PARIS, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR
27 Nov. - 3 Dec 1972

[redacted]

HEROINE : LES POURVOYEURS

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Michel R. Lamberti et Catherine Lamour ont fait le tour du monde pour remonter toutes les filières qui mènent aux vrais patrons de la drogue

« *Si nous ne venons pas à bout de ce fléau, c'est lui qui viendra à bout de nous* », s'exclamait, le 7 juin 1971, le président Nixon devant les dizaines de millions de téléspectateurs. Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste privilège de compter le plus grand nombre d'héroïnomanes du monde : plus d'un demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent mille pour la seule ville de New York. Plus de 50 % des crimes perpétrés dans les grandes villes sont directement liés à la drogue : on tue pour se procurer l'argent nécessaire à l'achat d'une dose d'héroïne.

Le phénomène n'est pas seulement américain : tous les pays européens voient croître à une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de leurs héroïnomanes. En France, où la pénétration de la drogue n'a été sensible qu'à partir de 1968, on en compte déjà vingt mille. Et le ministère de la Santé estime que le pays pourrait compter cent mille héroïnomanes en 1976.

Couper la source

La drogue n'est plus un simple problème de police. Partant du principe évident, exposé dernièrement à un journaliste américain de « U.S. News and World Report » par l'ancien directeur des Douanes américaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et selon lequel « *on ne peut pas devenir toxicomane si l'on ne trouve pas de stupéfiants* », Washington a décidé de remonter à la source, c'est-à-dire à la production même de l'opium, dont l'héroïne est un dérivé.

Couper la source d'approvisionnement des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les affaires des pays producteurs : de policière, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est devenue politique. Se posant une fois de plus en « gendarmes du monde » mais, cette fois, pour une cause dont personne ne songe à discuter le bien-fondé, les Etats-Unis se sont lancés dans une croisade que d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouée à l'échec.

On produit, en effet, chaque année, dans le monde, assez d'opium pour approvisionner les cinq cent mille héroïnomanes américains pendant cinquante ans : deux à trois mille tonnes, dont la moitié seulement est destinée à l'industrie pharmaceutique. Le reste passe sur le marché entre les mains des trafiquants qui approvisionnent les fumeurs d'opium et les héroïnomanes.

Les trafiquants peuvent se fournir à deux sources différentes :

● 1) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est légale et contrôlée par l'Etat, mais où une partie de la récolte échappe aux autorités administratives.

● 2) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est en principe interdite, mais qui n'ont pas les moyens matériels et politiques — ou le désir — de faire respecter cette loi.

La Turquie, troisième producteur mondial, entrait dans la première catégorie. Jusqu'à ce que le gouvernement d'Ankara décide de proscrire la culture du pavot sur tout le territoire turc à partir de 1972, 25 % de la production d'opium était détournée vers le marché clandestin, alors qu'elle aurait dû, en principe, être entièrement achetée par l'Etat. Ce pays n'est pas le seul à connaître pareil problème, une enquête effectuée par le service stratégique des renseignements du Bureau des Narcotiques américain (B.N.D.D.) donnait, pour 1971, les chiffres suivants :

	Production (1) écoulée sur le marché licite	Production écoulée sur le marché clandestin
Turquie	150	35 à 50
Inde	1 200	250
Pakistan	6	175-200
Iran	150	?
U.R.S.S.	115	?
République populaire de Chine	100	?
Yougoslavie	0,83	1,7
Japon	5	—
Triangle d'or (Thaïlande - Birmanie - Laos)		750
Afghanistan		100-150
Mexique		5-15

(1) En tonnes.

Contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait penser, les « fuites » ne sont pas proportionnelles à l'importance de la production licite ni à celle des superficies cultivées en pavot. Elles dépendent du plus ou moins grand sous-développement administratif du pays concerné et de la capacité des autorités locales à exercer un contrôle effectif sur les paysans, au moment des récoltes.

Pourtant, même des contrôles rigoureux ne suffisent pas à éviter les détournements, compte tenu de la différence des prix pratiqués sur le marché officiel et sur le marché clandestin. L'exemple de l'Inde le prouve, où, en dépit d'un système de contrôle gouvernemental cité en exemple par toutes les instances internationales, les fuites s'élèvent à 18 % de la production totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait échapper près de 70 % de sa production. Le Pakistan, enfin, qui produit légalement six tonnes d'opium, contribuerait pour près de deux cents tonnes à l'approvisionnement des trafiquants.

Le pavot partout

Dans une deuxième catégorie de pays la production de l'opium est illégale. Il n'existe évidemment aucun organisme d'Etat chargé de contrôler une production qui, en principe, n'existe pas. Clandestine la récolte d'opium est entièrement écoulée sur le marché parallèle. Selon le B.N.D.D. ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent cinquante à mille tonnes à l'approvisionnement du trafic.

D'autres régions, sur lesquelles on ne possède absolument aucune information, produisent de l'opium en quantité appréciable : le Népal et, probablement, la Syrie et le Kurdistan irakien. On signale aussi l'apparition de champs de pavots en Amérique du Sud. Contrairement à ce que l'on a souvent affirmé, la culture du pavot ne requiert pas de conditions géographiques ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle réclame seulement une main-d'œuvre abondante et bon marché car la récolte demande beaucoup de soins et de minutie.

Nombre de pays qui ne sont pas de producteurs traditionnels d'opium pourraient, s'ils le voulaient, se mettre à cultiver du pavot. C'est le cas tout récent du Japon. La production d'opium a, de ce fait, tendance à croître en fonction de la demande et pourrait encore augmenter considérablement. Des indices nombreux mo

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BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
26 OCT 1972

Burma Heroin Hoard Destined for U. S.

By ROBERT KAYLOR

BANGKOK, Thailand — (UPI) — Narcotics traffickers have stockpiled hundreds of pounds of pure heroin in North Burma and are trying to establish a connection to lucrative markets in the United States.

In the meantime, U. S. and Thai narcotics agents who have tightened their grip on routes for heroin and opium traffic are watching from across the border.

Informed sources here who have watched the stockpiles build up, say a wary standoff has developed in the "Golden Triangle" the border area of Thailans, Laos and Burma where the Southeast Asian narcotics trade is centered.

INTELLIGENCE reports indicate that narcotics traffickers—mostly overseas Chinese—have considered killing U. S. narcotics agents to clear the bottleneck.

"Eventually they'll start to move the stuff," said a local source, "and things will start to happen. The question is when."

Sources who monitor the narcotics traffic say producers in North Burma have on hand several hundred pounds of neatly packaged, pure grade no. 4 white heroin, which looks like soap powder.

Manufactured in refineries that are in some cases almost in sight of the Nam Ruak River forming the boundary between Burma and Thailand more than 400 miles north of Bangkok, the heroin was intended for the American GI market in South Vietnam, the producers were caught unawares by the U. S. withdrawal, the sources say.

TRAFFICKERS ARE now looking for connections in other markets, including the United States, which now gets an estimated 5 to 10 per cent of its heroin from Southeast Asia.

"These boys haven't even tapped the U. S. market yet," said one source here.

That they are interested was demonstrated by the arrest of two Chinese who sold a suitcase full of heroin to an undercover narcotics agent in New York's Chinatown this summer. The heroin was traced to Southeast Asia.

Narcotics authorities estimate that about 700 tons of opium are produced each year in the jungled mountains of the Golden Triangle, mostly in Burma. While Thailand and Laos cooperate with the United States in combating narcotics traffic, Burma does not.

THE AUTHORITIES believe half of the opium is used in the area where it is grown and another 200 to 250 tons used in Hong Kong and other places in Southeast Asia where there is a large addict population. That leaves 50 tons or more unaccounted for—enough to produce at least five tons of high-grade heroin.

The major route for the opium has been across the borders into Thailand, then by highway to the Bangkok area and from the Thai coast by fishing trawler to Hong Kong and the rest of the world.

About a dozen U. S. narcotics agents have moved into Thailand, some of them operating in the far northern Thai sector of the triangle.

The Thai police last April formed a 30-man special narcotics operation (SNO) to work in North Thailand. While U. S. and Thai agents cannot work across the Burmese border, they have formed their own network of informants and also enlisted the aid of the CIA, which has been active in the area for the past 20 years.

SINCE SNO STARTED work it has seized more than five tons of opium, heroin and other drugs and broken up smuggling networks which used dummy gasoline tank trucks and opium runners in Thai army officers' uniforms to get past checkpoints.

Much of the SNO success has been through cash awards running up to $2,000 for large drug seizures. The money is paid to the Thai investigators who make the haul, and they distribute it among their informants.

Sources here say the reluctance of traffickers to move large quantities of opium since two big seizures in July totaling more than 6,000 pounds is proof the system works.

Heroin is still plentiful in Bangkok and at the U. S. military bases in Thailand, as was discovered by a more efficient system of testing GI's which went into effect in July.

TESTS SO FAR indicate that up to 1,575 of the approximately 45,000 GI's in Thailand use heroin, compard with about 255 discovered earlier. A vial of pure heroin that will sell for $500 in the U.S. can be bought for $5 in Thailand.

Authorities say big-time traffic through Thailand has dried up temporarily, however. They cite the crackdown and temporary loss of a big market as the cause.

"What keeps a connection together is a combination of faith and trust in the guy you're dealing with," said one source here. "It takes time to build that up."

The sources added that heroin is a product that does not deteriorate sitting on the shelf, and that the men who run the Golden Triangle drug traffic can afford to wait.

WASHINGTON POST
2 2 OCT 1972

Thailand Buildup Reported

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States since May has sent about 3,000 Marines, mostly airmen, to Nam Phong as part of a big shift in military personnel from South Vietnam to Thailand.

Military sources in interviews said Nam Phong in northern Thailand is fast taking on the characteristics of Danang during the early days of the Vietnam war—complete with Marine riflemen patrolling outside the base.

Officially, the Pentagon lists an American military presence of 45,000 men in Thailand, but does not break the total down by service or area.

"I wouldn't quibble with 3,000," said a Pentagon official yesterday when told this was an estimate Marines gave for their number at Nam Phong.

As many as 3,000 Marines plus a varying number of Seabees, with one recent estimate of 2,000, constitutes a much bigger American presence than has been described previously by the U.S. command.

The Pentagon has been saying in recent weeks that there are about 45,000 American servicemen in Thailand. It does not break them down by service. Defense officials have said about 1,000 must be Marines since that number had been transferred from South Vietnam to Thailand.

Back in June, the U.S. command announced that Marine pilots and planes had been sent from Danang in South Vietnam to Nam Phong to gain greater security. But few details were given out as a tight secrecy lid was clamped on the old air strip at Nam Phong formerly used by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Interviews with military sources in Washington and elsewhere brought these other disclosures about the buildup at Nam Phong:

• Thai soldiers have been accompanying Marines on armed night patrols outside the perimeter of the base ever since summer, when an American and a Thai patrol mistakenly shot at each other in the dark. The Thai government has steadfastly insisted that it allows no American combat operations on its soil—as distinguished from providing space for U.S. airplanes which go into combat outside Thailand. Pentagon officials have maintained that providing base security does not constitute ground combat.

• Marine planes, airmen and support forces went to Nam Phong not only from South Vietnam but from Japan and Okinawa as well. The contingent from Japan were F-4 fighter-bombers from the Marine Air Group 36 at Iwakuni—a fresh indication that Thailand will build up as an American outpost as the U.S. military presence in Japan declines.

• Mortars are frequently fired at Nam Phong. This could indicate that Nam Phong will draw fire just as Danang did after the Marines landed there in 1965 to secure the air strip.

At the Pentagon, Cmdr. Joseph J. Lorfano, public affairs spokesman on Southeast Asia, said yesterday that there have been "no sapper attacks" or other hostile activity at Nam Phong.

A Marine trooper from Nam Phong insisted that 122 millimeter mortars were being fired at the base regularly, though inaccurately. He said his superiors told the men the explosions were dud bombs being detonated. "I know incoming when I hear it," said the Marine in discounting the no hostile action claim.

• Seabees are building a hospital at Nam Phong instead of relying on medical facilities at the Udorn air force base some 40 miles away. The hospital testifies to the permanent plans for the base and, in the view of some Marines, the possibility of combat in the area.

Task Force Delta was the name of the operation to refurbish Nam Phong for the First Marine Air Wing. Two companies of Marine combat troops from the Third Battalion of the Third Marine Division flew into Nam Phong on June 3 and 4. The North Vietnamese offensive was threatening Danang at the time.

The combat troops were supposed to protect the two battalions of Seabees flown in a few days ahead of them to improve the sparse base of overgrown bush and four buildings. But Marine riflemen found themselves spreading wire around the base besides going out on patrol.

A Thai army training base is also at Nam Phong in a separate compound. The American security effort is concentrated on protecting the 100 or so Marine F-4 and A-6 fighter-bombers and helicopters at the base.

Nam Phong is directly west of the demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam, putting its planes in easy combat range of both Vietnams and Laos. The base also has a few C-130 transports converted for refueling fighters, thus extending the range of those based at Nam Phong.

One source estimated that the troop presence at Nam Phong has been as high as 6,000, with two battalions of Seabees at about 900 men each; an air wing of 4,500 people; and the rest Marine riflemen and military police.

In addition to the buildup at Nam Phong, the U.S. Air Force earlier this year reopened its fighter-bomber base at Takhli, north of Bangkok, home of the F-111 recently sent back into action.

Another part of the buildup in Thailand this summer was the doubling of B-52s at Utapao to about 80 planes. The future status of U.S. air strength in Thailand is one of the issues in the current peace negotiations, but not the paramount one.

CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

E - 434,849
OCT 19 1972

U.S. fights Asian tradition in its drug war

Second in a series

By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service

CHIENGMAI, Northern Thailand — Not long ago a visiting American congressman asked a U.S. narcotics agent in Bangkok if the hill tribesmen of Southeast Asia had any idea of the havoc their product, refined to heroin, was creating in the streets of New York.

For a moment the agent was speechless at the question. Then taking a deep breath, he replied: "Sir, they never heard of New York."

They never heard of Bangkok, either.

The question is indicative of the wall of ignorance that separates most Americans from the history and realities of the drug traffic in Southeast Asia.

FOR FOUR centuries, beginning with the aggressive prodding of greedy European colonialists, Asians have been cultivating the poppy that yields the opium that yields the morphine that yields the heroin that is now finding its way into the United States.

Up through World War II and beyond, every Southeast Asian government had its opium monopoly. Everywhere it was a major source of revenue, like other government monopolies including salt and tobacco.

In the middle of the last century the British fought a war to win the right to sell opium to the unwilling Chinese. Hong Kong had its own opium "farm." And not until 1946 did the British outlaw the drug traffic in Hong Kong.

FOR THE ASIANS opium was, and still is, an escape from the pains of reality just as alcohol is an escape for so many Americans. Some Asians become addicts — a growing number, in fact — just as some Americans become alcoholics.

Opium is a pain-killer in more ways than one. An American woman may swallow a pill to ease the pain of her menstrual period. The hill tribe woman of Southeast Asia's golden triangle — the upper reaches of Burma, Thailand and Laos — will smoke a pipe or two of opium.

Opium also happens to be the only cash crop of the hill tribe people, their only means of acquiring some of the minor luxuries of the outside world. Their economy is as dependent on opium as the lowlanders are on rice.

DURING all those earlier years, to Americans opium was an Asian affair. But two years ago, when heroin addiction hit epidemic proportions among American GIs in South Vietnam, the Asian narcotics traffic suddenly became America's business.

Now the GI market almost has vanished with the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. But the drug problem lingers on — a legacy of the Vietnam War as the heroin traffickers seek new outlets in the United States to replace their lost GI market.

At the same time President Nixon has declared global war on the international drug traffic. As a result, stopping drugs has become almost as important as stopping communism among U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

IN AT LEAST three countries — Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam — all the resources of U.S. embassies have been thrown into the campaign to choke off the flow of heroin to the United States.

Embassy political officers, accustomed to routine diplomacy, have been diverted to full time narcotics assignments. "One way or another, we spend at least 50 per cent of our time on narcotics," said a senior embassy officer in Bangkok.

"Hell," said a young foreign service officer recently transferred to narcotics work. "I love it. It's a lot better than shuffling papers."

THE CIA, stung by charges that it has contributed to the drug traffic by collaborating with opium-growing hill tribesmen and corrupt Asian officials, has thrown all its intelligence-gathering resources into the antidrug campaign.

On top of all this, agents of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs have made their appearance in Asian capitals from Tokyo to Hong Kong to Bangkok in increasing numbers.

For 10 years there was one U.S. narcotics agent in Bangkok. Today there are 12 operating in all Thailand, "making cases" in co-operation with Thai police.

SINCE Thailand is the natural conduit for drugs coming from the golden triangle, the biggest effort has been centered there.

"When the heat is on from the White House," said one U.S. official, "you jump. No one questions the desirability of cutting off the drug traffic, although some of us wonder if there isn't an element of overkill in the current campaign."

If there is an element of "overkill" — and that is debatable — the reasons are understandable. Mr. Nixon is running for re-election and the "Asian drug connection" could easily become an explosive campaign issue.

Next: The drug traffic — romantic and deadly.

DAILY WORLD
18 AUG 1972

[redacted]

Free (drug) enterprise

Perusal of news dispatches about the Federal "World Opium Survey 1972" discloses several deficiencies in the report.

It does not deal with the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in conspiring in the opium traffic in the "golden triangle" in Burma, Thailand, and Laos. That CIA role is dealt with in detail in Alfred W. McCoy's "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," published yesterday by Harper & Row.

The Survey is, thus, a coverup for the CIA's drug operations.

The Survey does not deal with the drug traffic in Saigon where several of President Thieu's generals are major operators. That traffic has been protected by the U.S. command. One consequence has been the massive drug addiction among GIs, addiction which has returned to the U.S. with them.

The Survey reveals one useful consequence of President Nixon's visit to Peking. For years the U.S. Narcotics Bureau, and Harry Anslinger, its chief, carried on a slanderous war against the Peoples Republic of China as the main source of the world's opium traffic. The present report admits, in effect, that that was a lie. There is "no reliable evidence that China has either engaged in or sanctioned the illicit export of opium or its derivatives," it says.

The Survey concedes that, world-wide, government "seizures... represent only a small fraction of the illicit flow."

The obvious conclusion is that the flow of opium through the capitalist world is made possible by massive corruption of government officials, police agents, etc.

The inspiration for the massive business in opium is the same one that inspires other business — profit. In this respect, it is a shining example of "free enterprise."

NEW YORK TIMES
6 AUG 1972
STATINTL

[redacted]

Drug Traffic:

Furor Over the Asian Pipeline

WASHINGTON—A bill to cut off $100-million in military and economic aid to Thailand as a penalty for failing to halt the flow of narcotics to the United States will come before the House on Tuesday. It is unlikely that the measure will ever become law—it has already been defeated in the Senate—but it does reflect a furor in Washington over official handling of the Southeast Asian drug traffic problem.

Behind the furor is the fear that a new wave of opiates, especially heroin, is on its way to the United States, particularly from Thailand, which in turn gets the narcotics from Burma.

Until now, the bulk of the illicit heroin supply entering the United States was siphoned off from the 200 tons of opium produced in Turkey. Turkey has promised to stop growing opium poppies by the end of this year. But a number of members of Congress are troubled by the knowledge that some of the 500 tons of opium produced each year by the hill tribes of Burma and neighboring countries could profitably be diverted to the United States.

Moreover, there is suspicion that certain corrupt Thais are pulling the wool over the eyes of officials in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency who are supposed to block the flow of opiates. Or worse, that Americans have also been corrupted.

But many of the legislators who have been digging out "secret documents" and hurling accusations are ill-informed about the realities of the situation.

For a century or more, opium has been grown by the hill tribes in Southeast Asia. It was bought up by the Chinese traders and distributed to the addicts of Asia. Hardly anyone in America cared.

In recent years this pattern has been changed slightly as the main source of the Burmese opium has fallen into the hands of a Chinese named Lo Hsing-han, whose militia of about 1,500 men controls the mule train route to the refineries at Tajilik in southern Burma where the raw opium is converted into morphine base or heroin. The Burmese Government does not interfere with Lo because he also helps them control Communists and other insurgents in the area. Nelson Gross, the State Department's senior senior adviser on narcotics, met Premier Ne Win of Burma last January and has had follow-up conferences at lower levels, but the Burmese have declined outside help and have done little or nothing on their own.

The shipments continue to reach Thailand, which, according to some American officials, faces a situation comparable to that which would confront the United States if Canada made no effort to control narcotics.

