

U.S. Civilians Dying Unheralded in Laos

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star-News Special Correspondent

VIENTIANE — Some Americans killed in Indochina combat do not appear in the U.S. Indochina death toll which stands at latest count at 45,915.

These unacknowledged combat deaths are of American civilians performing military duties normally carried out by U.S. Air Force or Army personnel.

As they are civilians the U.S. military does not include them in the death toll when they are killed in action.

For example, U.S. officials this weekend announced two American military deaths. They said U.S. Air Force Capt. Harold L. (Sklp) Mischler of Osborne, Kan., was killed Saturday when his light observation plane was shot down by small arms over the embattled South Laos town of Saravane. U.S. officials said a second American was lost over the plain of Jars area but were unable to identify him until next of kin were notified.

On Friday, Dec. 15, however, at a town on the South Laos' Bolovens Plateau called Paksong another kind of death occurred. John Kearns of Alvarado, Tex., was listed as killed by North Vietnamese mortar shells which hit the command post of the Lao irregular unit he was advising.

Killed at Saravane

An embassy spokesman described Kearns as "American contract personnel attached to an irregular Lao unit." Irregular Lao units are handled by the Central Intelligence Agency. Kearns was the third American adviser to irregulars killed in action since September.

Another American was killed when Lao irregular units launched a heliborne attack on Saravane on Oct. 19.

He was aboard one of eight U.S. Air Force helicopters which carried Lao irregulars into the Saravane airstrip under intense enemy fire. The American was killed just before the helicopter touched down. Six of the U.S. helicopters

engaged were hit by Communist fire but none crashed. A third American adviser to the irregulars was killed during an operation which failed to retake the Plain of Jars in North Laos in September.

Air America officials say about twenty of their American crew members have been killed in Laos since March 1970.

Air America is a private contractor to the Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. government agencies and as air crew personnel are civilians.

They are not carried on the military death toll.

Air America engages in resupply drops to irregulars often under intense enemy anti-aircraft fire and in infiltration and exfiltration of irregular intelligence and commando teams behind enemy lines. Another company, Continental Airlines, has lost some American personnel in similar operations in Laos.

American officials say roughly 800 Americans were killed or are missing in Laos since May 1964 when the United States first shouldered a greater burden of the Laos war. This figure includes all categories and is mostly military.

The unheralded paramilitary deaths in Laos indicate a trend which may start to show in South Vietnam as American military wind down the war there and various private American civilian companies are poised to move in to take over paramilitary chores.

Deaths Unreported

Increasing use of disguised paramilitary organizations will allow the U.S. military to put out figures of zero American casualties on the ground as they do now in Laos, as it will be "civilians" who are being killed, not U.S. military personnel.

As in Laos most of these civilians will be former members of Special Forces and similar units contracted to the Central Intelligence Agency

or other U.S. government agencies.

The U.S. failure to announce a list of paramilitary deaths in Laos, however, is one of the few faults which mar these operations.

In Laos, instead of having thousands of Americans as the Pentagon has poured into South Vietnam, the war is run just as effectively if not more so by 500 to 600 Americans.

Small Group Functions

While Hanoi fields four, and in the dry season, five weak divisions of some 40,000 combat troops in Laos, the United States has only between 30 and 40 men on the ground at the most in combat areas throughout the country.

In the past eight years an estimated 31 of these Americans been killed. This figure includes some technicians caught flatfooted on the ground in 1968 at Phou Pathi, a supersecret installation in North Laos which the North Vietnamese overran.

About 60 Air America crewmen of American nationality are believed to have been killed in the same time period.

The small number of Americans with the irregulars are essential to insure good Lao leadership and lack of corruption. Poor leadership and non-payment of troops severely weakened Royal Lao regular forces throughout the war.

It has been suggested, however, that U.S. Embassy officials should admit it when such Americans are killed in action instead of trying to pretend they are "American personnel in management" as happened initially in the Kearns' case and these American deaths should be included in military casualty figures released weekly in Saigon.

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U.S. Research Agency Leaving Thailand

BANGKOK (UPI)—A Pentagon agency said to have carried out intelligence and policymaking in Thailand over the last decade is to quietly close its doors at the end of this month as part of the wind-down in America's military role in Southeast Asia.

The agency is a field facility of the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), a little-known organization that develops classified electronic research and intelligence systems as well as more mundane items such as new combat packs, boots and field rations.

When ARPA's office here was opened in 1962, it was billed as a facility to help Thailand's military develop its own research and development capability. It grew to an organization with a staff of more than 140 and became by far the largest of ARPA's five overseas branches, spending about half of a \$25 million yearly budget for a program known as Project Agile.

ARPA's Bangkok office also became involved in wider activities such as defoliation and counterinsurgency work, leading to charges that the advisory role to the Thai military was

merely a cover for other jobs.

Almost to a man, the professional staff of about 30 American scientists that has phased out the facility's last research projects over the last few months feels that much of the criticism has been unjustified.

U.S. officials still decline to discuss, on grounds of security, many of the projects ARPA was involved in, and there is still no official confirmation that the agency used airplanes of Air America, a charter line that works for the CIA and other U.S. government agencies in Southeast Asia, to defoliate an area of jungle in Thailand in 1965 and 1966.

An ARPA source said the defoliating was done to test results in an area under secure conditions that were not available in Vietnam. The same source said that a later Thai government request for ARPA's help to defoliate an area in North Thailand where Communist guerrillas were active was refused because the defoliants had been found harmful to animals and humans.

ARPA also ran projects to gather intelligence material on Communist guerrillas from Thai sources, and ARPA teams helped develop ground and airborne sensor systems to detect Communist movement through the jungle. Some of these sys-


tems have had application in the electronic warfare system the United States has used to locate bombing targets in Laos and Vietnam.

The workers at ARPA say they have done valuable work in such areas as soil testing, vegetation and environmental sciences that have peaceful as well as military applications.

When ARPA closes its doors here it will leave behind the military research and development center, a facility built jointly with Thailand that will be operated by the Thai supreme command. ARPA is also leaving about half a million dollars' worth of electronic equipment and the unclassified portion of its reference library, which runs to about 20,000 volumes.

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U.S. plans prolonged role in Vietnam

By Richard E. Ward

Despite press speculation a peace agreement for Vietnam may soon be concluded, there is concrete evidence indicating the U.S. is planning to prolong the conflict and will attempt to subvert any peace accords.

U.S. procrastination in Paris, intensified bombing and the huge shipments of arms to Saigon, among other developments, are all indicators that the White House has no desire for true peace and has not abandoned its neo-colonial designs in Indochina.

An even more ominous proof of U.S. intentions of maintaining its puppet regimes in Indochina, was the apparent effort by presidential envoy Henry Kissinger to press Saigon's "demands" in Paris at the end of November, which would have virtually scrapped the agreement reached in October by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho of the DRV.

There have been various hypotheses put forward in the Western press concerning Kissinger's seeming about-face on behalf of Saigon, after proclaiming in October before the world that "peace is at hand." Nearly every possible explanation has been proposed by the pundits except the most plausible one. The U.S. stalling in Paris does not represent any deference to its Saigon puppets, but rather it is for the purposes of U.S. policy and the Saigon regime is merely an instrument. U.S. expressions of "support" for Saigon's policies, now as in the past, to the extent they are not fictions for deceiving American opinion, are fundamentally expressions of the aims and designs of the U.S.

Gala time

In essence, American procrastination in Paris has been an effort to gain time for augmenting Saigon's war machine and setting up a huge clandestine network of "civilian advisors" which will attempt to prolong the struggle in Vietnam, as well as in the rest of Indochina. If no peace agreements have been reached,

"Even as the U.S. military is packing up for its expected exit from Vietnam, American officials here are secretly planning a major postwar presence of U.S. civilians in Vietnam, with many of them doing jobs formerly done by the military," wrote Fox Butterfield in a report from Saigon in the Nov. 27 New York Times.

Without alluding to the delay in Paris, Butterfield noted that the U.S. is in the process of augmenting its "civilian advisory" force in Vietnam, from 5000 to 10,000, its peak level at the stage of maximum U.S. military presence in Vietnam. But it should be apparent that this "advisory" apparatus could not be assembled overnight, any more than the enormous flow of U.S. arms could be brought to Saigon in a day. Saigon's air force was increased two-fold, from approximately 1000 to 2000 aircraft during the past two months, to give only one item of U.S. supply effort.

To place recent developments in their proper perspective, it must be noted that there has been a major shift in U.S. strategy set in motion last spring in the wake of the long-sustained offensive by the Liberation Armed Forces in South Vietnam.

Despite administration efforts to play down the strength of the offensive, it is evident that once again the whole U.S. strategy for victory in Vietnam was smashed. Only the most drastic U.S. measures of the war prevented the complete collapse of the Saigon regime and its armed forces: the blockade of the DRV, the greatest aerial escalation against the DRV and liberated areas of South Vietnam (while heavy bombing of Laos and Cambodia was sustained), and unprecedented aerial tactical and logistics support for the Saigon forces.

The augmentation of the U.S. air logistics support for Saigon's forces during the offensive surged from a monthly average of about nine million pounds of cargo before the offensive to 60 million pounds in May. Augmented U.S. "support" for Saigon after the offensive began, raised total U.S. expenditures on the war by an annual rate of approximately \$10 billion or nearly double the rate prior to the offensive.

The Nixon administration concealed this augmentation by requesting additional war funding only for the period ending Sept. 30. At about the same time the administration presented Congress with a request for these funds in June, Air America and Continental Air Services, the CIA contractual "civilian" airlines, began stepping up recruiting among Air Force personnel in Indochina, according to a Dec. 1 report of Dispatch News Service, by John Burgess. He quoted from a confidential recruiting brochure which, among other points, stated:

Clandestine warfare

"The flying is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are being recruited by the government, that is government agencies

such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane."

The brochure makes it clear that "civilian flying" is merely a cover for clandestine military activity: "Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination!"

In what Burgess describes as a "hastily" added postscript, the brochure states: "Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in RVN (Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected that a boom among contract operators will result. . . ."

In other words, here we have the first concrete indication that the White House was implicitly admitting defeat of its "Vietnamization" program and reverting to a less costly program of clandestine warfare. The U.S. strategy shift was probably equally dictated by a desire to further diminish the political impact of the war on American opinion and finally by a desire to diminish the blow to U.S. prestige in the event of ultimate failure, that is the collapse of the puppet regimes.

The U.S. is clearly trying to stave off this development as long as possible, but it also

wants to avoid the impression of being engaged in direct and large-scale U.S. intervention at the time, which sooner or later Nixon and Kissinger must know is inevitable.

Even if they cannot face this reality, they are now in deadly earnest about maintaining support for the puppet regimes, regardless of any peace agreement. If the U.S. honestly adhered to a peace agreement, Saigon's political collapse would quickly follow. That is why the U.S. is stepping up clandestine support for the Saigon regime, military aid disguised as civilian "contractual" aid, provided mainly by U.S. private military contractors.

There is a relationship between the U.S. arms build-up Indochina and the program for secret contractual aid. Before the October peace agreement, the U.S. made little effort to keep the program secret. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Sept. 13, Air Force Maj. Gen. Joseph R. DeLuca explained in detail U.S. plans for contracting for personnel to train Saigon Air Force members. In the area of maintenance alone, the U.S. was planning to make contracts for \$54 million of one to three years to train Saigon personnel, according to DeLuca.

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A War To Help Sell Heroin?

By FREDERIC SHERMAN
Herald Editorial Writer

THERE is at Yale University a doctoral scholar who would like to believe Richard Nixon is trying to cut loose from Vietnam because of evidence that American involvement in Southeast Asia is a major factor in the increasing problem with heroin addiction here in this country.



Sherman

Alfred W. McCoy has offered such evidence in his book entitled *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (Harper & Row). Those who support American intervention in Vietnam as a selfless act in defense of freedom will judge the McCoy book as a spurious indictment filled with wild and baseless charges. But there is too much in this book for it to be dismissed as anti-Vietnam propaganda. Eighteen months of study produced the names, the places and the dates of trafficking in the poppy gum that is turned into the powder of white death.

Sources of opium and heroin are traced through the politics and the economies of the military dictatorships in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.

Aircraft controlled by General Ky in Saigon transported from Laos the heroin that was pushed on tens of thousands of American servicemen. It was sold cheaply because there were more than 500,000 potential customers. It was General Ky's sister who directed much of the traffic in heroin from the Sedone Palace Hotel in Pakse, a city in western

Laos near the Thai border.

The Cambodia invasion did not accomplish the capture of the North Vietnamese headquarters, but it did enable the Saigon Navy to expand its role in the heroin traffic. Up until the invasion of Cambodia, there was no surface transit for heroin from Laos. But with the protection of American air power, the Vietnamese admirals were able to run their heroin in competition with General Ky's aircraft.

THIS is a book the CIA tried to suppress because it documents the use of American money and American airplanes in the heroin traffic. This again is more of the political expediency on which Washington's stumbling in

Southeast Asia is based. The loyalty of mountain tribesmen could only be bought by purchases of their poppy crop and transport of the opium gum to processing plants controlled by political leaders in Laos and Cambodia. It was a repeat of the game invented by French intelligence officials who use profits from heroin traffic to finance political machinations.

On Page 263, McCoy writes, "Without air transport for their opium, the Meo (tribesmen) faced economic ruin. There was simply no form of air transport available in northern Laos except the CIA's charter airline, Air America. And according to several sources, Air America began flying opium from mountain villages north and east of the Plain of Jars to Gen. Vang Pao's headquarters at Long Tieng." This, then, is the major factor in the so-called secret American war in Laos: traffic in opium destined for pushers in Saigon and for the smugglers coming into the United States by way of Miami from Latin America.

THE BASIC problem, as McCoy outlines it, is that American officials in Southeast Asia who know the inside story of the heroin traffic cannot or won't do anything about it because of fears that their actions would somehow hamper the war effort.

If agents of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics, for example, were to get tough with Thai leaders mixed up with heroin in Bangkok, American commanders of the airbases in that country would suddenly find it impossible to get jet fuel delivered or other vital supplies delivered.

This is why McCoy called his book *The Politics of Heroin*.

Air America: Flying for U.S. and Profit in

Asia

By JOHN BURGESS
Special to The Star-News

BANGKOK — "The flying is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S. government, that is government agencies such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane."

Thus an unnamed American pilot describes "civilian flying" in Southeast Asia for Air America and the lesser known Continental Air Services — both private companies on contract to the U.S. government. The pilot's comments are part of a confidential, 16-page brochure available at certain Air Force personnel offices. It is shown to Air Force pilots interested in flying for one of the companies upon completing their military service.

The brochure lists no author or publisher, but it offers an illuminating view into the internal operations of Air America, which has played a crucial role in the Indochina war theater since the 1950s. Air America, along with the other companies, has airlifted troops, refugees, CIA agents, American politicians, war material, food and occasionally prisoners all over Southeast Asia.

Extravagant Salaries

The brochure, dated June 29, 1972, boasts that Air America ranked as one of the most profitable corporations in the United States in 1969, a year when most of the world's airlines lost heavily. Air America's customer is the U.S. government.

It employs about 436 pilots, according to the pamphlet, of which 384 are working in Southeast Asia. The center of Air America's operation is Laos, where the presence of military or military-related personnel is prohibited by the much-abused Geneva Conference of 1962.

Air America's profits are high despite the somewhat extravagant salaries it pays for flying personnel. According to the report, a pilot with 11 years experience flying a UH-34D helicopter based at Udorn air base in Thailand an

average of 100 hours monthly, will take home \$51,525. All salaries are tax free.

A newly hired pilot flying a C-7 Caribou transport based in Vientiane, averaging 100 hours flying time monthly, would earn a minimum \$29,442. The U.S. commercial pilot average is \$24,000.

Also available to Air America personnel, in addition to a liberal expense account, is life and medical insurance, two-weeks leave, tickets on other airlines at 20 percent normal cost, PX and government mailing privileges and educational allowances for dependents. Many Air America pilots are retired military men receiving military pensions.

'Good' Investment

Americans can also become "air freight specialists", commonly called kickers. Their job is to push cargo out over drop zones. Salary is \$1,600-\$1,800 per month. Qualifications: American citizenship, air borne training, experience with the U.S. Air Force preferred.

Air America, Inc., is owned by a private aviation investment concern called the Pacific Corp. Dunn and Bradstreet's investment directory places its assets in the \$10-\$50 million category, and rates it "good" as an investment risk. Air America itself employs al-

together about 8,000 persons, ranking in size just below National Airlines and above most of the smaller U.S. domestic airlines.

Formerly called Civil Air Transport (CAT), Air America was organized after World War II by General Claire Chennault, commander of the American fighter squadrons in Burma and China known as the Flying Tigers. CAT played a major role in post-war China supplying Nationalist troops. CAT also supplied the French during their phase of the war in Indochina.

Air America is commonly considered an arm of the CIA. In Laos, the CIA for the past 10 years or more has maintained an army of hill tribesmen, mainly Thai and Lao mercenaries. Most of the air supply and transport needs for this army have been handled by Air America.

Military Assistance

Though the brochure does not mention opium explicitly,

it hints at the subject of contraband:

"Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo much more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination!"

Air America works hand-in-hand with the U.S. Air Force. At Udorn air base in Thailand, Air Force mechanics repair the airline's transports and helicopters, many of them unmarked. The Air Force has reportedly leased giant C130 transports when the planes were needed for opera-

tions in Laos. In the section on Air America's benefits, the brochure lists in addition to normal home and sick leave: "Military leave will be granted appropriately" — an apparent acknowledgement that there are military people working directly with Air America.

One should not conclude, however, that the salaries, excitement and tax advantages mean that Air America pilots hope the war will continue. As the brochure's author notes in a typed postscript:

"Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in RVN (Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected that a boom among contract operators will result when implemented, due to inevitable rehabilitation and reconstruction aid in wartorn areas. . . . Job market highly competitive and you'll need all the help you can get."

According to Pacific News Service, the following men sit on the Air America board of directors:

Samuel Randolph Walker — chairman of the board of Wm. C. Walker's Son, New York; director of Equitable Life Assurance Society; member of Federal City Council, Washington, D.C.; member of Action Council for Better Cities, Urban America, Inc., and life trustee, Columbia University.

William A. Reed — chairman of the board of Simpson Timber Co.; chairman of the Co.; director of Crown Simpson Timber Co.; director of

Seattle First National Bank; director of General Insurance Co.; director of Boeing Co.; director of Pacific Car Foundry Co.; director of Northern Pacific Railroad; director of Stanford Research Institute.

Arthur Berry Richardson — foreign service officer in Russia, China and England from 1914 to 1936; chairman of the board of Cheeseborough Ponds, Inc. from 1955 to 1961; director of United Hospital Fund, New York; trustee of Lenox Hill Hospital.

James Barr Ames — law partner in Ropes & Gray, Boston; director of Air Asia Co., Ltd., director of International Student Association; member, Cambridge Civic Association and trustee of Mt. Auburn Hospital.

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NEW DESTINATION: Air America, which has had its Asia headquarters in Taiwan for many years, is relocating its main operations to Thailand.

The airline---often referred to as the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) air arm---has been tied in with Taiwan's old Civil Air Transport (CAT) complex, which includes Air Asia, for management and operational purposes.

CAT doesn't operate its own planes anymore but provides management services for others. It's Air Asia arm is the biggest aircraft maintenance operation in the Far East. Both will stay in Taiwan.

Word about the Air America move has just leaked out. We'll have a more detailed report on what the move is all about and what it means in a later issue.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN

E - 634,371

S - 701,743

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Lao Irregulars Get More Aid Than Regulars

By JOHN EVERINGHAM

Special to The Bulletin

Phou Dum, Laos — The twin antennae of a small U.S. communications transmitter sticks up from a lonely mountain top 10 miles northwest of the village of Luang Prabang in northern Laos.

According to a Thai civilian employed by Air America (under contract to the CIA) to maintain the installation, it provides the U.S. military with communications between northern Laos and the U.S. air base at Udorn, Thailand.

Pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces control everything north and west of the mountain, beginning just a few hundred meters from the transmitter.

Not 'Irregular'

The 400 Lao Teung (mountain Lao) "irregulars" at the installation are among the 30,000 mountain villagers who form the backbone of the CIA's no longer secret army in Laos, an army that is virtually independent of Laotian control.

Officials refer to them as "irregulars," but they are fulltime, highly trained troops. The Special Guerilla Units (SGU) are given credit for the Vientiane government's not having lost control of the whole country. Communist forces occupy three-fourths of Laos.

How did these mountain soldiers wind up in an American army?

"Money," I was told over and over again on a recent overnight visit to the mountain. (Chances of a journalist being given a lift aboard the American helicopter that serves the mountain are about nil. The hike through the mountains took 10 hours.)

They Want Out

They want out more than to escape the SGU and the war, return to their villages and families, and grow rice.

The deterrent to escape was the Royal Lao Army — 26 years in the Royal Lao Army. Military service is compulsory for all males of 15, though if a 13-year-old is big enough to hold a gun he will be drafted. And once a soldier, the only way out is bribery or serving until you're 40. Twenty-six years in the Royal Lao Army is risky at the very best odds.

Army recruiting teams reach even remote villages, getting in by helicopter where trucks won't go.

It isn't hard to see why those who had the chance opted for being an "American soldier" instead. "American Army" pay begins at 12,500 kip per month (\$15); Lao army at 4,500 per month (\$5).

Food too, I was assured, was far better and more plentiful, chiefly because the Americans deliver it themselves. Even big jars of local firewater whisky are occasionally given out.

In battle, SGU troops have access to superior weapons and a more reliable flow of ammunition than their brothers in the Lao army. Air support comes faster and their wounded are evacuated more swiftly, said Lieutenant Ohn See, the company commander.

More Respect

The Lao Teung speak of the "American bosses" with more respect than do the Meo SGUs with whom they share these highlands.

Before CIA militarization of the two mountain tribes, the Meo had a firmly established social-political structure which the CIA brushed aside. But the Lao Teung were disorganized and scattered, and the CIA had no need to interfere with their traditional leadership.

The Lao Teung's economic position has always been well below that of the Meo. Their crops were less carefully tended and their livestock fewer.

Now CIA militarization has the Lao Teung. But the once prosperous Meo have been decimated by the CIA's military programs.

The tens of thousands of unwilling and unknowing tribesmen helicoptered up to the Plain of Jars each dry season since 1968 have been cut to pieces by communist guns and shelling.

Barely 10 percent of the Meos survive in their traditional mountain-top homes. As their villages fell behind Communist lines, they were bombed by the Americans.

Dispatch News Service International

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U.S. aid is still pouring into Laos

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun-Staff Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—The United States role in the Indochina war may have diminished—but not in Laos.

No longer top secret but still partly concealed from public view, the American war effort in support of the Lao government remains as large as ever. Without it, U.S. and Lao officials agree, the war against the Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese allies would collapse not in months but possibly in days.

"They might last a couple of weeks without us," said an American officer with long experience in Laos. He grinned, but he wasn't joking. A Lao colonel, asked how long it would take with continued outside aid for the Lao Army to be able to defend itself, said seriously: "Eight or 10 years."

In support of the government's war effort, the U.S. is providing direct military aid of \$350 million a year. This is about 10 times the whole Lao national budget, and almost twice the country's gross national product.

The aid totals do not include the cost of American bombing, which is mounted from outside Laos. Although the present extent of bombing in Laos is not known, fighter-bombers and B-52's have at times in the past reached sortie rates over Laos exceeding the highest ever reached over North Vietnam.

U.S. aid to Laos began in the 1950's. During the confused warfare preceding the Geneva Conference of 1962, the Americans supplied nearly half a billion dollars for military salaries and equipment, administering the military assistance through a mission misleadingly called the Programs Evaluation Office and manned by military officers in civilian clothes under the guise of "technicians"—an operation that foreshadowed later clandestine efforts.

When the Geneva Accords banned foreign military aid, the Americans conscientiously withdrew 666 military advisers. Only 40 of the 10,000 North Vietnamese advisers remained in Laos under International Control Commission supervision, though others may have faded across the border. The war quickly resumed, and so did American support.

In 1964-1965, when the Americans launched full-scale air war in Indochina and the North Vietnamese increased their commitment of men and arms to the battles in South Vietnam, the Laos war took on a pattern that has remained essentially unchanged ever since.

The U.S., seeking to impede the flow of Communist troops and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail complex in eastern Laos, stepped up its support of Lao government troops in return for diplomatic silence on U.S. bombing of the trail. The North Vietnamese in turn increased their aid to the Lao Communist forces in northern Laos, committing thousands of their own men to keep Lao government troops pinned down safely away from the approaches to the trail and North Vietnam's border.

In the ensuing years, both Washington and Hanoi attempted to hide the degree of their involvement in Laos. The North Vietnamese have never acknowledged the presence of their troops in the country—now estimated to number about 20,000. The Americans, though feeling their aid was justified by North Vietnam's violation of the Geneva agreement, apparently felt it would be embarrassing to intervene openly while Hanoi continued to deny its role.

Though an effort as large as the U.S. war in Laos could not really be kept hidden, official secrecy was maintained for a long time. It was not until March, 1970, that President Nixon publicly acknowledged American aircraft were bombing Laos, though the facts had been known long before.

Few details

Though the bombing is now officially admitted, few details are made available. The number of missions each day, for example, is not disclosed, nor are weekly, monthly or even yearly totals. Presumably this is not for security reasons, since the Americans have for only 40 of the 10,000 North Vietnamese advisers in Laos withdrawn under International Control Commission supervision, though others may have faded across the border. The war quickly resumed, and so did American support.

It is known, though, that the bombing has been very heavy. In 1969-1970, a period in which most bombing of North Vietnam was suspended, the sortie rate over Laos was reported to have been 400 a day—a higher rate than has ever been reached over North Vietnam.

In the ground war, American Embassy officials, military attaches and Central Intelligence Agency personnel are deeply involved in war planning. The U.S. Embassy spokesman in Vientiane, gives a military briefing for correspondents at 11.30 every morning.

The briefings are quite detailed except on U.S. operations. Though the spokesman will often refer to air strikes, for example, he will not say whose planes were flying them.

All supplies

On the ground, the U.S. furnishes all the weapons, ammunition and supplies for the 59,000-man Royal Lao Army—which, despite the U.S. aid, still is regarded as poorly trained, badly led and largely ineffective except for defensive garrison duty.

The main American effort has been with the irregular units, originally organized, trained, paid and in many cases directed by the CIA. The irregular forces have grown to about 30,000 men, and many of them are only very loosely controlled by the Lao military command—a fact which is now giving some concern to the government and to U.S. officials looking ahead to a possible cease-fire.

The origins of the irregular forces are still shrouded in secrecy, but the information available suggests that the Americans did not intend, in the beginning, to create what has become a parallel army. The first units apparently were formed by the CIA to wage guerrilla warfare against the

Ho Chi Minh trail—an activity that might have embarrassed the Lao government, which has always regarded the war in Eastern Laos as the affair of the Americans and North Vietnamese.

An American official said, the ir-

regular units "just grew"—partly because many Americans felt the Royal Lao Army was simply too inept to be made into a capable fighting force.

"Has evolved"

"The situation has evolved," said an American officer, speaking of the formation of the irregular units. "and I'm not sure our policy has evolved along with it as it should have."

Along with the irregular units, the U.S. pays and equips battalions of "volunteers" from Thailand. Almost everything about the Thai units is classified, because both the Lao and Thai governments are sensitive on the subject. There are said to be about 12,000 Thai troops in the country now, almost double the number present a year ago.

Working with the Lao forces, according to the U.S. Embassy, are 320 U.S. advisers, which does not seem a large number but actually represents a far higher ratio of American advisers to local troops than has existed for years in South Vietnam.

It is not known how many Americans working for "the annex"—local slang for the CIA—are directly involved with military or paramilitary units.

Between 300 and 400 Americans provide logistical support for Lao forces, mostly through Air America, the CIA-financed charter airline that flies troops and supplies throughout the country. Air America's helicopters and transport planes, some of them with the company's insignia but most unmarked, can be seen at virtually every airstrip in Laos.

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The Marasco Story STATOTHR

Two Bullets End, Start Trouble

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(Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were involved in one of the major controversies of the Vietnam War in 1969 when accused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recalling events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public.)

By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer

Vietnamese triple-agent Thai Khac Chuyen was "ordered" assassinated by the Central Intelligence Agency in June 1969 because he knew too much about American relations with Prince Norodom Sihanouk who was admitting that the Communists were setting up base camps in Cambodia, Capt. Robert F. Marasco says.

This, plus the fact that the CIA learned Chuyen was a North Vietnamese agent, resulted in an order to Marasco and his men "to eliminate him."

"He (Chuyen) was more dangerous without a rifle than 100 men with rifles," Marasco told The Daily Journal. "He had the knowledge, intelligence and capability of killing many people.

"There was no difficult decision to make. It was one Vietnamese spy against possibly thousands of American GIs. There was no point for discussion."

Chuyen knew Marasco's units had photographic, communications and other intelligence equipment. More important, he also knew that Project Gamma was keeping close watch on the Cambodian

mercurial chief of state.

Sihanouk was at that time balancing the east against the west, attempting to maintain Cambodia's independence — and to steer his country clear of the Vietnam War. He did not succeed, however.

Hanoi, at that time, became more demanding in its dealings with Sihanouk as the Communists built up large base camps and underground arsenals in border areas.

"Prince Sihanouk has always contended that there were no VC or North Vietnamese in Cambodia and that Cambodia was not used as a refuge or as a supply route," Marasco said. "In 1969 Sihanouk was starting to come around. He was saying, 'yeah, well, there may be a few.'"

"We were about to send an American charge de-affairs to Cambodia because relations were improving," Marasco said.

Had Chuyen talked about intelligence operations in Cambodia to the North Vietnamese, "it might have affected relations with Prince Sihanouk.

"Chuyen also knew that Project Gamma was a unilateral operation and, did, in fact, inform South Vietnam about our highly classified operations," Marasco said.

Although the United States and South Vietnam were allies, the latter could not be trusted enough for involvement in Project Gamma, Marasco said.

"We wanted it to be successful," Marasco added. "It could not have been with all the politics and all the double agents we might have found as our bosses."

Marasco said Project Gamma had nine camps in

were directed to Laos, some to the border area and others to Cambodia.

"If we had the South Vietnamese in there with us," Marasco explained, "Project Gamma would have become just another worthless unit like so many others."

It was in April 1969 when Chuyen's triple identity came to light. The entire story, Marasco said, was never told.

"I had a split camp," he explained. "Myself and two men were in one camp. I had a sergeant, Alvin L. Smith Jr., who was at another location, setting up a team of Vietnamese and Cambodians of his own."

Chuyen was Smith's principal agent. Ultimately, Marasco relieved Smith and assumed total responsibility for the second camp or "net."

Prior to the actual takeover, however, Marasco said he handled Smith's net only in a supervisory capacity.

After an emergency leave to Florida when Smith's mother died, the sergeant was assigned to Nha Trang Special Forces headquarters. One day he was going through some

Second of 5 articles

captured photographs from another, unrelated operation.

One of the pictures, Marasco said, showed a known Viet Cong general standing with his arm around Chuyen, in a friendly manner.

Marasco was called from the field and, after a meeting, it was decided to "run a check" on Chuyen.

"We found that he had not gone through the normal processing before his

"Supposedly, it was hard to come up with enough appointments with the guy who ran the lie detector. . . it was tough to do it, so there was always an excuse as to why it hadn't been done."

As it turned out, it was discovered that Chuyen had been trained in North Vietnam "in the equivalent of our CIA." He had arrived from Hanoi in 1954.

During the early 1950's Ho Chi Minh had allowed great numbers of people to migrate to the south. Some of those who settled in various hamlets were, in fact, North Vietnamese agents who could be called upon at any time to perform a service.

Thus, it is possible that Chuyen was an "inactive" agent until 1968 when Hanoi "Tapped him" for espionage duties.

"Chuyen came to us highly recommended by the South Vietnamese," Marasco said. "When I took over Smith's net, Chuyen had already been established as a principal agent.

"We brought him to Nha Trang and eventually to Saigon for questioning," Marasco said. "This was all based on the photograph we had found. We put him through three lie detector examinations which he flunked miserably."

It was early June of 1969 when Chuyen's guise was discovered. Between the time Chuyen was brought from Nha Trang to Saigon, Marasco had gone home to New Jersey on emergency furlough.

"When my leave was up," he said, "I would have had only four weeks to serve in

HEROÏNE :

STATOTHR

LES POUR VOYEURS

STATOTHR

Michel R. Lamberti et Catherine Lamour ont fait le tour du monde pour remonter toutes les filières qui mènent aux vrais patrons de la drogue



« Si nous ne venons pas à bout de ce fléau, c'est lui qui viendra à bout de nous », s'exclamait, le 17 juin 1971, le président Nixon devant des dizaines de millions de téléspectateurs. Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste privilège de compter le plus grand nombre d'héroïnomanes du monde : plus d'un demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent mille pour la seule ville de New York. Plus de 50 % des crimes perpétrés dans les grandes villes sont directement liés à la drogue : on tue pour se procurer l'argent nécessaire à l'achat d'une dose d'héroïne.

Le phénomène n'est pas seulement américain : tous les pays européens voient croître à une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de leurs héroïnomanes. En France, où la pénétration de la drogue n'a été sensible qu'à partir de 1968, on en compte déjà vingt mille. Et le ministère de la Santé estime que le pays pourrait compter cent mille héroïnomanes en 1976.

Couper la source

La drogue n'est plus un simple problème de police. Partant du principe évident, exposé dernièrement à un journaliste américain de « U.S. News and World Report » par l'ancien directeur des Douanes américaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et selon lequel « on ne peut pas devenir toxicomane si l'on ne trouve pas de stupéfiants », Washington a décidé de remonter à la source, c'est-à-dire à la production même de l'opium, dont l'héroïne est un dérivé.

Couper la source d'approvisionnement des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les affaires des pays producteurs : de policière, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est devenue politique. Se posant une fois de plus en « gendarmes du monde » mais, cette fois, pour une cause dont personne ne songe à discuter le bien-fondé, les Etats-Unis se sont lancés dans une croisade que d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouée à l'échec.

On produit, en effet, chaque année, dans le monde, assez d'opium pour approvisionner les cinq cent mille héroïnomanes américains pendant cinquante ans : deux à trois mille tonnes, dont la moitié seulement est destinée à l'industrie pharmaceu-

tique. Le reste passe sur le marché entre les mains des trafiquants qui approvisionnent les fumeurs d'opium et les héroïnomanes.

Les trafiquants peuvent se fournir à deux sources différentes :

• 1) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est légale et contrôlée par l'Etat, mais où une partie de la récolte échappe aux autorités administratives.

• 2) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est en principe interdite, mais qui n'ont pas les moyens matériels et politiques — ou le désir — de faire respecter cette loi.

La Turquie, troisième producteur mondial, entrait dans la première catégorie. Jusqu'à ce que le gouvernement d'Ankara décide de proscrire la culture du pavot sur tout le territoire turc à partir de 1972, 25 % de la production d'opium était détournée vers le marché clandestin, alors qu'elle aurait dû, en principe, être entièrement achetée par l'Etat. Ce pays n'est pas le seul à connaître pareil problème, une enquête effectuée par le service stratégique des renseignements du Bureau des Narcotiques américain (B.N.D.D.) donnait, pour 1971, les chiffres suivants :

	Production (1) écoulee sur le marché licite	Production écoulee sur le marché clandestin
Turquie	150	35 à 50
Inde	1 200	250 .
Pakistan	6	175-200
Iran	150	?
U.R.S.S.	115	?
République populaire de Chine	100	?
Yougoslavie	0,83	1,7
Japon	5	—
Triangle d'or (Thaïlande - Birmanie - Laos)		750
Afghanistan		100-150
Mexique		5-15

(1) En tonnes.

Contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait penser, les « fuites » ne sont pas proportionnelles à l'importance de la production licite ni à celle des superficies cultivées

en pavot. Elles dépendent du plus ou moins grand sous-développement administratif du pays concerné et de la capacité des autorités locales à exercer un contrôle effectif sur les paysans, au moment des récoltes.

Pourtant, même des contrôles rigoureux ne suffisent pas à éviter les détournements, compte tenu de la différence de prix pratiqués sur le marché officiel et sur le marché clandestin. L'exemple de l'Inde le prouve, où, en dépit d'un système de contrôle gouvernemental cité en exemple par toutes les instances internationales, les fuites s'élèvent à 18 % de la production totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait échapper près de 70 % de sa production. Le Pakistan, enfin, qui produit légalement six tonnes d'opium, contribuerait pour près de deux cents tonnes à l'approvisionnement des trafiquants.

Le pavot partout

Dans une deuxième catégorie de pays la production de l'opium est illégale. n'existe évidemment aucun organisme d'Etat chargé de contrôler une production qui, en principe, n'existe pas. Clandestinement la récolte d'opium est entièrement écoulée sur le marché parallèle. Selon le B.N.D.D. ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent cinquante à mille tonnes à l'approvisionnement du trafic.

D'autres régions, sur lesquelles on possède absolument aucune information produisent de l'opium en quantité appréciable : le Népal et, probablement, la Syrie et le Kurdistan irakien. On signale aussi l'apparition de champs de pavots en Amérique du Sud. Contrairement à ce que l'on a souvent affirmé, la culture du pavot ne requiert pas de conditions géographiques ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle réclame seulement une main-d'œuvre abondante et un bon marché car la récolte demande beaucoup de soins et de minutie.

Nombre de pays qui ne sont pas producteurs traditionnels d'opium pourraient, s'ils le voulaient, se mettre à cultiver le pavot. C'est le cas tout récent du Japon. La production d'opium a, de ce fait, tendance à croître en fonction de la demande et pourrait encore augmenter considérablement. Des indices nombreux m

PYRRHIC PLOY

REMEMBER CAMBODIA?

E. W. PFEIFFER

Mr. Pfeiffer is professor of zoology at the University of Montana and a co-author of Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare in Indochina (Free Press/Macmillan). He visited Cambodia in 1969 and 1971 and was in Hanoi in 1970.

While on a visit to Hanoi in June 1970 my two companions and I met with Premier Pham Van Dong. During the conversation, I asked the Premier to evaluate Nixon's invasion of Cambodia which had occurred one month earlier. His answer was straightforward: "It makes things very favorable for the success of our revolution." By "our revolution" I supposed him to mean the revolution of the Indochinese people against foreign invaders.

How well does Premier Pham Van Dong's 1970 evaluation accord with the situation of Cambodia in late 1972? Recent dispatches from Indochina suggest that he knew what he was talking about. According to the A.P. (September 1), only one-third of Cambodia is still under "Khmer Republic" control. It has been revealed that the tanks used in the fall offensive against the An Loc area (only a short distance from Saigon) came from the Chup Rubber Plantation and nearby areas in Cambodia. These are the very areas that President Nixon characterized in April 1970 as "Communist sanctuaries" that must be cleaned out.

Two factors have been principally responsible for the failure of Nixon's Cambodian policies. First, the President was badly misinformed about past U.S.-Cambodian-Vietnamese relations and about the situation on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border prior to the March 1970 change in the Cambodian Government. For instance, in his speech of April 30, 1970, announcing the U.S. invasion of the Fishhook region of Cambodia, Mr. Nixon stated: "Tonight American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality." Mr. Nixon, standing in front of a map of Cambodia, put his finger on the little town of Mimot as he made this accusation. That puzzled me a great deal, for I had spent two days in and around Mimot about four months before the U.S. attack, and knew it to be controlled by French and Cambodian rubber interests. Many Europeans were working there, and some of them (e.g., a Belgian plant pathologist) were in complete sympathy with the American effort in South Vietnam. These Europeans were living with their wives and children in an environment of complete tranquillity. We asked many of them whether they had seen any sign of North Vietnamese or Vietcong activity and they all answered no.

My colleague A. H. Westing and I had visited the region to inspect the damage done by a clandestine defoliation raid carried out in April-May of 1969 over almost 200,000 acres of eastern Cambodia. According to a letter

I received some months later from Sen. Frank Church, the raid was carried out by Air America, a CIA airline, for what purposes we still do not know. After the raid, the Sihanouk regime asked that American officials visit the region, with a view to making reparations for the damage. Although the U.S. Government to this day officially denies having carried out this operation, it did send a team of experts, including Charles Minarik of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories, U.S. Army, into the Mimot region shortly after the raids. This team's report describes how they were flown over the region, driven through it, and how they walked in it—just as Westing and I did some months later. It is inconceivable to me that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, who according to Nixon controlled the area, would have permitted an official U.S. Government team to wander through what Nixon called "the headquarters for the entire Communist military operations in South Vietnam." After the invasion began it was widely reported that no key control center could be found. Some arms caches were reportedly uncovered and, of course, a great deal of rice. The rice did not greatly surprise me, since at the time we were there, the main occupation, in addition to tapping rubber, was harvesting rice.

When speaking about the Cambodian "Communist sanctuaries," Mr. Nixon failed to mention that, on orders of Prince Sihanouk, troops of the Royal Cambodian Army had in fact swept these areas about three months before his invasion. The troops were led by Prince Sirik Matak, a loyal American protégé and one of those later involved in Sihanouk's overthrow. Sihanouk ordered Matak to search out and destroy all Communist-Vietnamese positions in Cambodia. Paul Bennett of the Cambodian desk of the State Department informed me in an interview, March 22, 1971: "A Cambodian Army operation began in January of 1970 in a northeastern province at approximately the time when Sihanouk left for France and when Prince Sirik Matak was Acting Prime Minister. They sent up a number of additional battalions, among the better troops in the Cambodian Army, and carried out a series of small sweeps generally in this area. They did have, as I recall, a number of contacts with small V.C. and North Vietnamese units. They found and destroyed a number of small supply dumps, a relatively small campsite, but there was no major contact with the main North Vietnamese forces." Where were the thousands of North Vietnamese troops that Nixon said had occupied the area for five years?

Besides being mistaken about the nature of the so-called Communist sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia, Mr. Nixon grossly misrepresented the facts when he stated that "American policy since 1954 has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of Cambodia. . . . North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality." The defoliation of vast sections of the rubber plantations, mentioned above, was one blatant violation of

B52 Raids Called 'A Signal to Hanoi'

By EDITH M. LEDERER
Associated Press

SAIGON — U.S. B52 bombers continued their heaviest raids of the war over North Vietnam yesterday.

The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issued another statement condemning the bombing attacks, and American military sources indicated the raids were a signal to Hanoi that the United States will not stop its bombing below the 20th Parallel until a peace agreement is reached. The peace talks have gone into recess until Dec. 4.

U.S. officials disclosed that a second B52 was damaged in a surface-to-air missile attack last week that claimed the first B52 combat loss of the Vietnam war. None of the six crewmen on the damaged plane was injured but two of the six crewmen on the downed aircraft were hurt.

U.S. officials in Vientiane, Laos, also disclosed that an Air America C7 Caribou cargo plane flying in support of Laotian irregular forces, was shot down by enemy antiaircraft fire Thursday, killing two Americans, a Thai and a Lao. Air America is backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

10th Lost in 5 Days

The Air America plane was the 10th American aircraft lost in Indochina in five days, one of the heaviest tolls in several months. Six Americans were killed, 11 rescued and three are missing in the crashes.

As reports circulate in Paris of serious differences between U.S. and Hanoi negotiators, the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry said the B52 attacks "laid bare the deceitfulness of the Nixon administration's professed desire to end its military involvement and restore peace."

In South Vietnam, tens of thousands of marchers demonstrated along a 50-mile stretch of Highway 4 in an anti-Communist protest to show that the government is in control of the main road through the Mekong Delta.

The Air Force credited the pilot of the downed B52 with saving top-secret electronics equipment from falling into North Vietnamese hands.

The Air Force praised Capt. Norbert J. Ostrozny, 30, of Lackawanna, N.Y., for guiding the crippled bomber from North Vietnam into friendly territory before it crashed.

U.S. officials said a SAM missile exploded 150 feet off the right wing of Ostrozny's aircraft near the North Vietnamese port of Vinh. Fragments of the Soviet-built missile set two outboard engines afire. They fell off and the two inboard engines then failed, dooming the big aircraft.

The marchers carried flags and banners demanding that North Vietnamese troops get out of South Vietnam and declaring that "coalition with the Communists is suicide."

During the 24-hour period ending at noon yesterday, the U.S. command reported 14 more B52 missions against North Vietnamese targets below the 20th Parallel. Sources said that brought to more than 200 the number of missions against the North in the last

five days, the heaviest B52 raids of the war in the North.

The U.S. command said the attacks were centered on supply caches awaiting shipment to Laos and South Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese claim the Stratofortresses are bombing populated areas and causing heavy civilian casualties and damage.

President Nixon halted bombing above the 20th Parallel Oct. 23 in a move administration officials described as a good-will gesture following announcement of the draft cease-fire agreement.

Less than three weeks later, air strikes were intensified below the 20th Parallel to counter what American officials described as an intensive North Vietnamese supply buildup.

Heavy Ground Fighting

Since monsoon rains have sharply curtailed strikes by smaller fighter-bombers, the B52s have undertaken the burden of the bombing mission in North Vietnam's southern panhandle.

On the ground, heavy fighting continued in the central highlands 15 to 20 miles southwest of Pleiku City. Shellings were reported at Dalat in the highlands and at Cu Chi base camp 18 miles northwest of Saigon. No casualties were reported.

Enemy Military Leaders, to Show 'Respect,'

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE

Special to the New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Nov. 25

—There were ferris wheels and Charlie Chaplin movies and horse races and cancan dancers and a one-legged American stunt pilot to entertain both royalty and revolutionaries at the That Luang Fair.

The annual fair, which ended today, is a two-week festival just outside Vientiane, in which this little country's citizens gather to reaffirm their faith in Buddhism and fealty to the King.

It is also an occasion for spectacular displays of the kind of fraternizing between enemies that has led some outsiders over the years to conclude that the war in Laos is not to be taken seriously.

It was taken for granted this year that the Communist-led Pathet Lao delegation currently in Vientiane would join enemy military leaders of the Vientiane Government in prostrating themselves before King Savang

Vatthana, and the public was not disappointed.

Asked why the Pathet Lao had participated in the annual profession of loyalty to the King, their spokesman, Set Petrasy, replied:

"We participate in religious festivals because of our wish to show respect for the customs and religion of our country."

Nine nations contributed small pavilions to the fair this year, mainly to show photographs of life in those countries.

Bow to a King at a Fair in Laos

The French pavillion offered a juggling act and dancing the Soviet pavillion showed movies of World War II on an outdoor screen and the South Vietnamese displayed lacquerware, nuoc fish sauce and other products.

But as King Savang Vatthana and the royal entourage, accompanied by the Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, made the rounds of the pavilions, the first stop was at the relatively elaborate American pavilion.

Inside, there were movies of astronauts, recorded music and a model of Niagara Falls. The King paused politely before each exhibit as it was explained by Ambassador G. McMurtie Godley. The diplomatic corps that followed the King into the pavilion did not include the Russians or Chinese; they waited outside.

As the King emerged, the Americans treated him to a show that captured the attention of most of the tens of thousands of people on the fair grounds.

Roaring out of the sultry low overcast was a tiny white biplane that pulled up just over the King in a spectacular display of aerobatics.

The King, the crown prince and the Premier seemed to be enjoying the show, but for some of the spectators, the show was not without embarrassment.

Word was spread that the pilot of the plane was James H. Rhyne, a pilot of Air America, the quasi-military airline operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Civilian Advisory Corps Recruited in Saigon To Replace GIs Who Are Being Pulled Out

By JAMES McCARTNEY
From Our Washington Bureau

SAIGON. — An ad in the English-language Saigon Post Saturday read:

"NHA Inc. has an immediate requirement for 200 additional aircraft technicians ... due to contract expansion, and skills are needed NOW." At the bottom were the words: "U. S. citizens only."

The ad was one of the first open indications here of plans for an American civilian advisory corps to remain in South Vietnam after a ceasefire.

NHA INC. — one of the larger American contractors here — is seeking maintenance men for South Vietnamese aircraft, both fighter planes and helicopters.

The ad represented only a portion of the advisory corps' iceberg.

The United States is developing plans in many fields for advisers to maintain sophisticated equipment, run computers, supervise economic assistance — and a good deal more.

The force could easily surpass 10,000 — and that figure could be an underestimate.

"YOU CAN BET that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can do more for South Vietnam than just help out technically. They'll want 10,000 snake-eaters in here for sure," one source said.

A "snake-eater" in Saigon

military jargon is a member of the Green Berets, Army specialists in secret warfare.

The draft peace agreement negotiated by Henry Kissinger and the North Vietnamese in Paris calls for withdrawal of all U. S. military forces from Vietnam within 60 days, but says nothing about civilian advisers.

It does say that the United States will not "intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam."

AS NEARLY as can be discerned from various sources here, all of whom would prefer to talk of the advisory corps in whispers, the civilians would fall into at least three major categories:

—U. S. CONTRACT personnel, working for companies that sign up to do specific jobs, such as NHA's aircraft maintenance work.

—ADVISERS to the Saigon government in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces, from the Mekong Delta to the demilitarized zone.

—MEN TO KEEP an eye on the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of economic assistance that is expected to pour in here to help rebuild South Vietnam.

What all this adds up to is perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 contract people; 500 to 1,000 advisers, most of them outside Saigon; and a few thousand overseeing the spending of huge sums in American money.

COVERT MILITARY operations — perhaps in the pattern of Laos, where the CIA has been running the Laotian war for years — would be another possibility.

No one is willing to talk about that, and decisions may not yet have been made in Washington on a covert ballgame. Such decisions may be held back until U. S. officials determine whether Hanoi violates a ceasefire.

In Laos, plainclothes CIA military advisers have been attached to the U. S. Embassy in Vientiane as military attaches.

One big civilian contractor in Vietnam is Air America — a CIA-controlled airline which has played a key role in the Laotian War.

"THE BIGGEST contracts are going to fall in the area of maintenance and logistics," said one official.

"The South Vietnamese are going to need help in keeping our sophisticated equipment going. They do a pretty good job, overall, but there are just some things they can't yet do — at least do well enough."

In logistics, they'll need help primarily in running U. S. computers, to keep track of maintains of equipment and of military units. And they are used in intelligence work.

GOVERNMENT advisers will be organized along the lines of the present "CORDS," the U. S. "pacification" effort. (The initials stand for "Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.")

A U. S. officer said it will probably operate largely out of USIAD (U. S. Agency for International Development).

AID, headed by former Michigan State University president John A. Hannah, has been used as a cover for covert military operations in Laos — much to Hannah's distress.

CORDS has maintained advisers to South Vietnam's 44 province chiefs and to its 272 districts. If a ceasefire agreement is signed, plans call for continuing U. S. advisers at only the province level. Still, they would travel extensively.

CORDS has about 1,500 advisers in Vietnam. That number will probably be cut.

PRIMARY NEEDS in Vietnam, according to experts, will be in agricultural advice, public health and engineering.

New book delves into problem

Airline accused of shipping opium

By JIM MORRELL
For Pacific News Service

A doctoral candidate in Chinese History at Harvard University, Jim Morrell has previously written for scholarly journals in the Asian Studies field.

WASHINGTON, D.C. — "It's a damned lie. You can say THAT!" We were asking Arthur Berry Richardson of New York, about reports that his airline, Air America, was one of the biggest opium shippers in the world. "We've discussed them at our board meeting, these scurrilous articles. There's no substance to them."

Last month Harper & Row published Alfred McCoy's long-awaited book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." The heavily documented book is based on some 240 interviews with CIA agents, Bureau of Narcotics officials, top Laotian military commandes, and opium-growing Meo tribesmen. And it presented striking evidence that Air America has been flying Meo-grown opium out of north- and northeast Laos ever since 1965.

When asked specifically about McCoy's interviews with the Meo opium farmers whose harvest was flown out on Air America, all Arthur Richardson would say was: "Some guy thinks he's clever. Just take my word for it. Goodbye!"

Interviews with the publicity-shy directors of Air America tend to be brief but emotional affairs. For years Air America, the CIA's "private" charter airline in Southeast Asia, has indignantly denied any involvement in the Southeast Asian heroin traffic. This year, though, fewer people than ever seem inclined to take their word for it.

MOTTO IS NO IDLE BOAST

Air America's motto is "Anything, Anytime, Anywhere — Professionally" and it is no idle boast. From dusty airstrips in the Meo hill country they have been airlifting the raw opium to laboratories in Long Chieng or Vietnam where it is refined into No. 4 heroin (90 to 99 per cent pure), then smuggled abroad by Corsican gangsters or Laotian diplomats for ultimate disposal in U.S. markets.

The Opium Trail leads from the poppy fields of the Southeast Asian "Fertile Triangle" (of Burma, Thailand, and Laos which now produce over 70 per cent of the world's opium supply) to Saigon, Hong Kong, or Marseilles, and then right to the waiting arms of America's estimated one million heroin users.

In separate interviews, Laotian Gens. Ouane Rattikone and Thao Ma both told McCoy that Air America began flying opium to markets in Long Chieng

Rattikone was until last year owner of the largest heroin refinery in Southeast Asia. Gen. Thao Ma is former commander of the Laotian Air Force.

After several more interviews in Vientiane, McCoy told us he took a bus out of Luang Prabang, hitched a ride in a government truck and, when the road gave out, started hiking over the mountains. By nightfall he reached a small village, spending a sleepless night under a thin thatched roof.

"There was always the sound of a plane somewhere," he said. "Sometimes it was far away and sometimes it seemed right overhead. And every so often you would hear the sound of its mini-guns going off—600 rounds a minute at who knows what, anything that sets off its infrared detectors, anything that moves or breathes or gives off warmth."

The next morning McCoy and an interpreter walked down from the mist-enveloped mountains into the village of Long Pot, 10 miles west of the Plain of Jars. There, under the shadow of 6,200-foot Mt. Phou Phachau, which dominates the entire district, McCoy had reached the head of the Opium Trail.

TRADITION OF POLITICAL POWER

The village of Long Pot is a Meo community of 47 wooden dirt-floored houses. It is one of 12 Meo and Lao Theung villages that make up Long Pot District. One of the oldest Meo villages in Northeast Laos, it has a tradition of political power and is the home of District Officer Ger Su Yang. According to Ger Su Yang, the village households produce 15 kilos (33 pounds) of opium a piece. They are guaranteed an adequate food supply by Air America rice drops.

In return, officers of the CIA's "clandestine army" (led by the Meo Chieftain Vang Pao) pay them a high price for the opium. The source of Vang Pao's money, of course, is the CIA.

Long Pot is one of the few remaining areas in Northeast Laos where opium history can still be observed: close enough to Long Chieng still to be controlled by Vang Pao but far enough to escape the fighting. The Meo tribesmen's only cash crop is opium, and the CIA's deal with Vang Pao, badly put, comes to this: you send us soldiers and we'll buy your opium.

The 47 households' harvest of 700 kilos of opium will yield 70 kilos of pure morphine base after it has been boiled, processed and pressed into bricks. Then further processed in one of the region's seven heroin labs, the Long Pot harvest will yield 70 kilos of No. 4 heroin. Worth \$500 to the villagers of Long Pot, it will bring \$225,000 on the streets of New York or San Francisco.

Formerly Long Pot's opium harvest was bought up by merchant caravans, but these

replaced by pony caravans of Vang Pao's men. But the 1969, 1970 and 1971 opium harvests were flown out in Air America UH-1H "Huey" helicopters.

RENDEZVOUS IS DESCRIBED

District Officer Ger Su Yang described the rendezvous with Air America: "Meo officers with three or four stripes (captain or major) came from Long Chieng to buy our opium. They came in American helicopters, perhaps two or three men at a time. The helicopter leaves them here for a few days and they walk to villages over there (swinging his arm in a semi-circle in the direction of Gier Goot, Long Makkhay and Nam Pac), then come back here and radio Long Chieng to send another helicopter for them. They take the opium back to Long Chieng." The pilots were always Americans and the Meo army traders did the buying.

The head man of Nam Ou, a Lao Theung village four miles north of Long Pot, confirmed the district officer's account. In 1969 and 1970 Meo officers helicoptered into Tan Son village hiked to Nam Ou, and purchased the opium harvest, then continued on their way to Nam Suk and Long Pot.

The harvest of 1971 may well have been Long Pot's last. In return for the rice drops and opium purchases, Vang Pao and the CIA kept demanding soldiers. USAID (United States Agency for International Development) built a school in the village, and "Mr. Pop" (Edgar Buell, then the CIA's chief operative in Laos) had high hopes for the place, but in 1970 Vang Pao demanded that all the young men in the village including 15 year-olds join his army fighting the Pathet Lao. Ger Su Yang complied and they were flown away by Air America helicopters in late 1970.

But reports of heavy casualties came in and the village refused to send more. Ger Su Yang described what happened next: "The Americans in Long Chieng said I must send all the rest of our men. But I refused. So they stopped dropping rice to us. The last rice drop was in February this year."

ANSWER TO THE VILLAGERS

Fight or starve — this was the CIA's answer to the villagers of Long Pot. Air America flew the villagers's young men away to fight and returned their corpses to the village — professionally wrapped in sanitary plastic bags.

For the CIA the Meos offered a convenient instrument for keeping alive their war in Laos, but for the Meos their alliance with the CIA and Air America has only brought disaster. They have been decimated and the survivors have fled the hills for the refugee camps around Long Chieng.

Long Pot's 1972 opium harvest was destroyed when "allied" fighters napalmed the village and three nearby Lao Theung villages. And Vietnam's National Liberation Front reported that on Jan. 10, 1972, units of the Lao People's Liberation Army took Long Pot.

Because of the fighting, in fact, Laos will only account for a fraction of Southeast Asia's estimated 1,000-ton 1972 harvest, and Air America may be shipping more dead bodies than opium this year.

Revelations like these in McCoy's book made the CIA so nervous that they contacted the publisher and insisted on a prior review, an unprecedented move. After considerable arm-twisting, Harper & Row reluctantly agreed, but found the CIA's critique of the book unimpressive and went ahead with publication anyway.

Since the CIA is Air America's major contractor, the trail of responsibility leads directly to the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. It neatly undercuts all the "law and order" statements flowing from the White

Nixon adopts Thieu stand

Daily World Combined Services

The U.S. has assured Saigon puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu it will not sign any agreement allowing South Vietnam's patriotic forces any participation in governing the country, United Press International said yesterday.

The Nixon Administration move was the latest in maneuvers to back out of the agreement reached Oct. 8 with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and in effect was the equivalent of Thieu's rejection of a coalition government.

Reports from the Pentagon yesterday stated that the U.S. is rushing hundreds of new warplanes to Thieu's forces, while UPI newsmen Walter Logan quoted a high-ranking U.S. Army officer in New York as revealing that U.S. advisers would remain in South Vietnam even if all U.S. troops are withdrawn.

Logan's story follows:

By WALTER LOGAN

NEW YORK, Nov. 3 (UPI) — A cease-fire in Vietnam will not end the American presence there, even if all U.S. troops are withdrawn, a high ranking U.S. Army officer told UPI today.

The officer, himself a veteran of the Vietnamese army training program, said a large group of civilian advisers would remain after the cease-fire to aid the South Vietnamese armed forces but that the advisory group would consist largely of a brain trust of young West Point graduates working as an unofficial joint chiefs of staff.

