bangkok International School died from an overdose of narcotics during the past school year, and 14 others were expelled for drug usage.

"Those were only the constant violators," explained one student. "You know, the kids who go into the bathrooms and shoot up between classes."

The psychiatric ward at Bangkok's 5th field hospital has grown accustomed to American dependents.

Little Girls, Too

"There's almost always a 13- or 14-year-old kid in there for smack," a medic said. "They usually bring them in at night and give them a urine test in the morning."

A hospital psychologist said:

"It hurts when a 12- or 13-year-old girl is brought in with an overdose. I've seen little girls with needle marks on their arms. Their parents often cry and want to know why."

To support their habits, or just to make money, some kids sell drugs. They rationalize that "somebody will do it, why not me?"

Shortly after last Christmas, the 17-year-old son of a U. S. foreign aid employe was shot to death in a Bangkok alley.

"He had not," according to one of his former associates, "paid his Thai supplier the full amount for the last shipment (of heroin) he received."

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STATINTL

CIA Recruiting Mercenaries For Laos, McCloskey Says

By PAUL HOPE
Star Staff Writer

Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr., charged today that the Central Intelligence Agency is recruiting American mercenaries to fight in Laos.

McCloskey, a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, also accused the Nixon administration of practicing "concealment and deception" and claimed that "truth in government" is a major issue in his campaign.

The California congressman indicated, however, that if he does "poorly" in the nation's first primary in New Hampshire March 7, he will drop out of the race.

He said it would be "absurd" to ask people to give him financial support if he does not make an acceptable showing there.

Doubts About Nixon

McCloskey indicated he would be hard-put to support President Nixon as the Republican nominee. He said there is little evidence to indicate that Nixon in-

tends to withdraw all U.S. troops from Vietnam or to discontinue all American bombing in Southeast Asia.

He made the charge against the CIA while discussing Nixon's policy with a group of reporters.

"We caught the CIA in Oakland recruiting mercenaries to fight in Laos," he said.

Pressed to explain that, he said he had received a letter from a "constituent" — an unemployed aerospace engineer who was offered \$1,000 a week to fight in Laos.

When his office produced the letter, it turned out to be one to Rep. Jerome R. Waldie, D-Calif., with whom McCloskey recently made a visit to South-

Second-Hand Report

The letter was not from the engineer whom the CIA reportedly had tried to recruit but from another Californian who was relaying the incident to Waldie.

The letter writer, Donald H. Fibush of Walnut Creek, identi-

fied the man as Clarence C. Holben of Lafayette, Calif.

The letter, dated July 11, said in part:

"Do you know that 'Air America,' an arm of CIA, is hiring mercenaries to fight in Laos at \$1,000 per week for each mercenary?"

"I just learned about this a couple of weeks ago. A friend of mine is an engineer and one of the many long-term employees of the rad lab at Livermore who were laid off July 1.

"In looking for employment he answered an ad of an employment agency, Overseas Services, 1939 Harrison St., Oakland, and they offered him the employment as a mercenary in Laos paying '\$1,000 per week plus the box to bring him back.'

"... Today I telephoned him for verification and told him I would like to inform you. Even though he is somewhat a conservative Republican, he has been a strong dove for four or five years...

"I hope that you and/or McCloskey, at your instigation, will verify this information and use it to the fullest extent."

Investigation Sought

McCloskey said he has "asked a field representative to go over" and investigate the matter but that he hasn't done it yet.

"This is the first time I've ever heard of hiring mercenaries by ad," McCloskey said.

"It draws attention to the fact that Congress says there shall be no American ground combat troops in Laos. It raises the question of whether the CIA can recruit an army (and) at what point does an army of irregulars become an American army... At what stage does the CIA get authorized to fight a private war."

STATINTL

CIA ORGANIZING, WAGING UNDECLARED WARS OF AGGRESSION

Moscow TASS International Service in English 1971 GMT 21 Sep 71 L

[Text] Washington September 21 TASS--TASS correspondent Vladislav Cherny

The Central Intelligence Agency is playing an increasingly active part in organizing and waging undeclared wars of U.S. imperialism. This is confirmed by facts contained in the "confidential memorandum" sent by the former CIA agent V. Marchetti to the member of the Congress House of Representatives Radilio published in the Washington POST. Marchetti pointed out, in particular, that the U.S. administration, taking advantage of the vague formulation of U.S. laws, sanctions the setting up of secret military arsenals and paramilitary forces secretly from the public and Congress. These arsenals and forces controlled by the CIA, the Washington POST writes, were used and are evidently being used for waging secret wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The "confidential memorandum" says that for securing the possibility for launching rapidly military operations in various regions of the world the CIA has at its disposal air companies everywhere from the Congo to Nepal. Among such companies mention is made, for example, of the "Southern Air Transport" in Miami whose tasks include the air lifting of troops and weapons to some Latin American country for waging a secret war in case of emergency.

The biggest agent of the CIA is the "Air America" company which is playing an important part in the secret war in Laos.

In addition to its "unlimited" air transportation facilities, Marchetti points out, the CIA also keeps in the middle west arsenals of unregistered weapons, a secret base for training commandos in North Carolina, a secret air base in Nevada, and maintains contacts with international firms trading in arms.

Of late the attention of the U.S. and world public has been riveted to the war in Laos which has been waged for a number of years by the forces of mercenaries trained and paid by the CIA. As the U.S. ambassador to Laos Godley admitted recently, the army of the CIA has a strength of 30,000 men now. These "irregular troops" as Washington prefers to call them are, as he put it, "the backbone of military efforts in Laos".

The "confidential memorandum" tells of how the CIA prepared these military operations. A network of airfields and supply bases where weapons and ammunition were brought from CIA arsenals, was set up in Laotian territory. Simultaneously the CIA recruited mercenaries with whose hands the war is being waged now.

The CIA is by no means the only intelligence and subversive body of the USA through which the U.S. administration is waging undeclared wars against the national liberation movements. According to the U.S. press, Washington spends approximately 5,000 million dollars a year on subversive activities in all the regions of the world. These assignments of U.S. imperialism are carried out by about 200,000 staff members of various intelligence bodies.

As the newspaper Washington POST reports, the U.S. administration is now working out a plan of reorganizing and stepping up the activity of the country's entire espionage and subversive system.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Ex-CIA Man Tells Secret War Effort

By Jack Anderson

A former insider has charged that the Central Intelligence Agency has provided the President with the military wherewithal to wage his own private wars around the world and is geared to fight still new clandestine wars.

In a confidential memo to Rep. Herman Badillo (D-N.Y.) former CIA official Victor Marchetti makes these allegations:

The White House has used "vague phraseology" in the law to build up a vast military arsenal and paramilitary force. Past presidents have ordered the CIA to wage secret wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America without the traditional constitutional safeguards and congressional oversight.

The CIA "has bought and sold air transport companies all over the world" from the Congo to Nepal, so the President could mount paramilitary operations almost anywhere. Marchetti claims one such company, Air America, "has grown so large, owning more aircraft than most major U.S. airlines, that it was a source

of embarrassment within the agency. A senior officer had to be assigned the full-time job of keeping an eye on George Dole (the founder) in the hope of cooling his fantastic business success in the Far East."

Southern Air Transport, a Miami-based firm, is also fingered by Marchetti as a CIA subsidiary. "The sole purpose for the existence of SAT," he asserts, "is that the CIA be ready for the contingency that some day it will have to ferry men and material to some Latin American country to wage a clandestine war."

Fire Fighters

Marchetti also identifies Rocky Mountain Air of Phoenix as "one of the more colorful companies owned by the CIA." This outfit specializes, he says, "in training and air-lifting parachutists, ostensibly for fire fighting purposes." But he then points out that the CIA has no need of fire fighting capability "unless it is to put out military brushfires south of the border."

The CIA's "air capabilities, its warehouses full of unmarked military supplies in the Midwest, a secret demolition training base in North

Carolina, even a secret airbase in Nevada, and its connections with international arms dealing firms," Marchetti charges, give the President a formidable, secret war-making capability.

A CIA spokesman acknowledged that Marchetti formerly held a position of trust at CIA headquarters. He resigned several months ago to write a novel, "The Rope Dancer," based on his CIA experiences. But he abandoned fiction recently to write a detailed background memo for Congressman Badillo, who has introduced legislation to restrict the CIA to intelligence gathering and to prohibit clandestine wars.

Declares Marchetti: "Airports and huge supply bases were secretly established up-country, close to the action. Arms and material were delivered by the boatload from the CIA's warehouses in the Far East and the United States.

"Guerrilla chieftains were recruited to lead the Mcos, who would actually fight the war for the CIA. The government of Laos was placated and finessed into turning things over to the CIA opera-

tors who could conduct the conflict.

Swashbuckling Agents

"The chief of station—the CIA's top post in the field—during the crucial mid-60s, was ----. His previous assignment had been Berlin, where he announced to the CIA contingent there upon his arrival that he intended 'to tear down that blankety-blank wall.' He was transferred to Laos before he had the opportunity to carry out his threat, in part because of his ferociousness.

"He has been succeeded by ----, former chief of station in the Belgian Congo. When things grew quiet there, he once dropped everything for a clandestine foray into the French Congo in hope of tracking down Che Guevara.

"He failed. But his fellow operators a couple of years later eventually caught up with the revolutionary in Bolivia.

"These are the kind of men who have led the CIA in Laos, and the CIA has led the U.S. into another humiliating, inextricable international dilemma."

Bell-McClure Syndicate

STATINTL

After Six Months

U.S. Rice Supplies Resumed in Laos

By D.E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, Sept. 5 — The U.S. Agency for International Development has resumed supplying relief rice to a group of Laotian tribesmen after withholding the food for six months, AID officials said last week.

The resumption of supplies followed publication of a report by an American writer that AID was using the rice in an effort to force tribal villagers at Long Pot, 80 miles north of Vientiane, to cooperate with the U.S.-financed Meo army of Gen. Vang Pao.

Two AID officials, Charles Mann and Norman Barnes, said the rice supplies were resumed when it was determined that the Long Pot area was "secure." The fact that the area was secured a few days after the report by writer Alfred W. McCoy was published was "coincidental," Barnes said.

McCoy, who spent five days at Long Pot researching his second book on Laos, said U.S. and Meo authorities had stopped supplying rice to the village because the tribesmen refused to allow any more of their youths to be pressed into Vang Pao's forces or, alternatively, to move their village into the Cheng-Sam Thong military complex.

Publication of McCoy's allegation resulted in a query from AID headquarters in Washington to Mann, the agency's local director. Mann and Barnes reportedly went immediately to Long Pot and airplane drops of rice were resumed.

The first drop of grain contained 10 days worth of food for the seven villages in the Long Pot area, Barnes said. In addition, he said, a local medic and more than 350 pounds of medicines have been supplied.

Commenting on McCoy's claims about why the rice had been withheld for six months,

Barnes said their investigation did not cover the question.

However, he said Long Pot was declared "insecure" early this year and "U.S. AID does not drop rice into high-risk areas."

Barnes said Long Pot was listed as controlled by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese army forces since last February, when there was fighting in the area and 12 persons were killed.

McCoy, of New Haven, Conn., said however, that there has been no fighting in the Long Pot area since that time. He also said that a six-man detachment of Meo soldiers, equipped with a radio, has been in the area since the fighting.

Village leaders and the Meo troops themselves reportedly told McCoy they had been in constant radio communication with the base at Long Cheng and had frequently requested rice drops.


McCoy also said helicopters operated by Air America, a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency-backed airline in Laos, made periodic visits to Long Pot. One touched down there while he was in the village, McCoy said.

Village leaders told McCoy their relations with the Meo headquarters at Long Cheng fell off when the villagers refused to allow 14-year-old boys to be pressed into military service with the Meos. The 15-year-olds they had turned over to Gen. Vang Pao had been wiped out, they said.

"They simply decided they had lost too many killed already, that they could not afford more," McCoy said.

He added that following this refusal, the villagers were asked to move to the Cheng-Sam Thong complex. When they refused to leave their home of the last 30 years, he said, their rice supplies were cut off.

STATINTL



Gaps in Nixon-Mao publicity

By TOM FOLEY

Henry Kissinger's trip to Peking and the forthcoming visit of President Nixon to the People's Republic of China are now getting tremendous publicity in the U.S. news media. But many questions about this apparent U.S.-PRC rapprochement remain unanswered—at least, publicly—and the detailed speculation in the U.S. press deliberately seems to avoid these areas. They are the following:

1) Northern Burma and Laos: ever since the Chinese civil war, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been deeply involved in this region just south of the Chinese province with the romantic name of Yunnan, or "Cloudy South" province. In 1949, the defeated remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army crossed over into north Burma and Laos, seized control of these outlying areas, and began calling themselves the Yunnan Anti-Communist and National Salvation Army. Actually, they are the biggest opium dealers in Southeast Asia and they have been financed and armed since 1949 by the CIA.

In Laos, the CIA organized, trained and equipped the 50,000-man secret army led by Gen. Vang Pao, composed of his Meo tribesmen followers, who are the biggest opium smugglers in Southeast Asia. But everybody knows that the CIA created this Meo military force not only for use in Laos: in Yunnan, there are 4.5 million Meo tribesmen who form the most important national minority in south China and who have maintained their ties with their relatives across the Laos border.

2) Tibet and northern Nepal: in 1959, when revolt broke out among the Amdo and Khampa tribesmen of Tibet, it did not require great insight to see the CIA hand involved in it. The Khampas were armed with brand new U.S. equipment, including GI fatigue uniforms and thermoboots. Since both Tibetans and Chinese hate and fear the Khampas, the CIA made a serious political mistake in backing them, because everybody else allied against them. They did get the Dalai Lama, however, probably because he is of Amdo, in China. About 20,000 Khampas

and Amdos fled mainly into northern Nepal after the 1959 revolt and simply took over the country in conjunction with the CIA and U.S. military in Nepal. As far as anybody knows, most of them are still there.

3) Taiwan and CIA air bases: as everybody except the ordinary American citizen knows, Taiwan is headquarters for the CIA's vast air operations in Asia. The CIA base is at Tainan and is run by a front organization called Air Asia, which also has an office in downtown Taipei. Air Asia in turn is a subsidiary of Air America, the CIA line which provides all supply and transport runs for CIA operations in Laos, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia. Air America has its offices in Okinawa; it is a Delaware corporation with about 4,000 employees listed on its records as working in Asia.

The CIA base at Tainan, in southwest Taiwan, was the launching point for all CIA operations against the Chinese mainland, including parachute drops and reconnaissance flights. This is also well known to everybody except the American people.

But the curious fact is that the U.S. news media have not mentioned a word about any of these areas, and neither has the U.S. government. The Chinese side has been completely silent about them as well.

Any real normalization of U.S.-China relations demands that all these CIA operations be ended—and not only in China—and that the American people finally be told the truth about them in detail.

STATINTL

Student congress applauds veteran

Ex-Green Beret discloses U.S. guided China incursions



By Trudy Rubin
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Fort Collins, Colo.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency "equipped and directed" incursions by mercenaries into Chinese territory from northern Laos, according to a former Green Beret captain.

Lee Mond, now a student at Newark, N.J., State College and a delegate to the National Student Association Congress here, says "no Americans have crossed the Chinese border." However, the CIA recruited ethnic Laos and Chinese for the crossings. In addition, he maintains the CIA "directed reconnaissance missions and monitored operations along the Chinese border."

Emotional speech

Mr. Mond repeated in an interview with the Monitor charges he first aired at a forum on war crimes sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War as part of the congress last Saturday.

The tall, black veteran of seven years, seven months service who left the Army in June, 1970, after being wounded three times—winner of the Silver Star and three Bronze Stars—struggled with his emotions as he told the cheering NSA delegates on Monday that he had "made up my mind after a year of deliberations to disclose this information because these things were part of an ongoing philosophy of . . . the executive branch of this country."

Mr. Mond said that about 3,000 Chinese were in northern Laos when he was in Thailand from June, 1969, to June, 1970, and that they then controlled the quarter of the country north of the royal capital Luang Prabang.

The majority were engineers, building a north-south road from China to Luang Prabang. He said "studies indicate" that they hoped to push down to Vientiane, the present provisional capital.

Chinese infantry units were in Laos to protect the road builders, he added, and antiaircraft installations were built in Laos to protect them.

Incursions described

The incursions were aimed at watching Chinese movements.

He said the incursions were made at Lai Chau in the northern tip of Laos and Muong Sing, also in northern Laos, and that the units moved about 50 to 75 kilometers north and northwest into a large open area touching on the town of Lant Sang in Yunam Province in the People's Republic of China.

Mr. Mond said his information was based on studies he had read while serving as a plans officer in Thailand on the U.S. Army general staff and in conversations with military personnel.

He also served with the 101st Airborne in Vietnam.

The former captain cited as one main reason for his disaffection with American policies the massive flood of drugs pouring out of Laos into Thailand and then into the hands of American troops.

Opium smuggling

He charged that the CIA "actively encouraged the growing of poppies, the flower from which opium is made, by Montagnard tribesmen (on the opium rich Plain of Jars) whom the agency recruits as mercenaries.

He later qualified this statement by adding, "perhaps they (CIA) don't always need to encourage them (the Montagnards) to grow poppies because it is so lucrative." He added, "But I am sure they don't discourage them. If they cut off this source of income, they would have to support the tribesmen far beyond what they are paying them now."

Mr. Mond also charged that the opium is often flown illicitly to major populations in Laos by Air America, a private airline said to be controlled by the CIA. "Opium comes out of the Plain of Jars catch as catch can," he said in an interview with the Monitor, "but from Moung Suoi, a major CIA base which has an airstrip, . . . I am aware that pilots would fly it down to Vientiane for their own profit."

Planes carry drugs

He said he "knew" that Air America was flying opium from Vientiane to Udon Thant on the southern Lao border from where it would be transported to Bangkok and perhaps on to the United States. He said that the base at Udon had one of the biggest drug problems of any U.S. base.

added "it is inconceivable that this much opium could be transported on American aircraft without their superiors knowing it."

Mr. Mond said he had never personally witnessed such shipments. However, he said, that while he was in Bangkok doing research for his study on Thailand "I talked with several young Air America pilots. They had been helicopter or fixed-wing pilots in Vietnam—and they told me that the drug trade from Vientiane to Bangkok was vast. They indicated that it was being flown in. I took it for granted that since they were relating this, they had firsthand knowledge."

While in Thailand Mr. Mond's unhappiness with the drug problem led him to write a letter in April, 1970, to the commander of U.S. Army Support Forces in Thailand in which he indicated that between 10 and 15 percent of the junior enlisted men on his base used hard drugs daily.

He also initiated a drug rehabilitation program on his base.



Laos "its no longer 'secret war'"

By Richard E. Ward

The official curtain of secrecy surrounding U.S. aggression in Laos was lifted slightly with the recent publication of a Senate subcommittee staff report, "Laos: April 1971."

The heavily censored report of the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Commitments of the Foreign Relations Committee presented a darkly pessimistic view of U.S. military efforts and indicated that the initiative was in the hands of the liberation forces. The staff report was written by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, who made an on-the-spot study of U.S. activities in Laos from April 22 to May 4.

"Most observers in Laos," they wrote, "say that from the military point of view the situation there is growing steadily worse and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy. There are apparently no plans for retaking and holding any of the two-thirds of the country no longer under government control but only a hope, not too firmly held in some quarters, that the one-third of Lao territory now under government control can continue to be held. Since Lam Son 719, more Lao territory has come under enemy control. . . ."

Lowenstein and Moose reveal that CIA-sponsored forces, formerly known as the Armees Clandestine, which now go by another French term, Bataillons Guerriers, have suffered particularly heavy casualties since 1968 and the Nixon administration has tried to make up for the losses by the introduction of Thai "volunteers"—actually mercenaries.

At a secret June 7 Senate session, when the report on Laos was discussed, Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) and other Senators charged that the use of Thai troops constituted a violation of a Congressional prohibition against U.S. financing of outside mercenary troops in Laos. An expurgated version of the June 7 session was published in the Congressional Record on Aug. 3, the same day the staff report was released.

Thai troops

In releasing the report, which also appeared in the Aug. 3 Congressional Record, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), chairman of the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Commitments, noted that one of the aspects of the U.S. "secret war" in Laos "is that the executive branch refuses to divulge to the public concerns details of arrangements for using Thai troops.

The report indicated, however, that the Thai troops are recruited in Thailand, trained and entirely financed by the CIA, apparently completely bypassing the authority of the Royal Laotian government in Vientiane. The U.S. claims that the Thais are commanded by Gen. Vang Pao, the head of principal CIA-mercenary army recruited in Laos, but there is evidence that he does not exercise command over the Thai troops.

Fulbright stated in the Senate that Thai generals were secretly present in Laos to head their forces. This was verified in the Aug. 9 Washington Post by D. E. Ronk, who wrote that the Thai forces were regular units and not "irregulars," as they were referred to in the Senate report, which was based on the terminology used by the executive branch. On the basis of his own investigation, Ronk wrote from Vientiane as follows:

"Their units are formed and non-commissioned officers are given special training for Laos."

"They arrive in Laos aboard CIA-supported Air America planes from Udorn airbase in northern Thailand. All orders from battalion level down are issued by Thais, the soldiers said. . . ."

CIA "case officers"

"Vang Pao does not command the Thais, they said, but consults with Thai officers and the CIA 'case officers' who actually make the decisions.

"The Thai soldiers agree with press reports that there is at least one Thai general in Laos using the code name Nai Caw. This is the equivalent of John Doe. The Thai troops say he is a lieutenant general.

"Code names are frequently used by and for Thai troops in Laos. . . .Recent visitors to Pakse say that Thai soldiers are very much in evidence in hotels and bars. They do not wear Thai army markings on their uniforms. . . ."

The fact that the Thai commander is a lieutenant general, usually the rank of a divisional commander, is an indication of the substantial size of the Thai contingent which the U.S. is attempting to keep secret. Estimates from the press and senators refer to 4800-6000, with the numbers increasing, while Pathet Lao sources say that the Thai interventionary forces may total 10,000 or more.

The Senate report states that Laotian irregulars under the CIA had 6873 killed in action from 1968 through April 1971. The losses of Vang Pao's units in the same period were almost 3300 dead and more than 5400 wounded. The irregular units now totalling 30,000 have suffered catastrophic losses for their size. The figures do not include the lower but significant losses of the Vientiane royal army (also entirely U.S. financed) nor losses from sickness and desertions—the latter being extremely high. The report observes that the military manpower base in Laos "is now exhausted. . . .Thus additional military manpower can only come from outside Laos."

Shifting strategy?

The only possible conclusion is that Washington is again shifting its strategy in Laos. First it attempted to build up the Vientiane army for use against the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao) and that effort failed. Now that Vang Pao's and other CIA-sponsored forces from Laos have been decimated, the U.S. apparently hopes to prolong the war with the use of Thai troops. It is noteworthy that the Thai commander outranks Vang Pao, whose Meo minority troops were considered until last year to be the backbone of the U.S. military effort in Laos. Because of losses, according to the Senate report, 40% of Vang Pao's troops are no longer from the Meo.

Further evidence of the difficulties confronting the U.S. results from a quasi-disintegration of the royal army. Lowenstein and Moose write that it has "become increasingly difficult in the past year or so to maintain an adequate level of manpower in the Royal Lao Army." Recruitment, they continue, "is said by some to resemble a press gang operation in which only those without political connection end up in the Army. We were told that 30% of all new recruits desert."

Later in the report, the authors write: "Royal Lao Army units are all controlled by individual military region commanders who are frequently likened to warlords. We were told that Vientiane authorities are thus not at liberty to move them from one region to another as the overall military situation may require. Apparently each such move requires negotiation with regional authorities."


It is evident that the Vientiane regime has even less jurisdiction over the CIA irregulars than it has none.

Secret U.S. Action Against Chinese Aired in Congress

By JAMES McCARTNEY
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The story of clandestine U.S. military activities against mainland China has unfolded here before a joint House-Senate committee.

A former Chinese expert for the State Department testified that the United States, in 20 years, has played a key role in mounting "espionage, sabotage and guerilla" activities against China.



**BACKGROUND
REPORT**

The witness, Allen S. Whiting, now with the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, said "secrecy and censorship" have made it impossible for the public to know what was going on.

He blamed the secret activities for starting a whole series of wars in the Far East — and contributing heavily to the start of the Vietnam war.

Whiting's descriptions are believed to be the most detailed made public of secret activities against China mounted by the United States in cooperation with Formosa.

He blamed the U.S.-Taipei efforts for:

- Creating crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1954 and 1958.
- Adding to the flames of a revolt in Tibet in 1959.
- Heightening Chinese "alarm" of Indian advances on the Tibetan frontier in 1962, which led to a Chinese-Indian war in the fall of 1962.

HE SAID THESE CRISES "triggered Chinese Communist military reactions which, in turn, have been used to justify a vast expanse of U.S. military bases, alliances and military assistance programs throughout Asia, ostensibly to contain the threat of Chinese Communist aggression."

These expenditures, he said, have been made "largely in response to a nonthreat."

Whiting's testimony was praised by John Fairbank, who is director of Harvard University's East Asian Research Center and considered the nation's top Chinese expert.

"We should be outraged," Fairbank said, "about the way in which the military had their cap set under the argument of secrecy."

HE SAID WHITING'S testimony indicated the CIA is able "to conduct wars which in turn produced responses from the People's Republic (China) without the American public knowing about it."

It is not known whether the United States is continuing secret operations against China since President Nixon announced plans to visit the RE.

There have been reports that the Nixon Administration has ordered a halt to the dispatching of special, CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen into China on reconnaissance patrols.

But Whiting described much more elaborate activities.

HE SAID THE "SHADOWY involvement" of the United States grew rapidly after the Korean War and the Geneva Conference of 1954.

He identified a Formosan airline, Civil Air Transport (CAT), as being connected with the CIA.

CAT, he said, provided a "commercial cover" for CIA and other secret government activities.

These included "more than 2,000 overflights of mainland China and Tibet, according to Whiting.

"These included "more than 2,000 overflights of mainland China and Tibet, according to Whiting.

"These were not reconnaissance, but airdrops of supplies and possibly men for guerilla warfare."

IN THE 1960S, according to Whiting, CAT "gave way" to a new "cover."

It has been called China Air Lines, which began operations in Laos and later moved to South Vietnam.

China Air Lines has carried out "clandestine intelligence operations" as well as "more dangerous missions," Whiting said.

He said Formosa has also provided the headquarters for Air Asia, a subsidiary of Air America, a CIA-operated airline in Southeast Asia.

HE DESCRIBED AIR ASIA as the "only facility in the Far East — excluding Japan — with modern jet fighter maintenance and overhaul contracts."

"Well over 6,000 combat aircraft were serviced there in the fiscal year 1969," he said.

China Air Lines, Air Asia and Air America, he said, work together to support U.S. attacks in Laos mounted from bases in Thailand. All, of course, are secret.

These activities, he said, help to explain China's road-building activities in northern Laos as well as its efforts to provide anti-aircraft facilities.


STATINTL

The Wonderland of Opium

OPPIUM growing and heroin marketing are not new to Asia or the world. Nor are efforts to control them. Yet last month US President Richard Nixon was prompted to declare a national emergency in his country, bluntly stating: "If we cannot destroy the drug menace in America, then it will surely in time destroy us." America, he admitted, has the highest number of heroin addicts of any nation in the world, although no opium is grown there and no heroin processed. "This deadly poison," Nixon said, "is a foreign import".

Such words must ring ironically in those Asian capitals which are targets of a new international effort to stem drug marketing. And Peking, forced just over a century ago to open its borders to foreign trade after attempting to prevent Westerners from destroying its people with the "foreign mud", now sees the wheel come full circle.

Recently a UN mission accompanied by US observers investigated outlets in northern Thailand — following charges by Taipei that China devoted 6 million acres annually to the production of 10,000 tons of opium for export. It declared China innocent of any involvement in the production or export of opium, heroin or any other narcotics. Marshall Green, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, did not mention China



at a July 12 press conference on the drug problem. He pointed instead to the "golden triangle" — the border areas between Burma, Thailand and Laos.

Experts estimate that in this area 1,000 metric tons of raw papaver somniferum — the "opium poppy" — are harvested every year, 80% of it in Burma, the remainder in Laos and Thailand. Far above the legal limit authorised by the UN, the crop realises 30 tons of heroin in world markets. The route to such markets was directly through Rangoon in the years immediately following world war II, then through Bangkok until 1957, and finally by way of Vientiane, Pnom Penh and Saigon.

The Indochina War, despite creating problems of distribution, has not slowed the flow of drugs. Social workers in South Vietnam now report many of the nation's large street urchin population are hooked on the cheapest form of opium by-product — a dark watery substance which is heated and then injected into the veins. As Green noted, heroin traffickers need to seek new customers as American troops leave Vietnam. "The youth of Asia are a prime target," he concluded "and this disturbing possibility is beginning to come home to Asian leaders". Perhaps they, like their American counterparts, now realise that if they do not destroy the drug menace, it will surely in time destroy them.

Fortunes of War

By T. D. Allman, Bangkok


HEROIN addiction among American soldiers in Vietnam has finally prompted White House orders for US missions in Southeast Asia to crack down on drug traffic. But these new efforts to curb the clandestine trade in drugs are not America's first incursion into the murky area of Southeast Asia's most secret and profitable business enterprise. Though the exact details have been well-guarded secrets, several US clandestine agencies and a number of allied Asian military leaders have been involved in the traffic for years. Until the tragedy of opium and heroin addiction began to strike US soldiers, the reason for American involvement in the trade was ruthlessly simple. Opium is a major basis of the power wielded by several of the area's most influential pro-American leaders, and US influence with them has depended partly on American ability to influence the flow of opium within the region.

The remote northern mountains of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Burma are among the world's prime opium growing areas. Traditionally, the local warlord, governor or military commander has controlled the drug trade for his own profit. In their efforts to dominate these regions, American personnel have become involved in a sordid business that goes back to the opium wars of the last century.

The degree and nature of official involvement in the drug trade takes different forms in different countries. When asked by a congressional committee if Asian government officials

were involved US Attorney General John Mitchell replied "the fact of the matter is there has been involvement of government officials in some of these countries. Mitchell refused to name publicly any of the suspected figures, but Congressman Robert Steele, a former CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) officer who has personally investigated Southeast Asian drug trade, said a fortnight ago the US had "hard intelligence" that Major General Ngo Dzu, commander of a vital military zone

in northern South Vietnam was "one of the chief traffickers in heroin in Southeast Asia". Although Dzu promptly denied the charge, both Saigon's defence ministry and the US state department announced they would investigate immediately. But when similar accusations were made against Vice Presi-



Vientiane marijuana market: Traffic is hardest to control in Laos, because of involvement at the top.

STATINTL

16 AUG 1971

LAOS

The Twilight Zone

The total budget for the Kingdom of Laos this year is a paltry \$36.6 million. To fight a war there, the U.S. in fiscal 1971 spent \$284.2 million—or \$141 for every one of the approximately 2,000,000 men, women and children under government control. (The gross national product totals only \$66 per capita.)

These bizarre statistics are contained in a once secret staff report released last week by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after five weeks of haggling with the Administration over declassifying its salient points. The figures become even more bizarre when the cost of air operations—one of the figures still classified, but reliably estimated at \$1.4 billion—is included, bringing per capita expenditure up to an incredible \$900. The report was compiled after a visit to Laos last spring by Richard Moose and James Lowenstein, both former Foreign Service officers, who are the committee's staff experts on Southeast Asia. Their findings at least partially lifted what Committee Member Stuart Symington called "the veil of secrecy, which has long kept this 'secret war' in Laos officially hidden from the American people." The study also came to the discouraging conclusion that despite vast expenditures by the U.S., the military situation in Laos "is growing steadily worse, and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy."

War by Proxy. Though the 23-page document focuses on the clandestine nature of U.S. operations in Laos, the fact is that quite a few nations are involved in the same way. The reason for the secrecy is that none of the nations want to be accused of violating Laotian neutrality, which is guaranteed by the Geneva accords of 1962.

The North Vietnamese have always considered Laos vital in their struggle to unify Viet Nam. As early as 1953, an NVA division invaded Laos and slashed all the way to the Mekong. The Chinese have been working on an extensive road project in northern Laos since 1962, with a sizable military presence for protection. According to the Moose-Lowenstein report, that presence has increased from 6,000 two years ago to as many as 20,000 today, and carries with it a concentration of anti-aircraft and radar installations, which makes the area one of the most heavily defended in the world.

