

DAILY WORLD
7 DEC 1972**Dear
Editor,****PERLO REPLIES**

Mrs. Seigel appeals for a change in Soviet policies and propaganda. Her points, it seems to me, are based partly on misinformation and partly on false analogies.

1. The million Jews rescued by the USSR from death in Nazi-occupied lands returned to their homelands after the war. They are not involved in the present emigration to Israel from the USSR.

2. Mrs. Seigel calls on the Soviet government to say it doesn't want Jews to leave, to reiterate the laws against anti-Semitism, to discuss ideological problems in relation to Jews.

The Soviet government has been doing exactly that and much more. It has been widely publicizing the tremendous contributions of the Jewish people to the USSR, in military, economic and cultural fields, paying them high honor. An example is the pamphlet by the Soviet Jewish writer, Solomon Rabinowitz, which has been translated into English. Criticism should be directed at the United States media and commercial publishing houses, which in effect censor all material telling the truth about Soviet Jews so that it becomes accessible only to the handful that know about left-wing bookstores or read the Daily World and Peoples World.

3. Under socialism, the two trends — a flowering of national cultures and a merging of peoples — go on simultaneously. Because the Jewish people are spread out all over the country, because so many of them are in advanced professional and political positions, the tendency towards blending into a multinational Soviet cultural pattern is particularly strong. It is for that reason, rather than the absence of a daily Yiddish newspaper, etc., that only one-sixth of the Soviet Jews consider Yiddish their mother tongue. The same blending into a common United States cultural pattern goes on in this country, marred by the vicious racism being stirred up by our reactionaries.

4. Comparison with Bulgarian postwar emigration policy is not valid. It is true, by the way, that the Bulgarian state, alone among those wholly occupied by the Nazis, protected the Jews from the invaders and saved them from the Nazi death camps. However, in the immediate postwar period, the Bulgarian Jews did not constitute a group with special qualifications for building the country, they had not lived most of their lives under socialism, they were relatively few in numbers, and they were going to a country which, at the time, was not engaged in acting as spearhead for the imperialist offensive against the national liberation movement.

5. It seems to be true, as Mrs. Seigel points out, that assiduous efforts of the United States Information Agency, the CIA and Zionist organizations have succeeded in creating among a minority of Soviet Jews — amounting to thousands, even — a fever to emigrate to Israel. But, according to recent press reports, many of the Soviet Jews going to Israel are settled in occupied lands, for use in fighting against neighboring peoples who are struggling to regain the lands seized from them by Israeli aggressors. It's too bad that some Soviet Jews are lured by the pied piper of bourgeois nationalism. But the Soviet government has a right, in relation to the national liberation struggles in the Middle East — which it rightfully supports — to restrain emigration which would aid the aggressor.

6. I gather Mrs. Seigel is criticizing me for "badgering and blaming" those who slander the USSR in connection with the so-called Jewish question and for showing the basic correctness of the Soviet position. The trouble in this country is that there aren't many more writers, with access to much wider circulating media, to tell the truth. I would hope that Mrs. Seigel, who herself understands much on this issue, will help the cause of combating anti-Semitism by using letters to the editor or other means to get some of the truth to people in her own community.

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*THROUGHOUT
FOLDER*

6/24/98

The Washington Merry-Go-Round**Columnists Bore Gifts to Greeks****By Jack Anderson**

The Greek dictatorship has sponsored a luxury tour for some of America's best-read conservative columnists. In some cases, their wives also made the trip.

Not surprisingly, the red-carpet trip produced a gush of pro-junta columns in the nation's press. Readers, however, didn't know that the tour was financed, at \$2,000 a head, by the government-controlled Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, whose urbane governor, Paul Totomis, once rounded up thousands of innocent Greeks in concentration camps.

Totomis was the Junta's Minister of Public Order for six months after the 1967 coup. This charming Athenian man-about-town put up the columnists at the plush King George Hotel, arranged for their first class travel and picked up their bills for fine wines and Greek foods.

The suave Totomis and his bosses would have gotten their money's worth out of the junket if the only man on it had been Ralph de Toledano, who distributes his conservative views to 100 papers. "For the first time in its 150 years of independence," wrote de Toledano, "Greece is prospering and the people satisfied."

But de Toledano had another gift for the Greeks. When Totomis' bank sponsored a pavilion at the Greek-American

AHEPA conference in Atlanta, deToledano wrote Vice President Spiro Agnew on Totomis' behalf. The Vice President did not know Totomis, but took de Toledano's word for the Greek's good works.

In a personal letter, Agnew — without ever seeing the bank's pavillion — lauded Totomis' contribution to Greek-American amity. The letter has been proudly publicized by Totomis.

The dictatorship reaped further benefits from columnist James J. Kilpatrick, who praised the way things are going under the military regime. The capable, sometimes caustic Kilpatrick failed to tell his millions of readers that the bank had picked up his tab when he singled out the bank for praise.

"The more the present government succeeds in promoting industrial growth around the country, the more secure that government becomes. Through . . . such energetic outfits as the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, the government is doing just that," wrote Kilpatrick.

Other kind words were written by junketeering columnists Anthony Harrigan, who doubles as executive vice president of the Southern States Industrial Council; former National Press Club President Allan Cromley, Daily Oklahoman bureau chief in Washington; Robert Baskin, Dallas Morning News political writer,

and Oscar Naumann, Journal of Commerce economic writer.

While most of the copy written by the subsidized tourists is favorable to the junta, Cromley and Naumann did take a few honest bites at the dictatorship. Cromley wrote candidly: "The fact is that the present government is a form of dictatorship which exercises sporadic censorship of the press and exists without periodic consent of the government." Naumann criticized the Greek steel industry.

When we questioned the columnists about their week of junketing, the reaction was mixed. De Toledano said: "I'll stick by my friendship with Paul Totomis. I think he's doing a helluva job there." The facile de Toledano said he had even helped out Totomis with a little unpaid public relations work.

Kilpatrick called it a "routine industrial tour," and said he had been led to believe the Greek government had not picked up the tab. Baskin, Cromley and Naumann also spoke frankly with us.

Only Harrigan, who finds even President Nixon's politics too far left for him from time to time, refused to discuss the junket.

We reached Totomis by overseas telephone at his bank in Athens. For 45 minutes he vigorously defended himself. There was nothing wrong with the tour, he said. As for his roundup of Greeks in 1967, he said there had been no com-

plaints from the detainees. In any case, he said he was merely carrying out orders from higher up. "I have lived my entire life in honor," he said.

Footnote: Among other junketeers were travel writer Theo McCormick and U.S. Steel public relations man Tom Geoghegan. One of those invited by Totomis, AP economic writer Sterling Green, turned down the junket because free trips are against AP policy.

Intelligence Reports

Anti-CIA Campaign — The Soviets, apparently, have launched a world-wide campaign to discredit the Central Intelligence Agency. Particularly in Asia, Soviet propaganda blames the CIA for everything from conspiring against President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines to stirring up ill will between India and Bangladesh.

Mao's Successor — Intelligence reports say China's Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai have discussed how to prepare the Chinese public for the inevitable demise of the revered Mao. The attempt to build up Lin Biao as a successor led to an abortive coup when he got in too big a hurry to take over. Mao is said to recognize, however, that he cannot live much longer and that a successor must be groomed who can hold China together.

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BALTIMORE SUN

20 OCT 1972

Book says CIA stole Sputnik briefly in '58

Washington (AP)—The Central Intelligence Agency stole the Soviet Sputnik to examine it minutely while it was on a world tour in 1958, says a new book by a former intelligence agent.

Patrick J. McGarvey, in "CIA—The Myth & the Madness," a book critical of the agency, relates:

"The Sputnik display was stolen for three hours by a CIA team which completely dismantled it, took samples of its structure, photographed it, reassembled it and returned it to its original place undetected."

CIA review required

The country where this occurred, Mr. McGarvey said, was among the things in about 100 lines the CIA cut out when he submitted his manuscript to the CIA. Review by the CIA was required under his secrecy agreement signed when he joined the agency, he said.

Other things Mr. McGarvey says he is revealing for the first time include:

1. Intelligence bickering nearly provoked Chinese Communist entry into the Vietnam war in 1966.
2. Richard Helms, director of central intelligence, taps the phones of his subordinates.
3. The FBI tried to enlist the CIA in an attempt to "scandalize" Stokely Carmichael, the black civil rights activist, in Hong Kong during his travels in 1967.
4. The ill-fated Pueblo mission and capture by North Korea was unnecessary since

all the targets it was working against were already adequately covered by other intelligence sources.

The CIA had no comment on Mr. McGarvey's book. And in giving him the go-ahead, the agency wrote Mr. McGarvey if any claim is made that the CIA "in any way approves your book or confirms the accuracy of any information contained therein, it will be officially denied and we will consider what other action may be appropriate under the circumstances."

Mr. McGarvey is a 14-year veteran in intelligence, three years with the CIA, the rest with the Army's National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency between 1955 and 1969.

He served in intelligence assignments in Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam.

Battling with 2 authors

Mr. McGarvey's book is one of three new books on the CIA but the agency is battling with authors of the other two who did not present theirs for clearance.

The CIA tried to block the publication several months ago of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred McCoy, which accused the CIA of heavy involvement in drug traffic in that area. The book was published over CIA protest.

Last spring, the CIA won a federal court injunction to block publication and speeches by a former high-ranking intelligence official, Victor Marchetti. He is now appealing to the Supreme Court.

Ex-Aide of C.I.A. Says U.S. Bombed Leper Colony

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 19—A former Central Intelligence Agency official said in a new book published today that the Air Force bombed a North Vietnamese leper colony in 1966 after Air Force photo analysts mistakenly concluded that the buildings—surrounded by two rows of barbed-wire fence—were a North Vietnamese division headquarters.

The former agent, Patrick J. McGarvey, spent 14 years with the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency and Air Force intelligence before resigning in 1969.

In his book, "C.I.A., the Myth & Madness," published by the Saturday Review Press, Mr. McGarvey charges that defense agency and C.I.A. specialists were overwhelmingly concerned with providing what he called "intelligence to please" and would often distort facts to do so.

In some cases, he contended, vital information was withheld from the White House by bureaucrats anxious to avoid criticism.

The leper-colony incident began, Mr. McGarvey wrote, after the Air Force reported that it had spotted a division headquarters in reconnaissance photographs. At the time, the service was eager to destroy the

fighting capability of the North Vietnamese Army, then largely still in the north.

"They spotted a huge, heavily guarded compound at a village called Quynh Loc," Mr. McGarvey said. "No public mention was ever made of the incident."


"An honest portrayal of what intelligence is all about must conclude that the C.I.A. is an insufferable bureaucratic mess with little or no central direction sorely needing drastic change," Mr. McGarvey wrote.

A spokesman for the C.I.A. confirmed that Mr. McGarvey had worked there, but refused comment on the book. The book was sent to the agency for review before publication, Mr. McGarvey said, and only a few minor segments were deleted.

In a letter to Mr. McGarvey clearing the book for publication, an agency official noted that if any claim is made that the C.I.A. "in any way approves your book or confirms the accuracy of any information contained here therein, it will be officially denied."

Sputnik Reported Stolen

Although the book's title deals with the C.I.A., the bulk of Mr. McGarvey's criticisms and anecdotes are drawn from his service with the Defense Intelligence Agency during the Vietnam War.



Associated Press

Patrick J. McGarvey

Garvey said. "The compound was isolated and ringed with barbed wire. Inside were areas shut off from each other with more barbed wire."

Both the Air Force operations personnel and the officers attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff "concluded that this had to be a division headquarters," Mr. McGarvey wrote. The initial defense agency analysis did not support that conclusion, he added, and it was officially reported that there was "no information to support the existence of a division headquarters at that location."

Mr. McGarvey, who was serving with the Defense Intelligence Agency at the time, noted that it had previously been determined that the North Vietnamese Army had abandoned all of its identifiable garrison areas and military camps shortly after the air war began in 1965 "and took to the hills and caves."

Nonetheless, he wrote, the

Joint Chiefs "insisted that D.I.A. label the facility a possible military headquarters site." His account went on: "D.I.A. acceded to this demand. On May 6, 1966, a heavy bombing raid was mounted against the facility."

'No Public Mention Made'

"A few days later," Mr. McGarvey wrote, "the North Vietnamese charged that the United States had bombed a leper colony at Quynh Loc, killing 30 patients and wounding 34. D.I.A. examined the photos and compared them with those on which they had based the mission."

"They proved to be the possible military headquarters site," the former intelligence

In the book, Mr. McGarvey also reports that C.I.A. agents successfully stole the Soviet Sputnik for three hours while the missile was on a world tour shortly after its successful launch. The C.I.A. team "completely dismantled it, took samples of its structure, photographed it, reassembled it, and returned it to its original place undetected," he said.

Mr. McGarvey, now a resident of suburban Washington, is known to have spent some years working under cover as a clandestine C.I.A. agent in South Vietnam and elsewhere, but deals lightly with his personal experiences in the book.

"This book is not an attempt to expose the C.I.A.," he wrote. "One of my reasons for writing this book is to shed some light on the most damaging, persistent myth afoot today about the C.I.A.—that it is an efficient, well-run machine capable of almost any act of trickery or intrigue."

STATINTL

Two Germanys in market for spies

From JOHN GOSHKO, Bonn, October 3

The two women spies exchanged by West Germany for more than 100 prisoners from the East has focused attention on a little known aspect of commerce between the two Germanys — a lively traffic in human beings.

Such exchanges have been going on for nine years. Officials here say privately that since 1969 they have arranged the release to the West of about 4,000 people held in East German jails.

Until now the Federal Government was loth even to admit its role in these "buying out" deals for fear of endangering these operations, and the West German public has been generally unaware of the size of this system of exchanges.

The practice received renewed notice a few days ago when Government officials here confirmed press reports that two spies, Liane Lindner, and Irene Schultz, had been handed over to East Germany in exchange for more than 100 political prisoners. Both women had been in prison 30 months, awaiting trial on charges of espionage against West Germany.

Mrs Schultz had been the personal secretary to the then Federal Minister of Science and Research, and she allegedly had passed to Mrs Lindner papers describing the private meetings of Chancellor Brandt's Cabinet.

The case was unusual because the Minister for Inter-German Affairs, Herr Franke, took pains to issue a statement confirming the Government's part in the exchange. Evidently he deviated from the usually discreet diplomatic tactics because first reports of the women's release were "highly inaccurate" and handled by the opposition press "in a way that constituted a partisan attack on the Government."

Privately Government officials say that the system of "buying out" began in 1963 during the chancellorship of Dr Erhard and was initiated by Dr Barzel, now the leader of the Christian Democrat Opposition, and an aspiring Chancellor next

month. In 1963, Dr Barzel was Minister for Inter-German Affairs.

Since then the exchanges have been a regular part of the uneasy relations between the two Germanys. Usually prisoners held by the two sides are exchanged or West Germany "buys" East German prisoners for goods or cash.

One of the more sensational instances was the release in February 1969 of Heinz Feife, a Soviet agent who had infiltrated West German intelligence for 10 years. He was released in exchange for three Heidelberg University students detained in the Soviet Union on charges of spying for the Central Intelligence Agency. Bonn's view is that the East Germans deliberately stockpile hostages as a bargaining counter to secure the release of specific agents imprisoned in the West.

For this reason senior members of West Germany's security services generally frown on the system on the grounds that the East Germans are better able to recruit spies by promising them a speedy "buy out" if they are caught.

In spite of such objections, the Federal Government has continued to exchange imprisoned spies because, as one official says, "the advantages generally outweigh the disadvantages."

"Most of those exchanged are little fish to begin with. Once they have been caught and identified, their usefulness to East Germany as agents is ended."

Most of those held in East Germany have been released by "direct purchase." On occasion, this has involved shipping such commodities as citrus fruit or medicines. But for the most part German Marks are paid out to satisfy East German hard currency demands.

Publicity surrounding the Lindner-Schultz affair might depress the chances of further exchanges for a time. But East Germany's need for hard currency and concern for its agents should allow business to resume soon. — Washington Post.

29 SEP 1972

SAKHAROV'S VIEWS CRITICIZED

Even the Swiss weekly Weltwoche, with a circulation of 100,000 worldwide and plenty of ads from IBM, Ford, etc., can't buy the line of the CIA's "Golden Boy" — Soviet intellectual Sakharov.

In the publication's July 26 issue, it subtitled a full page writeup about Sakharov "Professor Sakharov, Mystic and Utopian." The article describes some of his writings as "mirroring naive," and reports that Sakharov advocates a return to privately practicing physicians and to billing of patients by hospitals for health service rendered!

—J. M., Miami

WASHINGTON POST

1 SEP 1972

The Washington Merry-Go-Round**Nixon Expects Stepup in Viet Fighting****By Jack Anderson**

President Nixon was optimistic until a few weeks ago about achieving a cease-fire in Vietnam before the Nov. 7 election. Now he expects Hanoi to step up the fighting as the election gets closer.

Intelligence reports suggest that fighting on all fronts will be combined with guerrilla activity in the rear to create turmoil in South Vietnam and to undermine confidence in the Saigon government. But the real Communist aim, in Mr. Nixon's opinion, is to give the American voters the impression he can't end the war.

From sources close to the President, we have been told of his bitter disappointment over Hanoi's refusal to accept a cease-fire. He has responded with Cold War rhetoric, which he feels is the best political defense against the expected North Vietnamese offensive. But he would prefer to campaign as a peacemaker.

The story of his diplomatic-military maneuvering to settle the war began four years ago with his campaign promise of a "secret plan" to end the war. This was greeted with derision by Democrats and skepticism by others. But those privy to the President's strategy assure us that he not only had a "secret plan" but that it has come close to succeeding.

Nixon's Secret Plan

His "secret plan" simply was to appeal over Hanoi's head to

Moscow and Peking. He hoped to sit down separately with Russian and Chinese leaders for some straight talk. He thought he could persuade them that U.S. friendship could be more valuable to them than Hanoi's favor.

Without the support of their two great Communist allies, Mr. Nixon figured, the North Vietnamese would be compelled to come to terms. He was willing to offer terms, indeed, that he thought Hanoi would find hard to turn down.

Reaching Moscow and Peking took longer and the diplomacy was more sophisticated than the President had anticipated. But a month ago, it looked as if the scenario would turn out largely as he had foreseen.

He pressed for a cease-fire and the release of American prisoners. In return, he promised that the United States would cease all military activity, withdraw from Vietnam and leave it to the Vietnamese ultimately to settle their own affairs. He also made the point that he would be easier to deal with before his re-election than afterward.

Subsequently, the White House learned that both Moscow and Peking had advised Hanoi that Mr. Nixon would be re-elected and, therefore,

that serious negotiations should be resumed. This led to the secret talks between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho.

The word from Moscow and Peking was so optimistic that the President felt sure he would get a cease-fire. President Thieu, for his part, even agreed to step down and permit an internationally supervised election in South Vietnam. But the negotiations broke down over the question of who would control the interim government.

President Nixon had expected to be able to tell the Republican convention last month how he had kept his end-the-war pledge. Instead, he returned to Cold War rhetoric in his acceptance speech, promising not to "betray our allies" nor to "stain the honor of the United States."

Washington Whirl

Secret Rays—CIA officials were intrigued over the Soviet charge that the Americans used mysterious rays and chemicals to defeat Russia's Boris Spassky, the defending world chess champion. A thorough examination of the chess area, of course, produced no trace of hidden rays or chemicals. But the CIA men suspect that the Soviets were holler-

ing about a technique that they, in fact, use. Back in the 1960s, U.S. security men discovered that strange microwave impulses, some steady, some pulsating, were directed into our Moscow embassy from a neighboring building. A CIA investigation turned up Russian medical literature, suggesting that microwaves can cause nervous tension, irritability, even disorders. A secret study produced no conclusive evidence, however, that the mysterious microwaves had any serious effect upon our embassy people.

Curious Coincidence—State highway officials are required by law to submit reports to the federal government explaining how their road projects will affect the environment. Two Washington, D.C. scientists have discovered, however, that the highway officials care so little about their reports that they copy whole sections word-for-word from their colleagues across the country. Drs. James Sullivan and Paul Montgomery of the Center for Science in the Public Interest found identical sentences being used by highway engineers in Reading, Pa.; Waterloo, Iowa; St. Louis, Mo.; Omaha, Neb.; Philadelphia; Gadsden, Ala.; Tulsa, Okla., and Chesapeake, Va.

U.S. Said to Break All of Soviet's Codes

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 15—The United States is reported to have refined its electronics intelligence techniques to the point where it can break Soviet codes, listen to and understand Soviet communications and coding systems and keep track of virtually every Soviet jet plane or missile-carrying submarine around the world.

"We're able to break every code they've got," a former analyst in the National Security Agency, one of the most secret of the Government's many intelligence agencies, is quoted as saying in the August issue of Ramparts magazine, which is published by Noah's

Ark, Inc., 2054 University Avenue, Berkeley, Calif.

The former analyst, whose name was not given in the article, was an Air Force staff sergeant who was discharged from military service in 1969 after three years of overseas duty as a communications traffic analyst for the agency in Turkey, West Germany and Indochina. He uses the pseudonym of Winslow Peck in the article

Some Corroboration Found

Mr. Peck, who is 25 years old, was recently interviewed by a correspondent of The New York Times in California. Extensive independent checking in Washington with sources in and out of the Government who were familiar with intelligence matters has resulted in the cor-

roboration of many of his revelations. But experts strongly denied that the United States had broken the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union or of other foreign powers.

The national security agency headquarters is at Fort Meade, near Baltimore. It has nearly 100,000 employees — most of them military personnel — and spends slightly less than \$1-billion a year. Unlike the Central Intelligence Agency, the N.S.A.'s primary purpose is the collection of information — most of it through advanced technology — but it rarely, if ever, tries to evaluate the importance of the information or analyze it.

The Ramparts article says that

the United States has encircled the Communist world with at least 2,000 electronic listening posts on land or on naval vessels or aircraft.

United States electronically equipped aircraft, according to the article, are constantly penetrating the air space of the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries to provoke and record their radar and signal techniques to develop countermeasures against them.

This claim has been challenged here by independent Government intelligence experts, who said that there have been no authorized, as distinct from inadvertent, violation of Soviet or Chinese airspace by the United States since the U-2 flights of the early nineteen-sixties. The experts said that satellite photography has replaced aerial overflights, conceding, however, that United States electronic intelligence planes often fly along Communist borders to provoke reaction and collect signals.

In the California interview, which was recorded on tape, Mr. Peck described his early life in Joplin, Mo., his enlistment in the Air Force in 1966 when he was 20 years old, his subsequent recruitment by the security agent, his specialized training, his promotions and his three years of duty overseas. He was discharged in California in November, 1969, and says he turned down a \$10,000-a-year job offer by the Central Intelligence Agency. He decided instead, he says, to work to end the Vietnam war.

Tells of TV Monitoring

A highlight of Mr. Peck's disclosures include a report that in 1967 during his duty in Turkey the agency monitored a live Soviet television contact between Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, who was in tears bidding an emotional farewell to the astronauts Vladimir M. Komarov.

Mr. Komarov was then in orbit in the spacecraft Soyuz I, which was still two hours from re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. According to Mr. Peck's account the astronaut had just been informed by Soviet ground control that he braking parachutes designed to bring his spacecraft safely to earth were malfunctioning and that there was no hope of saving him.