The officer said the first of

these civilian advisers already had arrived in Saigon and were consulting with U.S. officers and South Vietnamese military officials on the future program.

The program would amount to a continuation of the Vietnamization program but with the American civilians advising the South Vietnamese command not only on warfare techniques but on training programs for the South Vietnamese armed forces, the officer said.

The program would, in effect, put the United States back where it started in South Vietnam. In the early days of American involvement in Vietnam in 1950 there was only a handful of military advisers.

The advisory group in South Vietnam would to a large extent resemble the program carried out in the "secret war" in Laos and to a lesser extent in Cambodia, the officer said. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) trained and equipped the army of Maj. Gen. Yang Pao, Meo hill tribesmen who operated out of a once secret base at Long Tieng.

The CIA-financed group in Laos even has its own airline, Air

America, and such an arrangement presumably could be used in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

In recent years West Point graduates expert in training programs and still in the U.S. military service, carried out widespread officer training programs in South Vietnam in hopes the South Vietnamese eventually would be able to handle their own training programs on warfare geared to American weapons.

U.S. military advisers also accompanied South Vietnamese Units in the field and worked directly with the troops, a practice that tapered off. Some advisers are still working with the South Vietnamese, the Army officer said.

The officer was mainly concerned with the South Vietnamese Army but said there presumably would be similar programs of advising the South Vietnamese Air Force and Navy. None of the training programs were mentioned in the cease-fire agreement worked out by Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger and the North Vietnamese.

29 Oct 1972

STATOTHR

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An American who once picked the targets tells How we ran the secret air war in Laos

By Seymour M. Hersh

Seymour M. Hersh is a member of The Times's Washington bureau. His latest book is "Cover-Up: The Army's Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4."

Jerome J. Brown could easily be mistaken for a typical American businessman living abroad. He's 30 years old, slightly beefy, profane and constantly wears oversized sunglasses. He's now a partner in a management consulting firm headquartered in Malaysia, where he lives with his Indonesian wife and their young son.

Brown has been in Southeast Asia less than seven years, but he knows it extremely well. He should. He was once in charge of bombing parts of it.

For 18 months, beginning in early 1967, Capt. Jerry Brown operated covertly as the chief Air Force targeting official for the secret air war in Laos. He was assigned to Project 404, a still-classified bombing operation personally controlled by the American Ambassador to Laos. And for more than a year before his assignment to Laos, Brown — then a lieutenant — worked as a highly trained photo-intelligence specialist for the Seventh Air Force in Saigon. Later in his career, he was assigned the key job of writing intelligence manuals for Southeast Asia reconnaissance operations.

Because of the secrecy, Captain Brown never wore his uniform in Vientiane, Laos's capital. He dressed instead in another uniform: business suit, white shirt and tie, and he carried papers identifying him as an employe of the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). He worked in an unmarked building in the center of the city, along with more than 100 other Air Force and Army attachés who were also clandestinely assigned. His job was a remarkable one for a junior Air Force officer—picking targets for a secret bombing war carried out under the direction of the American Ambassador.

Captain Brown left the Air Force in late 1968 and began his business consulting career in Malaysia, but he kept in touch with former colleagues and with the air war. On a recent business trip to the United States—only his second visit since 1968—the former officer agreed to a wide-ranging interview, in violation of his agreement not to disclose classified materials. It was the first time

that an insider has publicly discussed the "secret war."

That war has evolved into a steady procession of rainy-season offensives by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. The other side has gained steadily and now controls at least two-thirds of the territory and about half of the three million population of Laos. In essence, the United States' mission in Laos is still the same as it was five years ago, when Captain Brown first reported for duty in Vientiane. Bombing wasn't working militarily in Laos or in North Vietnam then, and—according to recently published United States intelligence estimates—it still has failed to slow down the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese operations, despite causing widespread damage and many deaths in both North Vietnam and Laos.

There was little in Brown's background to suggest he would become a maverick. A number of his former colleagues and superiors, while reluctant to discuss specifics, had high praise for him. "He's a very respectable guy in our business," one high-ranking Air Force intelligence officer said at the Pentagon. Another officer said simply, "He's credible." And another privately confirmed many of Brown's facts and specific recollections.

Brown was born in Newark and attended the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minn., earning a bachelor's degree in 1964. His family, moderately wealthy, now lives in Wilmette, Ill., a high-income suburb of Chicago. Brown's biggest passions, before Vietnam, were golf, baseball and a sports car his father bought him for his 17th birthday.

"When I first came back to the States in 1970," he said, "I wasn't ready to sit down and talk. I don't care now. I think the country's ready for it. Something has to be done."

Brown is convinced that what was wrong with the air war in the nineteen-sixties is still wrong. "The bombing can't work and the senior air officers would never totally present the picture as it really was. The politicians and the ambassadors and the Presidents are continually being lied to," Brown said during the interview, which took place at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York.

He described what he said were the two most important "myths" about the air war: "One, that bombing is accurate" and two, "that when it's accurate it totally destroys targets, which it doesn't."

He cited a number of examples that demonstrated, he said, that the North Vietnamese—despite the heavier bombing and improved reconnaissance technology of the nineteen-seventies—were capable of coping. Among them: their ability to move scores of Russian-built tanks without detection down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the months before the North Vietnamese offensive this April. The tanks were deployed around the province capital of Anloc, which was later besieged.

"Even the laser bomb can't make a difference," Brown said. "It's an agrarian society. We can knock out a bridge at Thanhhoa [in North Vietnam] and they'll go down river 10 miles and ford it there. We can knock out all the electricity and they'll burn wood. We can mine Haiphong Harbor and they'll send material from other parts of the country by the TOL [petroleum, oil and lubricants]

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continued

LIFE BOOK REVIEW

A packet of
high-quality heroin

The book the CIA couldn't put down

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

by ALFRED W. MCCOY (Harper & Row) \$10.95

One cool, clear January morning in 1970, I journeyed upward through the jungle-covered hills on the Thai-Burma border to interview a contingent of the Kokang Revolutionary Force, a band of Burmese guerrillas, about their revolt against the government in Rangoon. The talk around the campfire that day was not of revolutionary struggle, however, but of smuggling opium. And their chief worry was not the Burmese army but the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese whose gear-wheel flag could be seen floating over Thai territory on the next mountaintop.

Even as recently as 1970 the muddled politics of the opium-growing hill tribes and the American agents who operate among them like white gods seemed the stuff of Eric Ambler novels, a problem for Asians perhaps but not a big worry for Americans. But even then the pure heroin refined from Southeast Asian opium was finding its way into the bloodstreams of American GIs. The infection now shows every sign of following them home.

Alfred McCoy, a 27-year-old Yale Ph.D. candidate, has spent the last two years unraveling this complex situation. It is his thesis that Southeast Asia is rapidly replacing Turkey as the main source of heroin in the U.S. By supporting the very people who are most involved in the trade, moreover, our government has itself become involved in the passage of opium as "simply an inadvertent consequence of its Cold War tactics."

The CIA has given a boost to the book's sales by foolishly asking to read the manuscript before publication. The CIA's lawyers said the book "could create an accepted myth that the CIA has been involved in the drug traffic." Yet their written criticism of the manuscript seemed pathetically thin. For example, the CIA denied any "substantial" contact with the Nationalist Chinese forces in Southeast Asia after 1951. But McCoy puts his sources, including a former CIA operative, on the record to the contrary. The debate breaks down over the meaning of the word "substantial." Again, the CIA denies that Air

America, the CIA contract airline in Laos, carries opium. But Air America pilots are contract soldiers of fortune, and, in the bars of Vientiane, they often admitted to it.

One should remember, however, that opium-growing has long been a way of life to the hill tribes, and as such is neither illegal nor immoral. Once the political decision was made to arm the tribesmen in the anti-Communist cause it became inevitable that the agency would become at least tangentially involved in opium. Ironically, the CIA-based clandestine Meo army have been all but run out of the opium-growing areas of northeast Laos.

The book is much more than an exposé of CIA activities, however. McCoy lays out the whole history of the opium trade, going back to colonial and precolonial times, and explains in detail how the system works today. But though he paints a clear picture of governmental corruption in our client states and of the political vacuum in northern Burma, where most of the world's opium grows, it is still difficult to accept his conclusion—that the answer to the problem lies not in curing addiction at home or in smashing the syndicates, but in eradicating production in Southeast Asia. "The American people will have to choose between supporting doggedly anti-Communist governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of their high schools," he concludes.

Unfortunately, the long history of our involvement in Southeast Asia has shown that we seldom have the leverage over our clients required to impose this kind of solution. It is questionable whether even the most intensive economic or diplomatic pressure could completely cut out the deeply ingrown opium business from that region. And if not Southeast Asia, are there not other fields in which poppies can grow? If we have found we cannot be the world's policeman, can we hope to become the world's nare?

by H.D.S. Greenway

Mr. Greenway is a former chief of TIME's Bangkok bureau.

LIBERATION FORCES STRENGTHENED IN LAOS

STATOTHR

By Richard E. Ward

In Laos the Nixon doctrine of using bombs and dollars to support reactionary forces is suffering serious setbacks.

The bombs which primarily kill and maim civilians have not been able to stop or blunt the liberation forces led by the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao). And sharply increased U.S. military aid to its mercenaries in Laos has not been able to raise the morale of these forces still experiencing heavy losses annually, especially in recent years.

Once the pro-U.S. mercenary force of 30,000, directed and financed by the CIA, consisted almost entirely of Lao minorities, mainly Meo, led by the Meo Gen. Vang Pao. Now after a decade of operations the Meos have been bled white in the service of the U.S. and no amount of money can replenish their ranks in Vang Pao's forces. The CIA has had to turn to other minorities and to "volunteers" from the military forces of Thailand to fight for the U.S. in Laos.

Thai troops now constitute the majority of Vang Pao's secret army which operates virtually independent of the Vientiane government. Their orders come from the U.S. embassy and in particular from ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, who relishes informal titles like field marshal and procounsel given to him by the press.

Offensive bogged down

Vang Pao's mercenary troops are now engaged in their annual offensive. This drive, which began in mid-August, is reportedly bogged down and being turned back by the Pathet Lao earlier than ever before, even during the present rainy season when virtually all advantages are with the pro-U.S. forces.

The main CIA-backed operations customarily begin during the rainy season because during that period ground transportation, the only means available to liberation forces, is extremely difficult at best and in some regions even impossible. While the liberation forces must fight under this disadvantage, the CIA's mercenaries have U.S. aircraft providing transport and logistical support as well as tactical and strategic bombing support.

But despite these advantages, Vang Pao's troops are engaged in what is probably their weakest offensive ever. Starting from Long Cheng, the once top-secret CIA base, Vang Pao's troops have moved against the Plain of Jars. Detailed information has been entirely withheld from the press, an indication that the drive is failing, which is the conclusion of few assessments made by Western press sources.

In a report in the Sept. 23 Far Eastern Economic Review, D.E. Ronk, writing from Vientiane, noted the disparity between official U.S. claims that Vang Pao was making satisfactory progress and the reality "that (progress) if any . . . is being made at a snail's pace."

Ronk adds that Vang Pao's forces scattered around the edges of the Plain of Jars are being hit hard, while "progress toward the plain itself has been slow, to say the least; probably it has now stopped." As for the near future Ronk, an experienced observer in Laos, writes:

Precarious hold

"Most observers in Vientiane, including military men, are concerned for the safety of Long Cheng while Vang Pao's best troops are on the offensive. Long Cheng's defenses are being manned by Thai troops and mercenaries, but they are being pushed back by Communist forces. . . . This year, Vang Pao's grip on the Long Cheng-Sam Thong defense line is precarious, at best, with most of the outer line ten miles north and northeast of the base in Com-

munist hands. Few in Vientiane would be surprised if the Communists managed to sweep Long Cheng-Sam Thong into their control before the end of the current rains, then turned on Vang Pao's isolated forces around the plain 20 miles to the northeast."

Last winter, liberation forces mounted a three-month siege of Long Cheng during which the CIA-mercenary base was evacuated for a period. The siege was maintained in the face of unprecedented U.S. bombing and despite wide deployment of Thai troops who suffered heavy casualties. The heavy losses taken by the reactionary troops, including Vang Pao's Meo forces, has caused serious morale problems among all their elements.

For leading the Meo into disasters year after year, the CIA and

Vang Pao are meeting increasing resistance to recruiting among the relatively few able-bodied potential soldiers left among the Meo, who once readily took up arms for relatively high mercenary wages in impoverished Laos. Those still in uniforms are, according to the New York Times correspondent Fox Butterfield, "bedeviled by exhaustion after many years of war. . . ."

Butterfield, in a Sept. 27 dispatch, confirms the dismal outlook for the pro-U.S. forces in a report sent from the Long Cheng headquarters at Vang Pao. Although the general appeared "energetic," Butterfield states that his troops are "reportedly exhausted by last spring's fighting and afraid of the Communists' newly introduced 130-mm long-range guns."

One feature of the current fighting is that the liberation forces did not fall back during the rainy season, leaving many units in place. In past years, Vang Pao's advances and "victories" were generally achieved with virtually no opposing forces on the scene and his forces could entrench themselves before having to face the liberation troops.

Fill the breach

It is doubtful that Thai forces will be able to fill the breach of the depleted ranks of Vang Pao's troops. The U.S. is currently spending at least \$100 million to support Thai troops in Laos, but despite their mercenary wages of many times the pay of regular Thai troops, the heavy fighting has reportedly dampened their enthusiasm. One indicator of this is a 30 percent desertion rate among Thai troops in Laos.

Secrecy still enshrouds many aspects of U.S. operations in Laos, apparently in order to disguise violation of Congressional restrictions. Congress has prohibited the U.S. from financing mercenaries recruited outside Laos. The Nixon administration sidestepped that barrier by calling the Thai troops and airmen in Laos "volunteers." The Thai government denies any role although it allows recruiting from the regular armed services and supplies Thai officers to command the CIA units in Laos. The charade is maintained by giving the Thais Laotian names and Laotian military identification cards.

In a preface to a Senate Foreign relations committee report issued in May, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) observed that the administration was violating the Congressional ban on the use of Thai troops in Laos. He said that Congress had virtually no control over CIA programs, in part, because of Congressional abdication of responsibility as well as because of administration furtiveness.

"It is a fact," stated Symington, "that not only the American people, but even the proper committees of Congress, have not been given much detail of our use of Thai irregulars in Laos. . . . This is a fact. . . . The use of Thai irregulars in Laos is a costly business of dollars of appropriated monies are involved."

continued

THE CALM IN THE EYE OF A STORM

Houei Sai: Air America-US AID base operations at the airport here waggishly identifies itself as "Houei Sai International." But on detailed maps of Laos the only maps on which it appears — this place is still shown as "Ban Houei Sai" — a village. Today Houei Sai is both village and international settlement, and many other things besides: regional supply centre, Mekong River port, customs and immigration point, tourist by-road and, according to the grapevine, headquarters for a substantial spy network.


Houa Khong Province, in which Houei Sai is located, is no stranger to flux or intrigue. Bordered on the northeast by China (Yunnan), on the west and southwest by Burma and on the southeast by Thailand, the province has been the home in recent centuries of a large number of tribal peoples pressed generally southward. Its hills, for example, have provided subsistence to increasing numbers of Sinitic peoples including Yao, Lahu, Ikau and various Miao groups who have entered Laos through Yunnan — or indirectly, through Burma — in the past 150 years. Its valleys have sheltered lowland groups such as the Thai Dom and the Lue peoples.

Yet Houei Sai itself seems an unlikely candidate for international notoriety. Situated on the Mekong in the southernmost corner of the province, its only road link with the rest of Laos — even when the country was nominally united — was through the capital at Louang Nam Tha. In recent years, approximately two-thirds of the province including Nam Tha has been firmly in the hands of the Pathet Lao; today, Pathet Lao or Thai communists (or both) exercise control over Mekong River traffic east and southwest from Pekbeng. Houei Sai thus is completely cut off from surface contact with the rest of the country. As a consequence, while postal communications and some urgent supplies reach here from Vientiane by air, the principal supply route is through Thailand. In fact, with Thai-Laotian border controls extra strict, the few on the Laotian side of the river find it a sim-

ple matter to do their trading in Thailand, at Chieng Khong or Chieng Rai. And most transactions here seem to be in baht, not in Loatian kip.

Paradoxically, the war, which completed Houei Sai's isolation from the rest of Laos, has also raised its importance — if not to Laos itself at least to the Americans. US concern with Peking's assistance to Hanoi and to the other communist forces in Indochina undoubtedly led Washington several years ago to undertake surveillance of Chinese activities in Yunnan. (The Chinese-built road from Yunnan to Muong Sai and from Muong Sai to Pakbeng — and ultimately, it would seem, to the Thai border — is evidence of China's similar concern with developments in the region.) Because of its proximity to China and also its minority groups with Yunnan ties, Houa Khong was a "logical" base for espionage activities directed at the Yun Ching area. And for security and strategic reasons, Houei Sai, with its ready access to northern Thailand, offered the only reasonable centre from which to operate the multiple activities that make up the intelligence operation in northern Laos.

The changes in the international political situation have produced some changes here (although fewer than one might expect). Since the partial rapprochement early this year, Washington has been under some compulsion to avoid the kind of espionage activities within China that it once might have undertaken; at the same time, it has less reason for concern regarding developments at the border. On the other hand, there are large numbers of Chinese — a recent estimate said 20,000 — currently engaged in building a road not far east of Houei Sai.



When completed, this road could well sever this area permanently from the rest of Laos.

For reasons that are not hard to conjecture, the US has made no attempt to interrupt the construction of the road. But it is intensely aware of the Chinese presence here in northern Laos. Whether or not the US mission continues to send spies into Yunnan, it is certain that it continues to collect intelligence on Chinese and North Vietnamese activities here.

The Yao people, many of whom are fluent in the Haw dialect and whose written language utilises Chinese ideographs, have been employed most frequently to gather information on the Yunnanese. But it is probable that all of the tribal peoples and particularly those classed as refugees have been used as informers to some degree. Even Houei Sai's small colony of Lahu, who come from Burma, owe their new houses and their air of prosperity, we are told, to their diligence in passing information to the Americans.

The presence of a significant number of tourists passing through Houei Sai seems to support the claim that the immediate area is quite secure. (These are generally students and other young people en route from Luang Prabang to Chieng Rai — either through Chieng Khong, directly across the Mekong, or via Chieng Saen, five hours up-river by boat and almost on the Burma border.) But there is another aspect to the security picture here. As the tourist traffic indicates, the major highways between here and Chieng Rai have not been seriously threatened. In June, however, both Chieng Khong district and Chieng Kham to the south were declared sensitive areas by the Thai Communist Suppression Operations Command and hill peoples in the region ordered to move out. At the same time, military operations against Thai insurgents were stepped up. In many ways, Houei Sai's calm today, it seems, could be equated with that in the eye of a storm.

It is doubtful that the Vientiane Government is much concerned with Houei Sai today. (Concerning its economic potentialities, one AID official says cynically: "The French took the wrong side of the river.") It has bigger problems, much closer to Vientiane. For the Americans, the Thais and SEATO, however, Houei Sai is in a critical

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VIENTIANE, Laos — Still savoring his cigar after a three-course luncheon washed down with French wines, G. McMurtrie Godley answered the telephone, postponed his tennis game, dashed to his sedan and was driven off at top speed.

"Wheatburner 50 to Wheatburner Base," he intoned into the car's radio-telephone, "heading for airport — ten-four." The rush mission of American Ambassador Godley on an otherwise sleepy recent afternoon in the Laotian capital turned out to be a false alarm of sorts. There was just a chance that three captured American pilots North Vietnam had agreed to release might be on board the regular weekly Aero-flot flight which was arriving from Hanoi ahead of schedule. And "Mac" Godley wanted to be on hand just in case the men accepted his personal suggestion they disembark and accept U.S. government transportation home rather than continue in the company of their antiwar chaperones.

While Russians in sports shirts and North Vietnamese in pith helmets and business suits streamed off the Ilyushin 18, Godley saw that the pilots were not among the passengers, got back into the car and headed home to change for tennis. "Forty-five minutes is about all the tennis I can take in this age anyway."

At 55, Godley has been going at this pace for more than three years in Laos and, for that matter, ever since he graduated from Yale, class of '39. Part proconsul, part traditional striped-pants diplomat and part general, Godley personally directs the no longer quite so secret American war in Laos — and loves every minute of it.

He has no doubts about his job or how to carry it out even though his critics suspect he is more Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's man in Vientiane than Secretary of State William Rogers. "Call me field marshal if it makes you feel better," he is inclined to say. "I don't care. But please note I've got no troops."

"Uncle Sugar"

INVOLVED in undercover work since World War II when he dealt with American prisoner of war problems while based in Switzerland, one of the first U.S. diplomats to work closely with the military, activist ambassador to the Congo during the "Simba" revolt in 1964, Godley believes in the American world mission in uncomplicated terms uncomfortable to more doubting Americans.

So big and burly that Congolese called him "The Bear that Walks Like a Man" when he was ambassador in Leopoldville, Godley says, "I think I've had the very best of the U.S. Foreign Service" and "if I end up being the fall guy I couldn't care less."

"They weren't ten deep for the Laos assignment, but I just pinch myself daily when I think I'm being paid for doing this."

—G. McMurtrie Godley

Our Man

In Vientiane

By Jonathan C. Randal

Washington Post Foreign Service

Godley is given to pithy, direct language of a nature which an earlier age would not have found repeatable in mixed company. Pure product of the Cold War in warm climates, he invariably refers to the United States as "Uncle Sugar," a sobriquet reflecting the persuasiveness of American power in underdeveloped countries.

Even with a staff of 1,000 diplomatic, military and CIA men, as ambassador to this Oregon-sized country Godley has his hands full:

- Requesting and approving all American air strikes against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops—who numbered over 100,000 just before the Easter invasion of South Vietnam—in northern Laos and along the Ho Chi Minh supply trails leading south to Cambodia and South Vietnam.

- Directing CIA military operations and the activities of some 230 military attaches whose tasks include supplying arms and ammunition to the Royal Lao army, Meo tribesmen and Thai volunteers in the Plain of Jars north of Vientiane and in the southern Laos panhandle.

- Keeping able neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma in office despite repeated right-wing efforts to dislodge him, to ensure that the tatty facade on the 1962 accords remains intact for another effort to neutralize Laos in the event of an Indochina-wide peace settlement, a task even the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao representatives here privately concede he performed brilliantly in the past month.

- Maintaining the precarious and artificial Laotian economy within the limits of a congressional aid ceiling of

\$350 million annually, a far from easy task since most of the money goes for military spending. Indeed, the annual threat of the fall of the CIA's base at Long Cheng on the Plain of Jars is feared less than the economic crisis reflected by the fall in value of the Laotian kip from 500 to 800 to the dollar in the past year.

Dropping the Veils

FOR MOST of Godley's first year as ambassador, and indeed since the 1962 Geneva accords were broken first by North Vietnam and then by the United States, American military involvement was kept as secret as possible. But in the past year or so, Washington has progressively dropped the principal fiction imposed by the Geneva accords which set up the tripartite right-wing, neutralist and left-wing government under big power auspices: a promise to avoid any foreign military establishment in Laos except for a small French training mission.

As early as 1964, the United States was deeply committed to the Souvanna Phouma government, providing aid, a stabilization fund for the kip and military help. In return, Souvanna Phouma allowed the United States to bomb North Vietnamese positions on the strength of a verbal understanding which even now remains the only basis for American military operations here.

In March, 1970, President Nixon started lifting the secrecy after a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee headed by Stuart Symington held hearings on Laos as part of its investigation of U.S. commitments abroad. Whatever major mystery was left disappeared last December when U.S. officials announced the discovery of Long Cheng, headquarters of Gen. Vang

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continued

Oct 1972

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Friday, June 2, 1972
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THE WASHINGTON POST

General Linked Thieu, Ky To Drug Ring In S. Vietnam

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Linked to
Drug Trade
WASHINGTON (AP)

Saigon Leaders Linked to Heroin

LAWRENCE L. KNUTSON
Associated Press

Pepsi-Cola Plant Used As Front

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heroin traffic in southeast asia

To judge from yet another study of the uncommonly unpleasant subject, there seems to be about as much chance of getting the drug business out of Indochina as there is of getting the officials of Indochina out of the drug business.

The prospects for reform are seemingly limited—at a time when the U. S. military is having mixed results in trying to detoxify addicted American GIs—and the situation is one more deadly, degrading element associated with U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia.

Some of the latest facts have been presented by Yale graduate student Al-

fred W. McCoy, who testified before a Senate foreign aid appropriations subcommittee that a flourishing narcotics trade in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand is carried on with the direct, active support of the highest government officials—and that U. S. officials make virtually no effort to intervene.

Perhaps such attempts would be ineffectual. The "Vietnamization" of the drug trade may be out of our hands as long as we remain resolved to "see it through with Thieu."

NEW YORK POST, 6/3/72

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THE EVENING STAR
Washington, D. C., Friday, June 2, 1972

Heroin: Viet Chiefs Linked to Trade

S. Viet officials
heroin racket ch
Is CIA
linked

Saigon's Drug Merchants

U. S. Aides
Rapped in
Drug Study

He Calls Us Guilty

For Asian Dope

COMMENTARY

STATOTHR

Interrupting its usual silence, the CIA has provided Harper's with a rare public document. It is an official letter of protest against our July cover story, "Flowers of Evil," an extremely compromising report by Alfred W. McCoy about the CIA's complicity in the heroin trade in Southeast Asia. "I trust," writes W. E. Colby, the Agency's executive director, "you will give this response the same prominence in your publication as was given to the McCoy article."

The letter appears below in full, together with Mr. McCoy's reply and the testimony of a former USAID representative who witnessed the CIA's participation in the Laotian drug traffic. This exchange, we hope, throws further needed light on a little-known stretch of the sewer that runs between Washington, Saigon, Vientiane, Pnompenh, and Bangkok.

Beyond all that, we are surprised by Mr. Colby's use of the word "trust." We may well be reading too much into it, but that word, and indeed the whole tone of the letter, suggests that Mr. Colby expected an immediate mea culpa from Harper's. Is the CIA that naïve? Mr. Colby, who once presided over the notorious Phoenix program in Vietnam,* is hardly an innocent. Still, his entire letter reflects a troubling simplicity, an unquestioning trust in the goodness of his own bureaucracy. He asks us to share that trust, whatever the stubborn facts may be. As conclusive evidence of the Agency's purity, for example, he even cites Director Richard Helms' public-relations argument that "as fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as all of you."

Such curious expectations of trust apparently motivated the Agency to ask Harper & Row to hand over the galleys of Mr. McCoy's book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, from which he drew his magazine article. The Agency declared that it simply wanted to check the book for factual inaccuracies, possible libel, or damage to national security. To deliver this unusual request, the Agency dispatched Cord Meyer, a man with the proper Establishment connections who, as the CIA's overseer of the since-transformed Congress for Cultural Freedom,** might be said to have once been in the publishing business himself. Although the galleys were duly sent to the Agency, the CIA's subsequent complaints about Mr. McCoy's research failed to impress Harper & Row, which has since confidently published the book, unchanged. Apparently there are limits to trust, even among gentlemen.

Although Mr. McCoy won't agree with us, our own reaction to this episode is to feel a certain sympathy for the beset bureaucrats of the CIA, who seem to be impaled on the defensive notion, "The Agency, right or wrong." By definition the CIA finds itself involved with a good many questionable people in Southeast Asia. That is a condition of its mission—a mission it did not invent but simply carries out on White House orders—and we suspect that the public would trust the Agency a good deal more if it either acknowledged the facts or remained silent. Alas, the CIA now seems determined to revamp its image into something like a cross between General Motors and the League of Women Voters. But so endeth our sermon. Let the reader draw his own conclusions.

THE AGENCY'S BRIEF:

Harper's July issue contains an article by Mr. Alfred W. McCoy alleging CIA involvement in the opium traffic in Laos. This allegation is false and unfounded, and it is particularly disappointing that a journal of Harper's reputation would see fit to publish it without any effort to check its accuracy or even to refer to the

public record to the contrary.

Normally we do not respond publicly to allegations made against CIA. Because of the serious nature of these charges, however, I am writing to you to place these accusations in proper perspective and so that the record will be clear.

The general charge made by Mr.

McCoy that "to a certain extent it [the opium trade in Laos] depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft, etc.) of the CIA" has no basis in fact. To the contrary, Mr. John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in a letter to Representative Charles S. Gubser of California on May 27, 1971

*Phoenix is a campaign of systematic counterterror designed to root out and destroy Vietcong sympathizers. As U.S. pacification chief from 1968 to mid-1971, Ambassador Colby headed CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), which ran Phoenix in cooperation with the South Vietnamese police. Mr. Colby has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, in 1969 alone, Phoenix agents "neutralized" 19,531 suspected Vietcong, killing 6,187 of them in the process. Critics argue that Phoenix uses assassination methods and that Mr. Colby's figures are extremely conservative.

**The CCF, among other activities, at one time published a dozen or so serious anti-Communist magazines throughout the world. The best known is *Encounter*, which now has a different sponsor.

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RECORD

SEP 25 1972

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Statute Versus Treaty As Narcotics Control

On paper at least, September 18 looked like a great day for the good guys in their battle against international drug traffic.

There on Capitol Hill was the U. S. Senate ratifying by a vote of 69 to 0 a strengthening revision of a 90-nation treaty designed to clamp down on the narcotics trade.

Henceforth, the revision provides, the International Narcotics Control Board will see to it that the world production of dope is limited to the quantity needed for medical and scientific use. Production above that ceiling will be reported to the signatory nations and the United Nations General Assembly.

And there at the Department of State was President Nixon saying this country will suspend all American economic and military assistance to any government "whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug problem."

Just which initiative will be the more productive is hard to say just now.

That of the Senate is dependent on devious channels and protocols, but it does have the advantage of being taken without benefit of George McGovern jaw-boning.

The route the president can take is a good deal more direct, if only he will follow it now that he has made a McGovern-nudged pitch for diligence.

But the chances for clamp-down would

be a great deal fatter, one suspects, if the president had been right when he said he is "required by statute" to cut off aid to governments contributing to our drug problem.

The statute is not quite so forceful.

The rule, written into last year's Foreign Assistance Act, is that aid shall be cut off only when the president himself decides that a government has "failed to take adequate steps" to suppress dangerous drugs. The president is the sole judge of which countries are being helpful and which are not. He is "required" to take no action that his personal verdict on the evidence does not support.

His evidence, clearly, is not the same as that which has disturbed Senator McGovern.

The president, says his challenger, has failed to "crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam" because the administration needs "air bases in Thailand, Laos" and "mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers to fight its war."

There may be more partisan testimony than hard evidence in that accusation, of course. Even so, the McGovern statement is not barren of corroboration.

There have been charges that the CIA's Air America has helped transport heroin in Southeast Asia. In his book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, Arthur W. McCoy raised the question of CIA agents knowingly engaging in such traffic to help maintain alliances. And Mr. McCoy qualified with no question his assertion that officials in Southeast Asian governments allied to the U. S. have profited from the drug traffic.

To accuse is not to prove. But if Mr. McCoy's questions and statements are rooted in nothing firmer than supposition, they suggest that the president, even if not derelict, will have a difficult time being diligent in application of that statute.

The helpfulness (or, for that matter, the helplessness) of allies like South Vietnam and Thailand in areas other than drug control cannot fail to influence Mr. Nixon's reading of the evidence.

Not, that is, so long as a keystone of this nation's foreign policy is to prop up such allies.

Presidential options running afoul of presidential commitments, it's just possible to see, are not to be applied to narcotics control.



THE C.I.A. AND THE HEROIN TRADE

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By ALFRED W. McCOY
and KATHLEEN B. READ

"LADIES and gentlemen," announced the genteel British diplomat, raising his glass to offer a toast, "I give you Prince Sopsaisana, the uplifter of Laotian youth."

The toast brought an appreciative smile from the guest of honor, cheers and applause from the luminaries of Vientiane's diplomatic corps assembled at the farewell banquet for the Laotian ambassador-designate to France, Prince Sopsaisana. A member of the royal house of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of Jars region, the prince was vice-president of the National Assembly, chairman of the Lao Bar Association, president of the Lao Press Association, president of the *Alliance Francaise*, and a member in good standing of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League. After receiving his credentials from the king in a private audience at the Luang Prabang Royal Palace on April 8, 1971, he was treated to an unprecedented round of cocktail parties, dinners, and banquets. For Sopsai, as his friends call him, was not just any ambassador; the Americans considered him an outstanding example of a new generation of honest, dynamic leaders.

The final send-off party at Vientiane's Wattay Airport on April 23 was one of the gayest affairs of the season. Everybody was there; the champagne bubbled, the canapes were flawlessly French, and Ivan Bastouil, charge d'affaires at the French embassy, gave the nicest speech. Only after the plane had soared off into the clouds did anybody notice that Sopsai had forgotten to pay for his share of the reception.

His arrival at Paris's Orly Airport on

the morning of April 25 was the occasion for another reception. The French ambassador to Laos, home for a brief visit, and the entire staff of the Laotian embassy had turned out to welcome the new ambassador. There were warm embraces, kissing on both cheeks, and more effusive speeches. Curiously, the prince insisted on waiting for his luggage like any ordinary tourist, and when his many suitcases finally appeared after an unexplained delay, he immediately noticed that a particular one was missing. Sopsai angrily insisted that his suitcase be delivered at once, and French authorities promised, most apologetically, that it would be sent to the Laotian embassy as soon as it was found. Sopsai departed reluctantly for yet another reception at the embassy, and while he drank the ceremonial champagne with his newfound retinue of admirers, French customs officials were examining one of the biggest heroin seizures in French history.

The ambassador's suitcase contained 60 kilos of high-grade Laotian heroin — worth \$13.5 million on the streets of New York, its probable destination. A week later, a smiling French official presented himself at the embassy with the suitcase in hand. Although Sopsaisana had been bombarding the airport with outraged telephone calls for several days, he suddenly realized that accepting the suitcase was tantamount to an admission of guilt and so, contrary to his previous declaration, he flatly denied that it was his. Ignoring his declaration of innocence, the French

government refused to accept his diplomatic credentials, and Sopsai remained in Paris for no more than two months before he was recalled.

DESPITE its resemblance to comic opera, the Prince Sopsaisana affair offered a rare glimpse into the workings of the Laotian drug trade. That trade is the principal business of Laos, and to a certain extent it depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft etc) of the CIA. Unfortunately, the questions raised by the prince's disgrace were never asked, much less answered. The French government overlooked the embarrassment for diplomatic reasons, the international press ignored the story, and the United States embassy demonstrated a remarkable disinterest in the entire subject.

Over the past 50 years, Laos has become something of a free port for opium. The delicate opium poppy grows abundantly at high elevations in the northern mountains, and under a sequence of different regimes (French, American, Laotian), the hill tribesmen have been encouraged to cultivate the poppy as the principal cash crop. Opium dens can be found in every quarter of Vientiane, and the whereabouts of the opium refineries are a matter of common knowledge.

The Laotian indifference to Prince Sopsaisana's misfortune therefore becomes easily understandable. The reticence of the American embassy, however, requires a few words of explanation. Sopsai had allegedly received his 60 kilos of heroin through the kind offices of a particularly Pao. Vang Pao also happens to be the commander of the CIA secret army in

continued

OAKLAND, CAL.

CALIFORNIA VOICE

SEP 21 1972

WEEKLY - 12,500

Politics and History of Heroin

By Mark Henriquez

Almost universally acknowledged as something akin to the great plague itself, it is often surprising to learn that heroin was once proclaimed to be the wonder drug of the age. The time was shortly before the turn of the century and the place was imperial Germany where heroin had just been developed as a cure for a more sinister addiction, that of morphine. As use of the drug became more widespread and its disadvantages more obvious, heroin quickly lost its privileged position and the scientific institutions of the day renewed their search in other directions.

Quantities of heroin first appeared in this country around 1930. The principle importers of the drug were sailors and other global transients whose activities were confined primarily to the larger coastal cities. The ghettos for the most part remained untouched.

MORPHINE

With the coming of W W II the situation underwent a radical change and once more the use of morphine was involved. Standard procedure adopted by the U. S. armed forces for the treatment of wounds received in combat involved immediate massive injections of the drug to deaden the pain. So widespread was the use of morphine during the war that many G. I.'s were issued their own personal drug supply and hypodermic needle in the event that self treatment became necessary. Despite the fact that morphine was known to have been dangerously addictive some fifty years before the outbreak of the war, the drug had become an integral part of America's wartime medical machine.

It was with the release of many of these wounded veterans from service that the specter of widespread drug addiction first appeared. No one, it seems, had yet developed a cure for morphine addic-

tion but heroin was a good substitute. Sailors soon found that they could make a lot more money selling heroin than they could on any ship and the rush was on to secure the most lucrative markets and methods of production.

EFFECT

Nowhere was the effect of heroin felt more dramatically than in the Black community. Seemingly overnight scores of young men, whose only misfortune was to have served

Freedom Party and even a fledgling Black Panther Party (New York chapter) have all espoused this position at one time or another. Whether or not this charge is valid in and of itself, there is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that the United States government has actively encouraged large scale heroin production to further its own political ends.

The genesis of this intrigue began shortly before the ac-

cess that border Laos and Cambodia. It just so happened that these Miao (pronounced Mao) and Montingyard tribesmen traditionally engaged in running guns and opium to the lucrative markets of Thailand and Viet Nam.


As they were already doing a booming business on their own, some incentive was needed to push them into the uncertainties of war. It seems that since these tribesmen had little or no contact with any government, political appeals were largely ineffective.

COMPROMISE

What evolved was a compromise. Montingyard and Meo tribes would fight and provide intelligence for American troops if the Americans would, in turn, help them move greater quantities of opium and heroin.

The details as to how this compromise has worked have been the subject of numerous articles appearing in publications ranging from Ramparts to THE NEW YORK TIMES. Air America aircraft, a charter owned and operated by the CIA, certain aircraft belonging to the USAF, and in one case documented by CBS, even the personal aircraft of the American ambassador to Saigon have all been involved in the trafficking of heroin.

That a new generation of American soldiers becomes addicted while serving in Viet Nam is seemingly a small price to pay for the opportunity of stopping the insidious red hoards.



their country, returned home with only their wits between them and what was most often a slow agonizing death.

Five years after the close of W W II the pusher was already established as the new king of the ghetto. The post war baby boom, the newfound affluence of the fifties, and the Korean conflict in which even more Americans were introduced to use of narcotics all played a role in the rise of smack. As a result countless millions of young men and women, most of them Black, found themselves involved with heroin before reaching the age of twenty.

Black power advocates were the first to allege that heroin addiction was actually encouraged by this country's Federal government as a means to further subjugate the Black population, and thereby avoid full scale revolution in the face of increasing repression. Stokely Carmichael, Rap Brown, the now defunct SNCC, Peace and

tual introduction of American troops in South Vietnam. Before the American army could embark it was necessary to determine the amount of local support they could expect. Since the South Vietnamese army was barely on the edge of destruction and the civilian population almost solidly behind the Viet Cong, or just as solidly neutral, the search concentrated on certain jungle tribesmen who inhabit the remote mountain

21 SEP 1972

A Correspondence with

Alfred W. McCoy

I

On June 1 of this year an official of the US Central Intelligence Agency paid a visit to the New York offices of my publisher, Harper and Row, Inc. This CIA official was Mr. Cord Meyer, Jr. (now the CIA's Assistant Deputy Director of Plans; formerly the CIA official in charge of providing covert financial subsidies for organizations such as the National Student Association, *Encounter* Magazine, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom).¹ Mr. Meyer urged several of his old friends among Harper and Row's senior management to provide him with a copy of the galley proofs of my history of the international narcotics traffic, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*. In this book I show the complicity of various US agencies—particularly the CIA and the State Department—in organizing the Southeast Asian drug traffic since the early 1950s.

Mr. Meyer presented one of Harper and Row's senior editors with some documents giving the CIA's view on the Southeast Asian drug traffic. His manner was grave. He said, "You wouldn't want to publish a book that would be full of inaccuracies, embarrass the United States government, or get you involved in libel suits, would you?"

Harper and Row's management promised to consider Mr. Meyer's request and summoned me from Washington, DC, where I was then testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee on my findings after eighteen months of research into the Southeast Asian drug traffic. This research included more than 250 interviews with heroin dealers, police officials, and intelligence agents in Europe and Asia.

At a meeting in New York on the afternoon of June 8, Harper and Row's president, Mr. Winthrop Knowlton, and its senior vice president, Mr. B. Brooks Thomas, told me that they had decided to provide the CIA with a copy of the galley proofs prior to publication for the following reasons:

First, the CIA would be less likely to seek a temporary court injunction barring publication of the book if the Agency were given a chance to persuade itself that national security was in no way endangered by portions of my book; and secondly, Harper and Row felt that a responsible publisher should have enough confidence in the veracity of any of its particularly controversial books to show them to any reputable critic for comment prior to publication.

At first I disagreed strongly with Harper and Row's decision, arguing that submitting

the galley proofs to the CIA could set a dangerous precedent and ultimately weaken First Amendment guarantees concerning freedom of the press. Moreover, in view of what I had learned of the CIA's operating methods in Southeast Asia I was convinced that the Agency was capable of using unethical means—such as coercing my sources into retracting statements they had made to me about US complicity in the international narcotics traffic—in order to induce Harper and Row to withdraw the book from publication.

After a week of negotiations, however, Harper and Row told me that they would not be willing to publish the book unless I agreed to submit the manuscript to the CIA. Faced with what I believed would be lengthy delays if I took the book to another publisher and the prospect of losing my Harper and Row editor, Elisabeth Jakob, with whom I had worked

closely, I capitulated. Thus began more than two months of lengthy negotiations between the CIA, Harper and Row, and myself. Most of what happened during these elaborate negotiations is in the correspondence reprinted below. I have added introductory notes to explain some of the attending circumstances.

Considered collectively, this exchange of letters provides us with another important reminder—perhaps the first since the National Student Association scandals of 1967—of the contempt this most clandestine of our governmental agencies has for the integrity of the press and publishing industry. As the CIA's letter of July 28, 1972, shows, it was unable to rebut effectively my analysis of its role in the international heroin traffic during the last quarter century. Since the CIA simply had no plausible defense against this charge, it tried to impose prior censorship in order to avoid public scrutiny of its record. If it was not already clear, it now should be obvious to publishers that the Agency cannot be regarded as a responsible critic when its public image is seriously threatened by what is written about it.

II

In this letter, written after Cord Meyer, Jr.'s visit, Harper and Row asked the CIA for official confirmation of their interest in seeing the book. Since the CIA had never before been quite so willing to defend itself publicly, neither Harper and Row nor

and Row by stating categorically that it could rebut all my charges about its complicity in the international narcotics traffic. We were surprised, however, that the CIA made no reference to "national security" as one of its concerns in requesting to review the manuscript. Rather, the Agency made its request purely on grounds of government privilege.

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

5 July 1972

Mr. B. Brooks Thomas
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

Dear Mr. Thomas:

Mr. Cord Meyer has asked me to respond to your letter to him of June 30th in connection with the book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, by Alfred W. McCoy.

As you are no doubt aware, Mr. McCoy testified on 2 June 1972 before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. His testimony included allegations concerning support of the international opium traffic by U. S. agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, and numerous other allegations concerning participation in the opium traffic by both Americans and local personnel in Southeast Asia.

In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U. S. Government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence. It is our belief that no reputable

Continued.

18 SEP 1972

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Nixon Warns of Aid Cut To Drug-Dealer Nations

By GARNETT D. HORNER

Star-News Staff Writer

President Nixon today warned that he will not hesitate to cut off all American economic and military aid to any government whose leaders participate in or protect the drug traffic.

He also praised the Central Intelligence Agency for its role in fighting international drug traffic and said the agency has been "much maligned."

He said the CIA has "performed superbly" in fighting the international drug trade. "In the field of intelligence," he added, "we always find that the failures are those that are publicized. Its successes by definition must always be secret. In this area, there are many successes, and particularly ones of which this agency can be very proud."

Critics of the CIA have charged that the Agency has aided drug traffickers in Southeast Asia to help maintain alliances.

He spoke of "fine initial progress" in immobilizing and destroying sources of drugs coming into the United States.

He said, "France, Paraguay, Laos, Thailand and Turkey are just a few examples of the many countries where the work of American officials, from the ambassador down, in partnership with local officials, has produced important breakthroughs — huge heroin seizures, key arrests, or — in Turkey's case — the courageous decision to eradicate the opium poppy itself."

The President said he considers keeping dangerous drugs out of the United States "just as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the United States" because the drugs can endanger the lives of young Americans just as much as would an invading army.

Speaking at an international conference on drug control at the State Department, he asked American officials from around the world to convey to foreign officials with whom they deal "this personal message" from me:

"Any government whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug program should know that the President of the United States is required by statute to suspend all American economic and military assistance to such a regime.

"I shall not hesitate to comply fully and promptly with that statute."

Nixon said he has been "cracking the whip" over government agencies involved in dealing with dangerous drugs

to get them to "quit fighting each other and start fighting the problem."

Citing some results, he said the number of arrests of drug traffickers in the last fiscal year was double the number arrested in 1969, and the seizures of heroin and other illicit drugs are at an all-time high.

"Very sharp increases in the prices of heroin throughout the eastern United States indicate that the supply is drying up and that the pressure is on the criminal drug trade," he said.

Nixon's statements apparently were in response to a statement yesterday by Democratic presidential candidate Sen. George S. McGovern.

McGovern said the number of heroin addicts in the United States had doubled since 1968 and charged that Southeast Asia had become a major source of heroin because the administration would not crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam.

Nixon made no direct reference to McGovern's charges, but his comments appeared to be a sharp counterattack.

The President's praise of the CIA role follows claims and official denials that the agency's Air America has helped transport heroin in Southeast Asia.

In a book called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," that was published recently, Arthur W. McCoy raised the question of whether CIA operatives knowingly engaged in such traffic to help maintain alliances.

More specifically, McCoy accused officials in governments of U.S. allies in Southeast Asia—particularly in Saigon—of profiting from the traffic.

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The Poppies And the Pushers

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Alfred W. McCoy

With Cathleen B. Read and

Leonard P. Adams II

Harper & Row, 464 pp. \$10.95

By LAURENCE STERN

"ORDINARILY THIS AGENCY does not respond to public criticism," the CIA's general counsel wrote the general counsel of Harper & Row publishing company last July 5. "However in this case we are under the strongest directive to support the U.S. government's effort against the international narcotics traffic and are bending every effort to do so. We believe we cannot stand by and see baseless criticism designed to undermine confidence in that effort without trying to set the record straight. . . ."

The subject of this extraordinary letter was *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* by Alfred W. McCoy, a doctoral candidate at Yale University. Harper & Row provided the CIA with advance proofs of the book and after receiving a statement of rebuttal covering several of McCoy's allegations of Agency involvement in opium traffic, the book was published.

If the intervention had any effect, it has probably been to boost the sales of McCoy's book; certainly it turned its publication into something of a *cause célèbre*. Perhaps the Agency would have better served its own interests by following the time-honored intelligence precept of maintaining silence in times of adversity. Public accountability has never been its strongest attribute.

By its nature as one of the world's

most profitable illicit businesses, the opium and heroin trail is heavily canopied with underworld and official secrecy. In the Golden Triangle region of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos, the principal opium growing and processing area in Southeast Asia, the traffic is fed by highland tribes, minor warlords and paramilitary soldiers, and it is controlled by high-ranking officials of the three countries. This distribution system fed heroin into the veins of American soldiers in Vietnam and into the international heroin stream that sur-

LAURENCE STERN is the roving foreign correspondent of The Washington Post.

faces terminally in the ghettos and suburbs of the United States.

McCoy has done a sturdy and comprehensive reporting job. He has interviewed American and Southeast Asian sources who either played a direct role in the opium traffic or are highly competent to talk about it. It is his argument that when the United States embarked on the geopolitical objective of trying to contain Chinese and North Vietnamese power at their borders in Southeast Asia, it slipped inexorably into the narcotics traffic.

The international market had been created long before by the European colonial powers, chiefly Britain and France. Great Britain in the late 18th century took the first big step toward internationalization of the Asian drug traffic by establishing a government monopoly over India's opium harvest, helping finance the regime of the Raj by taxing the product, and beginning the massive export of Indian opium into China. When Chinese imperial authorities tried to stop it, Britain, with its gunships, blasted open the Chinese ports to European trade and Indian opium during the Opium War of 1839 to 1842.

Under the forced infusions of opium from British-ruled India the Chinese imports rose from a level of 340 tons in the first decade of the 19th century to 6,500 tons by 1880. It was in this period that the Chinese began a large-scale program of domestic opium production, much of it in the outlying provinces of Szechwan and Yunnan. By the beginning of the 20th century, China had an addict population of 15 million. The wave of Chinese migrations into Southeast Asia spread the scourge of addiction southward.

The French played a similar role in expanding and monopolizing opium production under colonial authority. Centuries before the French arrived the Meo had used opium, but more as a ceremonial intoxicant than to achieve the stupefaction of "liv-

ing death" with which the Chinese coolies escaped their wretched life cycle of toil, poverty and disease. The French established their own monopoly and converted the Meo poppy harvests into an important cash crop which was taxed and sold to the growing addict population of Indochina. By the beginning of World War Two, according to McCoy's research, there were some 2,500 opium dens in Indochina serving about 100,000 addicts.

The Viet Minh war of independence eventually became a major challenge to French political rule and a drain on the colonial economy. In countering their guerrilla movement the French turned to the Meo tribal peoples in the Laotian highlands and to their poppy harvests. Meo opium became an important factor both in financing the war and in cementing the loyalties of the tribal guerrillas fighting on the French side. McCoy relates the case of the French Expeditionary Corps' "Operation X," a top-secret project for the collection and transport of Meo opium into the Saigon markets where it was turned over to the Binh Xuyen, an underworld secret society which the French occupation authorities permitted to take over civil authority in Saigon. By the time American influence replaced the French military presence, the poppy was the main cash crop in the Golden Triangle, the opium economy was fully developed, and there were well-rutted patterns for dealing with the tribal mountain guerrillas who had been enlisted by the French in the war against the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese Communist insurgents.

Here the argument begins. McCoy asserts that Central Intelligence operations became heavily involved in the opium-heroin traffic. He says that some of the Agency's chief Asian operatives and clients controlled it and that the CIA's contract airline, Air America, moved it toward the ultimate markets.

All this has long been a matter of conventional wisdom and surmise in the bars and embassies of Vientiane, where wags spoke of Air America as "Air Opium," but McCoy seeks to document the case with interviews (alas, some of the crucial ones anonymous) and hard evidence.

One of the most sensational allegations in the book is that Meo General Vang Pao, the most important field commander on the Royal Lao government side, arranged for the delivery of 60 kilos of high grade Laotian heroin (worth \$13.5 million in New York) to Prince Sopsaisana, the Laotian ambassador-designate to France in April 1971. Sopsaisana was killed in Laos after French

continued

'THE GREEDY WAR'

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FRED J. COOK

Mr. Cook, a long-time contributor to *The Nation*, is the author of many books, including the recently published *The Nightmare Decade: The Life and Times of Senator Joe McCarthy* (Random House).

The most damning document to come out of the war in Vietnam has now struggled into the light in this election year. It was indeed a struggle: the disclosures were squelched for years by the highest arms of the American bureaucracy; the pith of the message was ignored by the Senate subcommittee, headed by Abraham Ribicoff, which exposed the PX scandals; the revelations were verified by one of *Life's* top journalists—and pushed aside in favor of the incident on the bridge at Chappaquiddick; the truth set forth was too much for major American publishing houses, and in the end was published in Great Britain, coming to the American market on the rebound through the David McKay Company.

This bombshell is *The Greedy War*, a 278-page book written by the British journalist James Hamilton-Paterson

and detailing the Vietnamese experiences of Cornelius Hawkrige, a dedicated anti-Communist who spent seven and a half horrible years in Russian and Hungarian prison camps before escaping to the United States. Hawkrige and Hamilton-Paterson call the war greedy and the contents of this book fully justify the epithet. Hawkrige was born in Transylvania, the son of a Hungarian mother and a British father, a colonel in the Hungarian police force. His passionate hatred of communism and the Russians led him into protests and guerrilla actions—and into those long years in prison. He came to America believing all the dogmas of the cold war and eager to aid as a security officer in what he considered a holy crusade.

The Dominican upheaval in 1965, in which Hawkrige could not find the Communists President Lyndon B. Johnson assured us we were opposing, was the first disillusionment. Then came Vietnam. Hawkrige's first day in the field there in 1966 was a shocker. He had his nose rubbed immediately in the stinking squalor of the refugee camps of Qui Nhon. More than 2,000 refugees were living in paper shacks built largely of discarded American packing cases. Three contaminated wells provided the only drinking water. There were no sanitary facilities. "The inmates defecated between the rows of paper homes and the slow seep of ordure crept up the pulp walls." Hawkrige asked a priest what had happened to all the USAID. "Stolen," the priest said simply. "It's taken by the Vietnamese Government."

Hawkrige soon discovered that virtually everything was being stolen. Only the smallest trickle of supplies and war matériel being shipped to Vietnam in such prodigious, multibillion-dollar amounts ever reached their intended destinations. The Qui Nhon marketplace, an area of a good-sized block next to the refugee camp, was stocked with "C-rations, K-rations, drink, clothing, guns, cannons, shells, cases of grenades, television sets, washing machines . . . the mounds seemed limitless." So Hamilton-

Paterson writes describing Hawkrige's discoveries. "Wondering what limits there were he asked a Vietnamese stallholder whether he could buy a tank. Tanks are a bit difficult right now, this man admitted, but how about some armored personnel carriers? Or helicopters, of course. Or how about a heavy-duty truck?"

What the hell goes on?, Hawkrige thought. And he rushed to tell American authorities what he had found. They were bland, uninterested. Washington, in its holy-crusade delusion, had concluded agreements with the South Vietnamese that tied the hands of any security agent who tried to put an end to the national pastime—wholesale looting. Two provisions were critical: trucks could be driven only by South Vietnamese drivers; and only South Vietnamese police could make arrests. Even if an American security agent like Hawkrige trapped hijackers in the act, he was forbidden to lay a finger on them; he had to call in the South Vietnamese police. And when they arrived, they simply collaborated in the looting.

Here, in capsule form, are some of the things Hawkrige learned and some of his experiences:

¶South Vietnam all but sank into the sea under the weight of the tons of black-and-white television sets, radios, spin driers, untaxed diamonds and other commodities produced by a society of conspicuous consumption and shipped off to Vietnam to win what must be one of the most curious wars in history.

¶The port of Qui Nhon was clogged with shipping, a fleet that spread out to the horizon. Some of the ships waited for months to unload; meanwhile small boats plied out to them in the night and sometimes in the day; and so, when they finally reached a pier, some 60 per cent of their cargoes had vanished.

¶The United States shipped enough cement into South Vietnam to pave the entire nation, but there was a chronic shortage of cement to extend airfield runways and erect facilities. And the Vietcong always had a superabundance with which to build their individual bomb shelters.

¶On one occasion a truck containing several hundred TV sets was hijacked, tracked down in Tu Duc and turned over to the South Vietnamese police. Hawkrige went to reclaim this U.S. property, but was told he would have to get a Vietnamese driver to take the truck away. By the time he had found a driver, the truck had been stripped of its contents right in the police compound.

¶One night Hawkrige was following a hijacked truck, mystified because the Vietnamese were ripping open packages in disgust and tossing them into ditches at the roadside. Hawkrige kept stopping and picking up the packages. They were a consignment of aircraft parts for fighter squadrons at Bien Hoa. When Hawkrige arrived at the air base, he was hailed almost as a savior because several jets had been grounded for lack of spare parts.

¶Another time, Hawkrige chased a hijacked truck right into a compound belonging to the South Vietnamese Security Police. The panicked driver sped across the compound, forgetting there was a river on the other side, and braked to a halt at the last second with the front wheels

continued

10 SEP 1972

Heroin Road In SE Asia

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star-News

VIENTIANE—"I have the fastest boat on the river," boasted the Lao colonel as he swigged another glass of throat-burning rice whisky at a party in Ban Houei Sai, a Lao garrison town.

Nobody could dispute the colonel's claim, for the previous record-holder — a big Chrysler belonging to American Treasury and Customs officers — had a burned-out engine after someone had surreptitiously drained the oil from its crank case.

The prime suspect of U.S. officials is none other than the Colonel and his henchmen, who, they believe, are in the opium and heroin trade.

"The river" is the mighty Mekong, now swollen by monsoon rains. From Yunnan in China it plunges in a brown mass of whirlpools and forming eddies, over giant rock outcroppings that could dash a boat to pieces between the sloping green hills that make excellent land for poppy-growing.

If the river doesn't kill the unwary traveller he faces the peril of an arrow fired from a crossbow of Shan or Ekaw tribesmen or bullets from a Ho musket or a Kuomintang carbine.

The whole area—Burma on one bank and Laos on the other—is the battleground for American narcotics agents and heroin smugglers and refiners. The sabotaged boat is just a skirmish in the battle that started last November, when the United States persuaded the Lao government to pass anti-narcotics laws.

Stalemate

Agents of the Treasury and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs say that, after initial successes, they have reached a stalemate in the fight against drug traffickers along the borders.

Earlier this year agents knocked out two heroin refineries in villages just north of Ban Houei Sai. At one of them, Lao military officials, who denied running the refinery, burned buildings as a sign of good faith to show their willingness to stop the trade after considerable American pressure.

Later American narcotics agents and Laos' tough new drug squad leader, Gen. Khammu Bou-sarrath, took away truck loads of equipment from the burned refinery, including ether in 10-gallon drums, acetone and acetic anhydride, all used in heroin manufacture.

But the all-important chemist was never caught.

In Vientiane Gen. Khammu raided the house of a National assembly deputy, Miao tribesman Mou Seu, and reported confiscating 27 pounds of heroin hidden under the house roof.

Mou Seu, claiming immunity as a legislator, has not yet been prosecuted. This immunity runs out when the Assembly closes Nov. 11, and many American officials take the view that if the Lao government fails to prosecute Mou Seu under the new law, cooperation in the drug fight will have failed.

Sixty-six pounds of boiled opium have been confiscated from passengers on aircraft chartered to U.S. government agencies by Air America and Continental Airlines.

Since this flurry of activity, agents and runners have been eyeing each other warily.

"Nobody is buying opium for the international market," an informed U.S. official said.

Americans say the 1972 opium crop harvested in January and February has not been sold internationally because of the crackdown. This judgment is based on a drop in opium prices indicating a glut on the market on the Burmese side of the border.

To date, opium and heroin have followed certain routes, and the Americans are concentrating first on closing off these routes. The flow of heroin follows the line of least resistance, one U.S. official said "We will stop it coming one way and it will flow around us. The traffickers will find new routes and we will close them off till it's no longer worthwhile. We can pinch the flow off across Thailand and Laos eventually, but the traffickers can always move through Burmese territory to Rangoon and the Bay of Bengal and there won't be much we can do about it. We have no political leverage in Burma."

American officials say about 450 tons of opium are produced annually in Burma's Shan and Wa states.

The opium flows out of the hills to the walled city of Kengtung. From Kengtung it follows the Burmese road system to Tachilek opposite the Thai town of Mai Sai. There are at least eight heroin refineries around Tachilek.