There is little doubt that the North Vietnamese were the first to violate the territorial integrity and neutrality of Laos. But for a variety of reasons, including domestic politics, the U.S. never responded openly to this situation. In-

stead, Communist clandestine operations in Laos were matched—and often surpassed—by the U.S. and its allies.

Not all of the secret adventures are mentioned in the Foreign Relations Committee's report. But they include: American bombing missions in northern and southern Laos from Thai air force bases in Thailand; probes by U.S. Special Forces teams from South Viet Nam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos; secret forays into China from northern Laos by specially trained CIA teams (now reportedly halted); the formation, funding and training by the CIA of an irregular army of up to 15,000 Meo tribesmen; large-scale operations throughout Laos by Air America, the CIA's unofficial flag line in Asia; and the recruitment, training and payment of at least 4,800 Thai volunteers to fight in Laos.

The result is a curious war by proxy whose protagonists are the North Vietnamese and the American-backed irregulars. The cost has been particularly heavy for the Meos. Says Edgar ("Pop") Buell, AID coordinator for northeastern Laos: "Back in 1960 we told the Meos they would only have to hold out for a year. They've held out for more than ten. They're tired and badly cut up, and still we're telling them to hold out. They think it's time for someone else to do the dying."

Heavy Cost. The main argument for this costly effort, as Symington pointed out last week, is that it "will buy more time for Vietnamization" by pinning down North Vietnamese troops in Laos. Without this effort, the North Vietnamese would have unrestricted use of Laotian supply lines to support their effort in South Viet Nam. "But what about Laos?" asked Symington. "The United States is using the people of Laos for its own purposes, at a startlingly heavy increased cost to our taxpayers in money, and to the Lao people in terms of destroyed hopes, destroyed territory, and destroyed lives."

STATINTL

Asian Drug Trade Defies U.S. Crackdown

Saigon (AP)—Americans charged with the task of combatting the heroin traffic in Vietnam find themselves with few real weapons for a fight that is only now beginning.

"We didn't give a damn about the drug business as long as only Asians were using the stuff," commented an American investigator in Saigon. "Now that American GI's are hitting heroin we just don't have enough hard facts to adequately crack down."

12,000 To 37,000 Users

In the first three months of this year United States military authorities apprehended 1,034 users, nearly the same number as they had taken in the whole of 1970. The estimate of GI drug-users ranges from 12,000 to as many as 37,000 of the quarter-million-man American force in Vietnam.

Americans in Thailand say that even though the death penalty for opium processing has been in effect for 10 years, drugs roll through that country in ton lots past border checkpoints and roadblocks, and ultimately to fishing trawlers that move the shipments on to Vietnam.

And in Laos, a major growing, collecting and processing area for the Vietnam trade, Americans are shaking their heads in perplexity over ways to bring about the crackdown demanded by the White House.

Senior Lao generals have been named as being incriminated in

the narcotics pipeline run by a Chinese ring that buys the raw opium in the hills and pays off all down the line, from the time the black gum is processed into heroin to its being sold in tiny plastic vials to GI's on the streets of Saigon.

The huge profits of the racket have kept the narcotics pipeline running for years. And the United States has even become involved in it temporarily for political reasons.

"Why, in the mid-60's when the war disrupted the traditional haulage routes, the CIA ordered Air America to assist the loyal Mco tribesmen by flying their opium crops to Lao collecting points," commented one American involved in drug suppression in Vientiane. "That fact can be documented. The CIA have since got out of the business."

What the United States finds itself best able to do is first to warn GI's against drug usage, then to treat those addicted, and forcefully prevail upon the Vietnamese government to toughen the weak narcotics suppression laws.

President Thieu obliged this week with a bill instituting the death penalty for importers and peddlers belonging to organized rings.

American officials in Laos have helped draw up a bill that finally outlaws opium growing and smoking, and this is expected to be passed soon by the National Assembly.

"But then what we will end up with is rules, just rules," commented a U.S. official in Vientiane. "Now who is going to enforce them?"

American officials say that a concerted police effort in Laos could run to ground the Chinese operating the processing plants, and the dealers. But this would be a massive task involving retraining the police and breaking up a century-old way of life.

And in Bangkok, Americans say that the Thais just do not have the police resources to devote to a realistic drug-suppression effort.

Thailand is the major drug transshipment point to Vietnam, Hong Kong and Singapore, but Thai police must give priority to fighting Communist insurgents in the countryside.

Overlaying the whole suppression problem is the tolerance among Asians toward drugs, and the integral place the narcotics business occupies in the traditional patterns of smuggling in Southeast Asia.

"To effectively stamp out heroin, we would have to change the economic patterns of Asia. The governments of Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam are run by officials who are required to scoop out large doses of cash from the system to buy allegiance and pay political favors," said a U.S. official with long experience in Vietnam.

"At this stage of the game, with Americans getting out of Vietnam, we have less leverage than ever before. Maybe the only way to handle the problem is to pay officials the cash they would lose in cutting out the drug traffic, and I doubt the U.S. Congress would go along with that," he added.

12 AUG 1971

Expert Calls Taiwan U.S.-China Spy Base

By JEROME CAHILL

Washington, Aug. 11 (NEWS Bureau)—The United States and the Chinese Nationalists for 20 years launched espionage, sabotage and guerrilla forays against Communist China from Chiang Kai-shek's island bastion of Taiwan, a former State Department official told Congress today.

Allen S. Whiting, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, who served in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and in the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong from 1961 to 1968, said the covert operations included support of the ill-fated uprising in Tibet in 1959.

Increased After Korean War

Whiting said America's "shadowy involvement" in the clandestine operations grew steadily after the Korean war and the 1954 Geneva Conference. He said they triggered the Formosa Strait crises of 1954 and 1958 and helped set the stage for the Sino-India war in 1962 along the Tibetan frontier.

Testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate-House Joint Economic Committee, Whiting said the publication of the Pentagon papers provided partial documentation of the operations, particularly U. S. and Nationalist Chinese overflights of mainland China.

Quoting from a top-secret memorandum from Brig. Gen. Edward

Lansdale to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Whiting said a Nationalist Chinese airline called Civil Air Transport carried out "more than 200 overflights of mainland China and Tibet." In addition, the line provided aircraft for an abortive CIA effort to overthrow the Sukarno regime in Indonesia in 1958, and helped transport sabotage teams into North Vietnam as early as 1954, the witness said.

Airline Linked to CIA

In 1960, Whiting told the subcommittee, a new Taiwan-based airline, China Air Lines, came into being, and engaged in "clandestine intelligence operations" as well as commercial flights to Laos and Vietnam. He linked the airline to the CIA-backed Air America, which raided Northern Laos in the course of the CIA's "secret war in Laos."

At times, he said, the bombers strayed over the border, hitting mainland Chinese territory. This may explain "much of Peking's expanding military presence in road construction and antiaircraft activities in Northern Laos," he went on.

STATINTL

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STATINTL

CIA-Backed Thais in Laos Say They Are Regular Army

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, Aug. 8 — Thai soldiers serving with the CIA-supported irregular forces in Laos say they are regular army troops of Thailand, asked to accept special assignment in all Thai battalions.

Their assertion contradicts a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report made public last week. The report, prepared by Committee staff members James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose referred to Thai troops in Laos as "irregulars."

Heavily censored in most of its references to Thais serving in Laos, the report said the Thai fighting men "are recruited for service in Laos from outside the regular Thai army."

Speaking to a reporter, several Thai soldiers said they were asked to accept an assignment in Laos after the advantages of such service were explained. They have the option of refusing, they said.

According to the Lowenstein-Moose report, "the CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

Their units are formed in Thailand with Thai commissioned and non-commissioned officers and are given special training for Laos.

They arrive in Laos aboard CIA-supported Air America planes from Udorn Airbase in Northern Thailand. All orders, from the battalion level down, are issued by Thais, the soldiers said. Only at the very top, with Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo commander of Laos Military Region Two, and the CIA's Armee Clandestine, is there interference with the Thai chain of command, they said.

Vang Pao does not command the Thais, they said, but consults with Thai officers and the CIA "case officers"

The Thai soldiers agree with press reports that there is at least one Thai general in Laos, using the code name Nai Caw. This is the equivalent of John Doe. The Thai troops say he is a lieutenant general.

Code names are frequently used by and for Thai troops in Laos. Reliable sources in Thailand say that until recently all wounded Thais treated in the U.S. hospital at Udorn Airbase were listed as John Doe One, Two, Three, etc. to hide their national origins.

At present the troops say, there are 10 or 12 Thai battalions in Laos, or about 4,000 men. Two Thai battalions are at Pakse, in southern Laos, and "about ten" in northern Laos, with headquarters at Long Cheng, the soldiers said.

Reliable sources in Bangkok say, moreover, that another Thai artillery battery has either just entered Laos or shortly will, accompanied by an American major. The U.S. officer is to advise them on the operation of unfamiliar equipment, believed to be aiming devices.

Official U.S. sources deny knowledge of such a unit, that an American officer has been given such an assignment, and that a new American officer has arrived or is expected, even on temporary duty.

The Bangkok sources say the officer will be traveling on a civilian passport and in civilian clothing.

A Thai soldier now stationed in Pakse outlined the sequence of events in his assignment to Laos. Returning to Thailand from duty in South Vietnam, he said, he was sent for advance training in Thailand following a 30-day leave. He was told the training was for assignment to Cambodia, he said.

Following the training, he was told his assignment was changed to Laos, but that he could refuse to go and remain in Thailand.

After the pros and cons were explained he decided to accept and became a volunteer.

When he was assigned to a special battalion, he was sent to Udorn, then to Long

Cheng. At Long Cheng, the unit was engaged in defense of that headquarters. The Thais fought in one "heavy" battle in a sector call "Sky-line" by U.S. personnel.

Shortly before the fall of the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos to North Vietnamese forces last May the Thai battalion was flown to Udon Air Base in Thailand then to Pakse, where they were airlifted to the vicinity of Ba Houei Sai, on the Bolovens Plateau.

As a result of the Hanoi offensive, they withdrew to Pakse. The soldiers said they are not deeply involved in the current counter offensive to recapture the Bolovens, though some of them are used as forward air guides, relaying bombing targets from ground to air.

Recent visitors to Pakse say the Thai soldiers are very much in evidence in hotels and bars. They do not wear Thai army markings on their uniforms and the soldiers say they carry no identification, on orders from their officers.

STATINTL

Air America's Role in Laos Becoming More Clandestine

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, Aug. 6—The role of Air America, a private contractor providing special air transport services to the U.S. government in Southeast Asia, is reverting to a more specific clandestine nature in Laotian operations.

"The company is strictly a paramilitary operation again," following its loss of a "rice drop" contract in competitive bidding recently, says one source close to the company. "It is moving back to its original role."

Air America lost the supply contract to Continental Air Services, another contractor in Southeast Asia, but will continue transport services to the Royal Laotian Army, Vang Pao's CIA-supported clandestine army and other, more secret U.S. government operations in Laos.

Until recently, Continental and Air America shared the service as logistics links to U.S.-supported forces scattered in the mountains north and east of the Mekong basin, dropping them food, arms and ammunition from Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Longcheng or Thailand's Udorn Airbase.

Foodstuff dropping has come to be called "rice drops" because the double-bagged, half-filled sacks of rice, free-falling to outposts, makes up the bulk of the supplies. U.S. government sources say 50 tons are dropped daily.

Air America's helicopters, short takeoff and landing planes and heavy cargo

planes will continue to provide such services, but, according to the sources, company operations will be less open to the public than before because of the nature of the cargo and its destinations. Most strategic cargo moved to the mountains of Laos is moved by Air America.

Most air mobile military operations conducted in Laos, particularly in the northern sector, rely on Air America and its veteran pilots—most of whom, though civilians, have combat experience.

In recent weeks troops and material both for Gen. Vang Pao's current Plain of Jars offensive, 100 miles north of Vientiane, and for the Bolovens Plateau offensive east of Pakse in southern Laos, were ferried by Air America. The operations could not continue without the company's planes and helicopters.

The airline was created as a paramilitary air force following World War II being built around former combat pilots, the most flamboyant of them from Gen. Claire Chennault's Flying Tigers which operated in Asia.

Some of the original Flying Tigers remain with the company, as do former Army Air Corps pilots from the European theater.

The majority today, however, are U.S. Air Force veterans of the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Originally a highly secret service, Air America became famous during the earlier days of the Vietnam war and gradually became a fea-

ture of U.S. government operations in volatile areas, the bulk of its work being cargo and passenger transport. Clandestine operations continued, including piloting T-28 bombers in Laos and search and rescue missions, according to the Pentagon Papers.

Continental Air Services entered cargo hauling for the government in competitive bidding, along with smaller companies, allowing and forcing Air America to revert to its earlier paramilitary role.

Local sources note a recent management and government program to reassert security consciousness among the airlines employees under threat of revoking their security clearances and hence their clearance to fly for the company. According to the sources, recent breaches of security have led to a general shakeup.

Air America is also revert-

ing to use of Asian co-pilots on its less sensitive missions and on smaller planes. Former Nationalist Chinese co-pilots still with the company are being retired, and replacements taken from a small training program for Lao and Thai pilots conducted by the company for the U.S. government.

Use of such co-pilots is said to be a financial saving for the company and also creates a pool of pilots for local aviation. Most of the new co-pilots will be "volunteers" of Thai origin passing as Laotian, according to sources.

Sources say, however, that the larger cargo planes will retain American co-pilots because of the greater skill needed to fly them and the secrecy of many of the missions, particularly troop and war material movements.

"Asians have a low security consciousness quotient," says an American government official.

STATINTL

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CIA Spies, Opium Mix In Obscure Laos Town

By ARNOLD ABRAMS
Special to The Bulletin

Ban Houei Sai, Laos — It is not on any travel agent's list, and has no tourist facilities, yet some of the most interesting things in Southeast Asia are happening in this nondescript Laotian town.

Ban Houei Sai, is rugged mountain country about 225 miles northwest of Vientiane, is a key center for the region's opium traffic, as well as a major base area for CIA-directed intelligence operations in northern Laos.

The two operations are not exclusive. Two ostensibly private charter airlines — Air America and Continental Air Services — reportedly have been carrying both opium and intelligence agents passing through town.

The airlines, chartered exclusively by the U.S. Government and known unofficially as the "CIA Airlines," still fly intelligence operatives.

They presumably have cracked down on opium transport, however, because of Washington's current campaign against narcotics traffic.

The opium comes from the Burma-Laos-Thailand border area, known as the "golden triangle" because its annual output of about 700 tons of raw opium constitutes about half of the world's total supply.

The produce is carried here by former Nationalist Chinese soldiers who have been opium-running in the tri-border area for the past two decades.

The longtime director of opium flow in this area has been Gen Ouan Rathikoun, former commander-in-chief of the Laotian army.

Quan retired from the army recently after being named as a key drug operative by Rep. Robert Stolle (D-Conn), who conducted a wide-ranging study of narcotics traffic in Asia.

The Laotian commander reportedly has been shipping opium from Ban Houei Sai to Vientiane via Air America and Continental Air Services — in effect, having American taxpayers foot the bill for his illicit activity.

The opium is either processed in the Laotian capital or distributed for processing in Saigon, Bangkok or Hong Kong.

American-directed intelligence activities here are designed to assess capabilities and forecast future moves of hostile forces in Laos.

Those forces include Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops, as well as an estimated 14,000 Communist Chinese personnel building roads in northern areas.

Peking's aims in this strange country have long

been a mystery to American analysts. Recent intelligence reports suggest that the Chinese construction projects are designed to bolster China's border defense and facilitate the sending of supplies to Hanoi.

It has been suspected, however, that the roads also are designed to aid Communist-led insurgents in Thailand and Burma.

The spy teams gathering such information consist of specially trained Americans (former servicemen now employed by the CIA), Lao commandos and hilltribe troops.

Operating from bases around Ban Houei Sai, they are equipped with the latest snooping devices, including portable radar and starscopes that allow high visibility at night.

Seven such teams reportedly are operating out of this area. They combine long-range patrolling with periods of observation in which they map enemy supply traffic and troop movements.

The work is dangerous; although U.S. officials in Vientiane refuse to discuss such matters, there have been reliable reports of ambushed patrols and overrun bases.

Some teams, operating from an outpost north of Ban Houei Sai, also engage in patrols that penetrate as far as several hundred miles into south-

ern China's Yunnan Province. Although CIA-directed, these teams do not have American members; they are composed of hill tribesmen whose ethnic stock is prevalent in south China.

Several teams have been captured in Chinese territory during recent years, but U.S. officials in Laos discount the possibility of these forays damaging the developing relations between Washington and Peking.

BALTIMORE SUN
3 AUG 1971

STATINTL

CIA Said To Spend \$100 Million In Laos War

By GENE OISHE
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The CIA spent more than \$100 million last year on a secret war in Laos, using irregular Lao forces bolstered by a large contingent of Thai mercenaries.

This was one of the conclusions to be drawn from a staff report released yesterday by a Senate subcommittee on United States agreements and commitments abroad.

The top secret report was heavily censored by the Pentagon, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, but what remained was the most detailed account so far of U.S. operations in Laos, where, according to some senators, the U.S. is spending more than \$1 billion a year.

Brunt Of Fighting

By not following previous policy of deleting all references to the CIA, the administration for the first time acknowledged the agency's direct support and supervision of the guerrilla warfare being waged by Lao irregular forces, which, according to the report, are carrying the brunt of the fighting against the Communists.

The report was prepared by two members of the subcommittee staff, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, after a 12-day tour of Laos last spring. Its contents were reported to the Senate last month in a secret session, and Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), the subcommittee chairman, made public a "sanitized" version yesterday.

U.S. Spent \$284.2 Million

Excluding the amount spent on U.S. air operations in Laos and the cost of the Thai mercenaries, the report said, the U.S. spent \$284.2 million in that country in fiscal 1971.

Of this amount, \$162.2 million was in military assistance and \$32 million in economic aid. This leaves \$70 million unaccounted for since the CIA

was deleted. However, subcommittee sources made it clear that there was no other program to which the money could have gone.

The sources noted, moreover, that William P. Rogers, the Secretary of State, has stated publicly that the total U.S. expenditure in Laos for fiscal 1971, excluding the cost of the bombing—was \$350 million. This would place the cost of the Thai mercenaries at about \$65 million for the year.

\$374 Million For 1972

Some of this \$65 million is accounted for by an increase in the military aid program, but considerably less than half, according to subcommittee sources.

The budget for fiscal 1972, according to the report, totals \$374 million for military assistance, economic aid and the CIA. Again, the amount allotted for the Thai forces or U.S. air operations is not included in this figure.

The report said that U.S. air operations in Laos were declining because some squadrons are being transferred out of Southeast Asia and also because more aircraft are being used in Cambodia.

B-52 Raids Increased

In 1969, the report said, the U.S. was flying about 400 sorties a day. In April of this year, the level was down to about 340 sorties a day. Because of the deletions, the report did not give the breakdown between missions flown over northern Laos and the Ho Chi Minh trail.

The report noted, however, that the U.S. had increased the level of B-52 raids over northern Laos since last year, although the comparative figures were censored. B-52 bombers are used for high-altitude saturation bombing.

As for the ground war, the report said "friendly forces" totaled about 96,000 men, but that the regular forces are used almost exclusively for "static de-

fense." The irregulars, sponsored by the CIA, do most of the day-to-day patrolling, ambushing and attacking, the report said.

About 4,000 Thais

The irregular forces are composed of 39,000 indigenous troops—including a large contingent of Meo tribesmen—and Thai mercenaries. The number of Thai forces was deleted, but senators have said they numbered about 4,000.

The report said the CIA supervises and pays for the training of Thai recruits in Thailand and then transports them to Laos by Air America, another CIA-financed operation.

Once in Laos, the Thais join the Lao irregular forces, which according to the report, are "trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the CIA."

More Chinese

The report also stated that the number of Chinese forces in northwestern Laos has been increased from 6,000 to 8,000—an estimate given two years ago—to somewhere between 14,000 to 20,000.

Chinese forces are in northwestern Laos ostensibly to build a road, but the report said they have recently installed 300 new radar-directed, anti-aircraft weapons along the route.

The Chinese also have built 12 small-arms firing ranges, normally associated with the stationing of ground troops, as well as 66 basketball courts, the report said.

While the area occupied by the Chinese is off limits to U.S. bombers, the report said, the Royal Laotian Air Force has bombed the area at least twice.

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C.I.A. Says It Maintains Force of 30,000 in Laos

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 2—The Nixon Administration acknowledged today, through a Senate subcommittee staff report, that the Central Intelligence Agency was maintaining a 30,000-man "irregular" force now fighting throughout most of Laos.

Many news articles in recent years have described C.I.A. sponsorship of an irregular army in Laos. However, the subcommittee report represented the first time that the agency publicly and officially confirmed its military activities in Laos. The report indicated that the use of the irregular units in Laos was more widespread than had been indicated in the news accounts.

The force has become "the main cutting edge" of the Royal Laotian Army, according to the report, and has been supplemented by Thai "volunteers" recruited and paid by the C.I.A.

The agency's involvement in a secret war in Laos was finally confirmed officially in a staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on foreign commitments by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, two former Foreign Service officers who made an inspection trip to Laos in April. A version of their report, once classified top secret, was made public today after clearance by the C.I.A. as well as the State and Defense Departments.

Publication of the detailed 23-page report marks the formal acknowledgement of the secret war that the United States has been conducting in Laos ever since the breakdown of the 1962 Geneva accords, which were supposed to re-establish the neutrality of that country.

In making public the report, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, the subcommittee chairman, said: "It is an encouraging sign that the executive branch has finally agreed that much of the United States Government has been doing in Laos may now be made public. The veil of secrecy which has

long kept this secret war in Laos officially hidden from the American people has been partially lifted."

Senator Symington complained, however, that the executive branch was still refusing to make public "certain truths concerning the nature, composition and command arrangements of the Thai forces in Laos." The information the Administration has refused to make public, he said, bears on the question whether the recruitment of the Thai forces violates a provision against hiring soldiers that was written into the Defense appropriations Act last year.

One fact kept secret by the executive branch is the presence in Laos—referred to in the past by Senator J. W. Fulbright—of a series of Thai generals who use the Thai equivalent of John Doe as their names. The senator did not give the Thai equivalent. In contending that the provision against hiring troops is not being violated, the State Department has argued that the Thai volunteers came under the command of the Royal Laotian Army.

Out of the report came the first detailed description of the rapidly rising cost of the American military involvement in a war in which, the report observed, "the Royal Lao Government continues to be almost totally dependent on the United States, perhaps more dependent on us than any other government in the world."

U.S. Spent \$284.2-Million

In the fiscal year 1970, which ended on July 1, a "partial total" of United States expenditures in Laos came to \$284.2-million, of which \$162.2-million was for military aid, \$52-million for economic aid and \$70-million was spent by the C.I.A. exclusive of the amount spent on the Thai forces.

This was the first time that the C.I.A. has permitted disclosure of its spending in Laos, and even then the figure came out indirectly through subtraction from over-all estimates included in the report.

In the current fiscal year, the report said, the estimated cost of military assistance has "risen rapidly," doubling since January, mostly because of increased ammunition being furnished the Royal Laotian and irregular forces. The cost of military and

economic aid plus the C.I.A. programs is now expected to come to \$374-million in the current fiscal year. At that level, the report observed, the cost will be more than three times as large as it was in fiscal 1967 and 25 times as large as when United States assistance began nine years ago.

Not included in these estimates were the costs of United States bombing operations in northern Laos in support of the Royal Laotian forces and in southern Laos against the Ho Chi Minh supply line used by North Vietnam.

The report said that American air operations in Laos had declined over the last two years, with United States planes aver-

aging 340 sorties a day this April, compared with a daily rate of 440 in the first part of 1969. At the same time, B-25 bombing in northern Laos has increased since it was begun in February, 1970, with what amounts to "free fire zones" being established for the bombers. These zones have been cleared of the civilian population and any activity in them can be considered to be supporting the enemy.

The report also said that in recent months the Chinese Communists have increased their air defenses along the road they are building in northern Laos, making the "area one of the most heavily defended in the world." The Chinese, the report said, have moved in "a heavy new increment" of radar-directed antiaircraft guns, raising the total to 395, including for the first time 85-mm. and 100-mm. guns that are effective up to 68,000 feet.

The area around the Chinese-built road is "off limits" to American planes, but the report noted that on at least two occasions the road had been attacked by unmarked Royal Laos air force T-28's furnished by the United States.

The Chinese build-up of anti-aircraft defenses began after an attack by two Laotian planes in January, 1970.

In the last two years, the report said, the size of the Chinese forces along the road has increased from 6,000 to between 14,000 and 20,000. Since November, 1970, the Chinese, in addition to "upgrading carrier road construction," have constructed eight small-arms firing ranges of a kind normally associated with garrisons of ground troops as well as a large number of basketball courts.

The Chinese road stretches from the Chinese border to Muang Sai in north-central Laos, with branches extending toward Dienbienphu in North Vietnam and toward the Thai border. The purpose of the road remains unclear, but the report observes that in terms of "areas of influence," the "practical effect of the Chinese road is that the Chinese border has already been shifted southward to encompass a substantial portion of northern Laos."

To subcommittee members, probably the most significant disclosure of the report was confirmation that their irregular units in Laos are "trained, equipped, supported, advised and to a great extent organized by the C.I.A."

The "B.G. units," as they are known. (For the French term "battalions guerriers"), "have become the cutting edge of the military," the report said, "leaving the Royal Lao Army as a force primarily devoted to a static defense."

These units began as a force of Meo tribesmen under Gen. Yang Pao operating around the Plain des Jarres, but now, the report said, they are operating in all sections of Laos except a small military region around Vientiane, the administrative capital.

Except for a 1,500-man cadre from the Royal Lao Army, all members of these units, according to the report, are "volunteers," with their rations and pay supplied indirectly by the C.I.A. and guaranteed evacuation of wounded by air America helicopters.

At one point in 1968-69, the size of the irregular forces totaled 33,000 men, according to the report, but it is now down to about 30,000 men, largely because of desertions, heavy casualties and "financial restraints incurred by budgetary limitations."

With the military manpower base in Laos "exhausted," the report said, the agency turned to Thai "volunteers" to supplement the irregular forces.

The precise number of Thai "volunteers" in Laos was deleted from the report, but Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey and Senator Fulbright have used a figure of about 4,800.

The report—made public in its declassified form, with gaps representing security delisions—said:

"Most of the irregulars have been recruited, we were told, outside the Thai army, although (deleted)."

-8 AUG 1971

STATINTL

Deeper CIA Role in Laos Revealed

STATINTL

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency spent about \$70 million to operate an army of irregular forces numbering more than 30,000 men in Laos during Fiscal 1971, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report disclosed yesterday.

The report portrayed a far broader picture of clandestine American involvement in the Lao guerrilla armies, now known as the BGs (after the French battalions guerriers), than had previously surfaced publicly in Washington.

The 23-page document, prepared by Committee staff members James C. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, was released yesterday by Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), chairman of the subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad.

There has been a widespread conception, as a result of Symington subcommittee hearings and newspaper articles two years ago, that the principal CIA-trained guerrilla force in Laos was concentrated in the Plain of Jars under the leadership of Meo Gen. Vang Pao.

But the new report, based on interviews with American military and diplomatic officials in Laos, asserts that BG "irregular" forces are operating in all but one of the five military regions of Laos. Only 38 per cent of the irregulars are under Vang Pao's command in the second military region, which encompasses the Plain of Jars.

The BG irregulars, says the Senate report, are playing a far more important role in the Laotian war than the Royal Lao Army. They have taken heavier casualties and accounted for higher enemy kills than the regular Lao army forces.

In the 1968 to early 1971 period, for example, the BGs reportedly suffered 8,030 killed, and accounted for 23,726 enemy deaths, according to official figures. The Royal Lao Army in the same period lost 3,664 and reported an enemy kill of 8,522.

"The most effective military force in Laos is not the Royal Lao Army, but the force known previously as the Armee Clandestine . . . and now as the BGs . . . The BG units are part of the irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the CIA," the report asserts.

"The BG units have become the cutting edge of the Lao military forces, as one U.S. official puts it."

The irregular units, says the staff report, "do most of the day-to-day patrolling, ambushing and attacking throughout the country." They are "closely" supervised and fed and paid by the CIA. Unlike the Royal Lao Army, the Senate document says, the BGs are guaranteed evacuation by Air America helicopters (a CIA-organized airline) and medical care—in some cases provided in a U.S. field hospital at the Royal Thai Air Force base in Udorn, Thailand.

It took five weeks of negotiation with the Nixon administration to release the sanitized version of the report. The document is shot through with the word "deleted," which signifies omissions of facts and numbers insisted upon by executive agencies.

But the first time the CIA permitted itself to be referred to by name in a published document of the Subcommittee during its three-year review of U.S. military commitments. Although specific CIA expenditures were stricken from the report, they could be simply computed by subtracting published figures listed for the Defense Department and AID from the overall totals given in the subcommittee report.

In a statement announcing release of the Laos report, Symington said he found it "an encouraging sign that the Executive Branch has finally agreed that much of what the United States government has been doing in Laos may now be made public.

But the report, which has long kept this secret war in Laos officially hidden from

the American people has been partially lifted," he added. He protested, however, the administration's continued refusal to declassify much of the information bearing on U.S. support of Thai military forces in Laos.

Members of the Foreign Relations Committee have taken the position that the Thai units which have been acknowledged by the administration to be fighting in Laos are in violation of the Fullbright Amendment to the 1971 defense authorization and procurement bills. It prohibits American financing of third country forces in Cambodia and Laos and was designed to prevent further escalation of the U.S. role in the Indochinese war.

Most references to Thai troops in Laos were sanitized from the staff report. Foreign Relations Committee sources, however, indicated that the United States may have spent as much as \$35 million to finance a Thai "irregular" military presence in Laos.

The administration has refused to disclose how much it is spending for how many Thai troops in the Laotian war. Symington and other Foreign Relations Committee members, however, have cited publicly a figure of 4,800 Thai irregulars in Laos. This would indicate an approximate spending level of roughly \$7000 per Thai per year. A State Department spokesman said last week that there are fewer than 4,000 Thai "volunteers" in Laos.

"The Thai irregular program developed during the past year and was designed by the CIA specifically along the lines of the irregular program in Laos," the report said. "The CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

In objecting to the administration's secrecy policy on the Thai irregulars, Symington said, "The stated reason for this Executive Branch refusal to declassify this information is as to avoid making public

what the governments of Thailand and Laos do not wish to make public. But since the taxpayers of this country are paying the bills, why should the recipient foreign governments have the right to dictate what our citizens can and cannot be told about the way in which public funds are being spent?"

Thai forces were introduced into Laos in significant numbers early last year when North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces swept across the Plain of Jars and nearly captured the strategic CIA command posts of Long Cheng and Sam Thong.

"At the time of our visit to Long Cheng on April 23," said the Lowenstein-Moose report, "there were (deleted) Thai there, at the nearby base of Sam Thong, and at Hill 1663 near Sam Thong. (There was also a small Thai team of (deleted) men at Nam Yu in Military Region I.)"

"We were told that the details of the funding were not known in Vientiane, as all of this bookkeeping is done in Washington," the staff report said. The administration contends that the Thai forces are volunteers, recruited in their homelands.

The staff report takes a grim view of the military prospects ahead for the Royal Laotian government of Premier Souvanna Phouma. It notes that since the Laotian "incursions" by South Vietnamese forces last spring, "more Lao territory has come under enemy control, and there are about three regiments more of North Vietnamese forces in southern Laos than there were before the Lam Son operation."

Despite the reported claims of destruction of North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao supply trucks — 12,363 damaged and destroyed in 1970 — the report says "these figures are not taken seriously by most U.S. officials, even Air Force officers . . ."

The report also listed—for the first time with tacit official approval—the number of U.S. Air Force sor-

STATINTL

U.S. Involvement in Laos

Losing Secrecy Curtain

STATINTL

By DONALD M. ROTHBERG
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON — Day by day and leak by leak, the secret war in Laos is becoming more and more difficult to hide.

Successive administrations, Democratic and Republican, have refused to discuss the extent of U.S. involvement in Laos — a small, landlocked and officially neutral country whose borders touch China, North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma.

The question is not whether the United States provides military and economic aid to the neutralist government of Laos, but whether Americans are actually engaged in fighting between forces supporting that government and Communist insurgents.

THE OFFICIAL response, as enunciated by President Nixon when asked during a Sept. 26, 1969, news conference about American involvement in the war, is: "There are no American combat forces in Laos."