Soyuz I crashed on Soviet territory on April 25, 1967, and Mr. Komarov was killed. He was posthumously granted a second Order of Hero of the Soviet Union and is buried in the Kremlin walls.

Mr. Peck also said that during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the United States electronic intelligence ship, the Liberty, was ordered near the Israeli coast to intercept details of Israeli military intentions.

The ship was attacked on June 8, 1967, by Israeli jet aircraft and torpedo boats—an incident that cost 34 United States dead and 75 wounded and which President Lyndon B. Johnson later described in his book, "The Vintage of Pint," as a "heart-breaking episode." Before the attack, he said, the Liberty learned that General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defense Minister, intended to order his forces on to Damascus and Cairo.

Tells of Johnson Pressure

Mr. Peck stated that President Johnson then brought intense pressure on Israel to halt further troop movement and warned Premier Kosygin on the "hot line" against what appeared to be an imminent Soviet airborne operation from bases in Bulgaria against Israel.

Intelligence sources here said they were unable to recall these details but a veteran of 30 years service in intelligence said of Mr. Peck:

"He's obviously familiar with N.S.A.—its organization, operations and many of its techniques. But no sergeant in his early twenties would know how intelligence is handled at the White House level, what N.S.A. material is used or discarded

by the President or more than just the fringes about C.I.A. operations."

During his year of duty in Vietnam, from November, 1968, to October, 1969, Mr. Peck, said, he participated in airborne electronic sweeps in Thailand in support of C.I.A. operations. The C.I.A., he said, was using unmarked attack bombers flown by C.I.A. "spookies" and based at Udorn to punish Meo tribesmen who had clashed with Thai Government troops over control of their traditional areas.

The United States depended on a friendly Thai Government for important air bases and other facilities useful for the Vietnam war, Mr. Peck noted, and thus was prepared to assign the C.I.A. surreptitiously to help the Thai Government suppress internal disorders.

Neither the N.S.A. nor the C.I.A. would comment today. Senior Government intelligence officials who were shown transcripts of the Peck interview discounted parts of it but corroborated others.

David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers," (published by Macmillan in 1967) and a leading authority on cryptoanalysis, said in a telephone interview that the Ramparts article "represents much new information; that rings true to me and seems correct." However, he challenged some points, specifically Mr. Peck's assertion that the agency's experts are able to "break every Soviet code with remarkable success."

Top-grade Soviet Foreign Ministry code systems "have been unbreakable since the nineteen thirties" Mr. Kahn said. He added that it was "highly unlikely that they have switched to breakable codes."

Mr. Peck's contention that "information gathered by N.S.A. is complete" implies a false importance, Mr. Kahn said. The N.S.A. does, he said, "solve" many nations' diplomatic codes; but these are countries of the third rank and provide only "indirect clues to Communist intentions."

Mr. Kahn noted that "what we are doing in this field the Russians are doing and, contrary to the Ramparts statement, they are very good."

He pointed out finally that the "thrust of the article, that the N.S.A. threatens peace, is incorrect."

"I believe that in the existing world of two armed camps," Mr. Kahn said, "N.S.A. can provide more light, more truth—and this can lead to better evaluation of situations and so to more realistic responses. N.S.A. is not like the C.I.A., which can foment revolutions and can indeed threaten peace."

The interview contains a lengthy question-and-answer passage that Mr. Peck conceded, in his interview with The Times, was hurriedly prepared at a time when he was "extremely rattled."

details of hitherto suspected but obscure details of electronic eavesdropping around the globe resulted, he said, from opposition to the Vietnam War and from a hope that others doing similar clandestine Government work would "come forward and say what they know." He concedes that his disclosures "may involve him in legal tangles."

STATINTL



International

Radio Liberty, starring anti-Soviet finks

STATINTL

By ERIK BERT

"One of the most extraordinary developments in recent years within the Soviet Union has been the emergence within of samizdat, that is, the private publication and circulation of one's own works," the Library of Congress study of Radio Liberty says.

"Samizdat" has been lauded as a cry for freedom from out the Russian wasteland by the New York Times, by "kremlogologists" and by other exponents of freedom:

The reality is somewhat different, as the Library of Congress study shows.

Radio Liberty—the Central Intelligence Agency broadcast directed at the Soviet Union—has become a main depository for samizdat.

Foreign correspondents are "one of the major channels of the flow" of samizdat, according to Peter Reddaway, a "Soviet specialist" at the London School of Economics. This has been evident in the dispatches of the New York Times and other newspaper correspondents.

In fact, "normally, samizdat... documents are not sent specifically to RL from the Soviet Union. Most documents have been publicized elsewhere before RL gets them."

The Library of Congress study emphasizes by repetition how important samizdat has become in RL's anti-Soviet barrage and how important RL has become for the dissemination of samizdat.

The study says:

Samizdat is "presently the main staple of RL's programming."

"RL has become a prime source for uniting the disparate elements of Soviet samizdat producers... a disseminator of all forms of samizdat from both the Russians and the (Soviet) nationalities... It is a "prime transmitter of samizdat."

Radio Liberty is a "prime beneficiary of samizdat."

In the past two years, the Library of Congress study says, "the amount of programming devoted to samizdat has increased..."

tially," from four hours per month of "readings and discussions of samizdat materials" to 58 hours per month in the first quarter of 1971. In April 1971 RL's "Russian language services devoted six hours per week of its 36 hours of original program time" to this material.

Radio Liberty sees "intellectual dissenters" in the Soviet Union as "an audience of importance which it has cultivated in a special way." In fact, Radio Liberty "has become the prime broadcaster of works by these intellectual dissenters."

In the guise of a "public forum of free discussion, RL broadcasts their thoughts and their works back to the Soviet Union, thus enlarging in geometric proportions the potential area of international circulation.

In fact, the CIA's Radio Liberty has become "the principal source for disseminating samizdat."

"RL has become a mean of internalizing samizdat and also a means of communication among all Soviet people."

That is, Radio Liberty has become a means for directing to the Soviet Union the productions of Soviet citizens which serve its dissentious, anti-socialist purposes. Samizdat is a vehicle in that communications chain.

The problem as the CIA sees it, is to "maximize the use of the (samizdat) documents in achieving RL's goals and purposes."

That should be plain enough for any Soviet "dissenter" whose works find their way into the arsenal of Radio Liberty.

Edward van der Rhoer, director of Radio Liberty's Program Policy Division says "samizdat has opened up a new dimension to RL's activity."

The most recent "phenomenon in the Soviet dissident movement," the Library of Congress study reports, is the "new form of samizdat called 'magnitizdat'... a technique of tape recording... of dissident material and circulating it within a group of friends."

Here the CIA steps in.

Radio Liberty "broadcasts back to the Soviet Union the mag-

nizdat which has been forwarded to it.

The CIA's Radio Liberty "is able to benefit from magnitizdat by the multiple dissemination of its broadcasts." That is, RL broadcasts are, CIA hopes, taped in the Soviet Union and then passed on for further dissemination.

Among those who have "made it" on magnitizdat are Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin's daughter whose book "Twenty Letters to a Friend," on magnitizdat, was selling "on the black market" for "from 70 to 120 rubles (\$77 to \$132)."

The Library of Congress presents samizdat as a "form of self-liberalization," encouragement of "rational thought," "the enemy of Stalinism," "extending the horizon of thinking," representing the "maturation of democratic ideas within the context of the Soviet system," a "stimulant to independent thinking," the "nascent expression of a genuinely, democratically formed public

opinion," asking "basic questions. Only one thing is missing.

That this is the arsenal of Radio Liberty, prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, for suborning treason in the Soviet Union for preparing the overthrow of the socialist Soviet system.


Radio Liberty seeks to incite nationalist anti-Soviet sentiments: purporting to record the "concerns of the nationalities."

"Increasing attention has been given to the broadcasting of samizdat material in the Nationalities Service," the Library of Congress reports. It cites broadcasts in the Ukrainian, Karachai, Ossetian and Avar languages.

Some productions are run in toto. Thus Solzhenitzyn's "First Circle" was broadcast in 30-minute segments, three days a week over a five-month period.

(To be continued)





Stuffing mailboxes, the CIA

By ERIK BERT

concocts a Moscow 'appeal'

The efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency and other entrepreneurs in anti-Soviet espionage are reflected in a wide variety of productions. The most recent emission in the effort to suborn anti-socialist treason in the Soviet Union is far-off in right field, practically out of the ball park.

The New York Times carried on June 20 a lengthy Moscow dispatch from Theodore JShabad about an "underground appeal circulating in Moscow" which "calls on Russians to strike and to demonstrate for better living conditions, as the Poles successfully did in 1970."

The following day, Charlotte Saikowski, of the Christian Science Monitor, reported from Moscow on the same document.

The document has a funny smell about it, Miss Saikowski says.

"Political observers are somewhat wary of this latest burst... because the pamphlet is a curious blend of knowledge of the West on the one hand and exaggeration and sometimes inaccurate information on the other."

That did not prevent her from presenting it in her first sentence as genuine, or the Christian Science Monitor from titling her piece, "Soviet thumb fails to muffle dissident voice." That's pretty strong for what is a particularly inept product.

Somebody told both Shabad and Miss Saikowski that as many as a thousand copies were said to have been distributed.

The "typewritten document," Shabad says, was "reportedly stuffed into mail boxes of selected apartment buildings earlier this month."

Copies of the statement "have been available to Western newsmen," and by them, including Shabad and Miss Saikowski, to the world.

The document exists in three versions, according to Shabad, a "short version of 200 words, a more detailed version of 600 words and a full-length version of 1,200 words."

It's hard to know what's going on, for Miss Saikowski says the document, which she calls a refrain from such stupidity, "pamphlet", runs "in its fullest version (to) 1,500 words. She and Shabad have different versions of the complete docu-

ment or they don't count the same way.

Shabad quotes from his full-length copy:

"The typewritten document," Shabad says, "charges that the national wealth is being squandered both on a life of luxury among the privileged and on foreign aid for political purposes.

"It paints economic conditions in dark terms, comparing them with the greater affluence in the West..."

The document cites a rise in Soviet meat and butter prices 10 years ago, to prove how miserable the workers' conditions are. It adds that "over the last 10 years there have been... 'concealed' price rises... through changes in product assortment, reductions in quality and relabeling."

This violates the CIA admonition that subversion cannot flourish on charges that run counter to the experience of the person addressed.

Shabad faults the present document on this count.

The document makes "virtually no allowance for the improvement in the living conditions of the average citizen that has been evident to casual observers in recent years," he says.

Miss Saikowski makes the same point.

"There is... no... mention of the noticeable improvement in Soviet living standards in recent years," she says.

In view of these obvious falsehoods, it is a "moot question" to her as to whether "the pamphlet would appeal to the ordinary Soviet worker," to whom it is allegedly addressed.

She cites also, as a very dubious venture, the document's attempt to put the Soviet "state capitalism" on a par with "Hitler's socialism."

That "would certainly draw the ire of deeply patriotic Soviet citizens," she says.

The CIA has cautioned particularly that Radio Liberty should refrain from such stupidity, which fascist-minded anti-Soviet propaganda has used for years. The two basic changes in the document are, according to

Shabad, that "a privileged class is living at the expense of the workers and that a costly foreign-aid program is hurting Soviet citizens."

Such charges "have been made by dissidents before," Shabad says. They "were made for example, by Dr. Andrei D. Sakharov, the physicist in the widely circulated critique of Soviet policy known as 'Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom'."

It should be pointed out that the dissemination of the Sakharov document, "which reached the West in 1968," was a project in which both the New York Times and the Central Intelligence Agency participated.

The Times published the document in 1968, and republished it twice, in book form.

The Sakharov work has been used by the Central Intelligence Agency, through Radio Liberty, as one of the entrees on its menu of anti-socialist broadcasting to the Soviet Union.

The "dissidents" single out Soviet aid to North Vietnam, to socialist Cuba, and to the Arab nations for attack.

These targets coincide with those of U.S. imperialism, of the Central Intelligence Agency and the New York Times.

Shabad deduces from the fact that the document is couched in what he calls "unusually blunt, aggressive language," that it is "plainly directed at the average workingman."

Whatever the intentions, the document is an incredible product. It violates all of the rules which the Central Intelligence Agency has set down for its Soviet-directed Radio Liberty broadcasts.

It talks of the "Kremlin rulers," in the jargon of Western "Kremlinologists." It talks, also, of "Kremlinites," a newly invented epithet in "Kremlinology."

The document calls for strikes and demonstrations. The goals of these struggles are depicted as defense of socialism and the advance to Communism, "freedom of speech, of the press, of the right of conscience, of freedom and democracy."

The actual target however is the Communist Party of the Sov-

iet Union. The attack is oblique, assaulting the CPSU by praising the actions of the Polish United Workers Party, the Communist party of Poland.

This is an application of the technique of "cross reporting" which the CIA uses in its Radio Free Europe operations.

"Cross reporting" means, in practice, citing "good" actions of one Communist Party or socialist government, against the Communist Party and socialist government of the country to which the RFE broadcast is directed.

The document resorts to another "cross reporting" tactic used by the CIA: contrasting the situation in a socialist country with the situation in the capitalist West. However, the latest document uses this tactic in such a way as to make even Shabad and Miss Saikowski blush for the incredible stupidity of the authors.

The document says that the "number of unemployed in the West does not exceed 2 to 4 percent of the labor force."

To maintain her own credibility Miss Saikowski points out, in refutation, that "unemployment in the United States has exceeded six percent in recent months."

Normally, the CIA is too sophisticated to broadcast such things as the 2-to-4-percent figure over Radio Liberty, for all the world knows that the minimum rate of unemployment in the U.S. is 5.3 percent, that the rate of Black unemployed is twice that of white and that the rate of youth, and especially of Black and Chicane youth unemployment is several times the average for all workers.

It almost sounds as though some other gang were trying to reap where CIA has tried to sow for so long. Or, that this is a new CIA tactic, with its sights set on workers, in contrast to the "rational" approach it has taken in its efforts to subvert intellectuals.

10 MAY 1972

The Washington Merry-Go-Round**'Brainwash' Attempt by Russians?***By Jack Anderson*

Hidden in the Central Intelligence Agency's most secret files is an account of a possible Soviet attempt to "brainwash" our embassy personnel in Moscow with mysterious microwaves.

The fantastic details are contained in a file marked "Operation Pandora," which describes how the Russians bombarded our embassy with eerie, low-radiation impulses. Their secret intent, it was suspected, may have been to alter the personalities of our diplomats.

The bizarre story began in 1945 when a Russian presented Averell Harriman, then our ambassador, with a handsome carved Great Seal of the United States. Harriman proudly hung it in the embassy.

The seal contained a tiny electronic eavesdropping device, which monitored conversations inside the embassy until 1952, when it was detected. From this shocking discovery came urgent orders that all embassies must be periodically checked for electronic signals.

In the '60, U.S. security men discovered the strange microwave impulses, some steady, some pulsating, directed into our Moscow embassy from a neighboring building.

The CIA quickly learned that Russian medical literature suggested microwaves can cause nervous tension, ir-

ritability, even disorders. They speculated that the Russians were trying to drive American diplomats stir crazy with the waves.

Neither the Cia nor the State Department had the facilities to test the effects of the silent rays on human beings. At the Pentagon, however, the super-secret Advanced Research Project had worked on electronic sensors and other weird projects.

The agency quietly began a study, under the direction of Richard Cesaro, into the effects of microwaves on people. Cesaro gave the project the code name, "Operation Pandora," and called in a physician, Dr. Herb Pollack, and two crack military scientists, Dr. Joseph Sharp of Walter Reed Army hospital, and engineer-microwave expert Mark Grove of the Air Force.

Sharp and Grove, supplied with the microwave data monitored in the embassy, duplicated the embassy environment, using monkeys for diplomats.

The monkeys actually were trained to perform tasks and then were rewarded with food, much as embassy employees might be rewarded with a dry martini at the end of the day.

The monkeys were studied night and day for months at Walter Reed, while a collateral experiment was conducted on rabbits by consultant Dr. Milton Zaret in his own laboratory.

In the embassy in Moscow, meanwhile, no one except the highest diplomats and security men were aware of the secret microwave drama.

By 1967, the scientists felt they had watched the monkeys long enough for a tentative reading. Some felt there were signs of "aberrant behavior" caused by the microwaves, but the majority disagreed. Only the rabbits showed clear changes—in their heart rate—which Zaret attributed to heat from the rays.

The disagreement on psychological changes were sent to a top secret reviewing board, which also could reach no absolute conclusion that the rays affected the monkeys' minds.

Nevertheless, the suspicion lingered, and the White House decided that even if the microwaves were not "brainwashing" embassy people, they should be halted. It was also suspected that the waves might be part of some radical new surveillance technique.

At the June 1967 Glassboro meeting between President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, the question of the microwave rays came up. One informant insists Johnson personally asked Kosygin to end the ray bombardment, although other sources say the request was made at a lower level.

By 1968, most of Cesaro's scientists were convinced that the microwaves were not psychologically harmful and the

embassy experiments ended in early 1969.

The brilliant work done by the team, however, has now led to important research on the effects of microwaves. So far, tests show high radiation can injure eyes, genital organs and perhaps other parts of the body. But, as yet, there is no conclusive proof that low-level radiation is harmful.


Footnote: We have spoken with Cesaro, Pollack, Sharp, Zaret and Grove. All acknowledged they worked on "Operation Pandora," but all refuse to go into details. As Sharp put it: "Pandora was classified in those days and still is."

Bucinator

MAY 1972

COUNTERFEIT NEWS

Howard Hughes, Nikita Khrushchev, and the perils of secret journalism



That must have been true for the Belgian museum expert who still insisted, years after Meegeren's confession, that two of the disputed Vermeers were genuine. And weeks after Irving was exposed, there was a wistful touch of the same reluctance to grow psychically poorer, in the way Harold McGraw, while saying that his company was fully insured against losses through fraud, still acknowledged a lingering hope that something of the manuscript was salvageable. Vermeer being dead suggests only that hell may not, after all, be other people but counterfeits of oneself. Hughes, though, was widely thought to be alive, so what Irving could have dreamed he would gain remains a mystery, despite *Time's* devoting half a rueful cover story to his childhood. In the nature of the case, such spectacular failure is success.

McGraw-Hill's lust to believe was as pathetic as the little old lady's who sells all her AT&T to invest in the Ponce de Leon Water Resources Development Corp. The motives around *Life* were more complex. Time Inc. is evidently establishing a new category of news, to be called secret journalism. Of course, once Hughes staged his conference phone call to six reporters in Los Angeles, secret journalism began to shed cloaks and veils and ostrich plumes; *Time* and *Life* managed to stay a day or so ahead of the *New York Times* in chronicling their own inside story. The fevered mood of the weeks and months before, though, has hardly been conveyed.

Secret journalism evidently suppresses taste. Irving's Hughes was pastiche so thick it had lumps, some of it apparently lifted right out of the Time Inc. morgue. Yet *Life's* managing editor, Ralph Graves, could write after the fact that "It was marvelous stuff. . . . Even the boring parts were persuasive." The seeming appetite to be swindled could gulp down Irving's insistence that Hughes, though he had authorized the autobiography, was yet so publicity-shy he could not be approached independently. Then Irving suddenly claimed Hughes would switch publishers if his fee were not boosted to \$650,000; far from scaring off the fish, that twitch set the hook—and proved Irving, a master of the authentic psychology of the bogus. "Señor de Leon is not really sure he wants to sell, he's feeling younger every day."

Secret journalism certainly suppresses ordinary caution. "That a big news organization with the resources of *Life* should fall for it surprises me," the *New York Times* quoted the president of Random House as saying, again after the fact. "They should have checked it out." When on December 7, *Life* and McGraw-Hill at last announced their publishing coup, it was news to almost everyone at Time Inc., news to the one man best qualified to check it out—Frank McCulloch, chief of *Time's* New York bureau, a brilliant hard-news investigator, a friend of Hughes, the last journalist known to have interviewed him. McCulloch himself had once drawn back at the brink of signing a contract to write a book about Hughes. On December 14, McCulloch received an invitation that has since become famous: would he take a phone call from Howard Hughes. What journalist wouldn't? McCulloch checked upstairs, in the high-ceilinged, wood-paneled hush of the thirty-fourth floor, "the zeppelin hangar." By the time he was back to his office, the call was coming through. A man who sounded like

AND SO CLIFFORD IRVING, a name hardly known a year ago, has now established himself as one of the great confidence tricksters of the century. In the nature of the case, such success is failure—or is it?


As the glorious brass of the Howard Hughes hoax began to glimmer through the steam that swirls in the corridors of the Time-Life Building these days, somebody of unusual detachment compared Irving's Hughes to Han Van Meegeren's Vermeers. The comparison bit deeper than intended, a broadax that sank the sapling and then the logger's foot. The money? Meegeren sold his eight fake Vermeers, one to Hermann Goering, for millions; Irving got McGraw-Hill, *Life*, Dell, and Book-of-the-Month to commit something like \$2 million (estimates vary) of which about \$750,000 was actually paid over. Our fashionable confusion about definitions is titillated: does a picture, when proved a fake, remain art? Is a forged biography literature?

In the dark interior of every con game is the ambiguous tender relation between swindler and victim, where the victim so desperately wants to keep on believing, while the swindler must ever struggle against the mutinous impulse to be honest, particularly since honesty would so gratify the dwarfed creative ego that wants its talent and daring recognized at last. Meegeren forged his first Vermeer to prove himself more than a mediocre painter; after the war, self-exposure became a necessity when he painted a ninth fake in a Dutch courtroom to prove himself innocent of collaborating with the enemy by selling the one that went to Goering. Can a con be aid and comfort? Does a pirated manuscript remain a commercial enterprise? Should creative fakery be discouraged at all—for is there not about such an *objet non retrouvé* the same curious aspect John Kenneth Galbraith once perceived in the undiscovered embezzlement, namely "a net increase in psychic wealth"?

continued

28 MAR 1972

The Samovar Papers



Stan Mack

By RUSSELL BAKER

OBSERVER

WASHINGTON, March 27—Professor Kissinger, who has been arranging President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, has run into a samovar problem with the Kremlin leaders.

The difficulty arises from the President's desire to make his televised appearances in Russia just as diverting as his recent appearances from China. In Peking, one of the great moments occurred at a state banquet when the President surprised the television audience by eating his dinner with chopsticks.

The President does not want the Soviet leaders to feel that he has slighted them. He wants to assure them of equal banqueting surprise time on television. For this reason he has been practicing hard on the samovar for the past month.

His plan, which Professor Kissinger put to the Russians, was to preside at a big samovar during a great banquet in the Kremlin and produce the tea for the entire assemblage.

The President has, in fact, become so proficient on the samovar that among the press releases already composed for release during his May visit to Moscow is one which begins, "President Nixon last night became the first American President to make tea from a samovar in the Kremlin. . . ."

That press release will probably have to be scrapped. The Russians, though insisting that they are willing to go to great lengths to make the trip a success, say they have polled the members of the Central Committee and found that 82 per cent want coffee instead of tea after dinner.

They say it would be a gross provocation for the President to ignore the preference of the majority and concentrate his attention upon the out-of-step few who want tea.

If the President wants to make the coffee, they have told Professor Kissinger, they will not object.