From Tachilek heroin moves in two directions, one across the border into Thailand and through Thailand's busy road net, the other east from Tachilek to a point just north of the area where Burma, Laos and Thailand come together.

The heroin crosses into Laos from Burma at Muong Hi village then continues down to the Yao tribes' headquarters at Nam Keun on the Mekong River.

In the Nam Keun area there are also heroin refineries which handle not only Burmese opium, but opium grown by the Lahy and Ekaw tribes in

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U.S. Planes Carry Dope

THE U.S. government has insisted for years that its unofficial CIA-run airline, Air America, has not been running opium in the mountain-bound Asian land of Laos.

But now, from the files of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, we have evidence that U.S. ground and air equipment—if not U.S. personnel—has formed the backbone of the Laos opium trade.

“SELECTED ROYAL Lao Army and Royal Lao Air Force units, utilizing air and ground equipment furnished by the U.S., provide the means for protecting, transporting and processing of narcotics,” reports one intelligence summary on Laos.

“A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including Generals, Princes, high-level bureaucrats

and Province Governors,” says the report.

Another document, complete with a secret CIA map, reports unequivocally: ‘Most of the refineries in Laos operate under the protection of the Royal Laotian Armed Forces...Some reports suggest that a senior Royal Laotian Armed Forces officer may hold an ownership interest in a few of these facilities.’”

To end narcotics running by the highest echelons of Laotian society, the documents propose drastic action.

“An important target group will be the air force generals and other Royal Lao Air Force personnel who command and operate the transport aircraft involved in shipping narcotics.”

9 SEP 1972

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

U.S. Is Backbone of Laos Drug Trade

By Jack Anderson

The U.S. government has insisted for years that its unofficial CIA-run airline, Air America, has not been running opium in the mountainous Asian land of Laos.

But now, from the files of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, we have evidence that U.S. ground and air equipment — if not U.S. personnel — has formed the backbone of the Laos opium trade.

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"An important target group will be the Air Force generals and other Royal Lao Air Force personnel who command and operate the transport aircraft involved in shipping narcotics.

"Officials high and low who are found to be involved in a substantial way will have to be removed from positions of influence," urges the memo. It recommends curtailment of some aid to Laos.

"This is aimed specifically at eliminating the use of all U.S.-owned aircraft operated by the Royal Laotian Air Force or U.S.-leased aircraft, including U.S. support items, in the transport of narcotics."

In recent months, America's spokesmen claim a new Laotian anti-heroin law is having some effect. But, in fact, only lowly opium hustlers are arrested; the generals and princes go untouched.

Jonah and the Whale

The Federal Reserve Board is supposed to supervise banks, not do their dirty work. But recently the Fed aided the banks in an attempt to take over an entire industry.

The victim of this power play was supposed to be the

armored car and courier industry, a collection of small companies all over the country.

The banks would like to swallow up the industry, and the Fed has been deliberating whether to grant permission.

Unwilling to play Jonah to the banks' whale, the armored car and courier companies are fighting back. As part of their counterattack, one courier firm hired Dun & Bradstreet to survey how good a job the courier companies do.

They decided to survey the Fed's own outlying banks, figuring that if the Fed's own branches liked the courier service, this would be convincing argument that the industry deserved to survive.

Dun & Bradstreet gathered 20 interviews with Fed banks before their bosses in Washington got wind of the survey.

Off went a peremptory telegram. "It appears inappropriate for officials of Federal Reserve banks and branches to express any opinions about courier services," wired Board Secretary Tynan Smith, noting that a Fed decision on the takeover was pending.

To make absolutely sure the courier survey was stymied, Smith added: "Please keep us informed if you are contacted for such information." This so

intimidated the regional Fed officials that two of them, who had already given interviews, tried to withdraw them. Other officials insisted their replies be totally anonymous.

Although the survey was aborted, the courier services did get some use out of it. Based on the incomplete returns, it showed the Fed banks were generally satisfied with the private courier services.

No Spanish Allowed

A top anti-poverty official has scolded subordinates for speaking Spanish at a recent meeting that included Spanish-speaking officials.

"I was appalled," wrote operations chief James Griffith, "to hear a meeting of in-house (anti-poverty) people closed with a statement in Spanish and answered in Spanish. This was absolutely uncalled for and taken as a direct insult by the persons in attendance."

Griffith's rebuke was directed at migrant staff official Pete Merilez. Asked for an explanation, Griffith told us: "We poor gringos who don't speak Spanish sometimes get embarrassed when we hear others speak it. We get the feeling they're speaking behind our backs."

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3 September 1972 STATOTHR

The Politics Of Heroin in Southeast Asia

By Alfred W. McCoy.
With Cathleen B. Read
and Leonard P. Adams II.
Illustrated. 464 pp.

New York: Harper & Row. \$10.95.

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

It looks as though *Papaver somniferum*, the rather beautiful opium poppy, is going to provide us with a new genre of film, fiction, journalism and, even, scholarship. This is understandable. Heroin addiction is savaging our cities. "Any nation that moves down the road to addiction, that nation has something taken out of its character," President Nixon observed last March shortly after his return from China, once the most addicted of nations. Mr. Nixon has declared "war" on heroin at home—and galvanized his emissaries abroad. In certain parts of the world, American diplomats now give almost monomaniacal attention to persuading frequently indifferent or corrupt officials to do something about poppy cultivation, heroin refining and heroin trafficking.

Moreover, from the perspective of a journalist or film-maker, the subject is a natural, replete with ignorant hill tribesmen hacking away at their poppy fields in remote corners of Asia, ragtag paramilitary smugglers leading vast mule caravans across cloud-shrouded mountains, shadowy Chinese middlemen bribing

James M. Markham, who was a correspondent for The Associated Press in South Asia and Africa, now reports frequently on drug problems for The Times.

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A movie natural, with a part for the C.I.A.

high-ranking officials to look the other way, cosmopolitan Corsican intriguers arranging for stewardesses to strap on "body packs" of No. 4 heroin and fly to New York, intrepid undercover agents trying to foil all of the aforementioned and—last, but by no means least important—the junkies on our streets, symptoms and carriers of disquieting diseases.

This book, the first work of near-scholarship in the new genre, comes to us redolent of controversy [see *The Last Word*]. Before it was even in galleys—on June 1—the Central Intelligence Agency dispatched an employee to Harper & Row in New York to warn the company that the book could well be inaccurate, libelous and "damaging to the interests of this country," according to the recollection of Executive Editor M. S. Wyeth. The next day Alfred McCoy testified before a Senate subcommittee about alleged involvement of high-ranking South Vietnamese officials, Air America and others in the opium business. Alarmed, the C.I.A.'s General Counsel, Lawrence R. Houston, stepped up the pressure, and on July 5 asked to "see the text prior to publication" in order to point out its inaccuracies.

In a display of post-Irving caution—and over the author's objections—Harper & Row agreed on July 19 to let the C.I.A. consider the galleys for a week and submit its criticisms, on the understanding that the publishers would be under no obligation to make any changes. The mountain at Langley, Va., labored and produced a mouse. The 1,500-word critique the Agency returned to Harper & Row on July 28 understandably "underwhelmed" the editors (who appeared to have been concerned mainly about libel suits) and they decided to proceed with the publication of the book.

The C.I.A.'s clumsy intervention—particularly when linked to its ongoing efforts to prevent a former agent, Victor L. Marchetti, from even writing a book about the Agency for Alfred A. Knopf—is seriously disturbing. So is Harper & Row's submission of the book for prepublication criticism; it sets a worrying

precedent even if the company maintains, as it does, that this was a special case. But the C.I.A. assaulted the McCoy book like a bull lunging at a matador's outstretched cape. For what the 27-year-old Yale graduate student has given us is not—as advertised—an expose of "C.I.A. involvement in the drug traffic" but rather a fascinating, often meticulous unraveling of the byzantine complexities of the Southeast Asian opium and heroin trade. To be sure, McCoy weaves a New Left anti-C.I.A. leitmotif throughout his pages and at times lapses into the error (usually made by angry non-Americans) of crediting American espionage with history-bending powers. Thus, in the early (and weakest) chapters of the book we are led to believe that if the O.S.S. had not backed the Mafia in Sicily at the end of World War II and if the C.I.A. had not sponsored Corsican mobsters as anti-Communist strikebreakers on the Marseilles waterfront, these two underworld groups would have subsided into well-deserved oblivion and never gotten into heroin trafficking.

As a former C.I.A. agent told Seymour Hersh (who unearthed the pre-publication fiasco), McCoy's assertions are "10 per cent tendentious and 90 per cent of the most valuable contribution I can think of." "He's a very liberal kid," the ex-agent continued, "and he'd like to nail the establishment. But some leading intelligence officers inside the Government's program think that his research is great." Well they might. For McCoy has done his homework, and, unlike most authors of books about spooks and mobsters, he gives us a rich set of footnotes. It is too bad they are not at the bottom of the pages, because this is a book to be read in tandem with its footnotes. Some assertions in the text are stronger than the footnotes they rest on; many are not.

The book's strength does not lie in its finger-wagging approach to history, but in its astounding-but-true tales of exotic rivalries that make up the heroin trade. Have you ever heard, for example,

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When the Embarrassed Chuckling Stopped

Our Allies, Opium, and the CIA

By Michael T. Malloy

We were just about to take off from one of the many secret airstrips the Central Intelligence Agency had cut into the mountains of northern Laos, when a tribal soldier hurried up, spoke briefly to an American CIA agent, and threw a big, white canvas bag aboard. I already half knew the answer, but as we buckled our seat belts I asked the agent what was in the bag.

He looked embarrassed. "Opium," he said.

Embarrassment was the strongest emotion that American officialdom showed a decade ago if anyone mentioned the wide-open dope traffic conducted by our allies in Southeast Asia. Narcotics smuggling was more often viewed with amused tolerance as just another Asian peccadillo like corruption, gold smuggling, and night clubs that advertised "Twenty Fresh Girls Just Arrived From Bangkok With Medical Certificates."

White slavery and gold smuggling still rate little more than an embarrassed chuckle at some of our Southeast Asian embassies ("we're here to fight communism, not to play missionary"), but narcotics is something else.

The epidemic of opium-based heroin that struck our armies there in 1970 and the frightening inroads the drug has made among high-school students at home have turned that amusing peccadillo into a deadly menace to our own national well-being.


Free Publicity

So *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* couldn't have been published at a worse time for the men who direct our policies in that bloody and controversial corner of the world. Newspapers, magazines, and television reporters have described allied involvement with the narcotics trade in the past, without generating more than *pro forma* evasions and denials. But this book, published Aug. 17, is so thoroughly researched, so carefully annotated, and so specific in its accusations that even the Central Intelligence Agency has crawled out of its accustomed shell of secrecy to publicly issue 11 pages of denial.

The agency should have stayed in its shell. It guaranteed the book an enormous

Staff Writer Malloy spent several years in Southeast Asia as a correspondent for United Press International.

amount of free publicity by asking Harper & Row to suppress its publication. It trapped itself in a "put up or shut up" corner by telling the publishing company it could demonstrate that author Alfred McCoy's allegations were "totally false." It failed to demonstrate any such thing when Harper & Row broke publishing tradition by giving the agency an advance look at the book and a chance to explode



'The book is so thoroughly researched, so carefully annotated, and so specific in its accusations that even the Central Intelligence Agency has crawled out of its accustomed shell of secrecy to issue 11 pages of denials.'

its charges. Instead of preventing its publication, the president of the 155-year-old publishing house said the CIA's response merely "reaffirmed" his company's confidence in the book.

McCoy is a 27-year-old graduate student at Yale. His book is a monumental piece of scholarship in a field that sometimes resists investigation to the point of killing the investigators. He has interviewed spies, gun runners, opium farmers, mercenaries, policemen, and generals along a trail that ran from dusty European libraries to mountaintops in the no man's land of northern Laos. He produced a fascinating tale of mercenary armies, lost battalions, commando raids on Communist China, and wild mountain tribesmen led by hard-drinking American adventurers who sometimes pay cash bounties for enemy cars. It is right out of *Terry and the Pirates*, and it is all true.

McCoy's chief conclusion is that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in..."

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World of Books



'Politics of Heroin In Southeast Asia'

William Hogan

NEWSTORIES this week made much of President Nixon's pledge to cut off aid to any foreign government whose leaders "protect" international drug traffickers. This was in response to Senator George McGovern's earlier charge that the administration had failed to crack down on the narcotics trade in Southeast Asia because it needs "air bases in Thailand, Lao mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers to fight its war."

Senator McGovern's charges could have been based on the documented book by the young Yale scholar Alfred W. McCoy, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." Harper & Row released it, uncut, after the Central Intelligence Agency had sought to have Harper stop publication and to discredit McCoy's investigative reporting.

★ ★ ★

MCCOY presents the CIA-Harper controversy in a lengthy exchange of letters and memos prior to publication. Documentation on those strange and, for the CIA, very open pressure tactics appears in the September 21 issue of the New York Review of Books. McCoy calls these tactics "the strongest evidence of the folly of allowing government agencies to help decide what will be published."

Harper, over McCoy's objections, did allow the CIA to see page proofs of the book which analyzes the CIA's role in the international heroin traffic. But Harper

rejected the agency's suggested editing of the book. After a careful review of the manuscript and study of the CIA's objections to it, "it is our sincere opinion," a Harper's executive replied, "that Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains unshaken and we do not see any reason for making any changes."

"The Politics of Heroin" takes a long look at the Golden Triangle, where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet; it produces 60 per cent of the world's supply of heroin, including the Double UO Brand that has increasingly turned up in the New York and Miami areas. The Double UO lab was formerly owned by General Ousane Rattikone, commander-in-chief of the Royal Laotian Army in CIA-controlled territory.

★ ★ ★

HEROIN and opium, McCoy states, have been transported in American planes (the CIA-chartered Air America). U.S. personnel may not be directly involved in the trade, but they tend to look away because drug trafficking is a tradition in that part of the world. Yet looking the other way, McCoy's book emphasizes, has increased drug addiction among Americans, both GIs and those at home.

McCoy's reply to CIA pressure: "If America's publishers are not careful to defend their own constitutional prerogatives, then the CIA, for one, seems only too willing to help them wither away."

by TOM SCHUSTER

THE CIA'S WAR WITH RED CHINA AND OTHER ASIAN LANDS

THE OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced and yawed in the violent turbulence as its twin engines strained to maintain 160 knots. Its American pilot gripped the controls with every ounce of strength he could muster, and his eyes ached from the strain of searching the darkness to avoid the towering Himalayan mountains on each side. They'd taken off from a secret base over three hours ago and were threading their way east of the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, long occupied by the forces of Red China. Their mission: drop agents and supplies to a band of Tibetan guerrillas who were still fighting the Communists. The copilot, sweating over the air chart in his lap, tried to guide them to the drop zone that a mysterious American "civilian" at their base had earlier described. "Hold your course," he yelled. "Another two minutes should put us right on." The pilot reached up, flicking on the "get-ready" light to alert the Tibetan agents who'd be jumping, and the plane crew who would kick the supplies out. "Go!" he yelled and switched on the buzzer. Just as the last chute opened, the old plane was suddenly rocked by deadly Communist 37mm antiaircraft fire and the pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam—

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 bastards were waiting for us."

But he managed to drop down and contour fly the valley floors, below the Red radar, and just after dawn they landed back at their base. They climbed from the plane, their gray uniforms soaked through with sweat, and the pilot

muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta be an easier way to make a buck." The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The only other identifying marks were the fresh 37mm holes in the left wing panels.

Throughout Asia, people have come to recognize these strange aircraft and their even stranger American pilots. Especially the pilots. You learn to spot them wherever you are. They're the guys in the gray Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps, cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy Wong section of Hong Kong or racing motor bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the girls at the Vieng Rattay Club in Vientiane. They're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air America, one of the world's least known airlines. Many are "old China hands" who first began flying for the "outfit" back when mainland China belonged to Chiang Kai-shek. They're the last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune, and these devil-may-care mercenaries will

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Smuggling? Yes; collusion? No

Despite its full commitment to the fight against the narcotics trade, the CIA runs into continual accusations of engaging in the traffic itself.

The accusations center around Air America, an airline operating in Vietnam and Laos and into the "Golden Triangle" where 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium is produced.

It is an open secret that Air America was covertly established by the U.S. government to provide safe and adequate air services in a part of the world where commercial carriers provided neither.

The capital to start it was funneled through the CIA, which still serves as a funding mechanism for operating costs, but it is a semi-autonomous organization whose employees are all civilians under contract to the airline and not to the CIA or the U.S. government.

AIR AMERICA RUNS scheduled flights throughout Vietnam and Laos, and it is used by all manner of passengers with official travel orders.

In Laos, it is also used on a charter basis to support the irregular war effort against the North Vietnamese, transporting supplies, equipment and food as well as advisers and the Meo tribesmen and their families from hilltop airstrip to hilltop airstrip.

Throughout the "Golden Triangle" — which is beyond all formal administration, no matter what the lines on the map say — no currency has much value, and raw opium serves as the basis of what passes for an economy.

The CIA does not and never has paid its assets in it and does not and never has dealt in it. The tribesmen with whom the CIA works, however, do deal in it, and raw opium in small amounts has undoubtedly moved on Air America flights in the bundles of Meo personal possessions.

AIR AMERICA WILL stop this when it can, but it isn't easy. No U.S. airline, for example, has yet discovered how to prevent even shotguns from being smuggled aboard their flights. The problem is in any event inconsequential, since the amounts are small and des-

tinued for use only as currency in Meo village barter.

Far more serious is the problem of ranking Laotian diplomats and military notables who smuggle large quantities of opium and heroin out of Laos and into the world market.

The diplomats are immune to search when they travel, and an Air America employe — a resident alien in Laos — would be on a sticky wicket if he tried to search the luggage of a senior Laotian official in Laos itself.

The responsibility, moreover, is not that of the airline but of the customs service in the country of arrival. Here again, diplomatic luggage is immune to search, as are certain official aircraft used by the military, and a country that insists on an illegal search had better find what it is looking for.

THE JULY HARPER'S magazine features an extract from the forthcoming book "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," by Yale Ph.D. student Alfred McCoy. The extract starts with a detailed description of the arrival at Orly Airport in Paris on 25 April 1971 of Prince Sopsaisana, the new Laotian ambassador to France.

Despite the presence of a large reception party, the prince insisted on waiting for his numerous official suitcases like an ordinary tourist, and when they arrived he at once noticed one was missing. He angrily demanded that it be produced, but was forced to depart with the promise that it would be delivered to the Laotian embassy as soon as it was found.

The suitcase contained 132 pounds of pure heroin. France refused to accept Sopsaisana's credentials, and he had to return to Laos.

The gist of McCoy's article is that the drug trade in the "Golden Triangle" flourishes with CIA support. His argument runs:

- All the leading figures in Laos are deeply involved in the drug trade.
- The CIA works closely with many of these figures.
- Ergo, the CIA is supporting the drug trade.

While the first two statements are correct, the conclusion is not valid and is not borne out by any evidence.

McCoy might, for example, have asked who tipped the French government off to this particular shipment. Customs officials do not take it upon themselves to search an ambassador's luggage. Authority for that can only come from the highest levels, and takes days to arrange.

The Orly officials, moreover, knew precisely which suitcase to sequester. They removed the right piece of luggage and let the rest go in a matter of minutes, obviously before there had been any chance to search all of them. In short they had heard from Vietiane exactly what to look for, and this tip did not come from the Laotian government.

The U.S. government, through the State Department and the CIA, is doing all it can to scotch the trade. The government of South Vietnam has had impressed on it that collusion between its customs officials and arriving smugglers is a serious matter, and it has arrested both its own citizens and halted and searched ranking foreigners.

In short, neither the CIA nor any other U.S. agency has ever deliberately engaged in, fostered or cast a deliberately blind eye on narcotics smuggling, although it has worked in other fields with officials who have been privately active in that one.

Raw opium has undoubtedly been transported on Air America flights in the past, but only as a private venture of a foreign passenger, and never with the connivance of an Air America employe. And the CIA has done what it can to prevent the use of Air America for such purposes.

The stories will no doubt continue, as long as there is a need for air services in Indochina, and as long as opium holds the peculiar place it does in the economy of that part of the world. But the stories must be seen in perspective, and in no way will they support the contention that the U.S. government, through the activities of the CIA, has deliberately furthered the international narcotics trade.

13 AUG 1972

TORTURE BY SAIGON IN JAILS REPORTED

Documents and Interviews
Indicate Wide Abuse of
Political Prisoners

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Aug. 12—Documents smuggled out of South Vietnamese prisons and extensive interviews with former prisoners paint a picture of widespread torture of people jailed by the Saigon Government since the North Vietnamese offensive started four and a half months ago.

Here is a sampling of the prisoners' accounts:

"Nguyen Thi Yen was beaten unconscious with a wooden rod. Later, when she revived, she was forced to stand naked before about 10 torturers, who burned her breasts with lighted cigarettes."

"Trinh Dinh Ban was beaten so badly in the face that the swelling shut and infected his eyes. The police drove needles through his fingertips and battered him on the chest and soles of his feet until he was unable to move."

"Vo Thi Bach Tuyet was beaten and hung by her feet under a blazing light. Later, they put her in a tiny room half flooded with water and let mice and insects run over her body."

Stories Are Typical

These particular accounts are said to describe the torture of three student leaders still being held in South Vietnamese jails on suspicion of being Communist sympathizers. The accounts in these documents and many others obtained by this correspondent were purportedly written by prisoners—and in some cases by sympathetic guards—and then smuggled out.

The three accounts are typical of the stories told in the other documents and in the interviews about the treatment of the thousands of students, workers, peasants, women and children arrested by the

tional police and military authorities in the "pre-emptive sweeps" made in the search for Communist sympathizers and agents since the North Vietnamese Army began its offensive.

Some of the documents reached this correspondent through friends of prisoners or critics of the Government to whom the papers had been passed. Some of the interviews were also arranged this way. Additional information was gathered on the basis of other leads.

There is no way to verify the accounts of torture first hand, for the Saigon Government refuses to allow journalists to visit its prisons, which it calls "re-education centers." A formal written request was denied.

All of those interviewed said their names could not be used because they feared police reprisals.

Reports Are Similar

As with the smuggled documents, it is impossible to corroborate the accounts given by former prisoners in interviews. But although one cannot establish after the fact that the welts and scars visible on their bodies were inflicted by the police, the widespread reports bear out the prisoners' version.

Government officials and pro-Government legislators defend the recent repressive measures by arguing that the survival of South Vietnam is at stake. Critics reply that only the Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu, not South Vietnam, is at stake.

"Necessity requires us to accept a flexible view of the law," said one official. "You wouldn't wait until the Vietcong agent pointed his gun at your back before you handcuffed him, would you? Legal aspects do not count when there is a question of survival involved."

The victims obviously feel differently. Here, for example, is part of an account given by a woman who was interrogated intensively but not beaten in a police detention center in Saigon and then released:

"When you were being interrogated, you could hear the screams of people being tortured. Sometimes they showed you the torture going on, to try to frighten you into saying what they wanted you to say."

"Two women in my cell were pregnant. One was beaten badly. Another woman was beaten mostly on the knees, which became infected."

"One high school student tried to kill herself by cutting

her taps in the washroom, but she failed. They had tortured her by putting some kind of thick rubber band around her head to squeeze it. It made her eyes swell out and gave her unbearable headaches."

"One girl was so badly tortured that the police left her in a corridor outside the interrogation room for a day—so that other prisoners would not see her condition."

This was a typical story of those interviewed. Some said that water had been forced down their mouths until they nearly drowned. Others told of electric prods used on sensitive parts of the body, of fingernails pulled out and of fingers mashed.

Several of the informants said they had discovered, while in prison, a sardonic saying favored by the police—"Khong, danh cho co."—"If they are innocent, beat them until they become guilty."

The accounts of the informants indicated that the worst torturing took place while prisoners were being interrogated in police centers—before they were transferred to prisons such as Con Son and Chi Hoa. Con Son is South Vietnam's biggest civilian penitentiary, situated on Con Son, an island 140 miles southeast of Saigon. Chi Hoa, the country's second largest prison, is in Saigon.

The informants said that most of the torture and interrogation took place between 10 P.M. and 3 A.M. They said some of the prisoners, under torture or fearing torture, agreed to become police agents to win their release.

Names Are Given

Some of the documents purportedly smuggled out of the prisons gave the names of five persons who had been tortured to death recently in jail, and said this was only a part list. The documents listed Buu Chi and Nguyen Duy Hien, students from the Hue area who were said to have died in Con Son. Also listed were Ta Xuan Thanh, Dinh Van Ut and Bui Duong of Saigon, who were said to have died in Chi Hoa.

It is impossible to tell, without Government cooperation, how many thousands have been arrested since the North Vietnamese offensive began. Most foreign diplomats think the figure is well over 10,000. One American source said that slightly over 15,000 people had been jailed and about 5,000 released later. But whatever the exact figures, it is clear that thousands remain in prison and that arrests continue.

The bulk of the arrests have been in the Mekong Delta south

north. Many students were seized in Hue, some of them reportedly while working in refugee centers.

Little Distinction Indicated

It is also impossible to tell how many of those arrested really have Communist connections and how many are simply opposed to the Government of President Thieu, because the police seem to make little distinction. There is a third category of prisoners as well—people who were apparently seized at random and who committed no crime. They just happened to have been in the wrong place.

Critics of the Government say that each district administration has been given a quota of arrests and that local officials have been trying to meet the quotas quickly with little regard for legal niceties.

According to one document, purportedly written by a sympathetic jailer, an old woman has been imprisoned in Con Son because one of her sons is regarded as a Communist sympathizer and is in hiding. Her four other sons are in the South Vietnamese Army. She wants to write them about what had happened to her, the jailer said, but she has forgotten their military addresses and the prison authorities will not help her communicate with them.

Family Links One Cause

This woman seems to be typical of many of those arrested recently. They were picked up because they have relatives who are active Vietcong or suspected of having some link with the Communists. But according to the Vietnamese officials themselves, most families in South Vietnam have a relative or relatives "with the other side" and the Government would have to arrest millions if it were to apply this criterion across the board.

Nguyen Van Thong, a pro-Government member of the lower house and chairman of the committee that deals with police and prison legislation, said in a recent interview that the Government should have carried out these arrests a lot earlier. Though Mr. Thong acknowledged that some innocent people had undoubtedly been arrested, he said, "These people will sooner or later get out of jail."

Legal form, rarely observed with fidelity at any time in South Vietnam's recent history, has clearly been abandoned since the enemy offensive began. On the one hand, President Thieu continues to declare that the back of the North Vietnamese drive has been broken, yet on the other he has been using his recently announced measures to narrow civil liberties further.

Publisher Bars Changes in Book On SE Asia Drugs Hit by CIA

STATOTHR

By Tim O'Brien

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has sent Harper and Row, Inc., a detailed critique of a book the firm is about to release, saying the work will do a "disservice" to the fight against narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia.

The New York publishing house, however, has decided to go ahead with publication of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred W. McCoy. The firm informed the CIA that "it is our sincere opinion that Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains unshaken and we do not see any reason for making changes in the text."

The book is highly critical of the CIA's efforts to suppress opium production and smuggling in Southeast Asia.

On July 5, CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston wrote to Harper and Row, asking "to see the text" of the book. "In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence," Houston wrote. "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the support evidence was valid."

"This, of course, in no way affects the right of a publisher to decide what to publish. I find it difficult to believe, however, that a responsible publisher would wish to be associated with an attack on our government involving the vicious international drug traffic without at least trying to ascertain the facts," he wrote.

Author McCoy, when told that Harper and Row planned to release galley proofs to the CIA, protested. He argued in a letter to B. Brook Thomas, the firm's vice president and general counsel, that "submitting the manuscript to the CIA for prior review is to agree to take the publisher's word for abandoning the First Amend-

ment protection against prior censorship."

McCoy cited "extralegal actions" taken by the CIA to obstruct the book's publications. He said, "Visits by the CIA to Harper and Row, the telephone calls, and the letters are extralegal attempts by the CIA to harass and intimidate me and my publisher."

Thomas replied in a July 18

letter, however: "We want very much to publish (the book). But we want even more to live up to the traditions and responsibilities of a great publishing house as we see them. If we are forced to make a choice between the two, there can be no doubt what that choice must be."

McCoy, under "strong protest," agreed to give the CIA an advance copy of his book. He did so, he said yesterday, "for pragmatic reasons," partly because of the firm's decision not to publish the work if it were not first reviewed by the CIA.

Acknowledging receipt of the manuscript, CIA counsel Houston wrote Harper and Row on July 21: "It is not our intention to ask you to make changes in Mr. McCoy's book even if we believe some of the statements might be harmful to the government. It is possible that we might find some statement which is currently and properly classified in the interest of national security. If so, we will consult with you, but we believe this is highly unlikely. Our primary interest is in the validity of the evidence with which Mr. McCoy supports his allegations."

A CIA agent hand-delivered the agency's formal critique of the book in a letter dated July 28.

"Mr. McCoy supports his theme by citing a large number of allegations, assertions and interpretations," the 11-page criticism said. "From an examination of these, it is plain that Mr. McCoy has limited his citations to those supports to have ignored available information which might

contradict it."

"Mr. McCoy's charges against the CIA, both directly and by innuendo, have been repeated by editorial writers throughout the nation and could create an accepted myth that the CIA has been involved in the drug traffic. The truth is that CIA has never been involved in the drug traffic and is actively engaged in fighting against it. We believe that the effect of Mr. McCoy's book is to do a disservice to this fight and to dishearten the many sincere people in CIA who are at least as concerned about this menace as Mr. McCoy."

In his book, McCoy argues that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the narcotics traffic

at three levels"—coincidental complicity by allying with groups engaged in drug trafficking; abetting trafficking by covering up for Southeast Asian traffickers; and active engagement "in the transport of opium and heroin."

The CIA critique covered several, although not all, of the illustrations used by McCoy to substantiate his three charges. For example, McCoy said that Air America—"which is really a CIA charter airline"—has been actively involved in the transport of opium products out of Laos. His sources, he said, include former Laotian chief of staff Ouane Rattikone (himself a suspected drug smuggler), Laotian air force commander Gen. Thao Ma, a USAID officer in Laos, and McCoy's own interviews with officials in Laotian villages.

The CIA critique said: "We believe the statement Mr. Paul Velte, Managing Director of Air America, made on 2 June 1972 in response to these allegations, labeling them as 'utterly and absolutely false,' clearly expresses the company and CIA views on this matter."

"General Ouane categorically denied that Air America was in any way involved in

McCoy said yesterday that "there are over 200 pages of material on American operations in the Golden Triangle area. Out of all that, this is all they (the CIA) could come up with. They're only criticizing about 2 per cent of my total information."

"The most remarkable thing about the CIA's critique is that the agency actually admitted that one of its own mercenary army commanders, Laotian Gen. Chao La, was running a heroin lab in northwestern Thailand. Although the CIA said it destroyed his laboratory in mid-1971, it had been operating since 1965 and the agency's full knowledge," he said.

Elisabeth Jakob, the editor handling the manuscript, said yesterday that "the industry has been very cautious on things like this ever since the Clifford Irving story broke."

A source at Harper and Row said the CIA wrote the publishing firm that it could "prove beyond doubt" that McCoy's facts were wrong. "They just didn't do it," the source said.

On Friday, the firm wrote the CIA, responding to each of the agency's criticisms. The "best service we can render the author, the CIA and the general public is to publish the book as expeditiously as possible, and that is what we intend to do." The book is scheduled for release on Aug. 17.

STATOTHR

6 AUG 1972

American Involvement Still Growing in Laos

U.S. Military Takes More Far-Ranging Role, Including Remolding Royal Army

BY JACK POISIE

Times Staff Writer

VIENTIANE, Laos — American involvement in South Vietnam may be winding down, but in Laos it continues to grow.

The significance is not yet in increased numbers, but in more far-ranging roles. The newest one is remolding of the Royal Lao Army in the U.S. format. An Indochina peace settlement would end all such ambitious undertakings, but with the American-backed Laotian government in poor shape militarily, the shoring-up process is proceeding as if the war remains unending.

As noted, the numbers of official Americans reported in Laos is up only slightly — from 1,041 in 1970 to 1,190 last year. Now it totals 1,250. But that does not count daily commuters from Udorn, Thailand, a 30-minute flight away. There the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Army and Air Force, and the chartered U.S. airlines Air America and Continental have their Laos-operation headquarters, their logistical base, and many of their aircraft.

French Supplanted

Americans have supplanted the French as trainers of the Royal Lao Army. With the usual "take-charge" desire, American military officers are settling into their role as revampers of the motley Lao units into American-style divisions.

The American organizers of these radical changes insist the Laotians will conduct all their own operations. "Two or three" Americans

to oversee the process at each of four training camps. But if this endeavor follows the American experience in revamping the South Vietnam and Cambodian armies, the U.S. presence in the camps will become plentiful.

The enlargement of the American role expands in other directions. The U.S. Embassy, having recently added a second large building, is now constructing a third. Such diplomats as narcotics agents are housed inside.

The AID mission, besides its own legitimate civilian air program, continues to harbor CIA field agents, despite a Washington announcement a year ago that this practice would end.

The AID mission's role here as "paymaster" for other agencies including the CIA is considered defensible. As one AID official explained: "When you've got irregular soldiers on the embattled hill, that's CIA. When you've got civilians on the same hill, that's AID. But it's better to make one rice drop than two—and AID is in the rice-dropping business.

The candor with which officials discuss American activities here is due to a "fess-all" decision by Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley early this year. He decided, it was explained, "that just about all the secret activity in Laos has leaked out."

Patton-Like Phrases

Thus, Laos is now relatively open coverage for reporters. Thailand is the only country where the American coverup still exists.

With Godley's see-for-yourself policy, one might assume his image would have improved in the press. But he is still regarded in most profiles as a diplomat-turned-warrior. He uses such Patton-like expressions as "giving them the steel" in referring to a larger import of artillery to be used against the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in Laos.

And while there is still some denial, many previous restrictions on American military activities in Laos have been relaxed during Godley's regime. As a foreign diplomat observed: "The 1962 Geneva big-power agreement (to keep Laos non-involved in the Indochina war) is the most violated document in recent history — by both sides."

August 9, 1979

retired from the force long before its useful aerodynamic life was exhausted was that it was incapable of accepting, in a cost-effective manner, improved avionics needed to counter an increasing Soviet air defense threat. On the other hand, a principal factor which has contributed to the long useful operational life of the B-52 has been the ability of that aircraft to accommodate improved avionics in phase with threat developments.

The essential characteristics of a new bomber—including its maximum avionics weight capacity—are dictated by potential threat developments over the extended period of time—several decades—represented by the development lead time of a new bomber plus the long expected useful life of the bomber. It would be extremely unwise to design a new bomber—which will be operational beyond the year 2000—without the capacity for future growth if needed. However, this does not mean that the B-1 will be delivered with 10,450 pounds of electronics. Indeed, the Air Force has no intentions or plans to deliver the B-1 with other than the avionics package currently being developed—and, as noted earlier—the weight of that package is estimated at about 5000-6000 pounds.

SUMMARY

In summary, the estimates noted by Representative ASPIN are in error. The cost of the B-1 program is not "underestimated by at least \$3.6 billion" as Mr. ASPIN claimed was estimated by "officials of the Office of Systems Analysis in the Pentagon"; the cost of the aircraft is not projected at \$60 million by any officials within DOD; his estimate for the weight of the B-1 avionics package is clearly in error; the estimate he provides for the cost-per-avionics-pound is in error; and his understanding of the meaning of the 10,450 pound avionics capacity of the B-1 apparently is faulty. Singly and in combination, these deficiencies underscore the invalid nature of Representative ASPIN's press release and his position concerning the B-1 program.

THE NEW ARMS MERCHANTS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, during this year's debate on the military assistance bill, the Senate has formulated several significant policy decisions limiting U.S. involvement in the transfer of conventional weapons to various governments. I sponsored one of these, an amendment banning American-financed arms to the nations of South Asia.

In June, the Christian Science Monitor ran a six-part series on global arms sales and transactions. This timely and thorough study showed the pervasiveness of the international arms traffic; it showed that the United States is the world's largest and most active arms merchant; it showed the folly of arming governments that have yet to solve more pressing national problems for their peoples' welfare. Right now, \$200 billion is being spent worldwide on armaments, and in 1980, if nations continue to spend 7 to 9 percent of their output on arms, the yearly cost will be \$350 billion.

The Monitor series concluded with a number of proposals that could help stem the flow of armaments among nations. These included curbs on the use of surplus hardware, standardization of licensing requirements for arms sales, more rigid safeguards on the reselling of arms sales, more rigid safeguards on the reselling of arms to third parties, curbs on promotional efforts of armament makers and governments, and the encouragement of nations to seek out nonweapons commodities for redressing trade imbalances. Important, too, is a closer watch on arms traffic, so that the public is alerted to the dimensions, waste, and tragedy such traffic traces in the world.

The two largest suppliers of arms—the United States and the Soviet Union—need to discuss and negotiate limiting the flow of arms to smaller, often rival, nations. As the Christian Science Monitor wisely and realistically editorialized:

It would be folly indeed for the world's powers to congratulate themselves on controlling the nuclear demon, which is causing no actual destruction, while ignoring the grim daily havoc caused by conventional arms or surplus weapons.

I commend the Monitor for running this whole series and ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "The New Arms Merchants," written by John K. Cooley, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE NEW ARMS MERCHANTS

TRACKING DOWN MEN AND NATIONS THAT FUEL WORLD'S BRUSH-FIRE WARS

(By John K. Cooley)

In Washington a committee of senators listens glumly as a U.S. Defense Department spokesman explains why the American taxpayer must provide \$225 million for the Cambodian armed forces in the current year.

Thousands of miles away, aboard the Neuklong ferry between South Vietnam and Cambodia, an eyewitness reports: "New U.S. arms issued to South Vietnam are constantly being peddled on the black market.

"Many are bought and sold on the ferryboat. These include tents, guns, C rations. One Cambodian lieutenant bought, probably to resell for his own profit, enough M-79 rocket grenade launchers to equip a whole platoon."

On the other side of the world in Amman, Jordan, a U.S. embassy official tells a visitor: "The Jordan military gets a slice of everything that comes into this country. Where its funds come from is just a bookkeeping measure." All U.S. aid to Jordan this year is worth about \$120 million.

In Berne, Switzerland, a private arms trader negotiates a fat contract to sell hundreds of surplus North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tanks to a West African country whose people still suffer from malnutrition.

A few miles away, an arms buyer for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) discusses with an agent for the Czechoslovak firm of Omnipol a deal to replenish the IRA's arsenal of rifles and submachine guns in Belfast. The funds he pays were collected in the United States through an office in the Bronx, New York.

In these and countless other ways, the sale, loan, and gifts of weapons and other implements of war have become big business—and even bigger politics.

So big, in fact, that the worldwide trade in arms—in all its aspects from the smuggled crate of revolvers crossing a Latin American frontier to the transfer of the latest sophisticated Phantom or MiG jet combat plane

to an American or Soviet client state—has become the weightiest and most important tool of international power and diplomacy.

Some of the findings recently reached by an independent body of experts in a study for the United Nations Secretary-General boggle the imagination: While 10 years ago the world was spending \$120 billion annually on arms and warfare (\$150 billion at 1970 price levels), the figure reached and almost certainly passed \$200 billion after 1970.

The prospect, says the United Nations report on "Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures," is that even if annual military expenditures do not claim more than their present 7 to 9 percent of world output, "they could well reach the level of \$300 to \$350 billion [at 1970 prices] by 1980, with a total outlay for the current decade of about \$2,650 billion. . . ." This, of course, at the expense of education, public health, economic growth, environmental controls, and other matters vital to the welfare of the world.

This ballooning growth of arms costs has come about during a decade when there were no major wars between big powers.

PRIVATE DEALERS FEW

More, it happened even as the United States and the Soviet Union were starting to make progress in limiting strategic weapons, and as most major powers agreed to halt the spread of nuclear arms and to ban the terrible weapons of chemical and bacteriological warfare, and the use of the sea beds for war.

Gone are the days of the "honest" private dealers like Basil Zaharoff, whose influence upon governments and policies before and during World War I were immense.

The private arms peddlers and brokers, once called "merchants of death" but with access to presidents and kings, are probably fewer in number and certainly less influential now. A few, like Samuel Cummings of Interarms, have probably amassed fortunes.

But all available research now shows that not more than a tiny fraction—less than 5 percent—of the world's arms business is in the hands of such individuals.

Instead, governments and the giant armaments, aerospace, and electronics industries of the "military-industrial complex"—depending sometimes wholly on government orders—have long eclipsed the private traders.

Hence, private dealers now concentrate on the flourishing trade in sporting weapons and handguns and "sporterized" surplus military weapons. This is a specialty of big British gun importers and merchants.

The private merchants also operate in surplus and "scrap" weapons. These have helped keep many conflicts, such as recent ones in Nigeria and Central America, going strong.

AID STATISTICS CHALLENGED

In reply to recent questions asked by the United Nations about arms and development aid programs, many governments provided confident figures or statements indicating that arms aid was on the back burner.

But as Dr. Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish scholar who heads the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and who has devoted much of his career to studying the developing world, points out, "The statistics on aid and financial assistance is grossly juggled and falsified, giving the appearance that [non-military] aid and assistance from the developed to the underdeveloped countries is much bigger than it really is."

For the last 25 years, all the wars have been fought not in the industrialized regions of the West or Communist East, but in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. As SIPRI says in its 910-page study published last November and entitled, "The Arms Trade With the Third

2 AUG 1972

Report Pessimistic On Screening Out Indochina Drugs

By Tim O'Brien

Washington Post Staff Writer

A White House report circulated among congressmen early last month gives a gloomy forecast for U.S. efforts to stem illicit narcotics trafficking in Southeast Asia, particularly Burma and South Vietnam.

The little noticed report shows that a total of only 29 tons of illegal opium or its derivatives were seized in Southeast Asia between August 1971 and June 1972. This represents about four per cent of the annual illicit production in the region, which according to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is approximately 700 tons.

The report—a chronology of "narcotics action" in Thailand, Laos, Burma and South Vietnam—shows that 26 of 29 tons were destroyed at Chiang Mai, Thailand, last March.

The action has frequently been cited as an indication of a crackdown in Thailand.

But columnist Jack Anderson says that "the CIA and other federal agencies have quietly informed Washington that something besides opium went up in that bonfire." He said that all but five of the 26 tons was nothing but fodder, plant material and chemicals.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs refuted those charges, claiming that on-the-spot U.S. inspectors examined the material under microscopes and found it to be "genuine opium."

Andrew C. Tartaglino, Deputy Director for Operations in the BNDD, said "our chemist tested it before it was burned. There is no question—it was opium."

Anderson's colleague, reporter Les Whitten, was present at a BNDD press conference, challenging Tartaglino to make available a weekly intelligence summary compiled by the bureau from CIA and State Department reports. The summary, Whitten said, contained "a great deal of extraneous matter

was mixed with only five tons of opium."

Tartaglino said the summary was based on "raw intelligence" and had been "discounted as unreliable." He said the summary is classified and cannot be released without going through "established procedures."

The United States paid \$1 million for the 26 tons of material that was voluntarily turned over by bands of Nationalist Chinese living in northern Thailand according to Tartaglino.

The White House study, signed by Richard Harkness, information director for the President's Narcotics Control Program, said there would be difficulties in any long-term effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs in South Vietnam.

"Smuggling is endemic in the country and real control is unlikely," the report said.

According to the study, South Vietnam President Thieu was handed a memorandum on May 3, 1971, "which notes relationship between narcotics problems and future U.S. role in Vietnam." The memo urged him to greatly improve "intelligence and enforcement activities to identify and arrest narcotics ring-leaders and pushers."

The following day, the head of the Vietnamese national police's narcotics bureau was replaced, and its personnel expanded from 26 to 52.

But the unpublicized White House report summarized: "Encouraging as Vietnam's recognition of the problem and (its) dynamic response may be, real progress of a long-term nature is questionable."

This conclusion stands in contrast to the administration's public optimism, reiterated only a week ago by presidential assistant, Egil Krogh Jr.

The study was compiled for the White House by those State Department desks responsible for the four countries covered in the chronology.

The report listed no specific seizures or arrests in Burma.

the largest opium producing country in Southeast Asia.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimates that Burma's illicit opium production is about 400 tons a year.

According to the report, "the Burmese government's policy of non-alignment and sensitivity to foreign influence is a limiting factor in its involvement with the U.S. or the United Nations in the narcotics field."

"There are no BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) or U.S. Customs programs in Burma such as exist in neighboring countries with which the U.S. is allied or has common security interests and programs," the study said.

The White House said "very little opium is now grown in Laos; less than 30 tons a year." However, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimated last Tuesday that Laos produces more than three times that amount—about 100 tons a year.

"Nearly all of (the Laotian opium) still being grown is consumed by the growers," the report said. "There is no evidence that significant amounts of Lao-grown opium are entering the international traffic. Laos is a conduit for Burmese opium and opium derivatives, including heroin, however."

Of the 30 or 100 tons of opium products grown each year in Laos, less than one ton was confiscated between August 1971 and June 1972, according to the report's chronology of narcotics actions.

Although the report said that Laos is a "conduit" for Burmese opium and although only one ton was confiscated there in the 10-month period, the report concludes that "the flow of opium and heroin through Laos has been seriously disrupted."

Alfred W. McCoy, author of a soon to be published book "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," testified before a Senate subcommittee early last month that "all U.S.

officials in Indochina know that the vast majority of the high grade heroin sold to GIs fighting in South Vietnam is manufactured in Laotian laboratories."

"In northern Laos," he said, "Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and USAID have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

Publication of the book by Harper and Row, Inc., has been held up by a CIA request to review it. McCoy, under "strong protest," agreed to give the CIA an advance copy.

Last Friday, a CIA agent delivered "written comments and criticisms" to the New York publisher, but the company has not yet announced whether the CIA asked for revisions or a halt to publication. It is believed the firm will not agree to alter the manuscript, a source close to McCoy said.

AUG 1972

U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir

ABOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie factory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, headquarters of the National Security Agency.

Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses spanning the complex at regular intervals house specially-trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear iridescent I.D. badges — green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"—980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting

the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the DIRNSA building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies—it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Operations Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes of every nation in the world, analyze the de-crypted messages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director

STATOTHR

Harper to Show CIA Proofs of New Book on Asian Drug Traffic

Marchetti Book on CIA Still Under Suit

Harper & Row has decided, after much consideration, to honor a request from the Central Intelligence Agency to see page proofs of Alfred W. McCoy's controversial September 13 book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," and to consider "factual" corrections that the CIA may offer. The publisher, however, has made no advance commitment to accept any requested changes.

In his book, written with Cathleen B. Read, Mr. McCoy, a 26-year-old student in Yale's Ph.D. program in history, alleges that French, Vietnamese and U.S. personnel have used the traffic in opium and heroin in Southeast Asia for their own ends, and that the CIA and other U.S. agencies have either accepted or have responded inadequately to the situation. Mr. McCoy told Congressional committees early in June (including the foreign operations subcommittee, headed by Sen. William Proxmire, D., Wis., of the Senate Appropriations Committee), that he had had more than 250 interviews about the drug traffic, including talks with CIA and South Vietnamese officials, and that President Thieu and Premier Kiem were involved: he gave details of many allegations which appear also in the book. B. Brooks Thomas, Harper vice-president and general counsel, tells *PW* he and the editors have worked closely with Mr. McCoy on the manuscript, have insisted on documentation of all material points, and have had outside experts read it. As a result, Harper & Row is convinced that the book is well-documented, scholarly and deserves to be published.

A chapter from the book, adapted, appears in the July *Harper's* magazine. The magazine has received a letter from the CIA's executive director, W. E. Colby, denying allegations involving the CIA. *Harper's* reportedly plans to publish the letter soon. Mr. Colby and an officer of Air America (a contract airline which does work for CIA in Southeast Asia) also wrote to the Washington *Star*, disputing allegations picked up by a *Star* columnist from Mr. McCoy's findings. In these protests, and in its approach to

Harper & Row, the CIA is said to be departing sharply from its usual policy of silence concerning criticism.

Harper & Row was approached early in June, when a representative called upon Cass Canfield, Sr., former chief executive, now a senior editor for the firm, and said the agency understood the McCoy manuscript contained serious allegations about CIA and other agencies—allegations that he said might be libelous to individuals or severely damaging to the national interest. The representative spoke also to M. S. Wyeth, Jr., executive editor of the trade department. The Harper officials said the manuscript was not yet ready to be read, but that the request would be considered.

In weighing their decision, Harper & Row officials and editors talked among themselves and with respected publishing colleagues, including experts in the field of the freedom to read. On June 30, Mr. Thomas wrote to the CIA asking the agency to state its request, with reasons for it, in writing. The reply, dated July 5, came from Lawrence R. Houston, general counsel of the CIA. He wrote that the CIA was in no way questioning Harper & Row's right to publish the book, but said, "We believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims" about the CIA were "totally false" or "distorted" or "based on unconvincing evidence."

Harper & Row then decided to let the CIA see the book—subject to the author's approval, without which, Harper & Row president Winthrop Knowlton told *PW*, the CIA's request would not be accepted. The author finally accepted the decision, to let the CIA look at page proofs only, and to give a quick reply, with Harper & Row reserving all its options and reaffirming its right to publish.

"As head of the house of Harper & Row," Mr. Knowlton told *PW*, "I am sensitive, like all my colleagues in publishing, to the problem of censorship, and if I felt this request involved censorship we would not be agreeing to it. In view of the gravity of the allegations, we simply think this is the most responsible

way we can publish this book."

Ironically, in view of CIA efforts to refute the charges by Mr. McCoy and others, personnel of CIA, State and the Department of Defense completed in February a report to the Cabinet Committee on Narcotics Control which buttressed many of the charges, according to Seymour Hersh in a front page New York *Times* story, July 24. Mr. Hersh reviewed the Harper-CIA discussions in the *Times* of July 22.

The CIA's procedure with respect to Mr. McCoy's book is in sharp contrast to government action on an as-yet-unwritten book, a nonfiction work about the CIA, which Victor L. Marchetti is under contract to prepare for Knopf. In that case, the Justice Department obtained in April a restraining order to prevent Mr. Marchetti from publishing the proposed book, on the ground that it would be likely to divulge currently classified information in violation of a secrecy agreement that Mr. Marchetti had made as a CIA employee. Mr. Marchetti worked for the CIA for 14 years and resigned in 1969. He then wrote a novel, "The Rope Dancer" (*Grosset*), based on his observations.

Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., U. S. District Court, Alexandria, Va., in issuing the restraining order, ruled that Mr. Marchetti's agreement with the CIA "takes the case out of the scope of the First Amendment." The American Civil Liberties Union, representing Mr. Marchetti, denies this and argues that the author cannot in fact sign away his First Amendment rights. The Association of American Publishers and the Authors League have filed *amicus curiae* briefs supporting Mr. Marchetti in further court proceedings. (See *PW*, April 24, June 5, June 12.)

TORRINGTON; CONN.

REGISTER

JUL 29 1972

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Editorials**Uncle Sam - drug pusher**

Acting FBI Director Patrick Gray declared the other day that a shortage of heroin on the street market has developed as a result of the government's crackdown on the drug traffic, "the most intensive drive this nation has ever directed against narcotics racketeers." This might be encouraging news were it not for the fact that while the FBI is trying to crack down on the drug merchants another federal agency has been aiding and abetting them.

A detailed report linking the CIA to the enormously profitable traffic in heroin is presented in the July issue of Harper's magazine. It was written by Alfred W. McCoy, a PhD student in Southeast Asian history at Yale, not as a journalistic expose but as a chapter in a Harper & Row book scheduled for September publication under the title "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia."

It is a shocking indictment that McCoy presents in reciting how, as a result of direct and indirect American involvement, opium production in Southeast Asia is increasing and the export of high-grade heroin is flourishing. Most of the heroin used by American GIs in Vietnam has come from Laotian areas where the CIA is active, McCoy writes, and increasing amounts are being sent to the United States and Europe.

As part of the U. S. effort to bolster Southeast Asia against Communist inroads, the CIA has been working since 1959 with the Meo tribesmen of hilly northern Laos. In forging an effective guerrilla

army, the CIA built up the power of tribal commanders both militarily and economically. But by Laos tradition, economics is opium, starting with poppy farmers like the Meos and extending into the royal Laotian government.

One of the commanders of the CIA secret army, McCoy reports, is General Vang Pao, a major entrepreneur in the opium business since 1961. CIA operatives guided the building of airstrips to link his villages via Air America planes — which, naturally, soon were flying Meo opium to market. CIA and the U. S. Agency for International Development later helped finance a private airline for Vang Pao, who went on to open a heroin processing plant near CIA headquarters.

A year ago, President Nixon declared war on the international heroin traffic, and — under U. S. pressure — opium dens in Laos were shut by the hundreds. But, according to McCoy's report, neither U. S. nor Laotian officials are going after the drug traffickers. He notes that, according to a United Nations report, 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium has been coming from the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia — northeast Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos — "capable of supplying the U. S. with unlimited quantities of heroin for generations."

McCoy's conclusion: "Unless something is done to change America's policies and priorities in Southeast Asia, the drug crisis will deepen and the heroin plague will continue to spread."

NEW HAVEN, CONN.
JOURNAL-COURIER
JUL 24 1972
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CIA Said Eyeing Student's Book

A Yale University graduate student's forthcoming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia is reportedly being reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Alfred W. McCoy, 26, of 29 Lake Place, a Ph.D. student in Southeast Asian studies, spent 18 months in Asia investigating narcotics operations and recently testified before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Aid.

He testified at the time that aircraft chartered by the CIA and the Agency for International Development "have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

The CIA, with the permission of Harper & Row, the book's publishers, is reviewing the manuscript of McCoy's book with the intention of demonstrating that some of the book's claims are "totally false and without foundation," according to a recent article in The New York Times.

McCoy testified in two Congressional appearances in June that the material in the forthcoming book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia", was based on more than 250 interviews, some with CIA officials.

In a chapter of the book printed in the current issue of Harper's Magazine, McCoy charged that "American involvement has gone beyond coincidental complicity; embassies have consciously covered up involvement by client governments, CIA contract airlines have reportedly carried opium and individual CIA men have abetted the opium traffic."

At the time of his Congressional testimony, McCoy was described as a "very thorough scholar and not the antiwar type" by a senate staff member.

In the magazine article, McCoy wrote that during the last several months of 1970, more American soldiers were evacuated "mas casualites from South Vietnam for durg-related reasons than for reasons having to do with war wounds."

He also wrote that farmers in

the Golden Triangle--northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos--produce 70 per cent of the world's supply of raw opium and that much of it is being funneled to addicts on New York streets.

"After pouring billions of dollars into Southeast Asia for over 20 years, the United States has acquired enormous power in the region. And it has used this power to create new na-

tions were non-existent, to hand pick prime ministers, to topple governments and to crush revolutions.

"Unless something is done to change America's policies and priorities in Southeast Asia, the drug crisis will deepen and the heroin plague will continue to spread," McCoy wrote.

McCoy could not be reached Sunday night for comment.

KATHRYN KOLKHORST

C.I.A. AIDES ASSAIL ASIA DRUG CHARGE

Agency Fights Reports That
It Ignored Heroin Traffic
Among Allies of U.S.

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 21 —

The Central Intelligence Agency has begun a public battle against accusations that it knew of but failed to stem the heroin traffic of United States allies in Southeast Asia.

In recent weeks, high-ranking officials of the C.I.A. have signed letters for publication to a newspaper and magazine, granted a rare on-the-record interview at the agency's headquarters in McLean, Va., and — most significantly — persuaded the publishers of a forthcoming expose on the C.I.A. and the drug traffic to permit it to review the manuscript prior to publication.

The target of all these measures has been the recent writings and Congressional testimony of Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student who spent 18 months investigating the narcotics operations in Southeast Asia. His book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," is scheduled to be published by Harper & Row in mid-September—barring delays caused by the intelligence agency's review.

In his book, Mr. McCoy alleged that both C.I.A. and State Department officials have provided political and military support for America's Indochinese allies actively engaged in the drug traffic, have consciously covered up evidence of such involvement, and have been actively involved themselves in narcotic trade.

C.I.A. officials said they had reason to believe that Mr. McCoy's book contained many unwarranted, unproven and fallacious accusations. They acknowledged that the public stance in opposition to such allegations was a departure from the usual "low profile" of the agency, but they insisted that there was no evidence linking the C.I.A. to the drug traffic in Southeast Asia. One well-informed Government official directly responsible for

monitoring the illegal flow of narcotics complained in an interview that many of Mr. McCoy's charges "are out of date."

"Go back three or four years," he said, "and no one was concerned about this. It wasn't until our own troops started to get addicted, until 1968 or '69, that anyone was aware" of the narcotics problems in Southeast Asia.

This official said that in the eyes of the C.I.A., the charges were "unfair." He said of the C.I.A., "they think they're taking the heat for being unaware and not doing anything about something that was going on two or three years ago."

Based on 250 Interviews

During two Congressional appearances last month, Mr. McCoy testified that his accusations were based on more than 250 interviews, some of them with past and present officials of the C.I.A. He said that top-level South Vietnamese officials, including President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Tran Van Khiem, were specifically involved.

In July, 1971, Representative Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, said during a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearing that the United States Government possessed "hard intelligence" linking a number of high-ranking Southeast Asian officials, including Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu, then commander of the South Vietnamese II Corps, with involvement in the narcotics trade. Mr. Steele's accusations were denied and mostly ignored.

Mr. McCoy also alleged that Corsican and American syndicate gangsters had become involved in the narcotics trade. He said that such information was known to the C.I.A. In a chapter of his book published in this month's Harper's Magazine, Mr. McCoy further charged that in 1967 the infamous "Golden Triangle"—an opium-producing area embracing parts of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos—was producing about 1,000 tons of raw opium annually, then about 70 per cent of the world's supply.

The bulk of Mr. McCoy's accusations—both in the magazine and during the Congressional hearings—failed to gain much national attention. Nonetheless, the C.I.A. began its unusual public defense after a Washington Star reporter cited some of Mr. McCoy's allegations in a column.

Letter Sent to Paper

Two letters were sent to the newspaper for publication. Colby, the executive director of the C.I.A., and the other by Paul C. Velte Jr., a Wash-

ington-based official with Air America, a charter airline that flies missions for the C.I.A. in Southeast Asia. Both categorically denied the allegations linking C.I.A. personnel to any knowledge of or activity in the drug traffic.

A similar letter of disavowal, signed by Mr. Colby, was sent for publication to the publisher of Harper's Magazine within the last week. Robert Schnayer, the magazine's editor, said that the letter would be published as soon as possible.

The C.I.A. began its approach to Harper & Row in early June, apparently after learning of Mr. McCoy's appearance before the Senate subcommittee. Cord Meyer Jr., described as a senior agency official, met with officials of the publishing concern and informally asked for a copy of the manuscript for review prior to publication.

On July 5, a formal letter making the request, signed by Lawrence R. Houston, general counsel of the C.I.A., was sent to Harper & Row.

Mr. Houston's request was not based on national security, but on the thesis that "allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. Government [in drug traffic] or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence."