Pressed by a Senate subcommittee on the same question, William H. Sullivan, a deputy assistant secretary of state and a former U.S. ambassador to Laos, replied the next month:

"Are there any people with military training in civilian clothes? There are people who have had military train-

ing and people who have had paramilitary training who are in civilian clothes. My definition of troops are people who are members of the armed forces of the United States of America. I assume that is what the senator had in mind."

A year later, an Associated Press dispatch from Saigon quoted a military source as saying casualties for U.S. Special Forces troops in Laos were 1 or 2 killed and 3 to 10 wounded each month.

Asked about the figures, a U.S. command spokesman in Saigon said, "There are no U.S. combat troops in Laos."

Slowly, over a long series of hearings, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has disclosed some of the U.S. involvement in Laos. Other information has come from such sources as the Pentagon papers, present and former government officials, and field dispatches.

AMONG THE disclosures:

○ There are 4,800 Thai troops led by a Thai general and supported entirely by U.S. funds fighting in Laos despite an act of Congress prohibiting support of mercenaries in Laos.

○ Cambodian troops, trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, have been fighting in Laos. Forty Cambodians were killed and an undisclosed number wounded in recent heavy fighting for the Bolovens Plateau.

○ Current budget figures show the United States spending \$90 million for military and \$52 million for economic aid to Laos. The correct figure, congressional sources claim, is nearly \$500 million, most of which is channeled through the CIA.

○ Congressional sources estimate \$2 billion is being spent each year bombing that part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, principal Communist supply route from North to South Vietnam, that runs through Laos.

○ Since 1964, the United States also has conducted bombing raids in support of the Royal Laotian Army. While the number of sorties is classified, Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) has said "a handful" in 1964 increased a hundredfold in 1965, then nearly doubled again in 1966.

○ As of Jan. 27, 1971, according to the State Depart-

ment, there were 1,034 Americans in Laos, including 395 employes of the Agency for International Development, 244 with the military attache's office, and 300 employed by Air America and Continental Air Services International, two air lines supported by the CIA.

○ Since 1961, the CIA has had an undisclosed number of agents working principally with Meo tribesmen in northern Laos and more recently with the Thai force.

When John F. Kennedy became president in 1961, Laos was the United States' most pressing problem in Southeast Asia.

In President Dwight D. Eisenhower's view "the fall of Laos to communism could mean the subsequent fall — like a tumbling row of dominoes — of its still-free neighbors, Cambodia, and South Vietnam and, in all probability, Thailand and Burma. Such a chain of events would open the way to Communist seizure of all of Southeast Asia."

EISENHOWER supported the pro-Western government of Premier Boun Oum. With Boun Oum's army taking a beating from the pro-Communist Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies, American advisers were sent into Laos to try to shore up the faltering Laotian Army.

Kennedy sought instead to defuse the situation through formation of a Laotian coalition government led by neutralist Souvanna Phouma.

U.S. Pledging Aid, Pushes Laos To Enact 1st Anti-Drug Law

By MICHAEL PARKS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—Under strong American pressure, Laos is about to enact its first drug-control law, and the United States has promised to provide advisers and money to help the Lao police enforce it.

The proposed law, which is awaiting final action by a reluctant National Assembly, for the first time would limit the cultivation and use of opium, once the basic source of income for the hill tribes of northern Laos.

Marijuana Excluded

It also would completely outlaw the sale, processing and transportation of opium, heroin and related drugs. Marijuana, which is as plentiful and as easily obtained as tobacco here, is not included under the law since the Lao use it for cooking.

Although police are compiling lists of the dozens of opium dens to be closed and hundreds of drug addicts to be arrested, the law is intended principally to check the heavy flow of raw opium through the "Golden Triangle" where Burma, Laos and Thailand meet.

"Laos is probably the busiest single drug corridor in Asia now," said an American official.

"What opium is still grown here does not cause much of a problem, and the Lao users are not a big concern either.

"Major Thoroughfare"

"But Laos is a major thoroughfare in world drug traffic, and the amount of opium refined down to a morphine base and heroin is also very large. Laos funnels drugs to Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Hong Kong."

A European intelligence agent who investigated drug traffic here for his government estimated that virtually every civil-

ian airline flight out of Vientiane carries contraband drugs and that a fourth to a third of the thousands of military flights, aside from bombing runs, carry drugs.

"It is going to take a lot more than a fairly mild law to stop this drug traffic, especially when it is the Army that is a principal mover," the agent said.

CIA Accused

Two U.S. congressional investigators charged last spring that until recently the American Central Intelligence Agency had allowed its planes to be used by Lao officials transporting opium, morphine and heroin.

They accused the Lao Army commander, who is retiring, of being the top figure in the complex drug-running-and-refining operation. The processed heroin, carefully guarded through its journey by Lao soldiers, eventually was smuggled into South Vietnam for sale to American soldiers.

American officials in Laos have put up with the drug traffic over the years, the congressional report suggested, to win support in the fight against the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao and preserve political peace in the embattled kingdom.

American officials, now worried about enforcing the law once it is enacted, say they have won firm commitment of support from the premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, the King and other high-ranking Laotians, who are mindful of their country's virtually total dependence on U.S. aid.

To help enforce the law, American officials here have requested that Washington assign a drug coordinator to the embassy. "He should be here within a matter of days, we hope," a

senior embassy official said.

"Once he arrives, we expect he will be setting up a program to help the Lao national police enforce the law. The Lao have asked for advisers and we have promised to supply them. But details of the program are still to be worked out."

Tighter Controls

The initial effort, according to American officials, will be to tighten customs inspections of cargoes on domestic and international air flights and to establish controls over military flights.

American officials also hope to end the use of the northern Laotian town of Pan Houai Sai as a major opium transshipment point. It has been a center for refining raw opium to a morphine base and, recently, the site of a major laboratory turning morphine into heroin.

The proposed law would permit persons over 40 years of age to continue growing opium if they get a government license. But much of the land used in opium cultivation is under control of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese—who burn the opium crops out of moral strictness—and the growers, mostly Meo tribesmen, have been moved as refugees to lowlands, where the opium poppy does not grow well.

"We have no illusions that as soon as we get a law the flow of drugs is going to dry up," said a senior U.S. diplomat, "but with no law there is nothing that can be legally done."

In addition to advisers, the United States is prepared to provide financial aid, technical assistance (such as laboratory analysis) and help in establishing a rehabilitation program for Laos's own opium smokers and other drug users.

Hard Decisions Avoided*GIs and Heroin:
The Facts of Life*

By Flora Lewis

JOHN W. PARKER, director of strategic intelligence in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, knows a good deal about Southeast Asia's contribution to the dope problem. And while he is a soft-spoken Southerner, sometimes so quiet one has to strain to hear him, he is the most straightforward man I have yet found on the subject in the administration.

He starts with an explanation. Remember, he says, that until 1970 we were concentrating on the drug problem here in the United States. Not too much attention was paid by the bureau to the source of supplies. And the Army, the CIA, the State Department, the people out there where the heroin comes from weren't concerned about drugs. They were concentrating on other problems.

Further, while there has been opium in Southeast Asia since the British introduced it in the early 19th century, until 1970 the heroin refineries in the area were all in Thailand and Hong Kong, Parker says. It didn't seem to affect the United States.

In fact, the dominant government attitude was that this was a fact of life in Asia which Americans shouldn't try to upset, especially since by the beginning of the decade so many Americans were so deeply engaged in trying to control other facts of Southeast Asia's life, namely the Vietnamese war and all its offshoots.

Now, according to Parker, practically all the heroin refineries have been resituated along the Mekong River, in Burma, Thailand and Laos, and "almost all have been identified."

If so, why hasn't the United States, which completely subsidizes and virtually ruins Laos and has poured billions into Thailand, whose "volunteer soldiers" it employs in Vietnam and Laos, made sure the heroin factories were destroyed?

The obvious urgent question didn't annoy Parker. On the contrary, his stolid face slowly eased into a Cheshire cat grin. At first he didn't say anything. I suggested that the reason wasn't hard to guess and wasn't really secret.

"I know," he said. "I'm struggling not to say it."

IT IS AT once a simple and excruciatingly tough answer. As he finally pointed out, it is a matter of political decision in Washington. There is a choice to make. It would be easy to blow up the refineries, defoliate most of the poppy fields, push the governments involved into cracking down on their own high-level military and civilian profiteers and blocking the supply of heroin to GIs in Vietnam and, increasingly, to the United States.

But it would be a severe enbarras to allies in Southeast Asia. It would mean the prosecution of the war in Indochina, perhaps so seriously that basic U.S. policy would have to be changed.

There have been some changes in the past year, but they have followed a pattern of seeking compromise with the drug-producing countries, not confrontation.

The CIA has changed its rules in an effort to stop the use of its private airline, Air America, for the transport of drugs in Laos. Although only two months ago CIA Director Richard Helms adamantly denied there had ever been any agency involvement in the traffic, he is now said to have told a secret congressional hearing that there was involvement but it has been stopped in the past year.

The U.S. Embassy in Laos has pressed the government there to put through a strict law on drugs which may be passed this month. There was none before.

The U.S. Embassy in Saigon got the Vietnamese government to remove some of the corrupt customs officials, and similar efforts are being made in Thailand. With Congress vociferously taking up the issue, the White House is cracking the whip on all the assorted American officials who thought drug traffic was not their concern, who thought their job was only fighting the war, gathering intelligence, maintaining foreign relations.

THE QUESTION is whether these relatively gentle pressures will convince governments largely dependent on the United States that they must fight heroin. Years of argument got nowhere in Turkey, but a threat to cut off foreign aid finally did.

Now the Turks have promised to wipe out opium production after the 1972 crop, which means that in three or four years that source of supply will dry up. Parker is convinced now that the Turks can and will enforce the ban. But ask him how much difference it will make in the amount of heroin supplied to Americans.

"If nothing else is done," he says flatly, "no difference." And the "something else" can only be done in Washington, a decision to be just as tough in Southeast Asia as the Nixon administration was in Turkey.

Meanwhile, the inch-high vials of 96 to 98 per cent pure heroin distributed in South Vietnam have begun to turn up in the United States. The bureau foresees an almost uncontrollable flood as veterans re-turn, find themselves without jobs and realize how much money can be made by having buddies or friends, send them supplies from the Far East.

Addicts can be treated, but there isn't much likelihood that there won't be far more new ones than cures each day unless the flow of heroin is cut at the source. At the Bureau of Narcotics, experts are convinced that is possible, except perhaps for a going to happen. The hard political decision hasn't been taken.

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Laos

The rains came

The seasonal rhythm of the war in northern Laos is reminiscent of those animated barometers where one little man pops out on sunny days and another on rainy days. The dry season is traditionally the time for a communist offensive in Laos, and it is during the monsoon (when supplies from North Vietnam are interrupted and the communist forces pull back towards the northern fringes of the Plain of Jars) that General Vang Pao's Meo army inches its way back across lost ground.

Reports at the end of last week suggest that his "secret army," organized and equipped by the Central Intelligence Agency, has regained control of the plain after a two weeks' offensive.

Six Meo battalions pushed eastward from their base area around Long Cheng, while Air America planes carried a commando strike-force to Xieng Khoang in the centre of the plain. They met with very little resistance, although Pathet Lao radio reported some skirmishing over the southern part of the plain. There are reports that the Meos have discovered some important arms caches, but the Laotian prime minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, merely said that the offensive was "an American affair."

The recapture of 30 square miles of upland plain that has come to look rather like a battered sports trophy can hardly alter the military balance in Laos, and it may have strained the diminishing resources of the Meo army that forms the only effective local resistance to the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. The 300,000 Meo tribesmen, who share a hereditary distrust of the Vietnamese, have been badly buffeted by the Indochina war. They have become a nation of refugees, moved back and forth down jungle trails or in Air America planes as the communists advance or retreat. Over the past year, the "secret army" has suffered from an acute shortage of manpower, and Vang Pao has been forced to recruit young boys.

The campaign of systematic terrorism launched by the communists against the Meo civil population earlier this year has also shaken morale. Some of Vang Pao's troops, separated from their families for more than a year and worried by stories of intimidation and forced conscription by the North Vietnamese, have deserted and made the long walk east. The health of Vang Pao himself is another cause for concern. The current offensive is being headed by a team of junior officers and American advisers while the general convalesces from a serious illness whose nature has not been disclosed. He would be hard to replace.

STATINTL

S 11684

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900100001-4

STATINTL

States pursuant to article V of the Constitution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 1318

At the request of Mr. FANNIN, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROOK) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1318, a bill to deny tax exemption under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

S. 1442 THROUGH S. 1445

At the request of Mr. MOSS, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1442, a bill to provide that the first \$3,000 received as civil service retirement annuity shall be excluded from gross income; S. 1443, to eliminate the survivorship reduction during periods of nonmarriage of retired employees and Members, and for other purposes; S. 1444, a bill to increase the contribution by the Federal Government to the costs of employees' health benefits insurance; and S. 1445, a bill to provide increases in certain annuities payable under chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, and for other purposes.

S. 1659

At the request of Mr. FANNIN, the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1659, a bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act.

S. 2223

At the request of Mr. TALMAGE, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRILL), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) were added as cosponsors of S. 2223, a bill to amend the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

S. 2258

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN, the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE) and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) were added as cosponsors of S. 2258, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Acceleration Act.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 62

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN, the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 62, authorizing the display of the flags of each of the 50 States at the base of the Washington Monument.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 99

At the request of Mr. CASE, the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 99, a joint resolution proposing establishment of a National Collegiate Press Day.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 114

At the request of Mr. CURTIS, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 114, a stable purchasing power resolution of 1971.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 35—SUBMISSION OF AN ORIGINAL CONCURRENT RESOLUTION FAVORING THE SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

(Ordered to be placed on the calendar.)

Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following original concurrent resolution:

S. CON. RES. 35

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress favors the suspension of deportation in the case of each alien hereinafter named, in which case the Attorney General has suspended deportation pursuant to the provisions of section 244(a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (66 Stat. 204; 8 U.S.C. 1251):

A-0687878, Chan, Chuen.
A-17049342, Chin, Lean.
A-6816735, Frank, Thomas Fredrik.
A-13282197, Mo, Huey Nai.
A-10165000, Torres de Bojerano, Socorro.
A-11596573, Yee, Soon Hing.
A-8492968, Terrazas-Barrio, Efrén.
A-4316706, Ioanides, Gabriel Constantinos.
A-1834768, Herrera-Márquez, Aurelio.
A-18496866, Luan, Wah Gam.
A-3212791, Candanoza-Laza, Rogelio.
A-6499744, Cartier, Paul August.
A-12027264, Liu, Lai Chih.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS—1972

AMENDMENT NO. 254

(Ordered to be printed and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.)

CLOSING LOOPHOLES: AN AMENDMENT TO END U.S. FINANCING OF FOREIGN MERCENARIES IN LAOS

Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, last year many of us thought that the Congress, by means of amendments to the Defense authorization and appropriations bills, had made it unlawful for the U.S. Government to pay Thai troops to fight in Laos or Cambodia. Today there are Thai troops in Laos and they are being paid by the U.S. Government. The State Department has finally admitted that we are paying the Thais, but the Thai Government still asserts there are no Thai troops in Laos.

In our discussions with the executive branch, we have encountered two lines of legal argumentation being used to justify the U.S. role in this bizarre affair. First, it is argued that the legislative history of last year's amendments indicates that the amendments' sponsor, whose avowed purpose in proposing the amendments in the first place was to prohibit payment for Thai troops in Laos or Cambodia, had, by inference, condoned the very practice he was seeking to prohibit. Second, it is argued, that, even if this had been the sponsor's intent, the legislation enacted contained loopholes which permits the executive branch to do lawfully what the sponsor had sought to prohibit. Either way, they say it is legal for the United States to hire Thais to fight a war in Laos which the Lao are no longer able to sustain with their own manpower.

For those who find this situation diffi-

cult to comprehend, a brief review of the facts will be helpful before I propose a legislative solution to this problem.

Following the U.S. incursions into Cambodia in May 1970, it was recognized that language of the defense authorization and appropriations legislation providing \$2.5 billion for "support for Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces" could possibly be interpreted as permitting U.S. financing of Thai troops in Cambodia and Laos. Indeed, in August 1970, the State Department acknowledged that a "tentative agreement" had been reached between the United States and Thai Governments regarding the sending of Thai troops to Cambodia.

It was generally understood at the time that the provision of any troops to Cambodia by Thailand would be contingent upon the furnishing of financial support by the United States.

It was in the light of these facts that an amendment was added to both the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts which provided that nothing in the authorization to support "Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnam forces" could be construed "as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

This amendment was originally proposed by the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee who declared that his intention was to prevent our paying for South Vietnamese or Thai forces to expand their military activities in Cambodia and Laos so that we would become involved in large-scale operations in close support of the Government of Cambodia or the Government of Laos.

Nevertheless, despite this amendment, a Department of State spokesman admitted on June 7 that there were Thai forces in Laos and also that the United States was supporting them, although he described them as "volunteers."

This spokesman did not say that these Thai forces are operating principally in the war in northern Laos, a war that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan has said has "nothing to do with military operations in South Vietnam or Cambodia."

The amendment included in the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for fiscal year 1971 never defined "local forces in Laos and Thailand" and the prohibitions written into the Appropriation Act applied, of course, only to "appropriations available to the Department of Defense during the current fiscal year." Thus, it might be argued that Central Intelligence Agency funds were not covered by the amendment.

In addition, it has been argued by the executive branch that the Thai forces in Laos are "local forces in Laos," even though they are Thai nationals who were recruited and trained in Thailand, are transported by us from Thailand to Laos; then they are sent back to Thailand

S 10816

fact on the priority of expenditures and that he is well informed concerning performance against budget and plans in the program areas.

Thirdly, I would standardize and make more effective our activities in data processing, management research, auditing, and procurement.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, these are worthy objectives, and so long as they are not viewed as ends but are viewed as means to achieve the missions of the Department, their implementation can improve the efficiency and the responsiveness of the Department.

Mr. President, I urge that the Senate confirm Mr. Bodman to be Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Budget and Management.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of this nomination.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

THE HEROIN WAR IN INDOCHINA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Now, Mr. President, in this morning's Washington Post there is published an article entitled "Facts Surface on the Heroin War," written by Miss Flora Lewis. We all know and applaud what our Government has done in trying to bring about a decrease in the production of opium in Turkey; but I would hope that we would not lose sight of the fact that approximately nine-tenths of opium production in the world comes from the so-called Golden Corridor in Laos, Thailand, and Burma.

We have talked a good deal about the casualties of our men—and they are huge. We have talked a good deal about the costs of the war—and they are great. But only recently have we been discussing the question of drugs as they affect American personnel in Indochina and, incidentally, involve local dignitaries in many of the countries concerned.

If I may take an excerpt on two from the article written by Miss Lewis—which I hope every Member of Congress will read as well as the administration downtown—she brings out the fact that the CIA has provided Congress with a report naming the sites of the heroin refineries in Burma, Thailand, and Laos. There is more to it. It will go in with the full story.

I read as follows:

The report also confirms for the first time on the record that Laotian air force planes and Laotian and South Vietnamese commercial planes take the drugs on to markets, both the GI market in South Vietnam and international centers which ship to Europe and the United States. It does not mention Air America, the CIA-operated airline in Laos and Vietnam. But there have

long been numerous reports that Air America's secret flights supporting the Laotian war also often transport opium.

Further on,

Vice Adm. William C. Mack, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, has testified that the only thing that "will save our men" from the tremendous drug problem in Vietnam is troop withdrawal. But the supply routes are organized now. The high-ranking officials, and by no means all the highest have as yet been named, still have U.S. support and every prospect that support will continue after most troops have gone. So the heroin can be expected to follow the GIs home, a continuing souvenir of the war.

Two developments have begun to bring into the open the relation of heroin and the war. One is the huge increase in GI use in the past two years, while the military were assiduously fighting marijuana and virtually ignoring the opium-heroin trade. The other is counting public revulsion as each piece of news appears here.

And, further on,

It is time, late but not too late, for American intelligence which does know quite a lot about the drug traffic to make it their concern. It is time to stop defoliating Vietnamese fields and start defoliating poppy fields. It is time to stop subsidizing high Asian officials who use American support to deal in drugs with impunity.

John Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics, has written Congress that "It is probable that opium production in Southeast Asia will be brought under effective control only with further political development in these countries."

If that means that the United States can't successfully fight heroin and Vietnamese Communists at the same time because too many allies are on the side of heroin, it shouldn't be hard to choose the worst enemy. There can be no national defense even on this continent if the invasion of drugs is not stopped.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this very worthy article printed in full in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FACTS SURFACE ON THE HEROIN WAR

(By Flora Lewis)

At last the facts of the heroin war in Indochina are trickling out. Many officials, and others, have been aware of them for a long time. But the officials weren't very interested, and secrecy about the war in Laos and American clandestine operations made it extra hard for others to pinpoint the route of heroin from the mountaintop poppy fields of Southeast Asia to American bloodstreams.

The CIA, which has prime responsibility for the Laotian war, long denied any knowledge of the drug traffic. Now it has provided Congress, through the Bureau of Narcotics, with a report naming the sites of heroin refineries in Burma, Thailand and Laos. Further, the public report says that "a senior Laotian officer may hold an ownership interest in some of these facilities." The officer, named elsewhere, is Gen. Ouane Rathikone, chief of staff of the Laotian army, which exists entirely on U.S. subsidy. Army units provide a "military defense perimeter" to guard the refineries.

The report also confirms for the first time on the record that Laotian air force planes and Laotian and South Vietnamese commercial planes take the drugs on to markets, both the GI market in South Vietnam and international centers which ship to Europe and the United States. It does not mention

Air America, the CIA-operated airline in Laos and Vietnam. But there have long been numerous reports that Air America's secret flights supporting the Laotian war also often transport opium.

Rep. Robert Steele of Connecticut, an ex-CIA man himself, has named Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu who commands South Vietnam's Second Military region as one large-scale organizer of the traffic.

The opium, from which heroin is refined, is grown chiefly by Meo tribesmen who live in what is called the "golden triangle" area of western Burma, northern Thailand and Laos. The CIA organized the Meo of Laos into the Arnee Clandestine and has accepted responsibility for large numbers of them.

Although it normally denied having any awareness or interest in the drug trade, from time to time the CIA claimed progress in persuading the Meo under its influence to switch to food crops. Its own report now says that "In areas (in Laos) where the tribesmen have been encouraged to grow corn, the poppies are planted among the corn. When the corn is cut the poppies continue to grow until they too can be harvested."

Vice Adm. William C. Mack, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, has testified that the only thing that "will save our men" from the tremendous drug problem in Vietnam is troop withdrawal. But the supply routes are organized now. The high-ranking officials, and by no means all the highest have as yet been named, still have U.S. support and every prospect that support will continue after most troops have gone. So the heroin can be expected to follow the GIs home, a continuing souvenir of the war.

Two developments have begun to bring into the open the relation of heroin and the war. One is the huge increase in GI use in the past two years, while the military were assiduously fighting marijuana and virtually ignoring the opium-heroin trade. The other is mounting public revulsion as each piece of news appears here.

But the situation isn't very new. Capt. Robert Marasco, the former Green Beret who was accused of killing a double agent, tells of camping on the Cambodian border in the Parrot's Beak sector in 1959. "There was a big market field there; people went back and forth as though there were no border. The price of heroin was astonishing; for \$25 you could get what sells for \$500,000 in the United States," he told me. "It was being bought by South Vietnamese soldiers, obviously flunkies for the higher-ups."

On another occasion, he trailed 30 pounds of pure opium brought down the Ho Chi Minh Trail by Pathet Lao Communists along with medical supplies and found they were sold to South Vietnamese military and sent on to Saigon. "I didn't pay much attention," Marasco says "that wasn't our concern."

It is time, late but not too late, for American intelligence which does know quite a lot about the drug traffic to make it their concern. It is time to stop defoliating Vietnamese fields and start defoliating poppy fields. It is time to stop subsidizing high Asian officials who use American support to deal in drugs with impunity.

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EDITOR
THE DAILY WORLD
295 WEST 19th ST.
NEW YORK 10011

Our readers say--

WHOSE OPIUM WAR NOW?

From a third to a half of the returning S.E. Asia invasion veterans have used or are addicted to drugs. Traffic in opium is common among the government officials who are our puppets, according to John Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics before the House Select Committee on Crime on June 1st. "He said the heroin traffic is costing the U.S. \$3.5 billion a year," according to I. F. Stone (June 14/71), and that 176 pounds of opium were found a few weeks ago on a plane of Air America, the CIA's airline operating illegally in Laos. ✓

Weapons supplied Chiang Kai Shek with our tax money were exchanged for opium which was sold to American soldiers in Vietnam with aid of a top general in Laos, according to Rep. Paul C. Rogers of Florida. Now, Senator Frank Church of Idaho reports that the State Dept. is opposing Congressional bills that would cut off aid to countries that are sources of dope. Such laws would hurt diplomatic relations, according to Washington.

If Nixon is not in the dope business, you figure it out. The morals of this administration are straight from the gutter. And now Kissinger, Laird, and Rogers are out pimping in the provinces of the empire. Nixinger policy will make us a leper among nations. How stupid can the Republicans get, LBJ included?

PROFESSOR S.X., San Diego, Cal.

Operation in Laos Conceded by U.S.

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — U.S. officials have admitted for the first time that large-scale operations are being conducted on the Plain of Jars in north Laos and three battalions of special commandos are in control of two-thirds of the plain's area.

"Hundreds of tons" of food, ammunition, and arms have been found in caches on the plain by 12-man commando teams, officials said yesterday.

Eighty percent of the caches contain food and the remainder arms, the sources said, mentioning one item found—25 cases of Vietnamese canned candy.

Little Farming Noted

The teams have seen no local population to date, officials said, and this, coupled with the high percentage of food in the caches, indicates the 5,000 people who chose to remain with the Communists during the 1959 evacuation have not farmed on the plain in the past 18 months.

With no population to grow food, the Vietnamese were forced to bring in food to the plain area. Hence, the large caches, U.S. officials reason. Commando teams have received a few rounds of mortar fire but no contact by fire with Vietnamese troops.

U.S. officials insist the operation is small, with no intention to occupy the plain. The sole objective is to destroy Communist supplies, slow Hanoi's next dry-season offensive and perhaps relieve the pressure on Bouam Long north of the plain. Meo troops there, encumbered with 15,000 civilians, have been taking hundreds of rounds of shelling nightly, and at least 44 civilians have been killed.

Even U.S. B52 strikes failed to remove enemy gunners. The plain operation appears set to continue for some time with Air America planes stacking up over commando bases near the Plain of Jars airstrip, known as Lima 22, in the central plain. Commandos cleared landing places for the first aircraft, and U.S. engineers worked to clear mines from the regular airstrips.

Another five battalions of Thais, Lao and Meos are in the new positions on the plain's south rim.

The U.S. admission to the operation on the plain comes after a 72-hour coverup. Asked about the missions, earlier claims that commandos were only on the south and west approaches to the plain, a U.S. Embassy official said, "That was a mistake." Presumably, this also applies to similar claim by State Department briefers in Washington.

Gen. Thongphanh Knoksy, the Lao military spokesman, tells the press here to ask the Americans about the operation. Top Lao military officers insist the operation is coordinated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Led by Americans

Lao military men say the teams on the plain are led by Americans. In some cases on some teams there are two Americans who the Meo say are "commando leaders" based at Site 14 Pakkao, 10 miles southeast of the main U.S. base at Long Chen. There are also American military men in advisory positions.

It is relatively easy for reporters to find out about American team leaders from Meo and Lao military personnel in conversation. One must prefer these sources to State Department denials, particularly when the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane takes every step possible, first to cover up these operations, particularly the present ones on the plain, and, second, to prevent correspondents seeing the operations.

Thousands of Meos and Lao of the Laos hill populations see Americans engaged in military pursuits in their mountains.

Some of them inform North Vietnamese troops, making nonsense of embassy claims that these operations should be hidden because of U.S. national security. The CIA has certainly run an efficient operation in north Laos in many respects, but the fact that the agency is operating in the area has in itself become an excuse and a tool to cover up the deep U.S. military and political involvement in the area.

STATINTL

July 1971

STATINTL

CIA in Laos

I. ANDRONOV
Our Special Correspondent
in Indo-China

RECENT events have again focussed public attention on the Valley of Jars. Once this green valley framed by a chain of rocky hills presented an idyllic scene: rice fields, peaceful villages drowsing in the shade of coconut palms, small flourishing towns, and scattered over the fields the enormous roughly fashioned stone jars marking the burial places of an ancient civilization. Now all of it has been reduced to ashes. For many years under the control of the Laotian guerillas, the Valley of Jars was the target of massive strikes by the U.S. B-52 super-bombers, of "total defeat bomb strikes," to use Washington's lingo. Every B-52 strike meant 30 tons of bombs, a rain of fire and iron, the total killing of hundreds of Laotian peasants with their wives and children. Those who survived hid by day in deep bomb craters, only emerging at night to bury their dead and find food. Early this month the Americans resumed their air raids while simultaneously transport planes chartered by the CIA landed the cut-throat rangers it had hired in the Valley. The flames of war have flared up with renewed force in the heart of long-suffering Laos.

Little Laos lies on a major strategic crossroads of war-torn Indo-China, but why has it again become the object of Washington's criminal aggression at this particular moment? If the American press is to be believed, President Nixon and his close assistants are not inclined to challenge public opinion and reject out of hand the new proposals put forward by the patriotic forces of Vietnam, which open the way to peaceful settlement in all of Indo-China, not only Vietnam. This peace programme is strongly supported by broad sections of the American people as well as world public opinion. Yet it is reported from Washington that the CIA has submitted to President Nixon a special



report with a "negative appraisal" of the Vietnamese patriots' new peace initiative. There appears to be a hidden connection between this report and the present action in Laos. Perhaps those quarters in Washington which wish to quash all hope of peace in Indo-China have chosen to avoid an explosion of public indignation by torpedoing the efforts of the peace supporters under a cloak of secrecy, with the aid of that well-tried tool of American reaction, the CIA and its hirelings. It will not be the first time the CIA has handled dirty work of this sort.

The CIA military venture in Laos also has the aim of disrupting the present contacts in Vientiane between Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of the Vientiane government, and Tiao Souk Vongsak, special envoy of Prince Souphanouvong, president of the Lao Patriotic Front. Since officially the Americans have no part in these contacts, the Laotians would seem to stand a good chance of reaching agreement on preliminary conditions for negotiating a peace in their country. That possibility arose anew on June 22, when Prince Souphanouvong, acting on behalf of the Patriotic Front, proposed a draft agreement on a ceasefire, including cessation of American air raids on Laotian territory. A week later the

head of the Vientiane government fought shy of accepting the proposals opening the way to termination of the war and restoration of peace in Laos. And immediately after this, the CIA sent its planes and mercenaries to the Valley of Jars.

When, on July 8, foreign correspondents in Vientiane requested the Laos Defence Ministry to explain the character of the hostilities in the Valley of Jars, General Knoksy replied:

"The government is not responsible for this operation ... you should ask the American Embassy, this is their affair."

The U.S. Embassy, however, promptly disavowed the Laotian General's statement and denied that it was involved in the attack on the Valley of Jars. The Washington diplomats were obviously resorting to one of their habitual lies, easily seen through by observers of the American aggression in Laos, where the U.S. Embassy works hand in glove with the CIA.

IN DEFIANCE OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

Vientiane is a small city so that the swarm of Americans in it is very conspicuous. A big section in the centre of the capital is occupied by the buildings of the American Embassy and the office of Washington's Agency for International Development. Next to the biggest cinema theatre, the Lanxang, is the office of the United States Information Agency (USIA). At the edge of the city, behind a wire enclosure, are rows of cottages for the American personnel. And at the airfield there is a mass of transport planes of various makes, all with "Air America" on their fuselage. None carry identification marks on their wings or tail.

Officially, Air America is a private company, owned by Pacific Corporation. The director of the latter, George Doole, usually parries questions about Air America's activities with a jest:

"I don't know all of our customers' private business and relations. So help me, that's a fact."

The Air America manager in Vientiane, James Cunningham, also evades giving a direct answer.

"We operate on a you-call, we-haul basis. We don't go into details."

STATINTL

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The Series So Far: From Covert War Covert Warfare Sponsored by U.S. in '64 to Bombin

President Lyndon B. Johnson's Administration, amid his hesitation and reluctance to take final decisions, was sponsoring covert South Vietnamese warfare against North Vietnam starting in February, 1964, and drawing up plans that spring for overt war.

