

Turks affirm NATO link despite U.S. friction

By John K. Cooley
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The Christian Science Monitor

Ankara, Turkey

Turkey's new "law-and-order" Prime Minister, former law professor Nilhat Erim, says Turkey will remain faithful to its alliance with the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

At the same time, political observers here anticipate continuing problems with the United States.

Relations of some 16,000 U.S. servicemen and their families with the Turkish community seem unlikely to be one of the major problems, despite their difficulty and sensitivity.

A Turkish career official, who will serve the new government as he did preceding ones, sees Turkish-U.S. local relations this way:

"There is no denying that the anti-American and the anti-imperialist slogans of the leftists are catching and popular. They have appeal for many, many Turks, and not just student terrorist commandos or leftist intellectuals.

"There is even anti-NATO sentiment in the armed forces—mainly at the level of captains and below."

(Several hundred junior officers were reported transferred for seeking a direct Army take-over of power here. It was this push from the ranks that led the chief of staff, Gen. Memduh Tagmaç, and the other senior service chiefs to issue the ultimatum to outgoing Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to resign and make way for a "strong and effective" civilian government.)

Arms industry lacking

Top Turkish officers well understand that, as one of them said last year, "As long as we don't have our own arms industry we have to get our arms somewhere, so we will never be truly independent." One of the projects, however, being pushed the hardest by the U.S. military assistance and training mission here is development of new Turkish military plants for manufacture of spare parts.

The U.S. military presence began here with President Truman's military-aid program in 1947. In the 1950's there was little or no anti-U.S. sentiment. It grew to a peak in 1969 when the number of U.S. military and dependents here reached about 27,000.

Turks resented ostentatious U.S. living standards symbolized by post exchanges and military post offices. A GI corporal would earn more than a Turkish colonel or college professor.

Sailors from the U.S. Sixth Fleet were stoned, so the fleet ended most port calls at Istanbul and Izmir. Visiting American

dignitaries were given such angry receptions that their airport arrivals had to be kept secret and their cars trailed by busloads of Turkish security police. Six hundred Peace Corps volunteers were sent home. The program, mainly for English teaching, was closed. "Most Turks who know them were very sorry to see them go," says one Turkish official who worked with them. "But there was no denying that their lives were in danger."

Turkish arguments against the American presence are the same as those heard in many other countries around the world. The Turkish Left says the U.S. economic aid program (totaling just under \$3 billion since 1949 but now shrinking fast) is aimed at curbing Turkish economic growth so that Turkey will remain a good market for American goods.

United States technical aid and educational help is branded "cultural imperialism," aimed at keeping Turks within the American and outside the Soviet sphere of cultural influence. There are also the perennial stories that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is cooking up conspiracies to keep conservatives, like ex-Prime Minister Demirel, in power while suppressing "progressives."

The occasional misbehavior of American military men, the leftist newspapers and politicians say, is proof that "Americans look upon us as a colonized colored people—like Haitians or Congolese."

Touchy issue

The Dev Genç (revolutionary youth commandos); recent kidnapers of a black U.S. airman, released him, they said, because "he, too, is a victim of United States exploitation."

Turkey's proud history and the bad record of European attitudes here before the first Turkish Republic help make Turks hypersensitive about any suggestion that they are regarded as inferiors, ethnically or culturally.

Soviet diplomats, keenly aware of these factors, keep Moscow's approach here studied and cool.

There is no attempt at a "hard sell" of Soviet propaganda for communism. This is left to the radio station in Leipzig, East Germany, of the outlawed Turkish Communist Party. Its listening audience is not large, though Turks, dissatisfied with the slowness of their own state television to provide full service, tune to Communist Bulgarian broadcasts in Turkish, among others.

More than \$300 million in Soviet industrial aid here since the cautious Moscow-Ankara rapprochement began in 1964 is the largest tangible Soviet stake in Turkey.

The Russians have shown high irritation over Turkish failure to return the Lithuanians who hijacked an Aeroflot airliner last October. But Moscow has not threatened to cancel contracts or take other reprisals so far.

"There is no getting around it," says a Turkish student of history. "Russia has been our hereditary enemy for centuries. This is not easy to overcome, and no Turk can forget it completely."

Gen. Muhsin Batur, Turkish Air Force commander, put it another way: "I do not believe we can survive in this region with our own strength. We have to enter one of the blocs, and this cannot be the east bloc."