Nonetheless, Mr. Gross and William T. Wanzeck, who headed the Southeast Asia regional office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for the past four years, feel that something can be done and is being done to stem the flow.

Mr. Gross and his colleagues argue that their critics have relied heavily on testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate who in four years in Southeast Asia made it his business to find out about the narcotics traffic.

Mr. McCoy makes much of the fact that the opium is carried out of Burma by Chinese Nationalist paramilitary units that at one time were in the pay of the C.I.A. The American officials contend that this is no longer true. They say the two main Kuomintang units operating in Thailand left the narcotics trade last March when they were given land in return for a pledge to give up dope-running and for turning over 26 tons of opium, which was burned.

The Narcotics Bureau claims other achievements:

- They have helped the Thai Narcotics Office to set up special anti-narcotics teams, one of which in the northern area of the country has been responsible for seizing $347-million worth of morphine and heroin since March.
- New technological aid is being given the Thais to help curb the flow of narcotics on trawlers that carry the drugs from Thailand to Malaysia, Borneo, the Philippines and Hong Kong.
- The Thai Government is the first nation to enter into an agreement with the United Nations whereby farmers who give up growing opium will be recompensed. The Thais are contributing $5-million towards the program, the United States $2-million.

As Mr. Gross said last week, "Basically we are trying to anticipate what the narcotics operators are going to do to exploit Southeast Asian supplies. We have agents out. We have some chance of success."

—DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

LOUISVILLE, KY.
COURIER JOURNAL
JUL 31 1972
M - 239,949
S - 350,303

Opinion

U.S. aid for the drug traffickers?

AS PART OF the effort to combat drug abuse—which, according to President Nixon last summer, has "assumed the dimensions of a national emergency"—the administration is committed to an all-out attack on the international narcotics trade. This involves not just the breaking up of the syndicates that process and import the heroin to the United States, but persuading other governments, particularly in Southeast Asia where most of the world's heroin now originates, to come down hard on the growers and marketeers. But is the Nixon administration trying as hard as it could to cut off this profitable trade at its source?

Disturbing evidence is accumulating that it may not be. There is *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,* to be published this fall but excerpted in the July issue of *Harper's* by a young Yale graduate student specializing in Southeast Asian history and politics. This documents the involvement of high government and military officials in Laos and Thailand in the narcotics trade; it even charges complicity by the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA has challenged all the author's allegations, asserting that most of them are without foundation.

'Lever' is hard to use

But there is also the study made last winter by top-level officials of the CIA, the State Department and the Pentagon, and just now disclosed. This report concludes that there is no prospect of cutting off the smuggling of narcotics from Southeast Asia because of "the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam." This conclusion, too, is being discounted by administration officials, who argue that it is out of date and that "substantial progress" has been made in the past four months.

Yet it would be naive to assume that a situation that was so bad could have improved as significantly and as swiftly as all that. Certainly the administration is nowhere near repeating the success it scored last year when it was able to persuade the Turkish government to ban completely the growing and harvesting



Dowling in The Kansas City Star

"The place to start is the other end."

of the opium poppy. In Turkey's case the United States is to help in compensating the thousands of peasant farmers for whom poppy-growing has been an innocent livelihood for centuries and who now must switch to other cash crops. Whether the Turkish government or anyone else is compensating the many middlemen who have grown fat off the opium trade is not discussed publicly.

But the United States has another way of persuading reluctant governments to join the anti-drug campaign. Congress tacked on a provision to last year's foreign aid bill permitting the President to suspend aid to any country that doesn't take action against the drug traffic. The only problem is that suspending aid to the governments of Southeast Asia would virtually end the Vietnam war overnight.

It's a dilemma, to be sure. But it's worth recalling that last winter, when President Nixon was vehemently reiterating this country's commitment to keeping President Thieu in power in Saigon, even though this was the main obstacle to serious negotiations in Paris, the same regime was one of the major factors being blamed by U.S. officials for the continuation of our own "national emergency" in drugs. And that's why we ask: Is the administration trying as hard as it can in the war on drugs, or must that effort still rank way below a certain view of a solution for Vietnam?

AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
July 1972

The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China

By Allen S. Whiting

Abstract: President Nixon's "journey for peace" to Peking has implicitly modified the image of a Chinese Communist aggressive threat delineated by all previous administrations. However, it has not explicitly redefined the administration's assumptions on the Chinese use of force. This has left considerable confusion and unease among Asian and American audiences who accept the concept of massive Chinese military force being deterred from aggression primarily by American security commitments, bases, and force postures extending from Korea and Japan to India. The nine instances wherein the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has crossed customary borders in hostile array during the past twenty-two years provide prima facie evidence for the conventional image of a potentially expansionist regime contained by American commitments and force. However, closer examination of the use of military force by the People's Republic reveals an entirely different situation whereby the government in Peking, in most cases, deployed the PLA in defensive reaction against a perceived threat. The Chinese use of force primarily for defensive deterrence has remained remarkably consistent over twenty-one years, and considerable continuity may be anticipated for at least the next five years.

Allan S. Whiting, Ph.D., Ann Arbor, Michigan, has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan since 1968. He previously taught at Michigan State, 1955–57, and Northwestern, 1951–53. He was a staff member of the Rand Corporation in the Social Science Division, 1957–61; Director, Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East, U.S. Department of State, 1961–66; and Deputy Principal Officer, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, 1966–68. Educated at Cornell and Columbia universities and the recipient of several fellowships, he is the author of Soviet Policies in China 1917–24 *and coauthor of* Dynamics of International Relations; Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?; *and* China Crosses the Yalu.

[redacted]

According to a Gallup poll, in September 1971 more than half the American public saw China as the greatest threat to world peace in the next few years.[1] Nothing has eventuated from President Nixon's self-styled "journey for peace" to Peking to change this perception, nor has the administration given any systematic assurances to the contrary. Instead the Pentagon continues to demand new, complex, and costly weapons systems for the West Pacific, ostensibly to deter potential Chinese aggression. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warns we must prepare to fight two nuclear wars at once, with the Soviet Union and with China.[2] Our Asian allies from Korea to Thailand worry aloud about the credibility of America's deterrence in the aftermath of stalemate and withdrawal from Vietnam, against a rising weariness of military burdens in Asia, manifested by congressional pressures for cuts in military assistance.

American and Asian anxiety over the future use of force by the People's Republic is rooted in recent history. On nine occasions in the past twenty-two years, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has projected China's military power across its borders.[3] In Korea (1950) and India (1962) major war resulted. In Laos (1964) and Vietnam (1965) PLA deployments risked Sino-American conflict. Two crises in the Taiwan Strait (1954–55 and 1958) ostensibly fell within the category of civil war, but nonetheless confronted the United States as protector of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In March 1969 bel-

continued

AUG 1972

[redacted]

U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir

STATINTL [redacted]

ABOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie factory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, headquarters of the National Security Agency.

Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses spanning the complex at regular intervals house specially-trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear irridescent I.D. badges – green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"–980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the DIRNSA building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies –it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Operations Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes of every nation in the world, analyze the de-crypted messages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director

STATINTL [redacted]

continued

26 JUL 1972

Heroin and the War

Alfred McCoy, a Yale graduate student who interviewed 250 people, charges that the Central Intelligence Agency has known of Thai and South Vietnamese official involvement in heroin traffic, has covered up their involvement and has participated in aspects of the traffic itself. The CIA has publicly denied these charges, in the process even persuading Mr. McCoy's publisher, Harper & Row, to let it review his book manuscript before publication. But now there comes an internal government report—done by the CIA and other agencies—on the difficulties of controlling the narcotics trade in Southeast Asia. The report states:

> *"the most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion, and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective suppression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place."*

That is to say, a private report by agencies including the CIA confirms the thrust of charges which the CIA publicly denies. The White House contends the report, completed in February, is "out of date."

Now, we are aware that the Nixon administration has worked with great vigor and much effectiveness to curb the international narcotics trade. The fact remains that the largest supplies of the filthiest poison of them all apparently come from or through Thailand and South Vietnam, if one is to take the CIA's private word—as against its public word—on the matter. Nor should it stretch any reasonable man's credulity to understand that the United States has had to accept certain limitations on its efforts to get those governments to stop drug dealing because it has wanted to ensure their cooperation in the war against North Vietnam. In the final human analysis there is simply no place in the pursuit of honor and a just peace in Southeast Asia for an all-out honest effort to control traffic in heroin. This is the infinitely tragic fact flowing from continued American involvement in the war.

Would heroin addiction among Americans have swollen to its current dimensions and would the amount of heroin reaching the United States from South Vietnam and Thailand have reached its current levels if the war—and power politics—had not gotten in the way of effective American pressure upon the governments in Saigon and Bangkok? If President Nixon needs any further reason to make good his pledge to end the war, this is almost reason enough by itself for what it says about the character of regimes this country has gotten into the habit of supporting—lavishly and indiscriminately—in the name of our "national security" and "world peace."

Rear Guard

[redacted]

U.S. Cites Progress In Asian Drug Fight

By Tim O'Brien
Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House said yesterday that the governments of Southeast Asia are making "substantial progress" in stemming the flow of illicit narcotics to the United States.

Presidential assistant Egil Krogh Jr. told reporters that a cabinet-level report citing corruption and indifference in narcotics enforcement by Thailand and South Vietnam is not up to date.

He said the report, compiled by officials with the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department and Defense Department, was submitted last February, "but in the last four months there has been substantial progress."

A few hours later, however, Sen. Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) introduced a last-minute amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act to forbid further economic and military aid to Thailand "because of its major role in the international narcotics traffic."

The Senate defeated the amendment last night on a vote of 67 to 22.

Hartke criticized President Nixon for failing to withdraw aid to Thailand, "despite a provision of the Foreign Assistance Act that allows the President to suspend aid to any nation that doesn't take action" to halt black market narcotics exports.

The President's inaction, he said, is "in the face of hard evidence that Thailand serves as the conduit for the trans-shipment of opium produced in Southeast Asia, the largest opium-growing area in the world."

Recently published accounts of the pessimistic multi-agency study of Southeast Asian drug traffic said governments of the region were unable and sometimes unwilling to halt the flow of opium and other narcotics.

But Krogh argued that the tide, "can be stemmed in Southeast Asia." He cited increased seizures of heroin "and other substances" in the region and said the problem was being approached in an atmosphere of "mutual cooperation."

In Vietnam, Krogh said the United States has received substantial cooperation from President Thieu on down."

The State Department joined the White House in seeking to play down reports of Southeast Asian reluctance to crack down on narcotics smuggling. Spokesman Charles Bray said progress has been made since the cabinet-level report was filed in February.

He called the report "more retrospective than prospective" in outlook, and was not a State Department report, but "a report to the State Department."

Meanwhile, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) announced that U.S. agents and Thai police sized about $230 million worth of opium, morphine and heroin in two days of raids in Northern Thailand.

According to BNDD director John Ingersoll, the raids netted nearly three tons of opium, along with guns and other equipment.

Yesterday morning, federal drug law enforcers told President Nixon, that the Bureau of Customs and the BNDD had a hand in removing more than 470,000 pounds of narcotics "from world illicit traffic" in Fiscal Year 1972. This, they said in their year-end report, more than doubled the confiscated poundage over 1971.

Marijuana constituted about 94 per cent of the seized narcotics. The administration said arrests of drug dealers rose from 12,497 last year to more than 16,000 during Fiscal 1972. It was reported that the number of addicts seeking methadone treatment has also increased dramatically, though no numbers were cited.

Assistant Treasury Secretary Eugene T. Rossides reported that "the President is pleased that we're on the offensive now, whereas three years ago we were on the defensive."

Myles J. Ambrose, director of the six-month-long Drug Abuse Law Enforcement program, said that "three years ago we were on our own ten-yard line and the other team had the ball. Now we're on the fifty-yard line and we have the ball."

He said that, since its inception last January, his program has produced over 1,000 arrests and identified about 3,000 narcotics pushers.

WASHINGTON POST
20 JUL 1972

A Visit to a Secret American Base in Thailand[redacted]

By Peter Smith
Pacific News Service

PHITSANULOK, Thailand—In a U-shaped bend of a small river about 15 miles east of this northern district capital lies a secret U.S. military training base known as Camp Saritsana.

Near the point where I had been told to turn off the road to find the camp, a Thai waitress in a small restaurant said that there were usually about 1,000 Thai soldiers at the site, but that most had just left. She also told me that 10 or 15 Americans were stationed there, and that planes landed on an average of five times a day.

As I walked along the river away from the highway, the whine of diesel generators guided me until I saw several concrete and wooden buildings, a 100-foot-high water tower, and a generator shed. Further up, a steel suspension bridge carried truck traffic across the river. The scene reminded me of places where I had served in Vietnam and Thailand.

At Saritsana, U.S. Army Special Forces train Thai soldiers for combat in neighboring Laos. Since the early '60s, CIA-financed Meo mercenary armies, led by their most powerful chieftain Vang Pao, have been fighting in Laos, and estimates of the number of Meo men killed run as high as 50 per cent. To replace these losses, the United States has been training Thais for the last three years. But the training and the fact that Thailand has been sending troops to Laos have not been acknowledged by U.S. or Thai officials.

Senate Report

But a U.S. Senate subcommittee on security agreements and commitments abroad reported last year:

"The Thai irregular program . . . was designed by the CIA specifically along the lines of the irregular program in Laos. The CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

These Northern Thai speak a dialect similar to Meo dialect, and they are easily integrated into Vang Pao's forces.

At the camp, I was stopped at the main gate by three Thai guards, who called their commanding officer, a Thai special forces sergeant major, on the phone. When I told him I had once served with the U.S. Special Forces in Thailand and just wanted to talk with some Americans on the base, he said, "Sure, come on." One of the guards got on the back of my motorcycle and we drove to headquarters.

The 50-acre site is divided roughly in the middle by an airstrip. Heavy woods surround the base. Ten barracks for Thai soldiers were on the left side of the entrance road. Elsewhere on the grounds were a Thai special forces headquarters, a jump tower and cable rig for parachute training, a drying loft for the parachutes, and several maintenance buildings.

'Air America' Sign

After checking with the Thai sergeant major, the guard took me across the runway to a building marked "Air America," the name of the charter line which flies secret missions for the CIA throughout Asia. My Thai escort ushered me into a U.S. Special Forces team room, where five men were having their morning beer. All wore civilian clothes or jungle fatigues without insignia or name tag, a frequent tip-off that people are engaged in activity which might not square with formal pronouncements of U.S. policy.

Scattered among the usual pin-ups and memorabilia of home were other signs. One said: "No war was ever won with moderation and civility. KILL!" Another said: "Make war, not peace. War is the final answer."

The men were polite, almost painfully so. They did not mention their mission, and when I expressed interest they changed the subject.

Finally one of the men offered to escort me to the gate, and I followed his truck out and waved to the Thai guards as I left.

STATINTL

STATINTL

U.S. Said to Break All of Soviet's Codes

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 15—The United States is reported to have refined its electronics intelligence techniques to the point where it can break Soviet codes, listen to and understand Soviet communications and coding systems and keep track of virtually every Soviet jet plane or missile-carrying submarine around the world.

"We're able to break every code they've got," a former analyst in the National Security Agency, one of the most secret of the Government's many intelligence agencies, is quoted as saying in the August issue of Ramparts magazine, which is published by Noah's Ark, Inc., 2054 University Avenue, Berkeley, Calif.

The former analyst, whose name was not given in the article, was an Air Force staff sergeant who was discharged from military service in 1969 after three years of overseas duty as a communications traffic analyst for the agency in Turkey, West Germany and Indochina. He uses the pseudonym of Winslow Peck in the article

Some Corroboration Found

Mr. Peck, who is 25 years old, was recently interviewed by a correspondent of The New York Times in California. Extensive independent checking in Washington with sources in and out of the Government who were familiar with intelligence matters has resulted in the corroboration of many of his revelations. But experts strongly denied that the United States had broken the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union or of other foreign powers.

The national security agency headquarters is at Fort Meade, near Baltimore. It has nearly 100,000 employes — most of them military personnel — and spends slightly less than $1-billion a year. Unlike the Central Intelligence Agency, the N.S.A.'s primary purpose is the collection of information—most of it through advanced technology — but it rarely, if ever, tries to evaluate the importance of the information or analyze it.

The Ramparts article says that the United States has encircled the Communist world with at least 2,000 electronic listening posts on land or on naval vessels or aircraft.

United States electronically equipped aircraft, according to the article, are constantly penetrating the air space of the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries to provoke and record their radar and signal techniques to develop countermeasures against them.

This claim has been challenged here by independent Government intelligence experts, who said that there have been no authorized, as distinct from inadvertent, violation of Soviet or Chinese airspace by the United States since the U-2 flights of the early nineteen-sixties. The experts said that satellite photography has replaced aerial overflights, conceding, however, that United States electronic intelligence planes often fly along Communist borders to provoke reaction and collect signals.

In the California interview, which was recorded on tape, Mr. Peck described his early life in Joplin, Mo., his enlistment in the Air Force in 1966 when he was 20 years old, his subsequent recruitment by the security agent, his specialized training, his promotions and his three years of duty overseas. He was discharged in California in November, 1969, and says he turned down a $10,000-a-year job offer by the Central Intelligence Agency. He decided instead, he says, to work to end the Vietnam war.

Tells of TV Monitoring

A highlight of Mr .Peck's disclosures include a report that in 1967 during his duty in Turkey the agency monitored a live Soviet television contact between Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, who was in tears bidding an emotional farewell to the astronauts Vladimir M. Komarov.

Mr. Komarov was then in orbit in the spacecraft Soyuz I, which was still two hours from re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. According to Mr. Peck's account the astronaut had just been informed by Soviet ground control thatt he braking parachutes designed to bring his spacecraft safely to earth were malfunctioning and that there was no hope of saving him.

Soyuz 1 crashed on Soviet territory on April 25, 1967, and Mr. Komarov was killed. He was posthumously granted a second Order of Hero of the Soviet Unoin and is buried in the Kremlin walls.

Mr. Peck also said that during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the United States electronic intelligence ship, the Liberty, was ordered near the Israeli coast to intercept details of Israeli military intentions.

The ship was attacked on June 8, 1967, by Israeli jet aircraft and torpedo boats—an incident that cost 34 United States dead and 75 wounded and which President Lyndon B. Johnson later described in his book, "The Vintage oPint," as a "heart-breaking episode." Before the attack, he said, the Liberty learned that General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defense Minister, intended to order his forces on to Damascus and Cairo.

Tells of Johnson Pressure

Mr. Peck stated that President Johnson then brought intense pressure on Israel to halt further troop movement and warned Premier Kosygin on the "hot line" against what appeared to be an imminent Soviet airborne operation from bases in Bulgaria against Israel.

Intelligence sources here said they were unable to recall these details but a veteran of 30 years service in intelligence said of Mr. Peck:

"He's obviously familiar with N.S.A.—its organization, operations and many of its techniques. But no sergeant in his early twenties would know how intelligence is handled at the White House level, what N.S.A. material is used or discarded by the President or more than just the fringes about C.I.A. operations."

During his year of duty in Vietnam, from November, 1968, to October, 1969, Mr. Peck, said, he participated in airborne electronic sweeps in Thailand in support of C.I.A. operations. The C.I.A., he said, was using unmarked attack bombers flown by C.I.A. "spookies" and based at Udorn to punish Meo tribesmen who had clashed with Thai Government troops over control of their traditional areas.

The United States depended on a friendly Thai Government for important air bases and other facilities useful for the Vietnam war, Mr. Peck noted, and thus was prepared to assign the C.I.A. surreptitiously to help the Thai Government suppress internal disorders.

Neither the N.S.A. nor the C.I.A. would comment today. Senior Government intelligence officials who were shown transcripts of the Peck interview discounted parts of it but corroborated others.

David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers," (published by Macmillan in 1967) and a leading authority on cryptoanalysis, said in a telephone interview that the Ramparts article "represents much new information that rings true to me and seems correct." However, he challenged some points, specifically Mr. Peck's assertion that the agency's experts are able to "break every Soviet code with remarkable success."

Top-grade Soviet Foreign Ministry code systems "have been unbreakable since the nineteen thirties" Mr. Kahn said. He added that it was "highly unlikely that they have switched to breakable codes."

Mr. Peck's contention that "information gathered by N.S.A. is complete" implies a false importance, Mr. Kahn said. The N.S.A. does, he said, "solve" many nations' diplomatic codes; but these are countries of the third rank and provide only "indirect clues to Communist intentions."

Mr. Kahn noted that "what we are doing in this field the Russians are doing and, contrary tot he Ramparts statement, they are very good."