These activities—long before the Aug. 4, 1964, Tonkin Gulf destroyer incident that led to a Congressional vote authorizing "all necessary steps" to aid Southeast Asian countries—were described in the first installment.

The series was based on a Defense Department study, commissioned in 1967 by Secretary Robert S. McNamara to learn how American involvement in Southeast Asia developed. The study ranged from World War II until the start of peace talks in Paris in May, 1968.

There are gaps in the Pentagon study—the researchers lacked access to Presidential files—and in that part of it obtained by The Times—it lacks the chapter on diplomatic initiatives, some of which are continuing.

A Report by McNamara

The first of 13 documents published in the initial installment was a report on Dec. 21, 1963, by Secretary McNamara to President Johnson. This said "plans for covert action into North Vietnam were prepared as we had requested."

"They present," he went on, "a variety of sabotage and psychological operations against North Vietnam from which I believe we should aim to select those that provide maximum pressure with minimum risk."

The "covert military operations," drawn up by the Central Intelligence Agency station and the military command in Saigon, were begun Feb. 1, 1964, as Operation Plan 34A. President Johnson's hope was that they might eventually induce North Vietnam to halt the Vietcong and Pathet Lao insurrections.

Through 1964, they included flights over North Vietnam by U-2 spy planes, the kidnapping of North Vietnamese citizens for intelligence information, commando raids from the sea to blow up rail and highway bridges and the bombardment of coastal installations by PT boats.

Before The New York Times was restrained by Federal court order from continuing with its series on the Pentagon study of the Vietnam war, it had published the first three parts. They dealt with the first years of the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Here is a summary of those three articles and a recapitulation of some of the key documents published with them on June 13, 14 and 15:

'Hired Personnel' Used

They differed from relatively low-level and unsuccessful intelligence and sabotage efforts the C.I.A. had carried out earlier in North Vietnam. The 34A attacks were under the control of Gen. Paul D. Harkins, chief of the United States Military Assistance Command in Saigon, with raids performed by the South Vietnamese or their "hired personnel."

The covert war had a second major segment—air operations in Laos by 25 to 40 propeller-driven T-28 fighter-bombers. These bore Laotian Air Force markings, but were manned in part by pilots of Air America, a C.I.A.-controlled line and in part by Thai pilots under the control of Ambassador Leonard Unger.

Regular United States Air Force and Navy jet planes, code-named Yankee Team, gathered photographic intelligence for the T-28 bombing raids. The reconnaissance moved from high-altitude flights at the start of 1964 to low-altitude sorties in May; in June armed escort jets were added, bombing and strafing when the reconnaissance planes were fired on.

A third element in the covert military pressure was the patrolling by American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Code-named De Soto patrols, the ships collected intelligence on warning radars and coastal defenses.

In a memorandum on Jan. 22, 1964, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contended that "the United States must be prepared to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions" and to "undertake bolder actions," even to "commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam."

Difference of Opinion

The Johnson Administration was convinced from radio interceptions that North Vietnam was directing the Vietcong despite intelligence analyses that argued "the primary sources of Communist strength in South Vietnam are indigenous" arising from social and nationalist aims.

On March 16, 1964, describing a worsening situation, Secretary McNamara urged new plans up to "graduated overt military pressure," ready on 30 days' notice for strikes against North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese Air Force and an American air commando squadron, code-named Farmgate, that operated with South Vietnamese markings.

President Johnson approved the McNamara recommendations at a National Security Council meeting March 17, 1964. On March 20, President Johnson cabled Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon:

"...our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis at present, and immediate problem in this area is to develop the strongest military and political base for possible later action."

On April 17, the Joint Chiefs approved a so-called scenario, Operation Plan 37-64, including escalation steps against North Vietnam up to air attacks and mining of ports, initially by South Vietnamese but possibly using United States aircraft.

Military action was not to begin until after a joint Congressional resolution.

On May 4, South Vietnam's

head of government, Gen. Nguyen Khan, told Ambassador Lodge he wanted the United States to start bombing and to send in 10,000 troops.

The Pentagon study reported that at a Honolulu meeting on June 1 and 2, 1964, Secretary McNamara said "it might be necessary as the action unfolded . . . to deploy as many as seven divisions" of American troops.

One effort to apportion American aims in South Vietnam was attributed to a memorandum by John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, as follows:

"70 pct.—To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).

"20 pct.—To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

"10 pct.—To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life."

One move at United States request had J. Blair Seaborn, Canadian member of the International Control Commission, pass on a warning June 18 to North Vietnam's Premier, Pham Van Dong, that escalating the warfare could bring "the greatest devastation" to North Vietnam.

Separate from the Defense Department study, which was prepared in 1967 and 1968, was a 1965 Defense Department command and control study of the Tonkin Gulf incident.

In a 34A operation, South Vietnamese naval commandos raided two North Vietnamese islands in the gulf at midnight July 30. On Aug. 2, a De Soto intelligence-gathering patrol by the destroyer Maddox wound up in a clash with North Vietnamese PT boats, which the study said apparently mistook the Maddox for a South Vietnamese escort vessel.

On Aug. 3, President Johnson ordered the destroyer C. Turner Joy to reinforce the Maddox in the gulf. That night, two clandestine 34A bombardments were staged by South Vietnamese PT boats.

On the night of Aug. 4, Tonkin Gulf time, the two American destroyers were attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats, according to the Pentagon account.

At a national Security Council meeting on the afternoon of Aug. 4, Washington time, President Johnson ordered American reprisal air strikes, chosen by the Joint Chiefs from a 94-target list drawn up at the end of the Congressional resolution of full military support for South Vietnam.

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REPORTS & COMMENT

STATINTL

LAOS

The springtime in Laos is very dry. Save for the brief Mango rains, the heat is unrelieved, and shriveled green leaves lie like dead frogs in the dusty roads. The sun is dull red in the smoke and haze, for in the springtime the hill people slash and burn the brush off the hillsides. The pilots say that the haze stretches all across the northern marches of Southeast Asia from North Vietnam across to Burma. The Air America helicopters must pick their way carefully among the fantastic limestone outcroppings that rise like castles from the wooded hills tumbling out of China. One realizes that the misty mountains of the classical Chinese landscape paintings were not the product of artistic imaginations, but faithful reproductions of nature.

Here in these hills, fifty miles northeast of Vientiane, there is an airstrip known to the pilots as site 272. It is the center for American refugee relief in Northern Laos and the fall-back point for Long Cheng, the secret CIA base twenty-five miles to the north. Long Cheng is the headquarters for the Meo General Vang Pao's "Armée Clandestine," supported by the CIA. All this past winter and spring the base has been under siege by the North Vietnamese. The hill peoples, the highland Lao and the Meo dependents of Vang Pao's army, have been fleeing south by the thousands, pouring into the hills and valleys near site 272. They make temporary bamboo shelters, and Air America drops rice to

them, for they have no food. There is the despair of uncertainty. No one can tell them what their future will be. Like Laos itself, they have long since lost control of their own destiny.

In one such makeshift settlement the village chief greets visitors with a gold-toothed smile. There are over nine hundred people in his immediate area—four hundred of them are children. One night, the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese had come to his village. The soldiers in a nearby government outpost had detected no enemies in the area: "So we went to bed happy," the village chief said.

"But at four o'clock in the morning we were attacked. Before we knew it, they were in the village shooting and the houses were burning." Squatting down on his haunches, the village chief described with his hands in the dirt how the enemy had come and the attack on the outpost—the short, sharp explosions, the flames, the rifle fire, the measured hammering of the fifty-calibers, and then silence. Death had come in the classic Indochina way: a small, isolated outpost overrun in the night. It was a scene that has been played a thousand times in the last twenty-five years of war.

The villagers escaped into the surrounding woods, and for two days they marched over some of the most impenetrable and inhospitable country on earth. "We were so sorry to leave everything behind," the chief said, "and the march was very difficult. We walked two days, and the people cried and cried over the mountains. Two people died; one

was an old person and the other was a child." There was talk that the men might be conscripted into Vang Pao's army, but the chief did not know for sure, and he did not know what would happen to his people. "I am afraid," he said.

"For what?"

At site 272 the Air America planes continue taking off and landing in a roar of red dust, bringing rice, pigs, and ducks to the refugees. But one senses the end of a decade of American policy in Laos. Ten years ago, when the Americans first began to train and equip the Meo tribesmen, Vang Pao's guerrillas operated all over Northeastern Laos—far behind enemy lines to the borders of North Vietnam itself. Fewer than two dozen American servicemen have been killed in these mountains. Asians fight Asians. But ten years of costly, vainglorious offensives and unremitting pressure from North Vietnamese counteroffensives have pushed the Meo beyond their endurance. Vang Pao's losses in the last three years have been so heavy that the Armée Clandestine is no longer an exclusively Meo force. Almost half their numbers are now made up of other highland peoples. And in the last three or four years, the Meo have been organized to fight in battalion-sized units of over five hundred men instead of small guerrilla units. As a result, the slaughter has been magnified. Vang Pao's army can no longer hold Long Cheng alone, and by early April it was reliably reported by Lao and American sources that no fewer

CONFIDENTIAL

THE ASIA LETTER

AN AUTHORITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

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STATINTL

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (II): No intelligence operation in Asia is as well-heeled as that of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.).

The annual working budget of the C.I.A. runs over US\$600 million.

That's just a starter.

The agency spends far more than that in Asia alone if you count the cost of some of the "borrowed" services from other U.S. Government agencies. For instance:

---U.S. Air Force planes are used to monitor foreign nuclear tests and collect air samples. The agency, while having its own cryptographers, draws on the Army's corps of 100,000 code specialists and eavesdroppers to tap Asian communications.

---C.I.A. specialists often operate off U.S. Navy ships in the Pacific, usually involved in electronic surveillance.

---The agency also is privy to information from the Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) which has a substantial operation of its own in Asia.

The D.I.A. spends from its own budget more than US\$1 billion a year flying reconnaissance planes and keeping satellites aloft.

Those satellites allow C.I.A. analysts to know more---from photographs, taken 130 miles up---about China's topography than do the Chinese themselves.

---The U.S. State Department's intelligence section also feeds a considerable amount of confidential data it collects through its embassies, consulates and travelling diplomats to the C.I.A. This includes information gathered by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) the Justice Department and the U.S. Treasury (Secret Service) often attached to diplomatic missions abroad.

The C.I.A. also works closely with the intelligence services and police forces of the countries considered America's allies in Asia, exchanging information with them.

Where does all the C.I.A. money go?

It funnels out in myriad directions: To pay for the agency's overt intelligence gathering activities, to finance "dirty tricks" and other clandestine capers, to prop up ousted or failing politicians and to pay for "disinformation" and other psychological warfare ploys.

Despite the C.I.A.'s oft-deserved sinister image, a good deal of its funds are expended on open intelligence gathering operations.

These go for subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals and other publications and salaries for those who must scan them for intelligence tidbits.

It is estimated that more than 50% of the C.I.A.'s world-wide intelligence input comes from such overt sources. (An estimated 35% comes from electronic spying and less than 15% from JAMES BOND-type, cloak-and-dagger operations.)

An exception is Asia.

A greater amount of the C.I.A. funds expended in Asia go into covert activities.



The News Business

Few "Revelations" for Those Who Had Been Listening

THE continuing storm over publication of secret Pentagon papers contains lessons for all of us in the news business and for the country and the government as well.

The newspapers are learning from this episode and from the national loss of memory that has occurred since 1964 that their impact on public opinion in the United States is tragically limited. The substance and in some cases the precise details of virtually everything The Washington Post and The New York Times have printed from the Pentagon papers is ancient history. It was nearly all published while it was happening. And it was largely a futile enterprise; neither the public nor the congressional politicians were listening.

The government is learning something, too. It is learning that policy is poorly communicated and public opinion is poorly shaped by proxy. All through the early 1960s, government officials were anonymously "leaking" their fears and "options" for Vietnam through the press as a substitute for public candor and direct communication with the people. This produced considerable support for the government's zig-zag policies by most of the major newspapers, including The Post and The Times. But newspaper editorials are not necessarily the voice of the people, and newspapers, as is now evident, are inadequate instruments for public education.

What the public and politicians could learn from this experience is that if they sit there asleep in the back row while their destinies are being debated, they are in a poor position when the slumber ends to cry foul and search for scapegoats.

THE FACTS of this particular case are that The Post and The Times and other large news organizations published thousands of stories, editorials and essays in 1964 describing the deteriorating military and political situation in Vietnam—just as it was described in the official memoranda and cables in the Pentagon papers. The various options and contingency plans being put before the President at that time were reported repeatedly and accurately—as they are now reported in the official papers.

The growing combat role of American forces was laid out in impressive detail on front pages all over the country—the first uses of napalm against suspected enemy villages, the commitment of U.S. helicopters and crewmen to the battlefields, the reconnaissance, bombing and strafing missions of U.S. aircraft in South Vietnam and Laos, the U.S. role in the training and transport of South Vietnamese raiding parties into North Vietnam, the participation of U.S. advisers and Special Forces teams in major battles, the use of U.S. troops in perimeter defense at military bases. The circumstances of the Tonkin Gulf incident, including the prior raids by North Vietnamese forces against North Vietnamese territory, were

By Richard Harwood

reported accurately at the time. The possibilities of U.S. air raids on North Vietnam were reported and discussed in the press repeatedly far in advance of the event. U.S. casualty lists and the new funerals at Arlington National Cemetery received increasing prominence in the news as the war revved up in 1964.

"Today," one of our correspondents wrote in February, 1964, "there are 15,500 military personnel in South Vietnam; some 275 Americans have died, about 100 of them in combat, but there has been no outcry whatsoever at home for pulling out our troops. This attitude, one hopes, is an expression of maturing American opinion, of a willingness to face up to wars that are neither 'won' nor 'lost'; to accept the fact that the

Korean War was the first of what probably will be a host of 'mean, frustrating and nerve-wracking wars,' the term Secretary of State Dean Rusk applied last April to the struggle in South Vietnam."

FOLLOWING the Gulf of Tonkin incidents The Times editorialized: "United States determination to assure the independence of South Vietnam, if ever doubted before, cannot be doubted now by the Communists to the north or their allies."

A few days later The Times said: "The Americans went into Vietnam in 1954 to fill the vacuum left by the French and to contain the advance of communism in that part of Southeast Asia. The motives are exemplary and every American can be proud of them, but the crucial questions are: Can it be done? . . . Is this war necessary?"

These readings of "mature" and "united" American opinion toward the war were probably wrong. What the evidence from that time suggests is that despite the pre-occupation of the newspapers and of the government with Vietnam, the public was both ill-informed and not greatly interested. The Gallup Poll in May, 1964, reported that 63 per cent of the American people had no opinion about the war or how it was going or what the United States should do. The reason for that, Gallup explained, was that this 63 per cent were paying no attention to developments in Southeast Asia; neither the newspapers nor the government had gotten their attention. Six months later, when the war fever in Washington and in the press was rising, the Council on Foreign Relations reported the results of another poll. One in four adult Americans, the council found, was not even aware that a war was going on in Southeast Asia.

What had they been told by the press? If they had been told in February that Secretary Rusk was saying that retaliation against

STATINTL

Viet Politicking: U.S. Plane, U.S. Adviser and Thieu's Man

By Peter A. Jay

Washington Post Foreign Service

DUCPHONG, South Vietnam, June 21—It was old politics with a new Vietnamese twist.

Col. Luu Yem, the portly cigar puffing chief of Phuoclong Province, was out beating the bushes for support for his boss, President Thieu.

The presidential election is of some importance to Yem, who was appointed province chief by Thieu two years ago and who enjoys his job as the military governor of Phuoclong's 45,000 residents.

"If President Thieu doesn't win, I might end up in jail," he said—and chuckled.

The colonel had dropped into Ducphong to help celebrate the opening of a new Catholic Church.

Most of the residents of the area, a thinly populated district in the red-earth hill country near the Cambodian border, are Montagnard tribesmen whose gods are those of the forest and mountains. But there is a prosperous and influential Vietnamese minority, many of whom are Catholics; and these were the constituents the colonel had come to see.

He brought 50,000 piasters (about \$190) to help the church along, half a dozen black-robed priests from the provincial capital of Songbe, and his American adviser, Lt. Col. Carl G. Smith.

Actually, it was Smith who got everyone to Ducphong, by ordering up the

Air America plane that brought them there, but he took pains to emphasize that the project was Col. Yem's.

After landing on the little Ducphong airstrip—after a steep descent through the clouds that turned the faces of some of the priests a faint green—the group was whisked to the new church by jeep. Montagnards working in the fields watched the party as it sped by.

At the church, where the Ducphong power structure was having a social hour before lunch, Col. Yem found the first sign of another political force at work.

National Assemblyman Nguyen Dac Dan, who recently won the attention of the Saigon press by brandishing a hand grenade during a legislative debate, was comfortably seated in the midst of a group of dignitaries and chatting up a storm.

Dan, who wears a mustache like Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky's, said he was campaigning both for the vice president and for himself.

Though he was elected to the assembly from Baxuyen Province in the Mekong Delta, Dan has decided to run in Phuoclong (there are no residency requirements for Assembly candidates) in an effort to oust the aging pro-government speaker of the lower house, Nguyen Ba Luang.

Luong, 69, was also present, sitting in a corner and looking rather miffed.

"You know why Dan wants to run here, don't you?" Col. Yem asked a re-

porter later. "Everyone hated him so much in Baxuyen he couldn't win there again, so he came up here where nobody knows him."

Despite this confrontation of conflicting political forces, the splendid lunch laid on by the church proceeded smoothly, with Yem in the place of honor cracking jokes that made the priests giggle.

Midway through the last course, a helicopter passed overhead and landed in the churchyard.

"That must be my chopper," said Smith, the U.S. adviser, frowning and looking at his watch.

But it wasn't his chopper. Into the church strode two dapper young Vietnamese Air Force pilots. They would

be glad to have some food and a can of beer, they said when the priests offered them refreshment, but then they had to pick up Assemblyman Dan and take him to his next appointment.

Col. Yem looked at Dan, who smiled back. Luong was nowhere to be seen. "How is it you get a helicopter whenever you want one?" a reporter asked Dan.

"I have a friend in the air force," he said.

Interestingly, no one said a word about the Vietnamese election law that forbids any candidate for the assembly to campaign before mid August; and bars all campaigning for presidential contenders until early September.

Who is to say what this little incident illustrates?

Perhaps that the Vietnamese are beginning to enjoy, or at least to practice, the new system of politics that was imposed on them four years ago.

To say any more would be to venture out on thin ice; even to say that, in Phuoclong Province at least, presidential sentiment seems divided between Thieu and Ky would be rash.

A Vietnamese-speaking reporter asked the South Vietnamese soldier who chauffeured an American official's car in the provincial capital who he thought would win the election.

"Well, don't tell (the official)," he said, "but 80 per cent of us in my militia unit are going to vote for Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh. We think he's the one who will bring peace."

Soc. 4.0.1. New York Times
1 - Washington Post

LBJ Shown as Crafty, but No Liar

By Bernard D. Nossiter
Washington Post Staff Writer

A comparison of the Johnson administration's public remarks with the material that has been published from the Pentagon's private study of the Vietnam war discloses a public record marked by half-truths, careful ambiguities, and misleading and deceptive statements rather than flatfooted untruths.

What appears at first glance to be the grossest misstatement in public frequently turns out, on close examination, to contain a phrase or word that saves it from the label "lie."

For example, on April 1, 1965, according to the published documents, President Johnson secretly made a fateful decision, ordering the 3,500 Marines in Vietnam to shift from a static defense of the base at Danang to offensive actions. This was the beginning of an offensive combat role for U.S. ground troops.

The first public hint of this change came on June 8 when a State Department spokesman said that "American forces would be available for combat support." The next day, the White House put out a statement asserting:

"There has been no change in the mission of United States ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to Gen. Westmoreland recently or at any other time."

This appears to be the lie direct. But the statement continued:

"The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the airbase at Danang. They have the associated mission of actively patrolling and securing action in and near the areas thus safeguarded."

"If help is requested by appropriate Vietnamese commanders, Gen. Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned area to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese

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forces faced with aggressive attack . . ."

Thus, the last two paragraphs, although still avoiding the full truth, soften the impact of the first and patently false paragraph.

Again in late November 1964 the Administration's top-most circle, according to published material, agreed to adopt a "determined action program" aimed at putting pressure on Hanoi and raising South Vietnamese morale. A draft position paper of Nov. 29 charts a two-phase bombing program as a key element in this plan—possible reprisal strikes against North Vietnam and a U.S. readiness to conduct sustained bombing against the North.

At a press conference on Nov. 28, a prescient reporter asked the President:

"Is expansion of the Vietnam war into Laos or North Vietnam a live possibility at this point?"

Mr. Johnson, in a lengthy reply, allowed that his top advisers were then meeting, but in the operative part of his response said:

"I anticipate that there will be no dramatic announcement (emphasis added) to come out of these meetings except in the form of your speculation."

This was literally true but substantively misleading. No dramatic announcement was made but the meetings all but sealed the dramatic decision to launch the two-phase bombing program that began in February.

Administration leaders rarely made outright misstatements about the crucial events in the 20 months up to July 1965 when, as the already published Pentagon documents say, the United States entered into an open-ended commitment and an Asian land war.

Perhaps Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara came as close as any to complete falsification in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

in February, 1968.

The Committee was exploring the origins of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the authority on which the Johnson regime relied to enlarge the war. Sen. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), the chairman, was attempting to discover whether the administration had decided well in advance of the August incidents in the Tonkin Gulf to ask Congress for a broad grant of authority. The dialogue went like this:

The Chairman: Mr. Secretary did you see the contingency draft of what became the Southeast Asia resolution before it was ready?

Secretary McNamara: Mr. Chairman, I read in the newspaper a few weeks ago there had been such a contingency draft. I don't believe I ever saw it . . . But I can't testify absolutely that I didn't. My memory is not clear on that.

Executive Committee

In fact, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council — which included McNamara — had decided after its meetings on May 24 and 25, 1964 to seek a Congressional resolution authorizing "all measures" to assist South Vietnam. Thus, McNamara and the others had approved a draft of the Tonkin Gulf resolution nearly ten weeks before the attack on the American destroyers in those waters.

Even here, McNamara's choice of words to the Senate Committee is artful. He says he didn't believe he saw the draft and it is conceivable that he approved the substance without reading all the language. Moreover, he tells the committee that his memory isn't clear on the crucial point and he won't "absolutely" deny having seen it.

At the same hearing, Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, skirted perilously close to untruth. Whether he

Chairman Fulbright asked Wheeler whether in the period around July 1964 the military had recommended extending the war to the north by bombing or other means.

Gen. Wheeler replied: "I don't believe so, Mr. Chairman. I think that the proper answer would be that there were certain intelligence activities (deleted) but to the best of my knowledge and belief during that period there was no thought of extending the war into the North in the sense of our participation in such actions, activities."

Then, for the record, the Pentagon supplied an insertion:

"We have identified no such recommendation. A check of the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is continuing."

In fact, published records show, as early as Jan. 22, 1964 — six months before the period about which Fulbright was inquiring — the top brass sent McNamara a lengthy memo saying:

"Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder actions in Southeast Asia to:

" . . . h. Conduct aerial bombing of key North Vietnam targets, using U.S. resources under Vietnamese cover, and with the Vietnamese openly assuming responsibility for the actions . . .

"j. Commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam . . ."

Wheeler was stretching the truth to say the Chiefs harbored "no thought" of extending the war North. On the other hand, he could argue that a proposal "to make ready" northward actions is less than a recommendation and that he equates "thought" with an unqualified proposal.

The gap between public oratory and private belief is strikingly illustrated by Mr. Johnson's State of the Union address on Jan. 9, 1965.

STATINTL


LAOS

Change of Tune

BY ARNOLD ABRAMS

Vientiane: The thaw in Sino-American relations has not halted US-directed intelligence operations which penetrate deep into Chinese territory. These operations, which have been conducted for years by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), involve the sending of reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as far as several hundred miles into southern China's Yunnan province. Team members are native hill tribesmen whose ethnic stock — Meo — is prevalent in southern China.

The tribesmen have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, politi-



Souvanna Phouma: Stressing China's non-aggressive attitude towards Laos.

Chinese authorities have known for some time about the missions; several teams have been captured in recent years.

Consequently, American officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate such territorial incursions as long as they are conducted solely for intelligence-gathering purposes and do not pose a direct security threat. US authorities also believe that, if the Chinese want an excuse to reverse the friendly trend, they can do better than simply focus on these operations.

"Americans are still fighting in Vietnam, they have a military presence on Taiwan, and they are standing by their treaty commitments to Chiang Kai-shek," observes one source close to the US embassy here. "If the Chinese are looking for something to whip them with, any one of those three will do."

In Laos, American officials' major security concern about the Chinese stems from a Peking road-building project in the north. An estimated 14,000 Chinese personnel, including several thousand soldiers standing guard and manning anti-aircraft batteries, are constructing a route leading toward the Thai border.

Thai authorities repeatedly have expressed deep concern about the road's potential as a supply line for communist-led guerilla forces in northern Thailand. American officials privately voice similar concern. While conceding that Chinese forces in Laos have not shown hostility, they insist the construction project must be kept under closest scrutiny.

The Peking project originally was requested by the tripartite government, established in Laos with the signing of the 1962 Geneva Accord, which collapsed in 1963.

Ironically, while American officials fret about Chinese intentions in Laos, Peking's new diplomacy has prompted a positive reaction from the leader of this nation's neutralist government. In a recent interview, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma stressed China's historically non-aggressive attitude toward Laos.

The 70-year-old prince noted that the unhappy history of this landlocked kingdom is replete with tales of invasion by neighbouring Thais, Cambodians, Burmese and Vietnamese — but not by the Chinese. He also expressed the hope that China's attitude, coupled with a

possible Sino-American rapprochement, would restrain further North Vietnamese aggression in Laos.

Although Souvanna Phouma is still said to harbour private fears about Peking's longrange designs on this region, his current public stance marks a departure from the position he assumed earlier this year, prior to the US-supported South Vietnamese invasion of his country. Then, he warned that the allied move might prompt open intervention by Peking in the Indochina war. Now, his tune is different. Like everyone else, he can only guess about the intentions of China's leaders.

Fateful Flowering

BY A CORRESPONDENT

Vientiane: Asia's latest opium war is hotting up. East of the Annamite mountains, the US military is reported to be reeling under the effects of heroin, and in Saigon US leaders have been pressing the government into a series of emergency measures to stop the flow of supplies — including a mass transfer of customs agents from Ton Son Nhut airport, the centre of large scale trafficking, and sweeps through the city to arrest suspected peddlars.

A widely publicised amnesty-cure programme has been offered addicted soldiers. All chemists and known peddling centres have been placed "off limits" and medical tests instituted to detect addicts among homeward bound troops.

But these measures are preliminary skirmishes in the great war. The problem of stamping out or otherwise controlling opium can only be solved by an international campaign of which Laos is already feeling the impact. An American narcotics investigator is in Vientiane tracing the legend that heroin is produced in Laos and seeking information to map out strategy in the war against opiates. Early this month Laotian national police were pressured into a general round-up of Vientiane's opium den operators, most of whom have a licence from the Laotian government. More than 120 operators were held for questioning.

But Laotians find it difficult to take seriously a campaign which conflicts with local customs, tolerances and economy. The opium den operators were

POTTSTOWN, PA.

MERCURY

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Strong Indictment

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Long after the last American has been withdrawn from Indochina, the United States will still be facing the consequences of its participation in that theater in terms of human misery. Hundreds of thousands of wounded, many with permanently crippling injuries, will remind generations yet unborn of the cost America paid.

Perhaps more destructive, in terms of human lives, are the thousands returning from Indochina with sound limbs but bodies hooked on narcotics. Reports of drug usage by American servicemen serving in Vietnam have appeared almost from the beginning of the involvement. But the full extent of addiction on drugs such as heroin has not been revealed until recently.

A report prepared by two congressmen who toured Indochina and prepared their findings on drug usage for the House Foreign Affairs Committee reveals how widespread the problem has become. The study by Rep. Robert Steele of Connecticut and Rep. Morgan F. Murphy of Illinois backs up earlier allegations by the House Armed Services Committee on widespread corruption among Asian officials in drug traffic.

"In Laos, government armed forces

are major wholesalers of opium and heroin and have been directly involved in large scale smuggling activity," the two congressmen reported.

"Reliable sources report that at least two highranking Laotian officials, military and governmental, including the chief of the Laotian general staff, are deeply involved in smuggling activity," they said.

"In Thailand, a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reported to be one of the key figures in the opium, morphine base and heroin operations in that country and throughout Southeast Asia."

South Vietnamese and Laotian Air Force planes are used to move the illicit cargo into South Vietnam, Steele and Murphy charged. They also said there is evidence some of the narcotics are being shipped by diplomatic pouch on Air America, a CIA-backed airline.

Steele estimates as many as 20 percent of Americans in Vietnam have used heroin. If only half the charges made by this latest study are true — and thus far no part of the report has been refuted — it is a damaging indictment of the allies America has paid such a high price to defend in Southeast Asia.

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ment in Veterans' Administration hospitals.

The VA has made plans to provide 30 special units to care for narcotics victims by July 1972, with five units already in operation capable of treating 200 addicts each. Yet those dishonorably discharged prior to the enlightened Pentagon policy still cannot receive VA treatment.

Therefore, I am introducing today a bill which would authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to provide care and treatment for certain former members of the Armed Forces addicted to narcotic drugs. The "certain" members are those who were discharged dishonorably, because of drug addiction.

I believe it is important for the Armed Forces to assert national leadership in identifying drug abusers, and once recognized, insure that treatment and rehabilitation are available to all who have served their country. This is no less important for those addicts now serving on active duty who are now receiving treatment as it is for those who were treated punitively in being released dishonorably from the Army. Military leadership in handling the drug problem would be a distinct contribution toward the abatement of this national tragedy.

The bill which I am introducing today provides the possibility of treatment for thousands who have been sent home with an addiction which is all too often supported by regular criminal activity. It is madness to allow the military to return addicts to civilian life and not provide for their treatment.

OPIMUM TRAFFIC IN INDOCHINA

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the RECORD a news article on the recent testimony of John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, before the House Select Committee on Crime during hearings on the importation of opium into the United States. The article was written by Tom Foley and appeared in the Los Angeles Times on June 3.

Mr. Foley's coverage of the proceedings of that day are excellent and describe some of the startling findings we learned on the involvement of the governments and some high officials in many Southeast Asia countries in illegal drug traffic.

I commend this article to the attention of all who have an interest in this subject.

[From the Los Angeles Times, June 3, 1971]
ASIAN OFFICIALS PROTECT HEROIN SALE, PANEL TOLD—THEY MAY PROFIT FROM SUPPLYING DRUGS TO U.S. SOLDIERS, NARCOTICS CHIEF SAYS

(By Thomas J. Foley)

WASHINGTON.—The government's chief narcotics enforcement officer said Wednesday that officials of friendly Southeast Asia governments are protecting and may even

have an interest in heroin traffic to American servicemen in Vietnam.

In testimony before the House Crime Committee, John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, also said Heroin had been unwittingly smuggled into South Vietnam on airplanes of the CIA-operated Air America.

Committee Chairman Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) and other members urged the Administration to take a stronger stand with foreign friendly governments to force a halt to illicit drug traffic.

These included Turkey and France, which respectively grow and process the overwhelming amount of the opium smuggled into the United States as heroin.

RIGHT TO ASK AID

"We're committed to risk our own cities in a nuclear war if any French city is attacked by the Communists," Pepper said, "and we have the right not only to ask but to demand that the French take emergency action to help us."

Ingersoll, who recently returned from discussions with Southeast Asia leaders on the heroin problem, said he doubted that any policy-making officials of the countries—Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam—are involved in the illicit drug traffic.

Burma, Thailand and Laos account for about 80 percent of the world's opium production, he said.

But he told newsmen after the hearing that many lower-level officials, including members of the South Vietnamese Legislature, deal in opium. He said some legislators have friends in President Nguyen Van Thieu's cabinet.

Ingersoll told the committee that heroin refineries were under control of insurgents in Burma and Thailand but that those in Laos are protected by elements of the royal Laotian armed forces.

RAMPARTS DISCLOSURES

He said that while management and ownership of the Laotian refineries appear to be primarily in the hands of ethnic Chinese citizens of that nation, "some reports suggest" that a senior Laotian air force officer may have an ownership interest in some of the plants.

When Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D-Calif.) noted that Ramparts magazine had identified the official as Gen. Ouane Rathigoune, Ingersoll replied that "general speculation" conceded this.