The letter continued: "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the supporting evidence was valid." If the manuscript were handed over, the letter said, "we believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims about this agency's alleged involvement are totally false and without foundation, a number are distorted beyond recognition, and none is based on convincing evidence." A copy of the letter was made available to The New York Times.

Mr. McCoy, in an interview, said that the book had been commissioned by Harper & Row and carefully and totally reviewed by its attorneys with no complaint until the C.I.A. request was made.

B. Brooks Thomas, vice president and general counsel of the publishing house, said in an interview in New York, "We don't have any doubts about the book at all. We've had it reviewed by others and we're persuaded that the work is amply documented and scholarly."

"We're not submitting to censorship or anything like that," Mr. Thomas said. "We're taking a responsible middle position. We should have the chance to review it." If Mr. McCoy

did not agree, he added, Harper & Row would not publish the book.

In a subsequent interview, Robert L. Bernstein, president of Random House and president of the Association of American Publishers, Inc., said that his concern had twice refused official C.I.A. requests for permission to revise manuscripts. "In general," Mr. Bernstein said, "our opinion would be that we would not publish a book endangering the life of anybody working for the C.I.A. or an other Government agency. Short of that, we would publish any valid criticism."

In a series of interviews with The New York Times, a number of present and former officials of the C.I.A. acknowledged that smuggling and "looking the other way" was common throughout Southeast Asia during the nineteen-sixties. But many noted that the agency had since taken strong steps to curb such practices.

One official, who spent many years in Southeast Asia, said, "I don't believe that agency staff personnel were dealing

in opium. But if you're talking about Air America hauling the stuff around, then I'll bet my bottom dollar that they were in it."

Another former C.I.A. agent described Mr. McCoy's published writings as "1 per cent tendentious and 90 per cent of the most valuable contribution I can think of."

20 JUL 1972

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A Visit to a Secret American Base in Thailand

By Peter Smith

Pacific News Service

PHITSANULOK, Thailand—In a U-shaped bend of a small river about 13 miles east of this northern district capital lies a secret U.S. military training base known as Camp Saritsana.

Near the point where I had been told to turn off the road to find the camp, a Thai waitress in a small restaurant said that there were usually about 1,000 Thai soldiers at the site, but that most had just left. She also told me that 10 or 15 Americans were stationed there, and that planes landed on an average of five times a day.

As I walked along the river away from the highway, the whine of diesel generators guided me until I saw several concrete and wooden buildings, a 100-foot-high water tower, and a generator shed. Further up, a steel suspension bridge carried truck traffic across the river. The scene reminded me of places where I had served in Vietnam and Thailand.

At Saritsana, U.S. Army Special Forces train Thai soldiers for combat in neighboring Laos. Since the early '60s, CIA-financed Meo mercenary armies, led by their most powerful chieftain Vang Pao, have been fighting in Laos, and estimates of the number of Meo men killed run as high as 50 per cent. To replace these losses, the United States has been training Thais for the last three years. But the training and the fact that Thailand has been sending troops to Laos have not been acknowledged by U.S. or Thai officials.

Senate Report

But a U.S. Senate subcommittee on security agreements and commitments abroad reported last year:

"The Thai irregular program . . . was designed by the CIA specifically along the lines of the irregular program in Laos. The CIA

supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides them with salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

These Northern Thai speak a dialect similar to Meo dialect, and they are easily integrated into Vang Pao's forces.

At the camp, I was stopped at the main gate by three Thai guards, who called their commanding officer, a Thai special forces sergeant major, on the phone. When I told him I had once served with the U.S. Special Forces in Thailand and just wanted to talk with some Americans on the base, he said, "Sure, come on." One of the guards got on the back of my motorcycle and we drove to headquarters.

The 50-acre site is divided roughly in the middle by an airstrip. Heavy woods surround the base. Ten barracks for Thai soldiers were on the left side of the entrance road. Elsewhere on the grounds were a Thai special forces headquarters, a jump tower and cable rig for parachute training, a drying loft for the parachutes, and several maintenance buildings.

'Air America' Sign

After checking with the Thai sergeant major, the guard took me across the runway to a building marked "Air America," the name of the charter line which flies secret missions for the CIA throughout Asia. My Thai escort ushered me into a U.S. Special Forces team room, where five men were having their morning beer. All wore civilian clothes or jungle fatigues without insignia or name

tag, a frequent tip-off that people are engaged in activity which might not square with formal pronouncements of U.S. policy.

Scattered among the usual pin-ups and memorabilia of home were other signs. One said: "No war was ever won with moderation and civility. KILL!" Another said: "Make war, not peace. War is the final answer."

The men were polite, almost painfully so. They did not mention their mission, and when I expressed interest they changed the subject.

Finally one of the men offered to escort me to the gate, and I followed his truck out and waved to the Thai guards as I left.

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Letters to the Editor

Reply on CIA Drug Charges

SIR: On July 5, W. E. Colby, executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responded to a June 29 column by Judith Randal in a letter. He stated that charges of CIA involvement in the narcotics traffic from Southeast Asia were "unsubstantiated." Since I am one of the persons who have made such charges, I would like to give the basis for my findings.

The specific charge is that Air America aircraft chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium harvested by the CIA-supported Meo tribesmen in Laos. I have three sources for this information:

(1) This was told to me by Gen. Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army, who also admitted to me that he had controlled the opium traffic in northwestern Laos since 1962.

(2) Air America's involvement was confirmed by Gen. Thao Ma, former commander of the Laotian Air Force, who refused to carry opium for Gen. Ouane.

(3) I spent six days in August 1971 in the opium-growing Meo village of Long Pot, Laos. (The writer assures us that that is, in fact its name—Ed.) Ger Su Yang, the district officer, told me:

"Meo officers with three or four stripes (captain or more) came from Long Tieng to buy our opium. They came in American helicopters, perhaps two or three men at one time. The helicopter leaves them here for a few days and they walk to villages over there, then come back here and radioed Long Tieng to send another helicopter for them. They take the opium back to Long Tieng."

Verified by Others

This account was verified by other officials, farmers and soldiers in Long Pot. Ger Su Yang also reported that the helicopter pilots were always Americans. Long Pot harvests weighed approximately 700 kilos (1,543 pounds) and could not have been carried without the pilot's knowledge.

In my June 2 testimony before the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I charged that "by ignoring, covering up and failing to counteract the massive drug traffic from Southeast Asia, our government is aiding and abetting the influx of heroin into our nation." I stand by this charge. The U.S. has put top priority on its military and political goals in fighting the war in Indochina. As long as our Asian allies have fought the war, U.S. officials have tolerated governmental corruption. Narcotics trafficking has not been treated differently from stealing U.S. aid, currency manipulation or black marketeering, all of which are rampant.

The CIA has organized a mercenary army of mostly Meo tribesmen in Laos under Gen. Vang Pao. The Meos' cash crop has been opium, and the CIA merely followed their French colonial predecessors' dictum: "In order to have the Meo, one must buy their opium." The CIA may not have bought their opium, but did ship it to market.

Ignored Involvement

More importantly, the CIA, the U.S. Embassy and the whole U.S. apparatus in Laos ignored Gen. Ouane Rattikone's involvement in the narcotics traffic, even while American troops in Vietnam were being decimated by Laotian heroin. His involvement, as well as the location of the heroin laboratories, was common knowledge among even the most junior U.S. officials. As late as June 9, 1972, Nelson Gross, the State Department's drug coordinator, called my charges of Gen. Ouane's involvement "unsubstantiated allegations." However, John Warner of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in a June 19 interview in *The Star* admitted for the first time that Gen. Ouane controlled and protected the Laotian narcotics traffic for years. Colby quoted Warner in his letter to try to discredit my charges, but conveniently omitted mention that the former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army was also the chief narcotics trafficker.

Southeast Asia is fast becoming the major source of heroin for the U.S. market, and high government officials in Laos and South Vietnam are involved in the narcotics traffic. The U.S. government knows this but ignores and covers it up.

The time has come when we have to decide which is more important to our country—propping up corrupt governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of our high schools.

Alfred W. McCoy.

New Haven, Conn.

Editor's Note: McCoy is the author of the *Harper's Magazine* article, "Flowers of Evil," appearing in its July, 1972, issue, quoted by Miss Randal.

STATOTHR

Letters to the Editor

Air America Bans Smuggling

SIR: Judith Randal, in her column of June 29 made certain charges that I as managing director of Air America must take violent exception to. Her allegation "..... that this opium byproduct has been one of the more important cargoes carried by Air America" is completely false. Needless to say, Miss Randal failed to provide any proof for this allegation and it is my opinion that a charge as damning as the one made by Miss Randal should be supported by more than just rumors.

Air America is acutely aware of the individual opportunities for smuggling that inherently exist with our type of operation. We realized that these opportunities are made even more attractive by the fact that we operate in areas of the world where extremely high value, low bulk items such as gold and narcotics are easy to obtain and can be readily disposed of at tremendous profit.

The company continually works to impress upon its employees the seriousness with which any and all smuggling is viewed and evidence of such activity is cause for immediate termination! Also as a means for combating this situation we have for years assigned highest priority to the regular inspection of company aircraft, crews and cargoes by our own security force.

The establishment of a separate Security Inspection Service under a USAID-Air America contract constitutes a major advance in preventing illegal transportation of drugs aboard U.S. government-chartered aircraft in Laos. Through the continued and expanded efforts of programs such as these, more effective means will be developed for greatly reducing and eventually eliminating the opportunities for smuggling that still exist.

Air America, in denying similar charges made by Alfred McCoy to the Senate Foreign Relations Operations Subcommittee on June 2, 1972, stated that "if Mr. McCoy or any other individual can provide proof that any Air America employee has been connected in any manner with the drug traffic, appropriate disciplinary action will be taken and the matter referred to the proper authorities."

To date, no such proof has been forthcoming and we now extend the same invitation to Miss Randal and The Star.

Paul C. Velte, Jr.

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF STATOTHR

PROGRAM RVR EVENING STATION WRVR/FM
 DATE JULY 7, 1972 6:48PM CITY NEW YORK

AIR AMERICA

ADAM POWELL: Back now with RVR EVENING, I'm Adam Powell, and with us once again here in our studio Dul Vesario(?) Vietnam Veterans Against the war, who is taking part in our discussion of the air war. Dul Vesario used to be an operations assistant with Continental Air Services which is far from an airline, it's a long way there. America is used by the CIA for transportation throughout Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and also is used as a front of sorts, for agents who do country team work, i.e. organizing mercenaries. America's become something of a fixture, especially in Laos where Congress has said American troops can't get involved. And Dul Vesario also has some information on what other uses Air America and Continental Air Services were put to in terms of transportation of cargo.


DUL VESARIO: Yes, I was there in 1967 as an Operations Assistant, working out of Vienchen Laos(?) and various things I did see, something I didn't even think about until some time around the beginning of this year. But as an Operations Assistant I was able to,--I had to know all about the cargoes of every aircraft that went in and out of Laos, the CIA or the United States mission to Laos, used, where the planes were going and what they were to do with their cargo in Laos. A lot of the cargo, of course, is rice which is dropped to Mao and Yao(?) and black Tai tribesmen in the hills, to support the insurgency warfare, and commando teams in those areas.

But some of the things I did see was a type of cargo that was marked miscellaneous on our manifest, and this comes out as an area the Golden Triangle, which,--some of it is [UNINTELLIGIBLE] which is on the triple border of Thailand, Laos, and Burma.

HARPER'S
JULY 1972

Alfred W. McCoy

FLOWERS OF EVIL



The CIA and the heroin trade

STATOTHR

Ladies and gentlemen," announced the genteel British diplomat, raising his glass to offer a toast, "I give you Prince Sopsaisana, the uplifter of Laotian youth."

The toast brought an appreciative smile from the guest of honor, cheers and applause from the luminaries of Vientiane's diplomatic corps, assembled at the farewell banquet for the Laotian ambassador-designate to France, Prince Sopsaisana. A member of the royal house of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of Jars region, the Prince was vice-president of the National Assembly, chairman of the Lao Bar Association, president of the Lao Press Association, president of the *Alliance Française*, and a member in good standing of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League. After receiving his credentials from the King in a private audience at the Luang Prabang Royal Palace on April 8, 1971, he was treated to an unprecedented round of cocktail parties, dinners, and banquets. For Sopsai, as his friends call him, was not just any ambassador; the Americans considered him an outstanding example of a new generation of honest, dynamic national leaders, and it was widely rumored in Vientiane that Sopsai was destined for high office some day.

The final send-off party at Vientiane's Wattay Airport on April 23 was one of the gayest affairs of the season. Everybody was there; the champagne bubbled, the canapés were flawlessly French, and Mr. Ivan Bastouil, chargé d'affaires at the French Embassy, gave the nicest speech. Only after the plane had soared off into the clouds did anybody notice that Sopsai had forgotten to pay for his share of the reception.

His arrival at Paris's Orly Airport on the morning of April 25 was the occasion for another reception. The French ambassador to Laos, home for a brief visit, and the entire staff of

the Laotian Embassy had turned out to welcome the new ambassador. There were warm embraces, kissing on both cheeks, and more effusive speeches. Curiously, the Prince insisted on waiting for his luggage like any ordinary tourist, and when his many suitcases finally appeared after an unexplained delay, he immediately noticed that a particular one was missing. Sopsai angrily insisted that his suitcase be delivered at once, and French authorities promised, most apologetically, that it would be sent to the Laotian Embassy as soon as it was found. Sopsai departed reluctantly for yet another reception at the Embassy, and while he drank the ceremonial champagne with his newfound retinue of admirers, French customs officials were examining one of the biggest heroin seizures in French history.

The Ambassador's suitcase contained sixty kilos of high-grade Laotian heroin — worth \$13.5 million on the streets of New York, its probable destination. A week later, a smiling French official presented himself at the Embassy with the suitcase in hand. Although Sopsaisana had been bombarding the airport with outraged telephone calls for several days, he suddenly realized that accepting the suitcase was tantamount to an admission of guilt and so, contrary to his righteous indignation, he flatly denied that it was his. Ignoring his declaration of innocence, the French government refused to accept his diplomatic credentials, and Sopsai remained in Paris for no more than two months before he was recalled to Vientiane.

Fragile flower, cash crop

Alfred W. McCoy, a Ph.D. student in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, has written numerous articles on Southeast Asia and has edited a political history of Laos.

Adapted from a chapter in The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, by Alfred W. McCoy with Cathleen B. Read, to be published by Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., in September. Copyright © 1972 by Alfred W. McCoy.

Despite its resemblance to comic opera, the Prince Sopsaisana affair offered a rare glimpse into the workings of the Laotian drug trade. That trade is the principal business of Laos, and to a certain extent it depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft, etc.) of the CIA. Unfortunately, the questions raised by the Prince's disgrace were never asked, much less answered. The French government overlooked the em-

CELESTINO MATTA-DUENO

HON. JORGE L. CORDOVARESIDENT COMMISSIONER FROM PUERTO RICO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 29, 1972

Mr. CORDOVA. Mr. Speaker, thousands of families in the rural areas of Puerto Rico would join me in paying tribute to Mr. Celestino Matta-Dueno, who retired on March 31 after a long and distinguished career as Director of the Farmers Home Administration for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

This is the rural credit service of the Department of Agriculture. Under Mr. Matta-Dueno's guidance it has become a tremendous force for better living conditions in the rural provinces of Puerto Rico, as it has throughout the rural United States.

Largely because of the hard work and leadership of Mr. Matta-Dueno, FHA is one of the finest public service organizations in Puerto Rico. Nevertheless, the many who have benefited from his services regret that he is no longer in an active role. They honor him for his dedication and accomplishments in their behalf.

For 31 years, Mr. Matta-Dueno has been directly involved in improving conditions for the small family farmer. He also has taken a leading part in the development of housing credit and community facility credit now extended to the nonfarm rural population through the Farmers Home Administration.

Mr. Matta-Dueno came to FHA's predecessor agency, the Farm Security Administration, as a farm program specialist in 1941 after graduation from the University of Puerto Rico and 4 years of work as an instructor in vocational agriculture. In 1947, when the agency was reorganized as the Farmers Home Administration, he was named Director of the Farm Production Loan Division for Puerto Rico. A year later he became chief of all FHA program operations in Puerto Rico. In 1961 he assumed the state directorship for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and has held that position for the past 11 years.

Twice in his terms of service he received the Superior Service Award of the Department of Agriculture, a record that very few have achieved.

On the first of these occasions, in 1957, he was honored for his leadership in adapting the FHA program to a Spanish-language basis for serving the people of Puerto Rico, and conducting the programs in such a way that a revolutionary improvement was brought about in the fortunes of many rural families.

Farm families in the hills and obscure rural districts, whose living conditions were sadly substandard and whose practices and resources in agriculture were antiquated, found the credit, training, and counsel they needed for a new beginning, in the FHA supervised credit program as carried out under Mr. Matta-Dueno's direction. A familiar figure, widely known, and respected through the rural districts, he was the principal architect of a FHA field force

that was able and willing to work with the people in their fields and in their homes. By Mr. Matta-Dueno's example, the Farmers Home Administration in Puerto Rico is the extreme opposite of an office-bound bureaucracy; and, I have observed, so it is today throughout the rural United States under the fine national leadership of Administrator James V. Smith.

The second of Mr. Matta-Dueno's Superior Service Awards was conferred last year. He was honored for the continuing expansion and improvement of FHA services in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands during his work as state director since 1961.

Of all the so-called state jurisdictions in the FHA organization, our islands rank at the top in maximum value delivered to the people, to the community, and to the common public interest.

Credit services through the agency in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands increased fivefold, from \$3 million to \$15 million a year, between 1960 and 1970, and rose to the level of \$22 million in fiscal 1971. Beyond the \$9.5 million now outstanding through 2,500 loans to enable small farm families to own or improve the operation of their land, FHA has developed new programs for upgrading rural housing and community facilities, and brought them to a high level of value over the past decade.

Housing credit of \$334,000 was extended to exactly 65 families in 1960. Last year, 1,800 families in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands were served with nearly \$19 million in credit to finance modernized, adequate housing for families of low or modest income in the rural towns and countryside.

In directing the growth of this program, Mr. Matta-Dueno has worked with housing specialists to design a serviceable modern home adequate for a family in the Puerto Rico climate. This cement block home has become a standard for efficient construction at reasonable cost. It has supplanted thousands of frame huts with thatched or tin roofs which once were the common standard for rural housing in Puerto Rico.

Farmers Home Administration loan and grant financing to plan and build rural community water and waste disposal systems was introduced during the 1960's. This program has led to modernization of services in nearly 100 communities that previously relied on much more primitive facilities.

In all, Mr. Matta-Dueno bears the responsibility for over 56,000 loans and grants with a value above \$150 million.

Mr. Matta-Dueno's administration has been marked by excellent and highly productive cooperation with every level of government in Puerto Rico from government to village. He has chaired an inter-governmental committee for this purpose. He also has made his mark as an advocate of better services for rural people by persuading health clinics, banks, and many other lines of business and public institutions to expand their facilities in the small towns.

In all respects the system for delivering credit, personal service and the ways and means of progress in rural Puerto Rico,

as developed under Mr. Matta-Dueno's direction, has been a fine exhibit to the world for the United States.

Representatives from many countries, especially in underdeveloped areas of the world, have studied the workings of the Farmers Home Administration in Puerto Rico. Mr. Matta-Dueno has been loaned as consultant to other Latin American countries that seek to improve their rural credit systems along lines of the Farmers Home Administration. His programs in Puerto Rico also have pointed the way to better service for Spanish-speaking citizens in various parts of the continental United States.

As he retires to private life, we hope and expect that his counsel still can be called upon, for we know his devotion to a better chance, a better life for the rural people of Puerto Rico.

We commend Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz, and Administrator James V. Smith of the Farmers Home Administration, on the choice of Dr. Manuel Soldevila as successor to Mr. Matta-Dueno. Dr. Soldevila also is a product of our University of Puerto Rico. He comes to FHA after outstanding service as a field administrator of agricultural experiment work in Puerto Rico. We are confident of his ability to carry on and continue the development of Farmers Home Administration programs, and to achieve the ever greater goals of service that are set by this fine agency.

STATOTHR

CIA DOES NOT SMUGGLE OPIUM

HON. CHARLES S. GUBSER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 29, 1972

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, once again there has been an upsurge in charges alleging direct CIA involvement in drug traffic in Southeast Asia. These allegations have proven false in the past. Last year I personally looked into similar charges and I am satisfied myself that they were without substance. Moreover, in April 1971, Mr. Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, made a public categorical denial of Agency involvement in drug traffic before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He has personally reaffirmed this denial to me. What the facts actually demonstrated was that the CIA is cooperating closely with other Government agencies in a concerted effort to curb the world drug traffic. The efforts of these U.S. agencies are designed to persuade countries, which for centuries have accepted the growth or local consumption of illicit drugs, to take stringent steps against such practices. They are also cooperating to eliminate the flow of these drugs into the United States.

Most recently, Mr. Alfred McCoy, a graduate student who is about to publish a book on the drug traffic in Southeast Asia, has made the same charges against the CIA. In early June, he aired his charges before a Senate subcommittee and received considerable publicity. Immediately after Mr. McCoy's

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Homage to CIA Drug Fight Ironic

By JUDITH RANDAL

The American Medical Association, which predictably offers few surprises at its annual meeting, achieved the unexpected this year.

As one entered the convention's exhibition hall in San Francisco's Civic Center, one's nostrils were assailed by an odor more appropriate to that city's Haight-Ashbury district — an aroma strongly suggestive of the burning leaves and blossoms of the female Cannabis sativa plant.

The scent fired the curiosity of all in the hall who had ever sampled marijuana and drew from the wife of one physician attending the meeting the remark that she had smelled that odor many times in the back of the school bus she drives.

That was only the beginning of the surprise. Following one's nose, one soon came upon a booth housing an exhibit on drug abuse which featured a display about many drugs, including pot, and a device that generated a synthetic smoke that was close to, if not identical with the real thing.

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There was still more surprise to come in this display, which — it turned out—had won the gold medal in the AMA's coveted Billings Prize competition as one of the outstanding scientific exhibits of the meeting. The exhibitor was no mere doctor or pharmaceutical firm, or even your average, run-of-the-mill science-oriented government bureau. It was that most unlikely of contenders for an AMA award: The Central Intelligence Agency.

Dr. Donald Borcharding of the CIA was on hand to explain the exhibit's origins. Like most agencies, he said, the CIA has an occupational health division whose job it is to promote the well-being of its personnel. When CIA officials at the agency's Langley,

Va., headquarters became worried about pot, LSD, speed, heroin and the like, Borcharding and his colleagues assembled the display.

According to the CIA medic, it was an immediate hit, not only at the Langley "Spook Farm" but also among groups in the community, such as Knights of Columbus lodges and parent-teacher associations. The CIA is thinking about putting together "how-to-do-it" instructions so that other groups can build their own replicas.

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Granted, the crusade against drug abuse needs all the help it can get. But the trouble with the CIA exhibit is that it does not tell things strictly as they are. For example, it implies that the use of marijuana sets the stage for later use of heroin. This issue is by no means settled and, as a matter of fact, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that alcohol, rather than marijuana, is the first drug to be abused by most people who subsequently become heroin addicts.

In any case, many experts believe that if there is any connection whatever between pot and heroin, it is their illegal status and that if the former were "decriminalized," its link with the latter would tend to disappear.

More important to this discussion than an argument about the casual relationship of the two drugs is the point that the CIA does not come into the campaign with completely clean hands. Reporters have been hearing for more than a year that the agency has been supporting the heroin traffic in the Golden Triangle region of Laos, Thailand and Burma, and that this opium byproduct has been one of the more important cargoes carried by Air America, an airline operating in Southeast

Asia whose charter business is almost exclusively with the CIA. The Golden Triangle region, incidentally, is said to grow 70 percent of the world's illicit opium from which morphine base, morphine and eventually heroin are derived.

For more details on the CIA's complicity in the heroin mess, one might consult an article entitled "Flowers of Evil" by historian Alfred W. McCoy, in the July issue of Harper's magazine. Part of a forthcoming book called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," the article spells out in detail how Vag Pao, long the leader of a CIA secret army in Laos, has become even more deeply involved in the drug traffic and what role this traffic has played in the importation of heroin into the United States and its use by our troops in South Vietnam.

★

Writes McCoy of the situation: "As a result of direct and indirect American involvement, opium production has steadily increased, high-grade heroin production is flourishing and the Golden Triangle's poppy fields have become linked to markets in Europe and the U.S."

The CIA went away from the San Francisco meeting with a gold medal and, no doubt, a good many doctors who saw the exhibit went away impressed. Some of them probably learned for the first time what pot smells like.

But for others there was a bitter incongruity in the government's super-secret spy arm winning a medal for an exhibit on the horrors of drug abuse. To some it was a little like the Mafia getting a top award for a display of the evils of extortion, prostitution and gambling — and a few of the more socially aware physicians present did not hesitate to say so.

STATOTHR

June 28, 1972

H 6272

A mass of legislation has been enacted by the Democratic Congress, but most of it does not carry the political sex appeal of these principle issues. The President is not likely to overlook the opportunity to expose these shortcomings.

Democrats have a particular talent for killing each other off. Party infighting does not help the Nation or the Democratic Party. The writing of a platform may expose more weaknesses than the party can overcome regardless of candidate, and George Wallace and others are attempting to produce a party platform which is more acceptable to the American public than the one now proposed. Yet, efforts to start pulling responsible party factions together may have come too late to be effective. One thing is certain, the Democratic Party has serious problems ahead for November. America wants responsible programs and responsible candidates which it can confidently support for a better tomorrow. Let us hope it is not too late to repair the damage within the Democratic Party. America needs a strong Democratic Party under sound leadership.

AN OLD-FASHIONED PATRIOT SPEAKS OUT

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, the Missouri National Guard Association, the non-military forum of over 1,700 active officers, retired officers, active and retired enlisted men of the Missouri National Guard recently held its silver anniversary conference in St. Louis, Mo. At that ceremony Col. Oliver M. Husmann, president of the association for 1971-72, and a prominent St. Louis businessman, gave his report to the members.

The conference warmly received this old-fashioned patriot who spoke out for his organization, to always defend the country. From one who has served his Nation, speaking before those who also shouldered the task of defense, Colonel Husmann eloquently and concisely stated his dedication to the United States, and its traditional spirit of patriotic maintenance of freedom, plus efforts for peace.

I recommend these words of Colonel Husmann to this Congress as an example of the strong devotion to our country that still persists today:

REMARKS BY COL. OLIVER M. HUSMANN

Webster defines a Patriot as "one who loves his country and zealously guards its welfare; especially a defender of popular liberty." This is the kind of patriot I was taught to admire and emulate. The kind who has fought for his country throughout its history. The kind who admits the imperfections of government, but loves his country even more in spite of them.

Today we have a new kind of patriot. The draft dodgers who skulks into Canada, Sweden, or any other country that will grant them asylum. Those who trample and spit upon the Flag. Those who bomb and burn our public buildings and academic institutions. Those who condemn our involvement in Viet Nam and publicly esteem our enemies. Those who question every word uttered by our leaders, but willingly accept as the whole truth any and all charges leveled against us by our enemies.

There are many in this country who find favor with this new type of patriot. We find these "sob sisters" amongst our clergy, among our so-called intellectuals and even amongst our leaders in the Congress and the Senate. They say we should not have become involved in Viet Nam and now because we are so involved, the new type of patriot must be permitted to vent his frustrations as he desires.

The National Guard is made up of men. Men from many walks of life. Men in different stages of maturity. Men of different social antecedents. Men of various religious beliefs. Men with different political convictions. These qualities and characteristics which each individual possesses, must be nurtured, moulded and fused with those of the next man until, as an entity, we can move forward in a concentrated effort toward a common goal. We must resolve to do everything in our power to again convince the people of our country that Webster's definition of a patriot is and always will be correct.

There are too many in this country who have forgotten that the two ideologies—Democracy and Communism—cannot live side by side except by artful truces and so-called cold wars, neither of which can nurture a real, lasting peace. The tentacles of Communism creep insidiously wherever they gain a foothold. Our land, our way of life, our freedom and our liberty, as we know them, are the prizes Communism strives to take from us. Guardsmen must be constantly prepared to fight this threat. We must not permit ourselves to become the weak link in the defense of this great nation.

There is a greater need for the existence of the Guard today than ever before. We must let our fellow citizens know that the enemy wants us to be careless, lazy and uninspired in the desire to defend our country. That he looks upon us with utter contempt when we say we are tired of war. We must make the public realize that America needs its men—soldiers and citizens alike—to work continuously to improve our defensive posture while there is still time. If we wish to maintain for our children the liberty, freedom and safety which we enjoy, we must be prepared to defend these truths to the death. Consider for a moment what life would be like without these privileges we accept so matter-of-factly.

One thing is certain; we have the organization to build such a defense. We have the know-how and the money in this country to develop such a defense. Most important of all, we have US, the National Guard. We can discourage aggression now. All we have to do is feel the urgency, to realize the practicability of being prepared, and to work—work as men dedicated to the principle that the freedom we enjoy shall not perish.

Our silver anniversary is an opportune time to rededicate ourselves to the task at hand, to filling our ranks with true patriots, to teaching, to absorbing lessons learned, to building a defense capable of filling the needs of our people, our community and our country.

Guardsmen have taken such dedicated stands many times in history; always in the cause of freedom and liberty. Our citizen-soldiers, our National Guard, is older than the Nation itself. Dedicated men of the early colonies organized units and trained to defend their settlements long before the Declaration of Independence. Many of our present-day Guard units trace their history directly to these early groups of citizen-soldiers.

We need to review the heritage willed us by those who early stood in the defense of our country. We need to relive the struggles of the past, to see in our minds eye and feel in our hearts the valiant stand they took so this nation might be free. We need to think of those who stood with Washington at Brandywine and Germantown. We need to be

reminded of the Guardsmen, militiamen, minutemen, call them what you will, who bled at Bunker Hill. We need to trace their footprints that marked with blood the snows of Valley Forge. We must bend our backs and grasp with freezing fingers the frosted ears with Washington as he crosses the icy Delaware. We must lay siege with him to the heights of Yorktown. We must strive with those who followed Lee, Sherman and Grant! We must feel the fury of the charge at San Juan. We must share with them the blood and sweat of the Philippines and the Mexican Border. Let us follow "Black-Jack" Pershing through the holocaust of WWI. Eisenhower, MacArthur and Patton through the war to end all wars. Let us relive with them Argonne, Chateau Thierry, Corregidor, Normandy and MIG Alley. Finally Korea and Viet Nam. For the first time in history American fighting men find themselves in the unusual position of fighting a battle they cannot win, a war they are not supposed to win. A classic study in frustration.

Is Freedom, Democracy and the American way of life, which was bought at such a tremendous price to be lost to the most deadly enemy that has ever threatened free men? Has the sacrifice they made, been made in vain? Can we not continue the fight, can we not as citizen-soldiers bolster the defenses, man them effectively and surely, against any and all attacks of an enemy? Can we not show a love for our country? A love that surmounts all fears, all weaknesses and dedicates men to preserve with their lives the land they love?

I am not asking that we dedicate ourselves to becoming a nation of warmongers. No, I ask that we dedicate ourselves to work for peace. I firmly believe a strong aggressive, defensive posture is the best offense available to a country whose democratic ideals prevents it from initiating an attack against any enemy unless provoked beyond endurance.

Until we have made our country so impregnable, so invulnerable that an attack would be suicidal, will our enemies keep their distance. Until we have done this, the possibility of America becoming a major battlefield in a new world conflict becomes more apparent with each passing day.

Gentlemen, Now is the time for us to look to our defenses, time to follow the heritage which is ours. The time to demonstrate, once again, to all the world, that democracy is a living thing, transcending all other ways of life, and worth protecting at any cost.

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks in the body of the Record and to include an address by Mr. HOLIFIELD.)

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

(Mr. BUCHANAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. BUCHANAN'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

NARCOTICS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Mr. WOLFF asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, at this point in the Record, I would like to insert the texts of several formal statements made before an informal hearing which the dis-

In our own country, we stand in greater need of what we call conscience. Order is Heaven's first law; the Universe, with the infinity of celestial bodies, is regulated by law and maintained in order. The human creature on our own planet—as well as those which may inhabit any like orbs—is endowed with the faculty of reason; with faith, that is to say, reasoned hope; with the belief of the pure in heart that the soul shall have immortal being.

"Hats off to the past, and coats off to the future," must yet be the homely slogan.

I believe that mirth and music are material gifts from Heaven to Man, in compensation for the tragedies of life. Good thought and conduct constitute good morals. Evil is the exact opposite. If we transgress, we are punished, in one way or another.

All the qualities of humanity that are possessed of hope, faith, courage, diligence, reason, love of home and country, vision and noble ideals, must be exercised as indispensable labors in humanity's forward march. Apropos, the spirit of reverence and the Church must perform their necessary roles.

These observations are indeed trite. The multiplication table is trite, but reliance on the mathematics of Newton took the Astronauts to the moon, and thru the voids of space.

Our Baronial Order—whose members are descendants of sureties of A.D. 1215, has great opportunity for noble and patriotic service. It has also great responsibility, and, I believe, is meeting its obligations with fine dispatch.

The Magna Charta is a lengthy instrument of 61 articles. On June 12, 1215, it was adopted to hold in restraint, a cruel, despotic King John of England. Twenty-five sureties were named from the roster of Barons, to require the arbitrary King to pay allegiance to the Great Charter, which relates to benefits and property and other rights to the Barons, as well as the people in general.

Under the benefits conferred by Magna Charta, England, and the course of civil and religious liberty made lasting progress.

The next great document of liberty was the Mayflower Compact, adopted in November 1620 by the Pilgrims in Cape Cod Harbor. It was brief, but of essential character. It provided, in simple words, a comprehensive, organic and formal instrument enabling the establishment of Plymouth Plantation—on the Plymouth Rock site, binding equally on all; and assuring total equality, and to make all needed laws. Under it, the Pilgrims lived and prospered, with complete civil and religious liberty.

This modest compact proved to be the acorn which rooted and grew to the great oak of our Constitutional government, which we must uphold and sustain.

In conclusion, let me say, as did Tiny Tim in the immortal Christmas Story of Dickens, "Lord bless us all, each and everyone!"

CIA SMUGGLES OPIUM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, I am releasing today substantial new evidence that indicates U.S. pilots flying CIA operated helicopters have been smuggling opium inside Laos.

What this new evidence indicates is that U.S. pilots using U.S.-owned planes are illegally smuggling opium in Laos, some of which has almost certainly been sold to U.S. GI's in Southeast Asia and some of which has almost certainly been smuggled into illicit U.S. drug markets.

I am releasing today a letter which I have received from Alfred McCoy, au-

thor of a forthcoming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia, which details the allegation of United States and CIA complicity in drug traffic. If these allegations are true, then the CIA is implicated in fostering the drug traffic that ruins the lives of tens of thousands of Americans.

According to the information Mr. McCoy has given me, a Laotian district chief and other officials have told him that American helicopters flew Meo officers into Laotian villages where they purchased opium. The opium was also transported out by American pilots and planes to Long Tieng, the CIA headquarters in Northern Laos where it was allegedly refined into morphine and eventually heroin.

The Meo tribesmen, as many of my colleagues know, had been recruited by the CIA and form a mercenary army which fights the Pathet Lao Communist guerrillas. For the Meo, opium is considered an important cash crop.

Mr. Speaker, I have asked CIA Director Richard Helms to thoroughly investigate Mr. McCoy's allegations. Since Mr. McCoy obtained his information late last summer it is imperative to determine whether this kind of drug trafficking is still going on. A principal, unanswered question which the CIA must resolve is "At what level in the CIA were officials aware of this illicit drug traffic?"

It is also becoming increasingly clear, Mr. Speaker, that the Nixon administration is covering up and contradicting itself about the importance of heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. After Mr. McCoy testified before a Senate committee last month the State Department termed his charges about the involvement of Government officials in Southeast Asia as "unsubstantiated." However, the U.S. Army Provost Marshal reported in 1971 that high ranking members of the South Vietnamese Government were in the top "zone" of the four-tiered heroin traffic pyramid.

Mr. McCoy, quite rightly, also disputes the State Department's claim that "Southeast Asia is not a major source of heroin on our market." This statement by the State Department directly contradicts a General Accounting Office report which states that:

The Far East is the second principal source of heroin entering the U.S.

Mr. Speaker, it is imperative to determine whether the CIA is still involved in opium traffic and who was responsible for the alleged involvement of the CIA with the opium growers of Laos.

My letter to Mr. Helms follows:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., June 27, 1972.

Mr. RICHARD HELMS,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. HELMS: I am publicly releasing today substantial new evidence that indicates that U.S. pilots flying CIA-operated helicopters have been smuggling opium inside Laos. These allegations are contained in a letter and additional information that I have received from Mr. Alfred McCoy, author of a forthcoming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. If these allegations are true, then the CIA is implicated in fostering the drug traffic that ruins the lives of tens of thousands of Americans.

I am writing to you today to request that

you thoroughly investigate Mr. McCoy's allegations. Since Mr. McCoy obtained his information last summer, it is imperative to determine whether this kind of drug trafficking is still going on. A principal unanswered question which the CIA must resolve is: "At what level in the CIA were officials aware of this illicit drug traffic?"

I hope that you will report to me in full the results of your investigation.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

LES ASPIN,
Member of Congress.

ROONEY REQUESTS HALF BILLION FOR RELIEF OF FLOOD RAVAGED STATES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. ROONEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, in the wake of probably the most destructive flood in America's history I have today announced that I will request an additional half billion dollars in Federal funds for relief in the five States which have been declared disaster areas by President Nixon.

The \$92.5 million now available to the States in the President's disaster relief fund will not begin to compensate the losses suffered by the five States. If Pennsylvania were to receive the entire \$92.5 million it would cover only about 10 percent of the cost of putting the State back together.

I have introduced legislation to provide relief funds in the amount of one-half billion dollars to the States which have been declared disaster areas by the President. This money would be disbursed by the Office of Emergency Preparedness whose primary function is the administration of the President's disaster relief fund. In past crises involving disaster areas in several States OEP has appropriated financial aid to the States according to the amount of damage sustained in the respective States. This is the only fair and realistic method of tackling the massive cleanup job ahead.

Pennsylvania, hardest hit by the flooding by a wide margin, would receive the lion's share of the supplemental appropriation, and Florida, having the least amount of damage of the five States, would receive the smallest portion. The remaining money would be distributed by OEP to Virginia, Maryland, and New York.

Other Members and I of the Pennsylvania delegation will meet with Governor Shapp today to discuss the crippling effects of the flood.

I hope to explore all avenues of Federal assistance with the Governor and arrive at some concrete goals with regard to the needs of the stricken Pennsylvania communities.

BEEF PRODUCERS GET SHORT END OF STICK

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. SKUBITZ) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, in my opinion the action the President took on

26 JUN 1972

STATOTHR

The 'Tidiness' of History

Reviewed by

Richard J. Barnett

Book World

THE WAR CONSPIRACY: The Secret Road to the Second Indochina War. By Peter Dale Scott.

(Bobbs-Merrill, 238 pp., \$7.50)

The reviewer, cofounder and codirector of The Institute for Policy Studies, is the author of "Roots of War," a study of the men and institutions behind the making of U.S. foreign policy.

It recently came to light that the top Air Force general in Vietnam took it upon himself a few months ago to order the bombing of off-limit targets in Vietnam and in so doing to mislead his superiors. In his new book "The War Conspiracy," Peter Dale Scott finds a pattern of unauthorized provocative conduct by U.S. military officers and intelligence officials as far back as the Eisenhower administration.

What Scott means by a "war conspiracy" is the "sustained resort to . . . unauthorized provocations, and fraud by U.S. personnel, particularly intelligence personnel, in order to sustain or increase our military commitment in Asia."

He charges that on several crucial occasions in our recent history, commanders in the field have misled the President or taken action on their own which effectively tied his hands.

Perhaps the most celebrated of these incidents

have been the peculiarly timed escalations in the bombing of North Vietnam which seem so often to coincide with peace initiatives.

In April, 1966, a Polish diplomat arrived in Hanoi for a highly secret peace initiative known in the State Department code as "Marigold." The story of the crushing of "Marigold" in the bombing of Haiphong has been told by sophisticated journalists such as Kraslow and Loory in the book "The Search for Peace in Vietnam" and by insiders such as Chester Cooper in his "The Last Crusade."

Scott, however, brings many new facts together. He is a prodigious and careful reader who is able to juxtapose information in interesting ways. He points out, for example, that the Polish vessel Beniowski was attacked in Haiphong Harbor on April 19, 1966, while according to the official CINCPAC "Report on the War in Vietnam as of June 1968," these targets remained on the restricted list, despite increasing political pressure in Washington, until mid-June.

Scott has a long chapter

on the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, the Pueblo incident, the attack on the Soviet Ship Turkestan during the six-day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, and the circumstances surrounding the Nixon escalations into Cambodia in 1970 and into Laos in 1971.

Probably the most interesting chapter is a history of Air America and the Civil Air Transport, which he shows to be joint ventures of the CIA and the Chennault and Chiang families. He describes the role of Civil Air Transport in dropping supplies for the French at Dienbeinhphu. The planes were C-119s on "loan" from the U.S. Air Force and some of the "civilians" flying them were in fact U.S. military pilots. Five CAT mechanics declared missing on June 18, 1954, were according to Scott, "the first official casualties of the Vietnam War."

Scott is always looking for patterns. He believes that "history is not as untidy as we would wish." He is a connoisseur of conspiracy. The consequence is a series of hypotheses which vary

greatly in credibility. Some of the admirable efforts to make sense out of seemingly unrelated events are convincing but others are not. His effort to show a dramatic change of policy during the 72 hours following the Kennedy assassination is a fascinating historical brief, but I do not think he makes the case. By the end of the book he has enlarged the conspiracy to include not only the authors and editors of the Pentagon Papers but the judge in the New York Times case because he "was a wartime member of OSS." He sees the drama of the release of the Pentagon Papers as "one more manipulation of intelligence in order to influence public policy."

However, "The War Conspiracy" scores enough hits along with occasional wild shots to merit careful reading.

The important point that emerges is that a worldwide military and paramilitary establishment is impossible to control, that what was supposed to be an instrument to provide the top political leadership with "options" ends up restricting choices, often at crucial moments. Presidents and national security managers cannot make deception a routine instrument of policy, as they have done for a generation, without being deceived on occasion themselves.

STATOTHR

Private arms dealers: legal—and illegal

Not all arms deals are between governments of nations. There are also private peddlers — both the legal (and sometimes large) traders and the illegal gunrunning variety. For a look at both the sunny and shady sides of private arms sales, read this fifth story in a series about who arms the world.

STATOTHR STATOTHR

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*

LAST MONTH'S SOVIET-AMERICAN strategic arms limitation (SALT) treaty is viewed by many people and governments as a giant stride toward disarmament.

It has not, however, bothered the private arms traders. Quite the contrary.

Samuel Cummings, the 44-year-old American who heads Interarms — by far the world's largest private buyer and seller of arms — points out: "We don't worry about the SALT agreement because it will have no effect whatsoever on the movement of conventional arms; the arms we deal in.

"If anything, I would venture a modest prediction that it will cause an increase in conventional arms movement in the world, not only by private firms and producers, but also by governments.

"The inevitable result of denying or limiting strategic arms, the balance-of-power arms, is a greater movement of the conventional types.

"Anyhow, our business isn't controlled by us. It's controlled by the big powers who give the licensing.

"And we are merely, in my view, a reflection for better or for worse of the times in which we live... The whole arms business... is essentially based on human folly and as such is self-perpetuating. It increases in direct proportion to human folly as the world's population increases.

Licensed arms dealer

"It's a sad commentary, and I don't make it in any hypocritical sense but strictly in a brutally realistic and, from our side, commercial sense."

Mr. Cummings spoke in a telephone interview from his residence in Monaco. From there, he controls Interarms' American operations in the U.S., with main offices and warehouses in Alexandria, Va., and a staff of about

London 40; and Interarms U.K. in Britain, with a staff of 100, and warehouses in Manchester and Acton outside London.

Mr. Cummings, who comes from Philadelphia, began his present career after his World War II Army service by buying up captured German helmets and reselling them at a profit. Since 1953 he has been registered with the U.S. Government as a licensed arms dealer.

Essentially, Interarms' work is to buy up surplus military arms and resell them, either as sport weapons — after "sporterizing" or converting them — or to other governments. The sale to other governments has included everything from surplus uniforms to heavy tanks and jet combat planes. It is shrouded in secrecy because, says Mr. Cummings, "our clients prefer not to have publicity, and governments keep the figures classified anyway."

Turnover top secret

Mr. Cummings says Interarms' turnover is "top secret" too, but adds that "while we have been aiming for \$100 million yearly, it is still in eight figures only, not nine."

Mr. Cummings has taken legal proceedings against some who called him a "trafficker." That, "by European definition," he says, "is someone who does not pay any attention to the law... We are buyers and sellers under American and British Government licenses; we have only those depots physically in England and America, and every transaction is made only with the proper official approval by all governments concerned."

Clients of Interarms are found on every continent. Its Middle East business is so sensitive that even the names of its Midcast agents are kept secret.

Under the U.S. Gun Control Act of 1968, Interarms has helped convert thousands of "sporterized" ex-military guns into the United States. This has vastly helped U.S. gun manu-

Asian Allies Help Cut Heroin Traffic

By MIRIAM OTTENBERG
Star Staff Writer

U.S. narcotics agents are making a sizable dent in the Southeast Asian dope traffic and—despite reports to the contrary—America's Asian allies and the CIA are helping them do it.

"We have seriously damaged the program of the narcotics traffickers," reported John Warner, chief of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs' strategic intelligence office. "It's becoming increasingly more difficult for them to operate, even though their profits are tremendous."

Warner countered testimony given recently by Alfred W. McCoy, a Ph.D. student, before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee to the effect that the governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand are actively engaged in the heroin traffic and that the U.S. government has not moved to stop it.

"Corruption," Warner acknowledged, "is a way of life in Southeast Asia. It reaches to all levels. But the United States government has made it perfectly clear to all governments in the area that we will not compromise on the narcotics issue."

He cited as an example of increasing cooperation on instance earlier this year when 26 tons of opium were turned over to the government of Thailand by one of the insurgent forces along its border—presumably for reasons of its own.

Until recently, the opium would have found its way back into the traffic. But this

Second of 2 Articles

time, it was burned in the presence of American narcotics agents and samples were taken and analyzed by American chemists.

Even more significant are recent successes of Laos and Thai narcotics investigative units set up with U.S. aid.

Warner explained how they came into being and, in doing so, replied to the charges made by McCoy in his Congressional appearance.

McCoy had charged that the U.S. ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, "did his best to prevent the assignment" of U.S. narcotics agents to Laos.

Actually, Warner said, Godley has been one of the staunchest supporters of the anti-narcotics program in Laos, and requested U.S. narcotics agents as advisers long before they could be sent there. He was instrumental in persuading Laos to outlaw the opium traffic, Warner said.

Godley also persuaded the Laotian government to appoint an honest and competent general to head the new narcotics investigative unit which the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs established and trained, Warner added.

In the short time the unit has been operational, Warner reported, it has made tremendous progress in arresting traffickers and seizing laboratory equipment and the chemicals used to make heroin.

The unit's latest score came on June 7 when it arrested a Meo deputy of the Laotian parliament and seized 10 kilos of No. 4 heroin (the injectable kind), 26 kilos of opium and a number of U.S. Army carbines.

Another special investigative force, trained and equipped by BNDD agents, has just gotten under way at Chingmai in northern Thailand. Chingmai is a road junction in the network of roads leading south to Bangkok.

It's particularly important to U.S. narcotics agents because they hope there to halt the movement of heroin out of the "Golden Triangle," the opium growing area bordering Laos, Burma and Thailand.

The new Thai unit has just scored its first success. On June 10, a joint BNDD and Thai task force raided a compound and seized 1,600 kilos of raw opium and processing equipment, he said.

Warner also reported that the Royal Hong Kong police also have stepped up their anti-narcotics program, making large seizures of narcotics, arresting traffickers and seizing two laboratories this year. At the time, both labs had quantities of heroin, opium and morphine base.

Burma, the other government touched by the opium traffic, has expressed its willingness to cooperate, Warner reported, but Burmese officials frankly admit their control over the border areas are very tenuous. It would require an army to make any impact on the border areas where insurgent forces protect the opium traffickers, Warner said.

In Laos an acknowledged important trafficker has been knocked out of business not by an army but by American diplomacy, Warner said.

Gen. Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army, had consolidated several opium refineries into one, and with his army, controlled and protected the Laotian narcotics traffic for years, Warner said.

"He was forced to retire in July, 1971. We have political clout in the area and Ambassador Godley exerted it."

Warner said similar action would be taken against Vietnamese figures if charges of narcotics trafficking were proven.

"Politics means nothing to us in BNDD," he said. If we had the evidence . . . the President would be informed and I know something would be done about it.

McCoy had said in his congressional testimony that the political apparatus of Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky (the former

president of South Vietnam) "demonstrates the importance of official corruption in Southeast Asia's drug traffic." McCoy also said Ky's sister is tied in with heroin smuggling.

Warner, however, said there is no evidence that Ky is involved.

McCoy, in his Senate testimony, said he had briefed BNDD on his findings and they corroborated much of his evidence. Asked about that, Warner said he had seen nothing of an evidentiary nature from McCoy "other than gossip, rumors, conjecture and old history."

McCoy had accused the CIA of providing substantial military support to mercenaries, rebels and warlords actively engaged in the narcotics traffic and of letting aircraft it chartered be used to transport opium harvested by the mercenaries.

Of those charges, Warner said the American-chartered aircraft now have security forces guarding against the against the transport of any narcotics.

Since President Nixon asked the CIA to assist in dealing with the Southeast Asian narcotics problem, Warner said, the CIA has been one of the most cooperative government agencies working with BNDD to develop the information on which BNDD and its foreign counterparts can act to interdict the traffic and make cases.

The weeding out of Asian officials heavily involved in the dope traffic, as well as the strikes against the traffickers themselves, are all fairly recent. And so is the BNDD involvement in the Pacific.

It's only in the last two years that American narcotics agents have come into the Orient in force. Since BNDD Director John E. Ingersoll pushed for more agents to fight the Pacific traffic in drugs, regional offices have been set up in Bangkok, Saigon and Tokyo, and district offices in Chingmai, Vientiane, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hong Kong, Okinawa and Manila.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000

CIA-Backed Commando Raids into N. Viet Told

BY WAYNE THOMIS

[Aviation Editor]

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 14

Hanoi broadcasts infrequently mention "works of saboteurs" in North Viet Nam's panhandle, and Saigon's vernacular press occasionally report odd little aircraft accidents with nonmilitary planes in mountainous regions of Laos, Northwestern South Viet Nam, and sometimes in Northeastern Thailand.

These are mere pecks by the general public at a tremendous submerged "iceberg" of clandestine operations continuously and now increasingly carried out against the Communist North.

These actions probably never will be disclosed in full detail but it can be said responsibly that today they constitute an important phase of this Southeast Asia battle.

It is a silent war. It is carried out by special forces and by mercenaries. It is a hit-and-run war in which units are airlifted or sea borne deep into North Viet Nam for demolition missions, for seizure of prisoners, for probing forays, and—it now is understood—for accumulation of information on American prisoner of war camp locations.

This type of action has been taking place in the North Vietnamese panhandle from the Demilitarized Zone to well north of Vinh during the last 60 days.

An increasing series of such raids have come from the sea-coasts and from helicopter air-bridge links in Laos and Thailand to points where damage can be done or information obtained from the North Vietnamese, it was learned from reliable sources.

Communist broadcasts from Hanoi in the past have used "saboteur" in an ideological sense. Now they are referring to actual dynamitings by these raiders. They specialize in targets which are too difficult for bombers to identify from the air, or are too well hidden to be spotted by aerial photography. They also carry out a traffic in agents not otherwise possible under present conditions.

Size, Duration Vary

Reports filtering from Central Intelligence Agency and associates military establishments indicate such raids may vary from 20 to several hundred men. They may stay in North Viet Nam from a few minutes to 24 hours.

Mercenaries enlisted for such secret actions include Europeans, Chinese, Malays, Japanese and Americans. The operations are carefully planned and surrounded by the tight security.

The CIA now believes the large-scale American attempt to free prisoners from a camp near Hanoi a year ago failed because of a security leak

which resulted in a prisoner shift.

The raiders are heavily armed. Not one operation has failed, and none of the raiders have been trapped, according to informed sources.

Casualties among these special forces have been low. Pay scales are said to be "quite high" and morale among these specialists in demolition, electronics sabotage, and interrogation is very high. The men regard themselves as an elite corps.

Financed by CIA

The mysterious, CIA-financed Air America civil flying fleet seems to operate on a super-national basis across Cambodian, Thai, Laotian, and South Vietnamese borders. It has had a part in some of this work. However, much of the work is being done by military detachments, temporarily posted to the special forces.

The military establishment here generally attempts to suppress mention of this side of the war for a number of reasons, with security against enemy knowledge being the least important. The North Vietnamese are fully aware of the nature of the CIA-directed and financed special operations.

It is known that after each such raid all civilians and military personnel in the North who have had contact with the raiders are subjected to rigorous and lengthy questioning by Communist secret police and political commissars.

The U. S. forces seek to hide the clandestine side of the war to prevent embarrassment to Thai, Cambodian, and Laotian governmental departments.

It is recognized by American leaders that such concealment is merely "token" but is required in certain diplomatic tries fringing South Viet Nam maintain.

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16 June 1972

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

Silent War Stepped Up In Vietnam

Saboteurs Harass North's Panhandle

By WAYNE THOMIS


Miami Herald-Chicago Tribune Wire

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BACKGROUND REPORT

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STATOTHR

Adm. Felix Stump of Pacific Fleet Dies

By Jean R. Hailey
Washington Post Staff Writer

Retired Adm. Felix Budwell Stump, a much-decorated Navy officer of World War II and later U.S. commander in chief in the Pacific, died Tuesday at his home, 7012 Arbor La., McLean. He was 77.

He also had served in the 1950s as head of the U.S. military delegation to conferences of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

So vast was Adm. Stump's knowledge of Southeast Asia and the Pacific that President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked him to continue to serve two more years when he was due for retirement in 1956. He stayed on until 1958.

Before his retirement, Adm. Stump had warned frequently of the dangers of communist aggression in Southeast Asia, particularly the subversion of Indonesia. But he always expressed confidence in SEATO's ability to meet the challenge.

He was named commander in chief, Pacific by President Eisenhower in 1953.

Adm. Stump, who was born in Parkersburg, W.Va., graduated from the Naval Academy in 1917. He was navigator of the cruiser USS Cincinnati, which saw escort duty during World War I.

After the war, he reported for flight training at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Fla., and was named a naval aviator in 1920.

After instruction in seaplanes and aeronautical engineering, he attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he earned a master of science degree.

Adm. Stump saw duty with the aircraft scouting fleet and was head of the maintenance division of the Bureau of Aeronautics here before becoming executive officer of the USS Enterprise in June, 1941. He was serving as commander of the USS Langley, a seaplane tender, in San Diego when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

In January, 1942, he joined the staff of the com-



Adm. Felix B. Stump is pictured in 1955 as commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, holding a news conference in Taiwan on

possible evacuation of the Tachen Islands. At left is Adm. Alfred M. Pride, then commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and in February assumed command of the aircraft carrier USS Lexington.

That ship saw action against the Japanese in the Gilbert Islands, the strike against Wake Island and the Marshall Islands and in the

Tarawa, Makin and Apamama areas. The Lexington continued in battle until December, 1943, when she was torpedoed by an enemy plane and forced to return to this country for major repairs.

Adm. Stump was awarded the Silver Star for these campaigns.

In 1944, he assumed command of Carrier Division 24, serving as commander of the Carrier Air Support Group whose operations resulted in the capture of the southern Marianas. He then commanded a task force during the battle of Leyte Gulf in the Philippines, the battle off Samar Island and the am-

phibious invasion of Mindoro.

For those services, Adm. Stump was awarded the Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars and the Navy Cross with a Gold Star. He was cited for "exceptionally meritorious conduct" and "extraordinary heroism."

His force also participated in the invasion of Luzon and in action at Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands.

Adm. Stump returned to the United States in May, 1945, as chief of the Naval Air Technical Training Command in Chicago and remained in that position when the command moved to Pensacola.

He later was chief of naval air training at the Naval Air Technical Training Center in Memphis until he was named commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, in 1948, and commander of the Second Fleet in 1951.

In the Navy, Adm. Stump became chairman of Air America, which was founded by Gen.

Claire Chennault, who had headed the Flying Tigers. He also was executive officer of the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge.

He is survived by his wife, Elizabeth S., and a daughter, Elizabeth Frances Stump, of the home; a son, Felix B. Jr., of Cleveland, and two grandchildren.

U.S. Air-Drops Asian Guerrillas**Saboteurs Raid N. Vietnam**

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, June 14—Use of Laotian territory and specially recruited Asian mercenaries for CIA-sponsored espionage and sabotage missions in North Vietnam has been confirmed here by American sources close to the operation.

The missions are originating from a number of small mountaintop sites in northern Laos within 30 miles of the North Vietnamese border. The guerrilla troops are transported by unmarked Air America planes.

The existence of the guerrilla missions inside North Vietnam was first reported in Saigon earlier this week. Such missions were known to have been initiated in early 1960s, but were not regarded at the time as very effective and were apparently suspended after the 1968 bombing halt.

Highly trained mountain tribesmen from northern Laos and some Thai mercenaries with long experience in special operations are said here to make up the teams. Most of the guerrillas are said to speak Vietnamese, some fluently.

Officially, the Air America management in Vientiane is unaware that the company's pilots or planes are flying such missions. Air America is a quasi-private airline under contract with U.S. government agencies.

Pilots used on the espionage-sabotage mission flights are carefully selected and receive special pay for hazardous duty by a "white envelope system." This means that the money received is not accountable or traceable, even for tax purposes, sources say.

Official U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane decline to comment on the operation, but information pieced together from American and Laotian sources here indicates that virtually

inaccessible CIA-maintained bases in Laos are used to train, house, and transport the guerrillas.

Nam Yu, the CIA's most secret base in Laos, situated in northwestern Laos near the town of Ban Houei Sai, is reported to be the primary training center.

Nam Yu was formerly a base for intelligence teams being sent into South China to report on telephone and road traffic, a program discontinued last year when President Nixon accepted an invitation to visit China.

From Nam Yu, the guerrillas are moved to the Long Cheng area 80 miles north of Vientiane where they continue to train, making forays into the surrounding mountains inside Laos on lower-level reconnaissance missions for seasoning and practical experience in avoiding capture and inflicting harm on Communist forces.

Many of the potential North Vietnamese infiltrators are "weeded out" during this training period, sources say.

Resident newsmen here have been unable to visit Long Cheng in recent months.

Jump-off points for the guerrillas are considerably east and northeast of Long Cheng, according to the sources, most being tiny hilltop positions hardly known to exist. A major point of departure is said to be at Bouam Long, sometimes called "the fortress in the sky," about 40 miles northeast of Long Cheng, a base the Communists have never been able to wrest from its Meo defenders.