He pointed out finally that the "thrust of the article, that the N.S.A. threatens peace, is incorrect."

"I believe that in the existing world of two armed camps," Mr. Kahn said, "N.S.A. can provide more light, more truth—and this can lead to better evaluation of situations and so to more realistic responses. N.S.A. is not like the C.I.A., which can foment revolutions and can indeed threaten peace."

The interview contains a lengthy question-and-answer passage that Mr. Peck conceded, in his interview with The Times, was hurriedly prepared at a time when he was "extremely rattled."

details of hitherto suspected but obscure details of electronic eavesdropping around the globe resulted, he said, from opposition to the Vietnam War and from a hope that others doing similar clandestine Government work would "come forward and say what they know. "He concedes that this disclosure by the agency may involve him in legal tangles.

continued

29 JUN 1972

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Homage to CIA Drug Fight Ironic

By JUDITH RANDAL

The American Medical Association, which predictably offers few surprises at its annual meeting, achieved the unexpected this year.

As one entered the convention's exhibition hall in San Francisco's Civic Center, one's nostrils were assailed by an odor more appropriate to that city's Haight-Ashbury district — an aroma strongly suggestive of the burning leaves and blossoms of the female Cannabis sativa plant.

The scent fired the curiosity of all in the hall who had ever sampled marijuana and drew from the wife of one physician attending the meeting the remark that she had smelled that odor many times in the back of the school bus she drives.

That was only the beginning of the surprise. Following one's nose, one soon came upon a booth housing an exhibit on drug abuse which featured a display about many drugs, including pot, and a device that generated a synthetic smoke that was close to, if not identical with the real thing.

★

There was still more surpise to come in this display, which — it turned out—had won the gold medal in the AMA's coveted Billings Prize competition as one of the outstanding scientific exhibits of the meeting. The exhibitor was no mere doctor or pharmaceutical firm, or even your average, run-of-the-mill science-oriented government bureau. It was that most unlikely of contenders for an AMA award: The Central Intelligence Agency.

Dr. Donald Borcherding of the CIA was on hand to explain the exhibit's origins. Like most agencies, he said, the CIA has an occupational health division whose job it is to promote the well-being of its personnel. When CIA officials at the agency's Langley, Va., headquarters became worried about pot, LSD, speed, heroin and the like, Borcherding and his colleagues assembled the display.

According to the CIA medic, it was an immediate hit, not only at the Langley "Spook Farm" but also among groups in the community, such as Knights of Columbus lodges and parent-teacher associations. The CIA is thinking about putting together "how-to-do-it" instructions so that other groups can build their own replicas.

★

Granted, the crusade against drug abuse needs all the help it can get. But the trouble with the CIA exhibit is that it does not tell things strictly as they are. For example, it implies that the use of marijuana sets the stage for later use of heroin. This issue is by no means settled and, as a matter of fact, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that alcohol, rather than marijuana, is the first drug to be abused by most people who subsequently become heroin addicts.

In any case, many experts believe that if there is any connection whatever between pot and heroin, it is their illegal status and that if the former were "decriminalized," its link with the latter would tend to disappear.

More important to this discussion than an argument about the casual relationship of the two drugs is the point that the CIA does not come into the campaign with completely clean hands. Reporters have been hearing for more than a year that the agency has been supporting the heroin traffic in the Golden Triangle region of Laos, Thailand and Burma, and that this opium byproduct has been one of the more important cargoes carried by Air America, an airline operating in Southeast Asia whose charter business is almost exclusively with the CIA. The Golden Triangle region, incidentally, is said to grow 70 percent of the world's illicit opium from which morphine base, morphine and eventually heroin are derived.

For more details on the CIA's complicity in the heroin mess, one might consult an article entitled "Flowers of Evil" by historian Alfred W. McCoy, in the July issue of Harper's magazine. Part of a forthcoming book called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," the article spells out in detail how Vag Pao, long the leader of a CIA secret army in Laos, has become even more deeply involved in the drug traffic and what role this traffic has played in the importation of heorin into the United States and its use by our troops in South Vietnam.

★

Writes McCoy of the situation: "As a result of direct and indirect American involvement, opium production has steadily increased, high-grade heroin production is flourishing and the Golden Triangle's poppy fields have become linked to markets in Europe and the U.S."

The CIA went away from the San Francisco meeting with a gold medal and, no doubt, a good many doctors who saw the exhibit went away impressed. Some of them probably learned for the first time what pot smells like.

But for others there was a bitter incongruity in the government's super-secret spy arm winning a medal for an exhibit on the horrors of drug abuse. To some it was a little like the Mafia getting a top award for a display of the evils of extortion, prostitution and gambling — and a few of the more socially aware physicians present did not hesitate to say so.

THE MIAMI DAILY PLANET

GINSBERG-McGOVERN QUESTION

CIA SMACK SMUGGLING

By FLORA LEWIS

NEW YORK — A weird series of incidents is bringing into focus the question of the CIA's relation to the booming Indochina traffic in heroin and the opium from which it is made.

Ramparts magazine has published a study of the drug trade in Indochina, pulling together many details of the widely but only vaguely known story and making a series of specific charges against top South Vietnamese, Laotian and Thai officials. Further, Ramparts charged that it is CIA operations and subsidies in the area which have made possible the big increase in the supply of heroin from Indochina.

Sen. George McGovern (D.-N.D.) wrote a letter to CIA Director Richard Helms asking six questions about it. One inquired whether the opium production in Laos was conducted with the knowledge of CIA officials, particularly around the CIA's secret army base at Long Cheng in Laos, and if the effect of CIA operations is to "protect the supplies (of opium) and facilitate their movement."

CIA legislative counsel Jack Maury called on McGovern to give oral answers to the questions. He referred to a sheaf of legal-size papers for his information, indicating that the CIA has made a new investigation, but he didn't give McGovern the papers. He denied some of the charges, but said the CIA has been trying to convince the local people not to be in the drug traffic, which obviously inplies that the CIA knows about it.

McGovern's query wasn't the first challenge to Helms on the subject. On March 4 Helms went with his wife to an evening event at the Corcoran Gallery in Washington. The star happened to be Allen Ginsberg, the tousle-haired mystic poet. They met at a reception before the poetry reading, and Ginsberg took after Helms for what he says is CIA support of the dope trade.

The poet has been investigating drug traffic for seven years, and he has on the tip of his tongue a lot of precise names and places and figures. For one thing, he said, Long Cheng is a central collecting market for the opium flowing from Zieng Quang Province of Laos down into Vietnam and Bangkok and out around the world back to the United States.

Helms said it wasn't true, so Ginsberg said, "I'll make you a wager." If he lost, Ginsberg promised to give Helms a "vajra" (sic) which he describes as "a Buddhist-Hindu ritual implement of brass symbolizing the lightning-bolt doctrine of sudden illumination." Helms was to meditate one hour a day for the rest of his life if he lost.

Some time later, Ginsberg sent Helms a clipping from the Far East Economic Review saying that a number of correspondents who sneaked into Long Cheng over the years saw raw opium piled up for sale in the market there, in full view of CIA armed agents. He also sent a note offering Helms suggestions about how to keep a straight back while meditating, the best sitting position and proper breathing.

He has had no acknowledgement from the CIA chief, but says, "I have been tender toward him. It is terribly important to get him into an improved mind-consciousness. Anything that might help save the world situation would be sheer Hari Krishna magic, the hard-headed people have brought us to such an apocalyptic mess."

Helms says that he has received no note from Ginsberg, and only vaguely remembers the bet. He called the charges "vicious," "silly," "ridiculous." He told me, "There is no evidence over the years that any of these people were involved in any significant way. Almost all the opium grown there is in Communist-controlled areas, Pathet Lao areas."

I asked about Thailand, and he said, "I don't control northern Thailand. I don't control the Royal Laotian government; it's an independent country" (whose national budget and army are subsidized by the United States). "I don't know why you want to lay all this on the poor old CIA."

"We are not involved in the drug traffic in Laos or anywhere else. There is no evidence at all. To have evidence you'd have to get somebody in my office and have him say yes, I ran drugs with your approval."

At another point, he said, "Opium's been in that part of the world for centuries," and "most drugs in the United States come from Turkey." He said he didn't know anything about a U.N. report that 70%-80% of the world's supply comes from Southeast Asia.

And at another point he said "that part of the country (Laos) is loaded with opium. It's all over the area."

Maury, he said, had told McGovern that "it's all rot. It's not true." Later, Maury told me that he couldn't say anything about his talk with McGovern and that a written report which he has prepared to give the Senator would be available to you or anybody else for publication."

Meanwhile, the rate of heroin addiction among GIs in Vietnam is soaring dramatically, and drugs continue to pour into the United States.

Certainly, Helms is right when he says that drug control is not the CIA's responsibility. But two facts are inescapable.

1.—Drugs are flowing into Vietnam and out of Indochina into the world underground network in dramatically increasing quantity. Not only is there a fearful growth in the amount of opium, from which heroin is refined, produced and exported from southeast Asia. Alongside the traditional opium trade, heroin is being produced there. This is new. The proof that it is true is the ready availability of heroin to GIs in Vietnam. Their powder doesn't come all the way from Turkey or France.

2.—The CIA provides virtually all the transportation, the arms, and much of the money on which the people engaged in growing and moving drugs depend on in order to keep going. The CIA isn't there because of the drug traffic. As Helms says, it does not officially condone the traffic. But official CIA operations have made it much easier for the trade to prosper in security.

While the standard American government position is that Turkey is the main source of the heroin reaching the U.S., there is every reason to question whether this remains true. The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Durgs has said that 80% of the world's opium supply comes from southeast Asia. Dr. Alexander Messing, a UN narcotics expert, says that "if (the supply of opium from) Turkey were shut down overnight, there is still so much of the stuff around that it would hardly make a difference."

Partly, this is because the main producers of opium are the hill tribes in Laos and northeast Thailand. Many are the Meo people, on whom the CIA relies for its "clandestine army" in Laos. Opium is their one cash crop. The CIA needs the goodwill of the Meos. It does not go out of its way to offend them.

Partly, this is because the very nature of CIA operations in southeast Asia requires the cooperation of high local officials, daredevils, adventurers. Often those who are corrupt cooperate all the more willingly, since it facilitates their illicit enterprises. The CIA doesn't support what they do on the side, but it does support them.

DAILY WORLD
3 JUN 1972

[redacted]

Charge CIA and Thieu push heroin to U.S. GIs

Daily World Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, June 2—Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale student working on his doctorate, told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee today that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Saigon Dictator Nguyen Van Thieu are directly involved in the shipment of vast quantities of opium and heroin to the U.S.

McCoy, who has authored a book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," debunked President Nixon's campaign against heroin imported from Turkey."

He told the Foreign Operations subcommittee, headed by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wisc), that the U.S. underworld has totally recouped the loss of the Turkish supply by turning to Southeast Asia sources.

In South Vietnam, McCoy said, the opium and heroin traffic is divided among the nation's three dominant military factions: Pres. Thieu's political apparatus, Prime Minister Kim's political organization, and Gen. Ky's political apparatus.

"Throughout the mountainous Golden Triangle region, the CIA has provided substantial military support for mercenaries, right-wing rebels, and tribal war lords who are actively engaged in the narcotics traffic and in Thailand the CIA has worked closely with nationalist Chinese paramilitary units which control 80 to 90 percent of northern Burma's vast opium export and manufacture high-grade heroin for export to the American market," McCoy testified.

"Some of President Thieu's closest supporters inside the South Vietnamese army control the distribution and sale of heroin to Americans GI's fighting in Indochina."

"Finally U.S. agencies have been actually involved in certain aspects of the region's drug traffic. In Northern Laos, Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium."

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000800200001-4

[redacted]

FAMILY WEEKLY
(DATE UNKNOWN)
June 1972

Ask Them Yourself

Want to ask a famous person a question? Send the question on a postcard, to "Ask," Family Weekly, 641 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y. 10022. We'll pay $5 for published questions. Sorry, we can't answer others.

FOR REP. CHARLES B. RANGEL, N.Y.

You've accused the CIA of aiding and abetting heroin sellers in Asia. What grounds do you have for such a serious charge?—R. D., New York, N.Y.

● Despite public disclaimers by the CIA, many of us in Congress have serious reason to believe that the agency is indeed complicit in the trafficking of deadly heroin to our servicemen in Southeast Asia. Newsmen clandestinely entering the secret CIA base at Long Cheng in Laos have reported raw opium openly piled up for sale in the market there. In addition, we know that the CIA regularly supplies arms, transportation and funds to drug-producing hill tribes in Laos and Thailand in exchange for their allegiance, knowing full well that these tribesmen are cornerstones of the drug trade. Most Congressmen have little idea how the CIA operates and how much money it spends. The CIA budget is carefully disguised and hidden. In fact, a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, "Laos, April, 1971," reads like a jigsaw puzzle, with pieces "deleted at the request of the Department of State, Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency." Congress cannot prevent CIA involvement as long as we are deliberately kept in the dark about that agency's operations.

STATINTL

THE GUARDIAN
24 MAY 1972

world in revolution

LAOS

A heavily censored report revealed May 7 in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee charged the U.S. spends $100 million a year to support a Thai irregular army of 10,000 men in Laos. The report revealed that for the first time U.S. helicopter gunships, under U.S. army command but apparently with Thai pilots, are supporting medical evacuation missions in northern Laos. The report was prepared by committee members James Lowenstein and Richard Moose after their trip to Thailand and Laos in January. The report also noted the CIA and Thai army headquarters in Udorn air force base in Thailand provide contact with the Thai irregular forces; the irregulars are trained in Thailand by U.S. army special forces personnel; payments including bonuses are made by the CIA to the Thai unit at Udorn.

The Southeast Asian Connection

By HANS J. SPIELMANN

BANGKOK, Thailand—The world's attention in recent months has been turned toward the Mideast—Turkey, principally—as the source of illicit supplies of heroin. But the fact is that the fabled "Fertile Triangle" of Southeast Asia — Thailand, Burma and Laos—continues to produce two-thirds of the world's known supply of opium, from which heroin is derived.

The figures alone are eye-catching: in 1970 Thailand's hill tribes contributed 185 metric tons of raw opium to the world's supply, Burma 1,000 tons, Laos 100.

It is true that most of the opium, or about 800 tons, is consumed by Southeast Asians from Rangoon to Hong Kong. Nonetheless, about 400 tons continue to leave the area, bound for addicts around the world. The buyers, not all Americans by any means, range from soldiers in Vietnam to junkies along New York's Eighth Avenue.

So vast are these supplies (U.S. addicts, for example, consume annually the heroin derived from "only" 120 metric tons of opium), so limitless the profits, that governments, armies and revolutionary fronts have played parts in the production and trade through the years. They continue to do so, and even the United States Central Intelligence Agency has had its days in the poppy fields.

"They have been growing poppies for 150 years."

The Vietnam war and the complex and confusing movement of "foreigners" back and forth through Southeast Asia has created a boom in the illicit production of raw opium. Today, in Thailand alone, it is estimated that half of the 350,000 hill people in the elevated areas of the north participate in growing poppies.

Thirty per cent of these workers are addicts themselves, but they turn a tiny profit by the standards of the million-or-billion-dollar deals we are accustomed to associating with narcotics. The average worker earns about $100 a year and has, incidentally, no real knowledge of what he is doing. That is to say, the hill people do not even know that they are producing an illicit product for a world market; they have been growing the poppies and using the opium in lieu of pain-killing medicines for about 150 years.

The production of opium only became illegal in Thailand in 1958, as did trafficking and smoking, and the hill people really could not understand that they were outlaws. Not to worry, as things developed: production went on unabated.

As it is now, there is a sort of Common Market in opium operative in Southeast Asia. National boundaries are crossed by an assortment of rogues who, while moving tons of the stuff, "lose" only 2 or 3 per cent as bribes and tributes and so forth.

The operation begins with the fields in the high country (over 3,000 feet above sea level for the high-quality poppy) of Thailand, Laos and Burma.

The hill people themselves have neither the courage, contacts nor funds to enter into the distribution, so they await the sharp lowlanders. These townsmen come around at harvest time, looking down their noses at the hill people whom they consider to be inferior, and buy the opium at very low prices.

The best buy is in Burma, where a kilo of raw opium sells for $15; in Laos it's $30, and in Thailand $40.

Opium is gathered in the villages and then in ever-larger towns by smugglers, who may be described in the first dealings as petty, but who become rather more than that as the opium changes hands and the supplies pile up. Then highly disciplined paramilitary types take over, with toughness and sure-handedness.

Among these is an outfit known as the Shan of Northern Burma—relatives of the Thais—whose dream, at least back in Burma, was the establishment of an autonomous Shan State. But its fighting wing, the Shan Liberation Army, has generally abandoned politics as it observed the fertile fields of Shan asylum in northern Thailand.

Units of the front transport the opium grown in Burma (and this is the mother lode—700 metric tons for export) to bases in Thailand. Of course, as units cross the Burmese-Thai border, back and forth, back and forth, the talk is all politics and the dream of statehood, but it's camouflage for the real action, which is the opium.

The Shan has somewhat complex, but strict, working arrangements with the notorious Kuomintang (whose parent organization is Nationalist Chinese) troops of the Fertile Triangle. Sometimes the Shan and the Kuomintang trade arms and ammunition, and medicines—often purchased from U.S. stocks in Laos—for opium.

The Kuomintang troops also keep up political appearances, when the real idea is opium. They say that they carry out pro-U.S. espionage in Burma, and even claim forays into China for "anti-Communist" activities. But these units are no longer used and supplied by the United States or Taiwan, as they once were, although they maintain radio contact with each other.

The Kuomintang is said now to have 10,000 men under arms, chiefly in Thailand, but in Burma and Laos as well.

Frequently, Kuomintang caravans of between 300 and 500 men, plus horses and mules carrying contraband for trade, can be seen working toward the north of Thailand and Laos toward Burma. They are supplied along the way with food by villagers eager to please such impressive forces, and eager to make extra money or to acquire some unusual luxuries.

Once they make their contacts—either with Shan troops or with smugglers—the Kuomintang caravan can pack up as much as fifteen tons of opium for the return trip southward. It is said that these troops and their "allied contractors" transport between 450 and 500 tons of raw opium southward each year. Their profit mark-up is 200 per cent.

One arrangement that the Kuomintang and the Shan have is that each Kuomintang convoy that goes into certain poppy-growing territory actually controlled by Shan troops must pay tribute. This amounts to about $1.50 a kilo, and entitles the caravan to a transit letter and Shan escorts back to territory controlled by the Kuomintang. (In other areas Shan convoys must pay tribute to Kuomintang soldiers—the reverse situation.)

As noted, there are a great many addicts in Southeast Asia, and the Kuomintang troops sell off a good deal of the opium back in Thailand. They get four to six times what they paid. But most of it is headed for export—for quick dashes across more borders, to airports and train stations, to seaports, to Bangkok, Singapore, Hong Kong, Vientiane and Saigon. And on and on.

In the last five years, the Kuomintang, discovering among other things that some of the opium it was transporting was bringing in 2,500 times more profit to the ultimate dealer than to its troops, began processing the opium itself. Kuomintang thereby increased its own profits, never inconsiderable, at least threefold.

continued

THE LONDON TIMES
9 MAY 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

CIA behind Thai regulars in Laos

From Fred Emery
Washington, May 8

The Central Intelligence Agency is the paymaster for an expeditionary force in Laos of some 8,000 Thai "volunteers," with plans to increase it to some 14,000 men at a yearly cost of $100m (£40m), it was disclosed today in a staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The numbers and cost involved in this operation have been previously kept secret, with the Nixon Administration invoking Thai Government sensitivities.

However, Senator Stuart Symington, chairman of a Foreign Relations sub-committee, says in a preface to the staff report that the Congressional ban on American support for third country forces in Laos "is apparently being violated in letter as well as in spirit." The Administration's defence is that the troops are "local" forces.

The report questions the Administration's contention that the men are volunteers drawn from the large community of ethnic Lao living in Thailand. It asserts the men are recruited "by the Royal Thai army from all over Thailand" with a specific cadre of officers and ncos from the regular army.

The report, written before the current Communist offensive in South Vietnam, states that "Laos is closer to falling now than any time in the past nine years. Cambodia has lost half its territory, and is insecure in the remainder. . . The North Vietnamese will be able to continue to use the territory of Laos and Cambodia to pursue the war in South Vietnam, no matter how successful Vietnamization proves to be and to keep South Vietnam in a permanent state of seige".