Professor Kissinger has inquired whether the coffee could be made in a samovar. The Soviet central banqueting collective has replied that it takes years to learn to make a good cup of coffee in a samovar. It would be more practical, the White House has been advised, for the President to leave the banqueting hall, go into the kitchen and make the coffee in five ten-gallon vats similar to those used in American drugstores.

Excellent TV camera positions can be arranged by the vats to provide good angles of the President turning knobs and releasing steaming coffee.

Professor Kissinger has told the Soviet leaders that this is not what the President had in mind. He has explained that the President wants to show that he is sufficiently interested in Russian culture to master some aspect of it. The coffee vat, with its poisonous brew, was purely American, he protested.

The Kremlin said, in that case, maybe the President would like to tend bar during the cocktail hour. They say the cocktail hour is an old Russian cultural tradition invented soon after the discovery of vodka. The President could master it very rapidly, they said, with just a few hours practice on some vodka and dry vermouth.

Naturally, Professor Kissinger said no, and the samovar issue was left unsettled while the Russians and the professor argued about how small the President's airport reception crowd should be.

The Russians, who do not want to be outdone by the Chinese, want the welcoming crowd limited to seven people. Professor Kissinger is asking for billions, naturally; he is accus-

The Russians say this is impossible because their economy is booming so magnificently that no more than seven people can be spared from the factories. Professor Kissinger has replied that the United States will supply its own crowd, composed of C.I.A. agents assigned to the Soviet Union, if the Russians will promise not to take their pictures. He awaits a Soviet reply.

Leonid Brezhnev, the head Communist, has personally intervened in the samovar issue. If the President wants to do something on television to illustrate his mastery of some phase of Russian culture, Mr. Brezhnev has suggested to Professor Kissinger, he might learn to dance while in the deep-knee-bend position. Mr. Brezhnev says this would make for a smashing TV finale to a Kremlin state banquet.

Or, he has suggested, the President might like to wrestle a bear. It is not known what President Nixon has decided, but over the weekend bear tracks were seen in the White House Red Room.



Pogromist propaganda

For years, now, the New York Times, second only to the Central Intelligence Agency, has incited Zionist sentiments among a section of Jews in the Soviet Union.

The main ideological plank of its program has been the falsehood that in the Soviet Union Jews are discriminated against. It has sought to incite Soviet Jews to anti-Soviet actions, to induce Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union to Israel.

Now it complains in a recent editorial — commenting on a speech by Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow — that Brezhnev "takes no account of the general Arab suspicions about what may be hidden behind the increased flow of Soviet Jews allowed to migrate to Israel."

These are not "general Arab suspicions." They did not flower in the Arab lands.

They have been manufactured in the New York Times editorial offices on West 43 Street, in New York City.

Their purpose is to arouse chauvinist, anti-Semitic elements among the Arabs in order to use them against the Soviet Union.

The very Jews whom the New York Times and the CIA have induced to quit their socialist homeland, and go to Israel, are now pointed to by the New York Times as the most dangerous enemies of the Arabs — because they are, allegedly, Soviet agents.

At the end of its anti-Soviet road, we find the Times inciting anti-Semitism against former Soviet Jews, fingering them for whatever anti-Semites it can move into action.

Samizdat, Meany and the CIA

During the past couple of years the capitalist press, especially the New York Times, has reported how Soviet poets, writers, and scientists have resorted to "samizdat" to get their words to the world.

Via "samizdat" — self-publishing — the beleaguered intellectuals, through typewritten carbon copies, mimeograph, hectograph or other primitive publishing means, have bared their tortured souls, and have appealed to the conscience of the world for support, or so the Times claimed.

We now have the Library of Congress to thank for removing the veil from "samizdat."

Dr. Joseph G. Whelan, head of the Library of Congress' anti-Soviet operations, revealed last week that the "samizdat" business is a CIA operation.

The Library of Congress has been an unlikely source for truth about the socialist world, devoted as it is to anti-Sovietism.

However, when Senator William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, demanded that the U.S. quit funding Radio Liberty, a CIA operation in Munich, West Germany, Whelan complained that this would end the means of distributing "samizdat" in the Soviet Union. This "movement will unquestionably receive a serious setback," Whelan said.

The alleged cry for freedom from "Soviet intellectuals" is thus revealed to be, as long suspected, just a fink CIA operation.

It shares this distinction with Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Assembly for Captive European Nations.

All have been fed out of the U.S. Treasury to incite subversion and rebellion against socialism.

George Meany's complaint last weekend that the ACEN's \$250,000 a year payoff has been ended is one more token of the fact that his heart belongs to the CIA, as does his "foreign secretary," Jay Lovestone.

Meany's spiritual and other relations to the CIA are of long standing. His opposition to the Soviet Union and socialism reflects his devotion to U.S. imperialism. That devotion accounts for his unconscionable support of the ravaging of Indochina by the U.S.

Meany's devotion to U.S. imperialism is betrayal of the most elementary interests of the U.S. workers, is enmity to the national liberation movement throughout the world.

16 JAN. 1972

A forgotten footlocker

The Game of the Foxes

The Untold Story of German Espionage
in the United States and Great Britain
during World War II.

By Ladislav Farago.

McKay. 696 pp. \$11.95

Reviewed by RICHARD HANSER

It does seem a little late in the day—doesn't it?—for the international spy to be dusted off and taken out for another literary airing. With his codes and covers, and his devilish stratagems for stealing the plans to the fortifications, he may not yet be quite one with Nineveh and Tyre, but he's getting there. Today he seems so quaintly and dimly World War II-ish that he takes his place with the intrepid commando, the gung-ho Marine, and Rosie the Riveter—all cherishable elements of our folklore in their time but now grown a touch fusty, somewhat stale around the edges. The fictional 007 having long since become a widescreen joke, it is a little hard to take US/7-362, his honest-to-god counterpart, very seriously.

Ladislav Farago does, though, and in no less than 696 pages of unrelenting prose. Your average writer can lead a long, productive life without once using the word "spy-master," but Farago uses it four times on one page, and three of the four times in the same sentence. His book is trumpeted on the cover as "more exciting than any spy thriller," which is a little puzzling, since the book in-

Richard Hanser is the author of Putsch! How Hitler Made Revolution.

The Game of Foxes is a spy thriller. Its area is German espionage in America and Britain during WW II, a field in which Farago is thoroughly grounded. This is his sixth or seventh book on spying, and he has had some rather special experience at first hand in that curious endeavor. Though a naturalized citizen, and a native of a country with which we were at war, he rose high in U.S. Naval Intelligence, an exploit that not just every immigrant who comes through customs could duplicate. (It is perhaps not necessary to explain that Farago comes from Hungary. Hungarians, as we know, have a knack.)

The Game of Foxes tells how agents of the *Abwehr*, the German Intelligence Service, pulled off such dazzling feats of cloaking and daggering as swiping the Norden bomb sight, trickling spies into sensitive spots in Washington and London, tapping the Roosevelt telephone line, and the like. We learn much of secret rendezvous

We are never told the name
of a Politburo member
whose urine sample was stolen
from a noted Viennese urologist...

(here called *Treffs*) between agents, and pilfered documents, and sensational reports relayed to a "Nest" in Hamburg known as "Axt X." Before we are through we are well steeped in what Farago himself calls "the hoary melodrama of espionage and its bizarre rituals." Everything is scrupulously, not to say laboriously, documented, down to the last street number, date, and middle initial. (Well, perhaps not everything. We are never told the name of the Politburo member whose urine sample was stolen by the CIA from the laboratory of "a noted Viennese urologist.")

At the end, though, one wonders whether the game of foxes has been worth the candle. Despite the successes of Nazi espionage—sometimes detailed here with what can only be called misplaced enthusiasm—nothing really decisive was accomplished. The theft of the Norden bomb-sight did not win the air war for Germany. Stealing secrets of Allied shipping and troop movements did not prevent our troops and supplies from getting there, and in overwhelming quantities. Eavesdropping on Roosevelt and Churchill, if it actually occurred, did not save Hitler and Goering and Goebbels from dying like dogs in utter defeat. As the Bible itself says, the little foxes spoil the vines. They do not bring down the house.

Farago's book is the outgrowth of a find he made "in a dark loft of the National Archives in Washington, D.C." The find was a forgotten footlocker which turned out to contain microfilm documents on the internal workings of the *Abwehr* under its enigmatic chief, Admiral Canaris. Farago has based his story on what he calls "the incontrovertible evidence of the [*Abwehr's*] own papers."

An agency's own papers are seldom incontrovertible evidence of anything but the agency's natural desire to make itself look good. From other sources it is possible to get a quite different picture of the *Abwehr*. Others have seen it as a monumentally fouled-up operation, inefficiently run by Canaris (who may have been pouring sand in his own gas tank) and caught in an insane tangle of rivalries with other Nazi intelligence agencies, of which there was a mushroom-like proliferation in the Third Reich.

There is, to be sure, a certain fascination in getting this unexpected peek into all those *Streng Geheim!* papers from that forgotten footlocker, but the fun is a good deal diminished by the circumstance that the *Abwehr*, like Germany itself, was a loser. How much thrill can there be in kibitzing a poker hand, be it held ever so close to the vest, when somebody else wins the pot? It is a little like being made privy to the football play book of 1971 Buffalo Bills. □

STATINTL

The World

Defector Undefects

First, the Soviet Embassy car was found last October near Zbrugge, the Belgian ferry port for Britain. Then, a report that a Soviet military intelligence major, Anatoly Chebotarev, 38, had walked into the United States Embassy in Brussels, whence he was whisked to Washington for interrogation by the Central Intelligence Agency. In Washington, the defector reportedly "blew the cover" for 37 or so Soviet agents in Belgium who had been using supersensitive electronic gear to eavesdrop on phone conversations at NATO headquarters. They quickly left Belgium and Major Chebotarev settled down to exile in the United States.

But four days before Christmas, the major met a top Soviet diplomat at the State Department. After returning to his Washington apartment, he slipped away from his C.I.A. escort and turned up in the Soviet Embassy. Finally, last Sunday night aboard a Soviet airliner, he returned to Moscow.

Was his defection a Soviet ruse to disrupt Western intelligence? If not, why did he risk execution as a traitor when he returned to Russia? Neither the C.I.A. nor the Russian Embassy was saying.

31 DEC 1971

SOVIET MENTAL HOSPITALS

The Government of Doctor Caligari

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

The following is based upon an address delivered on December 3, 1971 to a Conference on Literature and Politics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, held at Stanford University, December 2-4, 1971, with the participation of experts on East European Literature and Politics from many countries.

AT THE SAME MOMENT that the address was being delivered, the same theme was being considered at a World Psychiatric Association Congress being held in Mexico City. The Congress was in receipt of appeals from such distinguished Soviet scientists as nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov and such literary figures as Dmitri von Mohrenschildt, editor of the Russian Review, as well as appeals from the World Federation of Mental Health (which concluded its congress in Hong Kong on November 25), the British Columbia Medical Association which asked for a resolution condemning the "unethical and anti-humanitarian activity" of police-dominated psychiatrists in the USSR, the Vancouver and the All-Canadian Psychiatric Associations, the British Psychiatric Journal, and a group of archbishops of the Russian Orthodox Church meeting outside the Soviet Union to adopt their appeal against "the corrupt use of psychiatric hospitals." Despite this pressure from the members of their own profession, and shocked editorials in the Washington Post, the New York Times, the London Times, L'Express, the Swedish press and radio, and many other public and

scientific bodies, a secret conference of the World Psychiatric Association leaders on December 2, from which the press was excluded, decided to refuse to show solidarity with the police-pressed Russian psychiatrists compelled to violate their Hippocratic Oath, and to leave the victims of the police psychiatric methods without support from the psychiatrists of the world—on the legalistic grounds that they might alienate the Russian delegation (which contained more than the usual quota of police psychiatrists) and on the further ground that their constitution did not "provide the mechanism" whereby attempts might be made to raise the standards of psychiatry among their sixty thousand members. They even prohibited debate or discussion of the practice complained against. How much cowardice, and how much knavery was involved one cannot know, but it is significant that around the conference in Mexico City, there were not lacking men to approach the reporters with the explanation that the sufferings of the KGB victims in insane asylums in Russia was nothing but a sinister myth of the American CIA. Indeed, Professor Andrei V. Snezhevsky, Chief Psychiatrist of the Soviet Ministry of Health and a reporter to the Congress, did not hesitate to call a press conference in defiance of the "no discussion" decision, in which he too charged that painfully detailed stories of such men as Jaurès A. Medvediev in his book, *A Question of Madness*, were nothing but "a maneuver of the cold war carried out by the hands of experts."

—BDW

IN 1955, with that remarkable nose of his for sniffing every slightest change in the breeze, Ilya Ehrenburg published in this country his novel *The Thaw*. Thereby he started a new trend among those of our Soviet experts who belong to the *Candide* school of Sovietology. But I who have seen the great iceflows crashing and breaking up in the spring on the Moscow River could see no resemblance between the freeing of the frozen river and Ehrenburg's *Thaw*. Hence, reviewing his book in the late lamented *New York Herald Tribune*, I commented that it looked like a thaw on a ground of permafrost. The recently published paper of Vera Dunham on the "Stalinist Debris" that still clutters up the Moscow popular literary scene painfully confirms my gloomy view of the transient thaw both as against the wishful thinking of Ehren-

burg and of the *Candide* school of Sovietology. The Dunham paper, as now made available to us, does not paint a pleasant picture of the Moscow literary scene at the close of 1971, but there is no point in blaming a conscientious messenger for bad tidings. Any complaints should be addressed to the proper party—and I mean *party*—and to its grim yet faceless spokesman, Ilyich II, who can properly be distinguished from Ilyich I Bolshoi [the great] by granting him his proper title of Ilyich Malenkii [the little].

When Stalin died, no one, I thought, would ever be able to improve upon or add anything to his terrifying discoveries in the art and science of confession and torture. But now I must recognize that though his lieutenants have borrowed from his arsenal of tortures with a certain self-denying restraint, perhaps to make up for that

very moderation they have invented a new torment that in important respects out-Stalins Stalin and out-Hitlers Hitler. It is not part of the Stalinist debris which Vera Dunham has examined, and, in a sense, it even overshadows the oft-asked question: "Are they restoring Stalinism?"

SINCE IN the Soviet Union power is knowledge and power over everything is knowledge of everything, we must trace this new invention back to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev who, until October 16, 1964, knew everything from how a painter should paint, a milkmaid milk, or a psychiatrist diagnose to how an astronaut should find proof of atheism among the stars. On March 10, 1963, we find him telling the readers of *Pravda* how it is possible for human beings living under Soviet rule still to

continued

9 DEC 1971

Henry J. Taylor / Spy business



THAT the traffic in international secrets is a horrible business — outrageously glamorized on television and in fiction — is bared again by the Paris implication that the French espionage apparatus framed former agent Roger de Louette into his recent dope-smuggling arrest here to get rid of him.

Television and fiction feature women in their glamorization, of course. This only compounds the nonsense. Espionage apparatuses seldom use women, the notable exceptions notwithstanding.

Women are brought in only occasionally as mere decoys. To cite a specific case, there was the one involving Polish women under the control of the Soviet KGB espionage apparatus in Warsaw. All spoke English and were proteges of one Ursula Marie Discher, who had successfully entrapped tried-and-convicted foreign service officer Irwin N. Scarbeck of our Warsaw embassy.

These decoys compromised 10 U.S. embassy Marine guards responsible for embassy security, the nightly locking of safes, etc. This example is typical. But, universally, espionage managers fear a woman may become emotionally involved.

ACTUALLY, women are more often involved in a reverse way.

Not too long ago the wife of an American foreign service officer at a key post in Europe made a trip to Moscow. KGB agents hiding in her Moscova Hotel bedroom spurted her with an odorless gas which leaves one unconscious but otherwise unharmed. Undressing her, they made her the victim of ghastly embarrassing photographs which they used to force her husband to supply classified information. The husband himself exposed this to the State Department, but it cost him his foreign service career.

Similarly, the KGB photographed former British Navy Cmdr. Anthony Courtney, a member of Parliament, during a bedroom intimacy with a British woman in Moscow. Except for anonymous threats, neither Cmdr.

Courtney nor his companion had any knowledge of this until on the floor of Parliament he urged the expulsion of a number of Soviet spies from the Soviet's London embassy.

Within 24 hours the embarrassing photographs reached selected members of Parliament and one packet was put under the door of the Prime Minister's No. 10 Downing Street residence.

THE prize — and priceless — information sought by any espionage apparatus is: What are the enemy's intentions and capabilities? This requires penetration at the decision-making, policy-making level. There are always enemy agents masquerading as friends and colleagues of high government officials. Every government is penetrated by enemy agents. Every intelligence service — including ours — operates on the basic assumption that its own government is penetrated. The only question is: To what extent?

Former CIA chief Allen W. Dulles once stated that "the Soviet had over 40 high-level agents in Washington during World War II. At least that many were uncovered. We don't know how many remained undetected."

It would be inconceivable to any experienced intelligence manager in this horrible business — this falsely glamorized blend of terror and blackmail, ugly and brutish — that there are any fewer secretly in place in Washington today.

World Psychiatrists Bar Condemnation of Soviet

By RICHARD SEVERO

Special to The New York Times

MEXICO CITY, Dec. 2—Despite an undercurrent of pressure from physicians and medical associations in various nations, the World Psychiatric Association has apparently decided that it cannot issue a statement condemning the use of psychiatry as a tool for political repression.

The impetus for drafting a statement had come from psychiatrists—principally in Canada and the United States—who expressed concern about the practice of psychiatry in the Soviet Union and reports that the Russians have placed individuals who disagreed politically with the Government in mental institutions.

In a closed-door two-hour meeting last night, delegates to the association's general assembly agreed with virtually no debate that there was no procedural basis by which such a statement could be made.

Dr. Denis Leigh of England, the secretary general, explained later that the association's constitution did not provide the mechanism by which one member could complain against another; he added that, to the best of his knowledge, no member had issued any public complaints.

Committee Is Rejected

The general assembly also declined to support a proposal that would have set up a committee to set internationally accepted standards of psychiatry.

The association is sponsoring the World Congress of Psychiatry, now in session here.

Before the congress convened there were reports that individuals and groups would attempt to make an issue of the situation in the Soviet Union.

The World Federation of Mental Health, meeting in Hong Kong, adopted a resolution Nov. 25 calling on its member associations "to defend the individual's freedom of opinion" when "it appears to be threat-

ened." The federation noted that some countries, especially the Soviet Union, had been the subject of complaints.

A recent meeting of the British Columbia Medical Association also expressed concern over what it called "unethical and antihumanitarian activity in the U.S.S.R."

C.I.A. Role Suspected

Individual psychiatrists at the Mexico City congress also expressed concern, but many tended to see it as a "political problem" not within the purview of the association. Some said they felt that the existence of the association, which has a membership of 60,000 psychiatrists in 76 countries, including the Soviet Union, would be in jeopardy if the issue were forced.

Still others saw the question as one created by the United States Central Intelligence Agency for propaganda purposes.


Much of the present concern over psychiatry in the Soviet

Union was caused by the book "A Question of Madness," by two Russians, Zhores A. Medvedev and his brother, Roy. Prof. Andrei V. Snezhnevsky, chief psychiatrist of the Soviet Ministry of Health and a member of the Russian delegation at the Congress, granted an interview to the Mexico City newspaper Excelsior and reportedly called the controversy "a maneuver of the cold war, carried out at the hands of experts." He delivered a paper today but did not mention the controversy.

There were no Russians at last night's meeting of the general assembly. After it was over, Dr. Leigh, who has served five years of a 10-year-term as secretary general, said he had a "personal file on human rights that I shall explore."

Another delegate said, "I just know that this will be misinterpreted when it becomes public." He asked that his name not be used.

DAILY WORLD
28 OCT 1971



22 OCT 1971



Political assassins

The alleged assassin of President Kennedy was silenced forever, in cold blood; the assassin of Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., protesting he had been doublecrossed, is walled up in prison as is the assassin of Senator Robert Kennedy. In all three cases there is widespread conviction that the truth has not been told about the assassins or their sponsors.

Furthermore, a conscious effort has been made — in the Warren report, in the various court proceedings — to obscure the fact that, whosoever's finger pulled the trigger, behind the assassin was the figure of fascism.

Political assassination marked the rise of fascism in Italy and Germany; it is a trademark of fascistic development in the U.S.

The aim of fascism is to resolve the critical situation in which U.S. capitalism finds itself by resort to totalitarian rule; and by eliminating anyone who stands in the way.

The attempted assassination of personnel at the Soviet United Nations Mission Wednesday night is part of that program.

The attempted assassination has been preceded by repeated violence against Soviet personnel and agencies in New York, Washington, and Chicago.

The would-be assassins were encouraged by the do-nothing policy of City Hall (Mayor Lindsay has been busy for years running for President; and the police have been busy running for graft).

It has been encouraged by the do-nothing policy of Albany (Governor Rockefeller was busy with Attica or his interests in Venezuela).

It has been encouraged by the do-nothing policy of the State Department and of all the federal police agencies.

The assassination attempt against Soviet Mission personnel was encouraged by the fake Soviet-spy story handed out recently by the CIA in Washington, and cynically retailed to the world by the New York Times. ✓

The situation demands, urgently, a massive outcry of protests and public demands that the perpetrators be seized and prosecuted. Effective measures must be undertaken to protect Soviet personnel in the U.S.

This is an essential part of the defense of democracy in our country and the strengthening of peace in the world.

21 OCT 1971

Saboteurs of peace

A couple of weeks ago the New York Times cynically published an obvious CIA handout implying that hundreds of Soviet citizens attached to the United Nations in New York were spies. This followed on the Tory government's stupid provocation ordering the expulsion of a hundred Soviet citizens in Britain. Last week the Belgian police got into the act, delivering to the Belgian government the names of two or three dozen Soviet citizens alleged by someone to be spies.

It all adds up to a large-scale provocation, with the CIA and its British counterparts at the center of the operation.


It is a transparent effort to counteract, by anti-Soviet hysteria, the uncompromising drive for peace on the part of the USSR.

This provocation gave heart in Canada to the Jewish Defense league-type of goons, to the fascistic Ukrainian groups and renegade Hungarians, and others of the same evil stripe, in their efforts to disrupt the peace and friendship visit of Premier Alexei Kosygin.

It is symbolic of the Soviet Union's enemies that they include Canadian-Ukrainian progromists, Canadian-Hungarian "freedom" fascists, the JDL-type of anti-Semite, and the CIA.

They reflect neither the people of Canada nor of the U.S. The people of both our nations are concerned with preserving peace in the world. That is what this vile combine seeks to disrupt.

Spies: Foot Soldiers in an Endless War



OUTSIDE London's Marlborough Street magistrates' court one morning last week, a throng of newsmen waited impatiently. The object of their interest, an ostensibly minor Soviet trade official named Oleg Lyalin, 34, failed to show up to answer the charges against him—"driving while unfit through drink." He was resting instead in a comfortable country house near London where, for the past several weeks, he had been giving British intelligence a complete rundown on local Soviet espionage operations. His revelations prompted the British government two weeks ago to carry out the most drastic action ever undertaken in the West against Soviet spies: the expulsion of 105 diplomats and other officials—nearly 20% of the 550 Russian officials based in Britain.

embassy operations rather as a skilled armored thrust compares with human-wave tactics in war." Moreover, the growing phalanxes of routine operatives are supported by spy-in-the-sky satellites that can send back photographs showing the precise diameter of a newly dug missile silo. But even as the modern army still needs the foot soldier, so does espionage still need the agent on the ground. "A photograph may show you what a new plane looks like," says a key intelligence expert, "but it won't tell you what's inside those engines and how they operate. For that you still need someone to tell you."