Practical training exercises are also conducted at Bouam Long. Communist radio broadcasts frequently note the presence, capture or killing of commandos from Bouam Long in the Sam Neua area of northeast Laos. Caves in nearby mountains contain the headquarters of the Communist-supported Laotian rebels.

The highest priority, however, is given to missions that move into North Vietnam

where they conduct sabotage, espionage and propaganda missions in that country's least inhabited and defended areas. Precise information on targets and types of guerrilla action is not available here.

It is known, however, that the CIA is distrustful of many claims made by the guerrilla infiltrators and frequently equips the units with cameras so they can photograph themselves at targets. The photographs prove the missions were carried out, and provides intelligence data for CIA analysts.

Each mission uses at least one specially equipped twin-engine Otter plane, said to carry half a million dollars worth of radio and electronic gear for pinpoint navigation and locating of ground forces. Because of the twin Otter's virtual silent operation as it passes close over the ground, its short take-off and landing capability, and the load it can carry, its basic function has been the clandestine insertion, pickup and resupply of guerrilla missions.

There are also reports of guerrillas being snatched from enemy-occupied territory by a hook dangling from rescue aircraft. The guerrilla on the ground inflates a large balloon with lighter-than-air gas, attaches it to a thin line which is then attached to a harness he fastens to himself. The rescue craft passes over the balloon, hooks on and hauls him up.

Qualified sources here say, meantime, that they believe that such espionage missions will be increased in northern Laos, and may be resumed inside China itself, to sabotage war material that—because of the mining of Haiphong—is expected to flow increasingly through China's Yunan Province and the Laotian Province of Phong Saly on its way into North Vietnam.

SUN

M - 164,621

E - 189,871

S - 323,624

JUN 3 1972

Indochina called key to drug traffic

BY WALTER R. GORDON
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The author of a forthcoming book on heroin smuggling told a Senate committee yesterday that the focus of opium traffic has shifted to Southeast Asia, where it is controlled by high government officials and abetted, directly and indirectly, by the United States.

Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old doctoral candidate who said he spent 18 months on research, travel and interviews, said heroin traffic in South Vietnam is "divided among the nation's three dominant military factions"—those controlled by the president, Nguyen Van Thieu, the former president, Nguyen Cao Ky, and the prime minister, Tran Thien Khiem.

He did not present any evidence personally linking the three leaders to the heroin trade, however. After the hearing, he commented that Vietnamese leaders traditionally insulate themselves from the dealings of underlings and there was no way of knowing whether the three leaders were involved.

Evidence from research

He added, however, that he had evidence from research and interviews that their organizations played a key role in the smuggling.

"Most of the opium traffic in northeastern Laos," he told the committee, "is controlled by Vang Pao, the Laotian general who commands the CIA's mercenary army."

He said the American government had directly abetted the heroin traffic by allowing smugglers to use the CIA's Air America to transport opium and by employing Burmese heroin smugglers as intelligence agents operating across the Chinese border.

Border crossings had

He said in an interview that the China border crossings had

been halted under presidential directive but that the Air America operations are continuing.

Mr. McCoy was testifying before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

In response to a question from Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis), the chairman, Mr. McCoy said he believed the only way heroin smuggling could be halted would be for the U.S. to put pressure on Asian governments by cutting off aid.

Senator Gale W. McGee (D., Wyo.), the only other senator present, accused Mr. McCoy of using "the vernacular of Joe McCarthy" when he charged the U.S. was "abetting" the drug traffic merely because it supported and financed those who actually engaged in the smuggling.

Shifted from Turkey

Mr. McCoy insisted that that word was correct but said he had not meant to suggest that American officials were personally corrupt or that the U.S. government intended to encourage drug traffic.

Mr. McCoy said that since the late 1960's the principal area of opium growing had shifted from Turkey to the golden triangle of Southeast Asia, which he estimated now produces 70 per cent of the opium smuggled into the U.S.

The witness said he had spent four months in Southeast Asia last year and had had "hundreds" of interviews in the process of researching the book. He said no official whom he talked to disputed the main points of his Senate testimony.

Example given

The author gave this example of international heroin traffic: A Laotian chief of staff who was said to have admitted to con-

trolling opium in northwestern Laos, allegedly sold the drug to a Chinese racketeer who was "the silent partner in Pepsi Cola's Vientiane bottling plant."

Then, according to the witness, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ly, the sister of General Ky, bought the heroin and arranged for Vietnamese Col. Phan Phung Tien to fly the drug to Saigon aboard planes of his 5th Air Division.

Mr. McCoy also identified Gen. Ngo Dzu, recently fired as head of the 2d Military Region after suffering defeats at the hands of the North Vietnamese, and Gen. Dang Van Quang, whom he called "Thieu's Kissinger," as major supporters of President Thieu who are involved in the drug traffic.

The principal international agents on the drug traffic, he said, are a group of Corsicans who first settled in Indochina in the Nineteenth Century and who maintain liason with heroin laboratories in France.

Mr. McCoy, a Ph.D. candidate in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, is the author of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," which will be published by Harper and Row in July or August.

STATOTHR

Charge CIA and Thieu push heroin to U.S. GIs

Daily World Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, June 2—Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale student working on his doctorate, told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee today that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Saigon Dictator Nguyen Van Thieu are directly involved in the shipment of vast quantities of opium and heroin to the U.S.

McCoy, who has authored a book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," debunked President Nixon's campaign against heroin imported from Turkey.

He told the Foreign Operations subcommittee, headed by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wisc), that the U.S. underworld has totally recouped the loss of the Turkish supply by turning to Southeast Asia sources.

In South Vietnam, McCoy said, the opium and heroin traffic is divided among the nation's three dominant military factions: Pres. Thieu's political apparatus, Prime Minister Kim's political organization, and Gen. Ky's political apparatus.

"Throughout the mountainous Golden Triangle region, the CIA has provided substantial military support for mercenaries, right-wing rebels, and tribal war lords who are actively engaged in the narcotics traffic and in Thailand the CIA has worked closely with nationalist Chinese paramilitary units which control 80 to 90 percent of northern Burma's vast opium export and manufacture high-grade heroin for export to the American market," McCoy testified.

"Some of President Thieu's closest supporters inside the South Vietnamese army control the distribution and sale of heroin to American GI's fighting in Indochina."

"Finally U.S. agencies have been actually involved in certain aspects of the region's drug traffic. In Northern Laos, Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium."

JUN 3 1972

Thieu Is Running Dope, Senate Told

Senator Gale W. McGee (Dem.-Wyo.) pressed McCoy on his lack of professional qualifications, implied his material was one dimensional and slanted and likened some of his charges to "McCarthyism."

"I resent your implication, Senator," McCoy replied, insisting his allegations are based on fact.

McCoy told newsmen he was financed in his investigations by the Fund for Investigative Journalism, the publishing firm of Harper and Row and from his own savings.

Associated Press

Washington

South Vietnam's president, former vice president and prime minister run organizations that split control of their nation's opium and heroin trade, a narcotics researcher charged in Senate testimony yesterday.

The witness, Alfred W. McCoy, said the South Vietnam narcotics ring has links with Corsican gangsters, with an organized crime family in Florida, and with scores of high-ranking military officers in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

McCoy, a PhD candidate in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on foreign operations. He said he had spent 18 months interviewing officials in the United States, Indochina and Europe.

POLITICS

McCoy accused American officials of condoning and even cooperating with corrupt elements in Southeast Asia's illegal drug trade out of political and military consideration.

At the State Department, a spokesman said: "We are aware of these charges, but we have been unable to find any evidence to substantiate them, much less proof."

These are McCoy's major charges:

- Heroin and opium traffic in South Vietnam is divided among the political organizations of President Nguyen Van Thieu, former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and Prime Minister Tran Van Khiem.

- General Ky's sister, Nguyen Thi Ly, travels about once a month to Vientiane, the capital of Laos, to arrange for shipment of packaged heroin to Pakse or Phnom Penh in Cambodia.

- The heroin is then picked up by transport aircraft belonging to the South Vietnamese Fifth Air Division and flown to Saigon.

- Until recently Mrs. Ky's prime supplier was an "overseas Chinese racketeer" named Hsu Tim Heng, who used his position as the silent partner in the Vientiane Pepsi Cola bottling plant as a cover to import a chemical necessary for the manufacture of heroin, McCoy testified.

- Heng bought raw opium and morphine from General Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army.

- General Rattikone admitted, McCoy said, that he controlled opium traffic in northwestern Laos since 1962 and controlled that country's largest heroin laboratory producing a high-grade drug for the GI market in South Vietnam.

- Most of the opium traffic in northeastern Laos is controlled by General Van Pao, commander of the CIA mercenary army, he said.

- The government of

Thailand allows Burmese rebels, Nationalist Chinese irregulars and mercenary armies to move "enormous hundreds of tons of Burmese mule caravans loaded with opium across Thailand's northern border."

- "Some of President Thieu's closest supporters inside the Vietnamese Army control the distribution and sale of heroin to American GIs fighting in Indochina."

Santo Trafficante Jr., whom he called the heir to a Florida based international crime syndicate, traveled to Saigon in 1968, contacted prominent members of Saigon's Corsican criminal syndicates and arranged increased imports of Asian heroin to the United States.

McCoy accused American embassies in London of trying repeatedly to cover up the involvement of local officials in the drug traffic.

CIA

"In 1969 the CIA in Laos," McCoy said, "Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

He was asked by Senator William Proxmire (Dem.-Wis.), the subcommittee chairman, to produce documentation for several of his allegations and he promised to do so.

Thieu, Ky Run Drug Trade, Yale Student Tells Senators

Associated Press

A narcotics researcher has testified top South Vietnamese leaders control their nation's illegal drug trade and are profiting handsomely from heroin sales to American GIs.

Alfred W. McCoy, 26, said control of heroin and opium traffic in South Vietnam is split among the political organizations of President Nguyen Van Thieu, former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, and Prime Minister Tran Van Khieu.

McCoy, a doctoral student in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, testified yesterday before the Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on foreign operations.

McCoy, son of a career Army officer, also said American officials have condoned and even cooperated with corrupt elements of Southeast Asia's illegal drug trade for political and military reasons.

State's Reply

In reply, a State Department spokesman said, "We are aware of these charges, but we have been unable to find any evidence to substantiate them, much less proof."

McCoy said the South Vietnamese narcotics ring has links with Corsican gangsters, with a Mafia family in Florida, and with scores of high-ranking military officers in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

He said he interviewed officials for four months in Southeast Asia, for two months in Europe and for a year in the United States.

High-ranking military and

civilian officials in South Vietnam and other Indochinese countries have been directly involved in distributing heroin to GIs fighting in Vietnam and to addicts in the United States, McCoy said.

He said he confirmed independently an allegation by the National Broadcasting Co. that Gen. Dang Van Quang, a military adviser to President Thieu, is the "biggest pusher" or narcotics in South Vietnam.

Have Denied Charges

In Saigon, Thieu and Ky were not immediately available for comment on the charges involving them. Both have denied similar charges in the past.

McCoy said that Santo Trafficante Jr., whom he identified as the heir to a Florida-based international crime syndicate, traveled to Saigon in 1968, contacted prominent members of Saigon's Corsican criminal

syndicates and arranged increased imports of Asian heroin to the United States.

In Tampa, Fla., a friend of Trafficante confirmed that Trafficante visited the Far East in 1968, but added, "it was strictly for pleasure."

McCoy accused American embassies in Indochina of covering up involvement of local officials in drug traffic, a charge denied by the State Department.

"In northern Laos," McCoy said, "Air America aircraft chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium harvested by tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

Paul Velte, the line's managing director and chief executive officer, said it is doing all it can in "a security program which effectively prevents the carriage of drugs on any of the airline's equipment."

STATOTHR

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Free

HOLD FOR RELEASE 9:30 A.M., MAY 27, 1971

92d Congress }
1st Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

THE WORLD HEROIN PROBLEM

REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION

COMPOSED OF

MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois, *Chairman*

ROBERT H. STEELE, Connecticut

PURSUANT TO

H. Res. 109

AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDIES AND INVESTIGATIONS OF ALL MATTERS COMING WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE



MAY 27, 1971

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1971

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[Perspective]

Electoral Politics: The Candidates Reply

IN THE EDITORIAL ESSAY "Vietnam and the Elections" which opened the April issue of RAMPARTS we observed that the call for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, once dismissed as extremist or naive, had at last become politically respectable. Withdrawal had in fact become the dominant theme of Vietnam policy among this year's Presidential candidates. At the same time, we noted, the clear principle of this demand was being clouded and distorted in the turgid mainstream of American electoral debate. And we called upon the anti-war movement in the coming months "to sharpen the demand for withdrawal and establish the clearest possible mandate for it."

In an attempt to follow our own advice, RAMPARTS wrote to each of the Presidential candidates, presenting to them a list of seven questions on their plans for peace in Vietnam. We received replies from Rep. Chisholm, Sen. Humphrey, Sen. Jackson, Sen. McGovern and Sen. Muskie. The letters from Chisholm, Humphrey, McGovern and Muskie essentially consisted of the candidates' point-by-point responses to our questions over their signatures. In the following commentary we have taken these questions one or two at a time, and grouped together the answers of these four candidates for comparison and analysis. Sen. Jackson's letter did not direct itself to the specific questions in a parallel way, so we are printing it in its entirety in a box on page 10. Of the Democratic candidates who remained in the aftermath of the Wisconsin primary only Wallace and McCarthy did not respond to our questions. Since Rep. McClosky had dropped out of the race in March, and Richard Nixon didn't answer, we drew a blank on the Republican hopefuls.

We posed seven questions; while the original numbering is maintained, the results are discussed here in a different order. This allows us to set out first the common thrust of the four candidates' policies and in a sense proceed from the easy questions to the hard, from the shared assumptions to the problematic implications.

1. *Shall the United States permanently withdraw all its armed forces (soldiers, sailors and airmen) from Vietnam on the sole condition of an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of war, timed to coincide with our withdrawal?*

2. *Shall the U.S. similarly withdraw its armed forces from all of Indochina on the same single condition? What about U.S. bases in Thailand?*

CHISHOLM:

1. I firmly believe and stand for an immediate total withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam; with the sole condition being an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

2. I also believe that it is imperative that we withdraw our armed forces from all of Indochina. I must further support a withdrawal of U.S. influence on the lives of those who seek a preservation of their culture.

HUMPHREY:

1. Yes.

2. Yes, although in regard to Thailand the critical point is that these bases not be used for strikes in Indochina. The question of leaving these bases altogether is a longer term proposition, involving issues that go beyond the Vietnam war; this calls for further study at the Presidential level.

McGOVERN:

1. Yes. It is important to note, however, that leaving U.S. forces in South Vietnam to defend the Thieu regime is a circuitous method of achieving release of our prisoners. I am convinced that they will be returned within the framework of Article 118 of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, which provides that prisoners will be released without delay "after the cessation of hostilities." This requires a complete American disengagement from Indochina. I want to point out, too, that I

do not regard this U.S. withdrawal as a negotiating position—it is instead a course of action which I fully intend to implement. The McGovern-Hatsfield Amendment did not urge the President to negotiate our withdrawal; rather it required withdrawal by cutting off funds for the war.

2. Yes. The bases in Thailand have no justification other than to attempt to exert U.S. influence over the internal politics of Southeast Asian countries. The withdrawal must, of course, mean an end to all military operations, including bombing, anywhere in Indochina.

MUSKIE:

1. Yes. I have consistently supported this position in the last few years. On February 2, I urged that "We must set a date when we will withdraw every soldier, sailor, and airman, and stop all bombing and other American military activity, dependent only on an agreement for the return of our prisoners and the safety of our troops as they leave." I do not believe that an agreement for the safety of our troops as they leave would be in any way a problem; the basic exchange would be a complete end to American military participation in the Indochina war for the return of our prisoners.

2. My proposal includes our military activity and personnel in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. I would therefore not make use of our bases in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia for activities related to the Indochina war. I would otherwise approach the issue of bases in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia in the context of efforts not only to promote detente between the U.S. and China but also with regard to the effect that either maintaining or removing our various bases would have on the possibilities for accommodation among Asian nations themselves. Clearly, we do not need to maintain anything like the number and size of bases we have now in Southeast Asia.

6. *Shall the U.S. set a date by which it will carry out its withdrawal (as specified in the preceding answers) on the same single condition of an agreement on repatriation of POWs?*



Jack Anderson

Smugglers Using Thai Connection

DESPITE furious denials by the Thai government, evidence is mounting that members of Thailand's 16-man ruling council have been corrupted by international dope smugglers.

As far away as this oriental intrigue is, it directly affects the alarming rise of crime on America's streets where addicts rob, house-break and shoplift to feed their gnawing heroin habits.

Reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State, Justice and Defense departments, all agree that more and more heroin is pouring into the United States from Thailand, one of America's closest allies.

"Historically, this area has not been an important source of opium-based narcotics for the U.S. market. This is no longer the case," bluntly states a classified CIA report now in our hands.

Buttressing the CIA are other U.S. intelligence sources who allege that at least two of the 16-man Thai National Executive Council protect dope smugglers.

The official U.S. sources also describe in detail heroin trade involvement of a top Bangkok police commander, a former parliamentarian, a Thai border patrol major and a colonel in a northern Thai army division.

The police official, say the sources, is owner of a well-known Bangkok massage parlor-brothel where heroin is readily available from employees. Run by a woman friend of the police official—who himself maintains an office in the building—the bordello is called "The Smack Parlor" by its American patrons. "Smack" is slang for heroin.

While this and other dope hangouts have long operated openly under the noses of Thailand's rulers, the lucrative up-country opium trade has been changing dramatically since this January.

Crude morphine base from the Thai-Burma-Laos border is no longer processed almost exclusively in the laboratories of Bangkok.

Instead, Royal Laotian Air Force fliers and a few pilots of the CIA-run Air America now airlift much of the morphine to warehouses in the "Golden Triangle" along Thailand's northern border.

The warehouses are dutifully protected by corrupt senior officials of the Royal Thai Army and the Thai border patrol who take a cut of the profits.

When the warehouses are bulging with illicit morphine base, chemists from Taiwan fly in, the sources say. They are ceremoniously welcomed by remnants of the old Nationalist Chinese divisions driven from Red China and now living off the land in Thailand.

No longer under Taiwan's control, the Nationalist veterans now support themselves in the dope trade. The Chinese chemists work night and day for 30 days, earning as high as \$10,000 for converting the morphine base to pure heroin.

Then the Royal Laotian Air Force and an occasional Air America pilot, who pretends he is unaware of his cargo, ferry out the newly processed white powder. This time it goes to distribution points in Bangkok, Vientiane and other Southeast Asian cities.

From there, it is transhipped to the United States. American intelligence officers are even fearful some may get aboard Air Force KC-135 tanker planes which fly directly to the United States from Thailand. The planes or crews are rarely checked properly by U.S. customs.

In Hong Kong, an important trans-shipment point, British officials are also scething over the corruption of the Thai government officials. Some proof of this dismay is contained in a cautious, classified cable from David Osborn, American consul in Hong Kong, to Secretary of State William Rogers.

Dated March 27, the cable urges secrecy, then confides: "Hong Kong narcotics officials have long-standing belief that Thai officials have

been involved in drug traffic for some years."

Yet, despite all this evidence of official Thai corruption, the United States continues to supply Thailand with millions in American arms. And the Thai government smugly dismisses this column's documented reports of heroin in high Thai places as "slandorous accusations."

FOR A welcome change, the government is going to get some return from one of its administrative trials. White House protographer Ollie Atkins accompanied President Nixon to Red China and helped put together a book called "The President's Trip to China." Atkins' share, instead of going into his pocket, will go to the federal treasury along with a check from his publisher for the pictures. Another Atkins book, "Eye on Nixon," will provide royalties to the American Red Cross.

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May 3, 1972

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of our GIs around the world. I am hopeful that U.S.O. will continue to serve them in the future. But I am afraid that from what I have been told, that there has been a serious scandal within U.S.O. that may possibly reach the very highest levels of administration officers in the organization.

If I can be of any further assistance to you or to anyone else in U.S.O. in conducting this investigation, please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Sincerely,

LES ASPIN,
Member of Congress.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., May 3, 1972.

The Honorable MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you may know, I have been investigating the current scandal in the United Services Organization.

I share your concern that some individuals within U.S.O. have been responsible for allegedly illegal acts. U.S.O. has been of great service over the years to many of our GIs around the world, but it is becoming increasingly apparent if these allegations are true, that a major scandal, possibly reaching the highest administration levels of U.S.O., has occurred.

I am enclosing the testimony which I have released recently, which I hope may be of assistance to you in pursuing the investigation.

Thank you very much for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

LES ASPIN,
Member of Congress.

MR. HARRINGTON IN VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, our colleague (Mr. HARRINGTON) recently returned from an official inspection trip to South Vietnam and Thailand. He was accompanied on his trip by William Wasserman, his former administrative assistant, who is a newspaperman by profession. On their return, Mr. Wasserman wrote an interesting and thoughtful review of their activities which was printed in the North Shore newspapers, which Mr. Wasserman publishes.

Because of their compelling interest on a subject of critical importance to all of us, I insert these articles by Mr. Wasserman into the Record at this time:

AIR WAR SECRECY IS MOST FRIGHTENING
(By Bill Wasserman)

You can be frightened after a week in Southeast Asia that U.S. policy is not successful.

You can be even more frightened when you see that we are rigidly pursuing that same policy of failure, and perhaps widening it to include Thailand.

But you can be most frightened by the effort of the U.S. government to conceal the whole business from the U.S. public, and even from a Congressman who votes the authorization for all U.S. military programs.

After three days of intensive briefings and tours of the five U.S. air bases in Thailand, Congressman Harrington learned from a newsman that several shifts in squadrons and aircraft were shortly anticipated which would increase the fighter squadrons in the area.

"That newsman's information is remarkably good," we were told by an Air Force officer.

"Why wasn't I told about it?" asked Cong. Harrington.

"You didn't ask," said the Air Force officer.

At Udorn Air Base in Thailand, a civilian pilot staying in the civilian hotel where I was billeted told me very openly that all Air America helicopter flights over Laos originated from Udorn Air Base. Air America is a contract airline paid by the American government, and presumed to be a CIA operation.

When Congressman Harrington asked the base commander at Udorn, "What is that squadron of helicopters over there?" pointing to the lined up aircraft.

"I don't know, sir," said the base commander. "Those are contract flights and I don't know anything about them."

A press association reporter who has spent five years in Thailand and has consistently sought to report on American air bases there, as reporters freely do in Vietnam, said that he has been unable to obtain permission to go on the bases. "The U.S. officials say 'Ask the Thais.' The Thais say 'Ask the U.S.'"

Craig Whitney, chief of the N.Y. Times bureau; Peter Osnos, Washington Post; Kim Willenson, United Press International; Don Sutherland, Christian Science Monitor—they have all tried and so far been refused permission to report first hand on the U.S. air war being waged out of Thailand.

Yet the U.S. has about 26,000 airmen in Thailand and its five bases account for about 5 million dollars a day. We have invested billions of dollars in Thailand, and from these bases we are bombing Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and now North Vietnam. We have nearly twice as many airmen in Thailand as in Vietnam. It is a gigantic effort, but it is concealed from the U.S. public.

One reason given for concealing the air war from the U.S. is "security."

But monasans, Thai women, come on the U.S. bases in droves every day to do the house chores of the U.S. airmen. They clean the barracks. They wash airmen's clothes. With their children, and their washtubs, and their picnic lunches, they make a colorful sight squatting between the GI barracks at lunch hour. Along with Thai men who work on the base, they can easily be the cover for any hostile agent seeking general information about the airbase. To suggest that what they know as common knowledge cannot be available to the American public just doesn't make sense.

SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHERE THE UNITED STATES
PRACTICES A POLICY OF MAKE-BELIEVE
(By Bill Wasserman)

(North Shore Weeklies' publisher Bill Wasserman traveled with Cong. Michael J. Harrington to Vietnam and Thailand for 10 days from March 29 to April 8. In Vietnam they visited Saigon and DaNang. In Thailand, they were in Bangkok and Udorn, and Mr. Harrington visited four other air bases. Harrington spent his days being briefed on the military operations which he, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, oversees. Wasserman interviewed airmen, civilians and newsmen.)

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, tall, patrician and gracious, leaned forward, his hands folded, and said, "You must look at the whole picture, not just the military. You must see the economic side too. The military, however, is now working."

That was less than three weeks ago.

Ambassador Bunker had received me before Congressman Harrington's arrival in Saigon because he was leaving for a week's trip over Easter to visit his wife, the U.S. Ambassador to Nepal.

It was a calm, sunny day in Saigon. We sat in comfortable chairs at one end of the

Ambassador's large, air conditioned office in the embassy. The Ambassador's youngest son had been my roommate in school for two years, and now, after catching up on family histories, he told me about Vietnam.

The U.S. initially had failed, said Mr. Bunker, to appreciate the need to provide the wherewithal for the South Vietnamese. "It was a new experience for the U.S. to be involved in a civil war and a war from without at the same time."

The Tet offensive in 1968, psychologically a blow to the U.S., had been the source of fresh determination by the Vietnamese, continued Bunker. They saw the need to be better armed, and, the Ambassador observed, the U.S. supplied M-16's. The ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) was modernized and expanded and now numbered 1.1 million.

The Ambassador dwelt on the economic development in the south. "I drove recently with President Thieu through the countryside. The farmers used to have bicycles. Now they have Hondas and tractors, radios and tv's, outboard motors for their sampans."

He urged me to arrange an air trip for Cong. Harrington over the delta to see the prosperity and to see, also, to the north towards An Loc—now the scene of desperate fighting—how air interdiction had not meant total destruction but selected destruction.

What Bunker was clearly saying was that Vietnamization was working, that we should on this trip pay attention to the broad, civilian achievements under President Thieu. He mentioned land reform, specifically.

As the interview drew to a close, the erect septogenarian who had completed a successful business career before joining the government, noted that he had served five Presidents. "Of course, I expected to stay here a much shorter time."

He smiled and described how President Nixon had arranged for him to visit his wife in Nepal regularly. "But that was impossible. It was so busy here—seven days a week, it used to be. It's better now," and he made a little joke about how he had to make this particular trip because his wife surely would not permit him to be absent over Easter.

Forty-eight hours later, the North Vietnamese offensive was underway. And within those few hours, Quang Tri and Hue, major bastions in the north, were threatened.

The American public at home was also calm as our trip to Vietnam took shape. One local newspaper even queried, "Why go?" Cong. Harrington, their editorial suggested, would do better to stay home and tend to his district. Going to Vietnam now, they said, was a junket.

In general it seemed the American public felt that the war was almost over. Casualties had almost disappeared—U.S. casualties, at least. Our troops were leaving. The air war? What was that? A distant war, Cong. Harrington said it needed seeing. It needed exposure. He suspected, but could not get firm figures that it was costing \$10 to \$20 billion dollars a year, and devastating three countries.

A gentle breeze swayed the palm trees over the ornate Buddhist temple while saffron robed young men, monks in training, strolled by. This was Thailand, where the people, commented the Air Force captain escorting me, were "very easy going and gentle," and where the U.S. now maintains its major Southeast Asian air bases.

Down the dirt road in front of the pagoda walked a young couple hand in hand. He was obviously American in his khaki trousers and sport shirt. She was obviously Thai. "Who would that be?" I asked.

"One of the guys from the base, and his girl," was the reply.

I was in Udorn, 30 miles from the Laotian border and the location of our largest fighter base in Thailand.

MAR 1972

CIA and Mercenary Air Forces

CIA and local Asian air forces are playing a growing role in the air war as the Administration seeks to minimize overt American involvement. There is abundant documentation pointing to the participation of these air forces in opium smuggling as well as in combat. (See Ramparts, 4/71 for a fuller account.)

Local Asian air forces--supplied, maintained and directed by American "advisors"--are doing an increasing amount of the bombing. The size of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) has increased dramatically, and the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), and the Cambodian Air Force at slower rates. Although all the aircraft are piloted by Asians, Americans do everything else, from directing bomb loading to spotting for strikes.

Air America and Continental Airlines, privately owned, profit-making companies, operate under CIA direction and wage much of the supportive air war in Laos and Cambodia. The "charter" companies' planes perform troop transport and supply functions, spot for bombers, and engage in rescue operations for downed pilots. Air Force helicopters, helicopter gunships and giant C-130 cargo planes are "rented" to Air America for \$1 a year in Laos.

ASIAN AIR FORCES

American aid to VNAF, FY 1970-72: \$922 million
American aid to RLAF, FY 1970-72: \$128 million
(DoD, CR, 8/3/71)

"The Nixon Doctrine . . . was premised on the assumption . . . of increased U.S. military assistance."
(Undersecy. of State U. Alexis Johnson, FY 1972 DoD Authorization Hearings).

"An important factor in carrying out the Nixon Doctrine will be our military assistance program. We are requesting 48 million for development and 70.4 million for procurement of the International Fighter. In addition, we are requesting 10 million for initial spares. This aircraft is needed to provide an air defense capability for [our] Asian allies."
(Secy. of Air Force Robert C. Seamans, FY 1972 Senate DoD Appropriations Hearings)

Sen. Symington: "Are we going to continue to put these billions into Southeast Asia? Is that the overall plan in the U.S. today?"
Secy. Seamans: "For the foreseeable future we are going to continue to spend sizeable dollars in Southeast Asia."
(Ibid.)

VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

"South Vietnamese military officers continue to deal in large quantities of heroin and to transport it around South Vietnam in military aircraft."
(Rep. Robert H. Steele, House Subcommittee on Europe, 7/7/71)

"The South Vietnamese Air Force is the sixth largest air force in the world."
(Michael Getler, Post, 1/14/72)

VNAF INVENTORY

Year	Fixed Wing Attack Aircr.	Heli-copters	Total, inc. Cargo, recon.
1/69	approx. 100	approx. 125	approx. 575
1/72	(total FW & heli. 750+)		1,000+
1/73*	300-400	500-600	1,200

*projected
(1969 and 1973 figures, Cornell study.
1972 figures, DoD)

VNAF PERSONNEL

1968: 20,000 (slightly under)
1972 (Jan.): 45,000
1973*: 50,000

*projected
(Ibid.)

VNAF ATTACK SORTIES

Year	Indochina	Laos	Cambodia
1968	2,250/mo.	none	none
1970	3,150/mo.	none	820
1971*	3,490/mo.	40	1,100

*as of July, 1971
(Cornell study)

"Mr. Seamans acknowledged that the Vietnamese 'will never be able to build the capability to do all that the United States Air Force has been doing in Laos. The Vietnamese Air Force . . . does not possess either B-52s or F-4s, the jet planes that do most of the trail bombing, and there are no plans,' Mr. Seamans said, 'to give it any.'"
(Craig Whitney, NYT, 12/6/71)

stroyers, and four—and soon to be six—aircraft carriers. An amphibious landing force from the 7th Fleet, comprised of a helicopter carrier and 2,000 men, has been shifted to Vietnamese waters.

The number of ships and Navy personnel now off the coasts of Vietnam is the highest since Lyndon Johnson left office. The number of B-52's now flying combat missions in Indochina is the highest since Lyndon Johnson left office. Hanoi and Haiphong are being subjected to American air attacks for the first time since Lyndon Johnson left office. In fact, this is the first time in the history of this increasingly futile and tragic war that those population centers have been attacked by our heavy strategic bombers.

The recent intensification of the air war over North Vietnam shows no more signs of halting the fighting in the South now than in the past. The Department of Defense has estimated that Communist forces require only 15 to 30 tons of imported material per day to maintain a moderate level of fighting in the South. This amount can be carried in 10 to 15 trucks, 75 to 150 bicycles, or on human backs.

While the air war is becoming more impersonal and remote for Americans, the same cannot be said for those on the receiving end of the bomb delivery system. Planes are still routinely armed with antipersonnel and incendiary bombs which inflict hideous suffering. Antipersonnel bombs include: Pineapple bombs, each bearing 250,000 steel pellets; Guava bombs, with each sortie releasing 400,000-500,000 ball bearing pellets; and Flechette or nail bomblets, each of which contains several hundred 1-inch barbed nails capable of shredding muscles and tissues and difficult to remove.

Incendiary bombs include not just the infamous napalm, but white phosphorus and NPT as well. White phosphorus continues to burn slowly inside the body and can usually be extinguished only when it reaches the bone. Needless to say, the pain is unspeakable and totally unjustifiable. NPT, or napalm-phosphorus-thermite, is the most destructive of all and can be applied to a large area. On the ground, so-called "area denial" mines can be laid by the thousands. The Dragontooth and Gravel mines will not destroy a truck tire, but they will blow off a foot. The Spider mine or WAAPM—wide area antipersonnel mine—has eight fine wire which, when tripped, hurl ball bearing-like pellets for approximately 197 feet.

Yet what can all of this accomplish? According to the Pentagon papers, a CIA bombing study dryly concluded as early as May 1967 that "27 months of American bombing have had little effect."

There is no historical evidence that massive bombing has ever succeeded in breaking the morale of troops fighting elsewhere. A careful and scholarly study of the social impact of bomb destruction reports that—

Studies made of troop morale after news had reached them of casualties and other air-raid losses during World War II disclosed no evidence that the efficiency of troops had been substantially reduced or that desertions had increased.

CRANSTON) is now recognized for 15 minutes.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that two of my assistants may have the privilege of the floor during this debate on Vietnam: Murray Flander and Ellen Frost.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, my purpose, and the purpose of other Senators participating in arranging this discussion of hostilities in Vietnam, was merely to focus the attention of the Senate and, hopefully, through that process the attention of the country, on the tragic developments in Southeast Asia.

I have done my best to insure that there will be a presentation of views from various stances supportive of present policies and the questioning of present policies in Vietnam during the course of this discussion.

The rules and procedures of the Senate as to the allocation of time to each Senator may make this presentation slightly jerky and perhaps a bit disorderly at times, but I am hopeful, as are others who hold varying and contrary views of what is occurring in Vietnam, that we will have a real presentation of the various alternatives, the various views, and the various questions that so many of us have in differing ways about Vietnam.

The first question is: Is this war really winding down? Is the administration successful in winding down the Vietnam war?

It seems to me that this war is winding up and winding sideways, to the air, the set, and to neighboring parts of Indochina, rather than winding down. It is still very much an American war.

The total number of plane losses and combat casualties has jumped to new and staggering heights. The number of helicopters and fixed-wing planes shot down over Vietnam has climbed to at least 7,419. This figure pushes the cost of lost airplanes to a shocking \$7 billion.

According to a study prepared by the Indochina Resource Center and Project Air War, one American has been shot down and either captured or listed as missing in action once every 3 days since President Nixon took office.

The number of B-52's in the area has climbed to 130, surpassing the 1968 peak. At least 20 U.S. Marine F-4 fighter-bombers have been sent from Japan. Another 20 F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers have been sent from the United States. The Air Force's 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, comprised of spotter and attack planes, will not be leaving Vietnam as planned. The total number of attack planes is now about 600.

Elsewhere, thousands more Americans still form part of the war effort in addition to those inside Vietnam. Some 45,000 air personnel fly bombing missions over Vietnam from bases outside Vietnamese borders.

In the coastal waters, the American armada is swelling toward 47,000 men on almost 50 ships. Naval strength includes two cruisers, at least a dozen de-

This statement is from a book by Mr. Fred Iklé entitled "The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction," which was published by the University of Oklahoma Press.

Bombing North Vietnam has simply not worked. There is a slight difference in the strategic situation now, with a more massive use of troops and more concentration of forces, but bombing targets in North Vietnam certainly does not relate to the immediate events on the battlefields far from those areas.

The failure of bombing raids can be documented elsewhere in Southeast Asia as well. According to figures gathered by Project Air War, 150,000 tons of bombs have been dropped on Cambodia since May 1970, but guerrillas control from 70 percent to 90 percent of the territory. In Laos, bombing undertaken since May 1964 has included a devastating 500,000 sorties dropping 1.5 million tons of bombs. And yet Communist forces control at least two-thirds of Laotian territory today.

What justification is there, then, for this heavy bombing today?

Nowadays all operations in the Indochina theater are primarily justified in the name of protection of our troops. That is what Secretary Laird said yesterday. That is what President Nixon has said in recent days.

This protection apparently is being used primarily as a legal reason and not as a strategic reason. There are questions as to what legal justifications there are now that we have repealed the Gulf of Tonkin joint resolution providing for resorting to this force throughout Southeast Asia.

At the current stage of the fighting, the threat posed to the vast bulk of American forces cannot possibly provide an excuse for extending the bombing to the 20th parallel. The purpose of these raids is clearly punitive, not protective.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from California yield?

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I am delighted to yield to my distinguished friend, the Senator from Utah.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I first want to congratulate the Senator from California for bringing this matter before the Senate.

It seems to me that there is no more timely or important discussion that we could be holding at this time in the Senate than the discussion of what is now going on in Indochina, and particularly in North Vietnam. It is my understanding from watching the television that the great emphasis that is being placed on the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi is that it is done in order to protect our troops and, for that reason, is fully and thoroughly justifiable because it is protecting American lives.

I, of course, have observed the map of Vietnam a number of times. In fact, I visited Vietnam about 4 years ago and observed the Tet offensive when it was raging at its height. However, in miles, how far away would Haiphong and Hanoi be from the nearest American troops? Does the Senator have any idea of that distance?

Mr. CRANSTON. The distance is over 250 miles.

April 19, 1972

U.S. Plans to Give Dacca \$130-Million More in Aid

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 8—The United States is planning to commit \$130-million in relief assistance to Bangladesh before the end of the current fiscal year on June 30, senior Administration officials have said.

Mr. Williams said that aid officials would confer here on Tuesday with Russell P. O'Quinn, a former Douglas aircraft test pilot who flew relief supplies from São Tomé Island into Biafra during the 1967-70 Nigerian civil war.

Mr. O'Quinn, who heads the Foundation for Airborne Relief, a non-profit organization based in Long Beach, Calif., recently visited Bangladesh. Aid officials said that they were preparing to grant Mr. O'Quinn \$1.5-million to launch an emergency food-dropping program in Bangladesh using two Boeing C-97 cargo planes, two Bell helicopters and two Cessna-185 amphibians with pontoons. Mr. O'Quinn said in an interview that his pilots would use a "double-bag" food-dropping technique devised in Laos by Air America, a Central Intelligence Agency unit.

The United States formally recognized Bangladesh on Tuesday, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, in a statement distributed to the press, said that the United States intended to be "helpful" as the new nation of 70 million Bengalis "face its immense task of relief and reconstruction."

Maurice J. Williams, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development, which is coordinating American relief efforts, said in an interview that the \$130-million still to be committed represented the remainder of the \$200-million appropriated for Bangladesh relief by Congress on March 8.

Breakdown of \$70-Million

The \$70-million already committed, he said, included \$31-million recently given to the United Nations in cash for immediate needs in the area; \$4-million being used to buy United States trucks requested by the United Nations and \$7-million granted to various private American voluntary agencies operating in Bangladesh. In addition, Mr. Williams said, \$27-million had previously been provided for Bengali refugees in India.

named head of United Nations relief operations in Bangladesh, has recently returned from a survey trip there. He has reported that owing to widespread disruption of communications, urgent needs include the charter of aircraft, tugs, barges and shallow-draft "minibulkers" for emergency movement of food grains up rivers and other waterways. Other needs include cargo-handling equipment, repair of port facilities, hiring of stevedores and

Hanoi Improves Its Air Defenses, U.S. Pilots Say

Washington Post Staff Writer

DANANG—The Soviet Union has improved North Vietnamese aircraft defenses, according to U.S. pilots here.

They said the relatively safe layer between the low-altitude 57-mm. antiaircraft guns, which are radar-directed, and the high-altitude SAM-2 missiles is now harder to find.

Pilots interviewed did not know what technical improvements were made in the Soviet air defenses but listed the following as among the possibilities: an improved radar-aiming system for the 57-mm. antiaircraft guns, Soviet technicians making adjustments on the ground in North Vietnam to improve both range and accuracy.

A further complication, the pilots said, is that the North Vietnamese have moved SAM-2 rockets and antiaircraft guns southward to protect more effectively their troops advancing in Military Region I.

One tragic bit of evidence of the improved air defenses came several weeks ago when the chief pilot of Air America had his leg shot off while sitting in the rear of an aircraft flying at about 13,500 feet over northern Laos where the Chinese have been building a road.

James Ryan, the chief pilot for the CIA-financed airline, was dropping pamphlets out of a small plane when he was hit by what fellow pilots believe was a 57-mm. shell. The pamphlets Ryan was dropping offered a reward for any information about the whereabouts of the crew of an Air America

C-123 crew downed earlier in the same area.

Hanoi on Sunday claimed that a high altitude B-52 was shot down over Vinhlinh in the eastern portion of the Demilitarized Zone. The U.S. Air Force denied the claim.

If the pilots are right in crediting North Vietnam with better air defenses, and there is no reason to doubt them, this will complicate their job of assisting South Vietnamese troops under attack in the northern portion of the country.

Just suppressing the antiaircraft fire to clear the way for bombing runs could cost the United States and South Vietnamese an unusually high number of planes if the air defenses indeed are more effective.

CIA: THE PRESIDENT'S

VICTOR MARCHETTI

Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign affairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its authority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations.

In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its operational plans accord with the aims of the administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional leaders. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influential individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more careful than are administrators in other areas of the bureaucracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress.

The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, nevertheless, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere.

After the Bay of Pigs, the agency had its sting of failure because it failed in overthrowing Castro. At the top of the agency's operations committee, which coordinates the agency's activities, throughout the time of the operations against the same time, and the agency deeply involved in regimes in Laos.

When the Nation exposed the CIA in 1967, the agency's labor and cultural funding conduits, ne tried to restrict the Senator Fulbright's control over the CIA. He was simply told by the President and get on with its business. He formed to look into the Secretary of State, the CIA. Some because they had been longer thought worth continued under improved cover. A few of the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a \$500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/assassination programs in Vietnam.

The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the financial management of the community, especially in the military intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Administration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should concentrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-

2 APR 1972

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Copter Rescues of 15 Recounted

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

PAKSE, South Laos — Air America helicopter crewmen returned here to their base tired but exhilarated Friday, after rescuing 15 American airmen downed on the Ho Chi Minh trail 75 miles east of Pakse.

The downed airmen were the crew of the American AC130 Spectre gunship shot down by Communist gunfire over the trail Thursday evening.

The search drama began in the middle of a Pakse cocktail party when the veteran U.S. air operations controller known as the Gray Fox was called out as the first news of the downed aircraft came over the air.

The first report was that the aircraft had been downed near Chavane on Route 96, a main part of the trail running over South Laos' Kasseng plateau, but Air America H34 helicopters and U.S. Air Force Jolly Green giants found the downed crewmen scattered over a wide area.

"Some people were 45 miles apart," an American rescue crewman said. An Air Force Jolly Green Giant pulled eight downed Americans out, leaving the remainder to slow moving, virtually unarmed Air America Sikorskys. "I think we picked up the last two," an Air America crewman said. "These guys were really good. 'Sandys' kept the enemy in their bunkers. They just kept going at it. I couldn't see the first guy. I thought he was in a camouflage suit, but it was a gray flight suit. I saw his face

when he looked up about 100 feet below the hoist. That hoist seemed to be coming up about a foot a minute." The hoist is a device lowered into thick foliage to pick up downed crews.

"The other guy said he didn't know where he was but I told him to puff that smoke," the grinning crewman said. U.S. aircrews in Asia usually carry smoke canisters which give off a colored smoke to mark their position.

"Sandys" are U.S. Air Force piston engined Skyraiders. They strafed North Vietnamese troops around downed crewmen and are credited with silencing at least one enemy antiaircraft piece.

Enemy Truck Reported

Another American said he saw a Communist truck just before making his pickup. Air America crews credited the Skyraiders' downed crews' calmness and controller Gray Fox for the successful pickup.

Air America is a private company chartered to CIA, U.S. Aid and other American government agencies. One of its specialties in Laos is search and rescue in combination with USAF Jolly Green Giants based in Northeast Thailand, Jolly Greens, the H53 rescue helicopter, is flown in Laos by a U.S. Air Force outfit (known as "The Jungle Knives.")

Jungle Knives specialize in lifting Lao and Thai irregulars into combat areas in Laos.

Following press reports, U.S. Embassy officials now indicate Americans are also flying helicopter gunships in

Laos. AC130s, known as "Spectres," have become features nightly on the air ways in both North and South Laos.

Over the Ho Chi Minh trail area in South Laos they are part of an electronic air program code named "Igloo White" which sows the trail area with mass antennae incorporating transistor devices which set off radio signals whenever Communist trucks, tanks and men pass. These signals are translated onto radar tubes in a series of images read by officers at American bases in Thailand and Vietnam to give enemy positions and set into motion American air strikes.

AC130s Use Starscopes

AC130s, which can stay up many hours, also have attack capability, using starscopes which translate starlight to daylight and sensors which pick up heat from truck engines and enemy fires or infrared viewers which see heat and translate it the same way light is translated.

AC130s are also led to a target by magic boxes handled by Lao forward air guides which transmit to planes the number Reporters on several occasions watched Lao controllers talking to Spectres in Lao irregular ground positions in forests in both North and South Laos.

Secret of the Golden Triangle

JANUARY 1970 *New Times* carried an article by L. Anthony entitled "Opium, Gold and Politics" discussing drug addiction in the U.S. and the international narcotics traffic. The article showed that one of the main sources of the opium smuggled into the U.S. and other countries of the "free world" was Northern Laos and adjoining sections of Burma and Thailand. It also recalled that the problem had been discussed time and again in the U.N. and that President Nixon had called abuse of drugs "a serious national threat." That was more than two years ago. Has anything changed since then?

Many Middle East countries, and especially Iran and Turkey, have established strict control of the cultivation of the basic raw material—the opium poppy and introduced severe penalties for trafficking in drugs. As a result production has shifted more and more to Southeast Asia, in particular the area at the junction of the Burman, Laotian and North Thai frontiers, in close proximity to the South Chinese province of Yunnan. More, the narcotics industry in this area has advanced to a higher stage. It formerly it exported the semi-manufacture opium—now it trades mainly in the finished product, heroin, the most dangerous of all the drugs which dooms its victims to an early death and brings fantastic profits to the traffickers. The production of heroin out of raw opium has been put on a large-scale footing in the northeast corner of Burma where the remnants of the Kuomintang 9th Yunnan Division which fled from China have been shel-



tering since 1949. The division commander, General H. My, who with the help of the CIA and the Chiang Kai-shek authorities managed to keep together the core of his force, has set up near the village of Takhylek no less than 50 laboratories for the purpose. Though primitive, these jungle-hut distilleries using the simplest equipment make up the world's biggest heroin producing centre and yield an income which has given the area the name of "Golden Triangle."

Correspondent Jean Pouget of the Paris *Le Figaro* who visited the fringes of the triangle (to try to get into it is to court death) estimates that it produces roughly 1,000 tons of raw opium annually. This can be converted into 100 tons of heroin, enough for 100 million 1-gramme packets or 1,000 million doses.

The Takhylek "firm" works not only on local raw material from Burma, Thailand and Laos. It is connected by a direct road with Kunming, the chief city of the Chinese province of Yunnan.

Jean Pouget asked a Laotian how the Chinese People's Republic army engineers building a highway from Yunnan to Phongsaly province in Laos regarded the Kuomintang ex-soldiers in these parts.

"Their attitude is that of elder brothers towards younger," he was told with a touch of humour. "Whether you are a Maoist or a nationalist makes little difference. You are above all Chinese, a member of a superior race."

Another interesting sidelight. The U.S. officials Pouget talked with during his first visit to Laos in April 1971 all confirmed that the drug traffickers operated under the protection of the Peking authorities. The *Chicago Tribune* recently reported that China annually exports illegally 2,000 tons of opium valued at \$500 million. The opium poppy is cultivated on an area of some 1,235,000 acres, mostly in Yunnan and Kweichow provinces and the Kuanghsi autonomous area.

How the heroin gets to the market is wrapped in deep secrecy. It is known, however, that there are several landing strips in the Takhylek area which systematically receive planes and helicopters, mostly piloted by Americans. They bring in canned foods, beverages, and medicaments, and leave heavily laden with crates of heroin. The

U.S. journalist David Feingold in his recent book "Opium and Politics in Laos" says that some aircraft waiting for Air America, a CIA outfit, carry narcotics to Saigon. It is also said that "unidentified" planes drop the loads containing heroin by parachute in the Tonkin and Siam gulfs to be picked up by waiting ships.

There is also the overland route across the Thai frontier to Bangkok. The traffic is so profitable that a single truckload delivered to the Thai capital is enough to pay for the truck.

According to a report submitted in early March in Washington by Federal narcotics co-ordinator and State Department aide Nelson Gross, the chief distributing centre in the illicit opium traffic from Burma, Laos, Cambodia and the Chinese province of Yunnan is Thailand. High-placed Thai officials, the report says, are involved.

Another outlet is Hongkong. Tat-Shing Leung, head of the International Affairs Department of the Hongkong and Kowloon trade unions and member of the Hongkong Government Labour Advisory Board, told our correspondent that narcotics from Bangkok are shipped through Hongkong to the U.S. and Western Europe despite the efforts of the Hongkong authorities to stop the smuggling. As for drugs from South China, this, he said, is often talked about though he personally had no definite evidence.

What is the situation in the U.S. today? On March 2 Senator Charles H. Percy said that according to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics there now are 560,000 regular heroin users in the U.S., as against 315,000 in 1969. The Senator believes, however, that the actual figure is higher. Information at his disposal, also obtained from official sources, suggests that the number of heroin addicts in the U.S. runs to 700,000.

The special United Nations conference on strengthening the international narcotics control system which closed in Geneva on March 25 adopted a number of amendments to the 1954 narcotics convention enlarging the powers of the International Narcotics Control Board. But as necessary as such international measures are to combat the illicit transportation and trade in narcotics, it is obviously impossible to put an end to drug addiction without stamping out the "Golden Triangle" and similar centres.

Y. ROSEN

CIA... Dope Pushers

SAN FRANCISCO—Earth Magazine has announced the preparation of a law suit against a CIA-controlled airline it accused in its March issue of flying heroin out of Southeast Asia with the knowledge of that clandestine government agency.

San Francisco attorney Ron Leachman says the suit will charge Air America, a corporation set up by the Central Intelligence Agency, with allowing its facilities to be used for the trafficking of opium from the "fertile triangle" of poppy fields in Laos, Burma and Thailand.

The current issue of Earth documents in a feature article by University of California Prof. Peter Scott, the connection between the CIA, Air America and the heroin trade, Scott charges that "the opium-based economy of Laos is being protected by a coalition of opium growing CIA mercenaries, Air America planes and Thailand troops."

The article charged that much of the heroin wound up being used in Vietnam by U.S. troops or went to the streets of America.

At a press conference announcing the publication of the article, Earth editor James Goode angrily pointed out how corruption abroad has brought disaster back home:

"The CIA helped put our kids in Vietnam and CIA heroin traffic turned them on to smack," he said at the press conference. "And we're paying the CIA \$6 billion a year for these services."

The impact of this trafficking on American youth cannot be underestimated. In the article, Scott quotes Eliot Marshall's estimate

that 25% of all heroin in the U.S. comes from the fertile triangle region of South-east Asia

A further amplification of the problem came from research done by Mike Benner of WRIF news in a recent broadcast about the Earth magazine exposures.

He said, "Studies on the heroin problem in the United States have indicated that up to five billion dollars is spent annually on heroin by an estimated five hundred thousand addicts. More than half of the money spent each year on the purchase of heroin - two and one-half billion dollars - is

U.S. Government studies have indicated that as much as 50% of the crime in metropolitan areas is caused by addicts and medical officials report that heroin presently causes more deaths to people between the ages of 18 and 35 than war, cancer or car accidents."


Most observers feel that the CIA involvement in the heroin trade has not come about through a desire of the U.S. government to poison its troops and young people. But rather through a trap of political alliances with the dealers and marketers of opium, who were often the only forces in Southeast Asia willing to support the U.S. political and military adventures in that region, an area controlled by remnants of the Chinese Nationalist Army.

Several recent calls for attacks on the trade by the government are not being taken too seriously and Hubert Humphrey even suggested having the CIA itself hunt down the smugglers. Don Strachen writing in the

Staff newspaper in Los Angeles suggested that this was like asking the Nazi S.S. force to investigate atrocities at the Auschwitz concentration camp.

Earth Magazine and attorney Leachman want GI's vets or other persons with personal knowledge of the drug trade and who would be willing to help them in the suit against Air America, to contact Earth Magazine, The Agricultural Bldg. The Embarcadero at Mission, San Francisco CA 94115 or phone (415) 989-4300. Copies of the above mentioned article can also be gotten from that address

the opium trail



HEROIN
and

IMPERIALISM

This pamphlet was written collectively by a study group supported by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. The group included Pat Haseltine, Jerry Meldon, Charles Knight, Mark Selden, Rod Aya, Henry Norr, and Mara. Thanks to all who helped, especially Jim Morrell, Tod McKie, and Jancis Long.

SEATTLE, WASH.

TIMES

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S - 310,357

Nixon revelation

50 civilians missing or captives

By SVEIN GILJE

In a rare reference to civilians involved in the Indochina war, President Nixon has revealed that some 50 American civilians are missing or held captive.

The reference came in a presidential proclamation declaring the week beginning today as the National Week of Concern for Prison-

ers of War and Missing in Action.

The week will be noted here with a proclamation to be issued tomorrow by Mayor Wes Uhlman. Earlier Gov. Dan Evans issued a similar proclamation.

The President's proclamation noted that "there are 1,623 American servicemen and some 50 United States civilians missing in action or being held captive by North Vietnam and its allies."

The proclamation did not go into specifics as to the civilians. It's known that some civilians were captured or are missing, such as from the 1970 invasion of Cambodia.

But presumably this also

refers to civilians missing in Laos, where the Central Intelligence Agency has been active in the so-called "secret war" there. Civilian pilots fly for Air America, which contracts with the C. I. A.

Some of the men have been held or missing for several years.

"At the end of this month," Mr. Nixon said, "the first men to be taken prisoner will begin their ninth year in captivity. This is the longest internment ever endured by American fighting men."

Seven men have been captive or missing more than eight years; 135 more than

seven years and 427 more than six years.

One of the men, Lt. Col. Jack W. Bomar, is believed to be dying of a kidney ailment judging from letters his wife has received. A kidney machine and a technician to operate it have been offered through the Red Cross, but there has been no response from North Vietnam.

The men in the P. O. W. or missing categories are aging; 311 are older than 40 years, 15 are over 50 years and two over 55.

The week will be observed at Fort Lewis and the McChord Air Force Base, as well.

ilians under Pathet Lao control. Congressmen McCloskey and Waldie found, in a U.S. information survey initially concealed from them by the Embassy, that 75% of the 190 respondents from 96 villages had had their homes bombed. In addition 97% had seen a bombing attack and 61% had seen a person killed. Congressmen McCloskey and Waldie also conducted their own interviews, and all 16 refugees queried, from 7 different villages, testified to the aerial destruction of every single dwelling in their hamlets.

A report by U.N. expert Georges Chapeller in December 1970 stated that in the Plaine des Jarres "by 1969 the intensity of the bombings was such that no organized life was possible in the villages . . . Jet planes came daily and destroyed all stationary structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers lived in trenches and holes or in caves. They only farmed at night. All of the interlocutors without exception had their villages completely destroyed. In the last phase, bombings were aimed at the systematic destruction of the materials bases of the civilian society.

At one time there were more than 50,000 people living in the Plaine des Jarres. There is virtually no life there now.

One village chief indicated that in 21 hamlets not one home was left standing. In his own village 45 percent of the 2600 inhabitants never left their trenches.

A sample of 25 villages from the Plaine des Jarres revealed casualty rates of 5-10 percent from the bombing. It is estimated that 50 civilians are killed for every Pathet-Lao casualty.

In 1968 Jacques Decornoy, the Southeast Asian desk editor for *Le Monde* traveled through Pathet Lao controlled areas. According to his interviews, 65 villages in the Sam Neua district alone had been destroyed by U.S. air power. Traveling through the devastated areas he depicts it as "a world without noise for the surrounding villages have disappeared. The inhabitants themselves living in the mountains."

Such testimony is of course contrary to our government's official position that "never before has such care been taken to spare civilians in bombing raids."

The picture burnt into one's imagination is that of hundreds of thousands of Laotians desperately huddling in caves and trenches as U.S. planes roar overhead. Again it is the enormity of the suffering endured by these poor people which blinds us to our own policy. I will rerun the picture, because we must break through the psychic numbness we have developed.

There are hundreds of thousands of poor peasants, noncombatants, living underground in fear of U.S. air power in Asia. There are entire areas of former civilization reduced to near cave man standards by the most advanced nation in the history of the earth. For what? no matter for what, it is indefensible.

At Nuremberg Teleford Taylor, chief U.S. Prosecutor, argued that where the military profits of any policy are dwarfed by the civilian casualties, such a policy is indefensible. The massive air war by the U.S. against the peoples of Indochina is indefensible. Every B-52 raid, every A-119 K stinger drop is criminal.

The situation in Laos is not appreciably different from what is currently occurring in Cambodia. As the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees noted, the same pattern of destruction is being repeated relentlessly throughout Indochina. It is up to the Congress to terminate it. The President has made it clear that he intends to continue the bombing, stating in February this year, "I will not place any limitations on the use of air power."

Secretary of Defense Laird has indicated that we intend to maintain a naval and air presence in Southeast Asia indefinitely after

the last ground troops are withdrawn. The Pentagon, which seems to have statistics available for all categories and contingencies, lacks even an estimate of the likely civilian casualties this presence will cause. Such considerations do not seem to have a high priority in current American decision making. The so-called "gook rule" which haunted the Calley trial has far more profound implications for the air war.

On the afternoon that the U.S. helicopters and attack planes accompanied the South Vietnamese into Laos the President issued a statement on our environmental crisis. Within it he quoted from T. S. Eliot's "Murder in the Cathedral," "Clean the air, clean the sky, wash the wind . . ." It would have been revealing for the President to have quoted further: "The land is foul, the water is foul, our beasts and ourselves are defiled with blood.

A rain of blood has blinded my eyes . . . Can I look again at the day and its common things and see them all smeared with blood through a curtain of falling blood? We did not wish anything to happen."

Let us stop the bombing, withdraw our troops and begin to "take stone from stone and wash them."

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD excerpts from remarks I made to the Fund for New Priorities dinner in New York City on January 14, 1972.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CONTINUING AIR WAR

(Excerpts from remarks by Senator Mike GRAVEL)

The Nixon Administration's recent resumption of heavy bombing of North Vietnam once more raises a basic moral question: what right do our leaders have to kill and maim men, women, and children halfway across the globe who pose no threat to this Country?

As usual, the Administration is claiming that it is bombing only "military" targets. This may or may not be true. One remembers, after all, that the Johnson Administration claimed the same thing.

Even if the Administration is bombing only "military" targets this time, there can be no doubt that it also is causing serious civilian casualties. In a rural country like North Vietnam most so-called military targets such as bridges and factories are located in and around heavily populated civilian areas. Hanoi reports that in the most recent raids bombs fell on a hospital, and even military sources admit that American jets hit North Vietnamese army barracks as they went after nearby airfields.