[redacted]

CIA WORRIED ABOUT THAILAND: High on the CIA priority list is Thailand. American intelligence predicts a communist takeover within two years unless military aid is stepped up. According to CIA sources, there has been an enormous influx of highly sophisticated Chinese weapons delivered to the Peoples Liberation Armed Forces, the Maoist guerrillas who have been harassing government forces for the past few years. Washington supplies Bangkok largely with surplus US weapons, and the CIA says the guerrillas' weapons are far superior to these.

SR: BOOKS

Book Review Editor: ROCHELLE GIRSON

STATINTL

IN THE MIDST OF WARS:
An American's Mission to Southeast Asia

by Edward Geary Lansdale

Harper & Row, 386 pp., $12.50

Reviewed by Jonathan Mirsky

With the exception of the Pentagon Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's memoir could have been the most valuable eyewitness account of the internationalizing of the Indochinese war. Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in his own book, furnished the model for the Ugly American who, from 1950 through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put down the Huk revolution in the Philippines. He then proceeded to Vietnam where, between 1954 and 1956, he stuck close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's first shaky years when Washington couldn't make up its mind whom to tap as the American alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured Diem as the final choice for Our Man in Saigon. While the book's time span is, therefore, relatively brief, the period it covers in the Philippines and Vietnam is genuinely important.

There is only one difficulty with *In the Midst of Wars*: from the cover to the final page it is permeated with lies. That Harper & Row finds it possible to foist such a package of untruths on the public—and for $12.50!—several months after the emergence of the Pentagon Papers, and *years* after the publication of other authoritative studies, exhibits contempt for a public trying to understand the realities of our engagement in Vietnam.

The lie on the jacket describes Lansdale merely as an OSS veteran who spent the years after World War II as a "career officer in the U.S. Air Force." In the text Lansdale never offers any explicit evidence to the contrary. Indeed, on page 378—the last of the text—he states that at the very time Diem was being murdered in Saigon, "I had been retired from the Air Force."

For all I know Lansdale drew his pay from the Air Force and, as the photographs in his book attest, he certainly wore its uniform. This is irrelevant. Lansdale was for years a senior operative of the Central Intelligence Agency; on page 244 of the Department of Defense edition of the Pentagon Papers, Lansdale, two other men, and Allen Dulles are identified as representing the CIA at a meeting of the President's Special Committee on Indochina held on January 29, 1954.

Why is this important? Because if there is one word Lansdale uses repeatedly it is "help"—and he uses it personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-like urge to offer *spontaneous* assistance. Thus, the first day he ever saw Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to me that perhaps he needed help. . . . I voiced this to Ambassador Heath. . . . Heath told me to go ahead." The informal atmosphere continues when Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem, immortalizes him as "the alert and eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding what to do about Snow White."

Further desires to serve inform Lansdale's concern for the "masses of people living in North Vietnam who would want to . . . move out before the communists took over." These unfortunates, too, required "help." Splitting his "small team" of Americans in two, Lansdale saw to it that "One half, under Major Conein, engaged in refugee work in the North."

"Major" Lucien Conein, who was to play the major role the CIA had in the murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in the secret CIA report included by the *Times* and Beacon editions of the Pentagon Papers (see *SR*, Jan. 1, 1972) as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] for cover purposes." The secret report refers to Conein's refugee "help" as one of his "cover duties." His real job: "responsibility for developing a paramilitary organization in the North, to be in position when the Vietminh took over . . . the group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese." Conein's "helpful" teams also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's largest printing establishment and wreck the local bus company. At the beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the CIA's Conein infiltrated more agents into the North. They "became normal citizens, carrying out everyday civil pursuits, on the surface." Aggression *from* the North, anyone?

Lansdale expresses particular pleasure with the refugee movement to the South. These people "ought to be provided with a way of making a fresh start in the free South. . . . [Vietnam] was going to need the vigorous participation of every citizen to make a success of the noncommunist part of the new nation before the proposed plebiscite was held in 1956." Lansdale modestly claims that he "passed along" ideas on how to wage psychological warfare to "some nationalists." The Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that the CIA "engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietminh, instructing Tonkinese on how to behave for the Vietminh takeover of the Hanoi region in early October [1954] including items about property, money reform, and a three-day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled."

The refugees—Catholics, many of whom had collaborated with the French—were settled in the South, in communities that, according to Lansdale, were designed to "sandwich" Northerners and Southerners "in a cultural melting pot that hopefully would give each equal opportunity."

Robert Scigliano, who at this time was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michigan State University team on how to "help" Diem, saw more than a melting pot:

> Northerners, practically all of whom are refugees, [have] preempted many of the choice posts in the Diem government. . . . [The] Diem regime has assumed the aspect of a carpet bag government in its disproportion of Northerners and Centralists . . . and in its Catholicism. . . . The Southern people do not seem to share the anticommunist vehemence of their Northern and Central compatriots, by whom they are sometimes referred to as unreliable in the communist struggle. . . . [While] priests in the refugee villages hold no formal government posts they are generally the real rulers of their villages and serve as contacts with district and provincial officials.

Graham Greene, a devout Catholic, observed in 1955 after a visit to Vietnam, "It is Catholicism which has helped to ruin the government of Mr. Diem, for his genuine piety has been exploited by his American advisers until the Church is in danger of sharing the unpopularity of the United States."

Wherever one turns in Lansdale the accounts are likely to be lies. He reports how Filipinos, old comrades from the anti-Huk wars, decided to "help" the struggling Free South. The spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture warms the heart—until one learns from Lansdale's own secret report to President Kennedy that here, too, the CIA had stage-managed the whole business. The Eastern Construction Company turns out to be a CIA-controlled "mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries for unconventional operations. . . . Philippine Armed Forces and other governmental personnel were 'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad."

Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of Diem's success against the various sects, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen. (At every step Diem was advised by Lansdale who, at one pathetic moment, even holds the weeping Chief

continued

LOS ANGELES TIMES
22 MAR 1972

Thailand Becoming Staging Area for U.S.-Directed Ground Combat

BY JACK FOISIE
Times Staff Writer

BANGKOK—Thailand is gradually becoming the staging area for most American-directed ground operations in Indochina as troop withdrawals continue from Vietnam and the war and political situations become more tense in Cambodia and Laos.

This has resulted in increased sensitivity by both Thai and American officials concerning the American air bases in Thailand and the camps and bases involved in cross-border operations.

In answer to a newsman's request, American officials disclosed that there are 245 U.S. military advisers in Thailand and 280 members of the U.S. Special Forces. But other than outlining their acknowledged training and advising roles, the officials declined to go deeper into Thai-based American operations pertaining to the Indochina war.

Many Secret Camps

Officially, the role of all American Green Berets is to "train the Thais to be trainers" in counterinsurgency warfare, both of their own troops and those of "third country" armies—that is, Laotians and Cambodians.

But these same American officials acknowledge that there are numerous secret camps—they call them "ad hoc training areas"—at which Americans are located. But they will not discuss the American role in these camps.

It is known, however, that some are border camps fronting on Laos and Cambodia. They are manned by both Thai and American Green Berets engaged in cross-border clandestine operations. Rebellious areas in Burma also are being penetrated from Thai-American camps in the western province of Thailand.

'Volunteers' in Laos

The participation of Thai army "volunteers" in Laos as part of a Western-backed royal Lao army is now an established fact. More than 5000 Thai infantry, artillerymen and airmen are in action on foreign soil. They are American-paid but the Thai government also has its own reason for making the "volunteers" available. The North Vietnamese army and its Communist Pathet Lao auxiliary are closer to the banks of the Mekong River than in past dry seasons and the Mekong is Thailand's border.

Despite contrary evidence, both Thai and American officials continue the pretense that the volunteers sign up on their own. They are, in fact, regular Thai units led by their own officers and taking orders mostly from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

One of the assembly areas for this trans-Mekong migration is the Thai army camp of Saritsena, outside the north central town of Phitsanulok. Air America transport planes fly the men from there directly into Laos.

In the most recent explanation of the Thai presence in Laos, a U.S. State Department spokesman last week described the Thais as "local forces" eligible for U.S. support. This definition is intended to avoid being in violation of the congressional ban on the recruiting and payment of mercenaries for Laos and Cambodia.

Secrecy concerning military assignments in Thailand has reached a point where a visitor with a great deal of aplomb can stumble into an American clandestine camp and stay awhile by pretending that he, also, is on a mysterious assignment.

It happened this way, without a lie being told. The gate guard challenged: "Who are you?" The newsman assumed a serious, knowing look and replied: "Don't ask me!" For emphasis he pressed a finger to his lips. "Oh," the guard said, impressed, "I understand." He opened the gate and directed the visitor to the command post.

Exotic code names also figure into the secrecy. Peppergrinder is the name of a big American-Thai logistical base, way point for weapons and supplies destined for allied forces in Laos.

Despite its various unpublicized roles, the American special forces in Thailand have declined from a high point of 369 in 1969. The reduction was possible after the Thai Field Police assumed their own training. The American advisory force also has been cut back by 25% from its high point.

Other American military activities have offset the reduction.

For more than a year, the American military strength in Thailand has been announced as 32,200. Twenty-six thousand are airmen, as five big bases in Thailand continue to be the major springboard for American bombing of enemy targets in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam missile and antiaircraft guns.

All-Time High Cost

The 6,000 other American military are mostly Army logistical units. They support the American Air Force here and equip the 125,000-man Thai army under the current $60 million military aid program.

This is an all-time high for annual American spending on the Thai army and apparently reflects its support of Thai forces in Laos.

A 10-man American advisory team is presently with a Thai army "sweep and clear" operation aimed at driving a 500-man insurgent band out of north central Thailand and back into Laos. The senior American, is Army Col. Charles G. Ray of Browns Mill, N.J. who speaks Thai fluently.

Ray said neither he nor any of his subordinates goes below Thai regimental level and are forbidden to fly or drive into any area where they might be shot at.

Confirming this, an American Embassy official said, "We've never had an American combat casualty in Thailand and we intend to keep it that way."

LOS ANGELES, CAL.
HERALD-DISPATCH
MAR 2 1972
SEMIWEEKLY - 35,000

"Earth" Mag. Says U.S. Spy Agency

CIA AGENTS PUSH DOPE

WASHINGTON, D.C.—If, and we have every reason to believe it's true, the charges made in the March, 1972 issue of "Earth Magazine," that the CIA is now, and has been in the past, dealing in the dope traffic, it's deplorable. Drugs and its danger was brought to the attention of the American people of the National HERALD-DISPATCH newspapers in 1960. We pointed out in our initial drive against dope, the fact that it destroys American youth.

Hence, if the CIA as charged and documented by "Earth Magazine" is dealing in the dope traffic, they are singularly destroying a whole generation of American youth. Dope destroys the brain cell, it renders the individual, regardless of race, creed, or national origin, useless and powerless to think clearly. Dope, as it was fed to American soldiers in Asia is despicable and deplorable. In Asia America's finest young manhood was destroyed before being sent into battle in a senseless, useless, racist war.

In the article titled "The Selling of the CIA" text by Morton Kondracke, offers documentation, photographs of former CIA spies. The spy was quoted, and we have no reason to believe that Earth is lying on the CIA, that its history is a sordid one.

The HERALD-DISPATCH has been aware for a number of years that the CIA has had stooges in the universities and colleges throughout the nation where they recruit brilliant young students. These students were used as spies to overthrow the African and Asian countries, to murder, assassinate, and destroy people.

"Earth" cites facts that the CIA is involved in the opium traffic with the "fertile triangle" in the border areas of Laos, Burma, Thailand and the Yunnan province of southern China. They say, "about twenty-five percent of the heroin sold in America comes through this Southeast Asian channel. Ironically, the American taxpayer foots a six billion dollar a year bill for running the dope—the CIA, an organization which answers to nobody, is intricately involved in the flow of opium out of the Asian hills and into the United States. U.S. tax money

Continued

THE ATLANTIC
APRIL 1972

BEYOND WORDS

Writing for the President

by Harry McPherson

> —but what is heroic death compared to eternal watching
> with a cold apple in one's hand on a narrow chair
> with a view of the ant-hill and the clock's dial
>
> Adieu prince I have tasks a sewer project
> and a decree on prostitutes and beggars
> I must also elaborate a better system of prisons
> since as you justly said Denmark is a prison
> I go to my affairs
>
> —Zbigniew Herbert, "Elegy of Fortinbras"

In 1965 one could still feel John Kennedy's presence in the White House. I walked out of the mansion one cold, starry night, headed for my office in the West Wing, and imagined I saw that lithe figure standing in the Oval Office, his back to the window; but it was only an aide.

I missed his wry humor, his detachment about himself, his rejection of all that was mawkish and banal in politics. If he had not generated widespread public sentiment for social change, he had helped the nation to gain a perspective on its problems in which reason played a greater part than passion. One of the many terrible ironies of the sixties was that the shock of Kennedy's death was a more powerful stimulus to congressional action than was his presidency.

Another irony lay in the response many of his partisans made to Lyndon Johnson. To the most passionate of these, Johnson was simply a usurper. The presidency had passed from Hyperion to a satyr. To others Johnson was a parvenu, and always would be. His accent was the occasion for scorn among people who had regarded Kennedy's way of saying "Cuber" as picturesque.

A distinguished reporter told me, "I don't hate Johnson. I just hate the fact that all the grace and wit has gone from what the American President says." I said that I found it difficult, reading his commentary, to make the distinction. I did not say that I could understand how reporters might have enjoyed Kennedy's deft banter more than three hours of self-justifying stream of consciousness by Johnson. It was hard to be fair in a climate spoiled by hurt feelings.

* * *

"If we stand passively by, while the center of each city becomes a hive of deprivation, crime and hopelessness . . . if we become two people, the suburban affluent and the urban poor, each filled with mistrust and fear for the other . . . if this is our desire and policy as a people, then we shall effectively cripple each generation to come."

Thus began the first presidential message on which I worked. What followed were the nuts and bolts: "special grants amounting to 80% of the non-Federal cost of our grant-in-aid programs," "planning funds for the coordinated treatment of the regional transportation network," and so on. They were the substance of the program. The rhetoric would last only a day or two; whether the cities would be helped depended on how well the "Urban Problems Task Force" had foreseen real-life problems and designed a practical structure to meet them which the President could persuade Congress to adopt.

Since Kennedy had promised to get us moving again, Democratic speech-writers had forced the pace of everything the President for whom they worked said. Nothing was too small to be termed "urgent." The consequences of inaction were never less than drastic; action would always bring redemption, prosperity, or civil peace. Sometimes the problem was described so severely that the program seemed feeble by comparison.

I speculated that writers for conservative Presidents did not have such problems. Their guiding principle was good management, where ours was social change. Good management was an end in itself. Social change, on the other hand, was a process—involving the recognition of legitimate needs, the arousal of expectations that they should and could be met, the creation of laws and bureaucracies, and a payoff—money, health care, the right to vote and get a job, better schools. The process could fail at any point—most often at the payoff. It could not even be started unless the needs were recognized and the expectations aroused. To do that, a leader had to raise his voice. He could not engage in an academic debate; he could not take a long view of history, in which crowded cities and poverty seemed in retrospect the benevolent engines of progress; he could not say, "Perhaps it would be wise"; he had to say, "We must."

In pressing hard for change Johnson took great risks, both for himself and for the country. He had to convey not only a poignant sense of the misery to be relieved but also confidence that money and organization and skill could relieve it. Otherwise men would do nothing.

If he proposed a law prohibiting certain malign practices—such as excluding blacks from restaurants and voting booths—he was relatively sure that he could effect the change he sought [illegible] was passed. If his goal was to provide medical care for the

continued

THE SOUND
Seattle, Washington
March 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

[redacted]

HOT COPY!!

CIA



Earth's editor and publisher James Goode charged that the CIA-supported Air America airline is being used to ship opium from CIA bases in Laos and Thailand. Goode cited an article written by University of California professor Peter Dale Scott who said that opium is grown by CIA mercenaries, including the Meo tribesmen, in Southeast Asia. According to Scott, the opium is then shipped from the remote jungle areas aboard Air America planes.

A spokesman for Air America in Washington, D.C. also declined to comment on the story. He would say only that Air America is a "non-domestic airline owned by Americans which operates in Asia." He said he was unaware of any connections between the airline and the CIA.

Earth magazine's March issue accuses the CIA of controlling Air America — and charges that the airline operation is responsible for at least 25 percent of all heroin which reaches the United States.

THE SOUND
Seattle, Washington
March 1972

[redacted]



Earth magazine charged that the Central Intelligence Agency is intimately involved in the smuggling of millions of dollars worth of heroin into the United States each year.

The magazine's editor James Goode announced at a press conference in San Francisco that the March issue of *Earth* documents a web of alliances which connect opium-growing Southeast Asian farmers to the CIA-sponsored Air America Airlines and big money interests in the eastern United States. Goode said, that heroin-smuggling entanglements are carefully spelled out in an article written by University of California English professor Peter Dale Scott; Scott's eight-page article traces the connection between opium growers, CIA operatives, flights of CIA-controlled airlines and the eventual delivery of heroin to the U.S.

Goode further charged that the CIA-supported Meo tribemen and other opium growers located in Southeast Asia's "fertile triangle" are responsible for anywhere "from 25 percent to 80 percent of all heroin traffic reaching the United States."

The magazine editor stated tht Scott's article was "clearly the most dramatic documentation of CIA complicity in heroin trafficking yet published;" but he added that the CIA's involvement in smack smuggling has been suspected and reported about for years, adding: "Yet nothing has been done."

Goode announced that he was making all of his evidence immediately available to United States Senators – and that he is calling for a Senate investigation of the CIA's role in the underground heroin market.

Studies on the smack problem in the United States have indicated that up to $5 billion dollars is spent annually on heroin by 500,000 American addicts. More than half of the money spent each year on the purchase of heroin – or $2.5 billion – is obtained through theft by addicts. Medical authorities report that heroin presently caused more deaths to people between the ages of 18 and 35 than do wars or cancer or car accidents.

Said Goode: "I find it inconceivable that the hierarchy of the CIA and other agencies within our government have not cracked down on this source of smack."

Goode was asked about a suggestion voiced earlier this week by Senator Hubert Humphrey that the CIA be assigned the task of investigating and stopping the flow of illegal heroin.

"That's like appointing the SS to investigate atrocities at Dachau or Auschwitz," Goode said.

A 28-year-old Seattle resident who worked as a "civilian aide" to Continental Air Services in Thailand and Laos testified in San Franciscothat he witnessed opium being loaded aboard CIA-sponsored aircraft.

Enrique B. del Rosario said he watched as cargo, labeled as "miscellaneous," was put aboard Air America planes at the Ban Houie Sai base in Laos, and at two other bases in Thailand. Del Rosario said he had served as a "civilian understudy" at the bases in Southeast Asia between 1966 and 1970.

When asked if he was actually employed at the time by the CIA, del Rosario declined to answer, insisting that he was not "permitted to." He added that his wife and two children are currently in Thailand – and said that he did not want to say anything "which might jeopardize their safety."

However, del Rosario admitted that he had worked very closely with the Meo tribesmen and other CIA-supported tribes, and that he had seen literally "hundreds of acres of cultivated opium fields planted by the tribesmen." Del Rosario said that the opium was later harvested, and that he watched as Air American planes landed at Thai and Laos bases and loaded the "miscellaneous" cargo aboard.

Del Rosario, a former marine who served in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965, said that the opium growing was permitted by the Laos and Thailand governments as long as there was no outside pressure exerted. He explained that, occasionally, a complaint would be lodged about the amount of growing and smuggling, and that then the government would move in and demand a temporary halt to the opium cultivation.

CIA DENIES

The Central Intelligence Agency has refused to comment on charges voiced by *Earth* magazine that the CIA "is deeply involved in the smuggling of heroin into the United States."

A spokesman for the CIA, assistant director Angus Thuermer, insisted to *Earth News* that the intelligence agency "never comments on any charges or complaints made against the CIA." Thuermer added, however, that CIA director Richard Helms had specifically denied any CIA connection to the trafficking of heroin during a speech he made to newspaper editors in Washington, D.C. early last year. At that time, Helms, in reply to charges that the CIA was involved in moving opium from Southeast Asia to the United States, said: "We know we are not contributing to that problem."

(Ed. Note: Further information on CIA involvement in the opium trade is contained in an article by Enrique B. del Rosario in this issue of THE SOUND.)

[redacted]

WASHINGTON POST
22 JAN 1972

Laos to Get More Thai Mercenaries

By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Foreign Service

BANGKOK, Jan. 21—The number of CIA supported Thai soldiers serving in Laos will be increased in the coming months to contend with the worsening military situation there, according to senior U.S. sources here.