Eric Ambler, author of spy mysteries, has little use for the new species of

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The case generated waves from Moscow to Manhattan. As soon as Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev returned to the Soviet capital from his three-day visit to Yugoslavia, he took the extraordinary step of convening an emergency meeting of the 15-man Politburo right on the premises of Vnukovo Airport. The high-level conference, which forced a 24-hour delay of a state dinner in honor of India's visiting Premier Indira Gandhi, might have dealt with the still-mysterious goings-on in China. But it might also have dealt with the difficult problem of how the Kremlin should react to the unprecedented British expulsions—a problem that Moscow, by week's end, had not yet solved.



BBC FILM SHOWING SOVIET "DIPLOMAT" AT SECRET PICKUP POINT
There was still a roar in the old lion.

Potato-Faced Fellows

In Manhattan, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home spent 80 minutes with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. "We have taken our action," said Sir Alec, "and that's all there is to it." Nonetheless, he emphasized that the British step was "designed to remove an obstacle to good relations." Harrumphed Gromyko: "That's a fine way to improve relations." He added that Moscow would be forced to retaliate. But the British apparently knew of some spies among the remaining 445 Russians in Britain. "Yes," said a Foreign Office man, "we have retained second-strike capability."

The British case dramatized the expanse and expense of espionage activity round the world. It was also a reminder that the old spy business, which has received little attention in the past three or four years, is as intense—and dirty—as ever, despite the rise of a new type of operative. Since World War II, espionage has undergone a metamorphosis. For a time, its stars were the famed "illegal" or "deep cover" agents—the Colonel Blonds, the Golden Lonsdales, the Kim Philbys. Says British Sovietologist Robert Conquest:

spy, particularly the representatives of the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB), the Soviet Committee for State Security, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "KGB men?" he sneers. "They're the potato-faced fellows you see on trains in Eastern Europe wearing suits that aren't quite right and smelling too much of eau de cologne. The CIA people all smell like after-shave lotion. They always look as if they are on their way to some boring sales conference for an unexciting product—and in a way, they are."

In one respect, Ambler is unfair and behind the times. The contemporary KGB man is generally far more polished, more sophisticated, more accomplished in foreign languages and manners than his counterpart of a few years ago. But Ambler is right in

liberately misleading, planted by departments of "disinformation."

It is work that occupies tens of thousands of mathematicians and cryptographers, clerks and military analysts, often with the most trivial-seeming tasks. Yet it is work that no major nation feels it can afford to halt. Says a former British ambassador: "We all spy, of course, more or less. But the Russians are rather busier at it than most. They're more basic too: not so subtle as our chaps. I like to think that we have a certain finesse in our methods—that we don't go at the thing bull-headed. But maybe our tasks are different from theirs, just because this country is so wide open."

question, in Eric Ambler's words: "What on earth has the KGB got to spy on in Britain? You would think 105 spies

10 OCTOBER 1971

Special Report

U. S., Russian Spying Contest Never Falters

NICHOLAS HORROCK

News American—Newsweek Correspondent

For half a century, the Americans and the Russians have been at one another's throats or, occasionally, in one another's arms. But one factor in the relationship has remained constant — spying.

The espionage game never falters, and it is a contest that has yet to produce a clear winner. The U.S. spends more money and has more scientific equipment. But no one puts more agents in the field than the mammoth Soviet espionage establishment.

Though 105 Soviet officials were recently ejected from Britain because of spying activities, the chief target of the Russian apparatus remains the U.S.

There are 214 Soviet citizens professionally employed in Washington, mostly at the Soviet Embassy, and 419 in New York where they work at the UN and for commercial organizations such as Amtorg, Intourist and Aeroflot.

U.S. OFFICIALS consider that about 50 per cent of these Russians are engaged to greater or lesser extent in espionage. Adding in the non-working dependents of these individuals, the total of Soviet citizens legally in the U.S. comes to about 1,250.

It is taken for granted that some of the wives among these dependents are also involved in espionage.

There are also short-term travelers, members of commercial, cultural and even sports delegations. These, too, are considered to have their share of spies.

"We do as a matter of common sense make certain assumptions that Soviet officials who come to the U.S. will attempt to take advantage of their assigned responsibilities to undertake extracurricular activities," says State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey.

"That being so, we will exercise care and attempt to keep ourselves as well informed as we possibly can about any of these activities."

SPYING PAYS considerably more dividends for a Soviet citizen than for his counterpart in the West.

On salary alone, the espionage agent starts his career with an advantage: he is paid twice the wages of an engineer or a teacher and his pay is customarily doubled — and his standard of living notably improved — when he is assigned overseas.

"In the old days," says an American expert in the field, "Soviet agents were rather forbidding characters, chosen for ideological purity as much as for anything else. But that's been changing.

"Now they're getting a young recruit who's anxious to live abroad and enjoy the amenities of the service life. They're probably less dedicated to the Soviet ideology, more sophisticated, more aware of what's going on in the world. In a sense, this makes them more challenging adversaries."

These adversaries are also considerably more upwardly mobile than Western spies.

THE SOVIET espionage establishment is a direct route to power in Russian life. It has huge influence — and sometimes dominance — not only in the political life of the country but in the army and even in important phases of industry.

And the intelligence apparatus has first priority. Any source, any person can be approached for aid, and it is a rare Soviet citizen who can refuse.

In contrast, the FBI and the CIA are frequently rebuffed — and sometimes insulted in the process — when they ask U.S. citizens for information about their trips abroad or about what they consider "anti-American" activities at home.

"When the Soviet intelligence man at an embassy asks another department for a favor, everybody scrambles to comply," says an American intelligence officer rather wistfully.

"When we ask the Commerce Department or someone to do something for us, as often as not they say they don't have the time."

STATINTL

Clean Embassy for Kosygin Visit

BY EUGENE GRIFFIN
Chief of Canada Bureau

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

OTTAWA, Ont., Oct. 2.—The Russian embassy was condemned as ugly when it was built but will be as attractive as money can make it when Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin arrives here on Oct. 18 for a visit.

A contractor estimated that the Russians are spending \$20,000 or more on new furnishings, fresh paint and new grass to transform their forbidding looking diplomatic base into a thing of beauty.

Floors Polished

Floors are being sanded and polished, walls painted, trees pruned, shrubbery planted and new sod is replacing old behind the high iron fence that encloses the grounds. A brick wall also shuts in a greenhouse and garden where the Russians grow their own vegetables, including sweet corn.

Kosygin, the first Soviet premier to visit Canada, will tour the country for a week after a round of receptions in Ottawa as the guest of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau.

Soviet Ambassador Boris P. Miroshnichenko, who lives in the embassy, has 31 officers on his diplomatic staff. The United States has 34 officers at its embassy of Renaissance style architecture on Wellington Street facing Parliament Hill.

The Russian Embassy was built in 1956 at a cost of \$340,000 after fire destroyed the former embassy, an old mansion in the Sandy Hill district which the Soviet Union had purchased in 1942 from the estate of an Ottawa lumber baron.

A city council building committee criticized plans for the new embassy, a squarish, three-storey structure, as "disappointing and dull." The Federal District Commission also attacked the design, especially its "dull arrangement of windows." The commission said

that the Russian building created a monotonous and unhappy effect in its neighborhood.

Both the old and new embassies have been publicized as spy centers, starting with the exposure of the first Russian spy ring in Canada in 1946 by Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk who defected from the embassy with a quantity of evidence.

On 1965, after Canada had expelled two Russian diplomats because of espionage activities, the Russian newspaper Ozvestia said that the new embassy had been bugged by the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency during its construction.

Tells U. S. Role

The paper said that an American adviser had guided Canadian intelligence operatives in placing American microphones in the walls of the embassy as it was built.

Various small anti-Communist demonstrations have taken place outside the fence of the embassy and abortive attempts have been made to bomb or burn it.

The burning of the old embassy, however, was considered accidental, originating during a New Year's Eve party.

Security is tight at the embassy. Iron gates are seldom open. When a Tribune reporter took pictures of the embassy from across the street, a man appeared in the embassy doorway to watch him. He was soon joined by a second man, who took the reporter's picture.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
CHRONICLE

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Great Spy Roundup

NOT EVEN IN SPY MOVIES at which the British excel, can we recall a roundup of agents of a foreign power to compare in numbers with last week's denunciation by Britain of 105 Soviet espionage agents. There is certainly no ground for accusing the British government of being half-hearted about this; it is breathtaking in scale and will be the envy of the CIAs and the Deuxieme Bureaux of many another country, who will be saying, "I wish we'd done that."

The episode has much style, and it makes Scotland Yard look very knowledgeable and inscrutable, as its men always do in motion pictures of this genre. We are happy, also, to learn that the plot, as so far laid bare, brings in not merely a highly placed KGB defector, but also the inevitable "big Daimler limousine." In filling out the picture of Soviet villainy, the Associated Press has informed us that this automobile, which is of course the status symbol of royalty and supercapitalism, was regularly used to drive one N. V. Nikitkin from "fashionable Highgate," where he lives, to the Narodny Bank in the city, where, it appears, he worked at harboring spies as well as financing East-West trade.

IT MAY BE OUT OF KEEPING for us to think lightly of this British order expelling from England no fewer than 90 of the 550 Soviet persons who are attached to their London Embassy. Relations between London and Moscow have become rather strained and icy, as a result, and one hardly welcomes that.

Still, a network of this size and character irresistibly suggests that the Russians have been stumbling over each other redundantly, and as one gentleman whose wisdom seems indeed ripe told the AP:

"If the Russians didn't insist on operating in such secret fashion, they could learn much of what they want to know legitimately." It is a memorable ruth which cloak-and-dagger agencies habitually ignore.

STATINTL

Seeks Shift to 'Unofficial Cover'

CIA Fears a Mass Exposure



By Chicago Sun-Times

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency has long feared the type of mass exposure that befell Soviet intelligence in Britain last week, a confidential report disclosed Monday.

The report shows that the CIA has been trying for several years to shift its espionage operations away from U. S. embassies and offices to "unofficial cover" — private organizations and

businesses and "non-U. S. nationals."

It acknowledges that tough Russian security has forced the CIA to collect intelligence on the Soviet Union through "third-country" operations — just as the Russians apparently were seeking intelligence on the United States through its spy apparatus in Britain.

THE REPORT, a copy of which has been obtained by The Chicago

Sun-Times, is based on a discussion among several former high-ranking intelligence officials conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on Jan. 8, 1968.

Richard M. Bissell, former deputy director of the CIA and moderator of the discussion, has confirmed the authenticity of the report, which is headed: "Confidential: Not for publication. Restricted to group members only. Not to be quoted or cited."



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THE PARTICIPANTS included Allen Dulles, the late director of the CIA; Robert Amory Jr., a former deputy director of the CIA; Eugene Fubini, former assistant secretary of defense in the area of electronic intelligence; Thomas L. Hughes, former director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Theodore Sorensen, special assistant to President Kennedy.

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Although the report does not identify the source of various opinions and comments, Bissell appears to have been the main contributor.

"If the agency is to be effective," the report declares at one point, "it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale . . . CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected."

THE REPORT calls for "deeper cover" and "increased attention to the use of 'cut-outs'" defined in a footnote as "projects backed by the CIA which cannot be traced back to the CIA."

The report concedes that there are "powerful reasons" for concealing CIA agents within U. S. embassies, principally to provide safe means of communication to Washington.

"Nonetheless," it goes on, "it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. This would require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U. S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U. S. posture."

THE REPORT suggested links with U. S. corporations which could make their own lines of communication available to CIA agents.

All 105 of the Russian officials expelled by Britain last Friday were under "official cover," operating out of the Soviet embassy or trade mission. As such they were much more susceptible to British counterintelligence than "unofficial cover" agents such as those suggested in the Bissell

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S - 541,868

SEP 28 1971

Spying: Political Fact Of Life

By RICHARD DUDMAN

Chief Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Sept. 23

BY COINCIDENCE, Great Britain announced the expulsion of 105 Soviet citizens accused of spying just as some radical scholars in Cambridge, Mass., were circulating a report that threw some light on American spy practices.

The fact is that all major countries maintain elaborate espionage networks.

Some well informed Western observers have been puzzled by the British vehemence in denouncing what is known to be standard practice and has been thought to be more or less condoned by mutual understanding.

One possible explanation that has been put forward has been that the recent defection by a high official of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, provided an unusual opportunity. He gave the British a list of Soviet espionage agents in Britain.

Some observers conjecture also that the governments of Britain and the United States had been waiting for an opportunity to undercut growing Western support for a European security conference which the Communist Bloc countries have been urging for several years.

IT WAS NOTED that the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko that Soviet espionage stood in the way of preparations for a conference on European security.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers, speaking with reporters at the United Nations Saturday, went a step further. He said that Soviet espionage activities in Britain must be halted before the preparation of a security conference on European security could begin.

Douglas-Home told Gromyko in two icy letters about efforts by Soviet agents to pay bribes for commercial and military information, to obtain embargoed commodities and to conduct sabotage operations.

The document circulated in Washington a report of a panel discussion in July, 1968 led by Richard M. Bissell Jr., former

deputy director for plans in the Central Intelligence Agency, was an unusually frank account of U.S. covert intelligence operations in other countries.

THE PANEL discussion, one of a series conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations on intelligence and foreign policy, was attended by former officials including Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, former CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, and Robert Amory Jr., former CIA deputy

director for intelligence. In evaluating the various means of covert intelligence collection, Bissell put reconnaissance in first importance. Next came communications and electronic intelligence, primarily understood by the national security agency. Finally, considerably below the other two methods in importance, he put "classical espionage by agents."

He described the Communist Bloc, "and more specifically USSR itself," as the "primary target for espionage activities" since the early 1950s.

"Circumstances have greatly limited the scale of operations that could be undertaken within the bloc, so much of the effort had been directed at bloc nations stationed in neutral or friendly areas, and at 'third country' operations that seek to use the nationals of other non-Communist countries as sources of information on the Soviet Bloc," the summary quoted him as saying.

More recently, he continued, priorities for classical espionage have shifted toward targets in the underdeveloped world, but "the USSR remains a prime target" and "Communist China would today be given the same priority."

The summary reported a general conclusion that espionage was not a primary source of intelligence against the Soviet Bloc or other sophisticated societies, "although it has had occasional brilliant successes (like the Berlin tunnel and several of the high-level defectors)."

"A basic reason is that espionage operates mainly through the recruitment of agents and the use of high-level agents," the summary went on. "A low-level

agent, even assuming that he remained loyal and that there is some means of communicating with him, simply cannot tell you much of what you want to know. The secrets we cannot find out by reconnaissance or from open sources are in the minds of scientists and senior policymakers and are not accessible to an ordinary citizen even of middle rank."

THE underdeveloped world, on the contrary, there are "greater opportunities for covert intelligence collection."

"Governments are much less highly organized; there is less security consciousness; and there is apt to be more actual or potential diffusion of power among party localities, organizations and individuals outside of the central governments," the summary said.


"The primary purpose of espionage in these areas is to provide Washington with timely knowledge of the internal power balance, a form of intelligence that is primarily of tactical significance."

In order to predict a coup d'etate, the summary said, U.S. intelligence must penetrate the military and other agencies and organizations in the country in question, reaching junior officers, non-commissioned officers, labor leaders and others, it was said.

BISSELL WAS quoted as saying that many such penetrations would "horrify classicists of covert operations" by their disregard of the standards and rules for recruiting agents.

"Many of the 'penetrations' don't take the form of 'hiring' but of establishing a close or friendly relationship (which may or may not be furthered by the provision of money from time to time)," the summary said.

He noted that there was a stereotype that all covert operations are illegal and hostile, but he said this was not really the case. For example, the CIA once provided ostensibly private financing of a project also supported by a loan by the agency for development. The CIA assistance gave aid "time for some hard

WASHINGTON STAR
23 SEP 1971

By ROBIN ADAMS SLOAN

Q. I read something about a British spy saying that Khrushchev had not actually written his own memoirs. Any more on this?—G. W., La Jolla, Calif.

A. The former British diplomat-journalist, Kim Philby, who became a key spy for the U.S.S.R., gave an interview saying that the former Russian premier's book, "Khrushchev Remembers," was actually written by the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. Philby also asserts that the CIA was behind the Penkovsky Papers, which purported to spill the cavir about Soviet espionage. In fact, says the defector, the CIA's major industry is manufacturing documents, pamphlets, and books to confuse the opposition and to make money. What is Philby up to in Russia? He is writing his own book—with the approval of the KGB (Soviet counter-intelligence), one presumes.

16 SEP 1971

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

CIA Eavesdrops on Kremlin Chiefs

By Jack Anderson

The Central Intelligence Agency has been eavesdropping, incredibly, on the most private conversations of Kremlin and other world leaders.

For obvious security reasons, we can't give a clue as to how it's done. But we can state categorically that, for years, the CIA has been able to listen to the kingpins of the Kremlin banter, bicker and backbite among themselves.

A competent source, with access to the transcripts of the private Kremlin conversations, tells us that the Soviet leaders gossip about one another and complain about their ailments like old maids.

It is evident from the conversations that Leonid Brezhnev, the party chief, sometimes drinks too much vodka and suffers from hangovers. Premier Kosygin, however, is in poor health, and his complaints are more authentic.

One of their favorite pastimes is visiting a private clinic to get their aches soothed. Like fat capitalists at the end of a hard day in their plush suites, the Kremlin chiefs stop by for steam baths, rubdowns and other physical therapy.

Brezhnev, in a typical conversation, might grump about

his back pains and announce he's going to have Olga give him a massage. "Olga Oh ho!" President Nikolai Podgorny might chortle, as if he is quite familiar with the masseuse.

Mac Close Up

Like the Kremlin crowd, the Red Chinese leaders are far less forbidding in private than they appear to the world. The mighty Mao Tsé-tung, his appointed successor Lin Biao and Premier Chou En-lai are tired, old revolutionaries slowed down by the ravages of age.

Mao shares Brezhnev's taste for good food, strong drink and a woman's touch. But he is less grumpy and grim than the Soviet leader. There's an avuncular affability about Mao, and he has an infectious laugh.

But at 77, he walks slowly, though erectly, with his left arm dangling strangely. The CIA concluded from a careful study of film shots that Mao's eyes are dim from age. He seems unable to recognize old comrades until they are face to face.

The CIA has also caught the old fox using a ringer to stand in for him at long, dreary public parades. But it was the real Mao who made that publicized plunge in the Yangtze a couple years ago. The picture

of his moon face bobbing above the waves was carefully scrutinized by the CIA, which concluded after measuring his ears and other facial features that the swimmer was no doubt.

Pictures of world leaders routinely are blown up and studied by CIA doctors for clues to their health. Their behavior is also analyzed by CIA psychiatrists and psychologists.

Footnote: One of the CIA's greatest triumphs, heretofore untold, was fishing out some of the late Premier Nikita Khrushchev's excrement before it was flushed down the toilet. The great bathroom caper was pulled during his 1959 state visit to the U.S. The filched feces was eagerly analyzed by CIA medics who concluded that Khrushchev then was in excellent health for a man of his age and rotundity.

Strong-Arm Tactics

One of the most notorious regimes in the American labor movement may be near its end.

Pete Weber, the strongman, \$136,000 a-year boss of the Operating Engineers in New Jersey, has gone to jail for extortion. His brother Ed, who ran for his job, has been beaten by Larry Cahill, an honest, veteran union man.

But there is life in the old Weber machine yet. Cahill's supporters were subjected to bullyboy tactics to coerce them going along with Ed Weber.

Cars with Cahill bumper stickers had their tires slashed and windows broken. Three Cahill men were beaten up. Others were laid off work by pro-Weber union foremen. Even the ballots were deceptively designed so that Cahill supporters would mark their ballots for Ed Weber.

Nevertheless, the challenger squeaked home by 135 votes. The count is official and final under the union constitution. But the Weber men are now trying to arrange a "recount". It would be carried out of course, by pro-Weber incumbent officers.

The man who could stop all this is the Engineer's international union President Hunter Wharton. Reached by telephone while eating lunch at La Chateleine, a swanky Washington restaurant, Wharton made it clear he is still unwilling to buck the Weber crowd.

He claimed he had no official knowledge of Cahill's upset win. "We're not doing anything either way," he said. "We're not in the middle of it one way or another."

B.JI-McClure Syndicate

14 JUN 1971

MONEY WELCOME BUT . . .

Russians Warned About Tourist Spies

BY HARRY TRIMBORN

Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW — Now that the tourist season is getting under way, Soviet citizens are again being warned to beware of strangers bearing flight bags and guidebooks.

The operative word for Soviet citizens who come in contact with foreigners is: "vigilance."

As *Kommunist*, a bi-monthly magazine published by the Communist Party's Central Committee, put it in its latest issue:

"Espionage and ideologically subversive activity against our country is conducted . . . with the assistance of (U.S.) agents who arrive in our country as tourists, members of delegations or specialists. Special centers in the United States find suitable candidates for trips to the Soviet Union and train them for intelligence activities."

It added:

"One must not forget that the class struggle is being waged in all spheres — political, economic and ideological — within the conditions of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems."

The warning represents a conflict between ideology and the practical requirements of the Soviet Union.

As always, the Kremlin is suspicious of visitors from countries of "differing social systems." After more than 52 years since the advent of Soviet power, the government still hasn't shaken off the political conspirator's constant fear of betrayal.

And in that half century, the government still doesn't trust its own people, despite all the "evidence" of "socialist superiority."

On the other hand, the Kremlin is eager for foreigners to visit the Soviet Union. They bring in needed hard currency for the nation's foreign-exchange program. The Yankee dollar—despite official gloating over its troubles in Western Europe—is still as desirable as ever in the Soviet Union.

The Kremlin doesn't disclose how much it earns in foreign exchange from tourists who last year totaled slightly more than 2 million.

The government also welcomes delegations of professional or occupational groups, and professes ardent support for cultural-exchange programs.

Here, too, its interest is basically practical, at least as far as cultural-exchange visits to the Soviet Union are concerned. It is eager to tap the knowledge of visiting specialists, especially at this time when it is seeking to refine its technological and scientific processes.

Tourists Restricted

As part of the effort to boost tourism, Viktor Boichenko, chairman of Intourist, the Soviet travel agency, recently declared:

"The country irresistibly draws foreign visitors who desire to see for themselves what has been achieved under Soviet power, to study the life of the Soviet peoples, as well as their culture and arts."

Yet most ordinary visitors—as a reflection of the Kremlin's view that

germ-carriers—are effectively screened from "studying the life of the Soviet people."

The visitor is shown monuments, not people. In Moscow, the main attraction is, of course, the Kremlin, an architectural-ly interesting pile of stone displaying the wealth of a long-departed aristocracy.

The country's second major attraction is Lenin-grad, a monument to Peter the Great's vanity and desire for Russia to join the world.