The Cornell Air War Study quotes a memorandum by former Defense Secretary McNamara, in which he estimated that the bombing was causing 1,000 civilian casualties every week during the sustained raids of 1967. An equivalent casualty rate in the U.S. would be more than 600,000 per year.

Interviews with U.S. pilots indicate that most of the bombs we drop on North Vietnam are anti-personnel ordnance such as pineapple or guava bombs. These bombs contain hundreds of steel pellets.

One sortie of this type of bomb sends over half a million of these pellets spewing over an area half a mile long and an eighth of a mile wide.

During the Christmas raids alone it was announced that American planes flew over 1,000 sorties against North Vietnam. It is, therefore, not hard to believe the following Associated Press dispatch, dated December 29: "Hanoi claimed that in Thanh Hoa Province on Sunday the U.S. planes killed 24 civilians and wounded 47. A broadcast said most of the casualties were caused by steel

pellet anti-personnel bombs dropped on workers in the fields."

It's not a very pretty thing what our bombers are doing to these people.

But it's still going on right now. This month alone another 50,000 tons of anti-personnel bombs, napalm, and white phosphorous are raining down upon not only the people of North Vietnam, but Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam as well.

We won't be told of the victims, of course. To the extent we learn anything it will be of "protective reaction" strikes, "interdiction" missions, and the bombing of supply depots.

But there are human beings under those bombs, and they will continue being killed and maimed until we, the American people, demand an end to this bombing.

In just the eight months since President Nixon told the American people in his April address to the Nation that "Vietnamization has succeeded", there have been an additional 1,302 Americans killed in the Indochinese War, and 4,370 more wounded. Deaths among allied forces in that same period have risen 15,595, and the Pentagon estimate of the number of new deaths among those people it chooses to call the "enemy" is 56,030. That last figure is no doubt conservatively low.

These numbers tell of the failure of Vietnamization, not its success.

An Orwellian transformation is taking place in our military policy in Indochina. Due to public pressure American ground troops are slowly coming home, but they are leaving an automated war behind. Computer technology and a small number of troops manning aircraft and artillery are creating a U.S. destructive presence that may literally hover over Southeast Asia for years to come. In the midst of this the public is confused, pacified by the diminishing troops levels, yet vaguely troubled by continuing reports of devastation.

In his mid-December newsbriefing Secretary of the Air Force Seamans sought once again to play down the air war. The basic point Seamans tried to make was that the air war was not escalating, that in fact it had been wound down. As such, his remarks represent a relativistic apology for the continuing raids, a logic more appropriate for 1964 than 1972—the logic of permanent war.

It is an insult to the American people to portray the air war as fading away when in 1971 somewhere between 750,000 and 800,000 tons of bombs were dropped over Indochina. Though down from the peak years of 1968 and 1969, this figure represents:

- nearly 40% of all the U.S. air ordnance expended during the Second World War,
- nearly 80% of all the air ordnance expended during the three year Korean War,
- the equivalent of 37 Hiroshimas, or roughly one every nine days.

Most importantly, the Nixon Administration has made it clear that the bombing is to continue indefinitely even after the last American ground troop comes home (if he ever does). Even if reduced by 50% the air war still would continue at an average level greater than that of the Korean War.

But there are many indications that the reductions in the bombing are bottoming out. Pentagon sources, for example, indicate that B-52 strikes, though currently down 60% from their peak in 1968, are to continue indefinitely at their present rate of 1,000 per month. And although tonnage figures registered a 30% decline from 1969 to 1970, they dropped only 23% from 1970 to 1971.

At a time when the Harris Poll indicates that 65% of the American people feel the war is "immoral", and oppose by a 57 to 29 margin continued American bombing in order to achieve political ends, it is indefensible to continue the strikes at any level.

In regard to Secretary Seamans' "wound down war", it is worth noting that the Senate Refugee Subcommittee found that, "In this year, 1971, more civilians are being killed

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S - 545,032

MAR 23 1972

Blockbuster Tomorrow on Laos**NBC to Air CIA's Secret Army**

By William Hickey

Television - Radio Editor

A television network documentary with the same blockbuster potential as CBS' last summer's "The Selling of the Pentagon" is scheduled to be aired tomorrow evening at 8:30 when NBC News devotes a sizable portion of its magazine-format news program "Chronolog" to an examination of the Central Intelligence Agency's secret army in Laos.

The 45-minute segment represents another reportorial coup for NBC News' indefatigable correspondent Bob Rogers and, in a larger sense, for all the broadcast industry's journalistic forces.

Rogers' latest accomplishment is really not surprising to those who have followed his brilliant career with NBC News, for they have come to expect nothing short of major scoops each time he leaves the confines of New York City.

Easily the outstanding combat correspondent currently working in television, Rogers possesses a splendid sixth sense for uncovering the full dimensions of a shootout, whether it be 30,000 feet over the Sinai Peninsula or in a bunker along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the intestinal fortitude to put his feet where his instincts lead him.

HIS STUDY of the once secret army in Laos is typical of his pursuit of the impossibly difficult story. No one, either in print or broadcast journalism, had been able to penetrate so deeply the CIA's web of secrecy, concerning its operations in Laos, but he did—and with a camera crew to boot.

When I asked him the other day how he managed it, he replied matter of factly, "Mac Godley, our ambassador there, helped immeasurably. He has been trying to break down the veil of secrecy surrounding the CIA's activities in Southeast Asia for a number of years now. Once a few ground rules were established, such as now showing the faces of CIA case officers on television, the agency cooperated completely."

HOW DID THE CIA become involved in Laos in the first place? I asked.

"It was very simple. After the Geneva Accords were signed in 1962, we withdrew all our military advisers to the country. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, kept 6,000 well-trained forces there. They called them border security battalions.

"For a while the United States lived with the fictional belief that NVA forces would eventually pull out. Of course, they didn't, so we began sending in CIA agents to work with the hill tribes, who always had been very pro-American, to offset their presence," he said.

What kind of a job did the

"A FASTASTIC ONE.

You've got to give the agency credit. With a bare handful of men, they accomplished what armies of regular soldiers couldn't. They solidified the Meo tribesman better use the word Moung, for Meo is a derisive term meaning hill-billy, into a first-class fighting unit. At best, it was hoped that the hill tribes would become fairly good guerrilla fighters, but to everyone's astonishment, they have been slugging it out with the best North Vietnamese regiments for the past three months and holding their own.

"In fact, if it weren't for the Moung tribesmen and the few thousand Thai volunteers, Laos would have fallen to the Communists long ago," he said.

Well what about the Royal Lao Army and the Pathet Lao? I asked.

"No one over there takes either outfit seriously. The Royal Lao Army and the Communist Pathet Lao have one thing in common—a total dislike of fighting. The war in Laos is being fought by the tribesmen and Thai volunteers against the North Vietnamese," Rogers said.

NO ONE ELSE? I asked.

"I stand corrected. I should have mentioned the CIA has an outfit called Air America, which is composed of young Americans who fly everything from Piper Cub observation planes to four-engine bombers in forces," he said.

How do the Moung feel about the impending U. S. pullout from Vietnam? I asked.

"They're nervous to be sure, but General Vang Pao, who is their No. 1 man, told me he had absolute faith in America and knew it would never abandon the peoples who joined her in the struggle to keep Southeast Asia free," he said.

How will your report be viewed by our State Department and the Pentagon? I asked.

"No doubt, they'll be upset by the fact that I revealed the extent of our operation in Laos, but I really don't believe they'll say much, because they can't refute anything we have put on film.

"MY JOB WAS simply to show the American people what has been going on in Laos under the direction of the CIA for the past eight years without their knowledge. While we have done this, we felt that our objectivity remained on the highest possible level," he said.

Be that as it may, I have the idea "Chronolog" is going to cause its first big flap and it won't be a secret.

DALLAS, TEX.

NEWS
MAR 19 1972

E - 242,928

S - 284,097

CIA's 'Secret Army' Filmed

THE Central Intelligence Agency's "secret army" in Laos is the subject—for the first time—of a detailed documentary film which NBC News' "Chronolog" will present Friday, at 7:30 p.m. on the NBC Television Network.

"This is the great untold story of the war in Indochina," Bob Rogers, the documentary's producer and reporter, says. "While the world has been watching Vietnam and Cambodia, the biggest battle this year in Indochina is being fought in Laos with up to three full North Vietnamese divisions committed."

ACCORDING TO Rogers, the brunt of the fighting is being borne by the so-called "secret army" of General Vang Pao, which is paid, trained, equipped and advised by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Their losses have been extremely high," he says, "but so far they have given the North Vietnamese a hell of a fight. I think for the first time we've managed to penetrate the veil of secrecy which has surrounded the war in Laos and have captured it on film."

This inside view of the secret war the Laos was shot last month during the height of this year's North Vietnamese offensive which, in terms of manpower, heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns, has been the biggest ever, Rogers notes.

THE FILM includes exclusive footage of the secret army composed of hill tribe guerillas and Thai "volunteers" in action.

The film crew traveled to remote mountain outposts held by the secret army, and covered the heavy fighting around the threatened CIA base at Long Tieng.

The documentary also includes exclusive footage of the secret army's commander, Meo tribal leader General Vang Pao, as he gives front-line directions to his irregular troops in their most desperate battle to date.

It includes, too—for the first time ever in the press or on television—an interview with one of the CIA's advisers to the secret army.

IN ADDITION, the film explores in detail the secrecy-shrouded opera-

tions of Air America and its American pilots, whose prime role is to render logistical support to the secret army and to the thousands of hill tribe refugees from the North Vietnamese invasion.

There is also exclusive footage of, and interviews with, the handful of young American Air Force forward air controllers who, in their unarmed light planes, direct the massive and controversial U.S. bombing program in Laos.

U.S. Seen Violating Ban in Laos

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, March 15—Thai air force helicopters, some of them armed, are being used in combat here in apparent violation of the congressional prohibition against U.S. financing of third country forces here.

Thai pilots are flying both medical evacuation and combat support missions in the area of the Long Cheng military complex 80 miles north of here, according to knowledgeable U.S. sources. The Thais are using UH1-E (Huey) helicopters on loan from the United States, the sources said, and fly from Udorn airbase in northern Thailand.

Command of the helicopters is said to lie with CIA advisors to Gen. Vang Pao, commander of the irregular forces fighting around Long Cheng. The craft are said to be controlled through a U.S. Air Force plane circling the area.

[A State Department source said the Thai pilots were not under U.S. command.]

U.S. Mission spokesmen, while acknowledging that the helicopters are armed, said that they are only flying armed medical evacuation missions under the command of Gen. Vang Pao. The spokesman will only describe the pilots as non-American and non-Laotian irregular volunteers who are present in Laos under the same program that covered the entry of Thai soldiers.

Informed sources said it was unlikely that Thailand could supply enough civilian helicopter pilots for the program because of the shortage of trained personnel in the country. Use of Thai military pilots in American aircraft would seem to violate the ban against U.S. funding of third country forces here.

(Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), commenting on the report of Thai-piloted helicopters being used in Laos, said, "This is but another illustration of disregard for the law

which states that U.S. funds shall not be used in Laos for military support of third countries. To my knowledge it is the first introduction of gunships.")

Information on the helicopters came to light last weekend when one of the Hueys crashed just north of Vientiane during a violent thunderstorm, killing at least four crew members.

U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane denied categorically that the craft was carrying Americans, although it was an armed U.S. craft of a type not possessed by the Lao military. Various other spokesmen confirmed it was U.S. owned, that it was serviced by the Air America Corp., and that it was going from Long Cheng to Udorn, Thailand when it crashed.

Heavy American participation in investigations following the crash raised widespread suspicion here that Americans were aboard. But now, it's generally accepted that concern over the loss of crew and an American craft assigned to a sensitive new program caused the flurry of official excitement.

There is nothing new in Thai pilot participation in the Laotian war, according to knowledgeable sources. Thai pilots have secretly been flying AC-47 "spookie" gunships and T-28 bombers on combat missions over Laos in recent years. It is the type of aircraft and their closeness to combat that has changed.

Aside from pilots, Thai troops now operating in Laos may number as high as 10,000 reliable sources here say, with more expected as the current military situation continues to deepen.

CIA reported shifting attention in Laos from Communists to opium

BY MICHAEL PARKS

Sun Staff Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos — American intelligence agents here are turning their attention from Communists to drug runners, according to informed sources.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency has been given a top-priority assignment,

American officials say, of discovering the routes used to smuggle opium from northern Burma through Laos to Thailand and pinpointing opium refineries in the area.

One result was a mysterious fire that destroyed a key refinery for turning opium into heroin last year.

A recently reported series of ambushes on mule trains and caravans bringing opium from Burma and Thailand are also attributed by knowledgeable observers here to the American anti-drug campaign.

Knowing smiles

When questioned directly about the fire at the refinery near the Laotian town of Ban Houei Sai or the caravan raids, American officials only smile knowingly and shrug their shoulders.

Other intelligence sources report, however, that some of the small guerrilla teams that used to probe China's Yunnan province for the Central Intelligence Agency have been shifted to tracking and occasionally attacking the opium caravans.

Last summer, American officials were discussing the possibility of bombing an opium refinery at Houei Tap, near Ban Houei Sai.

"There are so many bombing sorties that one could easily go astray, if you know what I mean," said one U.S. Embassy official.

Eventually, officials here now say, bombing was discarded as "imprecise."

"Besides, everyone would know we did it," an American here said recently. "With a fire, people are not sure. It may be a business rival."

The American Embassy, which for years had condoned and indirectly helped Laotian traffic in heroin, morphine and opium as a part of the war against the Communists, has now brought in a task force of U.S. Customs and drug officials to help the Vientiane government enforce its first drug law. Their budget may run to \$1 million a year.

The Customs officials are helping tighten inspection of cargoes on domestic and international air flights, the principal avenue for the drugs to move from northern Laos down to Bangkok, Thailand.

Some of the inspections on flights of Air America and Continental Air System planes, which are under contract to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, are too cursory to be effective, and some planes still escape inspection completely, as do most military flights.

In addition, private planes still land at Vientiane's airport from Thailand and Cambodia to pick up mysterious cargoes and fly off again, having avoided both Customs inspections and filing of flight plans and manifest by bribing the airport officials with \$200.

Americans here hope that pressure from the prime minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and his intelligence chief, General Khamou, will reduce this traffic.

An agent from the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has been assigned to work with General Khamou and coordinate the American and Lao efforts.

American advisers working with the Lao national police have also been ordered to press for enforcement of the new Lao drug law, enacted under U.S. pressure last summer.

The law prohibits the processing and transportation of heroin, opium and related drugs, and the cultivation and use of opium, a traditional crop among hill tribes, is restricted. A second law, passed recently, bars unauthorized importation of chemicals used to refine opium.

The U.S. efforts are directed less at stopping the cultivation of opium than in reducing the large volume of drugs flowing through Laos to Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Hong Kong.

Details of the budget for the anti-drugs program, which is being coordinated with similar efforts in neighboring countries, are still being worked out, but U.S. officials frequently mention \$1 million as the total annual cost.

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3 March 1972

LAOS

Patriotic Front's Successes

WORLD attention continues to be focussed on Laos, which lies in the very heart of the Indochina Peninsula.

Over the last 26 years, the Laotian people have been waging a persistent struggle for their country's freedom and independence. The defeat of the US aggressors and their puppets by the Laotian patriotic forces in the Xiengkhouang area, the Valley of Jars, and the Boloven Plateau in December 1971 is fresh proof that US adventurist plans in respect of Laos have no prospects before them. In 1972, the patriots are still in complete command of the situation and continue to press their enemies and hit them hard. This is seen from the January offensive against Long Cheng, the US mercenaries' chief base.

Striving to turn Laos into a springboard for a drive against the national liberation movement of the Indochinese peoples, Washington has entangled the country in a web of economic and military aid, and flooded her with various "advisers", now numbering 12,000. The US Central Intelligence Agency maintains an invisible presence in all government establishments at Vientiane, builds secret airfields and bases, and prepares and carries out subversive acts. The 30,000-strong "secret army" of General Vang Pao is also a CIA creature, which needs \$250 million a year to keep. This is the army on which Washington puts its stake in carrying out its "Vietnamisation" policy.

To achieve its aims in Laos, the USA has been making use of more than 20 battalions of Thai mercenaries, who act on the principle: kill everyone and burn and destroy everything in sight. But there is more to Thailand's participation in the undeclared war against the Laotian patriots: it also provides the Pentagon with bases for the air war against the Laotians.

Aerial warfare is a special aspect of the US aggression against Laos. The US military dropped their first bombs on her peaceful villages in May 1964. Since then, the US air force has become much more active. Over the last three years alone, it has dropped about 3 million tons of bombs on Laotian territory. The civilian population is being bombed with fragmentation, napalm and pellet bombs, and other latest "achievements" of the US arms industry. US bomber and fighter aircraft take part in all the operations launched by government troops, Vang Pao's bandits, other numerous mercena-

ries and the CIA. Hundreds of planes owned by the Air America and the Continental Air Services are engaged in ferrying troops and delivering arms and ammunition.

At present, Washington's policy in Laos has shown some new tendencies. There are plans to increase—at least to double—Vang Pao's "secret army" by including fresh detachments of Thai mercenaries and subversive groups from the Khmer-Krom nationality, recruited by the CIA in South Vietnam.

In February 1971, Washington made its first attempt to use the army of the puppet Saigon regime in extending its aggression in Laos. Southern Laos was invaded by over 40,000 US-Saigon troops under air cover from US helicopters and B-52 bombers. What is more, US diplomacy and the CIA have been trying hard to form another military bloc: the Saigon-Pnom Penh-Bangkok-Vientiane bloc. This would amount to Laos's membership of SEATO, the bloc being used by Washington in its aggressive Southeast Asian policy.

But neither bombs, shells, nor political guile on the part of US imperialism and its stooges can break the people's will. Led by the Patriotic Front of Laos, which was set up 16 years ago, the courageous people have been inflicting one defeat after another on the aggressors and their accomplices. Over the last 17 years, the Laotian patriots have killed a large number of US officers and men and something like 200,000 mercenaries, captured or put out of action about 64,000 weapons, and shot down over 2,200 aircraft.

The Laotian Patriotic Front is in control of two-thirds of the country's territory. In the liberated areas, the foundations of a future democratic, neutral and independent state are being laid. For example, despite the barbarous US bombings, the three-year national development plan for 1968-1970 was successfully carried out. In agriculture, the line is to set up collective labour groups, and the area under rice and other agricultural crops has been enlarged. Over 1,200 hydro-installations have been built, which have helped to irrigate 20,000 hectares of rice-fields. Some 2,500 kilometres of new roads have been laid. Thus, the victories on the battle-field have been backed by successes in labour.

On the whole, the events in late 1971 and early 1972 have shown the Laotian patriotic forces' firm resolve to liberate the country from the US aggressors and their henchmen. The sympathies of the whole of progressive mankind are on the side of the fighting Laotian people.

Y. MARUNOV

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LOS ANGELES, CAL.
HERALD-DISPATCH
MAR 2 1972
SEMIWEEKLY - 35,000

STATOTHR

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STATOTHR

"Earth" Mag. Says

U.S. Spy Agency

CIA - AGENTS PUSH DOPE

WASHINGTON, D.C.—If, and we have every reason to believe it's true, the charges made in the March, 1972 issue of "Earth Magazine," that the CIA is now, and has been in the past, dealing in the dope traffic, it's deplorable. Drugs and its danger was brought to the attention of the American people of the National HERALD-DISPATCH newspapers in 1960. We pointed out in our initial drive against dope, the fact that it destroys American youth.

Hence, if the CIA as charged and documented by "Earth Magazine" is dealing in the dope traffic, they are singularly destroying a whole generation of American youth. Dope destroys the brain cell, it renders the individual, regardless of race, creed, or national origin, useless and powerless to think clearly. Dope, as it was fed to American soldiers in Asia is despicable and deplorable. In Asia America's finest young manhood was destroyed before being sent into battle in a senseless, useless, racist war.

In the article titled "The Selling of the CIA" text by Morton Kondracke, offers documentation, photographs of former CIA spies. The spy was quoted, and we have no reason to believe that Earth is lying on the CIA, that its history is a sordid one.

The HERALD-DISPATCH has been aware for a number of years that the CIA has had stooges in the universities and colleges throughout the nation where they recruit brilliant young students. These students were used as spies to overthrow the African and Asian countries, to murder, assassinate, and destroy people.

"Earth" cites facts that the CIA is involved in the opium traffic with the "fertile triangle" in the border areas of Laos, Burma, Thailand and the Yunnan province of southern China. They say, "about twenty-five percent of the heroin sold in America comes through this Southeast Asian channel. Ironically, the American taxpayer foots a six billion dollar a year bill for running the dope—the CIA, an organization which answers to nobody, is intricately

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continued

C I A DOPE CALYPSO

by Allen Ginsberg (for Peter Dale Scott)

IN NINETEEN HUNDRED FORTY SIX
CHINA WAS WON BY MAO TSE-TUNG
CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S ARMY RAN AWAY
AND THEY'RE WAITING THERE IN THAILAND TODAY

SUPPORTED BY THE C I A
PUSHING JUNK DOWN THAILAND WAY

FIRST THEY STOLE FROM THE MEO TRIBES
UP IN THE HILLS THEY STARTED TAKING BRIBES
THEN THEY SENT THEIR SOLDIERS UP TO SHAN
COLLECTING OPIUM TO SELL TO THE MAN

PUSHING JUNK IN BANGKOK TODAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A

BROUGHT THEIR JAM ON MULE TRAINS DOWN
TO CHIENG MAI THAT'S A RAILROAD TOWN
SOLD IT NEXT TO POLICE CHIEF BRAIN
HE TOOK IT TO TOWN IN THE CHOOCHOO TRAIN

TRAFFICKING DOPE TO BANGKOK ALL DAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A

THE POLICEMAN'S NAME WAS MR. PHAO
HE PEDDLED DOPE GRAND SCALE AND HOW
CHIEF OF BORDER CUSTOMS PAID
BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE'S U.S. AID

THE WHOLE OPERATION NEWSPAPERS SAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A

HE GOT SO SLOPPY & PEDDLED SO LOOSE
HE BUSTED HIMSELF & COOKED HIS GOOSE
TOOK THE REWARD FOR AN OPIUM LOAD
SEIZING HIS OWN HAUL WHICH SAME HE RESOLD

BIG TIME PUSHER A DECADE TURNED GREY
WORKING FOR THE C I A

THE WHOLE OPERATION FELL INTO CHAOS
TIL THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAME INTO LAOS
I'LL TELL YOU NO LIE I'LL SPREAD NO RUMOR
OUR BIG PUSHER THERE WAS SOUVANNA PHOUMA

THREE STRONG PRINCES IN A POWER PLAY
BUT PHOUMA WAS THE MAN FOR THE C I A

TOUBY LYFONG HAD WORKED FOR THE FRENCH
BIG FAT MAN LIKED WINE AND WENCH
PRINCE OF THE MEOS GREW BLACK MUD
OPIUM FLOWED THROUGH THE LAND LIKE A FLOOD

COMMUNISTS CAME AND CHASED THE FRENCH AWAY
SO TOUBY TOOK A JOB WITH THE C I A

AND HIS BEST FRIEND GENERAL VANG PHAO
RAN OUR MEO ARMY LIKE A SACRED COW
HELICOPTER SMUGGLERS FILLED LONG TIENG'S BARS
IN XIENG QUANG PROVINCE ON THE PLAIN OF JARS

IT STARTED IN SECRET THEY WERE FIGHTING
YESTERDAY
CLANDESTINE SECRET ARMY OF THE C I A

ALL THROUGH THE 'SIXTIES THE DOPE FLEW FREE
THRU TAN SON NHUT SAIGON TO MARSHALL KY
AIR AMERICA FOLLOWING THROUGH
TRANSPORTING CONFITURE FOR PRESIDENT THIEU

ALL THESE DEALERS WERE DECADES AND TODAY
THE INDOCHINESE MOB OF THE C I A

-- January 5, 1972

Heroin traffic:

Some amazing
coincidences linking
the CIA, the Mafia,
Air America,
several
members of
the Brook Club,
Chiang
Kai-Shek,
the Kuomintang,
Prince Puchartra
of Thailand,
many banks and
insurance companies
— practically
everyone except
Richard Nixon.

Wasn't he asked?

by Peter Dale Scott

Professor Samuel Eliot Morison, a 1903 Theodore Roosevelt national law and moralist, advised the US Navy to support the "relocation" of Panama from Colombia. The result of the Canal Zone treaty, is described as "Panama businessmen, agents of J. & W. Seligman [which stood to gain \$40 million from the treaty] and United States agents" to add that the "agents" of J. & W. Seligman were New York in the Seligman and their Washington office who organized and financed the Panama Canal suite in the Waldorf-Astoria.

In some ways, the Panama Canal partition is an instructive prelude to involvement in Indochina.² Let us be different today; for many years ago, preparing for revolution and war was outlawed, under sections 956-60 of the Espionage Act. In theory, at least, responsibility of American "interests" is not to be placed on J. & W. Seligman and similar firms.

These contacts have been traced from Wall Street which succeeded in getting the CIA into its first covert operation. The man who created the CIA in 1949 was J. Edgar Hoover, who expressed unhappiness at the deflection of the CIA's original intelligence function: "I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations."³ His intentions, however, counted for less than those of Allen Dulles, then a New York corporation lawyer and President of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Administration became concerned that the Communists might shortly win the Italian elections:


Forrestal felt that a secret counteraction was vital, but his initial assessment was that the Italian operation would have to be private. The wealthy industrialists in Milan were hesitant to provide the money, fearing reprisals if the Communists won, and so that hat was passed at the Brook Club in New York. But Allen Dulles felt the problem could not be handled effectively in private hands. He urged strongly that the government establish a covert organization with unvouchered funds, the decision was made to create it under the National Security Council.⁴

continued

EARTH
March 1972

STATOTHR

THE SELLING OF



Text by Morton Kondracke
Photography by Dennis Brack & Fred Ward

CIA HOOKED

E. B. del Rosario
Wash.-Ala. Regional Coordinator - V.V.A.W.

Part One

In any given weekend night at the Constellation Bar and Restaurant, even the most casual tourist may find himself rubbing elbows with agents of half a dozen countries. These agents go under various official titles and capacities, such as "information specialists," "rural development technician," or "embassy official," but most all of them can be placed into one occupational category - espionage. The main attraction of the Constellation is the agents, and not the music or the food; for at Suzanne's down the road, one can get better, especially food. But since there's not much happening in Vientiane, and there's few places to go to hide, the Constellation becomes the center of activity on weekends. After official working hours, this little city by the Mekhong River tries to become a miniature Saigon but without the wartime conditions of its bigger sister.

While the resident agents are pursuing the music, lights and slenderly built Lao "puying," another group of men are busy under bright flood lights at Wattay Airport, working hurriedly, but competently, to rpreare silver unmarked airplanes for early morning flights. At the ramps of Air America and Continental Air Services, Filipino, Chinese and Thai mechanics are checking, adjusting, tuning and reassembling every functional part of the aircraft which must carry people and cargo over the entire length of Laos. One by one, the DC-3's, C-46's, C-123's, CARibous, Pilatus, Porters and Helio Couriers are checked and double checked, for these planes must fly over some of the most primitive terrain and under primitive conditions for four to ten hours daily. As each aircraft is released by the flight mechanics, other men take over the preparation of the plane. Lao laborers hump hundred-pound sacks of rice or cornmeal up the inclined belly of the C-46's or cargo of military wares into the Caribous and C-123's.

Before the first rays of sunlight break on the cheuis of Buddhist monasteris, pilots are receiving their briefings and assignments from the operations sections. "Captina, you're on Sixty Zulu this morning. Your DZ's are Sixty-three, Eleven, Five and One-Seven-Three. Weather is overcast at four thousand, broken at twenty-five hundred. Double-check your recognition signal at Site Five . . . the Pathet Lao took Site Thirteen last night." "Jim, take Fourteen Tango to Lima Two-five and pick up customer cargo. Take off is at Zero-Six-Thirty."

The tone of the voice of the briefer is as casual as the night life of the espionage agents and as casual as a bus drive. The pilots of the aircraft fly cargos that would horrify the average United States citizen, the person who must pay for the operations of teh CIA's airlines. In the seemingly innocent briefing given to pilot Jim are words which will make all other investigations into the U.S. overseas operations seem trivial. Broken down into layman's language, the briefing means, "Jim, fly the C-46 cargo plane to Ban Houie Sai and bring back a load of opium." On a flight between Ban Houie Sai, a town in the center of teh "Golden Triangle," the world's richest opium growing region, a C-46 aircraft can carry between 12,000 to 14,000 pounds of opium. On some days, three or four aircraft make such flights out of Ban Houie Sai.

Note About the Author: Del Rosario was an employce of Continental Air Services in 1967. As an "operations assistant" based out of Vientiane, Laos, he was responsible for the monitoring of all flights in Laos for that CIA-financed transport corporation and for the loading and unloading of all cargo. As an associate to a British citizen studying the languages of teh Meq and Yao hill tribes in the Golden Triangle, del Rosario was able to learn much about the opium culture of the region. On February 4, 1972, he testified in San Francisco before representatives of the national press and television networks about his observations in Laos. Parts of his testimony will be appearing in the next issue.


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Earth's editor and publisher James Goode charged that the CIA-supported Air America airline is being used to ship opium from CIA bases in Laos and Thailand. Goode cited an article written by University of California professor Peter Dale Scott who said that opium is grown by CIA mercenaries, including the Meo tribesmen, in Southeast Asia. According to Scott, the opium is then shipped from the remote jungle areas aboard Air America planes.

A spokesman for Air America in Washington, D.C. also declined to comment on the story. He would say only that Air America is a "non-domestic airline owned by Americans which operates in Asia." He said he was unaware of any connections between the airline and the CIA.

Earth magazine's March issue accuses the CIA of controlling Air America — and charges that the airline operation is responsible for at least 25 percent of all heroin which reaches the United States.



Said Goode: "I find it inconceivable that the hierarchy of the CIA and other agencies within our government have not cracked down on this source of smack."

Goode was asked about a suggestion voiced earlier this week by Senator Hubert Humphrey that the CIA be assigned the task of investigating and stopping the flow of illegal heroin.

Del Rosario, a former marine who served in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965, said that the opium growing was permitted by the Laos and Thailand governments as long as there was no outside pressure exerted. He explained that, occasionally, a complaint would be lodged about the amount of growing and smuggling, and that then the government would move in and demand a temporary halt to the opium cultivation.

CIA DENIES

The Central Intelligence Agency has refused to comment on charges voiced by *Earth* magazine that the CIA "is deeply involved in the smuggling of heroin into the United States."

A spokesman for the CIA, assistant director Angus Thuermer, insisted to *Earth News* that the intelligence agency "never comments on any charges or complaints made against the CIA." Thuermer added, however, that CIA director Richard Helms had specifically denied any CIA connection to the trafficking of heroin during a speech he made to newspaper editors in Washington, D.C. early last year. At that time, Helms, in reply to charges that the CIA was involved in moving opium from Southeast Asia to the United States, said: "We know we are not contributing to that problem."

(Ed. Note: Further information on CIA involvement in the opium trade is contained in an article by Enrique B. del Rosario in this issue of THE SOUND.)

Earth magazine charged that the Central Intelligence Agency is intimately involved in the smuggling of millions of dollars worth of heroin into the United States each year.

The magazine's editor James Goode announced at a press conference in San Francisco that the March issue of *Earth* documents a web of alliances which connect opium-growing Southeast Asian farmers to the CIA-sponsored Air America Airlines and big money interests in the eastern United States. Goode said that heroin-smuggling entanglements are carefully spelled out in an article written by University of California English professor Peter Dale Scott; Scott's eight-page article traces the connection between opium growers, CIA operatives, flights of CIA-controlled airlines and the eventual delivery of heroin to the U.S.

Goode further charged that the CIA-supported Meo tribesmen and other opium growers located in Southeast Asia's "fertile triangle" are responsible for anywhere "from 25 percent to 80 percent of all heroin traffic reaching the United States."

The magazine editor stated that Scott's article was "clearly the most dramatic documentation of CIA complicity in heroin trafficking yet published;" but he added that the CIA's involvement in smack smuggling has been suspected and reported about for years, adding: "Yet nothing has been done."

Goode announced that he was making all of his evidence immediately available to United States Senators — and that he is calling for a Senate investigation of the CIA's role in the underground heroin market.

Studies on the smack problem in the United States have indicated that up to \$5 billion dollars is spent annually on heroin by 500,000 American addicts. More than half of the money spent each year on the purchase of heroin — or \$2.5 billion — is obtained through theft by addicts. Medical authorities report that heroin presently caused more deaths to people between the ages of 18 and 35 than do wars or cancer or car accidents.

"That's like appointing the SS to investigate atrocities at Dachau or Auschwitz," Goode said.

A 28-year-old Seattle resident who worked as a "civilian aide" to Continental Air Services in Thailand and Laos testified in San Francisco that he witnessed opium being loaded aboard CIA-sponsored aircraft.

Enrique B. del Rosario said he watched as cargo, labeled as "miscellaneous," was put aboard Air America planes at the Ban Houie Sai base in Laos, and at two other bases in Thailand. Del Rosario said he had served as a "civilian understudy" at the bases in Southeast Asia between 1966 and 1970.

When asked if he was actually employed at the time by the CIA, del Rosario declined to answer, insisting that he was not "permitted to." He added that his wife and two children are currently in Thailand — and said that he did not want to say anything "which might jeopardize their safety."

However, del Rosario admitted that he had worked very closely with the Meo tribesmen and other CIA-supported tribes, and that he had seen literally "hundreds of acres of cultivated opium fields planted by the tribesmen." Del Rosario said that the opium was later harvested, and that he watched as Air American planes landed at Thai and Laos bases and loaded the "miscellaneous" cargo aboard.

STATOTHR.

WASHINGTON POST
18 FEB 1972

Laos Attacks on Plain of Jars to Relieve Long Cheng

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, Feb. 17—A Laotian task force has mounted a major counter-offensive into the Plain of Jars area 100 miles northeast of Vientiane in an effort to relieve heavy enemy pressure on the Long Cheng-Sam Thong defensive line, highly reliable sources in Vientiane say.

A force of several thousand Meo, Lao, Theung and lowland Lao irregulars was secretly maneuvered into attack positions around the upland plain during the past 11 days, and is now attacking enemy troop concentrations and supply points in the area 20 miles northeast of Long Cheng. Sources here describe the effort as designed to break up a major offensive threat by North Vietnamese troops against the Laotian government's northern front.

The precise location of the task force's various elements and the results of early action are not available here because of tight security on the operation and the scattered nature of the attacks, but sources say the attacks have undoubtedly disrupted any intentions of the North Vietnamese to launch heavy attacks on Long Cheng and its sister village of Sam Thong.

A number of attack positions have been established across the southern end of the 30-square-mile plain since the irregular force began moving out from Long Cheng on Feb. 6.

Among the military objectives, according to reports in Vientiane, are limestone caves in the deep Xieng Khuang

ville valley area 10 to 15 miles east of the plain where CIA-supported intelligence patrols say they have located enemy supplies for the current push against Long Cheng and Sam Thong.

Other objectives of the task force are supply routes running southward across the plain from its northeastern corner and the artillery positions on the southernmost end.

The Laotian task force is the first major offensive action by progovernment troops in the Plain of Jars since communist forces captured it from General Vang Pao's army in late December after 48 hours of battle. From the plain the communist force then moved against the strategic Long Cheng base, forcing its evacuation as headquarters for the CIA and Vang Pao's progovernment Meo Army Communist forces briefly occupied Long Cheng itself in mid-January, but were forced into the hills between the base and plain, where they have been preparing for what U.S. military observers here feel will be another major assault on the base. The base area is the key to the Royal Lao government's entire northern front.

An estimated three regiments of North Vietnamese, or about 6,000 infantrymen, are believed poised to the north and east of Long Cheng and Sam Thong.

From 10 to 12 130MM field guns, with a range of 17 miles, are in place to the east of Long Cheng. These are the forces that the operation into the Plain of Jars is attempting to disrupt. The task force's intention was to prepare in secret for simultaneous attacks


taken up by its troops over the past two weeks. The attack plan appears to have been accomplished.

To maintain secrecy before the attack, even supply drops to most of the task force were suspended during the entire period. Some units were supplied with food by quiet-flying Air America planes but only with limited amounts. Ammunition resupply was not required, sources say, because of lack of contact with the enemy.

Reliable sources here say that command of the operation was given to Gen. Thao Ly, commander of irregular forces in southern Laos, who is considered a highly competent soldier by most observers here. Aside from the Meo veterans at Long Cheng, Thao Ly's troops at Savannakhet are considered the best in Laos. Thao Ly may join his troops on the plain soon, sources here say.

To protect Long Cheng itself while the task force was maneuvering into place and beginning its attack, troops from southern Laos, including a substantial number of Thais were flown into Long Cheng-Sam Thong. Most of the so-called Thai irregulars in Laos—upwards of 9,000—are believed to be among those now holding the northern front. There are no Thais with the operation onto the Plain of Jars, informed sources here say.

Although information on the operation was kept in the highest secrecy, at least four newsmen in Vientiane learned about it the day military forces left Long Cheng when Meo tribesmen in the capital mentioned such an operation. In the interest of safety for soldiers involved the newsmen withheld publication of the story for nearly two weeks.



LAOTIANS ON THE MOVE: Soldiers board plane at Ban Xon, Laos, for flight to Long Tieng, a base operated by the Central Intelligence Agency that was recently under siege. The Airline, Air America, is also supported by C.I.A. The New York Times/Nancy Moran

First Congressional Restraints Are Imposed on C.I.A.

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12—The foreign aid authorization bill, signed by President Nixon on Monday, includes for the first time in a quarter-century new controls on the operations, cost and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The controls, which thus far have attracted little public attention, are the first to be added since Congress created the agency through the National Security Act of 1947, a measure that was amended in 1949.

This act exempts the CIA from most fiscal and personnel controls imposed on other federal agencies. Funds, personnel and material voted by Congress to other agencies, such as the Defense Department, can, for example, be switched legally to the C.I.A.

The controls were inserted at various points in this year's aid bill largely through the

efforts of Senators Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey; Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri.

They are members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Together with the committee's Chairman, J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, they have protested increasingly in recent months that Congress has too little knowledge of, let alone control over, the agency's activities, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Senator Case urged on July 12 a tightening of restrictions over the Defense Department's use of its funds overseas and over its power to transfer "surplus" military material to other United States agencies. Mr. Case insisted that the C.I.A. be included in the restrictions lest United States involvement in Cambodia develop surreptitiously, as he said it had in Laos.

The proposed restrictions, he

intended in the funding of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through C.I.A. rather than through more open Government agencies.

"It would also," he said, "eliminate the possibility that the Cooper-Church prohibitions against the use of American troops or advisers in Cambodia could be skirted by using C.I.A. personnel."

Stennis Their Irritant

The ire of the committee members is reported to be less against the C.I.A. itself than against Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and of the so-called "Oversight" Committee for the agency. The Oversight Committee comprises senior members of the Armed Services

and Appropriations committees plus four members of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is supposed to watch over all the agency's activities.

Under Senator Stennis's direction, however, it did not meet at all in 1971—to the annoyance of Senators from the Foreign Relations Committee, who contend that C.I.A. activities around the world intimately and sometimes decisively affect the conduct of United States foreign policy.

They have now moved to bypass Senator Stennis and to gain some control over the agency's funds, personnel and activities by writing controls into the aid bill. Some Congressional sources say, however, that there are still loopholes.

Specifically, according to legislative specialists, the new controls will require the following actions:

CIA poppies make kiddies

DON STRACHAN

George Orwell wrote 1984 in an era that was ignorant of ecology. Thus he was able to fantasize a whole proletariat segment of the population that was immune to the doomsday games of the main characters of the State and its minions.

Today we know better that we are all One. When Montrose Chemicals dumps DDT by the ton into Los Angeles Harbor, the brown pelican lays eggs without shells and passes from the parade. When consumptive Americans build and drive — what, 80 million? — cars, the ground is pumped hollow and its contents dispersed into the air. When capitalism becomes the system under which goods are distributed, men cease to be brothers and their minds turn from co-operation to crime and warfare as ways of relating to each other.

Thus it comes as no surprise that the March issue of *Earth* magazine documents that the CIA has been involved in opium traffic in Southeast Asia for the past 20 years.

And it is understandable that ripples from this innocent exploitation of southeast Asian growers and pickers have washed back home. Overcrowded Veterans' Hospitals are turning junkie ex-GIs away and strung-out adolescents wander vacantly under neon lights. They must pay with tortured and shortened lives — smack presently takes more 13- to 35-year-olds than war, cancer or cars — while some of us feel it so far only in the \$2.5 billion junkies steal annually to feed their habits, in vice squad and hospital budgets.

The most incriminating article in *Earth* is by Prof. Peter Dale Scott, a friend of Allen Ginsberg. Ginsberg's own researches into CIA opium traffic were published in last May's *Ramparts*, and he recently updated it on the Dick Cavett show.

Scott's article traces how certain Wall Street interests that controlled the CIA in its early days used it to set up far Eastern fronts for financial operations. One of these front companies — Civil Air Transport (CAT), later known as Air America — supplied arms and other supplies to the Nationalist Chinese troops of General Li Mi in Burma.

Li Mi and his troops long ago ceased up on their fighting and turned to the more lucrative business of opium farming. Moreover, in order to maintain political links with secret Chinese societies and keep them hostile to Mao's revolution, they took over the opium traffic in northern Thailand and Laos. Air America continued to make "supply runs" flying opium and its derivative, heroin, around the world.

To second Scott's researches, *Earth* held a press conference last week at which Enrique B. del Rosario, a former "civilian aide" to Cor...

Thailand and Laos, reported seeing opium loaded aboard Air America planes in Laos and Thailand. Del Rosario stated that he had seen cultivated opium fields planted by Meo tribesmen. He said that the opium was later harvested, labeled "miscellaneous" cargo, and loaded into Air America planes at military bases.

Scott's article asserted that in 1955 alone 200 to 400 tons of opium were harvested in the Burma-Laos-Thailand "fertile triangle," and only 100 tons of it were consumed in Thailand. He quotes Eliot Marshall's estimate in *The New Republic* that 25 percent of all the smack in the U.S. comes from there.

"Up until about 1964, however, the United States... complained officially and ceremoniously to the UN Narcotics Commission about 'Yunnan opium,' 'brand '93' morphine' and heroin from 'the Chinese mainland' as part of Peking's '20-year plan to finance political activities and spread addiction,'" Scott writes, while documenting that indeed many of the profits from smack sale went to finance the nationalist China lobby in Washington which, until last year, successfully barred American recognition of the largest country in the world.

Scott is careful not to blow up the "personal venality of a US construction contractor or pilots dabbling in opium on the side" into a blanket condemnation of the CIA. "The CIA as an agency, it is true, cannot be identified with the narcotics trade any more than can the whole of the Kowloon," he writes; and he admits that "the embarrassing links between Air America and CATCL (Air America) have been diminished in the last five years..."

"But," he concludes, "the opium-based economy of Laos is still being protected by a coalition of opium-growing CIA mercenaries, Air America planes and Thai troops." And *Earth* editor James Goode angrily points out how corruption abroad has brought disaster back home:

"The CIA helped our kids in Vietnam and CIA heroin traffic turned them on to smack," he said at the press conference. "And we're paying the CIA \$8 billion a year for these services."

Scott's article, although unfortunately peppered with runners, "it is claimed's" and "said to be's," like most muckraking exposes is unassailably documented and almost unreadably intricate. Its basic premise seems sound. Anyway, I believe it, if only because it fits the *zeitgeist*. As they say at another of those untrustworthy three-letter institutions — IBM — information overload equals pattern recognition. The amount of official skulduggery to hit the fan in recent years is such that once someone suggests that the

mummies

CIA is trafficking smack, I'd be surprised to learn it was not so.

To me, the most enlightening comment on the CIA's workings appears in a companion article in *Earth*, "The Selling of the CIA," by Victor Marchetti, a former executive assistant to the number two man in the CIA. "It's interesting how the CIA liberals justify murder," he writes. "They hire the guy who hires the guy who actually commits the act, but they pretend they had no part in it."

This indirect inhumanity is most certainly a national, and maybe a human, failing. It's been reiterated over and over in connection with the Vietnam war: we are all guilty if we so much as participate in the economic system or pay our taxes. Capitalism: the economy is dependent on the war; crime: capitalism teaches the competitive ethic; war: the extension of crime by legal means.

It's so easy to lose sight of connections. When I was a kid, as simple a thing as an ice cream cone brought instant joy. It doesn't now; and what does? Almost nothing, unless I'm stoned or feeling really good. I do notice that if I get up briskly in the morning, do my yoga, keep busy and alert and exercise my mind, I have a general feeling of well-being; and that if I'm sluggish and lazy I become despondent and depressed. But I discover this only through recollection in tranquility; I can't feel the direct connection. Shrinks call this losing touch with your feelings, but if it's a mental problem we all share the sickness. It comes, I suppose, partly from going, partly from cultural demands for insensitivity.

So it goes in our relations with each other. We're rude to the waitress without thinking that she'll go home pissed and holler at her kid who will beat up his brother who will... We drive cars and complain about the pain in our lungs. We commit petty larceny from our employer who after all is exploiting us anyway. But we draw lines, however jagged and arbitrary they may be.

The only difference I can see between these irregular moral boundaries and the immorality of the millionaire opium czars who feel no compunctions about poisoning and murdering their fellow men in order to keep up their consumptive and tyrannical habits is that the villains have questioned the capriciousness and hypocrisy of those lines. Why preach ethical vegetarianism while contributing to the deaths of refugees by paying taxes to back dictatorial governments? Why cry for cleaner air on newsprint which people will burn? Why pay

COLORADO TO KOKO NOR

**The amazing true story
of the CIA's secret war
against Red China**

• The author, L. Fletcher Prouty, is a retired Air Force colonel who is now with the Center of Political Research in Washington, D.C.

By L. FLETCHER PROUTY

STATOTHR

NIGHT HAD obscured the mountains when the Air Force cargo plane finally approached the Pikes Peak country from the west. Warily, it seemed, the aircraft crossed the south shoulder of the peak, turned left, dropped flaps and began the long, gradual descent to Peterson Field which serves both as an Air Force base and the municipal airport of Colorado Springs.

The landing was uneventful. But from that point some strange things happened.

The aircraft, a heavy-bodied C130 powered by four turbo-prop engines, taxied to a remote end of the field rather than to the regular ramp. A military bus quickly pulled up alongside.

If any outsider had been there to witness some 20 men disembark, he would have been told they were soldiers from India scheduled for training at nearby Ft. Carson under a military aid program.

But the troops weren't Indians and they never got to Ft. Carson.

The loaded bus headed westward out of Colorado Springs, up the Ute Pass highway, and disappeared into the night.

During the months that followed, other men like those in the first group disappeared periodically in Colorado Springs in

the same mysterious manner and vanished into the mountains.

The identity of these men and the nature of their mission makes a fascinating story — and, in some respects, a frightening one — with vast international implications. Recent developments in relations between the United States and Communist China, which portend so much for an era of peace, give that story a special timeliness. The details of this operation are reported here for the first time.

To understand what this hush-hush operation was all about, it is necessary to set the time, which was August 1959, and to recall the ominous twilight zone — neither peace-nor war — into which relations between East and West had drifted in that period. With an eye toward the successful culmination of his two-term administration, President Eisenhower announced a series of international events leading to a super-Summit Conference in Paris during May 1960.

The Korean War had settled into an uneasy truce six years earlier, in 1953. The Berlin Wall was still two years in the future, 1961. At the moment the point of East-West friction was at a most mythical place. That mythical land to most Americans

who connected it vaguely with a Ronald Coleman movie about Shangri-la.

There is nothing mythical about Tibet. It is an ancient country with an area four times that of Colorado, separated from India to the south by the Himalayan Range, many of whose peaks are twice as tall as Colorado's highest mountains. The country's average elevation is about 15,000 feet. Soon after the Communist government took over control of China in 1949, Peking announced its intentions of "liberating" Tibet. In October 1950 Chinese Communist troops invaded it.

Tibet's spiritual and temporal leader, the Dalai Lama, then only 15 years old, urged his people not to resist. The Chinese in turn left the Dalai Lama alone. But by February of 1959 it became evident the Chinese intended to seize him to gain undisputed control over that country.

Forewarned, the Dalai Lama and about 80 of his followers fled Lhasa, the capital city on March 17, 1959, heading for the safety of India. The Chinese were not aware of the Dalai Lama's departure for several days. They had been lulled by the fact that there were only two good routes out of Lhasa, both under Chinese control. One was a narrow, over-an-leaving for India would have had to

6 FEB 1972

STATOTHR

Official U.S. Secrecy Persists in Laos

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Star Staff Writer

VIENTIANE — U.S. official secrecy in Laos continues to a considerable extent, despite some recent relaxation of press restrictions by the U.S. Embassy here.

American sources said some influential U.S. officials in Vientiane still believe secrecy is the best policy and can't bring themselves to open information doors more than a crack.

"Part of it is they are afraid of the limelight focusing on this place, and they feel they don't want to bow to any press or Senate pressures. Secrecy is so deeply ingrained here it's become a habit," one said.

'Small Step at a Time'

Other Americans said the U.S. mission to Laos is split on press policy and, therefore, any improvements will come "only one small step at a time." Some encouraging steps have been taken.

On Jan. 19, a press group representing U.S. wire services, national dailies and television was allowed into Long Cheng, the CIA, U.S.A.F. base 75 miles northeast of Vientiane which have been off limits to all but a few of the U.S. press since the start of its operation in late 1962.

U.S. officials who normally work there were present, and they went about their business pretty much as usual, without hiding. Later, Air America crewmen who say they long have been under instruction to keep their mouths shut, talked openly about combat experiences.

Ground Rules Outlined

All this was done under a series of quite sensible ground rules given to the press on deep background. Ground rules were that U.S. personnel supporting irregular troops are not to be filmed, photographed or otherwise identified by name or function. They may, however, be quoted or referred to as U.S. officials. The Rules were acceptable to most of the press because they meant the press would have more access to information on Laos war at the price only of dropping any mention of U.S.

intelligence bodies. It was specified also on deep background that the press could describe what a "U.S. official" was doing.

A second press trip was permitted to Long Cheng last week, and during this it became evident that official secrecy still was very much around.

Trip by Copter

As in the first visit, the press went up in a helicopter chartered from Air America and flew to Long Cheng accompanied by U.S. officials and a Lao general.

Although combat action has shifted from the Long Cheng area, newsmen were taken to the same places as on the previous trip. Requests to go to other places were turned down on the grounds the helicopters would be endangered.

A request by this reporter to remain at Long Cheng overnight was agreed to by Meo commander Vang Pao and top U.S. officials and then suddenly rejected.

The fact that all newsmen wanting to go to the Long Cheng area were made to go together on the same day picked well in advance, and that a single newsmen is not allowed to go to the area on U.S. transport traveling constantly between Long Cheng and Vientiane, can only give rise to suspicion that the U.S. is sanitizing the area on specified days for the purpose of press junkets aimed at showing secrecy has stopped.

Reasons Given

U.S. officials here said that U.S. air transport is limited and in great demand, and that a continuous flow of press in the area would waste the time of U.S. officials and others.

Aircraft leaving Vientiane, however, often have one or two empty spaces and Van Pao and U.S. officials would not have to lay on elaborate briefings for one or two people who are interested in reporting what they see of the war.

U.S. officials have hinted at various reasons why secrecy has been lifted even to a small extent. One reason, of course, was that North Vietnamese mili-

tary pressure on Long Cheng made it practically unusable as a base for covert U.S. military activities, and there are few places left in Laos to which the United States could move to be out of reach of both the North Vietnamese and the U.S. press.

Another possible reason is that the United States has already overspent the ceiling of \$350 million allowed by Congress to fight the war here, and U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley is preparing a request for additional money.

Secrecy here has angered Congress in the past, and to continue it could mean Congress would not vote additional funds.

Also some U.S. officials are coming to realize that Laos secrecy has benefited no one, but Hanoi. Secrecy meant the U.S. press was impelled to uncover what was going on, concentrating on U.S. military activities here and less on the much larger Hanoi military activities.

Despite all this, much secrecy remains. The U.S. government still is not admitting that

many of the Thai forces fighting in Laos paid for and sometimes led by Americans, are regular Thai army troops on temporary detachment. U.S. officials still insist on calling them "volunteers."

The U.S. still does not admit to all American casualties in Laos. It will give air casualties on U.S. missions originating in Laos, but not from the 7th Fleet, Vietnam or Thailand and downed in Laos.

U.S. air attaches here refuse to talk to the press. Saigon gives some of the U.S. air losses but no details of the sorties.

U.S. forward air controllers and combat airmen continue to fly in unmarked aircraft on Laos missions. Skyraiders from Thailand with U.S. pilots, Lao air force TTT 28s sometimes flown by Americans, and others, do not carry American markings.

These craft fly in various Southeast Asian countries, but can be flown by pilots of many nationalities, and it is not clear just whose air force they belong to and U.S. aid officials cover up corruption among local government officials.

OAKLAND, CAL.
TRIBUNE

E - 225,038
S - 251,534
FEB 5 1972

CIA Dope Tie in Charged

A University of California professor, a magazine publisher and a former civilian aide in Thailand and Laos have joined to charge that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States Government is involved in the deadly traffic in opium in Southeast Asia.

Peter Dale Scott, professor of Medieval History at U.C., said wealthy New York investment interest collaborated with the CIA in setting up Air American, a Taiwan-based airline, established after the fall of China. He claims the firm is a front for the opium dealings.

Scott said the CIA's alleged involvement is more than just to shore up the economy of the countries of Southeast Asia.

"While the goal is not the infusion (of drugs) into the GI ranks, if the opium trade were not built up as it is the problem would not be nearly so acute as it is," he told a press conference at the San Francisco Press Club. He is the author of a soon to be published book titled "War Conspiracy."

Enrique B. del Rosario, a former civilian aide in Thailand and Laos and now regional coordinator for Vietnam Veterans Against the War, said he worked closely with Meo tribesmen and had seen cultivated opium fields planted by the tribesmen. He

said the opium later was harvested and that he watched it being put into warehouses operated by wealthy Chinese at Ban Houie Sai base in Laos as late as 1967.

He said he couldn't give any specific evidence of CIA complicity in the heroin traffic, adding, somewhat cryptically, "I can't say more. It depends

on the future."

He indicated he was not afraid for his life, but that he has a wife and two children still living in Thailand.

James Goode, editor and publisher of Earth magazine, whose March issue details the alleged involvement of the CIA in the dope traffic, said the area described by Del Ro-

sario produces only two products, chili peppers and opium.

"The only possible product air lifted out of there would be opium, and the CIA controls 90 per cent of the airlines," he declared.

He said he did not know where the suit will be filed or how much money it would seek.

EARTH PRESS

STATOTHR

PRESS RELEASE ON THE CONTENTS OF THE MARCH, 1972 ISSUE OF EARTH MAGAZINEFOR RELEASE: FEBRUARY 4, 1972 STATOTHR

HEROIN: SOME AMAZING LINKS BETWEEN THE CIA,
THE MAFIA, CHINESE NATIONALIST OFFICERS --
AND A FEW BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES

STATOTHR

According to detailed evidence in the March issue of EARTH magazine, the CIA is involved in opium traffic from the "fertile triangle" in the border areas of Laos, Burma, Thailand and the Yunnan province of southern China. About twenty-five percent of the heroin sold in America comes through this Southeast Asian channel. Ironically, the American taxpayer foots a six billion dollar a year bill for running the dope -- the CIA, an organization which answers to nobody, is intricately involved in the flow of opium out of the Asian hills and into the United States. U.S. tax money started Air America, the largest airline in Southeast Asia, used to supply and maintain opium growers, and also used for smuggling opium out of the triangle to Saigon and Hong Kong. The CIA claims other reasons for their huge operations, but as EARTH magazine points out in Berkeley professor Peter Dale Scott's thorough article, the agency is party to pushing dope around the world.

Scott's article, supported by over 80 footnotes, is especially sobering in that it reveals a set of international alliances ranging from Chiang Kai Shek's brother-in-law to members of the Royal Laotian family to Wall Street lawyers

(continued...)

Guardian

CIA admits it runs a base in Laos

By Richard E. Ward

President Nixon's latest "plan to end the war now" is proven to be yet another hoax by the administration's efforts to salvage its puppet regime in Laos.

On Jan. 19, a selected group of U.S. journalists was brought into Laos by the CIA contract airline, Air America, for the first officially authorized view of the once top-secret U.S. base at Long Chieng.

The base has been under siege by forces of the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao) for more than a month during one of the most important battles in the long struggle between liberation forces and U.S.-backed military elements.

In other recent briefings, U.S. officials have largely lifted the remaining secrecy about U.S. military operations in Laos being directed by the CIA.

CIA operations in Laos and elsewhere in Indochina are not new. As early as 1950, French officials detected a U.S. effort to use intelligence operatives posing as economic aid officials to undercut the French and to develop a pro-U.S. military and political base in Indochina. French suspicions were not unfounded, as the CIA established the Ngo Dinh Diem fascist regime in South Vietnam between the time of the French defeat at Dienbienphu in May 1954 and the signing of the Geneva Accords on July 20 of that year.

This CIA effort to maintain the Diem regime caused the war that has continued to the present and which has been extended by the U.S. to the whole Indochina peninsula. Eventually, CIA control of U.S. military operations in Vietnam was transferred to the Defense Department, but the CIA still directs ground operations of U.S.-backed forces in Laos and it controls a portion of U.S. activity using planes of Air America and Continental Airlines.

With pilots paid \$40,000 per year, the U.S. planes bring supplies to the CIA-directed armed forces in Laos, spot targets for U.S. bombers and carry out a variety of other operations, including the maintenance of assassination teams and espionage bases in the liberated zone, now comprising three-fourths of the country.

During the 1960s, the CIA created a secret army that at its peak had nearly 40,000 mercenaries, mainly of the Meo minority, under the command of Gen. Vang Pao. From 1968 to the present this army has been successively shattered by Pathet Lao offensives to the point where the Meo numbers have been reduced to less than 4,000. The U.S. has attempted to make up for

these losses by introducing large numbers of CIA-commanded Thai mercenaries, whose exact number remains unknown, but is estimated at 5,000-10,000. In recent weeks, top U.S. military leaders in Southeast Asia have gone to Bangkok and Vientiane to arrange a further augmentation of Thai mercenaries in Laos.

With recent Pathet Lao victories at the Plain of Jars, the Bolovens plateau and in other areas, and the continuing siege at Long Chieng, the situation confronting the U.S. in Laos has never been more acute. The military usefulness of the Long Chieng CIA base has been ended, although the battle there continues with the remnants of Vang Pao's troops reinforced with Thai mercenaries and forces of the Royal Laotian army, also completely U.S.-financed.

The latest reports from Laos state that the Pathet Lao forces hold the initiative and have the capability of maintaining a long siege, despite heavy U.S. bombings against the liberation forces encircling Long Chieng. Because of the heavy fighting U.S. journalists could not land and had to survey the battle scene at Long Chieng from the air.