The sources declined to say how many additional Thais would be sent, but unofficial estimates are that the present total, fixed variously at from 4,800 to 6,000, may be as much as doubled.

The Thai battalions have been taking very heavy casualties in the Communist dry-season offensive that began in mid-December, so the first job is to reorganize existing units and bring them up to strength.

Like those Thais already there, the reinforcements will be "volunteers," ostensibly recruited from outside the regular Thai Army and trained by the CIA to serve as mercenaries attached to the Laotian government forces.

Placing them officially under Laotian command (although each unit has Thai officers) is a technicality designed to meet the letter of Congressional restrictions on American financing of third-country forces in Cambodia and Laos.

The United States role in mounting the Thai contingent has been bitterly criticized by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A staff report said the CIA supervises and pays for the training of the Thais and "provides their salary, allowances. . . and operational costs in Laos."

Committee sources said last summer that the United States may have spent as much as $35 million to finance the Thais in Laos—roughly $7,000 per man a year.

Until very recently, Thailand maintained about 10,000 regular troops in South Vietnam, but the Thais have scrupulously avoided any official connection with the troops in Laos.

The repeated assertions of government leaders here have been that any Thai nationals serving in Laos have simply chosen on their own to work for the Laotians. Sometimes it is added that by battling the Communists in Laos, these patriots are helping meet the threat against Thailand.

Geneva Accords

By disassociating themselves from the troops, Americans here explain, the Thais cannot be accused of violating the provisions of the 1962 Geneva accords which prohibited introduction of foreign forces into Laos.

"From start to finish, the whole business is diplomatic and military sleight of hand," said a long-time American expert in Thai affairs. (For their part, the North Vietnamese also will not admit to having many thousands of troops in Laos.)

On the whole, Thais have greeted the issue of the troops lackadasically. Certainly the families of casualties know who they are and one Thai-owned English-language paper printed a news agency account of 200 Thais being killed in one battle at Paksong.

But no local opposition to the Thais being in Laos has been recorded. Indeed, Thai journalists and intellectuals interviewed in the past few days agreed that the presence of troops there would probably be applauded if Thai public opinion could be accurately tested.

Nagging Insurgency

With war raging just beyond Thai borders and nagging insurgency within them, popular sentiment appears to favor whatever steps are necessary to preserve the country's peace and relative prosperity.

In the past month or so while the situation in Laos has deteriorated, there has been an upturn in the number of incidents attributed to guerrillas in Thailand's northern and southern regions.

Some of the incidents have been serious. Yesterday, for example, 16 policemen were killed in an attack on a "special operations base" in a remote northern district. Police said about 200 Communist Meo hill-tribesmen were involved, armed with B-40 rockets.

Then too, there was a demolition team attack earlier this [illegible] in which a B-52 was slighly damaged. One day in Kembern in scattered fighting 35 Thai security forces were killed.

Analysts think any connection between external and internal events should not be exaggerated, but do note that North Vietnamese propaganda against the Thai regime has been harsher and more persistent lately.

U.S. Bombers

The vitriol has been primarily directed at the presence of American bombers in Thailand. The broadcasts threaten "punishment" to the Thais for allowing "American use of Thailand as a springboard."

"Putting it all together," said one American diplomatic source, "I guess you could say there is a kind of offensive under way here, but, of course, it doesn't begin to compare with what is happening in Laos."

So far the government has dispatched more gunboats to the Mekong River with Laos and has placed troops in critical areas on alert, but neither step is regarded as especially meaningful.

"Why they've been having red scares for so long, no ones knows what they mean anymore," said one young Thai civil servant, "How can we tell the difference between what is always serious and what is very serious?"

Thai Concern

There are indications, however, that the Thai leadership is very concerned about the implications of the worsening situation in Laos.

"It is our first line of defense," commented one Thai official," If it falls, we must be prepared."

Earlier this month, Prime Minister Thanom Kiitakachorn met with Gen. Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, to discuss what was officially described as "the war situation in Laos."

Details of the session were never made public, but informed Thai sources said various "contingency plans" were discussed, along with the question of sending the Laotians more "volunteers."

The Thai battalions already serving in Laos have been located at firebases in the northeast on the Plain of Jars and around the embattled CIA base at Long Tieng. In the south, they operated on the Bolovens Plateau.

In the very heavy fighting on the Plain of Jars last month, sources in Vientiane reported, the Thai casualties outnumbered those of the Laotian irregulars by about two-to-one. The same was generally true in the south.

Some observers speculated that the Communists might be bearing down particularly hard on the Thais in an effort to discourage others from coming. Another theory has it that the Thias were merely poorer, less disciplined fighters than their Laotian and Meo allies.

Jan 1972

THE LEGEND OF TONY POE, CIA

U.S. operations in Southeast Asia have often involved shadowy figures, perhaps none more shadowy than the elusive, Jekyll-Hyde figure of Anthony A. Poshepny

MEN AT WAR/ BY DONALD KIRK

HE'S A ROUND-FACED, cheery man with a cherubic smile and a charming family and, it is said, a penchant for preserving the heads of his victims in formaldehyde. He's a classic Jekyll-and-Hyde who has been waging the most secret phase of America's secret war in Southeast Asia for the past ten years.

To the boys at Napoleon Cafe and the Derby King on Bangkok's Patpong Road, a watering ground for Air America pilots, CIA types, journalists and other assorted old Indochina hands, he's just plain Tony Poe, but his real name is Anthony A. Poshepny. He's a refugee from Hungary, an ex-Marine who fought on Iwo Jima and a dedicated patriot of his adopted land, the United States of America, for which he has risked his life on literally hundreds of occasions while ranging through the undulating velvet-green crags and valleys of Red China, Laos and Thailand.

He also shuns publicity and *hates* reporters, as I discovered in a long search for him, beginning in the Thai capital of Bangkok and extending to the giant American airbases in northeastern Thailand and to the mountains of northern Laos. The search for Tony Poe ended where it had begun, in the lobby of the Amarin Hotel on Bangkok's Ploenchit Road, a crowded, six-lane-wide avenue that runs through a residential and shopping district supported largely by rich American "farangs," the somewhat demeaning Thai term for "foreigners." There, before leaving Bangkok for the last time, I picked up a note, signed simply "Tony," stating that he had to "decline" my request for an interview. "I beelieve [sic] that you can appreciate my reason for not seeking public commentary," wrote Tony in the formal "statement style" better befitting a public official and probably suggested, if not dictated, by a superior in the Central Intelligence Agency.

"C-I-A?" asked the cute little Japanese girl at the front desk of the Amarin, enunciating [illegible] letters, smiling slightly with glittering white teeth, raising her eyebrows flirtatiously. "Oh, Tony Poe is airplane pilot. He works for Continental Air Services." An assistant manager, also Japanese, showed me the registration card Tony had signed only a few days before my arrival at the Amarin last June, in the middle of my search for him. Tony, I learned, generally stayed at the Amarin, only a few blocks from the modernesque American embassy. He was a familiar, beloved character to the staff at the hotel—the opposite of his public image as a sinister, secret killer and trainer of anti-Communist guerrilla warriors.

"Anthony A. Poshepny," read the top line. "Air Ops Officer—Continental Air Services." So Tony, with a record of more combat jumps than any other American civilian in Indochina, had used Continental as his "cover" while training mountain tribesmen to fight against regular Communist troops from both China and North Vietnam. Tony's cover surprised me; I had assumed he would declare himself as some sort of U.S. government "official" —perhaps an adviser to border-patrol police units, the traditional cover under which CIA operatives masquerade in both Thailand and Laos. Still, Continental was a logical choice. Like Air America, Continental regularly ferries men and supplies to distant outposts throughout Indochina. Financed at least in part by the CIA, Continental could hardly balk at providing cover for full-time CIA professionals.

The next two lines on Poe's registration form were even more intriguing than his link with Continental, at least in terms of what he was doing at the present. After "going to," Tony had written, "Udorn," the name of the base town in northeastern Thailand from which the United States not only flies bombing missions over all of Laos but also coordinates the guerrilla war on the ground. And where was Tony "coming from," according to the form? His origin was Phitsanulok, a densely jungled mountain province famed for incessant fighting between Communist-armed guerrillas, most of them members of mountain tribes, and ill-trained Thai army soldiers and policemen. Tony, it seemed, had vanished into the wilds of Phitsanulok (where the jungle is so thick and the slopes so steep as to discourage the toughest American advisers) on a mysterious training venture not known even to most American officials with top-secret security clearances, much less to the girls behind the desk of the Amarin.

"Oh, he's such a nice man," one of the girls in the hotel assured me when I asked how she liked Tony—who, I'd been warned by other journalists might shoot on sight any reporter discovered snooping too closely into his life. "He has very nice wife and three lovely children," the girl burbled on, pausing to giggle slightly between phrases. "He comes here on vacation from up-country." The impression Poe has made on the girls at the Amarin is a tribute both to his personality and his stealth. As I discovered while tracing him from the south of Thailand to northern Laos, he already had an opulent home in Udorn for his wife, a tribal princess whom he had married a year or so ago. Mrs. Poshepny, a tiny, quick-smiling girl whom Tony had met while training members of the Yao tribe for special missions into China, liked to come to Bangkok to shop while Tony conferred with his CIA associates on the guarded "CIA floor," of the American embassy.

It was ironic that I should have learned that Tony stayed at the Amarin while in Bangkok, for it was only by chance that I had checked in there at the beginning of my search—and only during small talk with the desk clerks that I found one of Tony's registration cards.

The day after I arrived in Bangkok, local journalists gave me my first inkling of some of the rumors surrounding Tony Poe. One of the journalists; Lance Woodruff, formerly a reporter on one of Bangkok's two English-language newspapers and now with the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok, said Poe not only hated reporters but had been known to "do away with people he doesn't like." Woodruff compared Poe to a figure from *Terry and the Pirates* and told me the story of how Poe lined one wall of a house in northern Laos, near the Chinese border, with heads of persons he had killed. None of the contacts I met in Bangkok had the slightest clue as to Tony's whereabouts—except that he was somewhere "up-country" training tribesmen to fight the Communists, possibly in China itself.

Still [illegible] Amarin, I drove to a town named Ubon, some 325 miles northeast of

STATINTL

Donald Kirk has batted around the Far East for years, is now based in Tokyo as a Chicago Tribune *correspondent.*

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
7 DEC 1971

[redacted]

U.S., Allies Recruit Thai Irregulars

Saigon, Dec. 6 (Special)—The allies are secretly training Thai irregulars in South Vietnam to operate helicopter gunships against the Communists in Laos, reliable sources said tonight.

They said that the Thais had been recruited by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and that the U.S. would provide helicopters for their missions.

—Joseph Fried

WASHINGTON POST
28 NOV 1971

Thai Guerrillas Grow More Troublesome

By Peter A. Jay
Washington Post Foreign Service

BANGKOK, Nov. 25—Thailand's Communist insurgents, one American official here likes to say, are like mice "operating between the hooves of the government elephant."

It's not a bad simile. The Thai government is very concerned about the mice, who began to appear nearly seven years ago and have become increasingly troublesome, and it is squashing them as fast as it can. But they show no signs of going away.

By the standards of Vietnam, the guerrilla threat to Thailand is minimal. According to the government's best estimates, there are only about 5,000 armed insurgents in the country—though for each man with a rifle there may be as many as 10 unarmed but active supporters of the movement.

This number has not grown appreciably since the clandestine Communist Party of Thailand decided in 1964 to switch from simple political activity to armed struggle—but the guerrillas are now much better armed, trained and organized.

According to the official Thai reports, the combined number of terrorist incidents and assassinations has risen steadily from 300 in 1966 to 1,100 last year. In the first seven months of 1971 there were 900 such incidents.

Village-level organization by the guerrillas continues, despite new government programs to stop it. In one area of northeast Thailand alone, an estimated 200 villages are estimated to be effectively under Communist control.

When there is violence—ambushes, assassination of government officials, attacks on isolated police outposts—it is often carried out with speed and precision.

"That was a real pro job," an American counterinsurgency specialist said not long ago of an ambush in northeast Thailand that cost the lives of several government soldiers.

Generally speaking, Thailand has not one but several different insurgencies. Those of most concern to the government are in the north and northeast.

The northeast is a dry, flat, poor area, dotted here and there with the large American-built airbases from which bombing missions throughout Southeast Asia are flown, and it is here that Communist political organization has been most successful.

The insurgent Thai Peoples Liberation Armed Forces that operate in this area and base in the Phu Phan mountain area near the Nakron Phanom airbase have begun to establish a true village infrastructure, government sources say. The guerrillas have an estimated armed strength of 1,500.

In far north, the mountainous jungled arm of Thailand that reaches toward China between Laos and Burma, the situation is different.

About 2,000 Meo tribesmen—ethnically the same as the tough CIA-trained guerrillas used in Laos to fight the Communist Pathet Lao—led by Thai cadre have staked out highland "liberated areas" in the north where the government seldom seeks to go.

These units launch hit-and-run raids on lowland settlements around Chiang Mai, and then fade back into the hills where the royal Thai army follows only at its own risk. If pressed too hard, they can slip across the borders into Laos or Burma.

"What have you achieved when you have chased 40 Meo from one ridgeline to another?" asked one official in Bangkok. "Nothing and it takes a hell of a lot of effort."

In addition to the northern and northeastern insurgencies, Thailand has little pockets of trouble in back country areas of the south and west.

Also, in the far south, about 800 Chinese and Malay guerillas are known to base along the border with Malaysia—but they are said to be members of the Malaysian Communist Party and more concerned with probing across the border to the south than with Thailand.

Thai sources in the five-year-old Communist Suppression Operations Command, a combined police-civil-military organization headed by the respected Gen. Siyud Kerdphol, believed that the various insurgencies are directed from Peking—not from Hanoi.

The Americans, who have a special counterinsurgency section manned jointly by representatives of the embassy, CIA and the military, tend to agree.

"It's part of a long-term plan aimed at the ultimate control of Thai society," one source said. "It's not a spin-off from the Vietnam war."

Captured Communist cadre told Thai officials of training in China. More recently, there have been reports of Meo and Thai guerrillas being trained by Chinese instructors along the road the Chinese have been building, for the last several years, down through Laos toward Thailand.

The road, which has now reached to within 30 miles of the Thai border, has had Bangkok officials worried for some time and has tended to dampen enthusiasm for diplomatic overtures toward Peking.

Indeed, last week's "coup against parliament," in which the military leadership of the country disbanded the National Assembly, abrogated the constitution and imposed martial law, was said to be directed in part at checking public sentiment in favor of a rapprochement with China.

American officials here are sensitive to the insurgency, and tend to be annoyed by the not uncommon suggestion that the Bangkok government overstates the nature of the emergency to squeeze more military aid out of Washington.

They note that U.S. military aid to Thailand has been decreasing annually from a high of $58.3 million in 1966 to about half that in 1970.

They also say that Thais have responded well to the threat of the insurgents. "Both the insurgency and the government's performance are on rising curves," one source said, "and the government's keeping up."

Whether it can gain on the insurgency, however, is another question. It starts with certain basic disadvantages.

Thailand is a country only slightly smaller than France, with a hard-to-administer, largely rural population of about 35 million and thousands of miles of border.

Of the four countries with which it shares borders; two (Laos and Cambodia) are at war with Communist forces and the other two (Malaysia and Burma) have low-level guerrilla problems of their own.

On the other hand, it is the only country in Southeast Asia without a history of colonial rule.

At the moment, the guerrillas are still more of an annoyance than a real threat. But there is no doubt that over the long run the Thais are worried.

WASHINGTON POST
25 NOV 1971

AID Official Ending Career Tired, Disheartened

By Michael Morrow
Dispatch News Service

UBON, Thailand — Tom Boyd is a building man, a tall Lincolnesque American who has spent 20 years in half a dozen developing countries, mostly as an agent of U.S. foreign aid. Boyd is a symbol of much of what is noble about American assistance to poor countries. But also of much of what is tragic.

Boyd is 60, a native of northeastern Texas, who was bossing construction gangs in Arkansas by the time he was 20. Due to retire next July, he already has his bags packed, hoping that the hassle over foreign aid appropriations will evict him early from his crumbling, yellow-stucco office in this American air base cum market town of northeastern Thailand. Tom Boyd is tired.

Boyd is one of the four employees of U.S. Agency for International Development in Ubon. His job is to advise local officials on building country roads. "It's kind of like the county highway department back home," he says. And every week he treks over the two provinces to which he is assigned, writing poetry in large legible hand on long tablets of yellow paper to absorb the endless hours in his jeep.

Boyd's poetry is sour. It often mocks the anti-Communist crusade and slams the military. Boyd builds better bridges than poems. But both are stolid and hang together. Poetry keeps him sane, Boyd says.

"They say I've got it out for the military," he apologizes. "That just isn't so. I just don't like bullshit . . . and blowing things up just to be blowing them up is anathema to me."

Little victories

Boyd sometimes wins little victories. Recently he was able to persuade the Air Force not to post pictures of Thai girls reported to have venereal disease on the bulletin board outside the base post office.

"They don't post pictures of GI's who get V.D. And what if somebody were to slip a picture of the governor's daughter up there: where would we all be then?"

But the tragedy of Tom Boyd's life is that more often than not he loses. From 1960-67, at the peak of his career, he served in Vietnam. He supervised the modernization of Tansonnhut Airport, when it was intended for commerical use.

The only American official at Tansonnhut in the early Sixties, Boyd became Ambassador Frederick Nolting's representative in one of the early intramural wars in Vietnam. "They (the Air Force) used to land their jets. I'd go out and tell them how glad we were to see them and that they had one hour to refuel, eat lunch and be on their way," he remembers.

During the 1963 coup d'etat, Boyd overheard the last conversation between Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and President Ngo Dinh Diem. "And it wasn't all in the Pentagon Papers, either," Boyd recalls.

That conversation made Boyd an even stauncher dove. He tried to thwart military subordination of AID's local assistance programs. Westmoreland's command won. Tom Boyd was exiled to the outback of Thailand. His career has idled here ever since.

However, Boyd, like AID in Thailand, is far from free to ignore the military and their priorities. In fact, the Accelerated Rural Development Program of which Boyd is a part is basically counter insurgency, as much a part of the American regionwide effort to defeat communism as Ubon Air Base from where Air Force jets scream off daily for [illegible] Vietnam. Boyd, whether he fully realizes it or not is something other than the benevolent roadbuilder.

With the roads has come the border patrol police and, just as important, if not more so, 'the spooks.' American intelligence authorities have set up a guarded, off-limits communications center near the southernmost town of Namyin.

Indication of where American priorities in the area lie for the future is not hard to come by. Boyd is the only "straight" AID employee on the four-man roster. One other is an adviser to the border patrol police, principally a light mobile counterguerrilla force. Another is a liaison officer for CIA operation in Laos. The fourth runs the communications center at Namyin. When Boyd goes home, moreover, he won't be replaced.

Boyd does not believe in a Communist threat in northeastern Thailand. "I've always said that I could put all the Communists in this area in the back of a pickup truck. That doesn't mean you can't find people to shoot at you if you go stirring things up. But you can find them in Louisiana or Arkansas too. There are plenty of bandits, moonshiners and people cutting illegal timber. You go messing with them and they'll shoot you. That's all."

"You know," Tom Boyd said, stroking his silver Hemingway beard and looking over the pool of scrapers and bulldozers at the provincial workshop. "The Thais are some of the cleverest people I've ever worked with. If we pulled out tomorrow, they'd make out all right. Their economy would have some setbacks, but they need that. I don't agree with a lot of Americans that the Thai has just got his hand out. He's got his hand out because we've got our pocketbook open.

But then Tom Boyd is tired. Tom Boyd has had enough. Tom Boyd is going home.

[redacted]

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 536,108
S - 709,123
NOV 19 1971

Klong song

The "coup within a coup" in Thailand is about as confusing as trying to find one's way around Bangkok's network of *klongs*, or canals, without a guide or a map. But it does seem that all the Pentagon's money and all the CIA's men couldn't put democracy together again in that beautiful country.

This is the third political setback for the United States in Southeast Asia in the past six weeks. First, 43,000 American dead and untold treasure resulted in the re-election of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu on Oct. 3. Then, after turning Cambodia into a battlefield, the national assembly was suspended on Oct. 20. And now Thailand, where the military has extinguished parliamentary democracy.

When will we learn that the only way to ensure self-determination for a people is to keep our hands off their political processes?