When the visitor isn't looking at relics, he is in a hotel that is barred to Russians, buying souvenirs at shops the Russian consumer is not permitted to enter.

About the only Russians he will come in contact with are the chambermaid, hotel clerk, waiters and the Intourist guides, those well-disciplined automatons who keep their thoughts to themselves.

As though the present isolation of the foreign tourist was not enough, the government recently announced it was setting up a special "club" in an old section of Moscow exclusively for tourists this summer to provide them with a "flavor" of Russian life.

Some Justification

Of course, Soviet suspicions of Western visitors are not all due to political paranoia. Some Westerners do come to the Soviet Union for the purpose of causing trouble for the government, either on behalf of foreign agencies or on the basis of their own political views.

The question of what constitutes acceptable behavior by visitors was highlighted by the recent visit of Rep. Bertram L. Podell (D-N.Y.) whose ostensibly private trip quickly turned into a political issue.

Hidden in Shoes

After his return from a six-day stay in Moscow, Podell announced at a news conference in Washington he had smuggled out of Russia a petition on behalf of 190 Jews protesting alleged discrimination in the Soviet Union. He said he had slipped it past border guards in his shoe.

The congressman likened the condition of Russian Jews to that of those in Nazi Germany and areas under German occupation where an estimated 6 million Jews died in concentration camps after being driven from their jobs and homes.

The congressman told newsmen that the world closed its eyes to what the Germans did to the Jews in the 1930s and 1940s.

Can't Close Eyes

"We cannot afford to close our eyes again," he was quoted as saying in a news dispatch reaching Moscow.

Podell said he also smuggled out other material, which he would not identify, and turned it over to the State Department.

The congressman complained of being followed and harassed during his visit here.

The Russians become infuriated—with obvious reason—at likening the status of Russian Jews to that of those under Hitler. And they can only be wondering what sort of material a U.S. government official on a private visit turned over to the State Department.

In its warning about tourists, *Kommunist* acknowledged that not all foreigners may be spies.

Complacency Peril

"Many foreigners leave our country as our sincere friends," the magazine said, but then hastily added: "But this does not give us any cause for complacency."

Kommunist charged that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency "and other

HARPER'S
JUNE 1971

/Friedel Ungeheuer

FOREIGN REPORT

Spies by the thousands: report from Germany

ESPIONAGE CAN HARDLY be described as the ideal form of contact between peoples, but it has become so much a part of life in Germany today that its citizens have come almost to take it for granted. Dr. Horst Worsner, a lawyer specializing in spies, said recently, "a divided postwar Germany continues to be in the center of the tug-of-war between the victorious powers and furnishes the soil for an intelligence jungle that sometimes confuses even those in the know." Who works for whom, or for what reasons, may be as difficult to determine as a clear definition of what constitutes treason. When the fatherland is split, which fatherland is a German betraying? Theoretically, if not politically, he has a right to serve either. It is common knowledge that for years the East German regime has used the refugee channel to smuggle agents with long-term assignments to the other side. Under the circumstances, even the most legitimate political refugee has to appear suspect. The so-called "atom spy" Harald Gottfried, who came across in '55 at the age of twenty, told his interrogators in the refugee camp that he had wanted to escape the East German draft, "because I would never have worn the uniform of those who put my father into prison." His father, a former Nazi, had been convicted for minor shenanigans to eight years hard labor. His mother fled to the West before he did. But Gottfried was already such a convinced Communist that East Germany's *Staatssicherheitsdienst* (Secret State Service) selected him as a *Perspektiv-Spion*, a spy for the future. On orders from his superiors at Karlshorst, East Berlin, he studied en-

gineering in the West and subsequently joined the staff of West Germany's most advanced nuclear-reactor project in Karlsruhe. It took West German counterintelligence fourteen years to catch up with him. He was certainly not repentant in court; he told the judge that assignments like his were not only honorable, but "evidence of a special trust."

Dieter Joachim Haase, thirty-three, another long-term agent, was caught in Würzburg last year. He had just completed a doctoral thesis on the *Bundeswehr* with Professor Friedrich August von der Heydte who, as a former paratroop general in the old *Wehrmacht*, had many close associates in the upper echelons of the *Bundeswehr* staff. The court which tried Haase found that he, too, "had been selected by the Secret Service of the GDR [German Democratic Republic, or East Germany] in 1960 to prepare himself for a high government post in West Germany through the completion of legal studies."

Men like Haase and Gottfried run little risk. Through their activities in the espionage services in the West, they advance their eventual careers in the East. If they are caught, they are quickly exchanged for an undetermined number of West German agents or political prisoners, depending on the importance either of the regimes attaches to such people. Sometimes the exchange is one man for three, or more. Many agents who are caught do not even get to trial; they are exchanged before the public ever hears of their existence. West Germany's Interior Minister, Hans-Dieter Genscher, remarked, "spying is in danger of becoming a cavalier crime with little risk attached," but he is powerless against the practice. West German intelligence officials say that people from East Germany for hard cash. The standard price for a person with no partic-

ular political debt to either side, who wants to join his family in the West, is about \$12,000. Sufficient numbers of people are purchased in this manner every year to make the take a respectable item in East Germany's balance of payments with the West, I was told.

Meanwhile, West German counterintelligence officials admit that there is simply no way for them to stop the continuous infiltration of East German agents. According to their estimates, anywhere between 13,000 and 15,000 East German spies are active at all levels of West Germany's administration, in private industry, at universities, and in the armed forces. Every year about 2,000 of them are unmasked, but, as a confidential report noted recently, "the total remains constant through the arrival of new elements." The main reason for the facility with which East Germany can replenish its intelligence services in the West is to be found, of course, in the language and cultural background that they share. Western authorities have not put great obstacles in their way, either. An East German can still travel to the West simply by getting on the elevated S-Bahn in Berlin and leaving it at an unguarded station in one of the Allied sectors. Armed with a false West German passport, he can then emplane at Tempelhof airport for any city in West Germany.

IN VIEW OF THE POLITICALLY heterogeneous backgrounds that are the norm rather than the exception for officials, it is practically impossible to establish firm criteria by which to judge them as security risks. Few Western officials are without some sort of family link in the East, and many are the sons of East German immigrants. The highest ranking officer of the *Bundeswehr*, for in-

14 MAY 1971

No 007 he, newsman Sam Jaffee

spurns CIA

NEW YORK, May 13—Radio reporter Sam Jaffe last night told the world how the Central Intelligence Agency tried to recruit him as a spy on two separate occasions.

The former ABC and CBS newsman reported this information on a videotaped WNYC-TV program "All About Television." WNYC is a municipal station whose existence is threatened by city budget cut-backs.

Jaffe said his initial encounter with the CIA occurred in California while waiting to hear from CBS News where he had filed a job application. A young man, whom Jaffe believed to be called Jerry Rubins, told Jaffe that if he was willing to work as a spy, he would get a paid trip to Moscow.

Jaffe quoted the CIA as saying we "are willing to release certain top secret information to you in order that you try to obtain information for us." Jaffe cordially refused the offer.

The correspondent had formerly worked at the United Nations when he returned from Korea and had contact at the U.N. with Soviet citizens.

Wanted check on spy pilot.

The second encounter with the CIA occurred around the time of the U-2 incident in 1950 when Jaffe was assigned to CES to go to Moscow to cover the downed spy pilot trial, Francis Gary Powers. Jaffe said that the CIA wanted him to discover whether Powers was brainwashed.

"What they really wanted," says Jaffe, "I don't know to this day."

He has not seen the CIA since that time.

News of the Jaffe telecast was front-paged in Variety, newspaper of the entertainment world, in its May 12 issue.

Jeff Erdel, Director of Public Relations at WNYC to the Daily World today that the program "All About Television," is another "first" for the radio and T.V. station.

"We have always been an open microphone to those who were denied time on other stations," he said. Proposed city cut-backs which threaten the existence of WNYC "can only be interpreted as a withdrawal of that right to free speech," he added.

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By BENJAMIN WELLES

WASHINGTON.

“I CAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it’s been,” says his wife, Cynthia. “Some days he has on what I call his ‘Oriental look’—totally inscrutable. I know better than to ask what’s happened. He’ll talk when he’s ready, not before, but even when he talks he’s terribly discreet.”

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, apparently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband—at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms’s job is definitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington.

Successive budget cuts, balance of payments restrictions, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.’s public image have all reduced its operations considerably. President Nixon has recently ordered a fiscal and management investigation into the intelligence “community,” a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelligence agencies to hide in the bureaucratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs advisor,

BENJAMIN WELLES covers national security affairs as a correspondent in the Washington bureau of the Times.

Henry Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing: intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion—or, sometimes, no opinion—behind a screen of words.

Considered a cold-blooded necessity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be undemocratic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through “front” foundations of the National Student Association plus private cultural, women’s and lawyers’ groups, and, finally, two years ago, the Green Berets affair.

The 53-year-old Helms knows all this, better than most, as the first career intelligence officer to reach the

top since the C.I.A. was created in 1947, his goal has been to professionalize the agency and restore it to respectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to erase the image of the Director as a man who moves in lavish mystery, jetting secretly around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of “security,” the public’s vague fears and Congress’s probing questions. If Helms rules an “invisible empire,” as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor.

While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occasionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He prefers the Occidental, a tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed entering a private home.

He likes the company of attractive women—young or old—and they find him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer.

“He’s interesting—and interested in what you’re saying,” said Lydia Katzenbach, wife of the former Democratic Attorney General. “He’s well-read and he doesn’t try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton ‘43 routine that some of the columnists around town use.”

Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press—even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency’s ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation’s capital.

Yet, if he gives the appearance of innocuance—he is witty, gregarious, friendly—the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass of apparent contradictions: inwardly self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, absorbed in the essential yet fascinated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and can recall precisely what few Americans can: husbands wear noisier in the first place—what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap

From the Soviet Press

STATINTL

word article by V. Bolshakov entitled "Anti-Sovietism—the Zionists' Profession". "The logic of the socio-economic developments of the two world-wide systems—the capitalist and the socialist—determines the sharpening of the ideological struggle between them." Bolshakov began his article. "Into this struggle imperialism is launching ever new forces from its decreasing reserves of 'brain washers' and ideological diversionists. An increasingly active role in these imperialist activities directed against socialism and the forces of progress is played by the Zionist circles." Bolshakov then went on:

From Russia with Stalin . . . the enigma of a revived ideology

"The actions of Zionism are directed not only in support of the State of Israel. The international Zionist corporation, in the shape of the World Zionist Organisation and its fronts, the World Jewish Congress and other numerous branches and agencies, represents at the same time one of the greatest concentrations of financial capital and one of the greatest international centres of espionage, as well as of misinformation and slander. . . .

"There is nothing fortuitous about the fact that the political and ideological offensive launched by Zionism against the Soviet Union and other socialist states has coincided with the acceptance by the planners of America's foreign policy of the so-called theory of 'building bridges' between the capitalist and socialist camps. The first practical test of this theory and the policies built on it . . . was the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

"In the scenario of the 'quiet counter-revolution' worked out in the United States, and at the Hudson Institute in particular, a special role in the 1968 events was assigned to the international Zionist corporation. Its tasks included, in particular, the capture of the press and other information media in Czechoslovakia. The Zionist centre directed this operation. . . .

"The collapse of the plot hatched by the international reaction against Czechoslovakia shattered the far-reaching plans of American imperialism and its Zionist henchmen. In Washington the partisans of the 'bridge-building' school gave way to the partisans of a 'tough line' towards the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

"The cold-war winds blowing from Washington billowed the sails of Zionist propaganda. Not averse to exporting 'the quiet counter-revolution' into the socialist states, the International Zionist Corporation also set out to prepare plans for a widespread anti-Soviet campaign.

A student of Middle Eastern affairs who has read the Soviet press in February and March 1971 is left with one overwhelming impression. The impression created by the spate of articles, commentaries and news reports both in the Moscow press and in the newspapers published in the capitals of the union republics is that the Soviet Union is engaged in a world-wide defensive struggle against "World Zionism" and that Israel itself, the Arab world and the Middle Eastern peace talks being pursued under Dr Jarring's direction, are secondary to this struggle.

To a student of Soviet affairs, on the other hand, what is significant about the "anti-Zionist" campaign is that its fundamental arguments belong to the Stalinist era. For the fact is that the basic ingredients of the current "anti-Zionist" campaign were first blended in the charges levelled against Mikhoels and the other executed Jewish writers and poets and refined in the "Crimean Affair", whose chief victim was the Old Bolshevik Solomon Lozovsky.

They were all accused of having betrayed their Soviet homeland in order to serve the interests of "Jewish bourgeois nationalism" and Zionism, which, in turn, were described as serving American imperialism in its

preparations for a nuclear war against the Soviet Union and its allies. The accusations were elaborated during the Slansky trial and would have achieved the perfection of a "Marxist-Leninist" dogma at the trial of the doctors but for Stalin's death.

That the paranoid concoctions of Stalin's closing years should now be served up to the Soviet public as an explanation and justification of Soviet policies in the Middle East does suggest a surprising degree of ideological sterility or lack of originality among the men who rule the Soviet Union today. It is all the more striking because on March 5 every Soviet paper carried an article on Rosa Luxemburg, who was born on that day a hundred years earlier. Not one of the articles mentioned the fact that she was a Jewess; nor did any of them point out that it was Jewish cosmopolitanism that made it possible for Rosa Luxemburg and her Jewish husband, Leo Jogiches, to become the leaders of the Marxist movement in Poland, Russia and Germany, and so achieve the ideals of socialist internationalism as conceived by Karl Marx and Lenin.

Instead, the Soviet public could read in the February 18 and 19 issues of *Pravda*, the mouthpiece of the Soviet Communist Party, a 3,000-

14 March 1971

Days in the life of Comrade Nikita

KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS. With an Introduction, Commentary and Notes by Edward Crankshaw. Translated and edited by Strobe Talbott. Illustrated. Little, Brown. 639 pp. \$10.

By John Kenneth Galbraith

At lunch in Iowa about fifteen years ago Roswell Garst, the great corn man, told me of a meeting that he had just had with Nikita Khrushchev. Having saturated the United States market with Pioneer Hybrid Corn, Garst had been looking around for new customers and the Soviet Union had come strongly into his thoughts. The Garsts relate thought very closely to action. He had gone to Moscow several months earlier, made a sales call on the Kremlin and left samples, but had not been successful—a highly atypical result. But then a few weeks

John Kenneth Galbraith's most recent book is Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years. His Economics, Peace and Laughter will be published this spring.

later the Soviet Embassy in Washington had asked him urgently to come back. He went to see Khrushchev, whose interest in corn had greatly deepened in the interval. The huge ear encased in clear plastic which Garst had left on his earlier visit was prominent on his desk. For a long afternoon he questioned Garst about U.S. methods of corn culture—techniques of hybridization, land preparation, cultivation, fertilization, harvesting, storage and more. The telephone did not ring; there were no interruptions; Garst said he began to wonder who was running the country. Finally he begged to ask a question himself.

"I assume, Mr. Chairman, that you have methods of getting information from the United States—that if we have some new atomic secret you get it in a couple of weeks."

Khrushchev interrupted, angrily shaking his finger at Garst. "No! No!, we insist! One week only!"

"One week or two weeks, it doesn't matter," said Garst. "I still must ask why you question me about matters which are in our experiment station bulletins, which our Extension Services pound into the heads of our farmers, which are completely available and in Iowa hard to avoid?"

"It's the Russian character," Khrushchev replied. "When the aristocracy first learned that potatoes were the cheapest way of feeding the peasants the peasants wouldn't eat them. But whatever you can say for our aristocrats, they knew their Russians. They put high fences around the potato patches, the peasants immediately started stealing the potatoes. In no time at all they had developed a taste for them. You should have kept your corn a secret."

This story was on my mind last autumn when I began to read the Khrushchev memoirs, as they are commonly called, in the London papers. I imagined that they owed their interest to the murky process by which they were acquired and that, for literary and narrative power, Khrushchev probably ranked somewhere between Kwame Nkrumah and John J. Rooney of New York. I was wrong. After reading the book and a fair number of the American and English reviews I've concluded that a word should be said for a fellow-author. I think, with exceptions, he's had a bum rap from the critics.

There was first the question of authenticity—a greater question with English than American critics, quite a few of whom have attributed it to the CIA. The CIA can be excluded on very simple grounds. No one with that kind of imagination could be had for government pay. As a novelist with Hollywood possibilities he would be worth up to ten times as much. Even Lyndon Johnson could have doubled his pay as ghost and come out ahead. It may be that the KGB, which also gets possible credit, has less competition and thus can hire this kind of talent, but even those who think it responsible agree that it must have worked very closely with original Khrushchev material.

The critics have also complained that there isn't much that is new, but this is also true of the memoirs of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan and, unlike these worthy books, the Khrushchev production is full of perfectly fascinating stories. Unlike most other writers of memoirs, he has readers other than himself in mind, which is not a bad thing. And however jaded the experts may be, I was delighted to read about high level infighting as it is conducted in the Kremlin, how Britain, Clartidge's and George Brown looked to a visiting Russian, and what a terrible indignity it is to arrive at an international conference in a teeny two-motor airplane, which was what happened to the Soviets in Geneva in 1955. (All the others had four-motor jobs.) Clayton Fritchey believes the best thing is the account of his exchange with President Eisenhower at the latter's "dacha" at Camp David. Each tells how he is pressed by his generals for new and expensive weapons, how he bravely resists, how he explains that money is short, how the generals persist, how eventually he gives in.

I thought the accounts of home life with J. Stalin even better. No person is so little to be envied as the man who must keep company with the panjandrums of state. He has a good address but terrible working conditions and there is something in the juxtaposition to power that

continued

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Conflict Over Khrushchev Memoirs

The controversy over the claimed memoirs of Khrushchev published in the United States has not died down, and the claims as to both authorship and intent are far apart.

George Kennan, who is well acquainted with the Soviet Union, recently wrote in *The New York Review*, "It is . . . not impossible that the appearance of the book in the West will lend itself to exploitation in Russia precisely for the purpose of discrediting, along with the person of Khrushchev, the concepts with which his name has been associated; one cannot even exclude the possibility that the operation was encouraged in certain quarters with just this in mind . . . One is left . . . only with the strong impression that certain persons interested in ideas often attributed to Khrushchev have taken advantage of his age and infirmity and helpless situation to prepare for publication in the form we know, this body of material based on things he is known to have said, or has been heard to say."

In Kennan's view then, perhaps even the current leaders of Russia were not unhappy with the publication of the anti-Stalinist memoirs because they discredited Khrushchev as well as Stalin.

In a completely opposite view, Victor Zorza wrote in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* that "the anti-Stalinist emphasis of the memoirs is so obvious that it has been stressed by virtually every reviewer . . . But if anti-Stalinism was the 'chief concern' of the people responsible for the memoirs, it could not have been of the KGB (the Soviet secret police).

"Anti-Stalinism is, on the other hand, the chief concern of the Western propoganda organizations . . .

which seek to influence the formation of public opinion in the Soviet Union from outside . . . This is where the CIA comes in. Insofar as anti-Stalinism in the Soviet Union is ultimately a factor for the maintenance of peace, the CIA would see it as one of its functions to foster this by every means available to it . . . and sometimes, to create the means, when these are not available.

"I do not regard myself as a CIA baiter. But just as you don't shoot at your own side in war, so intelligence agencies should confine their 'dirty work' to the territory of the adversary. To foist on the Western world a book like the Khrushchev memoirs is to interfere with the free flow of accurate information which the people of the Western countries must have to form their political opinions. Intelligence operations of this kind can damage the democratic process," wrote Zorza.

Both Kennan and Zorza obviously do not believe that the memoirs are the untampered-with remembrances of Khrushchev. Of even more importance is that both appear to believe that there were political motivations in the publication. Kennan suggests the book plays into the hands of those who would discredit Khrushchev. Zorza believes the aim is to continue to discredit Stalin. He accepts without proof the idea that it has been the CIA that managed the publication. But when he sets limits of intelligence operations, he is being naive indeed. Political manipulation in a variety of forms is the name of one game among intelligence operations.

Khrushchev has denied he wrote or dictated the memoirs. This, too, could be part of the plot by either side. Maybe we'll never really find out the whole story.

U.S. Blamed By KGB For Dissent

By Dusko Doder

Washington Post Staff Writer

A top official of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) has accused the West and primarily the United States of encouraging political dissent in the Soviet Union to "undermine" Soviet society.

Senior State Department officials regard the publication of an article by Semen K. Tsvigun, first deputy chairman of the KGB, as unusually interesting since it is very rare for a secret police official of his rank to publicly address himself to delicate internal problems and do so in such a frank manner.

Tsvigun said that the United States, "without giving up methods of military pressure and armed adventures, is now forced more and more to resort to ideological forms of battle" which it is trying to "carry on directly on the territory of the U.S.S.R."

These officials saw Tsvigun's article as an effort to alert party workers around the country to clamp down on all manifestation of dissent before the forthcoming 24th Communist Party Congress.

Dissent Admitted

U.S. analysts pointed out that the article in effect admitted to a large party audience that may have been unaware of it the existence of political dissent as well as of a specific Jewish dissent in the Soviet Union.

The dissident movement is very small in size and confined to Moscow and several other major cities. There is no evidence that dissent has spread to the countryside.

The article appeared in the February issue of the journal *Politicheskoe Samoobrazovaniye*, which has a circulation of 1.7 million and is designed for political guidance of party members.

The thrust of Tsvigun's article is that the United States through its various intelligence agencies is trying to create and encourage dissent inside the Soviet Union "as a means of changing the current balance of power" in Washington's favor.

Directed at Youth

Efforts to "morally weaken" Soviet citizens are directed primarily at the Soviet youth and "creative intelligentsia." In this, the United States is using various Zionist organizations which, in turn, are trying to turn "Israel into an instrument of political control over citizens of Jewish extraction."

U.S. tourists, businessmen, diplomats, union leaders, journalists, students, members of various delegations visiting the Soviet Union, according to Tsvigun, all try to convert "some persons of Jewish nationality into pro-Israeli elements, spark their emigration intentions (to Israel) and collect treacherous information."

Western propaganda, particularly broadcasts by Radio Liberty, the Voice of America and similar stations based in Western Europe, has occasionally been effective, Tsvigun said.

"There are cases when individual Soviet citizens fall for the bait of enemy propaganda," he said. "Once under the influence of ideology that is alien to socialism, such citizens turn into supporters of our ideological adversaries. Regrettably, some of them turn into collaborators of Western intelligence services."

Bourgeois Attitudes

He acknowledged that bourgeois attitudes still exist in the Soviet Union and that "in the conscience of individual Soviet citizens some remnants of the past have been preserved."

"It is known that the main effort of imperialist intelligence services is directed toward our creative intelligentsia and the youth," he said. He quoted what he said was an ex-

ment manual defining as principal objectives in the "psychological war" ideological influence on "writers, critics, students and other persons forming public opinion."

Another main target of the Central Intelligence Agency is the Soviet scientific community, Tsvigun said. He complained that many Russian scientists "babble too much" and inadvertently reveal state and party secrets to their foreign colleagues.

Some U.S. analysts suggested that the article disclosed the KGB's preeminent role in combating ideological penetration. Others said that the weeks prior to the Party Congress comprise "a no boat rocking period" but added that the article appears to be a "logical precursor to clubbing down the dissident movement."