Ingersoll denied one contention of the Ramparts article. It maintained that remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang army left in the area are involved in heroin production and are in the employ of the CIA for operations on the China mainland.

But Ingersoll conceded that Air America planes had been used in the past for smuggling heroin—just as regular commercial airliners have been used to smuggle it into the United States.

He told newsmen later that 80 kilograms were seized on an Air America plane at the huge Tan Son Hut Air Base outside Saigon only three or four weeks ago.

During the hearing, Waldie also asked Ingersoll about a Ramparts report that the secret CIA base of Long Cheng, used to support the U.S.-paid Meo tribesmen, was a distribution point for heroin to be shipped into South Vietnam.

Ingersoll said he had not heard of that. However, he later said he had discussed the general illicit drug problem with CIA Director Richard Helms. He said Helms denied the CIA was involved in any way, and that he believed him.

"The Meo tribesmen are something else," Ingersoll said, "but I don't blame the CIA for what the tribesmen do."

POOR CIA SECURITY

Waldie said CIA security was apparently "absolutely poor" since those in the CIA em-

ploy used the base and facilities for the illicit traffic."

The narcotics chief sought to allay criticism by congressmen of U.S. efforts to get the cooperation of the Asian governments to crack down on the drug traffic.

He said the United States had virtually no leverage over the Burma government, since the last existing aid program is being phased out. The opium-growing area in Thailand is in the hands of insurgents, Ingersoll said, but the Bangkok government is taking steps to try to control it.

He said Laotian officials were "most responsive" even though some high-ranking officials were involved.

VIETNAM SMUGGLING

Ingersoll said the Saigon government had taken several steps to crack down on the smuggling, including a shakeup of its customs officials, an increase in the size of its central police force dealing with the problem and the appointment of a special task force by President Thieu.

He also said he was assigning three additional agents to the Far East and that the Defense Department had placed off limits areas of open heroin dealing.

A SYMBOLIC FLAG CEREMONY

HON. FRANK HORTON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, during these times, when, on one hand, the patriotism of some of our Nation's finest leaders is questioned; and when, on the other, it is often scorned to be patriotic, we must stop to consider what the flag and patriotism actually mean.

Sunday, in Rochester, N.Y., in my congressional district, I attended a flag ceremony at the Rochester Polish People's Home. It was the first flag raising at the home. I would like to share the ceremony with my colleagues for it vividly made the significance of the flag clear to all who attended.

Mr. Ray Gatz, president of the home, introduced the guests, who represented local, county, State, and Federal legislative bodies, as well as the Polish-American and American Legion Posts.

Officials included Rochester Mayor Stephen May, State Assemblyman Raymond Lill, City Councilman Urban Kress, Monroe County Legislators Nicholas Santaro and Sam Poppick.

County Judge Arthur Curran also attended. Judge Curran was especially aware of the value of the flag. He recently received the flag from the coffin of his son, a marine, who was killed in Japan.

Also present were James O'Grady, commander of the Michalski Post; Joseph Zabuchek, commander of the Pulaski Post; Joseph DeMeis, commander of the Monroe County American Legion Post; and Edmund R. Przynsinda, president of Hudson Avenue Area Association.

During the ceremony, I presented a flag which had flown over the Capitol to Mr. Gatz. It was blessed by Father Pietrzykowski and raised by Mr. Gatz. County Commander DeMeis led the Pledge of Allegiance.

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIET STUDY

Following are the texts of key parts of the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam situation from December, 1963, through the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964, and its aftermath. Except where indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, typographical errors corrected.

McNamara Report to Johnson On the Situation in Saigon in '63

Memorandum, "Vietnam Situation," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.

In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.

1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.

2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving little or no direction because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A specific example of the present situation is that General [name illegible] is spending little or no time commanding III Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs full-time direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has been pointed out to him both by Dean Rusk and myself

(and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.

As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate resources to secure the remaining government-controlled areas and work out from there.

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In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on the government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for cross-border operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would not be politically acceptable or even militarily effective. We need to have immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and this we are preparing on an urgent basis.

Heroin trade profits behind GI addiction

By Irwin Silber

The U.S. Army is many things: an instrument for colonial war, the military extension of American foreign policy, a force for suppressing domestic unrest, a power base for the military elite.


But the several million soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines—and most especially those on duty in Southeast Asia—also comprise another unit of always inordinate interest to American capitalism: a market.

The GI marketplace has long been one of the most lucrative for thousands of enterprising businessmen who are earning fabulous profits on a great variety of products and services ranging from transistor radios and popular records to comic books and love beads.

One of the most profitable deals going in Southeast Asia these days is the marketing of hard drugs—mostly 95% pure heroin—to American GIs. The drug trade has become so big recently that a special congressional investigating committee just returned from Vietnam says, "The problem has reached epidemic proportions."

What's an "epidemic?" Conservative estimates concede that 10 to 15 per cent of all American enlisted men in Vietnam regularly use "scag," the popular term for heroin. With some 250,000 GIs still in Vietnam, this averages out to a minimum of 25,000 men. But the "experts"—the specialists in narcotics addiction and drug rehabilitation—assert that the actual figures are much higher. Some of these experts, defying Pentagon pressure to minimize the problem, estimate that some 60,000 American GIs in Vietnam, mostly draftees, are heroin addicts. Various surveys have shown that some field units have a 50% rate of "scag" users.

But it's dollars that tell the real story. The average



price for the unadulterated heroin most common in Vietnam is \$3 a "hit." Many GIs are getting five and six "fixes" a day, but using the most conservative figures, it all adds up to the fact that GI heroin addiction in Vietnam is at least a \$50,000 per day—\$20 million per year-operation. The Army admits to more than 100 deaths from overdoses in 1970. The 1971 rate is already higher, with 35 OD's reported for the first two months alone. These figures do not include what the Pentagon euphemistically calls "drug-related" fatalities.

The extent of drug addiction in Vietnam has been an open secret for several years. Songs and jokes about the use of marijuana began to crop as early as 1965. It is generally agreed that anywhere from 80 to 90 per cent of American enlisted men in Vietnam had access to and used "grass" with some degree of regularity.

But the switch to the "hard" stuff a couple of years ago has changed the name of the game. Now some 20,000 heroin addicts are being discharged from the armed forces every year. They are returning to civilian life with an expensive and deadly habit. Add to the ex-GI's addiction his familiarity with weapons—and probably a somewhat easier access to them—and it is not difficult to see how this would have an impact on the growth of drug-related crime back home.

Undoubtedly it is this new social fact of tens of thousands of newly made addicts returning to civilian society that has led to congressional concern. But on looking into the situation, various representatives and senators have discovered what GIs and antiwar activists have known for some time. The drug traffic in Southeast Asia is big business. It's organized. It is run by people in the highest echelons of the puppet governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. And the U.S. military machine itself is, at the least, an active accomplice in the entire operation.

A special subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, headed by Rep. Robert H. Steele (R-Conn.), has concluded that the heroin traffic is protected—and in some cases directed—by government and military figures at the highest official levels in Southeast Asia. Among them is the chief of the (Royal) Laotian general staff. High-ranking South Vietnamese officials, both members of the National Assembly and military figures, are also deeply involved.

Vientiane, the administrative capital of the puppet Laotian regime, is apparently the center for heroin production. Utilizing an extensive network of the Saigon regime's customs officials, and with the tacit agreement of people high in the American diplomatic corps, the drug is "smuggled" into Saigon in prodigious quantities. (The word "smuggled" is used advisedly, since until the recent publicity, the traffic was so open that known dealers were personally escorted through immigration by top customs officials.) The key official in the operation is Tran Thien Khoi, chief of the National Customs Investigation Division and a brother of Premier Tran Thien Kiem.

The heroin comes into Saigon by commercial aircraft and also by South Vietnamese and Laotian Air Force planes. Air America, a "special" airline financed by the CIA, has also been utilized as a means of transporting the drug.

JUN 7 1970
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U.S. Pours In Record Aid

By Donald Kirk

Newsday Special Correspondent

Pakse, Laos—Gleaming, unmarked cargo planes were thundering on or off the sun-baked runway every 10 or 15 minutes. Half a dozen Lao Air Force T-28s squatted on an apron beside the airstrip revving their engines. A small observation plane circled lazily overhead.

"Just normal operations," said a brawny, tanned American, driving a truck of supplies from the offices of Air America and Continental, the two Central Intelligence Agency-financed contract airlines flying the unmarked planes. "This goes on every day," the American added for emphasis as a four-engined C-130, also unmarked, roared onto the runway and began taxiing toward a distant corner of the base.

The scene, in fact, epitomized America's desperate efforts to defend not only this vital commercial center on the Mekong River in southern Laos but also a series of other lowland towns threatened by North Vietnamese troops who have already conquered the entire Bolovens Plateau 40 miles to the coast. "The North Vietnamese could overrun this whole town in two or three hours," said one American official, whose wife and children had had to leave on orders for evacuation of all American dependents. "There's only two or three battalions of Royal Lao troops around Pakse, and they'd probably just scatter if the North Vietnamese made a determined effort to take this place."

Despite the seeming hopelessness of the situation, American officials are pouring in record amounts of arms and ammunition to brace the Lao forces, who vanished rather than fight the Communists in battles for critical positions on the Bolovens, crisscrossed and dotted by North Vietnamese supply routes and storage depots. "We're just in the business of providing economic assistance," said an affable, graying official for the U.S. Agency for International Development, but lettering on the tops of bomb crates clearly designated USAID as responsible for their distribution. USAID officials—some of them really with the CIA—were assigned to expedite the flow of materiel from Air America and Continental planes to Lao units.

Americans admitted that Lao ground forces, depleted and demoralized after years of back-and-forth warfare, could probably not use the materiel adequately, but they were optimistic about tiny Lao Air Force T-28s, propeller-driven planes capable of carrying four 500-pound bombs apiece. "They're maneuverable as hell," one American said as the planes began zooming off the airstrip and banked toward the first foothills of the Bolovens Plateau. "They operate fine as close air support." The 500-pound bombs for the T-28s are probably the most important item on the American aid inventory here. Con-

voys of civilian trucks carrying the bombs under loose-fitting tarpaulins arrive here almost every day by road from Thailand, bordering Laos 20 miles east of the Mekong. The trucks belong to the Express Transport Organization, a Thai company contracted by the U.S. government.

The U.S. would doubtless not rely on Lao Air Force T-28s were it not for restrictions imposed on the use of American aircraft near the Mekong River lowlands. American jets fly round-the-clock missions over the Ho Chi Minh Trail region of southern Laos from half a dozen bases in Thailand, but they seldom bomb within 50 miles of here. "We need special permission from the Lao government to do so," said an American official, "and sometimes, they don't grant it. All they've got beside the T-28s are some gunships which fly every night. It's really not much in a showdown."

This kind of air support was of only minimal value, in fact, when about 3,000 North Vietnamese troops attacked the town of Paksong, the last important Royal Lao outpost on the Bolovens Plateau, three weeks ago. Lao soldiers simply vanished into surrounding jungles while the North Vietnamese not only overran the town but also blocked the main road from Paksong to Pakse. "The fall of Paksong was the worst disaster in southern Laos in more than a year," said an American responsible for providing aid and relief for about 6,000 refugees who fled the town and nearby villages for the relative safety of Pakse. "There's very little chance the Lao army can retake the town. They just don't have the men."


The only real hope for Pakse and other towns in the lowlands seems to lie in the priorities set by the North Vietnamese. Their aim apparently is to solidify their control over the Bolovens Plateau, where they already have established a road network as an alternative to the Ho Chi Minh Trail system further east. "They need the second network to compensate for American bombings," explained a knowledgeable source. "They seem to want all of Laos except the lowlands so they'll have all the room

continued

TIME
7 11 1971



EXHAUSTED G.I.s AFTER COMBAT MISSION



SOLDIER SNIFFS HEROIN VIAL

New Withdrawal Costs

WITH the horror of a nightmare, the U.S. is discovering that getting out of Viet Nam has a price that it did not anticipate. One longtime supporter of the American cause—sympathetic enough so that President Nixon granted him a lengthy private interview only last February—is Peregrine Worsthorne, columnist and assistant editor of London's *Sunday Telegraph*. Now, Worsthorne argues, the U.S. presence in Viet Nam "may have become more a curse than a blessing, may now actually be doing the cause of South Viet Nam's independence more harm than good." The problem, says Worsthorne, is that American troops—once necessary to inspire the laggard South Vietnamese—have become dangerously demoralized. "Drug-saturated, mutinous, defeatist, incompetent, they constitute more of a threat to the South Vietnamese than do the Viet Cong," he contends.

Ominous Mutant. Worsthorne's brutal language is plainly exaggerated, but he has properly pointed to an ominous new mutant of the American tragedy in Viet Nam. The most melancholy statistics to come out of the war are, of course, the casualty figures of dead and wounded. Yet there is another, subtler casualty list that will haunt American society even after the last G.I. has left Viet Nam—the troops who became addicted to heroin while serving in Southeast Asia. The number is staggering: between 10% and 15% of U.S. troops in Viet Nam have developed a heroin habit. That represents from 26,000 to 39,000 Americans hooked. Some estimates are even higher—20% or more, which means upwards of 50,000 G.I. addicts. Only a few hundred G.I.s have enrolled in the Army's drug-amnesty-rehabilitation program since the first of the year.

These figures are not the work of antiwar propagandists. They were brought back by retiring Army Secretary Stanley Resor from a recent visit to Viet Nam, and repeated last week in a study conducted for the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Connecticut Republican Robert H. Steele. Steele made this chilling observation: "The soldier going to South Viet Nam today runs a far greater risk of becoming a heroin addict than a combat casualty." In all seriousness, he recommended that the President order all Americans home unless the governments of South Viet Nam, Laos and Thailand put an end to the traffic in illegal drugs. Corruption is so ingrained in Viet Nam, however, that stamping out the heroin trade would be a monumental task (see *THE WORLD*).

One reason for widespread G.I. addiction is the high quality of the "No. 4" crystalline white heroin distributed in Viet Nam. In the U.S., where most heroin is diluted with milk sugar or quinine to 5% strength or less, the drug is usually mainlined with a needle, a process that not only is unpleasant but also carries a considerable social taboo. In Viet Nam, by contrast, the heroin is so pure—95% or better—that it can be smoked with an equally powerful effect. Many G.I.s long since caught up in the pervasive marijuana culture have fallen prey to the myth that heroin is not addictive if smoked. Now a joint of heroin is passed around a group of soldiers in exactly the same manner as a joint of marijuana.

Off Limits. Under pressure from the U.S., the Saigon government is trying to curb the narcotics traffic and other smuggling. Several arrests were made in America, an airline that operates widely out of Laos and is often used by the CIA, were fired for carrying narcotics

into Viet Nam. The U.S. command declared all Vietnamese drugstores off limits to U.S. servicemen in order to discourage the buying of amphetamines and barbiturates. The Army followed suit by banning troops from bars, hotels and other businesses where drugs are known to be sold. But such measures have no effect on the thousands of other outlets, where most of the heroin is bought. A member of TIME's Saigon bureau asked a pedicab driver outside the U.S.O. club for "skag." After perfunctory hesitation ("You cop?"), the driver took the correspondent to a heroin source ten minutes away.

Palliative. No one can reckon the moral and emotional coin that the U.S. must eventually expend for the war in Viet Nam. General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Viet Nam, felt it necessary last week to warn against any form of "laxity" among the remaining G.I.s as the American pullout continues. Said Abrams: "It requires a herculean effort to keep alertness up." President Nixon acknowledges that heroin addiction in the military has become a serious problem; he is about to announce an ambitious federal program to combat the narcotics crisis through a new Government agency. It would confront the national drug problem generally, and would have specific authority to take over all cases of addiction in the armed forces and among veterans who became hooked while in uniform. That is at least a palliative gesture. Still, the President has often cautioned his countrymen against the hazards of a premature American withdrawal from Viet Nam: the dimensions of drug addiction among American troops offer one more heart-rending reason why the U.S. should get out as rapidly as possible.

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STATINTL

editorials

Strong indictment

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A report prepared by two congressmen who toured Indochina and prepared their findings on drug usage for the House Foreign Affairs Committee reveals how widespread the problem has become. The study by Rep. Robert Steele of Connecticut and Rep. Morgan F. Murphy of Illinois backs up earlier allegations by the House Armed Services Committee on widespread corruption among Asian officials in drug-traffic.

"In Laos, government armed forces are major wholesalers of opium and heroin and have been directly involved in large scale smuggling activity," the two congressmen reported.

"Reliable sources report that at least two highranking Laotian officials, military and governmental, including the chief of the Laotian general staff, are deeply involved in smuggling activity," they said.

"In Thailand, a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reported to be one of the key figures in the opium, morphine and heroin operations in that country and throughout Southeast Asia."

South Vietnamese and Laotian Air Force planes are used to move the illicit cargo into South Vietnam, Steele and Murphy charged. They also said there is evidence some of the narcotics are being shipped by diplomatic pouch on Air America, a CIA-backed airline.

Steele estimates as many as 20 per cent of Americans in Vietnam have used heroin. If only half the charges made by this latest study are true—and thus far no part of the report has been refuted—it is a damaging indictment of the allies American has paid such a high price to defend in Southeast Asia.

3 JUN 1971

Asian Officials Protect Heroin Sale, Panel Told

They May Profit From Supplying Drugs to U.S. Soldiers, Narcotics Chief Says

BY THOMAS J. FOLEY
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The government's chief narcotics enforcement officer said Wednesday that officials of friendly Southeast Asian governments are protecting and may even have an interest in heroin traffic to American servicemen in Vietnam.

In testimony before the House Crime Committee, John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, also said heroin had been unwittingly smuggled into South Vietnam on airplanes of the CIA-operated Air America.

Committee Chairman Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) and other members urged the Administration to take a stronger stand with foreign friendly governments to force a halt to illicit drug traffic.

These included Turkey and France, which respectively grow and process the overwhelming amount of the opium smuggled into the United States as heroin.

Right to Ask Aid

"We're committed to risk our own cities in a nuclear war if any French city is attacked by the Communists," Pepper said, "and we have the right not only to ask but to demand that the French take emergency action to help us."

Ingersoll, who recently returned from discussions with Southeast Asia leaders on the heroin problem, said he doubted that any policy-making officials of the countries — Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam — are involved in the illicit drug traffic.

Burma, Thailand and Laos account for 80% of the world's opium production, he said.



John E. Ingersoll
by Wirephoto

But he told newsmen after the hearing that many lower-level officials, including members of the South Vietnamese Legislature, deal in opium. He said some legislators have friends in President Nguyen Van Thieu's cabinet.

Ingersoll told the committee that heroin refineries were under control of insurgents in Burma and Thailand but that those in Laos "are protected by elements of the royal Laotian armed forces."

Ramparts Disclosures

He said that while management and ownership of the Laotian refineries appear to be primarily in the hands of ethnic Chinese citizens of that nation, "some reports suggest" that a senior Laotian air force officer may have an ownership interest in some of the plants.

When Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D-Calif.) noted that Ramparts magazine had identified the official as Gen. Ouane Rathi, Ingersoll conceded that "general speculation" conceded this.

Ingersoll denied one contention of the Ramparts article. It maintained that remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang army left in the area are involved in heroin production and are in the employ of the CIA for operations on the China mainland.

But Ingersoll conceded that Air America planes had been used in the past for smuggling heroin — just as regular commercial airliners have been used to smuggle it into the United States.

He told newsmen later that 80 kilograms were seized on an Air America plane at the huge Tan Son Hut Air Base outside Saigon only three or four weeks ago.

During the hearing, Waldie also asked Ingersoll about a Ramparts report that the secret CIA base of Long Cheng, used to support the U.S.-paid Meo tribesmen, was a distribution point for heroin to be shipped into South Vietnam.

Ingersoll said he had not heard of that. However, he later said he had discussed the general illicit drug problem with CIA Director Richard Helms. He said Helms denied the CIA was involved in any way, and that he believed him.

"The Meo tribesmen are something else," Ingersoll said, "but I don't blame the CIA for what the tribesmen do."

Poor CIA Security

Waldie said CIA security was apparently "abysmally poor, since those in the CIA employ used the base and facilities for the illicit traffic."

The narcotics chief sought to allay criticism by congressmen of U.S. efforts to get the cooperation of the Asian governments to crack down on the drug traffic.

He said the United States had virtually no leverage over the Burma government because the existing aid program is be-

ing phased out. The opium-growing area in Thailand is in the hands of insurgents, Ingersoll said, but the Bangkok government is taking steps to try to control it.

He said Laotian officials were "most responsive" even though some high-ranking officials were involved.

Vietnam Smuggling

Ingersoll said the Saigon government had taken several steps to crack down on the smuggling, including a shakeup of its customs officials, an increase in the size of its central police force dealing with the problem and the appointment of a special task force by President Thieu.

He also said he was assigning three additional agents to the Far East and that the Defense Department had placed off limits areas of open heroin deal-

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U.S. Moves Against Asia Drug Trade

Reuter

In the wake of a presidential press conference pledge of "highest priority attention" to drug problems, a federal narcotics official told the House yesterday that measures were under consideration for stopping traffic at the source in Asia.

John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, told the House Select Committee on Crime that proposals under study include strengthening Thailand's ability to control the rising flow from there.

Ingersoll, recently returned from Southeast Asia, was asked whether pressure could be put on Laos to restrain opium traffic.

"I can report to you that pressure is being put on," he replied. He confirmed reports that the drug traffic in Laos is protected by elements of the royal Laotian forces.

Questioned about reports that Air America, a CIA-financed airline in Laos, has been used to transport opium, Ingersoll said "in the past, Air America planes have been used unwittingly just as TWA has been used unwittingly to smuggle drugs into the United States.

"But I can say it has not been the policy of the management to provide transport," he added.

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28 MAY 1971



Congressmen tag Ky as drug pusher

By TIM WHEELER

STATINTL

WASHINGTON, May 27—Two U.S. Congressmen revealed today that President Nixon's allies in Saigon, including vice-dictator Nguyen Cao Ky, are drug pushers who have hooked 30,000 to 40,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam on heroin.

Also implicated in the dope pushing racket is "Air America," the Central Intelligence Agency's air supply wing. The report declares that CIA planes have been used to fly dope into Vietnam.

Rep. Thomas E. Morgan, (D-Ill), and Rep. Robert H. Steele, (R-Conn), were the two Congressmen who released a 46-page report titled "The World Heroin Problem," at a press conference today.

The report contains findings of a 21-day trip the two took through Southeast Asia on which they found rampant drug addiction of "epidemic" proportions among U.S. troops.

They reported that drug pushers in Saigon "are so blatant that several attempts were made to sell heroin to members of the study mission as they walked the streets of Saigon accompanied by a uniformed member of the United States Army."

Withdrawal "only solution"

They warned that unless the "Allies" curb the soaring traffic in heroin "the only solution is to withdraw all American servicemen from Southeast Asia."

"We are not optimistic," they said, "that the government is either willing or able "to curb the drug traffic."

The report states that heroin is smuggled into Vietnam aboard aircraft of the Laotian and South Vietnamese air forces, and in rented and commercial aircraft.

"Heroin," it added, "has also been smuggled in Air America aircraft although there is no evidence that any official of the U.S. agency has ever been involved in the flow of heroin into South Vietnam."

"The U.S. agency," which the two House members found themselves unable to identify by name, is the CIA.

Both House members have been supporters of President Nixon's war policies, but today Rep. Steele told reporters, "The bleak prognosis is that thousands upon thousands of junkie Johnnys will come marching home hooked on heroin."

The report declares, "It is assumed by the U.S. military that this activity reaches high levels of command, to include politicians, both in Laos and in South Vietnam. In Thailand a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reputed to be one of the key figures in the opium, morphine base and heroin operations in that country and throughout southeast Asia.

"There have also been reports that Vice-President Ky is implicated in the current heroin traffic."

Deaths zooming

Drug addiction in some U.S. units in Vietnam has reached 25 percent, the report continues. Between August and December, 1970, 90 deaths were suspected to have been drug-related. Autopsies confirmed 59 were from heroin overdose.

Last January, the rate shot up: 17 for that month alone were drug deaths and in February it rose again to 19.

"Figures for March and April are not yet available, but if this trend continues, over 200 young Americans will die of heroin addiction in 1971," the report warns.

Most of the opium is grown in Laos, but the major exporter of the drug to Vietnam and the U.S. is Thailand, the staunchest anti-Communist ally of the U.S. in Southeast Asia.

Heroin from Thailand, says the report, "is smuggled to the U.S. by couriers on commercial or military aircraft. Some is mailed to the U.S. by U.S. military personnel using both commercial and military postal services."

The disastrous impact of this drug flow from Indochina to the U.S. is reflected in the estimated 250,000 heroin addicts in the U.S., the report states. One half of these are in New York City, where 1,154 persons died from drug overdose in 1970, and one half of these fatalities were below the age of 23. In the nation's capital, heroin addiction rose from 10,400 in 1970 to 13,250 at present, a 60 percent increase.

"Five years ago," the report says, "the heroin problem was restricted to the ghetto areas of our major cities. Now it is spreading to the suburbs and is found among the children of the wealthy and well-to-do as well as among the poor."

The report charges the U.S. military command supplied U.S. Saigon ambassador Ellsworth Bunker "with the names of high-ranking Vietnamese officials it suspects of involvement in the heroin trade." To date, Bunker has remained silent on the subject.

STATINTL

House Team Asks Army to Cure Addicts

By FELIX BELAIR Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 27—A Congressional investigating team urged in a report made public today that the Army be required to identify and rehabilitate the 26,000 to 39,000 American heroin addicts in South Vietnam before returning them to civilian life.

The report to the House Foreign Affairs Committee—parts of which became known earlier this week—said that so many G.I.'s in South Vietnam were becoming addicted to heroin that President Nixon should order all troops home unless authorities in that country, as well as in Laos and Thailand, halted the drug traffic.

Representatives Morgan F. Murphy, Democrat of Illinois, and Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, suggested that corruption at the highest levels of the Governments and the Military of the three countries left little hope for halting the traffic. But they forecast "major moves" by the White House in the next six weeks to put pressure on the Southeast Asian Governments.

Legislation Introduced

The authors of the report visited nine countries in Europe, the Middle and Far East and Indochina and interviewed government, military and diplomatic officials of those countries and the United States. Their investigations outside the United States extended over 21 days.

Legislation requiring all armed services to retain addicted servicemen in active status until cured was introduced in the House recently by Representative John M. Monagan, Democrat of Connecticut.

Known as the Drug Abuse Control Bill of 1971, the meas-

ure would require all branches of the service to certify that men being discharged from active duty were free from drug addiction. It would establish a drug abuse control corps for each branch with responsibility to enforce its provisions.

One of the Congressional report's 19 recommendations urged the President to "take personal command of the struggle to eliminate the illegal international traffic in narcotics, particularly heroin, and commit the full resources of the county to that battle."

To identify heroin addicts before discharge, the report proposed that all military personnel be required to submit to a urinalysis and that the Defense Department provide "acute care and detoxification as well as basic rehabilitation services" for addicts.

3 Years' Treatment Urged

The report recommended that if military rehabilitation efforts proved unsuccessful, an addict's commanding officer "be required, prior to the addict's discharge, to civilly commit the addict to the administrator of the Veterans Administration for a period of three years for treatment and rehabilitation."

At a news conference on the report, Representative Steele said, "The soldier going to South Vietnam today runs a far greater risk of becoming a heroin addict than a combat casualty."

Representative Murphy observed that "a soldier suffering from a wound or even venereal disease can be retained in the service until restored to health, but one suffering from the sickness of heroin addiction is discharged and returned to society and denied the facilities

of the Veterans Administration because of the nature of his illness."

The Illinois Congress said it was "a national disgrace" that the Veterans Administration was not equipped to rehabilitate addicts.

The report estimated that heroin addicts in the United States armed forces in all of Southeast Asia numbered between 30,000 and 40,000, most of them in South Vietnam.

U.S. Planes Reported Involved

The report said that many high-ranking Laotian, Thai and South Vietnamese officials—both civilian and military—are making large profits from the illegal sale of heroin and other narcotics to G.I.'s. It said that in some cases United States planes and diplomatic pouches had been used to smuggle opium and heroin into Saigon.

"In Laos, Government armed forces are major wholesalers of opium and heroin and have been directly involved in large-scale smuggling activity," the report said. "Reliable sources report that at least two high-ranking Laotian officials, including the chief of the Laotian General Staff, are deeply involved in smuggling activity."

"In Thailand a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reputed to be one of the key figures in the opium and heroin operations."

The report said that South Vietnamese and Laotian Air Force planes provided by the United States are frequently used to bring heroin into South Vietnam. Smaller amounts are smuggled in on Air America, an airline financed by the Central Intelligence Agency, it added.

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
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Is the CIA Involved In Opium Traffic? We Should Find Out

DENVER:

A LLEN GINSBERG, the poet, made a bet this month with Central Intelligence Agency chief Richard Helms, that he (Ginsberg) would soon present incontrovertible evidence of CIA involvement in international opium smuggling.

The Helms-Ginsberg exchange comes at the early stages of what may yet be one of the year's big political furors. For months rumors of government dope privateering have circulated in underground press and political channels. Ginsberg is among the principal figures behind the speculation.



Steven Levine, 18

The first in-depth investigation was "The New Opium War," an article published in the May issue of Ramparts magazine. The authors are Frank Browning and Banning Garrett.

For centuries, write the investigators, opium has been a staple cash crop of the Meo tribesmen living in northern Laos, Burma and Thailand. Originally exported solely for intra-Asian use, it has, since World War II, become a salable commodity on the world market. For a time Sicilian Mafiosi purchased it directly from local warlord smugglers, but the politicization of Indochina has brought in competition.

The opium trade is now in the hands of Chinese mercenaries, Vietnamese, Laotian and Thai racketeers and the CIA, say Browning and Garrett. During the Dulles period, it was decided that the opium growing area was of strategic importance, demanding clandestine American involvement. This involvement took the form of equipping and training certain prominent military factions in the region as anti-Chinese counterinsurgents. The Meos, the Thai border patrol police and the Kuomintang, the 93d division of Chiang Kai-shek's army now exiled in northern Laos, all come under the protective and supportive wing of the CIA. The oil that keeps everything in this alliance running smoothly is opium money. With the Thai border patrol police looking the other way the Meos grow the stuff, the KMT deals it to smugglers who, in turn, deal it to the Viet, Lao and Thai gangsters who process it either as straight smoking opium or injectible smacks, and export it to Taiwan or Hong Kong from whence it proceeds to the United States.

According to Garrett and Browning, 80 percent of the American heroin supply comes in through these channels. They charge that the CIA lends technical and logistical support, alleging that harvested opium collected at Long Cheny in Laos is flown to processing and dealing installations in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam in Air America and U. S. military planes. All the parties to the action are equipped with CIA supplied ordnance.

If ever there was a public issue which commands a full airing and immediate action commensurate with what that airing brings to light, I would submit, this is the issue. We all need to know the outcome of Allen Ginsberg's bet.

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Drugs in Vietnam cited in plea for end to draft

STATINTL

By TIM WHEELER
Daily World Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, June 1—Leaders of the movement to dump the military draft have declared that 40,000 heroin addicted GIs in Vietnam should convince the U.S. Senate to let conscription die on June 30.

Their statement was a reaction to a report last week by two congressmen that 30-40,000 U.S. GIs in Vietnam have been hooked on heroin.

Chris Sayer, organizer of a nationwide citizen lobby to back Senate efforts to repeal the draft, declared, "The fact is, the draft takes people against their will. It exposes them to a double danger. They are 50 percent of the casualties and 65 percent of the army deaths are draftees. It is a clear and present danger."

And now, he added, there is the danger of drugs.

He said the authorities in sounding the alarm about heroin addiction have talked only about Turkey and Marseilles.

"But the vast bulk of the heroin is produced in Laos and then processed in South Vietnam and Singapore and Hong Kong before it is shipped to the U.S." he said.

The drug epidemic in the U.S., he argued, is one of the poisonous by-products of the Vietnam war.

"What is the role of the CIA if the drugs are being flown openly in Air America planes?" he

asked.

He linked the entire problem to the Selective Service System and the recruiting of people for the military.

Senate vote due Friday

The drive against the draft is centered in the U.S. Senate, where a vote is scheduled this Friday on a measure by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore) to repeal the draft law.

Sayer, a coordinator of a group called Enddraft, is bringing citizens in a steady stream to visit Senate offices to demand a vote for the Hatfield measure.