UNIVERSITY REVIEW
NO. 20
November 1971

HEROIN

Peter Arnett has been covering South East Asia and the Vietnam War for more than a decade. His reporting has won such varied accolades as The Pulitzer (1966) and Sigma Delta Chi (1968) prizes, expulsion from Indonesia (1962), and the government closing of his weekly paper based in Vientiane, Laos (1960).

An Associated Press reporter since 1960, Arnett recently wrote a series of articles with Bernard Gavzer about the heroin traffic in South East Asia and the ways that heroin gets to US troops in Vietnam. *UR* interviewed him shortly after his return to New York, and asked him about the nature of the drug traffic there.

An American GI lights up a cigarette in Saigon. He poured grains of white heroin powder into the menthol cigarette, from which he had first removed some of the tobacco. Wide World Photos

Everyone is against the use of heroin or at least they say they are. But beyond the basic idea that people take heroin because their life is a bummer, there are only a lot of charges and countercharges about who is letting/helping/pushing/or profiting from the heroin trade.

We think that the heroin trade is a typical issue of our time. For example, how is it that heroin can be transported thousands of miles over all sorts of obstacles to poison millions, while we cannot possibly figure out how to get food to starving people?

We hope to do a series of articles and or interviews about heroin presenting a variety of views and evidence. We have started with South East Asia because it is the largest source of opium in the world, and also because the heroin usage by American soldiers in Vietnam has led to increased information on this issue becoming available, such as the confidential government documents that we partially reprint here.

We do not imagine that we can cover this by ourselves and we hope that anyone who has information, documents, or knowledge will help us with this.

UR: Has the CIA been part of the drug traffic in South East Asia?

Arnett: The CIA has indeed been involved, as has the US Government, for years in the drug business, but it's essentially for political reasons — as a political necessity.

Now, why is it a political necessity? At the beginning of the '60's, South East Asia was seen as greatly threatened by Communist China. There was great fear that revolutionary war by people's armies would sweep across South East Asia, to Vietnam, Thailand, Formosa and all the rest. So the American officials out there — the CIA, the American Military, and the Embassy people — figured that any approach would be acceptable if it was in order to resist that great a threat. Eventually, of course, it led to a commitment of half a million American troops in Vietnam. But even before Vietnam, any act to prevent the Communists from taking over the area was considered acceptable, and this included the drug business. Here's an example of how it worked.

In Laos you have this tribe, the Meo. They came down from central China about one hundred years ago. They are nomadic and they are squatters. They move in family groups and live above the 5000 ft. level in the mountains. They farm crops, including opium, and they have a fairly well-developed culture based on silver ornaments and home-made weapons. The CIA and the American Government considered them important because they were the buffer between China and the rest of South East Asia. So it was in the interest of the American Government to win their allegiance. They were just another arm of the American war effort.

However, in the early 60's the Communists started pressing into Laos. Up to that time these people had been growing opium and other little crops, but opium was their only cash crop. The average family could make $40 or $50 a year from it, and that would be enough to buy some silver ornaments and to pay for the pigs for the harvest celebrations.

As the Communists started coming through they started to cut the old trails that these people had been using to unload their opium. The Meo were stranded in the mountains and the CIA figured that the least they could do was to help them in harvesting and distributing their crop. So, on the numerous American airfields you had a liason

continued

DAILY WORLD
6 Oct 1971

[redacted]

International News

CIA muscling in on Thai businessmen

BANGKOK — The manager of Thai Airways has complained to the U.S. Embassy here that Air America, the Central Intelligence Agency's owned and operated air line, has been picking up passengers inside Thailand and thereby competing with the Thai airline.

Prasong Suchiva, manager of Thai Airways, said his line had the sole right to pick up domestic passengers in Thailand. Air America is used mainly for transport of war materiel and personnel for the U.S. war of aggression in Indochina.

WASHINGTON POST

27 SEP 1971

Policy Shift Reported on U.S. Bombing in Laos

By D.E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Sept. 26 — U.S. bombing in most of Laos is no longer subject to prior approval by the U.S. embassy in Vientiane, according to American government sources.

Instead, final say in the choice of most targets has been shifted to the U.S. Air Force's tactical headquarters at Udorn, Thailand, these sources say. The principal exceptions are major populated areas of Laos and targets adjacent to China, according to the sources.

In most other cases, the embassy reviews the targets only after bombing, they say, by checking "after-action" reports from Udorn.

The sources say that this appears to be a major bombing-policy shift in Laos, although embassy spokesmen in Vientiane deny knowledge of such a shift in targeting methods or policy. There has been no public announcement of any shift in policy in recent weeks.

Reports that there has been a major change in bombing policy in Laos follow continued reports of bitter disputes at higher echelons over target-selection methods and delays in decisions affecting operations in this country.

Tactical and operation quarters of the American command, including the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency, have long contended that they need greater decision-making authority for quick and decisive response to targets of opportunity which, they say, under the previous system often managed to slip away.

Previous practice was outlined in the Moose-Lowenstein report released by the Symington Senate subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad on Aug. 3. That report, widely regarded as authoritative, outlined earlier changes in U.S. operations in Laos, including bombing.

According to the report, although there were prevalidated targets in Laos, or "free-fire zones," most targets required prior approval from the U.S. embassy here after being proposed by a committee meeting at Udorn Airbase, Thailand.

Under the old method, the list of targets was previewed by a junior foreign service officer and a U.S. Air Force sergeant in Vietiane under advisement of a member of the embassy's air attache office, usually the same office who attended the committee meetings at Udorn.

The "bombing officer," as he came to be known, could delete targets proposed for bombing or, in special cases, pass the decision upward in the embassy for higher approval.

The Udorn targeting committee is composed of representatives from the ambassador's office in Vientiane, military attaches from Vientiane, the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Air Force headquarters in Saigon and Udorn.

Sources say that the Udorn targeting committee remains functional, but that it is no longer required to submit all targets to Vientiane for prevalidation since it now has authority to bomb in most cases.

No area-size limitation of Laos requiring specific approval for bombing is known, but reliable estimates place it at perhaps less than 20 per cent of the country's area.

"After-action" reports are now reviewed daily and map-plotted by the bombing officer, according to the government sources. He sets aside those he finds "suspicious," reviewing the questionable targets weekly and requesting aerial photographs of those still believed questionable.

Photographs are routinely provided, the sources say, although there is no means of checking thier authenticity.

The sources also say that every U.S. overflight of Laotian territory is reported to the embassy in Vientiane, including those over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Embassy spokesmen have consistently denied in the past that such information is available to them, directing newsmen's questions to Saigon.

Introduction of forward air guides as an important element in bomb-targeting — guides lead airplanes to targets from the ground — is seen here as an adjunct to any justification for the reported new system.

Having a man on the ground directly observing a target and evaluating its military significance theoretically makes the rules of engagement more foolproof.

As reported by Moose-Lowenstein, however, the majority of forward air guides are of Thai origin with the remainder professional Lao soldiers. Both groups, according to Westerners who have talked with them, seem unclear in their attitudes toward the distinctions between military and civilian targets.

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

SEPTEMBER 1971

By Jerome Doolittle

In Bangkok at 12 o'clock, if you believe Noel Coward, they foam at the mouth and run. This is not how GIs from Vietnam remember the place, though what they do remember about it may seem just as far-fetched. To GIs Bangkok is a favorite Rest & Recreation center because it rules as the home of the art of the Southeast Asian full-body massage.

The massage parlors of Bangkok, capital of Thailand, are as hushed as temples, with expensively decorated waiting-rooms, piped music, and elevators to serve what may be a four- or five-story building. The massage girls, scores of them in even a medium-size establishment, sit gossiping in small amphitheaters. Each girl wears a badge with a number. The customer, invisible behind a giant one-way mirror, examines the field at his leisure, makes his choice, and tells an attendant the number.

"A friend of mine who served in Ghana," says a Central Intelligence Agency man whose own service has been all in Southeast Asia, "once told me you're never the same man after the first servant calls you 'Bwana'. For me, it was the first time a little massage girl in Bangkok got down on her knees and started to unlace my shoes. Perfectly naturally. It sort of restructured my whole notion of the relationship between the sexes."

The Southeast Asian massage (except in Vietnam, where the art is in a rudimentary state) is a serious affair. To be accepted as an apprentice in the best parlors of Singapore, a girl must pay a deposit, returnable after a year, that can run as high as $500. This is to insure the owner against the girl's running off and taking a job elsewhere as soon as her training is over. The apprentice starts by kneading mattresses to strengthen her fingers. Later she is set to toughening her hands by smacking walls with a modified karate chop performed with the fingers held loosely together, in the position of prayer—she will eventually use this technique to loosen up the large muscles of the legs and back. Once her hands are ready, she starts to learn the various holds, twists and wrenches of her new trade. Only after weeks of training will she be judged ready to work on a live specimen—usually one of the other girls.

The complete Bangkok massage treatment lasts about an hour, and starts with a thorough soaping of the customer. The masseuse then directs him to a raised table, like a doctor's examining table, and powders him all over with talcum. Now that he is dry and squeaky-clean, she goes to work on his [illegible] joints in ways that would plainly result, with the exertion of several more foot-pounds, in permanent maiming. She walks up and down barefoot on his back. In a hold too complicated to describe, she pops the vertebrae of his back in quick succession, like knuckles.

Next she positions the client on his hands and knees, his head lolling down, and suddenly wrenches his chin to one side as far as it will go, as if to twist his head off. This makes a sickening sound which means that the vertebrae of the neck, too, have been popped in chorus. Only the least imaginative customers ever get used to this one, just as only the most phlegmatic of men never wonders if the barber shaving around his windpipe might not be, after all, a homicidal maniac.

By now the customer is nicely gentled. He feels the gratitude of a baby towards the mother who has just washed and dried and patted and powdered him—and perhaps flung him around a little bit, just enough to make him pleasantly tired. The masseuse then leans over and whispers, "Want massage here?" Why she bothers to ask is not very clear—perhaps the occasional fundamentalist preacher refuses. In the normal course of events, the girl removes the towel covering the customer's midriff, positions a freshly-laundered napkin, and uncaps the Brylcreem. This is always the lubricant of choice for the final, intimate stage.

"As a rule, that's the whole of the standard treatment," says the CIA man, whose experience has become vast since the first massage girl unlaced his shoes. "A lot of places even leave the cubicle doors unlocked to discourage anything more happening. Some places, the girls get fired if they're caught sleeping with the customers. But there are exceptions.

"I ran across Naroudam the third time I went to a massage parlor. Pure luck. I just picked her out through the two-way mirror. Once she had finished with me in the usual way, she stretched out beside me and started breathing heavily, almost panting. I laughed and said she didn't have to bother, but just then she fished a breast out of that uniform they all wear, like a nurse's. Well, I mean, I'm a gentleman and I knew what to do. She was breathing harder and harder, but I still figured she was faking—until I noticed that damned if she wasn't playing with herself. Now *that* I took as a sign of sincerity. Naturally, I wasn't in any shape right then to apply the normal remedy, but I did manage to figure out a way to help. After it was all over for her, she said thanks very politely, and got back into her uniform. Going downstairs, she was [illegible] between us. No sign of any emotional connection. Didn't hold my hand, or smile at me, or even look at me. In a funny way, if you see what I mean, that was the nicest part of the whole thing.

"Girls like Naroudam get famous in their way. Their badge numbers and names get passed around. The funny thing is, they seem to do it more or less for the love of the thing. They'll take a tip if you offer them one, sure, but they don't seem to expect it and they don't get upset if there isn't any. A lot of times, it seems to depend on how the gal likes a customer's looks. My own theory is that after you've spent all day kneading rolls of suet, anybody who's reasonably thin and properly built looks awful good to a massage girl."

An American technician stationed in Laos tells of the time his sister visited him in Vientiane. "She's got into this fem lib stuff," he explains. "Driving around town, every time I spotted some little Lao gal swinging a bucket of cement on a construction job I'd point her out. 'There she is, Mary,' I'd say. 'They've won the battle here. That's Miss Fem Lib of 1970'. It drove her up the wall.

"The funny thing is, I would have taken that fem lib stuff seriously if I hadn't come to this part of the world. I was just a typical American boy. I didn't need the song to tell me those boots were made for walking and that's just what they'll do. I already knew that one of these days these boots are going to walk all over you. Then they sent me to Thailand four years ago, and then here. You might say it changed my life. Yes, you might.

"Frankly, I was never what you might call a big swordsman back home. The fact is, girls scared the piss out of me. Out here at first, I more or less went wild. But I was scared that it would all be over if I went back home. You know, though, I've heard the same thing from several guys, guys who always had plenty of girls back in the States. They said I wouldn't have anything to worry about, that once you've been in a place like this you get a lot less uptight about it or something, and the girls back home will recognize it. Not that I'm in any hurry to get back, but I hope they're right."

The American pauses a minute, remembering.

"Did you know there's a house in northern Thailand where the specialty is Chicken in a Basket? The girl gets in this huge basket with a hole in the bottom of it, and another girl hoists the basket up in the air with a rope and pulley arrangement. You position yourself on the bed underneath, and then the second girl lowers the basket just [illegible] around and around with your hands. Real slow."

Many marriages between American

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 AUG 1971

[redacted]

Thais involved

U.S. takes gambles in Laos war policy

By George W. Ashworth
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The Nixon administration is taking heavy gambles in its handling of the war in Laos.

On the domestic scene, the administration is risking deepening troubles with Congress and supplying ammunition to critics as it directs the war in Laos with debatable regard for congressional dictates.

And, in Laos itself, the administration has decided to take unprecedented steps in prosecuting the war that may have devastating impact on the future of Southeast Asia.

At specific issue is the use of so-called "irregulars" from Thailand to fight with the Royal Lao Army and other irregular forces. The State Department, which just weeks ago refused to talk about the matter at all, either with the press or the Congress, now has sent representatives to Capitol Hill to tell more and is steadfastly maintaining that the Thai forces are volunteers.

Options reduced

Whether the forces are indeed volunteers or not is important because, through amendments, Congress has been steadily whittling away at presidential latitude in the war zone. Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D) of Arkansas got approval last year for an amendment forbidding the use of U.S. funds to pay for troops of other nations fighting in Laos. Loopholes might allow such activities if the payment of such troops were tied into the Vietnamization process.

However, the State Department has assured Congress that the fighting along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which might help Vietnamization, is not related to the fighting in the north of Laos, which involves the Thais.

Thus, the administration is arguing that the Thais are volunteer irregulars, not falling under congressional strictures. The problem is that nobody really believes this argument. It is well known in the White House, State Department, Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency that the Thai Government has agreed to provide the troops, and the U.S. is picking up the tab.

Assignment optional

To help clear the air, D. E. Ronk, who writes for the Washington Post, went to ask some Thai soldiers in Laos what was the truth of the matter. The Thais told Mr. Ronk, he reports, that they are regular army troops of Thailand, asked to accept special assignment in Laos, which they can refuse. They are in all-Thai battalions with Thai officers.

There is even a Thai general (a lieutenant general, according to other sources here in Washington) directing their activities. The Thai troops are supervised and trained in Thailand and paid for fully in Laos by the Central Intelligence Agency.

One source in Washington said, "They are regular Thai troops, and we are breaking the law. Congress may now try to limit funds. Even if they did, however, I doubt that would stop us."

Spending estimated

Sen. Stuart Symington (D) of Missouri has offered an amendment to the military-procurement bill that would limit direct and indirect military and economic assistance to Laos to $200 million a year. This would not include funds spent to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other nearby areas. The administration clearly does not approve of the proposal, because, it is fairly clear, much more is now being spent. Senator Symington estimates military and economic aid and support spending for Laos and Cambodia together at more than $1 billion annually. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report estimates the partial costs in Laos during the last fiscal year at $284.2 million, including military and economic aid, plus CIA expenditures.

This infighting between elements of Congress and the administration doesn't appear likely to let up soon, what with the administration desire to play the war by its own, not congressional, rules, plus the advent of the political season, plus the continuation of antagonisms already at play. Adding to the difficulties for the administration is evidence that old-line stalwarts on the hill are becoming more and more unwilling to back the administration completely, lest they develop their own credibility problems.

The administration has come to the conclusion that the only way to safeguard Laos is to get the Thais involved in the rescue attempt. While this approach may help save the day militarily, it may have long-range political implications with the Thais now more deeply involved in the quest for any eventual settlement.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN

E - 634,371
S - 701,743

AUG 11 1971

Peril to Nixon Trip Seen

Secrecy Is Charged In U.S. Aid to Taiwan

By RAY MOSELEY
Bulletin Washington Bureau

Washington — A former State Department official said today the Government is concealing the full extent of U.S. military and intelligence operations on Taiwan (Formosa) from Congress and the American public.

Such operations, directed against mainland China, must cease if President Nixon's forthcoming "journey for peace" to Peking is to succeed, said Allen S. Whiting, chief China specialist in the State Department from 1962 to 1966.

Whiting, now a professor at the University of Michigan, testified at a hearing on China policy conducted by the congressional Joint Economic Committee.

Quotes From Documents

Quoting official documents and news reports, Whiting outlined a variety of alleged U.S. intelligence activities in support of Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan that have come to light over the last 20 years, and said:

"In sum, there is a credible case that overt and covert U.S.-Chinese Nationalist activities have aroused Chinese Communist security concerns, resulting in heightened military deployments toward and across China's borders. This activity, in turn, has been used to justify increased American and allied military investment throughout Asia to guard against the so-called Chinese Communist aggressive threat."

Whiting said a complete assessment of U.S. involvement with the Nationalists has been seriously hampered by secrecy and censorship.

"Certainly Peking has known more of what has been going on than has Washington, or at least the legislative branch of our government," he said.

May Block Settlement

Whiting said U.S. covert activities on Taiwan may block a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem by the Nationalists and Communists and lead to continued military escalation on both sides.

Allen S. Whiting

"Only a convincing and credible reversal of our military-intelligence use of Taiwan can lay the basis for confidence necessary to make President Nixon's 'journey for peace' a successful reality," he said.

The Nixon Administration was reported recently to have ordered a halt to clandestine activities, including U.S. spy plane flights over China, to avoid upsetting plans for Mr. Nixon's trip.

In his testimony, Whiting cited these examples of covert activities allegedly supported by the U.S. against China:

Airlines' Activities

— The Nationalist airline Civil Air Transport (CAT), identified in the recent Pentagon Papers as owned by the Central Intelligence Agency, operated from bases in Thailand in the 1950s to ferry supplies to guerillas in northern Burma, Laos, Tibet and China's Yunan Province.

— China Air Lines (CAL), another apparent CIA operation, provided planes and pilots to Vietnam and Laos and admitted involvement in "clandestine intelligence operations."

— A CIA line called Air Asia is headquartered in Taiwan, with the job of servicing jet fighter planes.

— U.S. Rangers have trained guerilla paratroopers in Taiwan, and some Nationalist forces have served secretly in South Vietnam.

— Nationalist China has received "a steady stream of cut-rate weapons out of the mammoth Vietnam stockpile" and some deliveries have been "unauthorized, uncontrolled and often unknown to the Congress."

[redacted]

STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST
9 AUG 1971

CIA-Backed Thais in Laos Say They Are Regular Army

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, Aug. 8—Thai soldiers serving with the CIA-supported irregular forces in Laos say they are regular army troops of Thailand, asked to accept special assignment in all Thai battalions.

Their assertion contradicts a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report made public last week. The report, prepared by Committee staff members James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose referred to Thai troops in Laos as "irregulars."

Heavily censored in most of its references to Thais serving in Laos, the report said the Thai fighting men "are recruited for service in Laos from outside the regular Thai army."

Speaking to a reporter, several Thai soldiers said they were asked to accept an assignment in Laos after the advantages of such service were explained. They have the option of refusing, they said.

According to the Lowenstein-Moose report, "the CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

Their units are formed in Thailand with Thai commissioned and non-commissioned officers and are given special training for Laos.

They arrive in Laos aboard CIA-supported Air America planes from Udorn airbase in Northern Thailand. All orders, from the battalion level down, are issued by Thais, the soldiers said. Only at the very top, with Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo commander of Laos Military Region Two, and the CIA's Armee Clandestine, is there interference with the Thai chain of command, they said.

Vang Pao does not command the Thais, they said, but consults with Thai officers and the CIA "case officers" who actually make the decisions.

The Thai soldiers agree with press reports that there is at least one Thai general in Laos, using the code name Nai Caw. This is the equivalent of John Doe. The Thai troops say he is a lieutenant general.

Code names are frequently used by and for Thai troops in Laos. Reliable sources in Thailand say that until recently all wounded Thais treated in the U.S. hospital at Udorn Airbase were listed as John Doe One, Two, Three, etc. to hide their national origins.