Bob
Cromie



STATINTL

Atlas, a Magazine for Thinkers

EVERY ONCE-IN A WHILE I am fascinated all over again by the magazine Atlas, which each month distills "the best from the world press" and offers it to subscribers in this country. The February issue contains material from publications in Moscow, London, Hamburg, Milan, Dakar, Peking, Prague, Rome, Buenos Aires, Paris, Budapest, Frankfurt and Montevideo, as well as cartoons from other places.

Atlas provides not only a view-from-inside of a number of foreign countries and their problems, but, when obtainable, foreign views of the United States and its problems. From the Journal Du Dimanche, for example, in Paris, comes an excerpt from a piece in which Playwright Antoine Bourseiller offers the opinion that the American love for dogs—he writes that he never has seen as many dogs as he did in New York City—is, he believes, "due to the fact that most Americans are frustrated sentimentally. They suffer from a lack of affection." Bourseiller also declares that the American theater provides a freer forum for artists because of "the right to be in bad taste"—something the French are fearful of trying.

THERE IS A SADLY informative story on how the half-black Italians, reminders of the influx of American troops during World War II, are faring in today's Italy, a satirical account of memoirs—such as Khrushchev's—which the Kremlin says were written by the CIA and the CIA says were done by the KGB, and a survey of Dutch television which, you may be startled to know, sometimes features a anked girl reading the stock market quotations.

But the most melancholy article, I suppose, and one that serves as a reminder that similar things have happened in this country in the not-too-distant past, is about "book burning"—and banning—in Argentina.

A young reporter for Semana, a Buenos Aires weekly, wrote the piece, which verifies rumors that the government does indeed seize—and burn—books with which there is official disagreement. The reporter, Juan Carlos Martini, writes:

"Publishers and distributors confirmed that customs and postal officials are now opening all packages containing books for export as well as those being imported. They added that confiscated books have meant the loss of millions of pesos to them. It appeared that after the initial inspection by said officials, the books are thoroly examined by SIDE, the Argentine secret police."

Martini discovered that some of the seized works are indeed burned, "like refuse and dead dogs," in the municipal furnaces to which they are brought in armored police cars.

Among titles banned in Argentina are "Portnoy's Complaint," by Philip Roth; "Myra Breckinridge," by Gore Vidal; "Ecstasy and Me," by Hedy Lamarr; "Summerhill," by A. S. Neill; "Ironies of History," by Isaac Deutscher; "Eros and Civilization," by Herbert Marcuse; "Who Rules America?" by G. William Domhoff; "The Deputy," by Rolf Hochhuth; "Three Faces of Fascism," by Ernst Nolte and "Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism," by Kwame Nkrumah—this one at the same time it was required reading

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FEB 2 1971

STATINTL

Pity The Experts

WHEN the experts can't agree, how is the nonexpert public to make up its mind? In the controversy over the Khrushchev memoirs, for instance, the most widely varying opinions are expressed by persons with intimate knowledge of the Soviet Union. This not only adds to the confusion of the ordinary reader, but may lead him to suspect that so-called expert opinion is not all that it's cracked up to be.

In England a Russian specialist and professor on the faculty of the London School of Economics called the memoirs "totally worthless for the serious student of contemporary history." He suggests that the KGB, the Soviet secret police, put the book together to confuse the West about Russian policy. Two other English experts agreed that the memoirs are spurious, but one of them believes they were written by agents of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

On the other side, 30 experts on the Soviet Union who met at Washington earlier this month concluded that the memoirs are genuine, and that they were published in the West with the permission of the leaders of the Russian government. And although he found what he called "odd and sometimes inexplicable mistakes" in the memoirs, Sir William Hayter, British ambassador to Russia in the 1950s, agrees that they are the real thing.

Since the supposed author is still living, it might be thought that the argument could be easily settled. Last November Nikita Khrushchev denounced the memoirs as a fabrication, and it is in some ways symptomatic of the times that the denial by the former Soviet leader has carried so little weight in the dispute.

It is not difficult, of course, to poke fun at the experts, with their exotic theories of plots by the KGB or the CIA. But it would all be a lot funnier if it were not for the nagging suspicion that there might be some truth in even the wildest explanation. Perhaps instead of ridicule, the Kremlin expert really deserves sympathy in his attempt to function in an area where virtually nothing is what it appears to be.

7 FEB 1971

STATINTL

Mr. K's Memoirs? The Debate Goes On

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Washington Post Staff Writer

"Khrushchev Remembers," a 639-page, \$10 memoir of that most fascinating of Russians since Stalin died 18 years ago, has created a giant storm among experts on the Soviet Union as to its authenticity and origin.

Some say it is the authentic of Nikita Khrushchev. Some say it is a put-up job by the KGB, the Soviet secret police. One pins most of it on the American Central Intelligence Agency.

The whole truth is impossible to get at and probably even those at Time Inc. who swung the deal to publish the excerpts in Life and elsewhere around the world and then to produce the book, do not know the full story.

Some contend there is essentially nothing new in the book, that Khrushchev or others have said it all before. Others retort that this is nonsense, that there is much new both in substance and in expansion on what had been known.

Here is what is known and what some of those experts have to say.

Edward Crankshaw, who wrote the book's introduction and footnotes, now says he was "rather dramatically faced" with the "original Russian typescript" of the book "early last spring" and that the transcript "reads like a transcript from tapes" rather than "a finished memoir." He adds that "it is material for a finished memoir — a memoir which I know Khrushchev to have been working on for at least three or four years."

Crankshaw, a leading British authority on Russia, apparently is the only person outside those at Time Inc. who handled the deal to see the Russian transcript other than Strobe Talbott, a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, who did the translation. Talbott wrote that "the original material, when it came into my hands, was quite disorganized." He took "certain liberties with the structure," he said, but "except for an occasional paraphrase or improvised transitional sentence, Khrushchev has said everything attributed to him in this book."

The publishers (Little, Brown & Co., a Time Inc. subsidiary) say in a "note" in the book that it is "made up of material emanating from various sources at various times and in various circumstances."

Goes On

It has been established that two Time Inc. representatives, Murray Gart and Jerrold Schecter, met last August in a Copenhagen hotel with Victor Louis, a man generally assumed to be a KGB agent who is widely known to Western newsmen and who has written (for The Washington Post among others) some rather startling articles from Moscow and elsewhere. He gave the first tips that Khrushchev was being ousted in 1964 and he hinted, in print, that the Soviet Union might make a pre-emptive strike at the Chinese nuclear establishment.

But was the Louis contact with Time Inc. the key one? Some sources contend that the Khrushchev material had all come out of the Soviet Union by April, four months before the Copenhagen session.

Millions of Americans saw on NBC on July 11, 1967, a taped film interview with Khrushchev, made at his retirement house, and some of what he said then is repeated in the book in only slightly different words. Some say other material from parts of that interview not shown on TV also is in the book.

There has been speculation that Khrushchev's well-known son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, once editor of Izvestia but ousted when Khrushchev fell, did the taping for both film and book and somehow got it out to the West.

But Henry Shapiro, the longtime United Press International correspondent in Moscow, wrote on Jan. 1 from London where he was on holiday, that "the widespread conviction now is that the job was done by Lev Petrov, the husband of Khrushchev's granddaughter, Yulia." Petrov, who died in the summer of 1970, spoke English and, wrote Shapiro, "had frequent contact with English-speaking newsmen and diplomats." Schecter for some time was a Time-Life correspondent in Moscow but his relations, if any, with Petrov are not on the record.

It is known that Petrov died of cancer and that he had been told some time in advance that his illness was fatal. This has led to speculation that, as a dying man, he took the risk of smuggling out the Khrushchev material without, as Shapiro suggested,

the knowledge or consent of either Khrushchev or Soviet authorities.

Why? Shapiro wrote that Petrov was said to have been deeply resentful of the way the current Kremlin leadership had treated Khrushchev, that he had some misgivings about the cessation of the de-Stalinization process that Khrushchev had originated and that he wanted to correct the historic injustice to Khrushchev.

Thus some experts conclude that Petrov was the key man, having seen the opportunity indicated by the 1967 NBC interview, and that much, if not all, of the material in the book got to the West by his doing.

There is, perhaps, some substantiation to this thesis in the story of Dr. A. McGehee Harvey of the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore. Along with the Khrushchev excerpts, Life published Harvey's account of a meeting with Khrushchev at his retirement dacha outside Moscow in late 1969.

What Life did not report, however, is that when Harvey was about to leave the Soviet Union, he was subjected to most intensive search of his person and his baggage. This has led some to conclude that by then the KGB had discovered that Petrov had gotten tapes out of the country and the officials were trying to halt any further leaks.

Victor Louis' Role

THIS BRINGS us back to Victor Louis. He is said to have had a hand in the NBC film deal. Leonard Shapiro, a distinguished British expert on the Soviet Union, says the KGB "sponsored" that deal. Once the Khrushchev tapes were out, presumably through Petrov's doing, did the KGB get Louis into the act to mitigate the effect? Did he provide additional and less damaging material or only some new photographs for Life?

Unhappily, the CIA, which tries to keep track of fellows like Louis when they are abroad, apparently did not have that Copenhagen hotel room bugged. It did find out afterward that Time Inc. paid Louis' bills. It is also said that the CIA knows how at least some of the material got out of the Soviet Union but that Time Inc. has refused to provide any information to either the CIA or other government intelligence agencies that have inquired.


Most of the above assumes, as Time Inc. contends, that the material in "Khrushchev Remembers" is indeed authentic Khrushchev.

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


BULGANIN SPEAKS

The Story of Marshal Bulganin

3 gns. February

This massive new work, which is sure to cause a publishing sensation, is not so much Bulganin's authenticated biography as personal memories dictated by the Marshal into a hidden mike in his salt cellar. It is preceded by an authentic introduction by Victor Zorza, much of which has appeared in corrupt form in first editions of the *Guardian*, and accompanied by copious notes by Tibor Szamuely smuggled out of the *Spectator*, but the meat of the work is Bulganin's own version of what happened to him before he started investigating the funny contraption on the bottom of his salt cellar. Here at last is the truth about his split with Khrushchev, in not one but five equally valid versions. Here at last is the true picture of those dark days under Stalin, when no man knew what innocent speech delivered to miners might not be used twenty years later to pad out an autobiography. But here, above all, are the words and reminiscences of a man who, for all we know, might have been dead for years.



A LETTER OF PROTEST

Mstislav Rostropovich

25/- March

This letter by the world-famous Russian cellist, protesting against Solzhenitsin's treatment, has been declared by some experts to be a forgery—some have even gone so far as to say that it was written by Rostropovich himself. We are satisfied, on the contrary, that this is a completely authentic document produced by the CIA with help from the KGB and that the cellist at no time meddled with its production. Victor Zorza's introduction is by Edward Crankshaw.

THE WIT AND THE WISDOM OF THE KGB

45/- April

It is now general knowledge that much of the Russian writing printed recently in the West has been partly authored by the KGB, and critics have felt that this reflects on the quality of the material. We feel, on the contrary, that some of their interpolations are of a very high quality, and we are proud to present this anthology from works they have failed to flog in the West. Outstanding are some satirical verses by Mikoyan, of a standard that he himself could never have reached, some short stories written for a young writer who died before he could be brought to trial, and some anecdotes omitted from *Kruschev Remembers* by mistake. There are also some telling epigrams, probably written by the KGB between books, and some incriminating doodles done by Kuznetsov in Moscow after he had fled to England. There is a long preface signed by Tibor Szamuely on which Edward Crankshaw casts doubt in a short foreword signed by Victor Zorza. Copyright CIA Washington

THE TRUTH ABOUT VICTOR ZORZA

Edward Crankshaw

£2 March



For many years Edward Crankshaw, the famous Kremlinologist, has been studying all the writings, however obscure and trivial, of Victor Zorza. Most people believe that this Russian expert, who rules over Gray's Inn Road with a fist of iron, is a man called Victor Zorza, but Crankshaw's evidence throws doubt on this. "Much of his work appears in the *Guardian*," he comments, "a journal which has always been noted for revising original copy with so-called 'misprints.' At first I believed that his real name might be Korka, or even Sorsa." Now, however, he thinks it likely that Zorza is not one man at all, but two Russians, an American and a telex machine. * * * Edward Crankshaw, the well-known Sovietologist, is a team of five embittered Poles.

DEAR SIR...

Edward Crankshaw

15/6 January

This is in fact a short letter from Kremlinologist Crankshaw to his tailor complaining about a suit, which was sent to us by mistake and automatically published. But there is a good deal of new material in the long foreword by Tibor Szamuely, as well as some hitherto unknown footnotes by Victor Zorza, and the letter itself casts fascinating light on mid-twentieth century Russian fastening. Copyright CIA Washington. This is certified authentic by the author.

ATLAS
Feb 1971

satire

MEMOIRS, MEMOIRS, WHO WROTE THE MEMOIRS?

or, dead comrades tell no tales

Translated from DIE ZEIT, Hamburg

Both the KGB and the C.I.A. are known to work hard at tailoring history to suit them. But rarely can they have been so calculatingly creative as in dishing up the Khrushchev 'memoirs'—although each agency modestly declines authorship in favor of the other. Where Mr. K. fits in is unclear. We suppose they sent him a copy. Anyway, it's getting harder and harder to distinguish fib from falsehood. Wolfgang Ebert, the Art Buchwald of the German press, thrashes it all out in this semi-satire from the weekly *Die Zeit*.

IT WOULD BE sensational if it were ever to come out that the Khrushchev memoirs were actually written by Khrushchev. For the moment the Kremlin insists they were written by the C.I.A., and in Washington they tend to see the handwriting of their colleagues in the KGB. These suppositions throw a dubious light on the strange activities of the secret services. Apparently

each service has its own literary department.

I asked Captain Spider of the C.I.A. how it feels to be a secret writer. "Very frustrating," he said, "because you can never sign your own work. You dream of some day writing the great American novel, and off you go on another memoir assignment. And your own style is ruined by constantly trying to imitate some-

body else's style. If you only knew what talents are withering away in the daily routine of the secret service."

I asked him about the Khrushchev memoirs. "The KGB beat us to it this time," replied Capt. Spider, who is believed to be responsible for several portions of the Penkovsky papers.

"Do you mean the C.I.A. wanted to hit the market with its own set of memoirs?"

"Yes, and a damned fine piece of work if I may say so. The fellow who wrote up the evenings with Stalin has a nickname—we call him Hemingway. Now the whole effort is wasted. Pity."

"What is your literary opinion of the KGB version?"


"We had more individualists on the project, but the KGB works more as a team. And the Russians took more literary liberties than we could afford, since we have Svetlana here. Svetlana is a great writer herself. She will probably honor us with her own Khrushchev memoirs."

"Do you approve of statesmen's memoirs being written by secret services?"

"Definitely. You can't leave a matter like that up to the statesmen. They hardly ever know what really goes on. Think how exciting the memoirs of Adenauer and De Gaulle would have been if a few of our colleagues had written them."

"What are you working on now?"

"On the guaranteed authentic diaries of Liu Shao-Chi, with sensational insights into the Cultural Revolution. But we have to hurry. Our literary agents have learned through aerial reconnaissance that the KGB is already on



"Niina, look what they've sent me!"

JAN 30 1971

12

THE KHRUSHCHEV MEMOIRS

VICTOR ZORZA has deduced that the Khrushchev memoirs now published in the West are not genuine and that the American Central Intelligence Agency has had a hand in them. Here he gives his reasons for thinking they are not by Khrushchev: next week he explains how he thinks the CIA was involved.

STATINTL

Mr K and the CIA

The Khrushchev memoirs, which have been described as the publishing sensation of the decade, are more than that. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that they are the publishing hoax of the century. They do not come from Khrushchev nor, as has often been asserted, from the "disinformation department" of the KGB in Moscow—although both Khrushchev and the KGB had something to do with them. On this occasion, however, the Kremlin's "Department D," as it is familiarly known in the trade, seems to have had the cooperation of its American counterpart, the "department of dirty tricks" in the Central Intelligence Agency, which looks like being responsible for the final product.

The evidence for this view which it has taken me more than a month to collect, will certainly be disputed. The reader will have to make up his own mind on the facts presented in this series. I spoke to Svetlana Stalin (now Mrs Wesley Peters) in Arizona, and to Milovan Djilas, the former Yugoslav leader, in Belgrade. I have questioned the Russian pianist Vladimir Ashkenazy, who has now made his home in Iceland, about the references to his activities which appear in the book. But above all else, I have been checking the facts in every accessible source — from the war archives captured by the Germans, to old copies of "Pravda."

There are literally hundreds of errors of fact, of time, and of place in the book—but the publishers claim that these prove nothing. Mr Ralph Graves, the managing editor of "Life" magazine, which obtained the material and then syndicated it throughout the world, says that Mr Khrushchev is "remembering at a fairly advanced age, and I think it is perfectly natural for him to misplace some dates, places, chronology."

The American publisher of "Khrushchev Remembers" declares in an introductory note that the book "is made up of material emanating from various sources at various times and in various circumstances." But he is "convinced beyond any doubt, and has taken pains to confirm, that this is an authentic record of Nikita Khrushchev's words."

These are not memoirs, the publisher insists, but "reminiscences." However, for the sake of convenience, I will follow the usage which has been generally adopted and will refer to them as memoirs.

Spokesmen for "Life," and the small group of men directly concerned in arranging the publication, refuse to state on record any fact concerning the provenance of the material. However, they have spoken off the record both to officials and to journalists of repute in the United States, which makes it possible to build up a composite picture of the claims they make for the book's origins.

It is claimed that the material came in the first place from members of the Khrushchev family—his daughter Rada, her husband Alexey Adzhubey, the former editor of "Izvestia" who, after the fall of Khrushchev, was given an insignificant journalistic post with a picture magazine, and another son-in-law, Lev Petrov, also a journalist, who died some months ago.

The story is difficult to credit, because these members of the Khrushchev family would have enough experience of international affairs to realise that their role could not remain secret for long. And that, sooner or later, the KGB would catch up with them,

and would ruin what remained of their careers and even their liberty.

Whatever motives they might have for wishing to publish Khrushchev's memoirs, they would not trust their lives to "Life." And, as the disclosure of their names in the American press shows, they would have been right. Even though "Life" might now deny, for the record, that they had played any role in the matter, their names have been published and the KGB would certainly follow up any such clue with the utmost thoroughness and would find out anything there is to find out—as they would have known in advance.

The theory widely held in American official quarters—which deny that the CIA could possibly have had anything to do with it—is that, whatever the origins of the material might be, at some stage the KGB got in on the act. The date quoted most often is late August when Victor Louis, the KGB's international journalistic "fixer," travelled from Moscow to Copenhagen for a week's meeting with staff members of "Time-Life."

At the same time, however, it is claimed that the "Khrushchev" material had been reaching "Life" in dribs and drabs for something like 18 months, during which the work of editing and translation was proceeding apace. Indeed, some American officials profess to believe that the Moscow purveyors of the material intended it to be published in the West in time for the twenty-fourth party Congress in March, since postponed to March this year.

It is that the publication of the memoirs, with their outspokenly anti-Stalin-

British Experts Doubt Authenticity of 'Khrushchev Remembers'

By ANTHONY LEWIS

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Jan. 24—British experts on the Soviet Union, reviewing "Khrushchev Remembers," have been much more skeptical than some American reviewers about the authenticity of the purported memoirs of the former Soviet leader.

"Totally worthless for the serious student of contemporary history"—that was the judgment of Leonard Schapiro, professor at the London School of Economics, in The Sunday Times of London today.

Professor Schapiro suggested that the Soviet secret police had concocted the book of purported memoirs and had got it out to the West to cause confusion and to advance the Communist cause.

David Floyd, Communist Affairs expert for The Daily Telegraph, concluded that the book was "not genuine." He believes that somebody in the West prepared the book.

Victor Zorza, in The Guardian, devoted a series of five long articles to arguing that the United States Central Intelligence Agency was the source.

Book Termed Hoax

He termed the book a hoax and a scissors and paste job of the C.I.A., which, he said, hoped to repeat its "most successful operation of all time"—the publication of Mr. Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist secret speech to the Soviet party congress in 1956.

A group of 30 experts on the Soviet Union, meeting in Washington earlier this month, concluded that the memoirs were authentic and had been released to the West with the approval of the present Soviet leadership. The panel believed that most, if not all the published

material, was in Mr. Khrushchev's words.

Sir William Hayter, who was British Ambassador in Moscow from 1953 to 1957, believes that the book is "basically genuine" despite "odd and sometimes inexplicable mistakes."

In a review in The Observer today, Sir William says: "I knew Khrushchev fairly well, emerged from obscurity and I was in Moscow when he came to supreme power. I met him frequently on social occasions. . . . Having just emerged from reading the book I have the strong impression of having resumed my personal intercourse with him."

Sir William found that a disturbing feature of the book was "Khrushchev's extraordinary incomprehension of the realities of other countries."

The Sunday Times, in addition to Professor Schapiro's review, ran in full the review in The New York Times on Jan. 3 by Harrison E. Salisbury saying that the book was authentic. The book was published in the United States on Dec. 21 by Little, Brown & Co.

Professor Schapiro, who is Professor of Economics With Special Reference to Russian Studies, specifically rejected one theory that had been discussed in the United States about the possibility of preparation by the K.G.B., the Soviet Secret Police. This was that elements in the Soviet police agency had slipped the book out to the West as part of a campaign in the Soviet to stop a return to Stalinism.

"Moonshine" was Professor Schapiro's word for that idea. The K.G.B., he said, would be the first to promote a return to Stalin's methods,

For Professor Shapiro the book also fails on the test of novelty. He argues that to his own knowledge it contains "only a very few facts or statements which are new."

Mr. Floyd, in The Daily Telegraph, concluded:

"My impression is that compilation of the 'memoirs' could well have been done in the West where all the material for such an operation was available. I

would not care to guess who or what institution was responsible. I will only venture the opinion that, with a little more knowledge and more trouble, they could have done a much better job."

Remembers'

STATINTL

Curious case of the doctor in Mr K's dacha

By Henry Brandon
Washington

THERE is little disposition here among experts in Sovietology to accept the theory of Victor Zorza in the Guardian that the so-called Khrushchev memoirs were the work of the Central Intelligence Agency, which "took over" the KGB's efforts to infiltrate the Khrushchev material into the West.

According to my sources, Mr Richard Helms, the head of CIA, at one point went to New York and saw Mr Hedley Donovan, editor-in-chief of Time-Life, in the hope of finding out how Time-Life Incorporated obtained the document. Donovan refused to give any information. Helms pleaded but Donovan still refused on the grounds that it could jeopardise those who provided Time-Life with the memoirs.

At the State Department this week some 30 experts on the Soviet Union convened to discuss informally the riddle of the memoirs. They reached a broad consensus that they were authentic. There was also a majority belief that the KGB got in on the act at some point, but not at the start. The idea that the KGB invented the memoirs, or that Mr Alexander Sholepin, who was formerly in charge of the secret police, engineered the whole thing to advance his own political interests and to hurt Mr Brezhnev, the present party leader, was discounted.

Enter the KGB

The theory that made most sense to the experts on Soviet affairs at the meeting was that somebody with personal access to Khrushchev got the memoirs started for politico-philosophical reasons, but without the knowledge of the KGB. When the latter became aware of this project and of the fact that some of the material had already reached sources outside the USSR, they tried to manipulate it, by proceeding to

a KGB plant.