They saw the battered remains of what was once one of the largest military installations in Laos, including the former headquarters of the CIA's secret army, an airstrip and a town housing about 30,000 civilian dependents of the mercenaries. The dependents have been evacuated, but reportedly about 6,000 pro-U.S. forces are still trying to prevent a complete defeat that could have shattering effects on the morale of the remaining U.S.-backed forces and the Vientiane puppet regime itself.

About the only remaining "secret" about U.S. operations in Laos was the name of CIA station chief. The Pathet Lao radio, however, revealed that he is Hugh Tovar, officially the first secretary in the U.S. embassy.

In the past, Western correspondents in Vientiane, including Americans, have had to keep some of their knowledge of CIA or other U.S. activities to themselves or risk expulsion or possibly imprisonment by the puppet authorities.

Prominent Laotian opponents of U.S. intervention in Vientiane have faced almost certain imprisonment and in some cases death. For example, Quinim Pholsena, an authentic neutralist and foreign minister of the tripartite government of national union established in 1962, was assassinated in Vientiane in 1963 by rightist henchmen of the CIA, according to the Pathet Lao. That assassination effectively ended the coalition government in Vientiane, which since 1964 has been completely dominated by the U.S. Prince Souvanna Phouma, prime minister of the Vientiane regime, who claims to be a neutralist, has sanctioned all the U.S. interventionary activities in Laos, at least since 1963.

The only conceivable reason for the U.S. secrecy was to hide from the American people that the U.S. was intervening in Laos in total violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva accords on Laos. The secrecy was part of the U.S. propaganda effort to disguise U.S. aggression in Indochina behind charges against North Vietnam. The U.S. bombing of Laos, which began in May 1964 and was not officially admitted by Washington until April 1970, has devastated large portions of the country. About half the total population have been refugees at one time or another, fleeing from U.S. bombs or forcibly removed to internment camps by the U.S.

The Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, at Six Billion Dollars a Year

Edward K. DeLong
United Press International
Washington, D.C.

"Whenever you are working on a problem that the military is deeply interested in — because it's affecting one of their programs . . . and you're not saying what they want you to say, the browbeating starts . . . the pressure to get the report to read more like they want it to read."

STATOTHR

(Based on a dispatch distributed by UPI
on October 3, 1971)

Offer of Job in CIA

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of — an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it — that is, dissident student groups and civil rights organizations — Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U.S. intelligence community.

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Moving Up

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA — and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations) — and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

Running Operations Against Domestic Groups

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who — if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like — are certainly considering it."

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

I Began To See Things I Did Not Like

"This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, (Va.), a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization — the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'the enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history.

E - 634,371
S - 701,743

JAN 30 1972

Air America Pilots Aging In Laos War

Vientiane, Laos — (AP) — They fly long hours in the flak-filled skies of Laos and play hard in exotic Oriental fleshpots.

But behind the swashbuckling facade, Air America pilots are often men with mortgages, sagging waistlines and even grandchildren. The soldiers of fortune are going gray. They now have something to lose.

If they get shot down, their lives are only worth two kilograms of gold — worth about \$3,300 in Europe. This reward is offered to primitive hill tribesmen for surviving crew members by the private company, a civilian contractor which takes orders from the Agency for International Development.

"The average age of my pilots is 43," said James Cunningham, the Air America chief in Laos. "They're still wild, some of them still break the rules all the time and fly by the seat of their pants. But they're also serious family men with business interests."

125 Professional Pilots

Often called the CIA airline because of its contract work for Washington's paramilitary involvement in Laos, Air America has 125 professional pilots flying 35 fixed-wing planes and 36 Thailand-based helicopters.

Cunningham pooh-poohs talk of clandestine "spook missions" and "black operations" allegedly performed in China and North Vietnam.

"That's a lot of drivel," he said. "We haul passengers, fuel and supplies, any cargo required by the services of this country. I'm not saying there isn't a CIA presence in Laos, but if I found any of my pilots taking orders from the CIA they'd get canned."

"You see those planes out there? At 125 knots they wouldn't last five minutes over China or North Vietnam."

Pretty Spooky

However, the pilots have some pretty spooky passengers on occasion — strange Americans with code names, unidentified Asians from several different countries, men with guns who ask to be landed at little-known airstrips in the jungled mountains behind enemy lines.

"I don't know who they are and I don't want to know," said one pilot. "All I know is a guy could get fired talking about them."

Pilots also have helped rescue downed U.S. Air Force fliers.

Air America itself has lost five planes in the past two months and nearly 50 have been shot up by anti-aircraft fire. Pilots also are being buzzed by Soviet-built MIGs of the North Vietnamese air force.

Danger Is Rife

Anti-aircraft sites are so thick in Laos that some areas are technically off limits to unarmed civilian aircraft. But "there's written policy and unwritten policy," explained one Air America man.

"We fly anywhere, and it's getting worse all the time," he added. "This country is going to hell. No place is safe any more."

Flying in high-risk areas and earning night differential, some of the pilots make \$40,000 a year.

"I earn every penny of it," said pilot James Russell, 49, a decorated World War II bomber pilot.

"I fly where other pilots don't fly because I need the money," the Texan said. "I have several deals cooking. I have a wife and three beautiful children to support. I want to expand my cattle ranch," a 25,000-acre spread in Brazil.

Plane Destroyed

Last week Russell's plane was destroyed on the ground by enemy mortar fire. He was on a clandestine mission involving six unidentified Asians, including a CIA agent code-named Swamp Rat. Russell outran pursuing North Vietnamese soldiers for two miles before a helicopter picked him up.

"Right now there's a well-dressed North Vietnamese wearing a singed \$65 flying jacket," he drawled. "I'd just bought that damn thing in Hong Kong and like a fool I left it in the plane."

STATOTHR

LANSING, MICH.
JOURNAL

JAN 23 1972
E - 81,637
S - 83,576

Major Refugee Area Once a Tiny Village

By ANNE DARLING
State Journal Special Writer

BAN ZONG, Laos—The unlikely assortment of people who cross paths each day at this dusty valley outpost in northern Laos includes soldiers, refugees, American public health and relief workers, ~~Central Intelligence Agency~~ employes, pilots, Filipino construction workers and a Chinese restaurateur.

Three years ago there was one tiny village in the valley and a bamboo pole with a flag on it. Now, where the pole was, is an airstrip long enough to accommodate bulky C-130 cargo planes. Refugee settlements are scattered across the valley. There are schools, prefabricated houses, a 140-bed hospital and a snack bar called Pop's Palace.

WHEN SAM Thong, to the north, fell to the North Vietnamese, this became the new base of operation for the refugee relief program of the U.S. Agency for International Development. Now that Long Cheng, south of Sam Thong, is threatened military operations for the region are being carried out from here as well.

The Americans fly into Site 272, Ban Zong's code name, and the refugees come by foot. But all are here because of the war.

The refugees, estimated at 10,000, are Meo tribesmen for the most part. Some have been here long enough to plant rice

on the hillsides. Others fled their villages recently, in the wake of advancing North Vietnamese units.

"EVERY DAY they come through looking for a plane ride to Vientiane," said one pilot of the dozens of women and children sitting alongside the airstrip next to meager bundles of household belongings. "But we aren't evacuating now. So they stay and we feed them or they move on by foot."

All of the equipment in sight at Ban Xong—from the jeeps and choppers and small planes that line the busy runway to the surgical tools at the hospital—were paid for by American dollars.

The primitive but clean little hospital is "full up these days," said Dr. Gene Kirkley of the USAID public health staff. About half of the patients were wounded in battles or in accidents with weapons. The rest suffer from malaria, pneumonia, parasites and malnutrition.

"THEY'RE SICK all right," said Kirkley. "As sick as any people I've ever seen anywhere."

As one 28-year-old Meo woman with malaria lay on a hospital bed, a man prepared an opium pipe for her to smoke. The doctor said the woman "may be smoking to relieve pain but she looks like an addict."

Across from her was a 12-

year-old boy shoe hand was blown off in a grenade explosion. "It's a wonder they don't all get kill," said Kirkley.

DOWN A hill from the hospital is the snack bar in stilts, gathering place for the Americans. The men in grey uniforms work for Air America, the private CIA airline that also serves USAID on contract.

Pilots for Air American and Continental Airlines fly in daily with military supplies and food for refugees. They fly out often with the sick and wounded, those cases too serious for Kirkley's staff to handle.

Many of the USAID relief workers have been in Laos for years and are able to speak Lao. The soldiers at Ban Xong are Lao and Thia. The CIA people, many of whom were in Vietnam and now are on contract to the Agency, are assigned to Lao army units.

MOST OF the pilots and CIA employes wear their "pound of gold," chunky 18-carat ID bracelets. One young CIA adviser entered Pop's in a turtleneck sweater and bell bottom dungarees, with bullet clips criss-crossing his chest and pistol and knife slung low on his hips. Another, with sliced-back hair and dagger tattoo on his forearm, carried a pistol in a shoulder holster beneath a sheepskin vest to which was pinned a big silver star that read "Sheriff."

Souvanna Phouma Says More U.S. Help Isn't Needed Yet

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 22—Despite the most serious North Vietnamese campaign of recent years in northern Laos, the Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, said today that his Government would not ask the United States for more military aid, "unless the situation gets worse."

Speaking at a news conference, Prince Souvanna Phouma said that the North Vietnamese forces were equipped with new and better arms—130-mm long-range artillery, provided by the Soviet Union—while "we are still equipped with old arms."

The North Vietnamese have driven the Government's troops and American-supported irregular forces off the Plaine des Jarres and have forced the abandonment of most operations at the Long Tieng base, about 30 miles south of the plain.

American officials here have said that even under the current aid program, because of heavy losses of equipment and casualties suffered by Government troops and Thai "mercenaries," as the Premier called them today, they may ask Congress for more money above the \$350-million annual ceiling imposed by the Senate last October.

These losses include 20 artillery pieces left by the 8,000 Thai and Laotian forces swept off the plain last month, out-gunned by the North Vietnamese.

Yesterday, according to authorities here, four more 155-mm guns were lost when North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops drove the defenders from Government positions at Phou Khoun, northwest of Long Tieng, 100 miles north of Vientiane and south of the royal capital at Luang Prabang.

Fighting Heavy on Ridge

At Long Tieng itself, heavy fighting between the Government forces and North Vietnamese regulars continued yesterday on the bombed-out Skyline Ridge, which dominates the northern side of the base. Government forces lost one position on to po fthe ridge yesterday morning, but then recaptured it in the afternoon at a wounded, according to informants here.

Many of these troops are regular Laotian and Thai Meo special forces that used to operate there.

The base's purely military significance has been greatly diminished since early January, when the Central Intelligence Agency withdrew its communications and surveillance equipment from Long Tieng and planes stopped landing on the airstrip because of Communist artillery fire.

An American pilot stationed here said that United States Air Force search-and-rescue helicopters which used to pluck downed American pilots out of the jungle, had also been stationed at Long Tieng but had been withdrawn to bases far to the south of Thailand. The crew of an Air Force Phantom jet bomber that was shot down Thursday in the mountains near the Plaine des Jarres had to be rescued by a civilian Air America helicopter, the pilot said.

Policy Stands, Prince Says

Prince Souvanna Phouma, who has allowed the United States to conduct bombing in his country since May, 1964 said today that he had not changed his conditions for acceding to Communist demands for an end to the bombing. His position has been that he would not order an end to the bombing until the North Vietnamese withdrew their forces, estimated at 50,000 to 90,000 men, from his country, both in the mountains to the north and on the Ho Chi Minh supply trails in the south.

But on Jan. 14 the Premier told a correspondent of the Voice of America that "we would agree to a cessation of the bombing if we had a guarantee that the North Vietnamese would not reinforce their troops in Laos," which suggested to many diplomatic observers here, a shift in emphasis.

Nixon's Trip Is Cited

Most Western diplomats here believe that there are two principal reasons for the current North Vietnamese offensive.

First, they say, the North Vietnamese want an end to the bombing of their supply trails. Second, as one European ambassador put it, "They want to show their allies in Moscow and Peking, before President Nixon makes his visits there, that the North Vietnamese have their own independent foreign policy and will accept no settlement made behind their backs."

73 of Foe Reported Slain

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 22 (AP)—The South Vietnamese command reported that 35 enemy soldiers were killed in a series of skirmishes in South Vietnam today, and South Korean headquarters said its troops had killed 38 more of the enemy.

The heaviest ground fighting, the Saigon command said, came in the coastal province of Binh Dinh, long considered a Vietcong stronghold.

Military spokesmen said the most severe South Vietnamese losses were suffered when two militia outposts two miles apart near Annon in Binh Dinh were attacked simultaneously. The spokesmen said four militia-


other wounded. It was the fourth American helicopter reported lost to enemy fire in five days.

Mansfield Doubts Increase

WASHINGTON, Jan. 22 (AP)—The Senate Democratic Leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, said today that he doubted that Congress would approve additional funds for operations in Laos and Cambodia. "The Senate wouldn't stand for increased involvement in either of these two countries," he said.

Report Airfield Falls

VIENTIANE, Jan. 22 (Agence France-Presse)—The airfield and military post of Mouong Phou, 28 miles southeast of the key road junction at Phou Khoun, fell to North Vietnamese and other Communist forces today, military sources reported here.



The New York Times/Jan. 23, 1972
Enemy forces took over Phou Khoun (1) in Laos and hit near Annon (2) in central South Vietnam.

men had been killed and four wounded but that at least 28 Vietcong had been killed.

The United States Command announced the loss of a light-observation helicopter in the Central Highlands in Pleiku Province and that one crew-



United Press International

BATTERED BASE — This helicopter view shows Long Cheng, the badly damaged secret military base in Laos maintained by the CIA to help Laotian irregulars battling

Communist forces. The base includes a mile-long paved runway, reloading facilities and stores of bombs for Laotian T-28 bombers and housing for 30,000 civilians.

Downed U.S. Pilot Rescued in Laos

By Jack Foisie
Los Angeles Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 20—Jim Russell is one lucky fellow. He is 49 and beefy, but he outran North Vietnamese soldiers for two miles today through Laotian jungle and was lifted to safety by a fellow Air America pilot.

James W. Russell is a seven-year veteran of Indochina flying. He makes about \$40,000 a year for doing what almost caused his death today for Air America, which is operated for the CIA.

"It was one of those bad days, maybe the worst."

Authorized by his bosses to talk about it, Russell related how his small "Porter" transport plane was destroyed by mortar fire after landing on a remote dirt

strip 100 miles northeast of this Laotian capital. He and five Laotians who were his "customers" ran through mortar and rifle fire for more than one hour.

"They set a trap to catch an American pilot on the ground, and they almost succeeded," he said.

"I was working with a Lao who I know only as 'swamp rat.' He said to shut down the engine while they got some bundles ready for paratroop.

'Not My Element'

"The moment my prop stopped turning, the bad guys knew they had me on the ground—and that's not my element," Russell said. "The first mortar riddled the aircraft, the second dropped me to the ground. I was hurt, and the others and I started running for the jungle.

"They knew they had an American and those little fellows (the North Vietnamese) took after us. They were shouting and shooting. It was tough getting through the bamboo. I cursed myself because I had been slipshod. I hadn't my gun strapped on and I didn't have any smoke to signal a rescue helicopter. But I knew where I was and I headed for some high ground with a bare spot on it."

Russell activated his pocket emergency radio and contacted a helicopter. It was flown by his fellow pilots, "Frenchy" Smith and J. J. McCauley. "They said they were coming to pick me up. It's lucky we all know the area." Russell and the five Laotians reached a clearing by

the creek. Two of the Laotians formed a rear-guard team to hold off the North Vietnamese. Russell plunged into the creek. "Man, I'd been running for an hour. I was so dehydrated I drank the jungle water." They could hear the North Vietnamese troopers crashing through the bamboo.

War Hotter

"But Frenchy and J. J. got there first. They hauled me up on a cable. It broke when they tried to pick up my customers but another chopper came and got them, too."

Air America pilots are finding the Laotian war hotter than ever. Twenty-four of these CIA-chartered aircraft were hit by ground fire in December and three were shot down. The record in January is described by Russell as "even worse."

C.I.A.-Aided Laos Base Hit Hard

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

LONG TIENG, Laos, Jan. 19—The long-secret military base maintained here by the United States Central Intelligence Agency to help Laotian irregulars battle the North Vietnamese is badly damaged and has been put out of effective action by the Communists even though the Laotians have reoccupied most of a high ridge that commands it.

The United States and Laotian Governments lifted a 10-year veil of secrecy from the base and allowed a group of newsmen to charter a helicopter today to land on it and observe military operations. Long Tieng came under heavy attack on Dec. 31 by a North Vietnamese force of 6,000 to 9,000 men.

The base consists of a mile-long paved runway, with reloading facilities and stores of bombs for the small Laotian T-28 bombers, a complex of communications buildings at either end and a large cluster of villages that housed 30,000 civilians before the attack began and they fled. By Jan. 12 all this was in imminent danger of falling to the largest North Vietnamese attack ever launched against it.


By that time the C.I.A. and the Laotians had moved most of their electronic and reconnaissance equipment from the base.

Since then, however, a force of about 6,000 Laotians has retaken most of a key position on what is known as Skyline Ridge, overlooking the base from the north. Included in the force are perhaps 2,000 of the Meo tribesmen for whose clandestine operations the base was originally built and 1,000 Thai "volunteers," in addition to regular Laotian troops.

Despite the advance atop the ridge, the helicopter that carried reporters and some United States officials to the central part of it came under mortar

attack from North Vietnamese troops only a mile away. Sporadic sniper fire ricocheted in the deserted streets of Long Tieng and made it unsafe for planes to land there.

High-ranking American officials, who acceded to requests for the visit to the base on condition that they not be identified, said the Laotians had suffered at least 600 killed,



The New York Times/Jan. 20, 1972

wounded or missing in the continuing conflict around the base.

Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, commander of the military region and of the Meos in the C.I.A.-supported irregular forces, was ebullient today as he was calling in American and Laotian air strikes on North Vietnamese positions on the craggy limestone pinnacles that dominate the eastern end of the base.

He quoted casualty statistics that appeared to be wildly optimistic—8,000 of the enemy killed—but he is usually either elated or despondent. American officials said they estimated that North Vietnamese casualties had been heavy and might have reached 600 to 700 killed in the current fighting, the heaviest in Indochina at the moment.

At the general's headquarters on a hill overlooking the south side of the Long Tieng complex, a handful of young Americans in civilian clothes were planning B-52 raids on the Communist positions around the base.

A visitor on a wide-ranging tour encountered no Americans in ground combat anywhere on or near the base. But the skies were filled with American planes—cargo aircraft dropping arms and food by parachute, and helicopters. All operated for the C.I.A. and the Laotians by the

charter line Air America—plus occasional United States Air Force jet bombers from Thailand.

Official Explains Change

A ranking American official, asked to explain why reporters were suddenly given a guided tour, replied: "This is a North Vietnamese invasion of Laos, and there's no point in keeping you people from seeing it for yourselves. This year they've brought in a lot more troops, heavier equipment, and showed more determination than they ever have before—for what political objective I just don't know."

Both the Americans and the Laotians here—the Laotians have made the defense of the spectacularly beautiful mountain valley their primary effort by bringing troops from all over the country—expect the North Vietnamese drive to intensify.

In the steep, trackless jungled hills to the north the North Vietnamese are believed to have moved 6,000 to 9,000 first-line combat troops across the Plaine des Jarres. They have used powerful artillery with a 20-mile range to commanding advantage.

Usable but Cluttered

The attacks have halted in the past two days, but fear of them prevents the Air America planes from landing on the airstrip, which is still usable but cluttered with ordinance for the T-28's, which now operate from Vientiane.

Some of them were dropping cluster bombs—antipersonnel devices that break into small bomblets and explode like firecrackers—on remaining Communist positions at the southern end of the valley.

The North Vietnamese have also been harassing the Laotian forces that have been driving them out of bunkers on the ridge by firing mortars at them, mostly at night.

Two mortar rounds aimed at a helicopter landing position wounded three Laotian soldiers; 28 have been killed and almost 70 wounded in the action there this week.

One of the wounded was a boy who was struck in the head by a piece of shrapnel. He said he was 14 years old but was part of the regular Laotian armed forces. He was flown out in a helicopter. "No sleep much at night," he said.

U.S. Expanding Role in Laos Despite Curb as War Worsens

BY JACK FOISIE

Times Staff Writer

PAKSE, Laos—American participation in the Laos war continues to expand despite congressional bans on spending and other limitations imposed by the State Department and the Pentagon.

As the war worsens here, it is the character of the Americans—from Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley in Vientiane to the refugee worker here—to work harder at trying to save the situation.

While new ways to bend the bans and stretch the limitations have been devised, the basic rule that no organized American ground combat units can get involved in Laos continues to be observed.

But everything short of putting in American infantry is being done to help the reeling Royal Lao Army. This backup, formerly carried out clandestinely, is now performed in the open.

"All the secrets have been exposed in congressional investigations or by you reporters," I was told. "There's nothing left to hide."

Pakse is a case in point. A year ago a reporter arriving by Lao commercial plane or crossing from Thailand was spurned by Americans and sometimes ousted by the Lao military. Now a correspondent finds the military more relaxed and the Americans friendly and cooperative.

There are 34 Americans living here and involved, in one way or another, with helping Gen. Soutchay Vongsavanh and his 5,000 Lao troops fend off the North Vietnamese, who have been steadily advancing since mid-December and are now only 20 miles from Pakse.

The military advisers—known in Laos as "attaches"—wear the green fatigue uniform, but most other Americans are in mufti.

A good number of them are pilots who fly light planes and spot targets

for bombers. These pilot-spotters are known as "Ravens," and "Raven House" in the evening has all the camaraderie of young professional military men who recount the adventures of the day and think not of the risk tomorrow.

The air war in support of Laos troops is small-scale in comparison with the "big air war" waged by Thai-based American jets bombing the Ho Chi Minh supply network in eastern Laos. But it can still mean death for the "Ravens."

During the past 21 months, 18 American planes "based in Laos" have disappeared while on combat support missions. These include 10 "Ravens," while the others are CIA-chartered transport planes or helicopters flown by Air America or Continental Airways pilots. Twenty-eight persons have died in these mishaps.

Guerrilla Teams

Another role performed by Americans in Pakse still is somewhat secret. Former military men work with Lao guerrilla teams. They continue to masquerade as members of the U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Laos, despite a Washington announcement that this association with AID would be ended and the longstanding AID policy of not being involved in military operations would be restored.

A military adviser to the Lao forces must have infinite patience. For years Lao officers have believed

that artillery is best utilized when fired one gun at a time, and all the persuasion of Americans advocating mass fire has had little effect here on the Pakse front.

An exception to the usual lethargic Lao soldier is the Lao pilot of the "Mighty Mite" fighter-bomber, a converted American propeller-driven training plane.

Once flown by American or Thai pilots, the "Mighty Mite" air force now appears to be all-Lao here.

The pilots fly with the zest of all airmen, even though their bomb loads are puny by comparison with American jets, which often on their way back from bombing the trail save a rocket or two to use in close support on the Pakse front.

11,000 Refugees

The conventional AID program continues in southern Laos, despite the prospect that the enemy may overrun Pakse and reach the east bank of the Mekong River.

A \$1.5 million expansion of the Pakse airport is nearing completion. A new dirt strip for aircraft has been built on the west side of the Mekong as a fallback position.

But mostly the AID team here, headed by Louis Connick, is occupied with finding new land for the 11,000 refugees who have fled from the agricultural-rich Boloven Plateau to the east of Pakse, an area now entirely occupied by the North Vietnamese.

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LAOTIAN DEFENSE IS SAID TO STIFFEN

Enemy Is Reported Under
Pressure at Long Tieng

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 18—North Vietnamese troops who have been staging attacks in the Long Tieng area of northern Laos since New Year's Eve are reported to have been encountering increasing pressure in recent days from the Laotian defenders.

Most of the fighting has been on a high two-mile-long ridge overlooking the American-supported base, and there the Laotians were said to be advancing slowly, trying to drive the enemy out of bunkers in the central part of the ridge.

[Government troops have retaken nearly 500 feet of the ridge in heavy hand-to-hand combat, United Press International, quoting military sources in Vientiane.]

Involved in the fighting at Long Tieng are about 6,000 North Vietnamese who began their attacks on the base after having completed a sweep across the nearby Plaine des Jarres to the northeast.

The defenders—about 4,000 Meo tribesmen in irregular units, regular Laotian forces and about 2,000 Thai volunteer soldiers paid indirectly by the United States Government—have been supported by bombing attacks from United States B-52 aircraft. The Thais were said to be manning artillery positions in support of the Laotians.

Airstrip Under Enemy Fire

With the base under continued enemy fire, the 5,000-foot airstrip is said to be usable only by helicopters and only at great risk.

Most Americans here think that the swift North Vietnamese attack across the Plaine des Jarres and against the main Government military stronghold at Long Tieng is an effort to crush the American-supported irregular forces and alter the political balance between the Government and the Communists decisively. If this succeeds, it is felt, the Government of Prince Souvanna Phouma may be forced to tell the Americans they may no longer bomb the principal Communist infiltration routes through southern Laos into South Vietnam and Cambodia.

In southern Laos, too, in the area east of Pakse, Government forces have been driven westward.

At present, American observers here say they see no indication that the Communist offensive is having the desired effect on Premier Souvanna Phouma and maintain that it will not succeed unless Long Tieng falls.

"We think now that we may have some chance, probably a little less than 50-50, of holding them off," one American observer said. But others said there were no plans at present to reposition the base, even if its position is saved, and there is the beginning of a suggestion in official circles here that the American strategy of bolstering Laotian forces with guerrillas backed by the Central Intelligence Agency is proving ineffective.

Laotian Air Force Assisting

"Air power is about the only thing keeping them going now," one source said. In addition to the B-52's, the Americans are operating C-134 gunships and F-4 Phantoms from bases in Thailand and the Laotians are dropping American bombs with their 40-plane air force.

Most supply and troop transport missions for the Laotians are performed by charter planes flown by Air America from Vientiane and Thailand. One of these planes went down a few weeks ago for unknown reasons in northern Laos in an area where 20,000 Chinese are building and defending a road from the border toward the Mekong River.

Another small Air America plane "took fire" several days ago over the same area while it was dropping leaflets in an effort to solicit information about the lost transport, an American official said today.

But he could not say whether the ground fire came from Chinese troops defending the road or from pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces in the mountainous area, which is completely under Communist control. American planes are normally forbidden to fly over the road, which has been under construction for two years.

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Chinese Fire Hits Plane Over Laos

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Jan. 15—An American cargo plane was heavily damaged, apparently by Chinese anti-aircraft fire while flying over northern Laos this morning, highly reliable sources here say. The pilot was seriously wounded.

An Air America C-123 on a leaflet dropping mission over a road being built by Chinese engineers in Laos, 175 miles northwest of Vientiane, was hit by Chinese air defenses along the road, the sources say, wounding at least two of the plane's crew including the pilot.

The sources said the plane's crew was dropping leaflets over the Chinese road. The leaflets offered a substantial reward in gold for information leading to the location of wreckage and occupants of another Air America C-123 lost last month in the area and possibly hit by Chinese groundfire.

Air America announced a week ago that emergency search and rescue operations for the downed aircraft with three Americans and one Laotian aboard had been suspended though a routine area alert would be maintained.

Air America is an American airline specializing in contract work for the U.S. government, mainly the CIA. Reliable sources in Vientiane said last month that the C-123 lost near the Chinese road was on a clandestine "drop" mission, carrying supplies to an intelligence gathering base north-east of the road.

Suicidal Flights

Because of groundfire, weather and terrain, flying

over Laos is considered some of the most hazardous in the world by seasoned pilots. Flying over the Chinese road is considered almost suicidal sources say.

"Normally the air space over the Chinese road is strictly "off limits" to American planes, official sources here say, due to a concentration of Chinese anti-aircraft weaponry along its length.

Installation of the anti-aircraft weapons resulted from unauthorized bombing of the road in 1969, sources here say.

Construction of the road by Chinese engineer crews has been in progress for the past four years, having been agreed to by Laotian Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma.

The road has now reached a point about 30 miles north of Pakbeng on the Mekong River. Beyond its present terminal point, a trail exists that is barely passable for wheeled vehicles, informed U.S. sources say, but they doubt it is being used for transport purposes.

Vientiane Tranquil Despite War

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

VIENTIANE, Jan. 14—

Several hundred neatly dressed Laotian students paraded down Vientiane's main boulevard yesterday morning chanting slogans at impassive riot police while shoppers and office workers looked on with amusement.

The biggest Communist offensive of the Laotian war is under way, according to American military assessments, but these students were disturbed because the exclusive French lycee they attend is changing the procedure for taking exams.

Vientiane has always been strangely removed from the fighting going on around it and now, although the situation in the northeast and to the south is worse than ever, the city remains probably the quietest and least warlike capital in Southeast Asia.

Communist Pathet Lao soldiers stride purposefully across a downtown intersection from one of their villas to another and no one pays any attention. At the North Vietnamese embassy there is a reception for left-wing journalists and U.S. "aggression" is denounced.

Defense Minister-delegate Sissouk Na Champassak spends as much time in his job as minister of finance as he does on military affairs and keeps his regular tennis dates with diplomatic friends.

The ministry of defense itself, a large brick building on the outskirts of town, is a textbook of disorganization. The functionaries, closeted in small offices poring over stacks of papers are genial but bemused. From Friday evening to Monday morning, their offices are closed.

National Assembly Election

Earlier this month, there was an election in government-held areas for a new National Assembly to take office in the spring. Forty of 60 incumbents were defeated including some backed by Laos' powerful princely families.

The assembly has little authority and has changed nothing. Americans, however, pronounced themselves pleased that the

contest went off smoothly and public resentment against some of the aristocrats was expressed.

The Pathet Lao radio denounced the balloting bitterly as a fraud and a sham, but then acknowledged that even so, the people had managed to make themselves heard. That being said, the elections have been promptly forgotten.

The only real issue after all is the war. The responsibility for coping with that falls very largely on 70-year-old Prince Souvanna Phouma who for 10 years has struggled vainly to restore some semblance of meaning to the neutralist coalition established at the 1962 Geneva conference.

The currently dismal military and diplomatic situation has Souvanna more worried than ever before, confidants say, if only because the positions of all those he is trying to deal with have hardened.

Brother's Letter

The most recent letter from his Pathet Lao half-brother Prince Souphanouvong (received on Dec. 18, the day the Communist offensive began) was a virtual ultimatum for surrender and insisted that there be a complete cease-fire and a total cessation of the U.S. bombing before peace talks begin.

A bombing halt would, of course, apply to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the Americans, who keep what is left of Laos going with military and economic aid and advice, would scarcely agree to that.

Faced with the always present possibility that Laos might collapse, threatening President Nixon's Indochina policies, Americans, too, are very concerned about the intensity of this year's offensive.

Many, however, take the optimistic view that there are limitations to what the Communists have in mind and conditions will ease once these objectives have been achieved.

By this reckoning, what the North Vietnamese are determined to have is undisputed control of the north-vaunted Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Cheng and crippling the remnants

of Gen. Vang Pao's CIA supported Army of Meo tribesmen.

To the south, the Communists are determined that the Laotians will no longer be in a position to harass their activities on the trail from the Bolovens Plateau.

Maximum Impact

Furthermore, say the Americans, the Communists want to make their splash now so it will have the maximum impact on Mr. Nixon's visit to Peking and the first presidential primaries in the United States.

Then, it is hoped, the enemy will settle back, confident that they have bloodied the Laotians and discouraged the Americans sufficiently so that no effort will be made to reclaim their losses until next summer, at the earliest.

Those Americans willing to discuss (but never for attribution) the present grim picture and the prospects ahead are the diplomats in Vientiane and a few authorized military men from the army attache's office.

Advisers in the field, on the other hand, especially the CIA men who supervise virtually the entire effort in the northeast, will say nothing and are not friendly to outsiders.

Ban Son, 70 miles north of Vientiane, is a refugee center with an airstrip and supply depot that began operating in March, 1970, in a valley not far from Long Cheng. It was a favored place to take visiting journalists who wanted to see what the United States was doing for the thousands of displaced mountain people.

There is a primitive but clean hospital with a doctor from the U.S. Agency for International Development. There is also a small mess where advisers and pilots of CIA-operated Air America can get cheeseburgers and cold beer.

Ban Son's Function

In the past two weeks as Long Cheng has come under increasing pressure, the function of Ban Son has changed greatly. Now it is the center of the military support effort for the northeast and the CIA contingent has been beefed up and installed in trailers along the airstrip.

Huge C-130 Air America

transports (rented from the Air Force), along with a half dozen other types of smaller aircraft and vintage I-34 helicopters, stream into the valley carrying supplies, ammunition and soldiers.

Ban Son is now the official headquarters for the Second Military Region but because of its location it is almost undefendable as a military installation. For the first time in a year, it was penetrated by a guerrilla squad and struck by rockets earlier this week.

There is talk, rumor at this stage, that Ban Son will soon have to be evacuated as the enemy sweeps southward past Long Cheng. As it is, the CIA men are not spending their nights there.

Meo's Role

Over the years, as the pace of fighting in the northeast has quickened, it has been the Meos who carried the brunt for the government. Lately, their ranks have become depleted and Laotian reinforcements who have filled out the units all are very young.

At the hospital in Ban Son, there is a young Meo soldier who had his hand and part of his face blown away at Long Cheng. He is 19 and has been a soldier for three years. Another wounded soldier, a two-year veteran, was 15.

At the start of the offensive, military sources fixed the number of Meo-Laotian soldiers in the northeast at 8,000, mostly in small units guarding firebases along the Plain of Jars and around Long Cheng. Another 3,000-4,000 Thai irregulars were also on duty.

As badly as the Meos were mauled in the fighting around the plain and more recently around Long Cheng, sources report that the Thais have taken proportionately greater casualties. One fire support base on the plain had 500 Thai soldiers when the battle began, according to a Meo officer. In the end only 18 came out.

The Thais, who the Americans steadfastly maintain are all volunteers, are used primarily as artillerymen with close support troops. Their reputation as fighters is not good. They are often undisciplined

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Bombings: major escalation of war

By Richard E. Ward

U.S. aircraft engaged in massive, indiscriminate bombings of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam last week.

According to the Associated Press and other press reports, all available U.S. aircraft in the Indochina area—at least 350—are being used in the attacks, the largest since President Nixon took office and perhaps the largest single series of raids since U.S. bombings of North Vietnam began in August 1964.

In a cynical abuse of the English language, the raids have been characterized by the Nixon administration as "limited-duration protective reaction strikes." But the attacks actually are new proof that Washington has not abandoned its dreams of victory in Indochina through airpower. This is the nearly unanimous view of the American press, including journalists reporting from Saigon and Washington as well as editorial commentary.

"Nearly seven years after President Lyndon B. Johnson began sustained bombing of North Vietnam... another American President is relying heavily on airpower to achieve his objectives in Indochina," wrote Neil Sheehan in the Dec. 28 New York Times. "It has been held as doctrine," continued Sheehan, "by a number of American policy makers since John F. Kennedy took office in 1961 that the threat of bombing, or bombing itself would intimidate" the North Vietnamese leaders "to order the Vietcong guerrillas in the South to halt their insurrection against the Saigon government."

"Limited duration"

It is evident that this is the doctrine still adhered to by the chief figures of the Nixon administration—Nixon himself, chief White House advisor Henry Kissinger and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird. The latter defended the raids and threatened North Vietnam with further massive attacks in a Dec. 28 press conference where journalists forced from him an admission that the latest U.S. attacks are similar to those carried out under former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara. "The major difference," conceded Laird, "is that these are of limited duration..." Laird would not define what he considered limited duration, but it was clear that the raids constituted an effort to force Hanoi to agree to U.S. terms for a settlement in Vietnam and to compensate for some of the gravest reverses suffered by the U.S. throughout Indochina since Nixon took office.

The latest U.S. attacks against North Vietnam followed major victories by liberation forces in Laos and Cambodia and a severe deterioration of the position of the Saigon regime, the latter confronted by unprecedented political opposition.

During the past month in Laos, the forces of the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao) have made strategic gains on all major fronts. The liberation forces have recaptured the Plain of Jars, which was briefly held by the puppet forces and Thai mercenaries during the rainy season. In southern Laos, liberation forces resisted efforts of the U.S.-backed troops to retake the Bolovens plateau, once a CIA base.

During the last two weeks, the largest CIA base in Laos, the top-secret installation of Long Chieng (south of the Plain of Jars) used by the

Meo troops, has come under heavy attack by the Pathet Lao.

"Communist forces in the mountain regions of northern Laos," reported D. E. Ronk from Vientiane in the Dec. 24 Washington Post, "are in a position to destroy the CIA-sponsored Meo army following last weekend's rapid rout of Gen. Vang Pao's pro-government troops from the Plain of Jars."

"Morale at Long Chieng," continued Ronk, "has plunged to its lowest point in more than a year with frightened Meo families hurriedly fleeing toward the south."

"Persistent reports from Long Chieng neither confirmed nor denied by spokesmen here, say Air America cargo planes are evacuating important equipment from the isolated base," he wrote.

"Long Chieng has a certain psychological importance for Meo tribesmen who are aligned in clans with Gen. Vang Pao and the CIA. Most knowledgeable sources here believe the fall of Long Chieng would take the binding force out of Vang Pao's army and send the troops and their families back to the hills to resume their nomadic lives."

"This would leave the entire mountainous region of northern Laos under the control of the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies."

In Cambodia, the pro-U.S. forces of Phnom Penh and Saigon troops sent to the rescue have recently suffered their greatest defeats since a CIA-backed coup toppled the neutralist government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk last year. These defeats, wrote Gloria Emerson in the Dec. 23 N.Y. Times, "are causing deep uneasiness among many Cambodian commanders, who privately admit they are no longer confident about the outcome of the war."

"Much of this anxiety results from the recent defeat of Cambodian troops trying to reopen an enemy-occupied section of Route 6... The collapse of the campaign disclosed the Cambodian army was still sickly and in deep confusion."

Puppets collapse

The defeats of the pro-U.S. forces in Cambodia have left in their wake an army on the verge of collapse and a puppet leadership fighting among themselves, according to Western press sources and first reported in the Dec. 15 Guardian by Wilfred Burchett. "While enemy forces make damaging advances in the countryside, an important contest for leadership is currently taking place among Cambodia's senior political and military leaders," Peter Osnos wrote in the Dec. 19 Washington Post.

After detailing the competition for power in Phnom Penh, Osnos wrote that "public and official morale has fallen sharply in recent weeks—lower, it is said, than at any since the war spread to the country in March 1970... Many of the young intellectuals and professionals who flocked to the government after the toppling of Prince Sihanouk are now said to be quietly bowing out as they lose faith in the ability of the regime to carry

"As for the beleaguered Cambodian army, some analysts believe that if its fortunes continue to sink

continued

THE LEGEND OF TONY POE, CIA

U.S. operations in Southeast Asia have often involved shadowy figures, perhaps none more shadowy than the elusive, Jekyll-Hyde figure of Anthony A. Poshepny
MEN AT WAR/ BY DONALD KIRK

HE'S A ROUND-FACED, cheery man with a cherubic smile and a charming family air, it is said, a penchant for preserving the heads of his victims in formaldehyde. He's a classic Jekyll-and-Hyde who has been waging the most secret phase of America's secret war in Southeast Asia for the past ten years.

To the boys at Napoleon Cafe and the Derby King on Bangkok's Patpong Road, a watering ground for Air America pilots, CIA types, journalists and other assorted old Indochina hands, he's just plain Tony Poe, but his real name is Anthony A. Poshepny. He's a refugee from Hungary, an ex-Marine who fought on Iwo Jima and a dedicated patriot of his adopted land, the United States of America, for which he has risked his life on literally hundreds of occasions while ranging through the undulating velvet-green crags and valleys of Red China, Laos and Thailand.

He also shuns publicity and hates reporters, as I discovered in a long search for him, beginning in the Thai capital of Bangkok and extending to the giant American airbases in north-eastern Thailand and to the mountains of northern Laos. The search for Tony Poe ended where it had begun, in the lobby of the Amarin Hotel on Bangkok's Ploenchit Road, a crowded, six-lane-wide avenue that runs through a residential and shopping district supported largely by rich American "farangs," the somewhat demeaning Thai term for "foreigners." There, before leaving Bangkok for the last time, I picked up a note, signed simply "Tony," stating that he had to "decline" my request for an interview. "I believe [sic] that you can appreciate my reason for not seeking public commentary," wrote Tony in the formal "statement style" better befitting a public official and probably suggested, if not dictated, by a superior in the Central Intelligence Agency.

"C-I-A?" asked the cute little Japanese girl at the front desk of the Amarin, enunciating each of the letters, smiling slightly with glittering white teeth, raising her eyebrows flirt-

Poe is airplane pilot. He works for Continental Air Services." An assistant manager, also Japanese, showed me the registration card Tony had signed only a few days before my arrival at the Amarin last June, in the middle of my search for him. Tony, I learned, generally stayed at the Amarin, only a few blocks from the modernesque American embassy. He was a familiar, beloved character to the staff at the hotel—the opposite of his public image as a sinister, secret killer and trainer of anti-Communist guerrilla warriors.

"Anthony A. Poshepny," read the top line. "Air Ops Officer—Continental Air Services." So Tony, with a record of more combat jumps than any other American civilian in Indochina, had used Continental as his "cover" while training mountain tribesmen to fight against regular Communist troops from both China and North Vietnam. Tony's cover surprised me; I had assumed he would declare himself as some sort of U.S. government "official"—perhaps an adviser to border-patrol police units, the traditional cover under which CIA operatives masquerade in both Thailand and Laos. Still, Continental was a logical choice. Like Air America, Continental regularly ferries men and supplies to distant outposts throughout Indochina. Financed at least in part by the CIA, Continental could hardly balk at providing cover for full-time CIA professionals.

The next two lines on Poe's registration form were even more intriguing than his link with Continental, at least in terms of what he was doing at the present. After "going to," Tony had written, "Udon," the name of the base town in northeastern Thailand from which the United States not only flies bombing missions over all of Laos but also coordinates the guerrilla war on the ground. And where was Tony "coming from," according to the form? His origin was Phitsanulok, a densely jungled mountain province famed for incessant fighting between Commu-

nist-armed guerrillas, most of them members of mountain tribes, and ill-trained Thai army soldiers and policemen. Tony, it seemed, had vanished into the wilds of Phitsanulok (where the jungle is so thick and the slopes so steep as to discourage the toughest American advisers) on a mysterious training venture not known even to most American officials with top-secret security clearances, much less to the girls behind the desk of the Amarin.

"Oh, he's such a nice man," one of the girls in the hotel assured me when I asked how she liked Tony—who, I'd been warned by other journalists, might shoot on sight any reporter discovered snooping too closely into his life. "He has very nice wife and three lovely children," the girl burred on, pausing to giggle slightly between phrases. "He comes here on vacation from up-country." The impression Poe has made on the girls at the Amarin is a tribute both to his personality and his stealth. As I discovered while tracing him from the south of Thailand to northern Laos, he already had an opulent home in Udon for his wife, a tribal princess whom he had married a year or so ago. Mrs. Poshepny, a tiny, quick-smiling girl whom Tony had met while training members of the Yao tribe for special missions into China, liked to come to Bangkok to shop while Tony conferred with his CIA associates on the guarded "CIA floor," of the American embassy.

It was ironic that I should have learned that Tony stayed at the Amarin while in Bangkok, for it was only by chance that I had checked in there at the beginning of my search—and only during small talk with the desk clerks that I found one of Tony's registration cards.

The day after I arrived in Bangkok, local journalists gave me my first inkling of some of the rumors surrounding Tony Poe. One of the journalists, Lance Woodruff, formerly a reporter on one of Bangkok's two English-language newspapers and now with the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok, said Poe not only hated reporters but had been known to "do away with people he doesn't like." Woodruff compared Poe to a figure from *Terry and the Pirates* and told me the story of how Poe lined one wall of a house in northern Laos, near the Chinese border, with heads of persons he had killed. None of the contacts I met in Bangkok had the slightest clue as to Tony's whereabouts—except that he was somewhere "up-country" training tribesmen to fight the Communists,

Still unaware that Poe stayed at the Amarin, I drove to a town named Ubon some 325 miles northeast of

JAN 1972

The Billions in the White House Basement

by Timothy H. Ingram

By cliché, the power of the purse is now widely referred to as Congress' only remaining lever for redressing the balance between itself and the presidency. Increasingly, Congress is recognizing that its foreign affairs and treaty-making functions are mere ornaments, and that its traditional checks on the Executive are either unrealistic or meaningless. What is left is the appropriations power, and a handful of senators and representatives are invoking it in a muted but growing struggle to revive congressional strength.

Few appreciate, however, the extent to which even the power of the purse, that bulwark of legislative authority, is already controlled by the presidency. As Congress attempts to tame the Executive by threatening to cut off funds for things like war, it finds that the Executive has already developed innumerable devices for

Timothy Ingram, formerly with public television's "The Advocates," is a Washington writer.

getting the money, anyway. And far from successfully denying the President his money, Congress is even having a hard time getting him to spend what is appropriated.

The Constitution, of course, says that the appropriations power is the exclusive prerogative of Congress. But in the vacuum created by Congressional indifference to overseeing the bureaucracy's spending habits, and by the now empty ritual of blue-penciling the President's annual budget, the Executive has amassed a mound of spending prerogatives of its own: transfer authorities, contingency funds, lump-sum appropriations, programmings, special waiver authorities, and covert financing.

A look at several discretionary spending options will give some idea of the extent of the Executive's grasp of the purse strings—and some indication of what Congress is left holding. For example, through secrecy, transfer powers, mislabelled military assistance, unauthorized commitments, and cloaked grants of excess war goods, the President and his national security managers are able to hire mercenaries, discourage a rump insurrection in Ceylon, promise South Korea \$3.5 billion, and turn over an unknown amount of equipment, helicopters, and bases to Vietnam. A simple budgetary procedure called reprogramming allows the Navy to quietly secure a behind-the-doors reversal of a congressional decision to defer production of the controversial F-14 fighter. And the pipeline, a huge reservoir of unexpended funds, permits the Pentagon to spend above the level of appropriations authorized by Congress. While lamenting the loss of its war powers, Congress consoles itself with the thought that it still maintains control over domestic priorities by its annual allotment of funds. But through impoundment, the President refuses to spend some \$12 billion in appropriated monies, placing a post mortem item veto on such programs as urban renewal, regional medical clinics, food stamps, and farm loans.

The panoply of deceptive devices available to the Executive's budgetary Houdinis was graphically illustrated in a memo submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary Laird on August 30, 1971. According to *The New York Times*, the Joint Chiefs offered several ways of by-passing the limited military appropriations available to Congress to generate an additional \$52 million or

more, to increase the strength of the Cambodian Army.

The first would be simply to transfer \$52 million appropriated for economic aid to the military aid program. The second would be to use economic aid money to buy all "common use" items such as trucks and jeeps, which have military as well as civilian value, thus freeing the other funds for strictly military uses. The third would be to increase procurement for the U.S. Army by \$52 million and give the materiel to the Cambodians, for "repayment" later. The fourth would be to make some exceptions in Defense Department supply regulations, declaring equipment to be "excess" and delivering it to the Cambodians.

In addition, the memo proposed, the Joint Chiefs would clandestinely provide for a mechanized brigade, an artillery brigade, and coastal patrol units, as well as ground troops and extensive logistic support. AID would help finance the paramilitary force of armed civilians, which the planners hoped would number 200,000 by mid-1973 and more than 500,000 in 1977. The CIA, with its secret budget, supposedly would help train and direct Cambodian military units, as it is now doing with Laotian and Thai troops in Laos, and would provide airlift support with its subsidized airline, Air America. The proposals represented a complete subversion of congressional authority.

But the real significance of the story was not reported: how commonplace these methods have become. The Executive devices are as widespread as they are ingenious.

30 DEC 1971

Cause of Plane Loss In Laos Still Unclear

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Dec. 29—Reports that an American civilian cargo plane missing in Northwestern Laos was shot down by Chinese Communist antiaircraft fire are being discounted by Air America operators of the plane in Laos.

Air America and informed U.S. sources here said that an Air America C-123 cargo plane carrying a crew of three Americans and one Laotian is believed down on a supply flight. The U.S. sources said the flight originated at Udorn airbase, Thailand, and was en route to the area of Xieng Long, Laos, 160 miles northwest of Vientiane on the Thai-Lao border.

Air America is a charter airlines which works for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Air America spokesmen refused to confirm the plane's destination or to divulge the nature of its cargo.

There was speculation here that the plane was in fact carrying a resupply drop to a reconnaissance team located in the area where it was downed. But U.S. sources would say only that the plane was carrying rice.

The presence of a number of clandestine bases, including those for CIA-sponsored guerrillas and intelligence gathering teams in the area of the suspected crash, is believed responsible for the reluctance of most sources here to discuss the current search effort.

Air America sources say they have now reason to be-

lieve the cargo plane was downed by Chinese gunners. They noted that the air space over the area where the Chinese are building a road, which cuts from northeast Laos toward the southwest and ends at the Mekong River, 140 miles northwest of here, is strictly "off limits" to American planes.

The Chinese road also lies 30 miles or more northeast of the standard air routes to northwest Laos.

There was some speculation the plane might have been shot down by Chinese ground fire, because sources here revealed that search and rescue planes now looking for the downed aircraft had received antiaircraft flak at 2,000 feet, higher than the effective range of guns used by the Patet Lao and North Vietnamese forces in Laos.

No rescue planes had been hit so far, the sources said.

Laotians Abandon Town on Plateau

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Dec. 28—Government troops supported by Thai irregulars suffered their second major setback in just over a week early today when they were forced to abandon the town of Paksong in the southern panhandle after a day of fighting.

The capture of Paksong gives the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao rebels virtual control of all the Bolovens Plateau.

According to informed U.S. sources, the Lao troops may attempt to reenter the town within the next few days.

Three months ago, Paksong had been retaken by the Laotians in some of the bloodiest fighting of the decade-old Laotian war.

Small Units

Following today's withdrawal from Paksong, the Lao troops reportedly dispersed in what are called mobile defense units to avoid a large-scale confrontation with superior North Vietnamese forces.

Thai artillerymen from Paksong are said to be regrouping in Pakse, 30 miles to the west.

Incomplete reports put allied losses at 18 dead and more than 20 wounded. Total strength at the onset on the battle was about 2,500 men, including 1,000 Thais.

Thai and Laotian gunners are said to have left behind eight 155-mm. howitzers in the retreat. A large amount of equipment was also abandoned, sources say.

The defeat at the Bolovens Plateau follows by eight days the government's loss of its position on the Plain of Jars north of the capital of Vientiane. It adds to the pall of gloom hanging over the Laotian government and the U.S. mission.

U.S. Pessimism

A major attack against the CIA base at Long Cheng, southwest of the Plain of Jars, is expected any day.

A major contributing factor to the American pessimism, sources within the U.S. Mission said, is the poor showing of the Thai forces in both the Paksong and Plain of Jars action.

The Thais were brought in to beef up the Laotians and the progovernment Meo tribesmen, the sources said. "but they seem to panic earlier than others, going to pieces and running at the slightest sign of heavy action."

Other sources in the U.S. mission said, however, that the Thai troops on the Plain of Jars took a terrible beating both from North Vietnamese artillery and infantry when they were caught in their fire support bases.

U.S. spokesmen here said no information is yet available on casualties at the Plain of Jars other than that they have been classified as "heavy," a military term indicating that at least some units were rendered unable to continue fighting.

Informed sources said the situation at Long Cheng remains serious with the enemy continuing to make recon-


naissance probes to the east and north of the base and also regrouping his infantry and artillery units. Probing actions have been reported less than five miles east of Long Cheng.

Other than scattered information from the U.S. Embassy spokesman, an apparent news blackout ordered by Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley continues in effect with U.S. officials refusing to meet with newsmen to discuss the war situation.

Some U.S. sources said the blackout was ordered to forestall reporting of any semiofficial assessment which would necessarily be grim.

CIA Airliner Is Lost Over Northern Laos

An Air America C-123 transport plane was missing over northern Laos, the airline's office here,



December 29, 1971

The Washington Post

Laotian forces have been pushed out of the town of Paksong in southern Laos on the Bolovens Plateau.

Reports from Vientiane, capital of Laos, speculated that the plane had been shot down by Chinese anti-aircraft known to be deployed in parts of northern Laos.

Air America is an airline run by the Central Intelligence Agency. Its transports ferry material and men around Vietnam and Laos.

The reports from Laos by the French news agency, Agence France-Presse, said that there were four Americans, a Chinese and a Meo aboard and that the plane was 24 hours overdue at its destination.

The Chinese Communists have been building roads in northern Laos for several years and have deployed several battalions of anti-aircraft to protect their roadworkers. A recent official U.S. estimate was that there were 14,000 Chinese

Troops' Families Leave Laos CIA Base

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Dec. 22—

Frightened families of CIA-supported Meo irregulars at Long Cheng, one hundred miles north of here, have been walking south from the base since yesterday morning's attack by 20 North Vietnamese commandos and in the aftermath of serious military losses on the Plain of Jars 20 miles to the northeast.

Reports reaching Vientiane from knowledgeable U.S. sources also say Air America transport planes are ferrying important equipment and material from the Meo-CIA headquarters, flying it to safety at

Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Udon, Thailand.

A hospital at the Long Cheng base, reportedly filled to overflowing by wounded from the Plain of Jars, has also been evacuated, the sources say, though it is unclear whether it is evacuation of old patients to make room for recently wounded or a general abandonment of the hospital.

Refugee movement from Long Cheng following the attack to the northeast is confirmed by informed U.S. sources who say they have no information on evacuation of the hospital or materiel. They note, however, that the situation at Long Cheng is con-

sidered "serious—though, not desperate."

30,000 Residents

At its peak, there are about 30,000 residents of Long Cheng, most of them dependents of Meo soldiers. About 35 Americans are believed to be stationed at the base.

Along with the sapper attack yesterday, which saw three government soldiers killed, nine wounded, two American planes damaged and two structures burned, Communist forces have occupied a hilltop position less than 15 miles east of Long Cheng, informed U.S. sources said.

Capture of the hilltop, called Phou Pha Xay, puts enemy forces within easy artillery range of Long Cheng. Announcement of the loss of Phou Pha Xay, which was part of the Long Cheng defensive system, occurred during the Communist rout of Meo and Thai troops from the plain, the sources say, and was not discovered until its defenders appeared at Long Cheng yesterday.

Communist consolidation of gains made last weekend continued through Monday night when Meo and Thai irregulars abandoned their two remaining fire support bases at Sting Ray and Cobra, west and south of the plain. Communists continued ferrying troops and artillery southward along the eastern edge of the plain toward passes leading to Long Cheng.

Off the Plain

Meo and Thai irregulars are reported to be completely off the plain now, though contact with many units has not been made. No decision on where to establish new defensive positions about Long Cheng has been reached, informed sources say, since pro-government forces have not completed regrouping off the plain.

The deteriorated situation

northeast of Long Cheng, coupled with the first commando attack on Long Cheng in more than a year, is given as cause for evacuation of the base's civilian inhabitants.

Although weather over Northern Laos is now clearing, no chance is given for pro-government forces to counter-attack onto the plain and little chance that Lao and American air forces could inflict meaningful casualties on Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops because they are dispersed.

Saigon to Release

689 Political Prisoners

Front News Dispatches

SAIGON, Dec. 22 — The South Vietnamese government will release 689 civilians arrested on suspicion of Communist political activity and held without trials for up to two years on Christmas Day, a spokesman announced today.

The amnesty, however, will not affect Vietnam's two most famous political prisoners—Truong Dinh Dzu and Tran Ngoc Chau he said. Both were tried and convicted by military courts.

The spokesman said the prisoners were seized under the three-year-old Phoenix program, a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese anti-insurgency operation.

The Saigon command and U.S. spokesmen here reported little military action in South Vietnam, but fighting continued in Cambodia 46 miles north of Phnom Penh.


A Cambodian spokesman said a battle for the riverside village of Peam Chhkork entered its third day. North Vietnamese forces were so close to government front lines that allied warplanes were unable to bomb and strafe effectively.

The spokesman also revealed that Cambodia had no plans for a Christmas ceasefire similar to the 24-hour truce proclaimed by South Vietnam.

STATOTHR

From The
Tennis
Courts of MIT

To The
Hills
of Indochina



The CIA and the Professors

BY BILL HAZELTINE AND FRANK MIRER

8 DEC 1971

quote - unquote

—From a United Press International interview by Edward K. Dolong with Victor Marchetti who quit the CIA after working there 14 years. The full text of the interview was published in U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 11, 1971.

"Marchetti said areas where the CIA might launch future clandestine paramilitary activities include South America, India, Africa and the Philippines — all places in the throes of social upheaval. Upheaval, he said, is what prompts the CIA director to begin planning clandestine activities in a country. . . .

"In addition to Air America, Marchetti said, the CIA has set up both Southern Air Transport in Miami and Rocky Mountain Air in Phoenix for possible use in paramilitary operations in South America. Similar fake airlines have been bought and sold all over the world, he said, including one in Nepal and another in East Africa."

STATOTHR

OIL CITY, PA.

DERRICK

DEC 8 1971

M - 14,890

Wind-Down

In the last five years we have heard various reasons for our violent presence in Vietnam. We had commitments; we wanted self-determination for the South Viets.

And our GIs were told that they were fighting in Southeast Asia to keep war from the beaches of California.

So we have not felt this war's outrageous immensities. Unless one of ours was a casualty. And we sit satisfied that our President is "winding down the war." Some say he is merely substituting brown bodies for white.

But how much longer will we keep converting their "green earth" into brown dust?

In one of those wind-down years, April 1969, one "clandestine raid" (so described by Paul R. Ehrlich and John P. Holdren in Saturday Review) by Air America, an airline of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency defoliated 173,000 acres in eastern Cambodia. It damaged about one-third of Cambodia's rubber crop and damage to local food production was severe.

Presumably the defoliation of 173,000 Cambodian acres prevents this same from happening to 104,000 Crawford, 24,300 Venango, 28,600 Warren, and 2,800 Forest county crop-producing acres.

By late 1969, more than five million acres of Indo China had been treated with defoliant applied at an average of 13 times the dose recommended by the USDA for the domestic use.

Those millions represent more acres than all Pennsylvania farms used for crop production in 1967, according to the Pennsylvania Statistical Abstract of 1969.

For Southeast Asians it's often fatal to be downwind from the "wind down."

C.I.A. IN BURMA?

--DNST

Is the Central Intelligence Agency playing clandestine war in yet another Asian country? Persistent reports involving Americans in secret operations in the opium land of northern Burma point to the possibility.

Most recent of these incidents is the hushed-up downing of a white, unmarked helicopter inside Burma in May of this year.

According to sources within the American intelligence community, the helicopter belonged to Air America--a U.S. contract air line--but was on charter to the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), the American military aid mission in Thailand, for use of the Deputy Chief of JUSMAG.

But on board, when it was forced to make an emergency landing at a small strip inside Burma, was a member of the military attache's staff in Rangoon, a CAS (Controlled American Source, under the CIA) officer and the pilot.

Initially the American Embassy here in Bangkok could find no information about this incident, describing it as a "Vientiane bar story." Trekking on to Vientiane, this reporter was then told by the American Embassy there that a helicopter did in fact go down in May in Burma and it belonged to JUSMAG.