At present the troops say, there are 10 or 12 Thai battalions in Laos, or about 4,800 men. Two Thai battalions are at Pakse, in southern Laos, and "about ten" in northern Laos, with headquarters at Long Cheng, the soldiers said.

Reliable sources in Bangkok say, moreover, that another Thai artillery battery has either just entered Laos or shortly will, accompanied by an American major. The U.S. officer is to advise them on the operation of unfamiliar equipment, believed to be aiming devices.

Official U.S. sources deny knowledge of such a unit, that an American officer has been given such an assignment, and that a new American officer has arrived or is expected, even on temporary duty.

The Bangkok sources say the officer will be traveling on a civilian passport and in civilian clothing..

A Thai soldier now stationed in Pakse outlined the sequence of events in his assignment to Laos. Returning to Thailand from duty in South Vietnam, he said, he was sent for advance training in Thailand following a 30-day leave. He was told the training was for assignment to Cambodia, he said.

Following the training, he was told his assignment was changed to Laos, but that he could refuse to go and remain in Thailand.

After the pros and cons were explained he decided to accept and became a volunteer.

Following formation of special battalion, he was sent to Udorn, then to Long Cheng. At Long Cheng, the unit was engaged in defense of that headquarters. The Thais fought in one "heavy" battle in a sector call "Skyline" by U.S. personnel.

Shortly before the fall of the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos to North Vietnamese forces last May the Thai battalion was flown to Ubon Air Base in Thailand then to Pakse, where they were airlifted to the vicinity of Ba Houei Sai, on the Bolovens Plateau.

As a result of the Hanoi offensive, they withdrew to Pakse. The soldiers said they are not deeply involved in the current counter offensive to recapture the Bolovens, though some of them are used as forward air guides, relaying bombing targets from ground to air.

Recent visitors to Pakse say the Thai soldiers are very much in evidence in hotels and bars. They do not wear Thai army markings on their uniforms and the soldiers say they carry no identification, on orders from their officers.

Cost of War in Laos Placed at $130 Million

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

A previously classified Senate report released today indicates the United States secretly spent about $130 million in the last fiscal year on "iregular" troops under CIA contril in the Laos war.

The money, according to the staff report of a Senate Foreign Relation subcommittee, supported 30,000 Lao irregulars operating in four of the five military regions of Laos, plus Thai irregulars operating mainly in the strategic Plain of Jars in North Laos.

The exact number of the Tahi forces is deleted from the report by administration censors. But Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, after reading the uncensored report, on June 8 put the number of Thais at 4,600.

Long Negotiations

Thev ersion made public today follows five weeks of intensive negoitations between the authors of the report, James G. Lowenstein and Richare M. Moose, and three representatives of the executive branch—one each from the State Department, Defense Department, and Central Intelligence Agency.

t is the first time that CIA activities in Laos have been confirmed and given some detail publicly.

The report states that the Lao irregulars—called BG units after their French nae, bataillons guerriers—"are part of the irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and, to a great extent, organized by the CIA."

These forces, the report continues, have become the "cutging edge" of the Lao military forces, far more active and efficent than the 60,000-man Royal Lao Amry.

Encouraging Sign

Sen. Stuart Symington, chairman of the security subcommittee which sent Lowenstein and Moose to Laos for 12 days, April 22 to May 4, said it was "an encouraging sing that the executive branch has finally agreed that much of what the United States government has been doing in Laos may now be made public."

But he hit the continued unwillingness of the administration "to acknowledge certain truths"—mainly the composition and command arrangements for the Thai troops in Laos.

On June 7, Symington presented the whole uncensored report to an executive session of the Senate. A "sanitized" version of the debate behind closed doors is to appear in the Congresiibnal Record tomorrow.

Most Exact Figures

For the public record, the 23-page report today manages to give the most exact figures to date on the cost of the secret operation, but overall totals still are obtained only by putting together bits and pieces of what the administration has allowed through censorship.

For instance, a key passage lists a total of $284.2 million as the total U.S. expenditure in Laos in the fiscal year ending June 30 —exclusive of bombing costs. That $284.2 million, the report says, is made up of "an estimated $162.2 million in military assistance, $52 million in the AID program (economic) and $(deleted) spent by CIA exclusive of the Thai irregular costs."

By school-boy mathematics — uncontested by administration representatives — that makes the CIA budget for irregulars $70 million.

Rogers' Estimate

In addition, Secretary of State William P. Rogers said June 15 that the total U.S. expenditures in Laos in fiscal 1971 — exclusive of bombing — was $350 million, not $284.2 million.

That makes an additional $65.8 million spent.

Committee sources say part of that $65.8 million went for additional and unexpected expenditures after the staff was in Laos. But the vast bulk was to pay for the Thai irregulars — a figure deleted from the report.

$130 Million Total

Therefore, a conclusion, produced from the report, sources close to the Senate committee and public statements by Rogers, is that the U.S. spent about $130 million on the activities of the irregulars in Laos — Lao and Thai irregulars.

Also for the first time, the report produces official figures to document the steeply rising costs of the Laos war since 1963. For the fiscal year 1972 which began July 1, the overt military assistance program alone is to cost $252.1 million.

Chinese Double

The report also finds that Chinese participation in Laos, along the road from the Chinese border into north central Laos, has more than doubled in two years. Up from 6,000 men, the Chinese force is now estimated by U.S. intelligence at between 14,000 and 20,000 men.

Since November 1970, the report says, the Chinese, besides improving previous road construction, have installed eight small-arms firing ranges usually associated with ground garrisons, plus antiaircraft guns, raising the total to 395.

The report says that, despite the huge expenditures of American money and Lao and Thai manpower, "most observers in Laos say that from the military point of view the situation there is growing steadily worse and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy."

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[redacted]

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

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S - 709,123
JUL 31 1971

Adlai backs policy of not beating Nixon to Peking

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.) said Friday that the State Department has advised China against admitting any senators or congressmen prior to President Nixon's visit. He felt "sure" Peking would comply.

Stevenson indicated support for the State Department policy and said he had passed the word to Peking that he did not think it would be "appropriate" for him to visit China until after Mr. Nixon's trip.

The senator applied for a visa a few hours before the President made his surprise July 15 announcement that he plans to go to China before next May.

To talk to CIA

Stevenson called a press conference to make a formal announcement of his plans to take a 25-day trip to Asia and the Soviet Union starting Wednesday.

His Asian stops will be Hong Kong, Thailand, South Vietnam and Japan.

Stevenson said he intends to concentrate on political and economic, rather than military, problems. However, he said he will discuss the war in Laos with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency at the CIA headquarters at Udorn in northern Thailand.

In Saigon, he said he hopes to see President Nguyen Van Thieu, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and Gen. Duong Van (Big) Ming, who, with Ky, is threatening to challenge Thieu in next October's presidential election.

'A special interest'

Stevenson said he has "special interest" in the political scene in South Vietnam since he fears, after an investment of 50,000 American lives and $200 billion, the U.S. involvement will end in what is "perceived to be a crooked election (with) a U.S.-dictated outcome."

Stevenson said he intends to enter the Soviet Union from the east, stopping in Siberia at Khabarvsk and Irkutsk before going on to Moscow and Leningrad. He expressed the hope of arranging a meeting with Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin and other high Soviet officials.

He is scheduled to return directly from Russia to Chicago on Aug. 29. He will be accompanied by Thomas Wagner, his administrative assistant, and John Lewis, director of the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University.

29 JUL 1971

Case Assails U.S. Financing Of Thais in Laos

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) charged yesterday that there is "glaring inconsistency" in the Nixon administration's explanations of U.S. financing of Thai troops in Laos.

Case said he believes that the administration is violating legislation which "forbids the use of Department of Defense money for funding foreign mercenaries in Laos."

The State and Defense departments disagreed. They said the 1970 legislation cited by Case would bar the transfer by Thailand of U.S.-supplied military assistance to another country. But in the case of Laos, the departments claimed, the legislation permitted the use of Defense Department funds for "Thai volunteers who are operating in irregular guerrilla units in Laos under the command of the Royal Lao Armed Forces."

Case recalled yesterday that he stated on May 20 that he had learned "from Government sources that there are four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. Government — through the CIA—is paying for them."

"I stand by that statement," Case said yesterday, and "I am glad we now have a better idea of where the money is coming from."

Case claimed that new information supplied to him "directly contradicts testimony given by Secretary of Defense [Melvin R.] Laird on June 14 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee."

State and Defense countered yesterday that there is "no inconsistency."

This was the latest in a series of disputes during the Indochina war in which congressmen expressed the belief that one avenue of funds had been blocked off, only to find that funds had been drawn from another category. In this case, the distinction drawn by the administration was between the use of the regular overseas Military Assistance Program (MAP) and funds drawn from the Defense Department budget, called "Military Assistance, Service Funded" (MASF).

Case produced a letter yesterday from David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, dated July 15. It said:

"Support for these [Thai] irregulars is supplied under the Lao military aid program which, as you know, is funded through the Department of Defense budget at 'Military Assistance, Service Funded' (MASF)."

Case contended that this statement conflicts with Laird's responses to his questions on June 14. He asked Laird then if the "Military Assistance Program" would be used "for regular or irregular Thai troops in Laos," or if that financing "comes from somewhere else." Laird replied, "That is correct. The Military Assistance Program will not fund that program." Laird later repeated the disclaimer.

Senate sources yesterday said that in another exchange, Case asked: "Would the funding for Thai troops in Laos fall under the international security program." Laird responded: "There is no program in our department which finances such a program." But in the transcript as amended by the Defense Department, these sources said, Laird's answer was changed to state: "There is no such program in our Department's request for international security assistance."

When asked for explanation of that change, a Defense Department spokesman yesterday said that the subject of Laird's public testimony was "the international security assistance program."

[redacted]

Laird's comments, "at that point in the lengthy hearings," the spokesman continued, "were in the context of MAP not MASF." It is "normal practice, the spokesman continued, for the Committee and the Department each to make their own corrections in "the unofficial draft transcript . . . for accuracy and clarity." Congress "is, of course, fully aware of the MASF program," said the spokesman, and Laird's remarks were "reviewed" to assure that they were "understood" in the proper context.

A State Department spokesman said that Congress, in 1966, set up the MASF program for use of Defense Department funds for Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.

Case said yesterday that "the fundamental issue remains of the public's and the Congress' right to know what is happening in the 'secret war' in Laos."

MIAMI HERALD
JUL 1971

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STATINTL

CIA Has Secret Army Of 100,000, Panel Told

By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency has built clandestine armies numbering 100,000 in Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia, an expert on Southeast Asia told a congressional panel Tuesday.

"It's the CIA's foreign legion," said Fred Branfman, a former member of the International Volunteer Services and a free-lance reporter in Laos.

The armies, controlled and paid for by the CIA, Branfman said, include native tribesmen, Thais, Nationalist Chinese and other Asians. Their job is to harass the population and troops in Communist-controled areas of Indochina, except North Vietnam. Presumably they would continue their fighting with American supplies and money after American forces are withdrawn, he said.

BRANFMAN'S charges were the closest thing to hard news at the opening of a three-day seminar on the Pentagon papers, sponsored by 17 members of Congress. The generally repetitive discussion showed that the leak of the Pentagon papers themselves is a difficult act to follow.

Rep. John Dow (D., N.Y.), chairman of the three-day event, said that Daniel Ellsberg would join the group today. Ellsberg, one of the authors of the 47-volume study, has acknowledged passing portions of the document to the press, for which he has been indicted by a federal grand jury.



Rep. Dow
. . . heads panel

Only one author of the Pentagon papers, Melvin Gurtov of Santa Monica, appeared at the conference Tuesday. But he added little to what is already known.

GURTOV, WHO last month was forced to resign as a researcher at the Rand Corp. because of his anti-war sentiment and his association with Ellsberg, told the panel that almost no one in government had read the Pentagon papers, including the man who commissioned them, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, until they were published in the press.

He noted, in response to a question, that the Pentagon study shows the intelligence analysts of the CIA, but not the field operatives, "in a good light."

The CIA analysts, he said, questioned basic assumptions, like the theory that if Vietnam fell to the Communists the rest of Southeast Asia would fall like dominoes. They also criticized the effectiveness of American bombing, Gurtov said.

"But when their reports, like others, challenged basic assumptions," Gurtov said, "they were ignored."

Branfman, talking about the CIA's role in Southeast Asia, said it "exercises functional control of military operations in Laos" and other Southeast Asian countries outside of Vietnam. In Laos it is conducting a campaign of "terrorism" in Communist held areas.

NGO VINH Long, a South Vietnamese now studying at Harvard, said the Pentagon papers disclose that American war planners had no understanding of the Vietnamese pople, their aspirations, problems, and nationalism.

"For them the Vietnamese didn't exist except as Communists or anti-Communists," he said.

And he suggested that administrative overtures to mainland China in hopes it would help impose a settlement of the war on North Vietnam indicates that the United States still does not understand that any settlement "must come with the Vietnamese people," by which he meant the Communists and the Saigon regime.

Tran Van Dinh, former South Vietnamese ambassador to the United States, traced American involvement in his country from May 1854, when Marines landed there to free an imprisoned French missionary.

"I DON'T plead for Americans to understand the Vietnamese," he said. "Americans should understand America first. In 1945, when we thought we won our independence by defeating the Japanese, we believed in this country and that it would help us. Ho Chi Minh had faith in America. But we didn't understand about your Indian wars, and the suppression of the revolts in the Philippines.

"In the past years we have been trying to find out what America is all about, and so far we don't know."

Others at the conference included Anthony Russo, a former Rand employe now facing contempt charges for refusing to testify about the leak of the Pentagon papers; Noam Chomsky, a linguist whose books on American policies helped convert Ellsberg, and David Truong, whose father ran second in the South Vietnamese presidential elections in 1967 and subsequently was imprisoned.

NEW YORK TIMES

Cooper Acts to Force C.I.A. to Report to Congress

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 7 — John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, one of the most influential Senators on foreign policy matters, introduced legislation today that would require the Central Intelligence Agency to give detailed intelligence information to Congress regularly.

Mr. Cooper, a Republican, said that Congress needed this kind of evaluation and analysis, now available only to the executive branch, to participate in the formation of foreign policy.

Meanwhile, the House rejected a series of resolutions demanding that the Nixon Administration provide Congress with additional information on United States operations in Laos.

Two other Senators also offered proposals relating to the C.I.A.

Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single-line item in the budget. Agency funds are now concealed in other items in the budget.

Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, said he would offer measures that would prohibit such C.I.A. activites as the funding of Thai troops to fight in Laos.

Senator Cooper emphasized in a Senate speech that his proposal was not aimed at any C.I.A. operations, sources or methods, but was "concerned only with the end result — the facts and analyses of facts."

"Congress would be in a much better position to make judgments from a much more informed and broader perspective than is now possible," he said.

Senator Cooper, an aide said, had been considering the legislation for three years but disclosures in the Pentagon papers on United States involvement in Vietnam had now provided an impetus.

The aide referred specifically to C.I.A. analyses during the Johnson Administration that full-scale bombing of North Vietnam would not be effective in halting infiltration or breaking the will of Hanoi.

Senator Cooper's proposal was supported on the floor by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, the only Senator belonging to both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

Mr. Symington said that it was "no secret that we on various committees have not been entirely satisfied with the intelligence information we have obtained.

"If the proper committees are not acquainted with what we're doing," Mr. Symington went on, "how we can function properly?"

Because Senator Cooper is so influential, it seemed likel that his proposal would bethe subject of hearings and, perhaps, floor debate this year.

A measure of the respect said his views came from Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader. "Anything John Cooper says would be given the most serious consideration by me," Mr. Mansfield said.

Regular Reports Asked

Senator Cooper's proposal would require the C.I.A.tomake regular reports to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and to the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. The agency would also be required to make special reports in response to inquires by these committees.

Mr. Cooper said that the agency would have to decide for itself what information to present to hte committees, but he specified that the data woul have to be "full and current."

There are now "oversight" committees in the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committes, that review the C.I.A. budget and operations. But these committees are not concerned with the substance of [illegible] gathers.

In the House debate today, the major fight came over a documents dealing with operations of the United States military and the C.I.A. in Laos from 1964 to the present.

The resolution, which was sponsored by Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Republican of California, was set aside by a vote of 261 to 118. Critics of the measure contended that the information was too sensitive to be given to Congress.

Following this vote, the House, without debate, set aside resolutions seeking information on bombing operations in northern Laos and on the Phoenix program, which is designed to neutralize the effect of underground Vietcong operations. The House also set aside a resolution seeking another set of the Pentagon papers that the Administration made available to Congress last week.

The supporters of the resolution were, for the most part, Democrats opposed to the war.

[redacted]

STATINTL

NEW YORK TIMES
1 JUL 1971

KEY VIETNAM TE

THE KENNEDY YE

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, dealing with the Administration of President John F. Kennedy up to the events that brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis Of Threats to Saigon Regime

Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960.

As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon would occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-Communistic in origin but Communists can be expected to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current Communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-nam to Communists. These two dangers are related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over in Viet-nam.

Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers.

Security recommendations have been made in our 539 and other messages, including formation internal security council, centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with our political and economic recommendations. I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most [word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following:

1. I would propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position. I would tell him that, while matters I am raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in Washington on appropriate measures to assist him in present serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under instructions.) I would particularly stress desirability of actions to broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1961 presidential elections required by constitution before end April. I would propose following actions to President:

2. Psychological shock effect is required to take initiative from Communist propagandists as well as non-Communist oppositionists and convince population government taking effective measures to deal with present situation, [illegible] of hand. To achieve that effect following suggested:

[redacted]

Orig. under Soc.

4. Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department of government with right to question any official except President himself. This step would make it possible to dispose: (A) find some mechanism for dis-

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

THE ASIA LETTER

AN AUTHORITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by THE ASIA LETTER Co. Tokyo Hong Kong Washington Los Angeles

[redacted]

Number 366

[redacted]

29 June 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (II): No intelligence operation in Asia is as well-heeled as that of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.).

The annual working budget of the C.I.A. runs over US$600 million.

That's just a starter.

The agency spends far more than that in Asia alone if you count the cost of some of the "borrowed" services from other U.S. Government agencies. For instance:

---U.S. Air Force planes are used to monitor foreign nuclear tests and collect air samples. The agency, while having its own cryptographers, draws on the Army's corps of 100,000 code specialists and eavesdroppers to tap Asian communications.

---C.I.A. specialists often operate off U.S. Navy ships in the Pacific, usually involved in electronic surveillance.

---The agency also is privy to information from the Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) which has a substantial operation of its own in Asia.

The D.I.A. spends from its own budget more than US$1 billion a year flying reconnaisance planes and keeping satellites aloft.

Those satellites allow C.I.A. analysts to know more---from photographs taken 130 miles up---about China's topography than do the Chinese themselves.

---The U.S. State Department's intelligence section also feeds a considerable amount of confidential data it collects through its embassies, consulates and travelling diplomats to the C.I.A. This includes information gathered by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) the Justice Department and the U.S. Treasury (Secret Service) often attached to diplomatic missions abroad.

The C.I.A. also works closely with the intelligence services and police forces of the countries considered America's allies in Asia, exchanging information with them.

Where does all the C.I.A. money go?

It funnels out in myriad directions: To pay for the agency's overt intelligence gathering activities, to finance "dirty tricks" and other clandestine capers, to prop up ousted or failing politicians and to pay for "disinformation" and other psychological warfare ploys.

Despite the C.I.A.'s oft-deserved sinister image, a good deal of its funds are expended on open intelligence gathering operations.

These go for subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals and other publications and salaries for those who must scan them for intelligence tidbits.

It is estimated that more than 50% of the C.I.A.'s world-wide intelligence input comes from such overt sources. (An estimated 35% comes from electronic spying and less than 15% from JAMES BOND-type, cloak-and-dagger operations.)

An exception is Asia.

A greater amount of the C.I.A. funds expended in Asia go into covert activities.

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
16 JUN 1971

[redacted]

U.S. uses Thai troops in Laos

By Richard E. Ward
Second of two articles

A rare secret session of the Senate was held at the request of Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) June 7 to hear a report on U.S. clandestine activities in Laos. Following the session, Senators Symington and J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) openly charged that the use of Thai mercenaries, just admitted that same day by the State Department which calls them "volunteers," was violating congressional restrictions on U.S. operations in Laos.

Some details of the nearly 3½-hour closed door meeting were given in the June 8 Washington Post in an article by Spencer Rich who reported:

—Symington, who revealed that the administration wants $374 million for military and economic programs in Laos for the 1972 fiscal year (a figure which does not include the $2 billion estimated costs of bombing), said that he wanted the Senate to know the details of "the secret war" before appropriating funds for it.