Another indication that the KGB was not the original source of the document but got to hear of it and tried to stop it, is the experience of Dr Harvey, director of the Department of Medicine at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore.

He was called to Moscow a little more than a year ago to attend to a female member of the Khrushchev family who was suffering from an intestinal disease. He spent the whole day with the family and had a chance to talk to Nikita Khrushchev.

When in the evening he returned to Moscow, KGB agents visited him and his wife in their Moscow hotel room, ordered them to undress and subjected them to a search, whose thoroughness could hardly be equalled by a medical specialist. The KGB's orders were clearly to make certain that the doctor did not carry anything abroad.

Exit Mr Louis

The rumour that Mr Victor Louis (who before now, has been an apparent agent of the KGB in the West) acted as intermediary in the case of the Khrushchev Memoirs is also discounted by the experts here. But definite proof one way or the other seems to be lacking on this point.

Stephen Fay writes from New York:

Mr Ralph Graves, of Time Life Inc., disclosed to me here this week that Life is actually bound by a contractual promise not to reveal the origins of the Khrushchev memoirs. Not only does this bind them never to reveal the sources it also prevents them from saying with whom the contract is.

On the theory that the CIA was involved, Graves says: "Such a notion is silly because the CIA has been asking us very nicely if we can tell them anything about it." He also points to the fact that not a single reviewer in the US has cast doubt on the authenticity of the memoirs.

STATINTL

85 JAN 1971

Truth on Khrushchev 'memoirs' still eludes

Compiled from
Associated Press and Reuter dispatches

London

In the light of differing opinions by experts, the authenticity of the recently published "Khrushchev Remembers" remains uncertain.

British Communist-affairs expert Victor Zorza claims the "memoirs" are a forgery. He asserts that the KGB (the Soviet Secret Service) had a large hand in producing the writings and then planted them with a Life magazine source. According to Mr. Zorza, the CIA attempted to thwart the operation.

Meanwhile, a meeting in Washington of U.S. experts on Soviet affairs has concluded the writings were authentic because of their repeated attacks on the Stalin regime. For this very reason the experts concluded that the "memoirs" never could have been released with the approval of the Soviet leadership; and this, they felt, precluded a deliberate trick on the part of the Soviet Government. The conference, however, could not agree as to how the writings were transmitted to foreign sources.

Soviets blamed

The British Communist Party, for its part, has blamed the Soviets for withholding the official records of Joseph Stalin's rule, documents that, it says, could determine whether the "memoirs" are authentic. The party also claims that Soviet secrecy is another cause of the growing Western interest in the writings.

The criticism of the Russians came in an article by Sam Russell, foreign editor of the Morning Star, the newspaper of the British Communist Party. The party has taken no position on the authenticity of the writings.

Answering claims that errors in the Khrushchev "memoirs" can be attributed to the author's advanced age, Mr. Zorza says many of the "literally hundreds" of errors could not conceivably have been made by Mr. Khrushchev, "however imperfect his memory might be."

STATINTL

BALTIMORE SUN

21 JAN 1971

Khrushchev Memoirs Called Fraud, Linked To CIA, KGB

London, Thursday, Jan. 21 (Reuter)—A Communist affairs expert, Victor Zorza, said today that the Khrushchev memoirs were a forgery in which both the KGB the Soviet Secret Police and the CIA played a part.

In an article in the *Guardian*, Mr. Zorza said the memoirs have been described as the publishing sensation of the decade. But there was a great deal of evidence to suggest that they were the publishing hoax of the century, he said.

He said the memoirs did not come from the former Soviet leader nor, as had been asserted, from the "disinformation department" of the KGB in Moscow, though both Mr. Khrushchev and the KGB had something to do with them.

Mr. Zorza claims that the KGB planted some of the material on *Life* magazine and that the CIA then moved in to thwart the operation.

He said later articles in his

series would present the evidence pointing to CIA involvement.

Mr. Zorza rejects a claim by Ralph Graves, managing editor of *Life* magazine, that errors in the Khrushchev memoirs can be attributed to the author's advanced age.

Mr. Zorza claims that his articles will show that many of the errors—of which there are "literally hundreds"—could not conceivably have been made by Mr. Khrushchev himself, "however imperfect his memory might be."

He said his evidence had taken him a month to collect and that he had looked for people who figure in the book and who alone could confirm or deny some of the facts mentioned. To this end he had talked to Stalin's daughter Svetlana, now Mrs. Wesley Peters, in Arizona, a former Yugoslav leader, Milovan Djilas, and the Soviet pianist Vladimir Ashkeazy.

STATINTL

What's Behind Leaking Of Khrushchev's 'Memoir'?

STATINTL

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

What goes on in the upper reaches of the Moscow Communist hierarchy, where everything is supposed to be tightly controlled but apparently is not?

The latest evidence of cross-purposes is the release of former Premier Nikita Khrushchev's supposed memoirs to *Life* magazine. As might have been expected, the Khrushchev view of Joseph Stalin, as presented in the memoirs, is as dour as ever: Stalin was a madman who had poisoned the good milk of Leninist doctrine and practically drowned Russia in blood. Since the official Moscow policy of the moment calls for the partial rehabilitation of Stalin, why should the memoirs have been peddled?

The Moscow mystery journalist, Victor Louis, who writes for London's *Evening News*, was the broker in the deal. What is Victor Louis' relation to the Communist hierarchs? He is supposed to be in the good graces of the KGB, the Soviet secret police.

The deal worked out with *Life* at the Hotel D'Angleterre in Copenhagen was not the first of its kind in Louis' career. In 1966, at the time of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial in Russia, when Soviet intellectuals were being put under the gun for allowing their manuscripts to go to the West, Victor Louis was a go-between in the strange "exile" tour of Valery Tarsis, a disaffected Russian writer, through Britain and the U.S.

The only logical explanation of the Tarsis "exile" which had been permitted was that the Kremlin counted on Tarsis to discredit himself, the theory being that his expected eccentricities might cause Westerners to think Sinyavsky and Daniel were dubious characters also.

Some time later Louis offered an alternative version of the memoirs of Stalin's daughter Svetlana to the West. Since Svetlana was on American soil and hence perfectly capable of marketing her own wares, which the Kremlin wanted suppressed, could the intention of the Victor Louis diversion have been to mess up the copyright situation? And possibly the Kremlin counted on the pictures that went with the alternative manuscript to tell an anti-Svetlana story.

Whatever is behind Victor Louis' activities, they add up to a confusion. Checking with Sovietologists, one finds there are several radically opposed theories of the motives behind the leak of the memoirs whose authenticity Khrushchev himself has repudiated.

One theory is that there is a dissident group in the KGB, and in the Politburo itself, that is anti-Brezhnev and doesn't want to see Stalin rehabilitated.

Another theory is that the Kremlin is looking for an excuse to declare Khrushchev an enemy of the state for allowing his memoirs to be sold outside Russia. A third theory is that the CIA has had a hand in the whole business. This would have to mean there are double agents inside the KGB itself.

The confusion indicated in Moscow over the Khrushchev memoirs comes at a welcome time for the West, for Christian Duevel's annual analysis of the Soviet Central Committee's October Slogans for Radio Liberty is not very encouraging.

Ever since 1967 the Kremlin had called every October for the "consolidation of all anti-imperialist peace-loving forces" to struggle against "reaction and war." But now the phrase "peace-loving" has been dropped from the slogan. This, as Duevel surmises, means that the Soviets are willing to accept help from anybody in their machinations against the West. Any Palestinian guerrilla organization, whether Maoist or not, is to be accepted in the "anti-imperialist struggle."

There are other subtle changes in the slogans that indicate a more intransigent Soviet foreign policy all down the line. What this portends for the SALT talks about a mutual limitation of armaments is not exactly encouraging. The main hope of the West is that a struggle for power in Moscow itself is making it difficult for the tougher warmongers in the Kremlin.

EFFORT TO DISCREDIT KHRUSHCHEV?

Memoirs Stir Speculation

STATINTL

MOSCOW (AP) — Kremlin secrecy has long made Moscow a city of mysteries, but few of them have stirred as much speculation in embassy chanceries and ordinary households as the Khrushchev memoirs being published in Life magazine.

Ever since Time, Inc., announced earlier this month that it would publish the reminiscences of former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, a long series of unanswered questions has been raised.

Are the papers authentic, as Life asserts? Are they a fabrication, possibly produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, as the Soviet government newspaper Izvestia claims? If they were really produced by Khrushchev, how did they get to the West? And whose interest is being served by their publication?

Kremlin Blessing Seen

One of the latest theories, said to be true by a Soviet informant who has furnished reliable information in the past, is that the reminiscences are authentic and were published with the blessing of high Kremlin officials.

The informant said Khrushchev started dictating the reminiscences on a tape recorder as a documentation of his years as premier and chief of the Communist party.

High officials learned of the project, the informant said, and hoped to discredit and stop it by making the early portion available for publication abroad before revision and editing.

The memoirs have not been published before. Time, Inc., says they go only up to 1962. The informant said the Kremlin did not want to see them carried through to 1964, the year Khrushchev was ousted by the collective leadership headed by

Communist party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev.

The first installment, published in the Nov. 27 issue of Life, contains numerous factual errors. The informant said this is because Khrushchev did them from memory.

The Kremlin believed that by getting the memoirs published with the errors intact, the informant said, the project might be discredited.

Khrushchev would then get so upset, this line of reasoning goes, that he would abandon the project.

Those who question this theory point out that the Kremlin has many ways of stopping Khrushchev without all the fuss and publicity that is accompanying publication in the West.

The controversy has brought Khrushchev back into the spotlight after years of obscurity. For the first time since shortly after his ouster, his name appeared in the Soviet press — as a signature on his denial that he sent any memoirs to any publisher, in the East or the West.

No Firm Denial

The vague wording of his statement and its failure to deny that he had prepared any memoirs only added to the mystery, however.

An early theory was that the memoirs were taken abroad by Victor Louis, an enigmatic Soviet citizen who frequently seems to serve as an East-West go-between. A Scandinavian report that Louis stayed in a Copenhagen hotel at the same time as two Time-Life editors last summer seemed to back up this theory.

Louis denied any connection with the project, however, and there are many who feel he is being truthful. They reason that he is too obvious a channel and that his presence in Copenhagen was an international diversion

from the real go-between.

Theories abound that the Soviet secret police had a hand in the matter for unclear reasons. Other speculation suggests that some internal Soviet political split or fractional rivalry was involved.

Another version is that the publication would somehow serve the purposes of the Communist party and its 24th Congress next March.

No solid basis for any of these versions has been established. Until one is, the speculation is likely to go on and on.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
27 NOV 1970

THE KHRUSHCHEV PAPERS

It was never safe for a reader to judge a book by its cover. Now you can't even be sure of the author, at least if he is purported to be a former Soviet premier like Nikita S. Khrushchev. His alleged memoirs are being published by Life magazine in a swirl of controversy.

Time Inc., which publishes Life, has refused to say where it obtained the Khrushchev material, which it calls his authentic reminiscences. Before their publication, Khrushchev denounced them as a "falsification." So did Svetlana, the emigre daughter of Khrushchev's old buddy, Stalin, after she read the first installment.

In the absence of any convincing proof of authorship, some Western students of Kremlin psychology have advanced an involved theory that the memoirs really were produced by KGB, the Soviet secret police. The idea is that their publication in the West would discredit Khrushchev and those of his men still in positions of power. It would also, so runs this theory, help destroy the reputations of all other Russian writers whose works are published clandestinely in the West.

As if possibly stung by an arrow that struck too close to home, Izvestia, the Soviet government newspaper, countered this theory with the contention that the fraudulent memoirs were fabricated by KGB's American counterpart, the Central Intelligence Agency.

If he were still alive, this would be the moment for Ian Fleming to appear on the scene, brush aside the KGB and CIA as contenders for the honors of authorship, and claim them for his own creation, James Bond. If you are going to have a ghost writer for Khrushchev, you might as well use a superspy who could also write.

STATINTL

WARREN, OHIO
TRIBUNE CHRONICLE

E - 40,058

NOV 27 1970

Lively Nonperson

Whatever is behind the unusual manner in which former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's book is being published in the West, the mystery has become almost as intriguing as anything the book might contain.

Khrushchev has been a nonperson in the Soviet Union since he was removed from power. His name never appears in the propaganda organs, and the former premier has made only one or two personal appearances since his ouster.

Soviet citizens, officially at least, did not know the former premier had prepared his memoirs until a notice was circulated by Tass in which Khrushchev supposedly claimed the forthcoming publication of his work was a "fabrication."

"I have never passed on memoirs of this kind to foreign publications," Khrushchev said in his statement. "I did not turn over such materials to Soviet publishers, either," he added.

The London Times, which is publishing the memoirs, says it believes the entire 400,000-word text is in the hands of the KGB, the secret police, which the paper says, "for reasons of its own sold excerpts to the West."

Adding interest to this conjecture is the fact Khrushchev was one of those responsible for having Beria, former KGB chief, executed. Thus, the mystery about Khrushchev's writings — or tape recordings, as some believe them to be — is surrounded by fascinating possibilities, possibly including another power struggle between the secret police and the present Kremlin rulers.

About the only way the pudgy ex-ruler could possibly top all, this is if he said in his memoirs he was actually a CIA agent. Even the rumor mill has not suggested that.

Russ Hit CIA on Nikita

(From Tribune Wire Services)

MOSCOW, Nov. 24—Izvestia charged today that the reminiscences of former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev being published abroad are fraudulent and suggested that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had a hand in creating them.

The government newspaper said the Khrushchev papers being published in Life magazine belong in a class with "all kinds of false memoirs" written by the CIA and other western intelligence agencies.

Life, to explain where it obtained the Khrushchev material gives rise to such strong suspicions that "you can sense

the forgery a kilometer away."

The newspaper also quoted Khrushchev's statement last week that "all this is a falsification." It did not discuss the content of the reminiscences.

Izvestia termed the Khrushchev memoirs a "propaganda dish cooked up in the kitchens of the CIA."

"No matter how hard the cooks in foreign kitchens of ideological subversive activities and falsifications try to prepare such a memoir dish which would be credulously taken by the western consumer without much thinking, their products, as a rule, give rise to great doubts even among those who themselves specialize on anti-Soviet concoctions," it said.

(portion missing from newspaper)

Izvestia Attacks Memoirs

By Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Nov. 24—The memoirs attributed in the West to Nikita Khrushchev are falsifications by the "imperialist strategists of ideological warfare," Izvestia said today.

A long Izvestia article seemed to echo an editorial in Pravda yesterday that demanded firmer ideological training for the struggle against bourgeois subversion.

This suggested to some observers that the Kremlin was genuinely concerned lest the memoirs' insights into Soviet leaders' guilts and flaws weaken the ideological dedication of Soviet citizens.

The memoirs will not be published here, but their existence and an idea of their contents seems known to many more Muscovites than usually talk about news broadcasts from abroad.

The article also fanned speculations about spy story aspects of the memoirs and the possibility that faction-fighting in the Kremlin helped to get them out of the Soviet Union—if they were indeed authentic.

Izvestia compared the Khrushchev reminiscences to memoirs falsely attributed to the late foreign minister Maxim Litvinov and published in the West; to the Penkovsky papers, purported notes by a Soviet spy that were later alleged to have been shaped by the CIA; and to a book by the late Soviet economist Eugen Varga whose authenticity has yet to be resolved.

"The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States is directly involved in publication of all kinds of anti-Soviet purposes," the newspaper said.

The London Times, the British publisher of the Khrushchev memoirs, said last week that the KGB, the Soviet secret police, might have had a hand in their transmission to the West.

Izvestia quoted Victor Crankshaw, the British expert who wrote the introduction to "Khrushchev Remembers," as agent BIN-120 of the British Secret Intelligence Service. Strobie Talbot, the American who translated the reminiscences, was labeled a member of the "young cadres of the CIA."

Izvestia quoted Victor

Zorza, Sovietologist of the Manchester Guardian, as an expert who doubted the authenticity of the Khrushchev memoirs. Zorza is usually an object of attack in the Soviet press; Izvestia labeled him an "old agent of SIS" even while quoting him.

[In an "open letter to the Kremlin" last week, Zorza wrote that "there is only one way to establish the truth of this—to make Mr. Khrushchev available for questioning" by a Westerner.

[Zorza suggested himself for this task because the interviewer should be "one known for his critical attitude to the Soviet Union" and his own writing "has often been described in the Soviet press as hostile" and he has "spent much time nailing down anti-Communist forgeries."]

Crankshaw suggested in his introduction that Soviet officials anxious to oppose the creeping rehabilitation of Stalin must have had a hand in getting the Khrushchev recollections to the West. Western observers in Moscow were inclined to doubt Crankshaw's thesis.

VICTOR ZORZA

A Request to Interview Mr. Khrushchev

An open letter to the Kremlin:

There is absolutely nothing you can do to prevent the Khrushchev memoirs from becoming the publishing sensation of the decade, quite regardless of whether they are genuine or a fake. The more denials are issued from Moscow, the more publicity you will build up for the book and its serialization in the press. And if you threaten to throw out of Moscow the correspondents of the papers which intend to serialize the book — as you threw some out over the publication of the "Penkovsky Papers" — you will only alienate much of western opinion.

It is obvious from the concern you have displayed that you too regard the publication of the Khrushchev "Memoirs" as a most important matter. But, if you accept that there is nothing you can do to prevent publication or significantly reduce its extent, you can still accomplish a great deal if it could be firmly established in the public mind that it is, as the Khrushchev denial describes it, "a fabrication."

It has already been said, however, that the Khrushchev denial settles nothing, because it might have been forced

from him. It has also been argued, as is so often the case with denials, that the words he had used fall short of a complete repudiation of the material said to have come from him. There is only one way to establish the truth of this — to make Khrushchev available for questioning at a press conference. If his state of health prevents this, then he should be made available for an interview. If the interview is given to a Soviet journalist, the result would be greeted in the West with the same skepticism as Khrushchev's earlier denial. He should therefore be interviewed by a western journalist, and one known for his critical attitude to the Soviet Union, one who could not be lightly accused by the publishers of the memoirs of having fallen for "Kremlin propaganda."

Obviously, an interview of this kind would be a considerable journalistic coup. If I were the journalist interviewing Mr. Khrushchev, what I would be after would be the truth. This indeed is one of the reasons why I have long specialized in the study of forgeries used in East-West psychological warfare. Far too many of these have been planted in the world press. Your own psychological warfare departments have

been as active as those of some western countries. Over the years, my personal concern in this has been to preserve the integrity of the press, to show both to newspaper readers and to newspaper writers that they are constantly being got at by psychological warriors who do not shrink from the use of forgery.

Although my own writing has often been described in the Soviet press as hostile, I have spent much time nailing down anti-Communist forgeries. Many of these, as in the early days of the Sino-Soviet dispute, were designed to exploit and to deepen the disarray in the world Communist movement. Your own propaganda agencies were often able to use my articles to show up such forgeries for what they were, where their own word would not have been accepted. As recently as last year, a western intelligence operation succeeded, by the use of forged documents, in causing a diplomatic rift between the Ivory Coast and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Novosti press agency used my study of this incident to show that the document which it was accused of circulating — which caused all the trouble — had in fact been a forgery.

But perhaps the most nota-

ble case concerned the "Penkovsky Papers" in 1965. On that occasion I produced a detailed analysis which showed that the memoirs attributed to Oleg Penkovsky, the top western spy executed a few years before that in the Soviet Union, could not have been wholly authentic. I also traced the parentage of the "Penkovsky Papers" to the CIA. The East-West propaganda battle which raged around the papers at the time ensured, of course, that the book became a best-seller. The diplomatic protests by Soviet ambassadors in the West, the scathing articles in the Soviet press, the outraged denials of the book's authenticity, only served to arouse greater public interest in it.

There is only one good way to fight lies — with truth. If the Khrushchev book is a fake, there are a number of ways in which the truth can be made to prevail, as I indicated in the message which I sent to the foreign ministry's press department in Moscow. However far apart you and I may be politically, we could work together in this matter to establish the truth because we have a common interest in it — provided, of course, that it is the truth that you are concerned about.

Copyright 1970, Victor Zorza

STATINTL

14 SEP 1970

STATINTL

THE PERISCOPE

EAST MEETS WEST

With West Germany busily strengthening ties with the East, the Communists in East Germany are turning their eyes to the West. The Ulbricht government now is lining up embassy-size quarters for its trade mission in London (which doesn't recognize East Germany). And it is "merely a coincidence," say the East Germans in London, that the new West End digs they are eyeing in Belgrave Square are within hailing distance of Bonn's embassy.

NEW JOB, NEW FACES

Washington handicappers are busy picking the man for the Capital's hottest new job, head of the soon-to-be-created Environmental Protection Agency. Two front runners to head the new \$1.4 billion agency are GOP Gov. Raymond Shafer of Pennsylvania and Assistant Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, chief of Justice's Civil Division. The favorite for dark-horse bettors: John Whitaker, President Nixon's chief environmental aide.

A SPY PLANE IS BORN

The JFK "oral history" tapes have added a note to the history of the U-2 spy plane. An interview with a former CIA deputy director dates its origin back to 1952. When the U.S. Air Force said it couldn't photograph a Soviet missile base on the Volga, the CIA persuaded the British to do it, flying from Germany to Iran. London then said it was its first and last such mission. The Air Force still refused to build the plane the CIA wanted, so the agency went to Lockheed on its own and got the U-2.

MOSCOW IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Moscow isn't confining its Middle East "presence" to Egypt. After appeals from the Sudan, just to the south, Soviet arms and technicians have been shipped in to help the Khartoum government in its war on non-Moslem tribesmen. And Russia's powerful presence in Yemen, across the Red Sea from the horn of Africa, is giving Ethiopia's Haile Selassie cause to worry that Soviet aid may become available to his rebellious subjects in Eritrea—25 miles from Yemen.

ELMIRA, N.Y.
STAR-GAZETTE
D - 51,075
TELEGRAM
S - 55,644

SEP 3 1970

Chewing Up a Protest

THE CENTRAL Intelligence Agency should take careful note of the Soviet seizure of 15,000 sticks of American chewing gum, or else it's missing a great chance to make propaganda points against the Communists.

The gum was taken from a U.S. industrial exhibitor who wanted to distribute it at a Moscow trade fair. Gum chewing, it appears, has long been banned in the Soviet Union as a capitalistic vice.

Now suppose the CIA were to smuggle hundreds of thousands—even millions—of sticks of gum behind the Iron Curtain and give them away to Russians and citizens

of satellite countries.

What a perfect protest method for long-suffering oppressed peoples! They could get pleasure from chewing while showing with their chomping jaws what they think of Red dictators (the especially daring could blow bubbles). And if secret police approached, gum chewers could hide the evidence under tables or chairs or, in extreme emergencies, even swallow it.

Of course, this might produce a sticky diplomatic fuss between Moscow and Washington. But it would be worth it to have everybody chewing away for freedom.

22 JUL 1970

LET RUSSIA HAVE IT

Not so long ago youthful Soviet audiences sat in rapt attention at performances of the great Russian classics. But no more. At a recent performance of Chekhov's "Cherry Orchard" in Moscow, the young Russians drank wine from bottles, yelled obscenities, smooched their girl friends, and raised such a racket that the actors quit.