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The Missile Gap Controversy*

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The disputes surrounding the formation of military policy are not famous for their clarity, yet, even so, the controversy over the missile gap stands out as a muddled issue. The controversy arose in the late 1950s as a result of intelligence estimates that between 1960 and 1964 the Soviet Union might have more intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) operational than would the United States. Assuming the existence of a missile gap, opponents of the Eisenhower administration argued the existence of a deterrence gap, that Soviet supremacy in ICBMs was so great that the American strategic forces could be eliminated in a single massive attack. Administration spokesmen generally conceded the missile gap but denied a deterrence gap on the grounds that the American strategic forces were too numerous and varied to be eliminated by a single attack and that the leaders of the Soviet Union were aware of this fact.

We now know that the administration's contention that a missile gap did not necessarily imply a deterrence gap was never tested, since the missile gap itself never developed. Therefore it

* I acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Bruce M. Russett, Morton H. Halperin, and especially H. Bradford Westerfield.

is almost impossible to evaluate the question of the deterrence gap, and we shall not endeavor to do so here—although, as the administration quite rightly pointed out, this rather than the missile gap was the relevant issue.

The missile gap was the result of a deliberate decision by the Eisenhower administration. The United States had many more strategic bombers than did the Soviet Union.¹ However, the Russians had recognized before the United States did the importance of the ballistic missile as a delivery system for hydrogen weapons,² and they appeared to be ahead in developing this new weapon which might neutralize the American advantage in manned aircraft. It was obvious that the United States, to meet the challenge, would have to develop a ballistic missile; the question

21 OCT 1970

Russ Warn Turkey: Return Hijackers

BY FRANK STARR
[Chief of Moscow Bureau]

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

MOSCOW, Oct. 20—The Soviet government tonight warned that Turkish-Soviet relations may suffer if the father and son who hijacked a Soviet airliner to Turkey last week are not handed over.

Reports from Turkey said a lower court had ruled against extraditing the two, identified as Lithuanians Fransizskas Koreivo, 46, and his son, Argedas, 15, on the ground that their act was a political one in search of asylum. Reports said a final decision could take a week.

In the hijacking last Thursday a stewardess, Nadezhda, Kurchenko, 19, was killed and one crew member was seriously wounded. The two-engine plane and 46 passengers have been returned to the Soviet Union.

Propaganda Drive Begins

A full-fledged propaganda campaign has blossomed here with papers carrying "demands of indignant Soviet Citizens that the criminals-murderers be tried in a Soviet court."

The official government newspaper Izvestia tonight implied that the United States and its Central Intelligence Agency had intervened to prevent their extradition.

Izvestia cited as the basis for the charge of CIA intervention the arrival in Turkey of a representative of a Lithuanian liberation organization and addresses in the U. S. found in the hijackers' luggage.

"But is it in Turkey's national interest to cast shadows on relations with a neighboring

nation for the sake of a criminal pseudo-Lithuanian organization which serves the CIA?" Izvestia asked.

May Face Death

There is little doubt that at least the father would face a certain death sentence if extradited.

There is no extradition agreement between the Soviet Union and Turkey, but Izvestia cited a Turkish law which allows extradition. It also cited a recent resolution of the Interparliamentary union which it said calls for extradition.

The hijacking represented the first successful attempt by Soviet citizens to hijack internal flights to foreign countries.

The refusal of Turkish authorities to hand back the hijackers would set a precedent that Soviet authorities certainly would fear.

Stringent new security measures were made at Soviet airports. However, Soviet authorities still refuse to allow foreign airline representatives to search passengers, arguing that no foreign official has the right to conduct security checks in Russia.

YANKS IN TURKEY

A PROBLEM OF VISIBILITY

ROBERT M. FRESCO

Mr. Fresco has just returned to this country after three years with the Foreign Service in Turkey.

In the Middle East recently, America has been beset by the troubles of Job. Egypt is now a Russian camp; Soviet naval strength in the eastern Mediterranean nearly equals that of our own Sixth Fleet; relations with the Arab states are almost nonexistent; we have gained the contempt of our closest European friends, by backing the sleazy Greek junta willy-nilly. The next explosion may occur in Turkey.