Senator Mike Gravel's plan to filibuster against the draft until draft authority expires June 30 is backed by Senators George McGovern (D-SD), Harold Hughes (D-Iowa), Vance Hartke (D-Ind), Allen Cranston (D-Calif), William Proxmire (D-Wis) and Marlow Cook (R-Ky). They will join the Senator from Alaska for the round-the-clock showdown on the Senate floor.

Enddraft is not discouraged by the 42-31 vote against a pay increase for first term troops—taken by some observers as an indication of weakness in the "dove" ranks.

"People will be coming in and then the pressure will build," Sayers said.

Laos: a Case of Overkill

By Laurence Stern

The writer, an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post, was its chief correspondent in Indochina in 1970.

THE SEVEN-YEAR-OLD American air war in northern Laos has been waged, by and large, out of the range of television cameras and newsmen and—until recently—Senate debates.

Only within the past year has there been a dawning of public awareness in the United States of the punishing intensity with which American airpower has been brought to bear on the little Indochinese kingdom. By the admissions of American officials closely associated with the war there, Laos has been the most heavily bombed country in the history of aerial warfare.

Yet today, despite the hundreds of thousands of tons of explosives dumped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the south and populated "enemy-held" village in the north, the Communists control more territory than ever before in Laos. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces are threatening the Mekong Valley population centers from Luang Prabang southward to Pakse, areas which have been under the control of the Royal Laotian government since the 1962 Geneva accords.

The bombings began without public notice in 1964, both against Communist infiltration trails and also in support of Royal Lao government forces in the Plain of Jars, which has been traded back and forth between the opposing sides of the struggle for many years.

Gradually the pace of the bombing stepped up to its peak in 1968 and 1969 after the halt in the bombing of North Vietnam. If it were not for the development of new targets in Laos, combat operations of the 7th and the combined 7th/13th Air Forces, based in Vietnam and Thailand, would have been drastically reduced. The planes and bombs were available as a result of the halt, and so they were turned on Laos. The number of daily sorties by American jet bombers then rose to more than 700, according to testimony given to congressional committees by State Department and military witnesses.

A Pointless Bludgeon?

SOME DAY IT MAY BE argued that Laos—even more than Vietnam—could be the supreme example of air power's ineffectiveness against a determined though primitively equipped subpower.

But the more immediately discernible truth is that the chief casualties of the war that has been waged from the air as well as on the ground have not been the Communist military forces but the thousands of civilians driven from their villages into crowded government centers or the jungle.

There has been a dispute of near-theological intensity over whether the great refugee flood in Laos (roughly 700,000 in the past decade) has been generated by the bombings or by Communist military activity. The official U.S. view, as it is expressed by former Ambassador to Laos William H. Sullivan, is that the bombings have not, under our rules of engagement, been directed against populated villages. The targets, it is asserted, are primarily the Ho Chi Minh Trail as it traverses the Laotian panhandle, and enemy military concentrations in the north.

There have been American officials in Vientiane, however, who concede privately that American bombs have fallen on population centers in Laos by "stupidity and confusion" rather than by intentional violation of the public rules of engagement.

And there are yet others, both in and out of government, who feel on the basis of their own investigations in Laos that the U.S. agencies involved in prosecution of the war are deliberately bombing villages in order to destroy the Pathet Lao "civilian infrastructure."

One classified survey of refugees from the Plain of Jars, which was forced into the public domain by Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R-Calif.), revealed that 97 per cent of the sample had been driven from their homes by attack; 75 per cent said their homes had been damaged by bombing.

The survey was conducted by the United States Information Service, which operates as an arm of the American embassy. It sharply contradicted the claim by U.S. officials in Vientiane that bombing of villages was a rare and accidental occurrence.

In March of last year I visited a refugee camp some 20 miles east of Vientiane, where 900 residents of a village on the Plain of Jars were trying to resettle under the supervision of the Agency for International Development. An interpreter was provided by AID officials.

The refugees told a consistent story. They had been evacuated from the Plain of Jars, then in its customary state of being contested, by Air America pilots on Feb. 5, 1970. It was the first day of a massive airlift that carried some 17,000 Laotian men, women and children from their embattled villages to the Vientiane plain, beyond the range of the shooting and bombing.

These simple villagers could describe with chilling precision the nomenclature of American fighter-bomber aircraft, such as F-4s and F-105s. They were also intimately acquainted with the various explosives dropped from the skies: antipersonnel cluster bomb units (CBU's), white phosphorus bombs, napalm. The villagers fashioned curtains from the flare parachutes used for night bombing and made lamp bases of the flare tubes.

Although the Pathet Lao had first moved into the Plain of Jars in 1964 and their village see-sawed between Communist and government control repeatedly, life did not become intolerable, they said, until the last two years of the intensified bombing—in 1968 and 1969. Today, whatever is left of their native village of Moug Koun is still under Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese control.

During his recent and controversial visit to Laos, McCloskey heard the same story from a number of refugees in government camps have given visiting journalists and government investigators since March of last year.

MILWAUKEE, WISC.
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MAY 22 1971

Looking for smack? CIA runs it

'You can salute an officer with your right hand and take a 'hit' in your left,' an enlisted man in Vietnam is quoted as saying in "The New Opium War" in the May issue of Ramparts magazine.

Anyone who claims to be concerned about smack, junkies and teenage (and younger) overdose deaths should consider the Ramparts article required reading.

The mind blowing theme of the story suggests that well meaning citizens who talk of "offing pushers," methadone clinics, et cetera should take a cooler look at what's happening. According to co-authors Frank Browning and Banning Garrett, what's happening is that the Indochina opium trade- which grosses an estimated \$500 million a year- has the tacit approval of the U.S. government and the active involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency.

'At the same time the government starts crash programs to rehabilitate drug users among its young people, the young soldiers it is sending to Vietnam are getting hooked and dying of overdoses at the rate of one a day. While the President is declaring war on narcotics and on crime in the streets, he is widening the war in Laos, whose principal product is opium and which has now become the funnel for nearly half the world's supply of the narcotic, for which the U. S. is the

chief consumer.'

For the Meos hill tribespeople in Laos, opium is their only cash crop. A kilo which goes for \$50 in the hills is \$200 in Saigon and \$2,000- the article says- in San Francisco.

A large part of the crop is simply dropped off in Saigon for the 'convenience' of U.S. army addicts. 'Probably a fifth of the men in his unit have at least tried junk,' the authors said of rehabilitated addict August Schultz. 'But the big thing, as his buddy Ronnie McSheffrey adds, was that most of the officers in his company - including the MP's- knew about it. McSheffrey saw MP's in his own division (6th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 9th Division) at Tan An shoot up, just as he says they saw him. He and his buddies even watched the unit's sergeant major receive payoffs at a hear-by-whorehouse where every kind of drug imaginable was available.'

One opium lord described in the article utilizes an army of 1,000- 2,000 armed men with mile long mule drawn caravans which move from 15 to 20 tons of opium-worth about a million dollars- out of Burma to syndicate men in Laos and Thailand in one journey from the hills.

To get to his destination, however, the opium lord must pay about \$80,000 a trip in protection money to the 93rd division of Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan army which has remained in

Burma- up to 9,000 strong- since the end of World War II when most of his troops fled the mainland for the island of Taiwan.

These Kuomintang (KMT) troops are said to be responsible to Chiang's son, Chiang Ching-Kuo, who is the head of the Taiwan secret police. The authors claim that the KMT supports itself by exacting such tribute, by buying opium directly from the Meos and reselling it, and by making occasional forays into China and Burma for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Ramparts article documents the involvement of U.S. planes and helicopters in the dope operation, in some instances overtly and sometimes under the guise of the Royal Laos Air Force which uses donated U.S. aircraft.

The role of the 'China Lobby' in the U.S. opium trade is also described. Involved are such patriotic stalwarts as J. Edgar Hoover and Nixon's State Department intelligence chief, Ray Cline. Instrumental is Governor Warren Knowles' sometime romantic interest Madame Chennault (who helped raise a quarter million dollars for Nixon's campaign). Her deceased husband, General Claire Chennault of World War II 'flying boxcar' notoriety, founded the Civil Air Transport just after W.W. II. In the 1950s it was renamed "Air America" and

now- as a CIA front- it keeps busy transporting opium as the 'official' Indochina airline.

The U.S. government operation presided over by General Ky-has squeezed out the Corsican Mafia, former holders of the southeast Asia heroin industry.

The Ramparts authors suggest that when Richard Nixon in his recent 'state of the world' speech- rapped about drying up world drug traffic, the Indochinese opium business was intentionally overlooked. The President commented, "We have worked closely with a large are often unable to get any refund, and at the same time, they are told that they cannot receive the "free" wig without paying an additional \$8- or \$9 styling charge.

This practice is both time consuming and frustrating to the consumer, Warren said.

Warren urged consumers who have knowledge of this scheme to contact his Office of Consumer Protection or the postal authorities.

N. Vietnam Diplomats Stoned

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, May 11—Several diplomatic representatives of North Vietnam were hit today by stones thrown by members of the Laotian army and other individuals believed to have been plainclothes police.

In another development, North Vietnamese Migs attacked American war planes near Ban Ban and south of the Plain of Jars, according to well-informed U.S. sources.

[A North Vietnamese Mig 21 interceptor attacked an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane twice over the Plain of Jars in northern Laos while a second Mig 21 circled overhead last Sunday, the U.S. Command disclosed Wednesday, according to AP.

["The aircraft was not damaged from the attack which lasted approximately five minutes," the command said.

[The Mig made two firing passes at the light observation plane which was supporting royal Laotian forces, it said. The pilot reported that he felt two explosions to his right rear and observed two large white airbursts.]

According to the sources, it was the first time the North Vietnamese have attempted air combat over Laotian territory.

Migs also reportedly threatened Air America planes 100 miles northeast of Vientiane. Air America is a private airline which makes supply runs and ferries troops for USAID and the CIA.

All Air America flights for later in the day were canceled.

The stoning of the North Vietnamese diplomats occurred at ceremonies marking Laos' constitutional day presided over by King Savang Vattana.

The North Vietnamese were leaving in protest over a passage in the King's speech condemning North Vietnam as "aggressors" in Laos.

They were just entering their Mercedes when they were set upon by soldiers throwing cartridges and what the North Vietnamese later described as "very large stones."

All windows of the sedan were broken out, and the chauffeur was said to have been seriously injured.

Charge d'Affaires Nguyen Giap, who was struck on the left arm and right leg during the 10-minute attack, later termed his own injuries as serious.

Giap issued a statement calling the attack a serious provocation and saying:

"We must underline that the presence of charge at the ceremony constituted a sign of goodwill to improve relations between our two countries."

STATINTL

CIA planes 'used to carry drugs'

Vientiane, May 10.—Mr. John Ingersoll, the head of the United States Justice Department's narcotics bureau, has said on his arrival here that one of the possibilities for wiping out drugs traffic in south-east Asia was the purchase of opium produced in Laos by the American Government.

Mr. Ingersoll, who is investigating the sources of marijuana and opium derivatives which are being used by American soldiers in South Vietnam, said the communist-controlled parts of Laos were one of the principal sources of drugs sent to South Vietnam.

Other important sources of opium were Thailand, Burma and China. Varieties of Indian hemp or marijuana, were grown nearly everywhere, he said.

Mr. Ingersoll said that opium grown in north Laos had been transported by aircraft belonging to the private American companies Air America and Continental Services which were under contract to the (Central Intelligence Agency).

STATINTL

5 MAY 1971

STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Laotians Accused in Heroin Traffic

By Jack Anderson

A Royal Laotian prince and the Laotian Army commander have now been identified as the principal traffickers in the heroin used by U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

Furthermore, a congressional investigation has confirmed our earlier allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency is involved in the Laotian heroin operations.

The investigation was made by Reps. Robert Steele (R-Conn.) and Morgan Murphy (D-Ill.), both members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Steele is preparing a report that will allege CIA Air America aircraft have been used to transport the drug from northern Laos into the capital city of Vientiane.

It says, however, there is no evidence that the CIA had any official policy of letting its planes be used to move the drugs. Furthermore, it adds that the agency has now cracked down on the practice.

According to the draft report, prepared by Steele for House Foreign Affairs Chairman Tom Morgan (D-Pa.), the deadly drug is transported from opium fields in Laos to the battlefields of South Viet-

nam in the following manner:

First the raw opium is hauled from deep in Northern Laos through Burma and into the Laotian town of Ban Pouei Sai, with former Nationalist Chinese soldiers-turned-drug smugglers riding shotgun on the shipments.

At Ban Bouei Sai, the Laotian Army commander, Gen. Ouan Rathikoun, takes over. He supervises the shipment of the opium into Vientiane, using American-supplied planes and protecting the smuggled cargoes with U.S.-supplied arms.

Once it reaches Vientiane, the morphine base is processed in Gen. Rathikoun's labs into "Number Four" heroin, a pure grade of the deadly drug almost unknown in Southeast Asia until traffickers began turning it out especially for American troops.

Protection and Payroll

Throughout Laos, the heroin operation is protected and abetted by Prince Boun Oun, Inspector General of the realm.

Once processed, the heroin is flown into South Vietnam aboard military and civilian aircraft from both Laos and South Vietnam.

Some of the carefully wrapped packages of the white powder are air-dropped near U.S. troop emplacements in the fields. Others reach the troops after being landed at outlying air strips or flown di-

rectly into Saigon's Tansonnhut airport.

With Vietnamese custom officials looking the other way, the heroin passes into illicit channels. The congressman identifies South Vietnamese Premier Tran Thien Kheim as the man behind the corruption of the customs agents, but they stop short of calling him an outright trafficker.

The angriest language in Steele's draft report is reserved for U.S. diplomats who have failed to use their leverage against such men as Rathikoun and Prince Boun Oun to get the drug traffic cut off at its source.

Steele points out that in Turkey some progress has been made, although slowly, though diplomatic channels to cut off the flow of heroin to the United States.

In a future column, we will detail how American ex-GIs and deserters, assisted by corrupt Thai officials, are beginning to move huge quantities of heroin into the United States to replace the Turkish supply.

Kosygin on Arms

The U.S. embassy, reporting to the State Department from Moscow on Sen. Ed Muskie's confidential conversations with Kremlin leaders, gave this account of the discussion on disarmament:

"Muskie began by talking about desire to reduce military expenditures. He said in

past two years, Senate had subjected defense budget to great scrutiny. As result, administration's budget in 1969 had been cut by six billion dollars.

"He expressed interest in MBFR (Mutual Balance Force Reduction) in Europe as part of desire to reduce armaments. He also advocated broadest possible agreement at SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks).

"Kosygin responded that U.S.S.R. has always favored disarmament. He asserted that Soviet military budget was 25-27 per cent of U.S. military budget, and nothing was hidden in other parts of budget.

"He said Soviet noticed and 'appreciated' Senate's action in cutting military expenditures by six billion dollars. Soviet also noticed President's statement that military budget might have to be larger next year.

"Soviets 'follow these events closely,' said Kosygin. Specifically on SALT, Kosygin said both sides are approaching question differently, with 'great wariness and care' but 'with great desire of finding a solution in limiting strategic armaments.' "

Footnote: The hush-hush report noted that Muskie had emphasized the "unofficial character of his visit and fact he carried no message and was not negotiating any agreement."

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The New Opium War

STATINTL

by Frank Browning and Banning Garrett

"MR. PRESIDENT, THE SPECTER OF heroin addiction is haunting nearly every community in the nation." With these urgent words, Senator Vance Hartke spoke up on March 2 in support of a resolution on drug control being considered in the U.S. Senate. Estimating that there are 500,000 heroin addicts in the U.S., he pointed out that nearly 20 percent of them are teenagers. The concern of Hartke and others is not misplaced. Heroin has become the major killer of young people between 18 and 35, outpacing death from accidents, suicides or cancer. It has also become a major cause of crime: to sustain their habits, addicts in the U.S. spend more than \$15 million a day, half of it coming from the 55 percent of crime in the cities which they commit and the annual \$2.5 billion worth of goods they steal.

Once safely isolated as part of the destructive funkiness of the black ghetto, heroin has suddenly spread out into Middle America, becoming as much a part of suburbia as the Saturday barbecue. This has gained it the attention it otherwise never would have had. President Nixon himself says it is spreading with "pandemic virulence." People are becoming aware that teenagers are shooting up at lunchtime in schools and returning to classrooms to nod the day away. But what they don't know—and what no one is telling them—is that neither the volcanic eruption of addiction in this country nor the crimes it causes would be possible without the age-old international trade in opium (from which heroin is derived), or that heroin addiction—like inflation, unemployment, and most of the other chaotic forces in American society today—is directly related to the U.S. war in Indochina.

The connection between war and opium in Asia is as old as empire itself. But the relationship has never been so symbiotic, so intricate in its networks and so vast in its implications. Never before has the trail of tragedy been so clearly marked as in the present phase of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. For the international traffic in opium has expanded in lockstep with the expanding U.S. military presence there, just as heroin has stalked the same young people in U.S. high schools who will also be called on to fight that war. The ironies that have accompanied the war in Vietnam since its onset are more poignant than before. At the very moment that public officials are wringing their hands over the heroin problem, Washington's own Cold War crusade, replete with clandestine activities that would seem far-fetched even in a spy novel, continues to play a major role in a process that has already rerouted the opium traffic from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and is every day opening new channels for its shipment to the U.S. At the same time the government starts crash programs to rehabilitate drug users

among its young people, the young soldiers it is sending to Vietnam are getting hooked and dying of overdoses at the rate of one a day. While the President is declaring war on narcotics and on crime in the streets, he is widening the war in Laos, whose principal product is opium and which has now become the funnel for nearly half the world's supply of the narcotic, for which the U.S. is the chief consumer.

There would have been a bloodthirsty logic behind the expansion of the war into Laos if the thrust had been to seize supply centers of opium the communists were hoarding up to spread like a deadly virus into the free world. But the communists did not control the opium there: processing and distribution were already in the hands of the free world. Who are the principals of this new opium war? The ubiquitous CIA, whose role in getting the U.S. into Vietnam is well known but whose pivotal position in the opium trade is not; and a rogue's gallery of organizations and people—from an opium army subsidized by the Nationalist Chinese to such familiar names as Madame Nhu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky—who are the creations of U.S. policy in that part of the world.

The story of opium in Southeast Asia is a strange one at every turn. But the conclusion is known in advance: this war has come home again—in a silky grey powder that goes from a syringe into America's mainline.

MOST OF THE OPIUM IN Southeast Asia is grown in a region known as the "Fertile Triangle," an area covering northwestern Burma, northern Thailand, and Laos. It is a mountainous jungle inhabited by tigers, elephants, and some of the most poisonous snakes in the world. The source of the opium that shares the area with these exotic animals is the poppy, and the main growers are the Meo hill tribespeople who inhabit the region. The Meo men chop back the forests in the wet season so that the crop can be planted in August and September. Poppies produce red, white or purple blossoms between January and March, and when the blossom withers, an egg-sized pod is left. The women harvest the crop and make a small incision in the pod with a three-bladed knife. The pod exudes a white latex-like substance which is left to accumulate and thicken for a day or two. Then it is carefully gathered, boiled to remove gross impurities, and the sticky substance is rolled into balls weighing several pounds. A fraction of the opium remains to be smoked by the villagers, but most is sold in nearby rendezvous with the local smugglers. It is the Meos' only cash crop. The hill tribe growers can collect as much as \$50 per kilo, paid in gold, silver, various commodities, or local currency. The same kilo will bring \$200 in Saigon and \$2000 in San Francisco.

There are hundreds of routes, and certainly as many methods of transport by which the smugglers ship opium—

STATINTL

26 Apr 1971

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01

Globe Man in Indochina

STATINTL

American Presence in Laos Hidden by Official Secrecy

- o Congressmen Hindered in Search For Report on Refugee Problem
- o Report Calls American Bombing Major Reason for Refugee Plight
- o US Lists 236 'Advisers' in Laos But Silent on Hundreds with CIA

By Matthew V. Storin
Globe Staff

VIENTIANE, Laos — Last week US Reps. Paul N. (Pete) McCloskey and Jerome Waldie of California had an extended dinner meeting here with the American ambassador and his 11-man staff. McCloskey remarked later:

"I thought I was having dinner with the commander of the First Marine Division and his staff."

McCloskey won a silver star for heroism as a Marine officer in the Korean War so he knew what he was talking about. The embassy here is more like a military operations center than a diplomatic post.

Ambassador McMurtrie Godley works in an office lined with top-secret maps. They presumably show the areas of northern Laos where American planes have bombed suspected Communist positions.

Godley has virtual autonomy over the military operations in northern Laos. This is distinct, of course, from the bombing missions against the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos. Those are part of the Vietnam war and are directed from Washington and Saigon.

The major difference between US operations in Laos and Vietnam — aside from their scope — is the degree of secrecy about what goes on in this country.

It is a difficult problem for President Nixon and other US officials.

Officially the US is illegally involved in Laos. The 1962 Geneva Accords outlaw the presence of any foreign military personnel in the country.

The North Vietnamese Army is clearly in Laos in force. Privately the US justifies its own illegal presence on this basis.

But to admit a US military presence would pose propaganda problems for the Soviet Union and Communist China, US officials claim, thereby prompting them to escalate their support for the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese Communists.

The latest figures on the number of US military "advisers" in Laos are 109 Army personnel and 127 Air Force, a total of 236. This compares with a figure of 244 given out about a year ago.

The US contends there are no "ground combat forces." It says nothing officially about hundreds of military men under contract to the CIA who are assisting Gen. Vang Pao's clandestine army of Meo tribesmen and Laotians.

The CIA's contract airline, Air America, is also highly visible to anyone visiting Laos. At an airfield in Vientiane last week a reporter could count more than 20 Air America aircraft. They range from cargo planes and C-47 transports to small one-engine propeller-driven, non-military aircraft.

The Communists are estimated to control about one-third the population of Laos, which totals three million.

Each year in the dry season the communist forces advance markedly, only to lose ground in the rainy season that starts in May. Yet American officials concede that if the North Vietnamese decided to overrun Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang, they could do so with

The government is led by Prince Souvanna Phouma. The Pathet Lao is led by his half-brother Souphanouvong. Many western diplomats and journalists in Vientiane predict negotiations between the neutralist government and the Communists would commence with an end to the American bombing.

The US is also hopeful of negotiations, perhaps this year. The bombing continues, however, and some US officials who are not directly involved in military operations suspect there still are "free fire zones" in northern Laos where anything that moves is likely to be gunned down.

In 1968 and 1969 the bombing of the Plain of Jars reached into hundreds of forties a day but now US officials claim the sorties are considerably less than 100 daily. (A sortie is one mission flown by one plane.)

The clandestine nature of the American operations in Laos unfortunately prompts some un-American tactics to maintain secrecy.

Reps. McCloskey and Waldie found this out first-hand.

McCloskey, a Republican who threatens to challenge President Nixon in the 1972 primaries unless his Southeast Asia policies are changed, knew before he arrived here that a US Information Agency employee had conducted a survey of 216 Laotian refugees showing that most had left their homes primarily because of US bombing.

During that dinner party with Ambassador Godley, McCloskey and Waldie both say they asked the ambassador and his staff whether any reports on refugees attitudes exist.

"Their answer was, "No,

continued

18 MAR 1971

STATINTL

S. Viets Continue Pullback

Saigon Says Laos Move Is 'Tactical'

SAIGON, March 17 (AP) American pilots reported that some South Vietnamese forces were retreating in Laos today, and enemy gunners poured artillery, mortar and rocket fire on Landing Zone Brown, an important base 14 miles from the Vietnamese frontier. Pilots said the base was doomed.

In South Vietnam, the major allied support base of Khesanh was shelled for the third night in a row.

South Vietnamese headquarters insisted that the pullbacks in Laos were tactical, but the pilots said fighting was severe in some areas. They noted that the South Vietnamese have abandoned two of their four fire bases south of Highway 9, the main Laos incursion route, and fallen back 15 miles in the past few days.

The South Vietnamese statement was supported in Washington by a Pentagon spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, who said the South Vietnamese troops are engaged in "mobile maneuvering" and were proceeding "according to plan." Asked if the maneuvering was a synonym for retreat, he replied: "No."

The heaviest fighting raged around Landing Zone Brown, one of the bases that the South Vietnamese 1st Infantry Division had planned to use for raids southward against a branch of the Ho Chi Minh Trail before heading for home.

The U.S. command said the North Vietnamese fired three surface-to-air missiles at U.S.

B52 bombers flying over Laos, but missed. Five U.S. helicopters were reported shot down, three in Laos and the other two inside Cambodia where a fresh outbreak of fighting was reported.

Reports from the northern front said that the North Vietnamese, while keeping up a barrage, launched ground probes against Brown. U.S. helicopter gunships were called out for missions after nightfall to try to beat the attackers back.

"They can talk about helicopter mobility all they want," said one pilot, Warrant Officer Fred Few, of Chattanooga, Tenn., "but from where I'm flying there's only one way to describe it--retreat, and a bad one."

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Army chief of staff, said today he "wouldn't categorize as a retreat" the withdrawal of South Vietnamese troops from their Laos bases.

Westmoreland said at a news conference in Seattle, Wash., that it was a "readjustment of troops," with the object of "getting into additional enemy logistic complexes." He added that the Laos operation has disrupted traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail and "hopefully will continue to the rainy season."

South Vietnamese officers in the field said the defenders pulled out of Brown last night and the North Vietnamese moved in, only to be hit by U.S. air strikes.

When the South Vietnamese returned to Brown this morning they said they found 80 enemy bodies and some of their own ammunition blown up. The South Vietnamese reinforced the base and the enemy resumed a methodical shelling.

There was no firm report on casualties in the fighting at Brown. South Vietnamese headquarters said that government forces had lost 16 men killed and 190 wounded in three days of fighting around Fire Base Lolo, five miles to the west, which was abandoned Monday.

[Reuter reported that Saigon sources said 66 South Vietnamese were killed at Lolo.]

A spokesman claimed that 1,100 enemy soldiers were killed in that period, many of them by air strikes and artillery barrages. There was, however, some question about precise casualty figures on both sides in the final situation.


The sprawling allied support base at Khesanh, in the northwest corner of South Vietnam, was hit by two artillery barrages late today. The base is a key supply and helicopter center for the Laos operation.

U.S. officials in Saigon announced that a U.S. helicopter gunship and a small single-engine Air America plane collided today over the Can Tho airfield in the Mekong Delta, killing all six persons in the two craft.

The dead were the two U.S. crewmen aboard the Cobra gunship, the American pilot of the plane and his three passengers, one a U.S. government employe and the others Vietnamese government employes. Their names were not disclosed.

Air America is a charter airline that flies for the Central Intelligence Agency.

NEW YORK TIMES
 1 2 1971



C.I.A. ROLE IN LAOS: ADVISING AN ARMY

150 U.S. Agents Help Direct
 Secret Guerrilla Forces

By HENRY KAMM
 Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, March 11

A month after the enemy attack on the American compound at the northern Laotian military headquarters at Long Tieng, the station chief, case officers and other officials of the American Central Intelligence Agency continue to perform their functions there and at other regional headquarters in Laos.

Though it conducts only ordinary intelligence activities elsewhere, the C.I.A. in Laos takes an active part in managing an army at war. This came about because the 1962 Geneva agreement on the neutrality of Laos barring foreign countries from playing a military role led the United States to turn over its assistance to the agency with the greatest experience in undercover activities.

The army functions separate from the Royal Laotian army, which is equally dependent on American logistic support and is equally financed by the United States, but is commanded by the general staff in Vientiane. The clandestine army is composed largely of mountain tribesmen. Its most active element are of the Meo tribe and its dominant figure is Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, who is also the principal leader of the Meo nation and the commander of the Military Region II of the Royal Laotian army.

Between 150 and 175 C.I.A. agents stationed in Laos are believed to be engaged in helping the guerrilla army. They are augmented by agents who commute from Udorn and other bases in neighboring Thailand.

Their work is coordinated by the station chief. He and his local staff occupy the entire second floor of the two-story United States Embassy. The station chief at Udorn is reported to occupy an important but subordinate command function in C.I.A. operations in Laos that is said to lead to occasional duplication and confusion in the chain of command. For operations involving the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the station chief in Saigon is said to have primary responsibility.

Professionals Preferred

For its work with the Laotian clandestine army, which Americans prefer to call by its official designation—the strategic guerrilla units—the intelligence agency has engaged under two-year renewable contracts a number of former professional soldiers—showing a preference for men of the Special Forces, or Green Berets, and marines—in addition to men whose careers have been with the C.I.A. Their average age is around 30.

Their principal operating bases are Long Tieng, Savannakhet in the center of the southern panhandle and Pakse near the southern tip. Long Tieng is the most active station, because General Vang Pao's guerrilla units, which are the largest, are stationed there, although since the Feb. 14 attack most are spending their nights in Vientiane. Long Tieng has its own station chief. He reports to the Vientiane chief, who figures on the diplomatic list as a special assistant to the ambassador.

The bulk of the agents are case officers, each entrusted with shepherding a combat position or unit of General Vang Pao's troops, whose present strength is estimated at more than 10,000.

Case officers visit "their" units daily, to check on their disposition and their needs. They fly out of Long Tieng in helicopters or STOJ—short take-off and landing—planes operated under contract with the intelligence agency by Air America and the Continental Air Services.

They consult with their units officers, ascertain their needs in arms, ammunition, water and food, supplies, tactical air support and helicopter or plane transport for combat operations. They also help with troop morale matters.

Although the agents carry rifles or sidearms and favor camouflage uniforms, their assignment does not include active participation in combat operations.

In the past, there have been frequent violations, but the rarity of casualties indicated that the rule is widely respected.

While counseling Gen. Vang Pao and his officers, the C.I.A. does not command his army at any level, informed sources say. Laotians who know the Meo general well say that his pride and temper rule out anything more than an advisory role in combat operations combined with total dependence on the C.I.A. for all materiel, transport and pay.

After visiting their units, the case officers return to Long Tieng, where they arrange for the delivery of required supplies, supervise loading of planes or helicopters and submit air support requests to the C.I.A. contractors and the United States Air Force officers also posted at Long Tieng.

Once a week the station chief at Long Tieng submits a report to his superiors in Vientiane and Udorn on the disposition of all troops in the clandestine army.

Case officers also work closely with the Air Force forward air controllers who fly out of Long Tieng and direct fighter-bombers to targets in ground-support missions.

STATINTL

LAOTIANS DRIVE TOWARD VITAL BASE

Lose Post Used for Actions Against Foe's Supply Trail

By HENRY HAMM

Special to The New York Times

VIENHIANE, Laos, March 10

The Laotian military command announced today the loss of a base that is vital for harassment and surveillance of the Ho Chi Minh Trail network in the southern panhandle.

Laotian troops were driven last night from a post known as Position 22 and from three smaller posts on the eastern edge of the Boloven Plateau after two days of bombardment by rockets, mortars and recoilless rifles and ground attacks.

The plateau is 80 miles south of the Tchepone area, where South Vietnamese troops are operating.

[Reports from Saigon said heavy fog was hampering United States helicopter support of the South Vietnamese attack on the enemy supply-trail complex and also was cutting down on ground fighting.]

Military sources reported that the defenders of the Boloven Plateau positions — three battalions of so-called strategic guerrilla units — had retreated in relatively good order, taking about 50 wounded with them. No reports were available on the number of Laotian troops killed because enemy fire destroyed the base communication center before the withdrawal.

Strategic guerrilla units — which normally have about 300 men to a battalion — are part of the irregular army sponsored by the United States. In addition, the United States underwrites the budget of the regular military force, the Royal Laotian Army.

The fall of Position 22 leaves the Government without a base on the eastern edge of the strategic plateau. From there, surveillance and raids could be carried out by the guerrilla units against Route 16, the principal western branch of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The loss of the base presumably reduces the amount of intelligence on trail traffic that has guided the United States Air Force in its missions against the trail.

Control of Plateau Threatened

Position 22 had been the strongest Laotian base in the area, and its loss is a threat to the Government's hold over the plateau, which is the dominant terrain feature in the southern panhandle.

The base had been under heavy pressure since last December, but a strong ground attack then was beaten off.

American and Laotian planes were reported in action during the last battle.

The deteriorating Government position in the south may be a result of a North Vietnamese reaction to South Vietnam's operation in the Tchepone region. Meanwhile, Government fortunes in northern Laos appeared to be more stable.

Despite heavy enemy pressure in the area of Long Tieng, the principal base of the irregular army of mountain tribesmen commanded by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, optimism is growing that the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces can be held off there until the monsoon rains starting in May or June halt enemy offensive activities.