Querried again, and after four days research, the Embassy in Bangkok could only conclude that the incident had occurred. But neither the Americans involved nor their mission could be discovered.

According to sources within the American intelligence community, the helicopter was on a mission inside Burma, was forced to find a landing zone because of engine trouble, and, upon landing was held for over a week by Burmese authorities.

One source in the Vientiane Embassy said the helicopter was on a mission in Thailand. Another source there said the helicopter was on a mission in Laos.

According to J. R. Cunningham, Laos manager for Air America, two other incidents involving American planes in Burma have occurred over the past three years. Three

years ago a twin-engine beechcraft airplane went down near Tachilek, in the vicinity of the Burma-Lao-Thai border. The second incident, a year ago, involved a helicopter with an American pilot and Filipino flight mechanic. Both of these were Air America planes that had mistaken Burma for Thailand when looking for emergency landings, Cunningham said.

Cunningham denied that there had been any such incidents involving Air America this year, or that Air America pilots ever fly missions into Burma deliberately.

State Department spokesmen in Washington D. C. confirmed that a helicopter had strayed over the border into Burma last November. The craft was on a "refugee resupply mission" and ran into bad weather. It was subsequently held for one week, a spokesman said.

The State Department denied any knowledge of the incident last May. A Department of Defense source in the military attache office also was unaware of the incident. "As far as I'm concerned, it didn't happen," he said.

Back in Bangkok American press attache Donald Newman shrugged off the May incident. He asserted that the helicopter was held no longer than "about a day."

"It wasn't a big deal," said Newman. "It didn't have anything to do with things real or imaginary going on in Burma."

But what is going on in Burma? All official versions of the story deny a member of the Rangoon American Embassy or of the CIA was on the chopper. A source within the military intelligence community, however, said "We've got guys going in and out of there all the time."

The area in question is known as the Shan states, the easternmost section of Burma, sharing borders with China, Laos and Thailand. It is well-known as the center of opium growing in Southeast Asia but is balkanized by warring tribes, clans and warlords. According to well-informed sources, there are at least three contingents of

The U. S. is also said, by a source close to the Bangkok American Embassy, to be helping to finance an irregular force known as the "C. I. F.", composed of remnants of old Chinese Kuomintang units, left in Burma and Thailand following communist takeover of China. These forces, along with local tribal groups, are reportedly engaged in a mini-war against the communist-supported Meo people for control of opium-growing land in the extreme northeast of Thailand near the Burma and Laos borders.

It is rumored here that aid will soon be cut off to these forces, numbering about 2,000 men, in connection with the new anti-opium drive of the Nixon administration.

A Shan trader, who illicitly plies in gems, skins and other exotic items of trade between Thailand and Burma, said that American weapons, particularly M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers, in the Shan states is increasing, as various factions attempt to control the trade routes and more recently the heroin factories in the area.

The factories have come apparently as a result of increased drug surveillance in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. The bulky opium is refined into heroin closer to the fields, making it easier to transport.

The trader felt that most of the arms are first given by the U. S. to the Lao and Thai armies and then sold under the table to various groups in the Shan states. Some of the arms, however, come directly from Americans to help their favorites, he said.

The Burmese Communist Party also operates in the area and is equipping its People's Liberation Army with Chinese weapons, the trader said. He added that American assistance was designed to counter the communist guerrilla movement, which has won some support in certain areas of the Shan states, by eliminating opium growing--not especially profitable to the farmers--and by driving off the bandit-like paramilitary units that control the movement of opium out of the desolate mountains of Burma toward the international heroin markets of the world.

Flying Drug-Runners Reap Big Profits

By ROBERT LINDSEY

They fly low and slow, by the light of the moon, and make \$50,000 a night.

They use some private planes and old military transports and land on deserted air strips or sagebrush-covered desert. Their cargo is marijuana, cocaine and heroin.

Along the sparsely settled frontier that divides the United States and Mexico, airborne drug-runners are doing a booming business, and Federal agents say that they do not know how to stop them.

On most nights, the agents estimate, at least 10 planes cross the border with marijuana and other drugs. On rare occasions, the smugglers are caught by United States agents flying their own planes. But usually they land unnoticed in Arizona, California, Texas, Florida or elsewhere and net at least \$50,000 each trip.

"Anybody who knows how to fly can get into the business and make a lot of money in a hurry if he gets away with it," said Donald A. Quick, a Bureau of Customs agent based at the border town of Nogales, Ariz.

"You get bush pilots, soldiers of fortune, crop dusters, guys who flew with Air America in Vietnam [an airline said to be affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency], and a lot of 'em can't get jobs.

"Pilots are a dime a dozen these days, and they're willing to do anything to fly, including smuggling."

"They're developing their own air force, and it's getting bigger and bigger," said an official of the Justice Department's Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which is jointly responsible with the Customs Bureau for policing the smuggling.

Most of the drug-runners use light single and twin-

engine private planes, often equipped with special devices so they can take off and land on short, improvised desert strips.

"But a lot of them are startling to use bigger planes—DC-3's, surplus military transports, turbo-prop executive planes, and we have our eye on one group that has a Constellation," the Justice Department official said.

The Constellation can carry 40,000 pounds of cargo.

The United States agents' air force consists of 30 unmarked helicopters and small planes. Occasionally, the agents are able to pursue smugglers and arrest them when they land. Increasing use of the planes over last year has clearly had an effect.

Since July 1, they have been used to make 57 arrests and seize 14 planes that were used in smuggling, according to the Bureau of Customs. This is twice the rate of a year ago.

"But we know we're only getting a tiny fraction of them," a Customs agent said. "They are very clever people, and if we put the heat on in one area—like we did in Brownsville, Tex., recently—they learn about it quickly and just take another route."

Started 5 Years Ago

Drugs have been smuggled into this country by air for at least five years. Initially, the smugglers tended to be of college age. They rented a plane and flew into Mexico to buy a small amount of marijuana and then sold it for a comfortable profit.

More recently, officials said, the huge profits that can be made have lured more and more older pilots and other people into the business.

Lieut. Dennis Dierking of the Arizona State Department of Public Safety, who heads the narcotics detail in the southern part of the state, said:

"We know of approximately 10 different organized operations in Tucson alone, each involving six to eight people, that are flying in loads weekly."

Customs agents recently arrested the City Attorney of Winslow, Ariz., a town of 8,000, and accused him of helping to direct a large aerial smuggling operation. He is under indictment for possession of marijuana.

Officials attribute the increased aerial smuggling to the growing market for drugs in the United States, the huge profit potential, tightened surveillance at some ground border crossing points and the relative ease of flying in contraband.

"Smuggling of narcotics by small planes is less risky for operators than by any other means of transportation," said Neal Sonnett, an Assistant United States Attorney in Miami, where he said smuggling of heroin by air is growing rapidly.

The drugs come into Florida from France via islands in the Caribbean and the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico.

Economics Explained

A Justice Department expert explained the economics of the industry this way:

"In the interior of Mexico, you can buy weed [marijuana] for as low as \$2 a brick [a kilogram, or 2.2 pounds], but if you don't know your way around, you probably will have to pay closer to \$30. It doesn't take

a very big plane to fly 500 bricks if you take out the seats and strip it down.

"If he takes the stuff to Tucson, he can sell it for about \$130 a brick, maybe as much as \$200, depending on the market. We've heard they're getting as much as \$750 in Boston. But, say he buys it for \$30 and sells it in the states for \$130; that's a profit on 500 bricks of \$50,000 for a night's work."

Although Mexican-grown marijuana is by far the largest cargo of the aerial smugglers, they have been increasingly carrying heroin and cocaine. It appears this is partly due to tightened surveillance of surface shipments on the East Coast.

"A small plane is perfect for bringing in heroin," an agent said, "because it doesn't take much to make a small fortune." Ten ounces of heroin purchased in Mexico for \$3,500 can be sold in Los Angeles for \$140,000.

Another recent trend that worries the authorities is the recent diversification of a group of "one-way" smugglers called "contrabandistas."

Operating from small airports along the American side of the border, contrabandistas fly United States merchandise such as refrigerators,

television sets and tobacco into Mexico and Central and South America without paying import duties.

Local Officials Bribed

As far as the United States is concerned, the flights are legal as long as readily available export permits are obtained. South of the border, the contrabandistas usually bribe local officials and earn a solid profit by selling their duty-free merchandise.

Within recent months, lured by the promise of even greater profits in drug traffic, an increasing number of contrabandistas have been flying to this country with drugs instead of returning home with their planes empty.

Although some illegal flights cross the border in daylight, most cross at night. The planes usually fly a few hundred feet above the ground to dodge what they believe to be searching signals from Air Force or Federal Aviation Administration radar antennas.

For the most part, such precautions are unnecessary. What radar there is on the border, officials said, is largely ineffective below 9,000 feet and at some points it is useless below 18,000 feet.

All pilots who cross the international frontier are required to file an official flight plan with the F.A.A. or the Mexican Government, depending where the trip originates. Many pilots ignore this rule. But some follow the procedure up to a point; they take off and land on the route indicated in their plan, but they take a detour over the border, drop the drugs to confederates on the ground or land briefly on the desert to get rid of the contraband before landing at an airport where they might be subject to a search.

Asked how the smuggling could be halted, Mr. Quick, the Customs agent here, said:

"People hear terms like radar, jet and computer, and think you can solve any problem. But this is a very complicated problem. That's a long border, and it's easy to get lost in it, and when you take it up to 18,000 feet, that's a lot of air space to watch.

STATOTHR

Continued

N. Viet Aircraft Harass U.S. Jets Over Laos

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE—North Vietnamese Mig-17 fighter bombers have been playing a month-long game of cat and mouse with U.S. fighter bombers over northern and central Laotian provinces to harass and provoke American aircraft, highly reliable American sources here say.

The Russian-built Mig-17s, described as obsolete and no match for U.S. planes, have been penetrating Laotian airspace continuously, sometimes twice daily, in the past month, flying in westward arcs into northern Laos from Hanoi and Vinh, 160 miles to the south, then streaking back to the opposite airfield from departure.

No shooting incidents have been reported.

Reportedly flying at a low altitude to avoid radar tracking, the North Vietnamese warplanes have penetrated as far westward as Moung Soui, 110 miles north of here, to guard the northwest approaches to the Plain of Jars where Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese gunners have recently begun mounting pressure on pro-government forces.

North Vietnamese planes have made similar runs at infrequent intervals in the past but never, reportedly, for such a lengthy period.

Presence of the enemy aircraft over Laos "on a number of occasions in recent days" is confirmed by U.S. embassy spokesmen in Vientiane.

The last public announcement of North Vietnamese jets over Laos came three weeks ago from Gen. Thongpanh Knoksy, Lao military spokesman, when he reported Migs over Xieng Khoang Province, about 40 miles east of Moung Soui on the eastern side of the Plain of Jars.

U.S. and Laotian aircraft flying in Laos have been warned of such penetration at least once daily since the announcement.

Pointing out that information upon which to base alerts, and the alerts themselves, originate with U.S. Air Force radar and radio surveillance, sources say, "Either someone is lying about alerts for a reason, or information just is not being circulated in the mission here."

The sources say that repeated attempts by U.S. jets to trap the Migs over northern Laos may account for the long delay in public announcement by the U.S. mission. The sources say that despite repeated attempts at interception, however, no contact has been made.

Enemy penetration alerts in Laos originate from an Air Force C-130 Hercules, code-named "Cricket," that is constantly flying over northern Laos (another is in southern Laos, the sources say) and monitoring radio traffic.

"Cricket" is the command center for air operations over Laos and monitors North Vietnamese as well as other frequencies, issuing a general warning to U.S. aircraft in the area when penetration is suspected or known.

"Cricket can hear them call out their course as they lift off Hanoi or Vinh," American sources say.

Upon receipt of an alert all civilian aircraft and non-fighter government planes immediately vacate, the sources say, flying elsewhere as low and as fast as possible while U.S. "fast mover," as jets are known by the military, move into the penetrated area to intercept.

U.S. sources say that the enemy aircraft in Laotian air-

space are creating a morale problem among U.S. civilian pilots flying for Air America and Continental Air Service, and for Laotian forces in northern Laos, reliable sources say.

Pilots say there is mounting speculation that one of the Migs may eventually attack an unarmed and lumbering cargo plane or one of the many civil helicopters plying Laotian skies.

Sources also say that failure to announce alerts leaves the public unaware of the hazards under which civil planes fly in Laos.

A reliable source in Laos reports that a helicopter was shot down recently by a Mig in southern Laos west of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a report mission spokesmen here say they cannot substantiate nor deny.

Army commanders in the Plain of Jars area of northern Laos are reported to have expressed some concern over the possibility of air attack on their positions, particularly the six fire support bases on and about the plain.

Recent visitors to the firebases and bases north of the plain note there would be little protection from air attack.

Aviation sources do say, however, that flying under these circumstances is about as safe as is possible considering that it is a war zone.

DROGUE ET SERVICES SECRETS C'EST LE COCKTAIL EXPLOSIF DE LA PLUS TENEBREUSE AFFAIRE DE L'ANNEE

STATOTHR

En accusant un colonel du S.d.e.c.e., Delouette, agronome, trafiquant d'héroïne, et agent spécial relance la campagne américaine contre la filière française de la drogue. Mais qui est Delouette?

4 novembre. — Hubert J. Stern, procureur général à la Cour de Newark, couve du regard son accusé favori, son poulain Roger-Xavier-Léon Delouette. Petit, maigre, le visage émacié des justiciers incorruptibles, le procureur général, dans son strict complet gris anthracite de fonctionnaire intègre, a l'allure tranchante des avocats qui ambitionnent une grande carrière. L'audience a lieu devant le tribunal de Newark, dans un local qui ressemble, avec son plafond aux caissons de couleur, à une salle des fêtes un jour de distribution des prix.

condottiere ténébreux. Une silhouette athlétique d'aventurier international à la prestance avantageuse, avec son 1,82 m il ressemble à un Jonquères d'Oriola au teint plombé qui aurait délaissé depuis longtemps les réunions hippiques pour les cercles de jeu. A côté de lui, son défenseur, Donald A. Robinson, un petit avocat brun qui a la mine compétente d'un qui connaît les 356 artifices de procédure permettant à un ennemi public fédéral de s'en tirer avec cent dollars d'amende.

Tout en manipulant nerveusement une paire de lunettes dorées, Roger-Xavier-Léon Delouette, plaide respectueusement coupable d'avoir, « depuis ou aux environs du 1er décembre 1970, en pleine conscience et de plein gré, et contrairement à la loi (« against the law ») conspiré pour importer aux Etats-Unis 96 livres (43 778 grammes) d'héroïne hydrochloride ».

LA JEUNE DOUANIERE DECOUVRE 44 kg D'HEROINE DANS LE MINIBUS

L'autre prévenu, celui que Delouette a désigné comme son chef et que la justice américaine a inculpé, est absent. C'est le colonel Fournier que l'accusation présente comme un officier « superviseur » du chartrain. Les services améri-

sans visage, dont le nom passe-partout a l'air d'un pseudonyme de fonction.

Le 5 avril 1971, le cargo français « Atlantic Cognac » vient d'arriver à quai à Port Elizabeth, dans le New Jersey. Une jeune douanière de 22 ans, Lynn Pelletier, contemple un minibus Volkswagen qui se balance au bout d'un palan. Lynn Pelletier, qui a un flair de vieux douanier, décide de visiter minutieusement ce véhicule. Elle y découvre les 44 kg d'héroïne pure. Peu après un Français élégant se présente aux bureaux de la douane pour retirer le minicar. On lui félicite les formalités et on l'arrête. C'est Delouette.

Son interrogatoire est fructueux : il se présente d'abord comme un agent itinérant du S.d.e.c.e. et révèle que, vers le 15 décembre 1970, il a été pressenti par le colonel Paul Fournier, haut fonctionnaire du S.d.e.c.e., pour faire passer de l'héroïne aux Etats-Unis. Peu après, il rencontre au Café de Paris un personnage mystérieux, dont il ignore le nom, qui lui offre 1 200 dollars par kilo d'héroïne transportée et qui le charge d'acheter une Volkswagen « Camper », d'obtenir un visa, et de s'occuper ensuite de l'expédition. Delouette touche bientôt une avance sur commission de 5 500 dollars et, sur l'ordre de Fournier, va prendre livraison de la marchandise à quarante kilomètres de Paris.

M. Stern se retourne très souvent vers le public, composé de ses futurs électeurs, comme pour souligner l'importance du combat qu'il est en train d'engager : il part en guerre contre les services spéciaux français corrompus. Insoucieux des complications diplomatiques, insensible aux pressions, il met en accusation le pays qui introduit l'héroïne aux Etats-Unis pour empoisonner la jeunesse américaine.

Roger Delouette lui donne la réplique d'une voix sourde, inquiète, mais... Un long visage chevalin de

Ein Eingeweihter über die CIA

Von paramilitärischen Geheimaktionen bis zur Anzettelung von Kriegen

Viktor Marchetti, ein ehemaliger Mitarbeiter der Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), sprach gegenüber einem UPI-Mitarbeiter als Eingeweihter über einige Praktiken des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes, dessen Leitung er lange Jahre angehörte. Obwohl er sich über die Verschwendung entrüstet, die dieses Instrument der USA-Regierung betreibt — er schlägt u. a. nicht realisierbare Kontrollmaßnahmen vor —, bejaht er im Prinzip diese Institution. Im folgenden Auszug aus dem amerikanischen Magazin dürften besonders die Äußerungen Marchettis — in einer ihm gemäßen Sprache — über die Rolle amerikanischer Geheimdienste bei der Anzettelung von Kriegen in Gebieten, in denen den USA nicht genehme Entwicklungen im Gange sind, interessant sein. Ein Grund für sein Ausscheiden aus der CIA liegt in der — sicher durch die Kenntnis von Geheimdokumenten beeinflussten — Einsicht, daß die blutige USA-Aggression gegen Indochina dem amerikanischen Ansehen in der Welt schadet. Das amerikanische Magazin zitiert aus dem Gespräch u. a.:

So verwendet zum Beispiel die Nationale Sicherheitsbehörde (National Security Agency) — zu deren Aufgabengebiet es auch gehört, aufgefangene Botschaften ausländischer Regierungen zu dechiffrieren — etwa die Hälfte ihres Jahresbudgets von einer Milliarde Dollar. „Sie haben in Fort Meade (Maryland) ganze Waggons voll von Tonbändern von mitgeschnittenen sowjetischen (Rundfunk-) Mitteilungen, die zehn Jahre alt sind — Güterwagen voll. Weil die Sowjets in Codesystemen ebenso erfinderisch sind wie wir. Es ist technisch fast eine Unmöglichkeit, eine verschlüsselte, chiffrierte Botschaft zu dechiffrieren. So beschränken sie sich darauf, ständig das Material weiter zu sammeln und es in Waggons zu

lagern. Sie horchen weiter in der ganzen Welt. Sie geben weiter ein Vermögen aus in dem Versuch, die sowjetischen (Chiffrier- und Dechiffrier-)Computer nachzubauen“, führte er aus...

Was Marchetti am meisten an der CIA beunruhigt, ist ihre Neigung zu den dunklen Künsten paramilitärischer Geheimaktionen — ein Gebiet, das für die Agentur doppelte Anziehungskraft besitzt, weil das Militär auf diesem Terrain kaum operieren kann.

„Eins von den Dingen, die die Geheimdienstleute der CIA tun können, ist Kriege anzuzetteln“, sagte er. „Sie können auf geheimen Wegen in einem Lande einen inoffiziellen Krieg auslösen und dafür sorgen, daß es so aussieht, als ob es sich nur um etwas handelt, was die lokalen Bauerntölpel selbst beschlossen haben und in eigener Regie durchführen wollen.“

Auf diese Weise haben — Marchetti zufolge — die Vereinigten Staaten zuerst begonnen, aktiv in Vietnam zu kämpfen. Das ist die Art von Aktivität, die jetzt in Kambodscha und Laos vor sich geht, wo die CIA, wie kürzlich Zeugenaussagen vor dem Kongreß enthüllt haben, eine Operation durchführen, die 450 Millionen Dollar jährlich verschlingt, sagte er.

Marchetti erklärte, er sei davon überzeugt, daß die CIA auch für den Staatsstreich verantwortlich sei, durch den Prinz Norodom Sihanouk (von Kambodscha) Anfang 1970 vertrieben wurde und der die amerikanisch-südvietnamesische Razzia nach kommunistischen Zufluchtsorten in jenem Lande einige Wochen später ermöglichte.

Die Geheimoperationen in Südostasien waren vor Jahren der Anlaß, daß die CIA zur Tarnung dort eine Luftfahrtgesellschaft, die AIR America, gründete, die heute ebenso viele Menschen, nämlich 18 000, beschäftigt, wie der Arbeitsstab der CIA zählt, führte er aus.

„Nun, die CIA hat nicht nur in Vietnam und Laos ihre Hände im Spiel“, sagte Marchetti, „sie hält Ausschau nach weiteren Gebieten, in denen sich vielleicht auch günstige Gelegenheiten dieser Art ergeben könnten. Wenn sie beginnt, private Luftfahrtgesellschaften und alles andere zu errichten, was mit der Unterstützung für eine Regierung oder eine gegen die Regierung gerichtete Bewegung verbunden ist, so ist dies sehr, sehr gefährlich, weil die CIA dies auf geheimen Wegen tun kann und es somit für das Publikum schwierig wird, zu erkennen, was vorgeht.“

Marchetti zufolge gehören Südamerika, Indien, Afrika und die Philippinen zu den Gebieten, wo die CIA möglicherweise eine künftige paramilitärische Aktivität entwickeln könnten — alles Länder, in denen soziale Umwälzungen gären. Ein Umsturz sei das, was den CIA-Direktor veranlasse, mit der Planung für eine mögliche Geheimdienstaktivität in einem Lande zu beginnen, sagte Marchetti...

Außer der Fluggesellschaft AIR America habe die CIA die Southern Air Transport in Miami und die Rocky Mountain Air in Phoenix zum möglichen Einsatz für paramilitärische Operationen in Südamerika gegründet, sagte er. Ähnliche getarnte Fluglinien seien in der ganzen Welt aufgekauft und verkauft worden, u. a. eine in Nepal und eine in Ostafrika. Ferner teilte Marchetti mit, die CIA habe ein großes Depot im amerikanischen Mittelwesten, wo sie militärische Ausrüstungen aller Art und unmarkierte Waffen aller Art hat.

„Im Laufe der Jahre hat sie alles in der ganzen Welt gekauft, was sie an Unentdeckbarem bekommen konnte — um sich auf den Eventualfall vorzubereiten, daß sie vielleicht den Wunsch haben könnte, einer Gruppe in, sagen wir einmal, Guatemala, Waffen zu liefern...“

STATOTHR

DES MOINES, IOWA
REGISTER

M - 250,261
S - 515,710
NOV 14 1971

Taiwan's Many Little Secret 'Wars'

By Charles F. Ransom

Of The Register's Editorial Page Staff

THE NIXON Administration was offended by the cheering in the United Nations General Assembly at the assembly vote which led to the ousting of Taiwan (the Nationalist "Republic of China").

But for much of the world, Taiwan does not have the "good guy" image it has had in the United States, but is regarded as a usurper to the name of "China" and a troublemaker in east Asia. Taiwan announced regularly its intent to "liberate" the mainland by force, and used what force it could muster.

Besides this open goal, it took part in a series of secret wars, mostly with the help of the United States, some at its instigation.

The world laughed in 1953, when the neophyte Republican Administration in Washington "unleashed Chiang Kai-shek" — that is, stopped preventing him from carrying on hostilities against the Chinese mainland. The U.S. restrained him during the Korean War: one Asian war at a time was more than enough.

Taiwan-Based CIA Airline

But it wasn't funny. Chiang was serious. The pin-prick raids from the offshore islands to the mainland; the heavy concentration of troops and guns on Quemoy, five miles from the mainland; the overflights of mainland China with Taiwan-operated U-2 spy planes furnished by the United States became public at the time or a bit later. But

they were not all the "unleashed" Chiang did.

Allen Whiting, one of America's outstanding China-watchers, pieced together the story for the New York Review of Books. Whiting watched China from the U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong 1966-68 and is now a political scientist at the University of Michigan's Center for Chinese Studies. He found evidence of Taiwan's secret wars in the Pentagon Papers, in new studies of China-India relations, in the memoirs of George Patterson, a British missionary-journalist and elsewhere.

It was an airline based on Taiwan, financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which provided transport for U.S.-trained sabotage and guerrilla teams sent into North Vietnam in 1954, when Vietnam was legally at peace.

The same airline provided the transport for the CIA effort to overthrow the Indonesian government in 1958.

Warplanes and transports from Taiwan airdropped arms and supplies to Tibetan rebels in the period from 1951 through 1962, though the major fighting was quickly suppressed in 1951 and 1959. They used refueling bases in Thailand and flew over India and Burma without permission. India and China each thought the planes belonged to the other and complained. The Burmese shot one down, it landed in Thailand and was identified as a Chinese Nationalist bomber from Taiwan.

Taiwan had a secret part in the wars in Laos and South Vietnam, too. Still another CIA-financed airline was formed in 1960, and a third later in the 1960s, and carried on legal commercial passenger and freight business in Laos and Vietnam, and also clandestine military

operations. One job was ferrying guerrilla paratroops trained by the United States in Taiwan. North Vietnam caught some of them in 1963 and sentenced them, but the effort continued. Later Taiwan more or less openly sent several dozen psychological warfare men to South Vietnam.

Equipment Handouts

The United States paid for a lot of this clandestine activity, and also made it possible for Taiwan to maintain large and modern armed forces for a country of only 14 million people. With considerable pride, Taiwan stopped taking open U.S. "military aid" some years ago, but it has continued to get handouts in the form of "excess equipment" — including planes, tanks, missiles and destroyers of not quite the latest model.

Whiting does not say so, but Taiwan enlarged its airport runways to take America's biggest planes, in the hope of replacing Okinawa as base for American strategic bombers and nuclear weapons.

There are only about 8,000 American servicemen on Taiwan now and routine U.S. naval patrols of the Taiwan Strait have stopped, and still more recently U.S. overflights of China have stopped. But the U.S.-Taiwan military alliance continues.

In words this alliance is defensive. But Taiwan's record must look pretty aggressive to mainland China, Burma, India, and other countries which learned about it long before it became public knowledge in the United States.

GREENSBORO, N.C.

NEWS

NOV 8 1971

M - 83,477

S - 101,081

Rabid reflections

Joseph Alsop's rabid and insulting reflections on the motives of senators who voted against the foreign aid bill a week ago Friday make very little sense. Provisions for the military security of South Vietnam are largely contained in the defense budget, not the foreign aid budget, and moreover the hotly-disputed items have to do with aid to Cambodia and Laos.

If "undeclared" is the word for the war in Vietnam, "secret" is the word for the war in Laos and Cambodia. Millions of American dollars continue to be spent, with little congressional oversight, for massive bombing, for secret CIA activities (including the operation of an airline and the hiring of mercenaries).

It is worth recalling, since it throws some little light on the foreign aid vote, that when President Nixon in May, 1970, thrust American forces into Cambodia he did not bother to consult or inform the Senate beforehand. Even when the Senate passed resolutions intended to restrain executive warmaking, the spirit and letter of those resolutions was defied in an invasion of Laos — this time by South Vietnamese soldiers riding in American helicopters.

There are 100 U. S. senators, a large majority of whom now believe for better or worse that this uncontrolled activity in Indochina must be brought to an end —

quickly. They have sought to get the message across repeatedly, by every means short of denying appropriations. Their impatience is symptomatic of a Senate mood that neither Mr. Nixon nor Mr. Alsop seems to understand — a mood that can hardly be explained by the mere influence of two senators.

As has been said before, a whole mixture of factors explains the defeat of the foreign aid bill. In retrospect, however, the essential one is the Senate's weariness with the President's determination to keep as much American force and money in Indochina as long as possible. That collision of judgments, which is largely to be explained by differences between the constituency and constitutional responsibilities of the President and the Senate, does not lend itself to such simple-minded explanations as Mr. Alsop's — that Senators Fulbright and Mansfield want to "lose" the war. Nonsense. By standards announced from time to time by Mr. Alsop, the war is already "lost," or should be. Yet withdrawal and Vietnamization, which he so much feared at the beginning, has apparently brought the war — in his view at least — to the verge of a successful conclusion. By that logic, completing the job of disengagement would perfect the good result. That is just what Senators Mansfield and Fulbright seem to have in mind.

6 NOV 1971

STATOTHR

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Murray Marder

AID—A Two-Way Road

IN ITS STRUGGLE to survive, the Agency for International Development is pointedly reminding U.S. senators that business profits and jobs in their home states will feel the pain of foreign aid cuts.

Money, jobs, and by clear implication, votes, can be more tangible weapons in a political fight than lofty arguments about World stability and aid to underdeveloped nations. The appeal to domestic interests to rally to the defense of balance sheets and payrolls could carry double weight in the present depressed state of the U.S. economy.

A generation ago, the concept of foreign aid was scoffed at by its many critics as "milk for the Hottentots." The time came when the condition of the Hottentots and other distant peoples came to be recognized to be not so totally remote from the condition of world order, but the attitude associated with foreign aid remained: "hand-outs," "give-aways."

To carry foreign economic aid through the Congress—"pure" foreign aid, that is, as distinct from direct, or roundabout support for foreign regimes whose continuance in office was judged to be of direct value to American security interests—economic aid allocations were linked legislatively with military aid. In the name of containment of communism, military assistance could win the votes to override the guffaws about "foreign aid."

THE PARADOX has been that both forms of "foreign" aid were, in a real sense, also domestic aid—spent in, and supporting, the U.S. economy.

According to AID, 93 per cent of its funds for the purchase of industrial goods and agricultural commodities is spent in the United States.

In addition, AID estimates that 86 per cent of all money allotted to it, for services, cash grants, salaries and goods and commodities are spent in the United States.

This is not just happenstance, or a result of foreign preferences for made-in-America labels. These funds are generally mandated to be spent in the United States by "tied" loans—meaning loans with strings on them—or other legislative requirements.

U.S. policymakers have been ambivalent about how much they should talk about the tied-to-America quality of American foreign aid. To stress the tie dims the aura of altruism, compassion, and humanitarianism which policymakers would prefer to portray to the world. The result has been that although AID routinely publishes lists of contracts awarded to

U.S. firms or organizations, there is normally no great stress on the dollar-tied nature of most foreign aid, leaving the non-military portion of the program adrift without any aroused constituency to defend it.

Only now, with its life on the congressional chopping block, has AID been encouraged, indeed stimulated, by the administration, to mount a major public display of the domestic consequences that can result from slashing "foreign" economic aid funds.

Item: Between 1964 and 1969, AID money financed from 22 to 30 per cent of all cargo shipped on U.S.-flag vessels.

Item: In 1971, AID loans and grants financed U.S. exports totaling \$972 million. While this represented only 2.3 per cent of total U.S. exports, it included 25 per cent of all American fertilizer exports; 16.4 per cent of U.S. iron and steel exports; 15.7 per cent of all exports of railroad equipment; 8.5 per cent of basic textile exports; 8.5 per cent of rice exports; 7.3 per cent of all exports of non-ferrous metals and products.

Item: To make the point even clearer politically on Capitol Hill, AID statistics now being circulated there show that in the same 1971 fiscal year, \$173,829,271 was spent in New York State; \$80,508,640 in California; \$77,081,159 in Pennsylvania; \$73,541,642 in Illinois, and with lesser amounts listed for other states, including \$20,572,073 in Maryland and \$10,162,141 in Virginia.

Item: Other "fact sheets" being showered on Congress report cumulative totals for many years of AID research contracts to universities, and service contracts to other organizations, including Air America Inc. of Washington, D.C., the organization which operates with the Central Intelligence Agency in Southeast Asia. It is listed for accumulated contracts from AID alone totaling \$83,324,200.

Item: The "fact sheets" serving nations" with a double meaning; one of them is the United States.

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Air America Helicopter Detained by Burmese

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Nov. 2— U.S. spokesmen have confirmed that an American helicopter was detained by Burmese authorities when it was found to be operating inside their borders around the end of May of this year.

According to the U.S. spokesmen, the Air America helicopter apparently violated Burma's air space during "bad weather."

However, Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Agency, who reported on the incident in late September, said the "best" sources in Bangkok, Thailand, told him the craft was on a clandestine mission into Burma and was carrying a Burmese military attache from Bangkok as well as at least one U.S. intelligence agent.

Air America is described as a private charter airline. It provides aircraft for several U.S. missions throughout Southeast Asia and has close links with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Morrow said the sources in Bangkok said the mission of the white, unmarked helicopter detained in Burma was to visit CIA camps within that country. The craft, according to Morrow's sources, was assigned to the deputy commander of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Thailand.

Burma is currently engaged in what one recent visitor to Rangoon described as a

"multi-headed civil war" with several opposing forces, some of them politically motivated but some no better than ethnic bandit gangs.

One group of insurgents is led by former Prime Minister U Nu who was ousted in 1962 by the current military regime of Prime Minister Ne Win.

Morrow's report about the Burmese military attache being on board the detained helicopter would indicate clandestine U.S. assistance to the Ne Win government.

Recent visitors to Burma report increasing evidence there of clandestine American presence and describe it as approximating the earlier presence and operations in Laos. Most areas of the country are off-limits to foreign visitors.

INDIEN/PAKISTAN**Explosive Lage**

Die bewaffneten Zwischenfälle an der indisch-pakistanischen Grenze häufen sich. Die pakistanische Armee hat in Ostbengalen Streitkräfte von 80 000 Mann an der Grenze zu Indien zusammengezogen. Indien berief 600 000 Reservisten ein und traf andere Maßnahmen zur Verteidigung. Premierminister Indira Gandhi erklärte, ihr Land unternehme „alles Erdenkliche, um einen bewaffneten Konflikt zu vermeiden“.

Die Kriegsgefahr auf dem Subkontinent, wo etwa ein Fünftel der Menschheit lebt, ist eine Folge der blutigen Ereignisse in Ostpakistan. Als dieser Landesteil, der fast 2000 Kilometer durch indisches Territorium von den westlichen Provinzen getrennt ist, seine Autonomie durchsetzen wollte, entsandte die Zentralregierung in Westpakistan im März 1971 Truppen. Sie erstickten mit Waffengewalt den Widerstand in der östlichen Region, die von der Bourgeoisie Westpakistans als innere Kolonie betrachtet und ausgebeutet wird (siehe auch „Die aktuelle NBI-Karte - Zum Konflikt in Pakistan“, Heft 22/71).

Um den Verfolgungen und Repressalien der Armee zu entgehen, ergoß sich ein Strom ostpakistanischer Flüchtlinge über die Grenze nach Indien - vor allem in den Unionsstaat Westbengalen. Noch immer flüchten täglich etwa 30 000 Menschen. Inzwischen wuchs ihre Zahl auf insgesamt fast zehn Millionen Menschen an, die meist in primitiven Lagern kampieren. Ihre Versorgung

bürdet der Wirtschaft Indiens zusätzliche unerträgliche Lasten auf, welche die Verwirklichung der sozialökonomischen Programme der Regierung Indira Gandhis spürbar verlangsamt haben.

Es gilt bereits als offenes Geheimnis, daß sich die amerikanische Geheimdienstzentrale CIA verstärkt in Pakistan engagiert hat. Die US-Gesellschaft „World Airways“, die ebenso wie die „Air America“ und „Continental Air Service“ in Laos eine verkappte CIA-Firma ist, befördert Truppen von West- nach Ostpakistan. Bereits in diesem Sommer trafen amerikanische Militärberater ein, die wie in Laos der US-Botschaft zugeordnet sind und einen diplomatischen Status haben. Wie kürzlich Senator Edward Kennedy erklärte, liefern die USA - trotz gegenteiliger Versicherungen - Waffen und Munition nach Pakistan und heizen damit die Spannung in diesem Gebiet weiter an.

Auf der UNO-Vollversammlung hat Außenminister Gromyko die Haltung der Sowjetunion, deren Friedensverhandlungen schon 1965 den pakistanisch-indischen Krieg beendeten, dargelegt: „Wir sind davon überzeugt, daß nur auf dem Wege einer politischen Regelung der in Ostpakistan entstandenen Fragen auch eine Entspannung in diesem Gebiet erreicht werden kann... Die Flüchtlinge müssen nach Ostpakistan zurückgebracht werden; aber das wird nur dann möglich sein, wenn dort ihre Sicherheit gewährleistet ist.“ Andrej Gromyko gab der Hoffnung Ausdruck, daß „Selbstbeherrschung und Vernunft die Oberhand behalten werden“.

Jan Wilten

November 1971

HEROIN

Peter Arnett has been covering South East Asia and the Vietnam War for more than a decade. His reporting has won such varied accolades as The Pulitzer (1966) and Sigma Delta Chi (1968) prizes, expulsion from Indonesia (1962), and the government closing of his weekly paper based in Vientiane, Laos (1960).

An Associated Press reporter since 1960, Arnett recently wrote a series of articles with Bernard Gavzer about the heroin traffic in South East Asia and the ways that heroin gets to US troops in Vietnam. UR interviewed him shortly after his return to New York, and asked him about the nature of the drug traffic there.

An American GI lights up a cigarette in Saigon. He poured grains of white heroin powder into the menthol cigarette, from which he had first removed some of the tobacco.

STATOTHR

Wide World Photos

Everyone is against the use of heroin or at least they say they are. But beyond the basic idea that people take heroin because their life is a bummer, there are only a lot of charges and counter-charges about who is letting/helping/pushing/or profiting from the heroin trade.

We think that the heroin trade is a typical issue of our time. For example, how is it that heroin can be transported thousands of miles over all sorts of obstacles to poison millions, while we cannot possibly figure out how to get food to starving people?

We hope to do a series of articles and or interviews about heroin presenting a variety of views and evidence. We have started with South East Asia because it is the largest source of opium in the world, and also because the heroin usage by American soldiers in Vietnam has led to increased information on this issue becoming available, such as the confidential government documents that we partially reprint here.

We do not imagine that we can cover this by ourselves and we hope that anyone who has information, documents, or knowledge will help us with this.

UR: Has the CIA been part of the drug traffic in South East Asia?

Arnett: The CIA has indeed been involved, as has the US Government, for years in the drug business, but it's essentially for political reasons -- as a political necessity.

Now, why is it a political necessity? At the beginning of the '60's, South East Asia was seen as greatly threatened by Communist China. There was great fear that revolutionary war by people's armies would sweep across South East Asia, to Vietnam, Thailand, Formosa and all the rest. So the American officials out there -- the CIA, the American Military, and the Embassy people -- figured that any approach would be acceptable if it was in order to resist that great a threat. Eventually, of course, it led to a commitment of half a million American troops in Vietnam. But even before Vietnam, any act to prevent the Communists from taking over the area was considered acceptable, and this included the drug business. Here's an example of how it worked.

In Laos you have this tribe, the Meo. They came down from central China about one hundred years ago. They are nomadic and they are squatters. They move in family groups and live above the 5000 ft. level in the mountains.

They farm crops, including opium, and they have a fairly well-developed culture based on silver ornaments and home-made weapons. The CIA and the American Government considered them important because they were the buffer between China and the rest of South East Asia. So it was in the interest of the American Government to win their allegiance. They were just another arm of the American war effort.

However, in the early 60's the Communists started pressing into Laos. Up to that time these people had been growing opium and other little crops, but opium was their only cash crop. The average family could make \$40 or \$50 a year from it, and that would be enough to buy some silver ornaments and to pay for the pigs for the harvest celebrations.

As the Communists started coming through they started to cut the old trails that these people had been using to unload their opium. The Meo were stranded in the mountains and the CIA figured that the least they could do was to help them in harvesting and distributing their crop. So, on the numerous American airfields you had a liaison

continued

POST

OCT 3 1 1970

E - 252,198

S - 344,155

Airline Sought Pilots Here

By CHUCK GREEN

Denver Post Staff Writer

A little-known airline, believed controlled by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and paid to fly secret missions in Southeast Asia, has tried to recruit pilots and mechanics in the Rocky Mountain Empire, The Denver Post has learned.

Response to the recruitment efforts couldn't be determined.

The work is being done by Air America, Inc., probably the world's most secretive airline.

According to the Pentagon papers, the company is run by the CIA, but it has a fleet of aircraft almost the size of Pan America World Airways.

Air America pilots flew T28 fighter-bombers on raids in Laos in 1964 before the American public knew of U.S. military involvement there, the Pentagon documents show.

Air America flyers also have played key roles in search and rescue missions beyond the borders of South Vietnam.

Dean Rusk, secretary of state in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, once cabled the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, that "Air America pilots can play critically important" roles in the missions.

Some Laotian

In the same cable, Rusk granted "discretionary authority to use Air America pilots in T28s for SAR (search and rescue) operations when you consider this indispensable."

The published version of the Pentagon papers tells of Air America's involvement in the early stages of the air war in Laos:

"The second major segment of the Administration's covert war against North Vietnam consisted of air operations in Laos. A force of propeller-driven T28 fighter-bombers, varying from about 25 to 40 aircraft, had been organized there. The planes bore Laotian Air Force markings, but only some belonged to that air force.

"The rest were manned by pilots of Air America (a pseudo-private airline run by the CIA) and by Thai pilots under the control of Ambassador Leonard Unger."

The parenthetical description is a part of the Pentagon papers published version. Unger was chief U.S. diplomat in Laos at the time.

These brief glimpses into Air America's purpose are in sharp contrast to its superficial character.

for Missions Over Asia

The company, believed to operate a fleet of about 175 planes, was formed in 1953 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Pacific Corp., a Delaware corporation.

American Pilots

Air America's executive offices are in Washington, D.C., and it survives primarily on overseas U.S. government contract work.

One of Air America's properties, Air Asia Ltd., owns the most sophisticated aircraft maintenance facility in the Far East on Taiwan.

Air America spokesmen have said they employ about 400 pilots, most of them American.

Air America advertising accounts in Denver date back at least to 1965, although most of the ads don't even mention the company itself. Respondents are supposed to correspond to a Washington, D.C., post office box.

Typical of the ads bought by Air America was this classified in The Denver Post last fall:

HELICOPTER PILOTS

Overseas openings for Helicopter Pilots with H-34 or H-53 Pilot in Command Experience. Applicants must have 1,500 hours Helicopter Pilot Time with 1,000 hours Pilot in Command Time and Instrument Rating in Helicopters. Send letter and resume to P.O. Box 19230, Washington, D.C. 20036, Equal Opportunity Employer.

Both the H34 and H53 choppers are used by the military. The Navy uses the S58 helicopter, and the modified version of that, the H34, is an Army transport craft.

Neither machine has been widely used commercially.

Air America spokesmen have said the company employs about 8,500 persons, and has at times had up to 11,000 on its payroll.

Ads in Denver during the last 18 months have offered jobs for airplane pilots, mechanics, supervisors, electronic technicians, teachers and quality control personnel.

The company did about \$58 million worth of business last year, with almost \$3 million in profit before taxes.

The Pentagon papers came from a source who said that Douglas S. Stone, Robert S. McNamara to determine how

the United States became involved in the Vietnam war.

The top secret documents were exposed by the New York Times in a series of articles in June and since have been published in paperback form.

CHARLOTTE, N.C.
OBSERVER

OCT 24 1977

M - 174,906

S - 204,225

CIA Or The Wings Of Man?

It would not bother us too much if now and then Washington fooled "them countries in Europe," to coin Will Rogers' phrase. But we are still Boy Scouts enough to have a little resentment whenever Washington fools "them people in America."

We see a good bit of that in the latest disclosures of CIA activities over the past couple of decades. In the messy world most immediately at hand, covert intelligence operations are probably a necessity for the world's most powerful country. But was it necessary to conceal from the voting public even the fact that we were massively engaged in covert wars, overthrows and foreign-policymaking through the CIA?

The people of other countries seemed to know about it better than the people of our own. There was a time when we would routinely dismiss some of the accusations. Aren't those people conspiracy-minded, we would think. It is, we would muse, ridiculous for anyone to think that we would be incessantly engaged in interfering with the internal affairs of other countries; we just don't have the time or inclination. A little bribing here or there, perhaps, if the legislators are cheap; but not assassinations, subsidized revolts or massive military operations unknown to the American public.



More recently we have gotten smarter. When we heard names such as "Air America" and "Air Asia Limited" we would put on our worldly smile and think: Actually, that's probably one of those little CIA fronts. We know about that. We've read "Terry and the Pirates."

Well, as our man James McCartney reports from Washington, it turns out that the CIA's Air America, which operates in Southeast Asia, has been a rather good-sized front. It has some 18,000 employees and as many planes as Pan American. It is bigger than Delta.


If we are going to run one of the world's major airlines in Southeast Asia, it ought to be properly advertised. We assume the CIA would not object to a slogan like "Leave the Flying to Us."

18 OCT. 1971

STATOTHR

STATOTHR

How the CIA Runs Secret Airline in Asia



SPECIAL REPORT

By JAMES MCCARTNEY
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The CIA, in supersecrecy, is running an airline in Southeast Asia with as many planes as Pan American — and about as many employes as the CIA itself — some 18,000.

Although virtually unknown to the U.S. public, which pays the bills, it ranks in numbers of planes among the half-dozen largest U.S. air carriers.

The airline is called Air America Inc., and it probably is the world's most secretive airline.

Its pilots — supposedly "civilians" — have manned T28 fighter-bombers on raids in Laos, according to the Pentagon papers.

THEY OFTEN fly hazardous missions in Laos, carrying troops into battle — and the wounded out.

They play the role of a part-time air force to many "irregular" of guerrilla fighters for a secret, CIA-sponsored guerrilla army in Laos.

Says a former CIA official: "Without Air America there could never have been a Laotian war."

Air America also carries freight, owns and operates Asia's largest aircraft maintenance facility, carries passengers, evacuates refugees, drops rice to the starving — and carefully hides its activities.

THE STORY of Air America, in fact, is one of the most intriguing of the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, shrouded in Oriental mystery.

Its mysteries, however, have now attracted the attention and concern of congressional investigators.

For the first time they have become fascinated with Air America — as well as with other CIA-related airlines that long have provided "cover" for clandestine U.S. activities.

Air America simply is the largest of a highly complex structure of secret, and semi-secret, CIA-related corporations with interests in air power.

"Nobody on Capitol Hill seems to know exactly what Air America does," says one investigator.

"But I can guarantee you that we're trying to find out."

THE CORPORATION has every outward sign of complete legitimacy — a Wall Street board of directors, thickly carpeted offices in Washington, neatly marked and maintained aircraft in the Far East often doing yeoman service for the U.S. government.

Many of the services of Air America are completely open in Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan.

But then there is the covert side.

Says Victor Marchetti, a former special assistant to the CIA's chief of plans, who quit in "disenchantment" and is now cooperating with congressional committees:

"The CIA created Air America. We owned it. It did our bidding.

"The top man of Air America, the man who built it, George Doole Jr., was a CIA man."

MARCHETTI recalls seeing an internal CIO memo in which the officer in charge of Air America's budget complained that the airline had become "so huge."

"The memo complained that Air America had more employes than the CIA — and the CIA had 18,000," Marchetti says.

Marchetti recalls that at one time the CIA made a movie about its activities in Laos — hoping to get public credit for its long-secret activities.

"The big star of the movie was Air America," he says.

"It carried the supplies and weapons into battle, supported the guerrilla army of Meo tribesman, and evacuated the wounded." The movie was never shown publicly.

THE PENTAGON papers also furnished a flash of insight into Air America's activities.

In talking about the beginning phases of the escalation of the aerial war in Laos, the published version of the papers says:

"A force of propeller-driven T28 fighter-bombers, varying from about 25 to 40 aircraft, had been organized there (in Laos).

"The planes bore Laotian Air Force markings, but only some belonged to that air force. The rest were manned by pilots of Air America (a pseudo-private airline run by the CIA) and by Thai pilots . . ."

THE PAPERS also include the text of a cablegram from then Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, granting "discretionary authority" to use Air America pilots in T28 fighter-bombers for search and rescue flights.

Rusk mentioned "T28 operations" as "vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos" — but did not discuss the full scope of Air America's role.

The Pentagon papers make clear that Air America pilots were flying heavily armed combat missions as long ago as 1964.

OFFICIALLY, Air America activities are supposed to be limited to carrying cargo and men on government contracts.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigators in Laos in recent months have been puzzled by the fact that T28 fighter-bombers at major airbases have been unmarked except for serial numbers on their tails.

continued

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601F

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

INQUIRER

OCT 18 1971

M - 463,503

S - 867,810

CIA's Super-Secret 'Air Force' in

Southeast Asia

Employs 18,000

By JAMES MCCARTNEY
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON. -- The CIA, in super-secrecy, is running an airline in Southeast Asia, with as many planes as Pan American -- and about as many employees as the CIA itself -- some 18,000.

Though virtually unknown to the U.S. public, which pays the bills, it ranks in numbers of planes among the half-dozen largest U.S. air carriers.


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They play the role of a part-time air force to many "irregular" or guerilla fighters for a secret, CIA sponsored guerilla army in Laos.

Says a former CIA official:



VICTOR MARCHETTI
...quit CIA

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ties.

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"But I can guarantee you that we're trying to find out."

The corporation has every outward sign of complete legitimacy -- a Wall Street board of directors, thickly carpeted offices in Washington, neatly marked and maintained aircraft in the Far East often doing yeoman service for the U. S. government.

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But then there is the covert side.

11 OCT 1971

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000

THE CIA--An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.

STATOTHR

THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad: for what it has allegedly done, as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then, as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big


This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U. S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is world-wide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-

11 OCT 1971

STATOTHR
STATOTHRTHE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER STAFF OFFICER CRITICIZES CIA ACTIVITIES

STATOTHR STATOTHR

Is the CIA starting to spy on Americans at home—turning talents and money against students, blacks, others? That is one of several key questions raised in a wide ranging criticism. A direct response starts on page 81.

STATOTHR

THE ATTACK

The following was written by Edward K. DeLong of United Press International, based on an interview with a Central Intelligence Agency official who has resigned. The dispatch was distributed by UPI for publication on October 3.

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it—that is, dissident student groups and civil-rights organizations—Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U. S. intelligence community.

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA—and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations)—and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who—if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like—are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, [Va.], a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'the enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history.

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of—an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization—the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

With many of his lifelong views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen career. One of the reasons was the CIA's Director Richard Helms why he was leaving.



Mr. Marchetti

CIA funded opium traffic,

ex-Beret says

By Joe Pilati
Globe Staff

A former Green Beret asserted yesterday that he regularly purchased large quantities of opium in Laos with funds provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.

His testimony came during the final day of "Winter Soldier Investigation II," sponsored by Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) at Boston's Faneuil Hall.

Former Sgt. Paul Withers, 24, a Springfield native now living in Cambridge, told 300 persons: "When I was in Laos in 1966, one of my main functions was to buy opium from Meo tribesmen, using CIA funds."

He said his orders to buy opium "came down from a contact man" from the CIA and were "only verbal, never on paper." Payment to the Meo tribesmen was made in "gold and silver, which came in on an agency plane," he added.

Withers said opium pickups at a small base camp in northern Laos, which he and two other Green Berets built, were made by "Air America" planes. "It was Americans who picked up the opium" in its raw, unprocessed form, he said.

A report in July by two House Foreign Affairs Committee members, Reps. Robert Steele (D-Conn.) and Morgan Murphy (D-Ill.), alleged that "Air America" aircraft, contracted by the CIA, have been used to transport opium from northern Laos into the capital city of Vientiane and that, once

processed, the drugs are flown into South Vietnam aboard both military and civilian aircraft.

The congressman's report also alleged that both the Laotian army commander, Gen. Ouan Rathikoum, and South Vietnamese Premier Tran Thien Khiem are involved in the corruption of customs agents and drug trafficking.

Withers said that, after completing basic training at Fort Dix in the fall of 1965, he was sent to Nha Trang, South Vietnam. Although he was "ostensibly" stationed there, he said he was placed "on loan" to the CIA in January 1966 with orders to help "train and equip Meo tribesmen in counterinsurgency" against Pathet Lao guerrillas.

The training was "in fact the main part of my job" in Laos, Withers said, but "there were never fewer than two opium pickups a week" during the year he served there.

Withers said that, after receiving language training in various Southeast Asian dialects while at Nha Trang, he was "stripped of my uniform and all American credentials" before going to Laos.

He said the CIA "wouldn't even let me write my own letters. They gave me blank sheets of paper and told me to sign at the bottom. Then the agency typed out letters sent to my parents and my girlfriend."

Discharged last December after post-Laos service in Cambodia and South Vietnam, Withers was

awarded nine Purple Hearts, the Distinguished Service Cross and Silver and Bronze Stars.

He said he spoke about his involvement in opium trafficking to Sens. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) and George McGovern (D-S.D.) and to aides of Sess. John Stennis (D-Miss.) and William Fulbright (D-Ark.) in June but was not aware of any subsequent action taken by the legislators.

He said FBI and Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agents had visited him "three or four times, most recently about a month and a half ago in Cambridge," to question him about his allegations. He said his mother in Springfield and his wife, now living in South Hadley, had also been questioned.

Another participant in yesterday's VVAW panels, Charles Knight of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, called opium "the largest export commodity in the Laotian economy" and commented: "In this sense, it is not at all strange that the CIA should aid and protect its transport."

Other testimony included statements by Indochina veterans who said they were former or current heroin addicts.

STATOTHR

8 OCT 1971

CIA Closes School After Drug Arrest

PHNOM PENH (UPI) — The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency closed a secret school for training Cambodian army guerrillas in Laos when police arrested a high-ranking Cambodian officer at the school on heroin-smuggling charges, military sources said.

The officer was a top aide of Lt. Col. Lon Non, brother of Prime Minister Lon Nol, the sources said.

Since his arrest in June, the aide has been released and, dressed in civilian clothes, has resumed duties in Phnom Penh at Lon Non's super-secret Special Coordination Committee.

The Cambodian army, in the meantime, has established a new guerrilla training center in southern Laos, and the CIA is once again considering providing American instructors and equipment, the officers said.

The Lon Nol aide was arrested in Pakse, Laos, by local police when he attempted to board a Phnom Penh-bound Air America plane with 22 pounds of heroin in a soapflake box, the sources said.

The heroin would be worth almost \$12,000 on the Vietnam market.

American officials were informed, and concluded after investigation that the heroin was bound for U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

The secret CIA camp, at Nakorn Sin in southern Laos, subsequently ordered out all Cambodian officers and trainees from Lon Non's 15th Infantry Brigade, the officers reported.

STATOTHR

*International News***CIA muscling in on Thai businessmen**

BANGKOK — The manager of Thai Airways has complained to the U.S. Embassy here that Air America, the Central Intelligence Agency's owned and operated air line, has been picking up passengers inside Thailand and thereby competing with the Thai airline.

Prasong Suchiva, manager of Thai Airways, said his line had the sole right to pick up domestic passengers in Thailand. Air America is used mainly for transport of war materiel and personnel for the U.S. war of aggression in Indochina.

STATOTHR

MIAMI, FLA.
HERALD
OCT 3 1971
M - 380,828
S - 479,025

Airline For CIA? 'Not Us'

SAT Officials Deny Columnist's Report


A CIA airline?
Not us, say the folks at Miami's Southern Air Transport.

"I'm chairman of the board," chuckles F. C. (Doc) Moor, "and if it's a CIA operation I sure haven't gotten anything out of it at all."

"There's no sound basis for those reports at all," says Stanley G. Williams, president of the supplemental airline based at the northwest corner of Miami International Airport.

COLUMNIST Jack Anderson quoted a former CIA official, Victor Marchetti, as identifying SAT as a subsidiary of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"The sole existence of SAT," according to Marchetti, "is that the CIA be ready for the contingency that



someday it will have to ferry men and material to some Latin American country to wage a clandestine war."

Moor and Williams, two of four stockholders in the privately held corporation that Moor founded in 1947, characterize SAT as a certified supplemental airline that deals in both commercial and military charters.

BUT, MOOR acknowledges, "I don't doubt that we've carried loads that may be CIA. A cargo agent calls with a load for us to pick up, and we carry it."

"We don't know who is shipping what to whom."

Because of the capacity of its Lockheed Hercules air freighters, SAT is certified to carry outsized cargo anywhere in the world. The airline also is certified to haul regular cargo from any point in the United States to destinations in the Pacific or the Caribbean. SAT's original market for flights out of Miami.

ITS CARGOS may be as harmless as furniture or as volatile as dynamite.

SAT conducts a divided operation, with three Hercules and two DC6s based in Miami and two Boeing jets operating on contract to the Military Airlift Command out of Taiwan.

"With our Pacific operations and military flights out of Patrick Air Force Base, I'd say that 60 per cent of our work is military and 40 per cent commercial," Moor said.

HE DENIES "absolutely" past reports that one stockholder in SAT is the Pacific Corp., a Delaware holding company that has been identified as the parent firm of Air America, whose shadowy operations in Vietnam have earned it the name "Air Spook."

According to Moor, SAT is controlled totally by himself, Williams, and two other private investors, Percy Brundage and Perkins McGuire.

Williams worries that rumors of cloak-and-dagger dealings could affect the company's international business.

"THAT COULD hurt us," he said. "We're frequently applying for landing permits at airports all over the world."

Whoever SAT's clients are, its business enjoyed an upturn in 1970, records show.

The airline turned a modest net profit of \$50,820 on \$10.79 million in revenues, against a \$2,470 loss the year before on \$11.04 million in revenues. Its total assets are listed at \$9.7 million.

STATOTHR

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
 TRIBUNE
 OCT 2 1971

M - 240,275
 S - 674,302

The problems of espionage

It's hard for a Russian spy to make an honest living any time, and it's even harder now that the London intelligence market has suddenly become less rewarding. With 105 of the 550 Russian officials previously assigned to Britain now banned from the country, and with the further restriction that prohibits even their replacement, the message to Moscow is clear: Quit sending spies.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Britain's foreign secretary, put it more elegantly. In an Aug. 4 letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, he wrote, after listing specific examples, "I do not accept your contention that, in the interest of Anglo-Soviet relations, Her Majesty's Government should abstain from taking measures to prevent, limit or inhibit the espionage conducted by Soviet officials and other Soviet citizens in this country on such an extensive scale."

Britain's action should not be misconstrued as putting an end to the spy business, even in London. American intelligence experts say that half or more of the officials in most Soviet embassies, trade missions and other delegations are involved in espionage. If that assumption is correct, then even after the crackdown last

week, 100 or so Russian agents will remain in Britain.

But the British move is likely to have an effect in many parts of the world. The number of Soviet officials involved should make people in nearly all capitals think twice about the purposes that visiting Russians might be pursuing.

Unfortunately the same people might also be provoked into second thoughts about Americans. Some will recall that the CIA has been running an airline and directing a war in Laos and carrying out other operations from the cover of aid missions. They might wonder to what extent they are the beneficiaries — or objects — of the estimated total of \$5 billion spent annually by the United States in its (also estimated) 200,000-person intelligence activities.

Unfortunately, too, the very definition of covert intelligence means that such doubts can't be overcome. The most one can hope is that people of other countries will have greater confidence in American integrity than in that of the Soviet Union. The exposure of Russian activities in Britain ought to help.