This September the last of more than 500 Peace Corps volunteers will leave Ankara, virtually forced out of the country by the anti-American climate. Most of those volunteers had taught English at universities in Ankara and Istanbul. Last winter, students in one department after another boycotted the classes, saying they would not return until all the volunteers, whom they called CIA spies, and other foreign teachers were removed from the classrooms. Volunteers were threatened with violence. In Istanbul, a classroom was invaded by leftist students and a British teacher badly beaten. Although the conservative government of Prime Minister Demirel insisted the volunteers were still welcome, it was considered politically unwise to take their side publicly against student leaders. The volunteers themselves voted not to teach in faculties where they were not wanted. In May, Peace Corps Director Jack Corry announced the decision to close out operations completely.

After World War I, Mustafa Kemal fashioned the modern state of Turkey from the battered wreck of the Ottoman Empire. He emancipated women, adopted the Western alphabet and dress, tried to suppress the Islamic clergy and embarked on a program of literacy and industrialization to pull Turkey into 20th-century Europe. But when he died in 1938 at the age of 57, Kemal left his work half done. The greatest strains in Turkish society derive from incomplete Westernization. Whether on the Center or the Left, urban, educated Turks call themselves Kemalists. Outside of Russia and China, this is the world's most atheistic elite. Many no longer think of themselves as Moslems. Miniskirts and Marxism abound at Istanbul and Ankara universities. The granddaughters of veiled harem favorites practice law and medicine. Arabic words are purged from the vocabulary and replaced by those derived from French. Although Maoism gains favor among the young, the dominant spirit today is Gaullist—Turkey should be friendly to the West, but without formal military ties.

This group of university intellectuals and professionals, upper civil servants and army officers, comprises less than 5 per cent of the population. Another 15 per cent is in the middle class: government clerks and businessmen. But in the villages and small towns, where 80 per cent of the population still lives, life has altered little from centuries past. Women wear the traditional baggy trousers and cover their faces from strangers. Few attend school, and the majority of village women remain illiterate. The Imams, the priests, hated by the city elite, still

wield tremendous power over education and morals. Villagers are devout Moslems; more than 50,000 made the pilgrimage to Mecca last year. Under pressure from the rural clergy the Demirel government has bent the spirit, if not broken the letter, of the Kemalist-inspired constitution by constructing dozens of religious schools throughout the country in the last five years. The fact that the United States openly supports this government has done little to endear the resident Americans to the secular, urban elite.

But the primary cause for anti-American feeling is our continued military presence in Turkey. On the basis of Turkey's neutrality in World War II and the not so secret pro-German feeling of some of its leaders, Stalin in 1946 demanded that the Turks hand over several eastern provinces and control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the Soviets. The threat was hardly new. In the past 300 years Russia and Turkey have fought thirteen wars over Russian claims to the Straits. Stalin's challenge came when Greece, next door, seemed destined to fall to Communist guerrillas in a murderous civil war. The American answer was to wrap these two ancient enemies, Greece and Turkey, into an untidy package called the Truman Doctrine. The battleship *Missouri* steamed triumphantly into the Bosphorus and sailors were invited into Turkish homes. His bluff called, Stalin soon dropped his threat. We were the beloved saviors. When war broke out in Korea, the Turks were among the first to send troops. As a reward Turkey, as well as Greece, was admitted to NATO in 1952, and for the first time U.S. troops were stationed on Turkish soil. Turkey was the eastern flank of the alliance, and the half-million-man Turkish army became the shield against Russian penetration of the Middle East.

Today, there are 18,000 U.S. servicemen and their families in Turkey, mostly with the Air Force. They perform two military functions. The air base at Incirlik in southern Turkey is used by the Strategic Air Command. A string of radar and other communications facilities near the Black Sea monitors Russian activity to the north. But many at the American Embassy admit that the airfield and radar stations have only marginal importance in the era of missiles and spy satellites. They also state privately that the 3,000 desk pilots in Ankara, who are the prime irritants, do little more than shuffle papers and manage the PX.

The U.S. Air Force in Turkey is not the Mongol horde. Molesting of Turkish women is unknown; drunken brawls are rare. But whenever pampered foreign soldiers are placed in an underdeveloped country, resentment and jealousy will soon fester.

In Ankara, the airmen do not live on bases but in the city itself. An American sergeant can afford an apartment next door to a senior Turkish university professor, and can buy cheap whiskey and cigarettes, which the professor cannot. There is a thickheaded opinion among our men that the Turks are cooks; an Air Force nurse in Ankara recently remarked of a co-worker, "There's only one thing wrong with him: he's a Turk." Noncommis-