Thai Troops in Action

At least four battalions of Thai troops, in addition to three battalions from the northern panhandle, have augmented General Vang Pao's battle-weary forces of Meo and Lao Theung (Mountain Lao) tribesmen.

The Thai troops, whose presence in Laos is officially denied, are occupying strong defensive positions around Long Tieng, notably at Ban Na and Sam Thong to the northeast.

The Thai troops are reliably reported to be under the operational command of General Vang Pao but are led by their own officers, reportedly including two generals.

The soldiers are wearing their normal uniforms but without insignia or other-identifying markings.

The Thai troops are supplied separately from the Laotian units from the Thai Air Force base at Udorn, which is operated by the United States Air Force. Their supplies reach the Thais daily by planes operated

by Air America and Continental Air Services, companies under contract to the Central Intelligence Agency for the transport and supply of the United States-sponsored Laotian irregulars. Thai supplies are distributed from a separate supply facility at Long Tieng.

It is believed that the United States is financing the Thai

participation in the war in Laos as it does in South Vietnam.

Thai artillery units have been reported active in northern Laos for some time. The infantry battalions were said to have been rushed in about a year ago, after heavy enemy pressure brought about the evacuation of the civilian population center of Sam Thong.

Long Tieng appeared to be most heavily menaced last month. The base remains vulnerable to an estimated total of 12 North Vietnamese battalions in the area.

STATINTL


ASIA

STATINTL

SOUTH VIETNAM

The massive Washington-led invasion of Laos bogged down last week and President Nixon admitted the bombing of the three countries of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos would continue to be unlimited. At the same time, several ground actions were reported in South Vietnam. By Feb. 18 fire support-base Scotch in northern South Vietnam had been surrounded for three days. A base for American troops, it is 10 miles northwest of the main jumping-off base into Laos-Khesanh. . . . U.S. and Saigon troops lost 500 tons of artillery shells and tear gas canisters when an ammunition dump outside Quangtri blew up. . . . There were five attacks in three days on U.S. military vehicles in Saigon. On Feb. 17 firebombs were hurled against the fence surrounding the U.S. embassy in Saigon. Two youths who threw the homemade bombs and fled on motorcycles scattered leaflets as they left, calling on people to burn U.S. vehicles throughout Saigon in retaliation against the sending of "South Vietnamese mercenaries" into Laos and the killing of civilians by a U.S. soldier in Quinhon. . . . The GI who killed a Vietnamese youth in Quinhon Dec. 10 was convicted this month of negligent homicide, sentenced to six months in prison, fined \$360 and reduced from Pfc. to private. He shot the boy in an alleged attempt to prevent other hungry teenage boys near a Buddhist school from taking C-rations from a military truck. . . . Several hundred forced labor companies in the Saigon army are made up of captured deserters, the New York Times reported. These "field labor battalions," comprised of many men who have deserted for religious reasons, are assigned some of the most dangerous jobs of the war and suffer high fatalities. Without weapons and not allowed to speak to other soldiers, they bring water to the front lines, carry the dead from combat and run errands. Since by decree of puppet president Nguyen Van Thieu, the deserters' deaths are not reported, the men use the buddy system: when one is killed a friend writes the family telling where the body is buried so it can be reburied properly later on. Sentences to the forced labor battalions are usually for three years, the report said, but often service is extended for five. . . . Jack Anderson revealed in his Washington Merry-Go-Round column "a top CIA pilot [stationed in Thailand] can make as much as \$100,000 a year flying high hazard missions" in the CIA's Air America planes. "Station allowances" of up to \$320 a month are paid additionally. . . . The U.S. is financing the Saigon regime's notorious jails, according to the National Liberation Front's English-language newspaper, South Vietnam in Struggle. It said the U.S. paid \$9.9 million for the current fiscal year to maintain the regime's 41 prisons.

18 FEB 1971



Among Americans wounded in Sunday's sapper attack against the base of Long Cheng in northern Laos was a ground employe of Air America, who was "slightly wounded." Previous unofficial reports said the man worked for the Central Intelligence Agency instead of the transport company that has been operating on contract in Laos to the U.S. government for more than a decade, according to the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane.

(P)

STATINTL

18 FEB 1971

The Washington Merry-Go-Round*CIA Life in SE Asia Is Not All Intrigue*

By Jack Anderson

The popular impression of CIA men in Southeast Asia is of lean-faced James Bonds talking in whispers to Indochinese beauties in dingy bars or of bearded guerrilla experts directing Meo tribesmen in the Laotian jungles.

The real McCoy, more often, is a rumpled civil servant going to laud, who worries about when his refrigerator will arrive from the States and plays bingo on Tuesday nights.

This is the unromantic picture that emerges from an instruction sheet handed to CIA pilots leaving for Udorn, Thailand. The CIA uses a front called Air America to fly missions out of Udorn over Indochina.

Instead of pressing cyanide suicide capsules upon new recruits, the stateside briefer slips them a bus schedule for CIA personnel between Udorn's CIA compound, schools and banks.

"A bowling alley in Udorn has league bowling," the CIA confides to its pilot-agents. Their wives are given such hush-hush CIA tips as "water should be boiled three to five minutes prior to drinking, but it is safe for cooking and washing dishes if it is brought to the boiling point."

The cloak-and-dagger boys are told they will have a su-

permarket, swimming pool, free movies, the "Club Rendezvous" (which doubles as a chapel on Sundays) and bingo on Tuesday and Saturday nights. The CIA bars are called The Pub and the Wagon Wheel and shut down at midnight.

The same humdrum life style can be found at such CIA outposts as Vientiane, Laos, where CIA men usually live with their families in villas and dine at the town's few French restaurants.

One lonely CIA flier, who had left his family in Florida, worried about their safety after reading about racial demonstrations at home. "I'm going to bring them out here where it's safe," he confided solemnly to my associate Les Whitten in Vientiane last summer.

But if the CIA living conditions are vintage suburbia, some of the missions are dangerous. The CIA pilots fly supplies to CIA-backed Meo tribesmen in Laos hinterlands. There are also more hazardous missions, such as flights along the Red Chinese border and ammo deliveries to tiny airstrips in Communist-infested country.

Footnote: Much of the recruiting for CIA pilots is done out of a modern, gold-carpeted office in downtown Washington with "Air America" on the glass doors. One of my report-

ers, posing as a pilot, was interviewed by H. H. Dawson, a beefy man in shirt sleeves. He said prospects were dim right now, because the number of fixed-wing pilots had been cut back from 600 to 500.

Dawson said the basic pay is \$22.93 an hour for captains, \$13.93 for first officers, with bonuses for special "projects." A top CIA pilot can make as much as \$100,000 a year flying high hazard missions. In addition, station allowances run \$320 a month at Saigon, \$215 at Udorn and \$230 in Vientiane.

STATINTL

16 FEB 1971

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01

Raid on CIA Base in Laos Rated Worst Yet

BY ARTHUR J. DOMMEN
Times Staff Writer

VIENTIANE, Laos — The Laotian government Monday gave details of a devastating North Vietnamese sapper attack on Long Cheng in northern Laos, compounded by an accidental American bombing of the CIA-run base there.

Considerable destruction of buildings and supplies resulted from the attack Sunday morning at the base, which is used by the United States to support irregular forces throughout northern Laos.

The attack by an estimated two companies of sappers, belonging to the North Vietnamese 316th Division was rated by observers here as the most serious to date against Long Cheng, which has been under severe Communist pressure for more than a year. The attackers got through the defense perimeter and briefly occupied an artillery position inside the camp.

Aside from the material damage achieved by the attack, the most devastating effect may be felt in the days ahead as tens of thousands of Meo tribesmen who live in the area become refugees once again and seek safety farther south, depending

on American rice crops to keep them alive.

Unofficial sources said 30 persons in the crowded camp were killed by the mistaken American bombing and many were injured, including one American CIA employe.

Giving reporters details of the attack at a special news conference Monday, Laotian Dep. Defense Minister Sisouk Na Champassak said the sappers fired B-40 rocket-propelled grenades.

The attackers briefly occupied an artillery position which sources here who have visited Long Cheng described as consisting of two 155-mm. artillery pieces manned by Thai soldiers in Laotian uniforms.

The attackers also heavily damaged a rice warehouse and a building containing medical apparatus, as well as a hostel used by pilots of Air America, the pseudo-civilian airline under contract to the U.S. government to fly rice-dropping missions and liaison flights.

Sisouk said 10 civilians

were killed and 20 wounded and government military casualties were still being tabulated. He said the attackers left 21 bodies on the battlefield and the defenders took one prisoner, a North Vietnamese.

Sisouk said that according to the government's information no Americans were killed or wounded in the attack. Among Americans normally working at Long Cheng are a detachment of the Requirement Office which runs the military assistance program in Laos.

The Long Cheng base is used by the United States as the advance base for support operations for thousands of irregular forces, many of them Meo tribesmen, fighting the Communists in northern Laos. The support is the responsibility of the CIA and is operated from a headquarters at Udorn in neighboring Thailand.

The CIA equips and pays the Meo irregulars, and also presumably the Thai artillerymen and other third-country nationals fighting in Laos.

U.S. sources here said that American jets from Thailand called in to help beat off the attack mistakenly dropped a stick of bombs among the buildings inside the defense perimeter. It was still dark at the time of the incident.

Sisouk said an investigation of the American bombing incident is under way.

STATINTL

CAPITOL STUFF

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Feb. 15--When an American aircraft through error of some sort dumped bombs on friendly forces at the Long Cheng base in Laos with resultant casualties and materiel damage, the explosion also blew off a little more cover from the supposedly secret CIA war in the jungle-covered mountains.

News dispatches from Vientiane, the Laotian capital, described Long Cheng variously as "American headquarters" in Northern Laos or as the operating base for assorted undercover activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In view of the stepped-up fighting in the Long Cheng area and the celebrated Plain of Jars, and the domestic flap which has brought repeated White House denials that American ground combat troops are involved in the South Vietnamese invasion along Highway 9, this is as good a time as any for a little further clarification.

CIA Director Richard Helms and his "spooks" in the field have got considerable attention for their operations in Laos in the last four or five years, but they have not been running any little private war of their own. Nor has the Laos war been much of a secret to anybody.

There are about 100 CIA agents in all of Laos. They include men who are experts in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage, in counter-insurgency operations, in surveillance and in military training. They are under the direct control of the American ambassador in Vientiane, and follow orders which are approved by the National Security Council in Washington.

Back in the 1961-62 period, the CIA, as well as the Army's Special Forces—the Green Berets—were active in Laos, engaged in surveillance and training operations in support of the royal government. Then, after the Geneva agreement in 1962 creating the troika "neutral" government in Laos, the Americans pulled out.

Some of the spooks may have remained behind. We wouldn't know. But they would have been very difficult to hide in the Laotian population, for the Americans have different colored faces and they are, as a rule, a foot or more taller than the Laotian people.



Richard Helms
Not running a private war

But a year later, when it was obvious that the North Vietnamese neither had pulled out nor had any intention of pulling out their thousands of regular troops, and fighting was continuing, Vientiane again asked American help. The CIA returned, in small numbers.

While other agencies of the U. S. government are charged with monitoring foreign broadcasts and code-breaking, and while these electronic intelligence duties, of enormous extent and cost, are on a global basis, the CIA does handle local, specific radio interception jobs. Such work would be done in Laos, within easy radio listening range of Hanoi and the North Vietnamese armed forces in the south.

They Made Arrangements With the Hill Men

Over the years, the CIA has established an excellent rapport with the Meo tribesmen, the poor hill farmers who didn't get along very well anyhow with the flatlanders in the cities and around the royal throne.

There were, and are, little pockets of the Meo people scattered all over the mountains; the CIA fed them rice, and supplied them with weapons and training. The spooks used the famed Air America flying company which, contrary to widespread belief, is not a CIA unit but a commercial company doing business under contract. The American Embassy uses Air America, and so does AID, also by contract.

The Meo proved to be excellent fighters; they didn't like the North Vietnamese nor their Pathet Lao (Laos Communist) associates, and the tribesmen were adept at harassment and interdiction.

Somewhere along the line, the CIA ran into Vang Pao, a tribal chief who was a leader of remarkable ability, who rallied the hill people around his banner and with a relatively moderate flow of American supplies turned his men into a tough little army. Vang Pao, a patriot, got to be so good at his fighting job that the Laotian government finally commissioned him a general and made him the commander of the region around the Plain of Jars.

Long Cheng was selected by Vang Pao as his major base several years ago, and he had CIA communications experts and advisers at hand. But about a year ago, he decided to decentralize. He separated his troops and scattered them around a number of smaller bases; Long Cheng lost its pre-eminence.

He's Got Only a Few Thousand Men

Vang Pao's immediate army consists of about 3,000 to 3,600 men; he doubtless could muster several thousand more in a pinch.

The Meo Tribesmen have raised a lot of hell with the North Vietnamese over the last couple of years in purely guerrilla operations. In the dry season, the North Vietnamese push forward with the Meos snapping at their flanks; when the rains come the Hanoi invaders pull back. Some of the towns and villages have changed hands fairly frequently.

Now, the North Vietnamese have a fresh division in the Plain of Jars area and it would appear that a battle of some consequence is in the making.

All these matters have been fairly open knowledge and the full details are known to four subcommittees of Congress, the Budget Bureau and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as well as the National Security Council. It's a skimpily concealed secret.

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16 FEB 1977

Aid Rushed to U.S.-Backed Base In Laos After Foe's Penetration

STATINTL

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Feb. 15—Reinforcements and supplies were flown today to the American-backed base at Long Tieng, which was penetrated yesterday by North Vietnamese commandos.

"We are determined to hold Long Tieng," Prince Sisouk na Champassak, the deputy defense minister, said at a news conference called to report developments at the base.

He said that several hundred North Vietnamese, attacking before dawn yesterday behind barrages of rocket and mortar fire, reached a base area within one or two miles of the airfield. The field itself was not damaged, he reported, but in two hours of fighting the commandos smashed food depots, the base's medical center, numerous buildings and other properties.

Among the buildings struck by the shelling was the home of Gen. Veng Pao, commander of the military region that includes Long Tieng. The general was not at home at the time.

It was during the commando raid that an American F-4 jet loosed some bombs by mistake within friendly lines. One American stationed at Long Tieng was wounded.

Prince Sisouk and American spokesmen said an investigation was under way to determine whether casualties and damage were caused by the American bombs or by enemy fire.

The commandos, coming un-

der attack by both American and Laotian planes, withdrew from the base a little after 6 A.M., Prince Sisouk reported.

The prince set enemy casualties at 21 killed and reported that a North Vietnamese who was wounded and taken prisoner said the North Vietnamese had suffered heavy losses.

The prisoner was the second taken by Laotian forces during the week. Both are being interrogated. Prince Sisouk said 10 Laotians were killed.

The prince described the situation around Long Tieng and its neighboring positions of Sam Thong and Ban Na as serious, but indicated there appeared to be no immediate threat of their being overrun.

The area is defended mainly by Meo and other tribesmen advised, trained and equipped by specialists from the American Central Intelligence Agency. American advisory, logistics and other liaison personnel work regularly at Long Tieng. Other Americans are also engaged there in relief activity for the United States aid program in Laos.

American transport planes of Air America and Continental Airlines, financed by United States funds, supply the Sam Thong-Long Tieng and other sectors in Laos and haul troops and other materials. Transport planes today were busy replenishing the supplies at Long Tieng.

16 FEB 1971

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30 Reported Dead at CIA Base in Laos

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Feb. 15

Thirty Meo tribesmen were killed and 60 wounded in Saturday's bombardment of the Central Intelligence Agency's base at Long Cheng, Laotian military sources said.

It was reported here that American F-4 bombers mistakenly bombed Long Cheng in an attempt to break up what is being called a siege of the base by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces.

[Reuter reported that the Laotian government sent troop reinforcements to Long Cheng, and Defense Minister Sisouk Na Champassak announced that an investigation was under way into the bombing of the camp.]

Initial reports from Long Cheng said the casualties occurred in a North Vietnamese rocket attack. Origins of the bombardment remain unclear.

Meanwhile, Laotian military sources said today that a

North Vietnamese soldier captured late last week revealed that the North Vietnamese command west of the Plain of Jars planned to attack Long Cheng today.

American military sources in Vientiane say the situation around Long Cheng remained stable and quiet Sunday night.

Long Cheng, 77 miles north of Vientiane, is a CIA center for intelligence, logistics and for command of the 6,000 troops of Maj. Gen. Vang Pao in that area. Vang Pao's troops are mixed Meo and Laotian.

Pressures against Long Cheng and Sam Thong, which form a command and logistics complex, have steadily increased in recent weeks. There have been almost daily reports of rocketing and ground probes against the outpost.

A general exodus of tribal residents from the area has begun. Upward of 65,000 tribesmen are moving southwest toward Muong Cha, a refugee center established by the U.S. Agency for International Development, an American official here said. Reliable independent observers confirmed the refugee movement.

Emergency rations are being flown into Muong Cha by Air America planes to meet the demands of a growing refugee population.

Air America pilots estimated that there is a two-week march from Long Cheng to Muong Cha. Edgar Buell, a U.S. aid official in Laos for a decade, says 20 per cent of the people on such marches die en route.

Reports originating at Long Cheng say there has been an increase in Meo army desertions in recent weeks and it is believed soldiers are leaving the base to accompany families on the trek out of the battle zone.

At Ban Son, called site 272 by Americans, observers note an increase in residents and hospital admissions. Ban Son was created as a replacement refugee center for Sam Thong which was abandoned a year ago, then reclaimed, but it remains almost a ghost town, according to recent visitors.

The refugee movements toward Muong Cha rather than Ban Son tends to confirm the belief among observers here that the Meo do not believe Ban Son would offer sufficient refuge.

In a move believed re-

lated to the desirability of Long Cheng, a new CIA base of operations for guerrilla forces was recently established at Pakkao and a military training center at Phou Koun.

Pakkao is now reportedly surrounded and Air America pilots report receiving enemy fire on approaching the landing strip. An American was reported wounded in a clash there early last week. Nonofficial observers are forbidden entry to Long Cheng, Pakkao and Phou Koun.

Long Cheng, now under siege, is seen by most observers here as the key to Vientiane's northern front.

"If Long Cheng falls, the Meo have fallen, and if the Meo fall there are no northern defenses to the Mekong Plain," one observer said.

"Long Cheng is immensely important psychologically to the Meo," he added. "It's been the only relatively stable place they have known for a decade—they have come to see it as a kind of capital. If it is lost they will be drifting without a home."

Vang Pao's army is called the only viable fighting force allied with the Vientiane government. Nearly all combat operations mounted in the past decade by government forces have involved the Meo. In the past three years they have suffered more than 7,000 killed in action.

Vang Pao himself has frequently told reporters that there are no alternatives to holding the mountains about Long Cheng.

"We must die here," he has been quoted as saying.

STATINTL

Attack Blasts CIA Base in Laos

STATINTL

Red Sappers, Bomb Mistake Hit Long Cheng

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — Long Cheng, the American headquarters in northern Laos, has been badly damaged as a result of a North Vietnamese sapper attack and a mistaken bombardment by U.S. planes.

American and Lao officials, reporting yesterday's incidents, Laos said the medical warehouse was destroyed, a Thai artillery position overlooking the airstrip was overrun and a Lao 105 mm. howitzer was destroyed. Houses in the Central Intelligence Agency compound were damaged, but American monitoring equipment, ammunition and fuel dumps survived.

Casualties are reported to be at least 30 dead and more than 100 wounded. Most casualties were civilians, and one American was reported wounded.

"We don't know yet who was responsible for what damage," a U.S. Embassy spokesman said when asked whether the damage was caused by the sappers or the air strike, but it appeared that most of the casualties resulted from the bombing.

Mortars Launch Attack

Officials gave this sequence of events:

The sapper attack began at 4 a.m. yesterday with "very accurate" mortar shelling.

This was followed by an assault by an estimated 100 North Vietnamese. About 90 minutes of combat followed in which the Meo troops defending Long Cheng, according to U.S. officials, "fought very well."

By 5:30 a.m. the airstrip was cleared of Communist troops and T28 divebombers took off, bringing firepower to bear. It could not be

these aircraft were flown by Americans or Laos.

"Other air assistance" was called for, a U.S. official said. This assistance was by U.S. Air Force F4 planes.

An American on the ground in Long Cheng fired a marker flare, causing one F4 to drop a stick of bombs on Long Cheng in error.

Patrols Pursue Sappers

The fighting ceased at 6:10 a.m., with guerrilla patrols pushing south after the sappers.

Sources said the North Vietnamese rocket and mortar fire apparently was directed exclusively at the U.S. compound where 20 Americans are living. The American houses, built of stone and wood, went up in flames. Destroyed were the officers quarters, the American Club and the Air America restaurant.

The American who was wounded was hit by shrapnel from an 82 mm. mortar round.

The Americans sought shelter in a partially built bunker.

The civilian casualties apparently resulted from the delayed action fuses on the bombs. The Meos in the village were not aware that the bombs which had dropped without exploding would explode later, and so were surprised by the delayed action.

Reinforcements Reported

Both Defense Minister Sisouk Na Champassak and Premier Souvanna Phouma say Lao reinforcements are being sent to Long Cheng, but Lao sources close to Souvanna deny this.

They say the only available troops belong to Gen. Kouprasith and Gen. Boumphone, the 5th and 3rd Military Region commanders. They are rivals for the soon to become vacant post of army commander in chief, a job which, in view of Souvanna's shaky position, could lead to the premiership. Because of this, they are unwilling to commit troops.

"Long Cheng is an American affair anyway," a Lao army officer said, reflecting the opinion

The Long Cheng base is run by the CIA. It is the headquarters for two U.S. operations, one of them intelligence gathering.

Long Cheng houses monitoring equipment for listening to Hanoi's communications in North Vietnam and Laos. A veritable forest of aerials rises from the American compound at the end of Long Cheng's main airstrip.

CIA "case officers" deal with refugees, recruit spies to return to enemy-held territory and run various benefit projects such as a parachute factory for amputees.

The second CIA operation involves running a purely military operation. Military men working for the agency lead teams on ground sabotage missions in

Laos and even into North Vietnam.

Americans have full command control, everyone spoken with, from Lao generals to army radio operators, says.

The commander at Long Cheng is the CIA station chief, not the leader of the Meos, Gen. Van Pao, U.S. sources say.

The CIA apparently got into the war business because the Johnson administration wanted to hide U.S. involvement in the Laotian war. This made it impossible to use U.S. military who, Americans say, would need more personnel.

American officials here say President Nixon continued to use the agency because to put U.S. military forces into Laos would be contrary to his Indochina withdrawal policy.

And the use of the CIA allowed the administration to stop senators worried of American involvement from probing too deeply.

The fall of Long Cheng would place the U.S. in a difficult position. For the U.S. command will be blamed by the Laotians for the failure.

As the U.S. leads, trains and pays the Meo and other tribal troops at Long Cheng, the blame would be difficult to wiggle out of.

Sunday's sapper attack proved just how deeply the North Vietnamese have penetrated the Meo hill country and indicated that Long Cheng is fast becoming untenable.

This is the second time in a year that sappers have entered the base. It is rocketed frequently, also.

Each time Long Cheng is hit, more Meo flee and Meo soldiers often go with their families.

As the Meo quit Long Cheng, their capital, they move south-east, leaving the way open for Hanoi to hit Vang Vieng and Vientiane.

It is virtually certain that the squabbling and inefficient Lao generals will not be able to stop the Communists, unhappy Lao civilian officials say, because many soldiers are tired and don't want to fight for the generals any longer.

STATINTL

Rockets Hit Laotian Base
 VIENTIANE, Laos, Feb. 13
 (AP)—Five enemy rockets hit
 Long Tieng during the night,
 killing one Laotian and wound-
 ing one.

Several buildings were dam-
 aged at the base, which is
 supported by the United States
 Central Intelligence Agency
 and is the headquarters of
 Gen. Vang Pao's Meo guerrilla
 army.

Refugees continued to leave
 Long Tieng, but authoritative
 sources said reports that 20,000
 to 30,000 were fleeing the city
 were greatly exaggerated.

They said refugees also were
 leaving Ban Na, Sam Thong and
 other towns in the area south-
 west of the Plaine des Jarres,
 with the total number of
 refugees possibly approaching
 those figures.

Later reports told of ground
 fighting and continued shelling
 around Long Tieng during the
 day. Long Tieng is 78 miles
 north of Vientiane.

Several planes of Air Amer-
 ica, a private airline whose
 principal client is the C.I.A.,
 took ground fire in the Long
 Tieng area. Pilots asked for
 tactical air support from the
 United States Air Force. Some
 pilots were said to be refusing
 to fly into the area unless they
 got such support.

7 FEB 1971

STATINTL

CIA Said To Misuse Aid To Lao Civilians

Senate Panel Reports \$25 Million In Supplies For Refugees Given To Private Armies

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, Feb. 6--A Senate subcommittee reported today that nearly half of the materials provided for programs to aid refugees and civilian casualties in Laos are being siphoned off by the Central Intelligence Agency for paramilitary operations.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.), the subcommittee's chairman, said the disclosure was based on two classified reports prepared by the General Accounting Office, the investigative agency for Congress.

"Sanitized Summary"

While these reports themselves cannot be made public, he said, they confirm findings made independently by the subcommittee's staff. What was released today was described as a "heavily sanitized summary" of the two classified reports.

During the last four years, according to the summary, the United States Agency for International Development has spent about \$54.8 million on refugee programs in Laos.

But according to the General Accounting Office studies, Senator Kennedy said, about 46 per cent, or more than \$25 million worth of the materials provided--such as food, clothing and medicine--have gone to CIA-sponsored guerrilla armies, composed mainly of Meo and Lao Young tribesmen.

Asked why the CIA could not give direct aid to the anti-Communist guerrilla armies instead

of using AID resources, Senator Kennedy said he surmised that it was to avoid an open violation of the 1962 Geneva accords, which bans U.S. military involvement in Laos.

He was, however, critical of the "cynicism" with which the administration comes to Congress to ask for funds to aid refugees and other war victims, knowing that half of it would be used for the war effort.

Harold Levin, chief of the Laos desk at AID headquarters here, confirmed that a substantial portion of AID resources in Laos goes to paramilitary forces and their dependents.

Not To Discriminate

He said this program was administered by AID officials, but declined to discuss the extent of CIA involvement. The policy of AID, he said, is not to discriminate against those who need help because they have been engaged in fighting or may again be engaged in fighting.

Mr. Levin also acknowledged that aid is given to forces actively engaged in fighting, but noted that many of these irregular troops have dependents who have been driven from their homes and can be considered as refugees.

Mr. Levin, however, said he could not confirm the estimate that nearly 50 per cent of the AID resources went to paramilitary forces and their dependents, without a detailed study of

the accounting-office reports. His own guess, he said, would be about 30 per cent.

No Fault With Estimate

He found no fault with the subcommittee's estimate that of the total refugee caseload of 280,000, about 45 per cent, or more than 100,000 persons, are in the paramilitary forces or their dependents category. But he said this percentage has fluctuated widely over the years.

Without giving his own views on the subject, Mr. Levin said there has been continuing discussion among various agencies as to who should bear the cost of the various aspects of U.S. activities in Laos.

Senator Kennedy said he was of the view that funds appropriated by Congress to further humanitarian objectives ought not to be used to support military activities.

Might Be Misleading

The subcommittee's staff also notes that budgetary descriptions do not suggest any military implications, and thus might be misleading.

The categories of costs include "refugee relief and resettlement," "air technical support," "public health development," and "PL-480 commodities," more commonly known as the "Food for Peace" program.

The "air technical support" is actually AID's contribution to Air America, a CIA-sponsored organization used in Laos to make deliveries of ammunition, weapons, food and relief supplies to guerrilla forces and refugees.

Too Small

Senator Kennedy also said that even without the diversion of relief materials to military activities, the U.S. aid programs would be too small to cope with the mounting number of war casualties and refugees.

As of last fall, he said, refugees in Laos numbered around 280,000, but "this is going to escalate dramatically due to the activities of the last few days."

Civilian war casualties over the last two years, he said, totaled 30,000, including an estimated 9,000 deaths.

The accounting office, according to the subcommittee's summary, found that the death rate at several refugee centers ex-

ceeded AID standards by as much as 250 per cent. AID, it was noted, established a maximum mortality level for refugees, and if the level is exceeded, remedial measures are supposed to be taken.

Accounting Office

But until the accounting office made inquiries, the summary said, the U.S. mission in Vientiane was not aware of the high death rates in the refugee centers.

The actual death rate among refugees in Laos, however, was not disclosed. The subcommittee's staff said this information was classified by the U.S. mission in Vientiane.

The accounting office's report also was critical of what it termed shady management of AID programs and overcrowded and unsanitary conditions at AID-sponsored hospitals in Laos, the subcommittee said.

STATINTL

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN

STATINTL

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FEB 4 1971

Bulletin Backgrounder

U.S. Role Has Grown In Laos Since 1962

By PAUL GIMMES
Of The Bulletin Staff

Military involvement in Laos by the United States and North Vietnam has risen steadily since 1962, when both promised to leave the kingdom virtually alone.

They and 12 other countries signed the 1962 Geneva Accords, which established a neutral Laos and barred foreign military personnel. There have been repeated violations, however, on both sides.

The United States has kept most of its activities secret, it apparently wants to preserve the neutral flavor of the Geneva Accords as the basis of an eventual political settlement. It doesn't want to give a propaganda advantage to Hanoi, which has never publicly admitted that it has troops in Laos.

Russia Goes Along

The Russians, meanwhile, have appeared willing to go along with Washington's secrecy so that they can continue to recognize the purportedly neutralist government of Prince Souvanna Phouma. Moscow is said to fear that any alternate government in Laos would be pro-Chinese.

This reasoning emerges from a close study of official statements, congressional hearings and news reports from Laos itself.

The study also produces a stark picture of how U.S. involvement has intensified in an effort to preserve Laos as a protective buffer for Thailand and to block infiltration routes into South Vietnam.

Among other things, it shows that before the current step-up in involvement:

--Laos, though sparsely settled (2,825,000 persons in 91,428 square miles), had long been one of the heaviest recipients of U.S. aid. It reportedly

has received more than \$260 million a year, more than two-thirds of it for secret military purposes.

--At least 26 Americans, most of them former military personnel, had been assigned to the Agency for International Development mission in Laos, arranging for and expediting delivery of U.S. military aid.

--About 125 U.S. Air Force attaches had been working with Laotian officers in planning targets for U.S. and Laotian bombing of Communist positions. The American team also included about 21 forward air controllers who flew spotting missions and personnel to man radar and tracking stations, some of them on remote jungle plateaus.

--About 70 U.S. Army attaches helped plan Laotian army operations, operated communications systems, engaged in military intelligence and sometimes visited front-line positions to gather information.

--Through the Central Intelligence Agency and at least 50 American advisers, the United States armed, equipped, trained, financed and often transported a private army of Neo tribesmen under a French-trained general named Vang Pao. There were persistent reports that the CIA also abetted the tribesmen in opium, their principal cash crop.

--U.S. air activity increased substantially in the last three years. According to U.S. newspaper dispatches, U.S. planes were flying between 12,500 and 15,000 sorties per month over Laos by the second half of 1969 and between 18,000 to 20,000 sorties by last May. Before the Nov. 1, 1968, halt in bombings of North Vietnam the United States flew 12,000 sorties a month and 4,700 in Laos.

N. Vietnamese Stay

Last March 6, President Nixon said 1,040 Americans were directly or indirectly employed by the U.S. Government in Laos. He said North Vietnam has 67,000 troops there.

Two days later, the White House said that since 1962, one Army captain and 25 American civilians had been killed by Communist troops or listed as missing.

Mr. Nixon said 656 Americans had been assisting the Laotian Government before the Geneva Accords but had withdrawn by an Oct. 7, 1962, deadline set under the accords. He charged, however, that more than 6,000 North Vietnamese troops had remained.

Military Aid Asked

The Geneva Accords were signed on July 23, 1962, allowing Laos to accept foreign military aid in "such quantities of conventional armaments" that it might consider "necessary for the national defense."

Souvanna Phouma invoked that provision two months later when he asked both the Soviet Union and the United States for aid.

Unwilling to irk North Vietnam, the Russians refused.

The United States complied. In addition, there is strong evidence that many clandestine military activities of U.S. personnel continued in Laos beyond the deadline.

Hostilities between opposing Laotian factions resumed in early 1963. Helicopters of Air America, a private airline controlled by the CIA, were seen transporting Laotian government troops as early as that spring.