Trud, the labor newspaper, called this display a "devilish disregard and immunity to beauty," an ominous sign of moral decay among Soviet youth. They would rather tune in their transistor radios to non-Russian broadcasts of Western hard rock or buy Beatle records from tourists. Their rapt attention now goes to a Czechoslovakian pop singer who can belt out "The Age of Aquarius" and other songs from the American hard rock musical "Hair."

If the effort to instill "Soviet soul" among the kids is losing out to this tough competition from the West, as the Associated Press reported from Moscow, perhaps the Central Intelligence Agency is overlooking a splendid opportunity. ✓

If the haphazard exposure of America's decadent youth culture thru pirated recordings and black market buys from the occasional tourist has such a devastating effect on Soviet youth, what could a really professional CIA operation accomplish? ✓

Imagine the effect on the Kremlin if the CIA arranged to dump the whole rock musical culture bit, complete with drugs, electronic guitar and long hair, on the Soviet Union. Russia would never be the same. And neither would we. Peace might even return to the United States. Or is our generation gap showing?

STATINTL



Henry J. Taylor

Sino-Soviet issue



AN undisclosed CIA breakthru in Irkutsk, the capital of Eastern Siberia, and confirmed by its agents in Peking, puts the potential Russia-Red China conflict in a startling new light that is clearly causing the Kremlin to burn the midnight oil.

Irkutsk is 3,225 miles and five time zones from Moscow and it's still another 1,500 miles to the Pacific, but Irkutsk polarizes the Kremlin's Far East position.

The guts of the confirmed revelation is the Soviet problem of Manchuria — Manchuria as distinguished from the main body of Mao Tse-tung's Red China.

THE Kremlin achieved this thru Mao Tse-tung and thus achieved what the American Security Council's respected strategist, Stefan T. Possony, calls "history's fourth Manchuria-based conquest of China." But in the bitter rupture with Mao the egg has hit the fan.

It is impossible for Russia to be a truly world power without tremendous strength in the far East. The CIA breakthru in Irkutsk reveals that the Kremlin sees Manchuria (not the body of Mao's China) as the real stake and looks upon Russia as superman trapped in a milk bottle without Manchuria.

The Peking government divides Red China into six economic regions. Manchuria leads them all in electric power, steel, gold, oil, machine tool, etc., output. Altho only fifth in area and population (50 million), it is first in industrial production.

Now, enter the increasing Kremlin problem of Japan. Japan, of course, is in a powerful Far Eastern upsurge. It is the greatest industrial nation in the free world next to the United States. Last November Japan also passed West Germany as the free world's second largest export-trading nation. And in the Irkutsk

breakthru our CIA agents found that the Kremlin's worries are concentrated on any rapprochement between Japan and Red China. For Russia's Far East domination hopes and plans would suffer a complete disaster if a Sino-Japanese rapprochement dominated Manchuria.

Extending from the Irkutsk headquarters, the Soviet Manchurian axis for Russia's position opposite China has always been Khabarovsk, 400 miles north of Vladivostok, the Russian-built port that blocked China from the Sea of Japan. The CIA agents find a command center has been expanded to Choibalsan, in Mongolia, only 75 miles from China's frontier.

MOREOVER, the expansion began long after the highly publicized border incidents in Heilungkiang province on the Manchurian plateau and along the Ussuri River, which is a part of the border — the longest (4,150 miles) border in the world, something like the distance from New York to Honolulu.

Our CIA agents located battle-tested Gen. Vladimir F. Tolubko and Red Army chief of staff Marshal Matvei Zakharov at Choibalsan. Gen. Tolubko was deputy chief of Russia's strategic rocket forces and the principal adviser to the North Vietnamese in Hanoi.

Gen. Tolubko has been given a unified command of three assault groups — the infantry, the armored branch and the air force. The Kremlin normally has about 18 divisions in the area. Our agents now count 52. Nine are mechanized. And Gen. Tolubko, the rocket specialist, has moved a whole development of Soviet missiles into the area.

To us, therefore, the watchword in the Far East is not Red China. It is Manchuria. That Manchuria could involve a preventive war by the USSR against Mao's China is not an automatic conclusion. But, based on the CIA findings, if either Russia or Red China is to pick a fight it appears that it is Russia which would do so and for the seizure of Manchuria.

THE ZHIVAGO MILLIONS

**My deal with the Russians for Boris Pasternak's
rehabilitation—by his publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli**

Dr. Zhivago was published in the West in 1957. Although the book brought Boris Pasternak disgrace in Russia, abroad it rapidly became a major best-seller, earning him an estimated three million dollars. This was held for Pasternak by wealthy Milan publisher, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, a radical, ex-communist critic of Italian society who in 15 years has created one of the world's leading publishing houses. Pasternak, who did not want to give the Soviet authorities a weapon against him by accepting Western royalties, took to sending Feltrinelli notes asking him to pay sums of money as gifts to

various people. When Pasternak died in 1960 apparently without leaving a will, an ugly dispute broke out as to what should happen to the remaining fortune. Olga Ivinskaya, Pasternak's mistress and the model for Lara of the book, was jailed soon afterwards for, the Russians said, illegally receiving some of Pasternak's money. During all this trouble Feltrinelli remained silent. Now he explains for the first time his side of the Pasternak affair and reveals that he recently signed an agreement with the Soviet authorities for Pasternak's fortune to go to Russia in return for rehabilitation of Pasternak's reputation.

DAILY WORLD
12 MAY 1960

STATINTL

Amalrik is no fiction

Los Angeles

Dear ERIK BERT

Is it true that Andrei Amalrik exists and lives in Moscow now, or is it just a fiction?

—N.E.

By ERIK BERT

Andrei Amalrik, the author of "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?" is "living in Moscow or sometimes in a cabin he and Gysel (his wife) have bought for a few rubles on a state farm," according to Henry Kamm, New York Times correspondent, in a preface to the volume. Kamm describes a visit to Amalrik's flat.

The book was reviewed by me in the Daily World of March 18.

It was published this year by Harper & Row, New York and Evanston and Fitzhenry & Whiteside, Limited, Toronto. It "was first published in the Russian language by the Alexander Herzen Foundation . . . Amsterdam . . . The Netherlands," according to a note in the Harper & Row edition.

The Harper & Row dust jacket reproduces a photograph showing Amalrik and his wife picketing what is, according to Kamm, the British Embassy in Moscow in 1968 on behalf of "Biafra."

Amalrik's book has been chosen this month by the Book-of-the-Month Club as an "extra book" which will be sent, it says, "without charge to every Book-of-the-Month Club member who buys another book."

The Book-of-the-Month Club, "as part of its crusading effort in the book's behalf . . . is sending a copy to every college and university library in the United States and Canada, with a suggestion that it be called to the attention of the students and the faculty." So we are informed by a BMC advertising flyer.

The flyer assures us that "the book is being published beyond the Iron Curtain with the author's full approval."

The Book-of-the-Month Club takes this CIA-type project a step

beyond where Harper & Row, the U.S. publishers, left it. A blurb in the flyer, by somebody called Peter Gardner, says Amalrik "invites readers who can afford constructive criticism to write him at Vakhtangov Street 5, Apartment 5, Moscow G-2, U.S.S.R."

Only a dim-wit would be taken in by Amalrik's alleged pining for "constructive criticism." The purpose seems obvious. Amalrik's address is bait, offered to get U.S. addressees from unsuspecting souls who are taken in by either Amalrik, or Gardner, or the Book-of-the-Month Club. The massive distribution projected by the BMC should bring some returns, even on a low percentage-of-returns basis. To what end? Probably, only the CIA knows, and they won't tell.

Peter Gardner is uplifted by Amalrik's anti-socialist, anti-Soviet effort. He wants to believe in Amalrik's "apocalyptic forecast" of the destruction of the Soviet Union. "The recipe for cataclysm already lies there, if Mr. Amalrik's judgment is true," says Gardner.

Gardner would have the Book-of-the-Month Club audience believe that Amalrik, a "serious and courageous thinker who believes in telling the truth," represents a "new, apparently fearless generation of dissent."

That "dissent" is not new. There's a special department in the CIA which cultivates such "idealists" (as C.L. Sulzberger, New York Times foreign correspondent, describes them, in a blurb within the BMC-Gardner blurb).

STATINTL

CIA director wins liberal applause

Henry Brandon

STATINTL

By Henry Brandon
Washington, Saturday

RICHARD HELMS, the CIA's director, has a personal temperament and public position that naturally leads him to avoid publicity. But this week he just couldn't avoid it.

First the CIA felt it had to clear its name of some of the accusations made against its involvement in the Green Berets murder of a Vietnamese double-agent. Then Helms roused the anger of Secretary of State William Rogers for having inspired the report that Soviet officers have asked East European Communist leaders for their reactions should Russia launch a preventive nuclear strike against China's nuclear installations.

Mr Helms' "cover" was blown by the reporter of a Washington evening paper who did not partake in this unusual intelligence "feast" offered by Helms to a handful of reporters. Rogers reportedly was angered because he thought this story played into the hands of Soviet propagandists and could be used as proof by Peking that the US is ganging up with Russia against China. But no one denied the story attributed Helms. It was a classic case of how intelligence and diplomacy can collide.

As to the American public's confusion about all this, it may well find itself in agreement with something Mr Rogers recently said admonishingly to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "It would be very helpful if you will ask yourself what it is that you would do differently than we are now doing, keeping in mind that you may not know what we are doing."

But despite these setbacks, Helms, a modern, shrewd man who has retained a sense of humour, has managed to give his agency the kind of face—without being faceless—that becomes his organisation.

Helms has sought to present the secret intelligence estimates

factually without getting involved in policy-making controversies. And at a time in world history when some of the most important policy decisions depend on the estimates of the enemy's nuclear strategic arsenal, which is perhaps today CIA's most vital task, this is not easy.

Moreover, until the Green Berets affair brought the agency's "cloak and dagger" operations back into the headlines, it was enjoying what must have looked to some a kind of perverse popular sympathy among Congressional liberals because of the restraint of Helms' assessments of the Soviet missile threat when compared to the Pentagon's assessments.

Never before have potential enemies been better informed about each other's current state of military power than today. The great intelligence controversies, therefore, are not so much about the present as about the projections into the future.

Tom Hughes who, before his assignment as minister to the American Embassy in London, was the thoughtful and wittily detached Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research in the State Department, said the other day that "budgetarily significant estimates such as those about Soviet or Chinese missile programmes always exert maximum claims for deference when they are unanimously agreed and when they are convenient for policy. However, when the official estimators split and especially when the split bears conveniently on strongly-argued issues, deference gives way to disputatiousness."

Over the last few months, for instance, Mr Helms and his estimators did not think as highly of the Soviet A B M defences as Secretary of Defence Mr Laird, nor did they subscribe to his initial assertion that the Soviet Union was "going for a first-strike capability—there is no question about that." It made history when Helms and Laird faced each other in secret

session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Helms' diplomatic skills were put to an even severer test when the CIA during the height of the bombing of North Vietnam, sharply contradicted Air Force intelligence about the effect of the bombing on the North Vietnamese war effort. Robert McNamara, the then Defence Secretary, finally decided to ignore his military intelligence and took the CIA reports as his guidance.

There is no doubt today, for instance, that the Russian A B M defence of 64 Golosh missiles covers only Moscow, that the rest of the system is only designed against high-speed aircraft and that most Soviet I C B Ms are still "soft" and not, like the American, in hardened sites.

But to estimate what the Russians will have accomplished by 1975 is much more controversial. In November, 1967, McNamara, declared that on the basis of intelligence information gathered about a series of space tests in progress, the conclusion had been drawn that the tests were aimed at "the possible development of a fractional orbital bombardment system or F O B S."

It raised the spectre of an orbital nuclear bomb being put into operation as early as 1968. Well, to the puzzlement of the intelligence community the tests seem to have been discontinued and all predictions about F O B S are off. There is also absolute certainty that the Chinese have tested medium-range ballistic missiles and war heads to fit them, yet there is no evidence whatsoever that they have any in place.

And so intelligence estimates, despite all the now-fangled gadgets, remain a very fickle business and very often the President receives these estimates with what is called "a footnote" which means a dissenting opinion. It is then up to him to decide between the variety of conclusions that can be drawn from the same piece of intelligence.

Proposal Splits FBI - Katzenbach

By ROBERT S. ALLEN
and PAUL SCOTT



Mr. Allen

STATINTL

Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach is apparently a glutton for punishment.

The former Attorney General has, at his own request, tackled the extremely thorny job of trying to persuade the Senate to approve the long-stalled agreement between the U. S. and Russia to set up consular offices in their countries.

A leading opponent of this treaty is FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. The out-spoken disapproval of the militant anti-Communist has been largely responsible for the Senate' failure to consider this pact, negotiated by the State Department with President Johnson's warm support.

State Department insiders say Katzenbach requested permission to lead a drive for Senate ratification of the consular agreement in order to force a showdown with Hoover over whether internal security or foreign policy should determine relations with the Soviet.

Katzenbach, who singled out Yuri Tchernjakov, counselor at the Russian embassy, as one of the first to be informed of this, argues that now is the time to expand U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and ratification of the treaty would be a tangible and effective step in that direction.

Since taking over the No. 2 position in the State Department, Katzenbach has consistently sided with Llewellyn Thompson, newly appointed Ambassador to Moscow and a leading exponent of developing closer ties with Russia for the purpose of mutually countering Red China.

Hoover, who denounced the consulate treaty from the forum of a House Appropriations Subcommittee, is credited as welcoming a direct confrontation over this issue with his former Justice Department boss.

Aides of Senator Thomas Dodd, D-Conn., leader of the Senate foes of the pact, say Hoover is eager to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee to present a detailed account of how Soviet consulates will be used to increase espionage in the U.S.

A particular Hoover target is Article 19 that grants immunity from criminal prosecution to all employees of Russian consulates. Hoover is expected to present this provision before agreeing to the treaty.

It is claimed by Hoover this is unprecedented in U.S. consular agreements. Such pacts with other countries grant immunity only on misdemeanors, and not felonies.

If this article remains in the treaty, an FBI estimate given Senator Dodd holds that "more than 400 Soviet espionage and Intelligence agents assigned to proposed consulates in New York, Chicago, Detroit and Los Angeles would be guaranteed immunity from prosecution."

Moscow has indicated that if the pact is approved, it will seek to open consulates in these four cities. In contrast to these plans, the State Department intends to open only one in Leningrad.

When the Kremlin initially proposed the immunity provision, Hoover vigorously dissented on the ground it would open the way for Russia to set up a virtual "fifth column" without fear of prosecution.

Under the agreement, the only recourse the U.S. would have in the event a Russian spy was apprehended would be to deport him. Hoover contended this would greatly work to the advantage of the Soviet as the U.S. meticulously bars its consulates from Intelligence activities.

Katzenbach, then Attorney General, overruled Hoover. At the State Department's request, Katzenbach participated in the negotiations on the consular treaty, and reportedly assisted in drafting Article 19.

Senator Dodd has strong bipartisan support in the Foreign Relations Committee in opposing the pact.

Senators Bourke Hickenlooper, Iowa, senior Republican on the Committee, Frank Lausche, D - O., John Williams, R - Del., and Karl Mundt, R-S.D., joined with Dodd in writing a letter to Senator J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., chairman, asking that both Katzenbach and Hoover be summoned to testify when the Committee holds hearings on the treaty in January.

The five senators did this after President Johnson, in a communication to the Committee, announced that "in January I will ask for early congressional action on the U.S. - Soviet consular agreement."

FEB 3 1967

FOREIGN RELATIONS

A Matter of Mutual Advantage

Chairman William Fulbright sent down encouraging notes. Senator Wayne Morse amicably asked just the right leading questions and agreed enthusiastically with nearly everything the star witness said. To Secretary of State Dean Rusk, appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it must have seemed like a remembrance of days past—those halcyon, pre-Viet Nam days when he could be sure that he had a solid majority of the committee behind him. The matter under discussion, a consular treaty with the Soviet Union, might itself have been the cause of some nostalgia, for it has been waiting a long time for ratification by the Senate.

Not that the treaty is so remarkable or so very different from similar pacts the U.S. has with 28 other countries. In its most important provisions, it would simply permit diplomats of both nations to assist their citizens who have run afoul of the law and have been arrested in their travels. What bothered some Senators—and kept the pact in limbo for more than 2½ years—was the fear, amply supported by statements from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, that Soviet officials would use their U.S. consulates as espionage centers.

The Hoover Letters. Hoover's testimony, offered to a House committee in 1965, has been the principal roadblock to ratification. Last week Rusk sought to minimize its impact by citing a letter from the director agreeing that the FBI could handle any increased security problems resulting from the treaty. But Rusk's intent was at least partly vitiated by the grudging tone of Hoover's letter and by a later Hoover letter that South Dakota's Karl Mundt, the treaty's most vocal opponent, brought forth. Though the FBI could take on the increased burden, Hoover conceded to Mundt, its work under the treaty would be "more difficult."

Rusk, for his part, never denied that the Russians might use consulates for spying—in the past decade, 28 Russian officials have either been expelled or arrested for espionage—but noted simply that ten to 15 Soviet consular officials, added to the 452 who already enjoy diplomatic immunity in the Washington embassy and the U.N. mission, would not "add significantly to the risk." Spying, of course, has never been claimed as a Russian monopoly, and Morse asked if the CIA might not enjoy snooping from the proposed U.S. consulate, tentatively slated for Leningrad. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach replied somewhat uncomfortably that, indeed, "the treaty is reciprocal."

A Big Name in Moscow. The consular treaty is the keystone of President Johnson's policy of "building bridges" to the East. Ratification would not only reduce the likelihood of international incidents over infractions by unlucky or unwise tourists (which have increased as larger numbers of American travelers—18,000 last year—visit the Soviet Union); it would also serve as an important spur to other East-West agreements. Though the Russians have said repeatedly that no major breakthrough can come while the U.S. is fighting in North Viet Nam, lesser agreements, notably the treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from outer space, signed in ceremonies in Moscow, London, and Washington last week, can still be reached. Such contacts, said Rusk, "can reduce misunderstandings between our two countries and lead, in time, to international cooperation in areas where we are able to find common interests and mutual advantage."

In the end, whether the treaty passes or fails depends not so much on Rusk, Hoover or President Johnson but, as in all other measures requiring the approval of two-thirds of the Senate, on Minority Leader Everett Dirksen, who controls a pivotal number of Republican votes. At week's end, Dirksen was inclined to be against the treaty, but was clearly open to—and vastly enjoyed—attempts to change his mind. One of the suppliants, he said, was a "young man" from the Soviet embassy. "His come-on was 'Yours is a big name in Moscow,'" Dirksen recounted gleefully, "but I told him I only wanted to be a big name here and preferably in the state of Illinois."

STATINTL

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BOSTON, MASS.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR

N- 177,755

JAN 27 1967

State
of the
nations

Mr. Rusk vs. Mr. Hoover

By Joseph C. Harsch

Washington

In theory the foreign policy of the United States is made at White House and State Department "by and with the consent of the Senate." In practice it now requires the positive endorsement of the director of the FBI.

The case in point is the pending treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union under which consular officers would receive the same diplomatic immunity as embassy officers.

The two principal world powers began negotiating such a treaty in 1959. They managed to get a draft which both would sign by 1964. And in 1965 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave it approval by 19 to 5 votes.

Increase work

But before it came to a vote in the Senate FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover said that opening Soviet consulates in the United States would increase the work load on his men.

That was a statement of fact. No one questions that the FBI must watch Soviet diplomats. Some of them do engage in spying. A consular official might do the same. The more Soviet offices and officers there are in the United States the more FBI agents will be needed to watch them.

But there is another side to the case. It has always been easier for the Soviets to get information out of the United States than for the United States to get information out of the Soviet Union. The Russians can get

they want out of American newspapers, magazines, and official government publications.

At least in theory, therefore, Washington ought to be able to get more useful intelligence value out of a dozen Americans posted to Russia than Moscow could get out of a dozen Russians posted in the United States.

Also, the Russian security police "cover" all Americans in Russia. An American likes to think that his officials in Russia are just as clever as Russians in the United States, hence should require at least as much "coverage."

Compensatory side

The record indicates that American intelligence does sometimes score considerable coups off the Russian security police.

Hence it is a fair assumption that if consulates are opened up on a parity basis the extra "coverage" burden on the FBI in the United States will be equaled by the extra burden on their opposite numbers in Russia. The measurement that counts is not the extra burden here, but which side gets the most advantage out of the exchange.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency doesn't talk officially about these things, but the word is around that they think we would win on the exchange. The State Department does too, but prefers to make the case for the treaty. We need the treaty to help protect the American tourists

But at this point politics enters the equation. Mr. Hoover has declined to talk or write about the compensatory side of the case on the ground that the FBI does not express opinions on legislation. He sticks to the accurate fact that a Soviet consulate would increase the work load on the FBI.

Efforts have been made to extract from him the positive opinion that there are compensatory advantages. He has gone so far as to say that facts stated in the second paragraph of a letter by Secretary of State Dean Rusk are "correctly stated." That paragraph named the compensating factors. But Mr. Hoover has never allowed himself to give quotable positive approval.

Needed majority

The net effect has been to leave in the hands of the opposition the priceless possession of the original Hoover position. They represent him as being opposed to the treaty. He has never repudiated them.

The gathering of intelligence overseas is the function of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), not of the FBI. Ratification of the treaty would presumably open up new opportunities for the CIA, but merely put new burdens on the FBI.

It seems unlikely that the President will be able to obtain the two-thirds majority needed in the Senate over Mr. Hoover's unwillingness to give his positive approval to the treaty. The treaty helps State and CIA, not FBI.

STATINTL



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PROGRAM: DREW PEARSON	DATE: February 4, 1967
STATION OR NETWORK: WTOP Radio	TIME: 6:45 P.M.

CIA QUIETLY LOBBYING FOR CONSULAR TREATY

DREW PEARSON: Capitol Hill:-- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE is quietly lobbying for the Soviet-American consular treaty that J. Edgar Hoover is lobbying against. He says his agents will have to keep an eye on the Soviet diplomats in new Russian consulates in the U.S.A., but the CIA figures it will be able to place its agents at new American consulates inside Russia.



Walter
Winchell
OF NEW YORK

STATINTL

SEP 28 1964

CIA's memo to the Prez: "The odds are ten-to-one" that the Reds will win in S. Viet Nam. "Even money" before Nov. 3.

NEW YORK
JOURNAL AMERICAN

OCT 12 1964

LBJ ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION of U.S. companies doing biz with Castro via hundreds of counterfeit Panamanian setups . . . CIA and Defense Dept. sleuths have proof that Red China Chief Mao had a coronary in August . . . Mao was a female impersonator in Canton-Peking plays as a youth . . . Tunisia is sitting on the world's largest oil strike . . . LBJ's European visits will include London and Berlin but not Paris . . . CIA has "round-the-clock" U-2 flights in Sovietnam . . . Defense is testing an inexpensive silent lightweight rocket pistol there. It fires a .45 calibre bullet. No recoil . . . CIA informed Defense that Algerian boss Ben Bella will soon start a border war against King Hassan II in Morocco. The prize: Multi-million-dollar phosphate mines . . .