Laird Defends Reports on Involvement in Laos

Says U.S. Policy Is to Be Frank About Activities; Secrecy Remains, However

STATINTL BY ARTHUR J. DOMMEN
Times Staff Writer

STATINTL

SAIGON — Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird was questioned sharply by newsmen Monday on the Nixon Administration's policy in disclosing the extent of American involvement in Laos.

Laird defended the policy as frank at the news conference which concluded his third Southeast Asia visit.

He said the Nixon Administration had initiated a new policy after the Johnson Administration and claimed "several changes."

Laird pointed out two such changes: The Administration is "telling you about our interdiction campaign" and its "announcing losses in Laos."

Areas of Secrecy

The fact is, however, that there are many other areas of American activity in Laos where the public is being told nothing. It is also a fact that President Nixon's pledge of March 6, 1970, in Key Biscayne that "we will continue to give the American people the fullest possible information on our involvement in Laos consistent with national security," is not being implemented.

One subject that continues to remain under a mantle of secrecy 10 months after President Nixon broke with the Johnson Administration's policy of total official secrecy is the activities of American personnel on the ground in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area.

American military personnel periodically go into the area from bases in South Vietnam and Thailand, accom-

Vietnamese, Thai or Laotian irregular troops on missions designed to collect intelligence about North Vietnamese movements and to disrupt these movements as part of the interdiction campaign.

Also in southern Laos, which has become a major battlefield for both the United States and North Vietnam, American aircraft ferry Laotian, South Vietnamese and Thai troops on such missions.

The American casualties incurred in the course of such missions are reported in the weekly totals released by the American military command in Saigon under the heading "Southeast Asia."

Casualty Lists

Another variation of the practice of secrecy by officials in apparent violation of Mr. Nixon's policy statement comes in the weekly listing "U.S. casualties in Laos" by the American military command in Saigon.

This is broken down into two categories: "on ground" and "air operations."

The figures of dead and wounded under "on ground" have stayed at zero since the reporting began on March 10, after the President's speech.

This is so because the U.S. Special Forces and other casualties on the ground in Laos have been men who were not "stationed in Laos," but elsewhere.

The "air operations" casualties are defined by the command as "incident to air operations over Laos" and lump together 7th Air Force, Navy, and Marine personnel with personnel

belonging to the air at the American Embassy in Vientiane. The latter frequently fly spotter missions over hostile territory in Laos.

The flat ban prohibiting newsmen from interviewing pilots who fly missions over Laos at air bases in Thailand and quoting them by name continues in effect, just as it did under the Johnson Administration. Veteran newsmen in Saigon who have requested a military briefing on the situation along the trail have got nowhere.

Another area not mentioned by Laird where President Nixon's policy continues to be thwarted by officials is the military assistance program for Laos. This program is administered through complex channels which begin in the Defense Department and extend through an office known officially as Deputy Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand.

It then hops across the Mekong River to the U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Vientiane where a special branch called the Requirements Office supervises the provision of military supplies to forces in Laos.

Not a jot of information about the military assistance program in Laos has been made public since last April, when the transcript of congressional hearings on Laos was published.

Other Areas

Other areas of secrecy about American involvement in Laos are beyond the purview of Laird, such as the financing of irregular Laotian forces, which is handled under the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the operation of the CIA-supported airline, Air America, which continues to be instrumental in the ferrying of irregular forces.

Until exposed by The Times last year, the CIA maintained many of its men in Laos under the cover of the AID mission in Vientiane.

As far as the interdiction of the war winding down, correct in asserting that the Administration is tell-

ing the fact that B-52 bomber Strategic Air Command and smaller tactical fighter-bomber's of the 7th Air Force, headquartered in Saigon, and of the Navy and Marine Corps are pounding the North Vietnamese supply routes through Laos known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In addition, the U.S. command in Saigon reports aircraft losses over Laos a few days after they occur, and personnel losses on a weekly basis.

This is the extent of the reporting of the war in Laos by American officials anywhere in Indochina, with the exception of a weekly briefing given by a member of the Army attache's office of the American Embassy in Laos, the facts of which are restricted to the actions of enemy and friendly troops in that country and are attributable only to "military sources."

The importance of Laos in the current situation was pointed up when Laird described southern Laos as the one region in Indochina where "the enemy threat has increased" compared to a year ago.

Laird disclosed at the news conference just before boarding his plane for Honolulu, where he will confer at American Pacific military headquarters before making his report to the President on the situation in Southeast Asia, that he had dispatched Dep. Secretary of Defense Dennis Doolin to Laos for a first-hand inspection trip during his stay in Saigon.

On the military situation in Cambodia, Laird said U.S. experts were watching it "very closely" and he was "certainly... impressed with the steps" made there to "face up to the Communist threat... The people of Cambodia are showing that they truly want to repel the invaders."

Discussing the morale problem among U.S. troops, the secretary said he had talked with many GIs in the field, adding:

"I feel it is a problem of the war winding down, and it is a good problem. The unhappiness only applies to a minority, and all the more about and will

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
President


January 11, 1971

Managing Director

ALLIR

Pilot Employment Information, SEA - KAWI



Subject publication has reached us from Taipei and the customer
also has this material. A copy is attached and we would appreciate
your making such marginal comments as you find desirable including
indications of inaccuracy where other operators are concerned.
Please coordinate with  at your end.

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George A. Doole, Jr.

GAD/afs

(This is a private and confidential report, not for publication or distribution)

PILOT EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION, SOUTHEAST ASIA

FOREWORD

The purpose of this report is to give you clear and unbiased information about the air transport operators in Southeast Asia (SEA) who employ American pilots. It is hoped that this may open new horizons for you and help you decide whether you want a job here and how to go about it.

The information is from the writer's personal experience and from others who have "gone the route" and are actually flying now in SEA, as well as from available data. Although we have tried to be exact in every detail, we will not be responsible for any errors.

COMMENTS ON THE OPERATORS IN SEA

- AIR AMERICA, INC. (AAM) is by far the largest operator in SEA. Quoting from NEWSWEEK April 6, 1970: although never advertised and little known, "Air America is one of the largest U.S. airlines, ranking just behind National and ahead of Northwest, in number of aircraft and personnel. It has, however, only one customer - the U. S. Government. In practical terms, it is an arm of the CIA, privately owned". We suggest you read the full text of this Newsweek article which is incorrect, however, in two details: "600 pilots" should read "about 436, of whom about 384 are currently working in SEA"; and "\$25,000 per year" has been substantially surpassed, e.g., helicopter pilots at Udorn base would come closer to \$42,000 per year. Also, NEWSWEEK fails to mention that AAM ranks among the most profitable corporations in USA for 1969 - a year in which most of the world's airlines lost heavily.


AAM is one of a group of aviation companies set up after WW II by General Claire Chennault of Flying Tigers fame and his associates after the war. The group includes the largest and finest overhaul facility in the Far East outside of Japan, located at Tainan, Taiwan (Formosa), which not only accomplishes heavy maintenance for the Air America group but also for U.S. military aircraft (F-105s, etc.). Maintenance of A/C is excellent in AAM.

AAM is also by far the best to work for, thanks in large measure to the recently-formed Far East Pilots Association (FEPA) which has eliminated personality biases, favoritisms and arbitrary decisions affecting pilot personnel on the part of management, and other evils long since eliminated in U.S. airlines. The result has been not only a substantial increase in pay but also for better operating conditions for the pilots, and the Company as well. AAM is the only operator in SEA with this security of association.

AAM is the only operator here with complete training facilities: a Ground School with some ten or twelve well-qualified instructors, well-equipped classrooms, and two Navy-type Link flight simulating units; and Flight Training which includes initial, recurrent (periodic) and transition training as well as thorough route checks by competent pilot personnel. AAM also has an FAA designee pilot.

25X1A

written by



former
employee

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AAM has a medical staff with a Senior Medical Officer (SMO) at each major base for medical care including pilot physicals.

- CONTINENTAL AIR SERVICES, INC. (CAS) runs a weak second to AAM, but nevertheless is a profitable, healthy operation. It is a subsidiary of Continental Air Lines which some years ago bought out an operation in Laos owned by Bird & Sons of Seattle, in the apparent hope of bettering their position in the CAB trans-Pacific bid competition, by thus establishing in Asia.

CAS operates on U.S. Gov't contracts like AAM, and CAS pilots enjoy the same tax advantage as AAM pilots in respect to no obligation for local or foreign income tax.

- CAS has successfully beaten efforts to form a pilots association by the expedient of firing the pilot organizers. It was a clear win for the management. Pilots are in fear for their jobs and have ceased the effort. The management can and does make arbitrary decisions concerning pilots and remarks, "The pilots never had it so good". Some of the pilots are not so sure.

CAS's predecessor took the position that "we hire professional pilots who don't require training" and true to their faith had no training other than route and equipment ride checks during the period of familiarization. We have observed no change in this policy worth mentioning. However, many pilots are happy with this idea and hate ground school, flight training anyway! What do YOU think? It must be said that CAS has a safety record comparable to AAM's.

- BIRD & SONS who sold their air transport operation in Laos to CAS are now showing evidence of re-entering the competition for U.S. Gov't contracts in competition with CAS and AAM. They seem to have chosen the name LAOS AIR DEVELOPMENT CO., based in Vientiane. They show one A/C of the Twin Bonanza type. With the right management they should be able to get a share of the game and thus emerge into an employer of American pilots.

- AIR VIETNAM (AVN) is the South Vietnam Government-owned flag carrier, operating scheduled air service from Saigon to Hong Kong, Taipei (R.O. China), Osaka and Tokyo; Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), Singapore and Manila. Although they employ American pilots, the pilots are on local civilian status and thus taxable like their own nationals. This foreign tax, however, is deductible from the U.S. income tax payment.

- JAPAN AIR LINES (JAL) showed 1969 earnings 70% higher than 1968, during a year when nearly all the major airlines lost heavily. They have a fleet of some 60 heavy jet A/C now including 747s, and some 1300 flight crewmen. Although JAL is not in SEA we include it because they employ American pilots.

- VARAN AIR-SIAM AIR CO., LTD. is owned by a rich Siamese Prince of Bangkok who formerly worked as pilot for Thai International Airways. The idea was to set up and operate an international airline on what appeared to be available bilateral opportunities for route franchises. The project has dragged along for years, possibly because the Prince wants capital, equipment and management and also wants to retain control,

a difficult feat! He has succeeded finally in acquiring two C-54s, operating them thrice weekly to Hong Kong carrying cargo. His six or eight pilots recently "struck" for better things, were all fired and the operation shut down until they hired new pilots. They hire Americans.

ADDITIONAL COMMENT ON THE OPERATORS

- AIR VIETNAM is not reputed to be a very good company to work for. The living conditions as well as the working conditions are far from ideal. However, if you have had experience working in the tropics, especially in Latin America, and have developed plenty of patience, you should get along alright. Incidentally, the flying is easy; short legs, home every night. AIRTECH handles all the pilot hiring.
- While there are only a limited number of job openings during each year - perhaps 80 to 110 average among all the operators, these openings will be filled by the more aggressive applicants among the qualified.
- All is not gold that glitters! And there is a reason for this pilot turnover. Pilots who have never worked on foreign assignment, especially in the tropics and in "under developed" countries, may find the living uncomfortable or even unbearable. An extreme case is one new hire who was brought to Vientiane from California, who got off the plane, and after looking around the airport got back on the same plane and returned to the U.S. Other pilots feel that they may be straining their luck after 2 or 3 years and decide to get back home with a whole skin. This applies especially to the chopper pilots - who often seem to perform miracles in everyday flying. The biggest turnover, in fact, is in the rotor-wing section. Its not only the tight locations but also the ground fire annoyance. At dusk you see those little spurts of flame, once in awhile you may catch a slug or two in your A/C; you report it to your base and they list it on charts and in bulletins; and you keep going. But its not everyday, and the attrition is not much. Some of the pilots have been flying this same area for 10 years and more; others get fed up in a couple years. Think this over a bit!

WHAT IS THE PAY - IN U.S. DOLLARS ?

AIR AMERICA, INC.

Basic Pay per Hour

	1970	1971	1972
Captain - All Types A/C SEA	20.25	22.28	24.51
First Officer	12.66	13.93	15.32

Night Pay per Hour

Captain	3.75	some	some
First Officer	2.00	"	"

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Project Pay per Hour

Captain	--	12.50	13.50	14.50
First Officer	-	12.50	13.50	14.50

Longevity Pay per Hour

		<u>Captain</u>	<u>First Officer</u>
Second year	-	.86	.54
Third	-	1.72	1.08
Fourth	-	2.58	1.62
Fifth	-	3.44	2.16
Sixth	-	4.30	2.70
Seventh	-	5.16	3.24
Eighth	-	6.02	3.78
Ninth	-	6.85	4.32
Tenth	-	7.74	4.86
Eleventh, and thereafter	-	8.60	5.40

Base is paid to all pilots

Station Allowance per Month

Bangkok, Thailand	150.00
Udon, Thailand	215.00
Vientiane, Laos	230.00
Saigon, South Vietnam	320.00

Trip Hour Pay. Trip hours is total elapsed time, excluding deadhead time, from time of reporting for flight duty until blocks back at base after completion of flight (s) plus 30 minutes.

Each month following is computed and the greater amount paid:

1. Actual block time plus deadhead time.
2. Deadhead time plus 1/4 total trip time.
3. Minimum guarantee time (70 hours).

Per Diem and Expenses, paid monthly per Company manual. Liberal.

Minimum Guaranteed Pay is equivalent to 70 hours at basic plus longevity rates applicable, plus night and project actually flown, plus base allowance, plus per diem etc. actually earned.

OTHER PAYMENTS — see BENEFITS

Project Pay is paid on the basis of a percentage of the time in certain equipment, according to the base:

	Type Equipment	Percentage hours flown
Udon	UH34D	92.5%
	204B/205	92.5%
	VTB	80. %
Vientiane	Pilatus Porter	85. %
	Helio Courier	85. %
	Caribou/ C7A	75. %
	C123K	72.5%
	C-46	70. %
	C-47	70. %
	VTB	57.5%
Solgon	204B/205	87.5%
	Pilatus Porter	85. %
	Helio Courier	85. %
	VTB	80. %
	Beech Ten Two	80. %
	C-46	70. %
	C-47	70. %

Notes on Pay

Project Pay Operations is defined as "operations flown within the normal limitations of the A/C requiring the pilot to transport hazardous cargo or operate into and/ or out of marginal landing areas where operating conditions are below levels normally expected or wavered operations or operations over man-made or natural obstacles or extremely remote areas and operations within hostile territory or territory reasonably suspected of being hostile". Read carefully between the lines, and use your imagination a little.

Trip hour, per diem and expenses vary according to circumstances and are not given in the following examples. These items can run up to \$150 or more.

Income Tax exemption for Americans working overseas is \$20,000, which becomes \$25,000 with more than three years foreign residence. This means that if you earn, for example, \$38,000 and deduct \$20,000 you begin with \$18,000 and take your other deductions. Some investments offer about 80% tax deduction on invested amount, so that it is possible to bring your tax down to an insignificant amount.

Working for Air America (AAM) and Continental Air services (CAS) you pay no local, or foreign, tax.

EXAMPLES OF AAM PAY EARNINGS FROM FOREGOING DATA :

1. A recently hired, newly-checked out pilot on single piston engine UH34D, based in Udron, has averaged 100 hours/month with 10% night. His pay is :

			<u>Annual Rate</u> (1970)
Basic	100 x 20.25	\$2,025.	
Night	100 x 10% x 3.75	37.50	
Longevity	100 x (none)	---	
Project	100 x 92.5% x 12.50	1,156.25	
Base allowance		215.	
Trip pay, per diem, expenses		?	
total (add trip, per diem etc.)		<u>3,433.75</u>	\$40,205

2. An eleven year pilot flying as in example (1) above :

Basic		2,025.	
Night		37.50	
Longevity	100 x 8.60	860.00	
Project		1,156.25	
Base Allowance		215.	
Trip, per diem, expenses etc.		?	
total (add trip, per diem etc.)		<u>4,293.75</u>	\$51,525

3. A recently hired, newly checked out First Officer based in Vientiane on 2-engine Coribou, averaging 100 hours/month with 10% night. His pay is :

Basic	100 x 12.66	1,266.	
Night	100 x 10% x 2.00	20.	
Longevity	none	---	
Project	100 x 75% x 12.50	937.50	
Base allowance		230.	
Trip, per diem, expenses etc.		?	
total, add: trip etc.		<u>2,453.50</u>	\$29,442.

4. A five-year pilot on single/piston engine Helio, based in Saigon, is averaging 100 hours/month :

Basic		2,025.	
Night		37.50	
Longevity	100 x 3.44	344.	
Project	100 x 85% x 12.50	1,062.	
Base Allowance		320.	
Trip, per diem, expenses, etc.		?	
total, add: trip, per diem etc.		<u>3,788.50</u>	\$45,462.

5. A 3-year First Officer on C-47s in Vientiane flying 100 hours/month with 10% night :

Basic		1,266.	
Night	100 x 10% x 2.00	20.	
Longevity	100 x 1.08	108.	
Project	100 x 70% x 12.50	875.	
Base allowance		230.	
Trip, per diem etc.		?	
total, add: trip, per diem etc.		2,499.00	\$29,888

6. The same First Officer in example 5 above, assuming he did not check out as captain, would make \$3,013.00 per month in 1972 (1972) for the same flying - due to scheduled increases in basic and longevity and project pay. \$36,156

CONTINENTAL AIR SERVICES, INC.

CAS classifies their flying in 3 types :

1. STOL, with equipment such as Pilatus Porter.
2. UTILITY, using such A/C as Beech Baron.
3. TRANSPORT, in C-47 etc.

Pay for all newly-hired pilots, and co-pilots, is \$750.00 per month for a guaranteed minimum of 50 hours or less, plus \$7.00 per hour over the 50-hour minimum, plus \$10.00 per hour project pay, plus \$200.00 per month Living Allowance.

Pay for Captains is \$1,050 per month basic for a guaranteed minimum 50 hours per month, plus \$10.00 per hour Project Pay, plus \$200.00 per month living allowance, plus 13.50 per hr O/T.

Project Pay is based upon a percentage of hours flown on various routes, and CAS Management says that it averages out to about 70% of total flight time.

CAS Management recently stated average pay for various classifications as follows - (for Captains)

1. STOL 120 hrs/month for about \$2,700/2,800 per month.
2. UTILITY, 90/100 hrs/month, \$ 2,000/2,200 per month.
3. TRANSPORT, 70-80 hrs/month, \$2,000/2100 per month.

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AIR VIETNAM

Pay for Captains is a basic guaranteed \$1,700 for 50 hours or less, plus \$200.00 living allowance for the DC-6B. For the DC-4, Captain's pay is basic \$1,400

1. Captain's pay (must be ATR'd and current in equipment at the time of hiring):

DC-6B basic (50 hrs or less) \$1,700.00

DC-4 " " " " " " 1,400.00

2. AVN's management says that average pay for DC-6 Captains works out to \$2,500 per month, and DC-4 Captains to \$2,200 per month.

JAPAN AIR LINES

JAL pays \$2,200 flat flight pay and works their pilots an average of less than 70 hours. They pay a living expense allowance of \$600, which is to be raised to \$800 next year.

A supervisory flight crewman states that the \$2,200 is subject to about 33% Japan income tax, but the allowance is not. Note that U.S. allows an exemption of \$20,000/25,000 to Americans working overseas, the Japan tax is deductible from your U.S. tax payment.

VARAN AIR-SIAM AIR CO., LTD.

Pays a flat \$1,250 for Captains on their DC-4 operation.

BENEFITS

AIR AMERICA

Insurance. AAM provides group life insurance in the amount of \$25,000 for Captains and \$17,000 for F/Os.

Medical and Hospital include services of the Company's medical staff and a group medical hospital plan costing about \$6 per month to pilots for employee and dependents, which includes all hospital services, prescriptions, laboratory tests, x-rays, etc.

Pilot Physicals performed by Company medical staff. Standards set forth in FAA Part 67 for First Class Certificate are used. If a pilot should fail to pass, there are proscribed recourses. Fairness is the rule.

An allowance for dependents is made up to 12 at the age of 21 or less plus 100% of the cost of education and transportation, up to \$1,500 per year per pilot.

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Loss of License Insurance available at pilot's expense.

Leave :

Annual Leave accumulates at the rate of 14 days per year at average pay.

Home Leave accumulates at the rate of 2 1/2 days per month or 30 days per year at average pay, plus air transportation to pilot's home in the States and return for himself and dependents.

Sick Leave accumulates at the rate of 1.5 days per month or 18 days per year up to a maximum of 90 days at average pay.

Emergency Leave may be granted by the Company for up to 14 days at average pay.

Personal Leave without pay (LWOP) may be granted for up to 12 months without losing seniority or longevity pay accrual; it may be extended for up to two additional years but without seniority and longevity pay accrual. However, a pilot is subject to recall anytime after six months and if he doesn't accept it, is subject to termination. During LWOP he must keep up his medical certificate or lose seniority and longevity pay accrual. LWOP due to sickness or injury may run up to 5 years without loss of pay accruals.

Military Leave will be granted appropriately.

INTERLINE AIR TRAVEL

Discount air fares are available to pilots according to interline agreements by the Company, and includes dependents. For example, confirmed space on Pan American flights at 80% discount - you pay 20% of the listed fare.

APO PRIVILEGES

Available to pilots in SEA. You can send and receive letters and packages at domestic postage via the APO in San Francisco. You can order things bought at Sears in SFO sent via APO, for example.

PX and COMMISSARY PRIVILEGES

Available at Saigon, Udorn and Vientiane, with some restrictions. Available in Bangkok to retired military, without restrictions.

EDUCATIONAL ALLOWANCE FOR DEPENDENTS

An allowance for dependent children in grades 1 to 12 at the rate of 75% of tuition plus 10% of tuition amount for books and transportation, up to \$1,500 per year per pilot.

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RETIREMENT PLAN

You can join the plan after one year of employment, in which you pay a percentage of your earned income each month and the Company pays an equal amount. The money thus paid is invested by a Pension Fund in various securities and is payable upon separation at its current invested value, returning the full amount of the employee's contribution plus a percentage of the Company's contribution at its current invested value, depending upon the length of service.

MOVING OF PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS is provided for up to 3,500 lbs. net.

TRANSPORTATION

At beginning of employment to SEA assignment for pilot, and for dependents 6 months later; although a pilot may bring his dependents at any time at his own expense and collect a refund, per Company Personnel Manual - upon completion of the 6 month period.

At termination of employment, to his home in the States, including his dependents.

At the termination of one year, to his home and return for himself and dependents.

BENEFITS FOR DEATH, INJURY, CAPTURE AND INTERNMENT

Including missing persons, is in accordance with the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, the Defense Base Act, The War Hazards Compensation Act, and the Company Personnel Manual II. Liberal enough; accumulation of pay is an item.

FREE TRANSPORTATION

For pilots and their dependents on Company flights on a space-available basis.

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICANTS

AIR AMERICA lists the following:

1. Minimum 2,000 hours flight time.
2. FAA Commercial License with multi-engine and instrument ratings.
3. Restricted Radio Telephone Permit.

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4. First Class Medical certificate without waiver.

We note, however, that during the past few years AAM has at times hired pilots with the above qualifications except with less than 2000 hours - in fact, with very little time beyond completion of flight training school.

AAM has no fixed age limit on the upside for hiring, but they do have a mandatory retirement age of 60 for pilots, (65 for ground personnel) Age limit exceptions are arbitrary.

It also should be noted that many AAM pilots are retired military pilots on pension.

All employees take a physical exam by the Company Medical staff upon entering employment, which is no problem if you have passed an FAA physical.

CONTINENTAL AIR SERVICES

Requirements are the same as AAM's except that they have a 40-year age limit for hiring, and as far as we know have not hired anyone with less than 2000 hours.

JAPAN AIR LINES

A recent conversation with a JAL supervisor disclosed that they have hired pilots up to 55 years, although in the past they hired two retired PAA pilots (PAA retirement age is 60), but currently they have a pilot retirement age set at 58 years. As you may know, there has been considerable discussion in U.S. official circles and elsewhere regarding age limitations for schedule pilots; age limits based on calendar years may be unrealistic, since a corpulent, overweight man of 35 years with high blood pressure (but still able to pass a 1st-class physical) may be a poorer risk than one age 65 but in excellent physical shape.

JAL is currently "crying for pilots" and is lagging in their B-747 program for lack of cockpit crews to fill the DC-8s, 727s etc., when they move pilots up to 747s. Anybody with a DC-8 rating, or an 880 or 727 rating, is almost sure to be hired on the spot. This applies to F/Es as well as pilots.

JAL will also take you for DC-8 training if you have heavy 4-engine piston time, on a plan whereby they put you into Ground School and Flight Simulator at their expense, and pay half the actual flight training costs as an advance against your pay when you are rated and assigned to flight duty. The other half is in the form of an advance of \$10,000 which you must put up. They will collect their half by salary deduction over a period of time.

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During training the Chief Pilot checks you every hour for normal progress; no progress, no need to continue and you are cancelled to save further expense both for you and the Airline. The unused portion of your deposit is refunded in this case.

It was a wonderful opportunity for advancement from DC-4s and DC-6s for some 25 former AAM pilots, who quit AAM and are now flying captain position on JAL stretched DC-8s (at least one is currently on 727s on domestic flights). A number of AAM F/Es are also now with JAL.

AIR VIETNAM

AVN must operate according to the rules set forth by the DCA, which provide, among other things, that AVN must hire Captains with ATR and current DC-4 or DC-6B ratings - whichever equipment they are hired for. Accordingly, you must have this to apply for employment with AVN. But if you can qualify, you are almost certain of immediate employment since AVN is hard up for pilots. In fact, they have currently (August 1970) one DC-6B grounded for lack of crews. Unfortunately, the DCA will not permit them to upgrade other qualified pilots.

PROCEDURE IN APPLYING FOR A JOB

AIR AMERICA, INC.

1. Write to the System Chief Pilot who goes under the title of Director Flying Division (DFD):

Captain D. E. Teeters, DFD.
Air America, Inc.
108 Chung Shan Road, North, 2nd Sec.
Taipei, Taiwan

2. Write or call personally:

Mr. H. H. Dawson
Air America, Inc.
815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

CONTINENTAL AIR SERVICES, INC.

Write or call personally:

Continental Air Services, Inc.
7300 World Way West
Los Angeles, Calif. 90009

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AIR VIETNAM

Write to :

~~Mr. Roger N. Haynes, Pres.~~
CAPT. CHARLES LANTOW
AIRTECH, Inc.
c/o Air Vietnam
P.O. Box 217
Saigon, South Vietnam

JAPAN AIR LINES

Write to or contact :

International Air Services Co., Inc. (IASC)
1299 Bayshore Drive
Burlingame, California

IASC is controlled by Captains James Anderson and Charles Smith, both actively flying JAL. If you personally contact IASC, see one of these personally.

BIRD AIR ENTERPRISES (LAOS AIR DEVELOPMENT CO.)

Write to :

Mr. William H. Bird
c/o Bird & Sons
Vientiane, Laos

VARAN AIR-SIAM AIR CO., LTD.

Write to :

Capt. MacIntosh, Chief Pilot
Varan Air-Siam Air Co., Ltd.
28-34 Rajadamri Road
Bangkok, Thailand

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STATINTL

NATURE OF THE FLYING

STATINTL

The flying is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S. Government if you are with AAM or CAS. [REDACTED]

direction. You don't know and you don't care. The Gov't agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your Company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane according to flight plan and within published limitations.

Since all of SEA lies within the tropics, and your operations are within 6° and 20° N. Lat, vegetation is heavily green the year around. Much of it is covered with heavy jungle growth and most of it is mountainous - jungle-covered mountains. The mountains are not very high, however, the highest point in Laos being about 9,000 ft; in South Vietnam, mostly below 8,000; in Thailand, below 7,500.

WEATHER. There are two seasons: the Wet and the Dry. The wet season is characterized by the monsoons - a condition peculiar to the land areas bordering the Indian Ocean to its north. Monsoons begin in Thailand and Laos about July 15th and continue until about October 15th when "Siberian Highs" or Polar Continental air masses begin to work down into SEA with clear, dry conditions and good weather continues for most of the next four months. Some name the seasons the Hot and the Cool; other say the Hot and the Hotter! which is fairly accurate since it never gets really cool - except in the higher altitudes inhabited only by native tribes.

The hottest months are April and May, during which local schools enjoy their "summer vacations". The heat subsides in June and there are frequent showers usually in the afternoon and night.

Flying in the monsoons is about like flying anywhere in the tropics, for example, in Central America and the Caribbean area generally. Buildups often reach 50,000 to 60,000 feet with heavy rain and hail. Low altitude flying is a matter of getting from Point A to Point B by flying mostly VFR around the storms. Deviating from course involves good knowledge of the terrain. Or when the buildups are not too violent and the overcast is hanging down on the ridges but with "valley effect" and higher ceilings on either side of the ridges, you may find yourself on and off instruments at minimum enroute altitude.

The dry season arrives suddenly in October and it is a great relief to see the terrain again and spot landmarks 75 miles or more away. The fine weather gradually gives way to reduced visibility as the natives begin to burn their fields and jungle clearings. By February and March the smoke gets so thick that the terrain can be seen only vertically down, if at all; but the degree of smoke density is rather spotty. A few rainy spells and the fires and the smoke disappear around June.

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If you have already flown in the tropics you will feel at home here; if you haven't, it will be different, but it will still be better than the cold and warm fronts, the icing, the snow and freezing rain, the fog and the crap that you are accustomed to. And since your outfit and just a few others have a practical monopoly on the flying, you'll find its a relief to get away from the potpourri and congestion now found in many U.S. areas.

Although one of the operators (AAM) makes a great fanfare about ATRs and flying "according to FAA regulations" the plain fact is that they all violate FAA on nearly every flight. AAM encourages its pilots to get ATRs and provides training for some, but it could be that this is mostly to build up its image to the "Customer" in the competition for contracts.

Flight crews are issued parachutes and survival kits on all appropriate flights. The survival kits are well equipped, as a result of years of experience and improvement. AAM supplies training in Survival, and Escape and Evasion.


Flight watch is maintained on both VHF and HF, with crews reporting every 20 minutes. Failure to report brings prompt action, leading to search and rescue under appropriate circumstances. Interplane conversation on little-used VHF frequencies keeps all flights in touch with each other and is of great value to flight crews; it ranges from spot weather information to flight levels to occasional enemy troop movements and ground fire locations.

Security is an important factor in the operations. Not only is efficient guard maintained, but also specialists in enroute safety are employed who collect information from all available sources on enemy ground fire and other activity and keep such information posted up to the minute. Before flight each crew is briefed by Flight Safety; at the end of the day, each pilot is debriefed. Pilot radio reports during flight are recorded. Charts are prepared and displayed in the briefing room to show danger areas.

AIR-FREIGHT. On cargo drop flights, e.g., C-123K, C-46 and C-47, and Caribou types, an Air Freight Specialist and Air Cargo Dispatcher (s) are included in the crew. The difference in these two grades - besides the pay scale - is the AFS's are Americans and the AFDs are non-Americans. Both grades are superbly qualified for the work - and usually are ex-paratroop types with current jump qualifications - who know the D zone terrain as well as or better than the pilot in command and are therefore a great help to pilots on less familiar drop missions. These types also load and tie down the cargo. The drop A/C are equipped with tracks and rollers and the cargo is palletized.

Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo much more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination! (Refer to NEWSWEEK and TIME articles.)

FOR ANY FURTHER INFORMATION you may require, WRITE KAWI enclosing three bux (\$3) - to cover air mail postage & expense, and We'll send you a prompt reply. We want to help you in any way we can. You may enclose a brief resume of your aviation experience for our records. Include mention of licenses and of military experience, if any. We will keep you listed for suitable jobs as they come up, at no further fee. We also offer an "underground booster service" to ensure and expedite employment in a desired position; please enquire if interested.



STATINTL

Photography

Photography For Magazine Articles, Brochures, Etc.--Imaginative, realistic approach. Domestic and foreign assignments. Portfolio shown by appointment. Marti Coale, (213) 474-1371, Los Angeles.

Attention Freelance Writers---Not selling? Southeast Asia and Laos are sure fire articles today. Need hard hitting impact photographs to accompany your work? Send me your needs and ideas. Have B & W-Color transparencies on most subjects or will shoot for you. Will also collaborate on percentage basis and credit line. Send \$1.00 and S.A.S.E for details and sample portfolio. H. F. Harper, USAID/BPR, A.P.O. San Francisco, Calif. 96352.