—Of the request, $120 million is said to be earmarked for funding CIA operations in Northern Laos, including the use of Meo mercenaries from Laos as well as at least 4800 Thai troops.

—A major issue in the secret debate centered upon whether the use of Thai forces was in contravention of the 1970 Fulbright amendment to the 1971 Defense Appropriations Act, signed into law by President Nixon Jan. 11 this year. The amendment barred use of Defense Department funds to support what the Pentagon calls "free world forces" in actions "designed to provide military support and assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos."

—The massive bombing of Northern Laos, which has nothing to do with the movement of supplies from North Vietnam to the South or Cambodia, was questioned by several senators, including Fulbright and Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.).

Nixon the lawbreaker

After the Senate meeting, Rich reported that Symington stated: "My personal opinion is...that the law has been contravened. The amendment said you couldn't spend money to train and put people of foreign governments into Laos or into Cambodia." That was also Fulbright's view. State Department sources later said, according to Rich, "that the Thais being used aren't recruited on a government-to-government basis, but were individuals recruited from the borderside Thai population."

The Post report obviously left out many details of the Senate discussion, assuming the legislative body got a full account of U.S. activities. Symington's disclosures were based on a report by two staff members of his subcommittee of the Foreign Relations committee, James Lowenstein and Richard Morse, who had recently made an inquiry into Laos.

Reportedly the Symington subcomittee now has a relatively accurate account of U.S. activities in Laos that is more complete than was provided by the administration at secret hearings in October 1969, released after "security" deletions by the administration in April 1970. What might be called the battle of Laos in Washington, concerns the attempt by antiwar senators to get U.S. activities in Laos itself into the public record. Initially and perhaps still, some senators have been reacting against the administration's deception of themselves along with the public. However, the issue of Laos is now being put forward to oppose administration policy in Indochina as a whole because it so clearly reveals the White House aim of maintaining—if not expanding—the war. This point remains clouded during discussions focusing on Vietnam because troop withdrawals are still used by the supporters of U.S. agression to obscure the actual aims of U.S. policy.

As has been previously noted by the Symington subcomittee, the lid of U.S. official secrecy conceals little that is not known by informed journalists or "the other side." Certainly the Pathet Lao knows what is happening in Laos. They are obviously fully aware of the bombings by the Air Force as well as the array of CIA programs. Although no reliable figure had been released on U.S. spending on its Laotian programs, the Pathet Lao accurately estimated it last summer as greater than $300 million (again apart from bombing).

Number of Thai troops growing

Concerning the use of Thai troops, the Pathet Lao stated last year that they numbered about 1000 during the Johnson administration (a figure that has recently been corroborated in the press and by Sen. Fulbright)and that the increase in Thai forces was undertaken by Nixon. However, according to the Pathet Lao, the number of Thai troops now exceeds the 4800 figure used by Fulbright.

In April of this year, Prince Souphanouvong, head of the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao), charged that the number of Thai troops was being augmented by the U.S. Shortly after this, George W. Ashworth reported in the April 17 Christian Science Monitor: "Nixon administration officials have hammered out an agreement with the government of Thailand for sharply increased use of Thai forces in Laos."

Thai troops were previously used in the ill-fated U.S.-backed attempt to hold the Plain of Jars, which ended in an important Pathet Lao victory in February 1970. Presumably the losses then were an element leading to the more formalized agreement for use of Thai troops. Bangkok may relinquish some of its sovereignty to Washington, but not without a price.

Thai "volunteer" troops used in South Vietnam were given a bonus by the U.S. considerably augmenting their regular pay while Bangkok received military hardware and other considerations from the Johnson administration to agree to use of Thais in Vietnam. There is no reason to assume that Bangkok's price has gone down, more likely it is up. Confirming this, a Senate source has noted that the cost of the mercenaries was high. Symington on June 7 referred to both regular and irregular Thai troops being used in Laos, so it is possible that part of the deal with Bangkok involves freedom for the CIA to recruit directly in Thailand. Taking all evidence into account, Thai troops in Laos may now number 10,000 or higher.

Senators Symington and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) attacked administration activities in Laos in statements issued a day before the secret debate. Symington emphasized the administration furtiveness while Kennedy charged that U.S. military activities in Northern Laos lacked constitutional authority, which seemed to be implicitly saying that the U.S. was conducting a war against the Laotian people without a declaration of war or congressional authority.

Wide destruction

Among the facts to emerge from the recent congressional debate is the acceleration of U.S. bombing in Laos, or rather, of the liberated zone since the autumn of last year, and the increased use of B-52s, a plane whose bombing reaches the peak of indiscriminate destructiveness. The step-up in B-52 activity in Laos has largely coincided with the accelerated "protective reaction strikes" being carried out against North Vietnam, and it is quite possible that one of the real purposes of these attacks is an effort to prevent the DRV from utilizing its potent aerial defenses to assist their Laotian neighbors.

continued

r world is made up of individuals, and nk that in the individual is where any of a change or solution must start. It stop there, though, because it must tually reach the top. For example, if a on is happy he won't mind separating his age for recycling, giving away some of food or money, thinking of the other before he demands more rights or ws a bomb. If he is happy he will have ncern for other people. If everyone did ndividual part in helping to solve such r problems, and took down just one that wall would be gone in no time. at is a lot of if's. How can a person be by so he will want to do his part? As already said, happiness means different gs to different people, but a full stom- a roof over one's head, and a feeling ceptance and security among one's peers lly helps. For those of us who are lucky gh to have these things already, happi- should be helping others to find them. Happiness is contagious, and even if can't give a person what he needs most, mile or a hello can sometimes mean just uch. Then maybe he will pass that smile o another person.

metimes I have to stop to think, and re myself that we, the people of this et, are not going backwards—or be- ing more violent, egotistical, and antag- tic. I always manage to convince my- that we aren't although sometimes it ap- s that way because it's always the nega- and not the positive things that we hear ut. The number of people who truly care ut other people is growing, and man is nning to spread his concern over a wider le of humanity. We usually care about family and friends and we want them to happy, but as the years go by there are *e and more* of us who care about the ple in our city, state, county, and world *individuals*. By caring, I mean wanting n person to be happy and secure and, ting this bad enough to do something ut it. If each inhabitant of this earth ed about the rest of mankind as indi- uals our brick wall would disappear, and ope that we can destroy it before it crushes

d just like to see everyone here *really* ppy and able to show it. Sometime—try ing HI to someone you don't know—take the mask for awhile—really feel the le you are giving everyone—forget your blems—make someone else happy—and if can't do that at least *you* can be happy. Vell, I know what I can do to make every- happy *now*—that is to end this speech hat we can all get out of this wind. Have appy day tomorrow! and make it happy someone else too. The world is only what make it—so let's make it happy!

NIVERSARY CONGRATULATIONS TO FATHER WALSH

HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR.

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, congratu- tions are in order for Father Gerald . Walsh who celebrated the 25th an- versary of his ordination to the Holy iesthood on June 1, 1971. Father Walsh turned to St. Mary's Church in Nutley, J. where he had spent his early priest- od to perform a special mass with St. ary's pastor, Msgr. John J. Feeley.

Father Walsh is an ardent contributor both his parish and his community. His humane spirit pervades all who know him. Let me offer my warmest thanks for his devoted service and wish him continued personal fulfillment in the future.

THAIS "VOLUNTEERS" IN LAOS

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the RECORD a second article by Tammy Arbuckle on his recent findings in Southeast Asia which appeared June 7th in the Washington Evening Star.

I believe it sheds further light on the military interests and activities of the Thai Army in Laos and the corresponding role of the United States.

The article follows:

THAIS IN LAOS IDENTIFIED AS REGULARS

(By Tammy Arbuckle)

VIENTIANE, LAOS.—Despite official statements that the Thai forces serving in Laos are volunteers wtihout official sanction from the Bangkok government, informed sources here say they are regular Thai army troops.

The sources said the troops sent here keep their Thai army rank and salary as well as the salary paid by the Americans.

Some Thai units come here in a group, said the sources, adding that Thailand's 940th Battalion presently is garrisoned on Hill 1663 west of Ban Na on the southwest rim of the Plain of Jars in northern Laos.

The Thais are sent to Laos on temporary detachment for six months or a year, the sources said. There are cases where units are formed from Thais of different units who have volunteered for certain duties in Laos, the sources said. However, these units remain part of the Thai army on loan to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the sources said.

The only voluntary aspect of their duty is that Thai soldiers are anxious for assignment to Laos because of the financial benefits.

Officials of the United States and Thailand governments insist the Thai troops in Laos, numbering at least 3,200, are volunteers. Thai officials, in particular, claim the troops have no official sanction from Bangkok.

(Even the number of troops is in dispute. As a result of U.S. Senate inquiries into the operation, the figure of 4,800 troops presently is given in Washington as the number of Thai troops on duty in Laos.)

The Lao military attributes the official Thai position to corruption. They say only certain members of the Thai government are pocketing payments from the United States, so the entire Thai cabinet may not be informed of the entire U.S. arrangements for Thais to fight in Laos.

Thai troops have been fighting in Laos since late 1964. The first Thai unit in Laos was a battery of 155mm howitzers based near Ban Khay village in the Plain of Jars.

Thai officers and men then were sent separately to guerilla units run by the CIA.

On Feb. 1, 1967, a reporter met one of these Thais at NAM Bac, Lao fortress 40 miles southwest at Dien Bien Phu. The Thai said he was a captain in the Thai army and came from Bangkok.

An American in civilian clothes was commanding his unit and was responsible for payment, he said.

There were at least 20 Thais with the captain at Nam Bac and Site 217.

On June 25, 1969, the Thai Artillery unit (which remained in the same place for five years while men were rotated) was overrun when North Vietnamese tanks broke through the neutralist Lao troops.

Following this attack, in which at least 30 Thais were killed, Bangkok insisted on having Thai troops protect the Thai gunners. Thai gunners also were sent to Long Cheng, further south, but this time several hundred—some sources say 800—Thai infantrymen were sent to protect the artillery.

Part of these units now are at Fire Base Zebra northeast of Long Cheng.

Recently Thai troops have served on the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos and on operations against Route Seven, the main Hanoi resupply route to its troops in northern Laos.

All troops under American control who need medical help are sent to Thailand directly, American officials say, so Thais have no worries if they are sick or wounded.

The Communist Lao radio claims over 300 Thais have been killed in action in Laos, but American officials say it's less than 200.

The Thai role, according to U.S. officials is to make up for heavy losses among the Meo tribesmen of Gen. Vang Pao, who have been fighting since 1960 against the North Vietnamese, suffering in the last three years over 8,000 killed in action.

The Lao army claims it's under strength and unable to substantially help Vang Pao because it's spread the length of Laos, facing the enemy. This claim, however, is suspect. Hundreds of unemployed young men roam around Vientiane in motorbikes. When Gen. Kouprasith Abhay, the Vientiane military boss, tried to conscript them, he found they are the sons of influential Laotians who protested conscription and forced Kouprasith to cease his activities.

Also, several thousand Lao troops are not gainfully employed but act as bodyguards, chauffeurs, office personnel or are building new villas for Lao officers.

Despite all this, it may be said that Laos still is woefully short of manpower as well as good field officers and some military discipline. Therefore, Lao needs help from its ethnic neighbors, the Thais.

The Lao however, don't want their neighbors in the western provinces of Champassac and Sayaboury, which the Thais covet nor in Mekong River towns where the Thai propensity for the spoils of war may match that of Saigon troops in Cambodia. Therefore, they are in the mountains of northern Laos where the Thais can do the most fighting and the least mischief.

HORTON PRAISES MRS. DONALD LOETZER FOR HER AFFIRMATION OF AMERICA

HON. FRANK HORTON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, during these times of protest by our Nation's youth, the very philosophies upon which this country was established are being questioned. At times, anti-American sentiments and acts seem to overshadow positive feelings for this country and our leader's goals.

There is little doubt that we must do what we can to foster respect for and understanding of this country among people of all ages, especially among our youth.

Concerned about the destiny of this country and about the young people who

WASHINGTON STAR
10 JUN 1971

[redacted]

VOLUNTEERS, BANGKOK INSISTS

Thais in Laos Identified as 'Regulars'

By TAMMY ARBUCKIE
Special to The Star

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All troops under American control who need medical help are sent to Thailand directly, American officials say, so Thais have no worries if they are sick or wounded.

The Communist Lao radio claims over 300 Thais have been killed in action in Laos, but American officials say it's less than 200.

The Thai role, according to U.S. officials is to make up for heavy losses among the Meo tribesmen of Gen. Vang Pao, who have been fighting since 1960 against the North Vietnamese, suffering in the last three years over 8,000 killed in action.

The Lao army claims it's under strength and unable to substantially help Vang Pao because it's spread the length of Laos, facing the enemy. This claim, however, is suspect. Hundreds of unemployed young men roam around Vienttiane on motorbikes. When Gen. Kouprasith Abhay, the Vientiane military boss, tried to conscript them, he found they are the sons of influential Laotians who protested conscription and forced Kouprasith to cease his activities.

Also, several thousand Lao troops are not gainfully employed but act as bodyguards, chauffeurs, office personnel or are building new villas for Lao officers.

Despite all this, it may be said that Laos still is woefully short of manpower as well as good field officers and some military discipline. Therefore, Lao needs help from its ethnic neighbors, the Thais.

The Lao however, don't want their neighbors in the western provinces of Champassac and Sayaboury, which the Thais covet nor in Mekong River towns where the Thai propensity for the spoils of war may match that of Saigon troops in Cambodia. Therefore, they are in the mountains of northern Laos where the Thais can do the most fighting and the least mischief.

3

STATINTL

[redacted]

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503
S - 867,810

JUN 9 1971



BALTIMORE SUN

8 JUN 1971

CIA-Thailand

SYMINGTON BLASTS U.S. LAOS ROLE

Says Financing Of Thai Troops There Breaks Congressional Edict

By GENE OISHI
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, June 7—Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) told a secret session of the Senate today that the administration was violating congressional restrictions by financing Thai mercenary troops to fight in Laos.

After the three-hour closed session, Mr. Symington repeated the charge to reporters, adding that he intended to introduce legislation to limit United States expenditures in Laos to $200 million a year.

That amount, he said, is what the administration says publicly it is spending in Laos for military and economic assistance.

Comment Declined

Mr. Symington declined to say whether the U.S. was actually spending more, pleading that he was dealing with classified information.

But in a statement released yesterday he said, "Our activities in Laos have been carried out largely in secret, without congressional sanction and outside the normal appropriations process."

Meanwhile, Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.), who had previously disclosed that the U.S. was financing 4,000 to 6,000 Thai troops in Laos, said the secret session revealed that the U.S. was spending $100 million a year more in Laos than Congress has specifically authorized.

The 4,000 to 6,000 estimate has since Mr. Case's original disclosure been refined to 4,000 by Senator [illegible]

(D., Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. After today's session, Senator Case said there was no indication that the number of U.S.-financed Thai troops in Laos have been increased beyond the 4,800 level.

Thai "Volunteers"

In another development today, a State Department spokesman acknowledged that Thai "volunteers" are fighting in Laos, adding that they are sometimes called mercenaries.

He declined to say how many there were or how they are financed. Asked whether the Thai troops in Laos were supported by the U.S. on the same basis as in Vietnam, he replied: "There are no comparable arrangements."

When reminded that Thai troops in Vietnam are paid by the U.S. and provided equipment and transportation as well, the spokesman said, "No, arrangements are quite different" in Laos.

The State Department spokesman began his briefing by stating that the U.S. operations in Laos were begun during the Kennedy administration and developed and continued by two succeeding administrations.

The "volunteers" in Laos, he added, are there at the request of Prince Souvanna Phorma, the Laotian prime minister, and "U.S. support of this program is fully consistent with all pertinent legislation."

The legislation at issue was attached by Congress last year to the 1971 Military Appropriations Act. The amendment, offered by Senator Fulbright, banned "the use of any funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia and Laos."

This amendment, however, was modified further in a Senate-House conference committee to state that "nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support or action required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of American prisoners of war."

It appeared that the administration was relying mainly on this second clause for legislative justification for its operations in northern Laos.

Letter To Kennedy

David M. Abshire, assistant secretary for congressional relations, said recently in a letter to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) that the operations in northern Laos were linked to the Vietnam war.

"If the North Vietnamese were to conquer all of Laos they could divert thousands of their forces now engaged in north Laos to the war against South Vietnam and greatly enhance their position in those areas of Laos bordering on South Vietnam from which they launch attacks on U.S. and allied forces," he wrote.

Senator Jacob K. Javits (R., N.Y.) commented after the closed session that the issue was primarily a "legal question" as to what constituted "free world forces" and whether there was a separate war going on in Laos or whether it had a bearing on the security of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

But the session, attended by about half the Senate, he said, was "useful" in that it again raised the question of what the limits of an undeclared war are.

"The Answer To Me . . ."

"The answer to me is to get out of Indochina," he said, "then you wouldn't have these questions raised."

Most senators emerging from the session said little new material had been disclosed. This was the seventh secret meeting held by the Senate in the last five years on a variety of subjects.

Senator Symington, chairman of the foreign relations subcommittee on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad, requested the session so that the contents of a special staff report on Laos could be disclosed.

The report was believed to contain information pertaining to the depletion of the Meo tribesmen, who have carried the brunt of the fighting against Communist forces in Laos, and their replacement by Thai mercenaries, financed through the CIA.

The report was also believed to contain details on B-52 bomb[illegible] only recently been acknowledged by the administration.

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
2 JUNE 1971

[redacted]

Behind Phnom Penh's musical

By Charles Meyer
Pacific News Service

Lon Nol's recent abdication of power in Phnom Penh has once again brought into the spotlight the man whom the CIA has long sought to impose upon Cambodia. Only three months after the coup of March 1970 which overthrew Prince Norodom Sihanouk, most politicians in the Cambodian capital were predicting a short term for Premier Lon Nol, and naming as his probable successor Son Ngoc Thanh.

Son was born Dec. 7, 1908 in Ky La, South Vietnam, of a Cambodian father and a Vietnamese mother. After attending a French high school, he moved to Phnom Penh in 1937, a functionary in the government there. The same year he started a nationalist group which published the first native language journal, Nagaravatta (Land of the Pagodas).

In 1941, French Indochina, still technically ruled by the Vichy government, granted the use of military facilities to the Japanese, in exchange for maintaining French sovereignty over Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Son immediately became an active collaborator with the Japanese Black Dragon Society, which aimed at overthrowing the French. On the verge of arrest by French authorities in the summer of 1942, Son fled to Tokyo.

With defeat imminent, the Japanese abolished the colonial administration in March 1945 and imprisoned all French citizens in Cambodia. A month later Son appeared in Phnom Penh as a Japanese captain and became minister in charge of relations with the Japanese command. On Aug. 10 a palace revolt inspired by Son and supported by the Kempetai (Japanese police) forced Sihanouk, then king, to confer upon Son the office of prime minister.

Following the collapse of Japanese power, Sihanouk on Oct. 8 secretly delegated a cabinet minister to go to Saigon for the avowed purpose of discussing "certain questions" with the French command. A week later French Gen. Leclerc arrived in Phnom Penh and arrested Son. He was put in the Saigon jail and then sentenced to forced labor for collaborating with the Japanese. Soon, he was sent to France and put under house arrest.

After several royal interventions, Son was pardoned in October 1951. He returned to Phnom Penh on the agreement that he would abstain from all political activities. He refused the ministerial portfolio Sihanouk offered to him, but within a few weeks—encouraged by several prominent Americans—he revealed clear political intentions. Early in 1952 he began publishing Khmer Krauk (Cambodians Awake!), violating his repatriation agreement with the French. By March he fled the city to rejoin an underground resistance band in northwest Siemreap province. He had, there, only a few hundred men and a radio transmitter. His broadcasts called upon the population to rise up and overthrow colonial rule under the French.

Joins with the CIA

In November 1953, Sihanouk's efforts at influencing the French paid off and Cambodia was granted formal independence. Son tried to gain some control in the new regime at Phnom Penh. Unsuccessful, he returned to the armed band in the northwest, where defections during his absence had weakened the ranks severely. His political constituency gone, in the wake of French maneuverings, Son was forced to ally himself with the CIA. In January 1956 the final blow was struck, as government troops attacked his camp near the Thai border killing 108 men and destroying the radio station. Son and a few men escaped and entered the service of the CIA in Bangkok.

Although his movement—now known as the Khmer Serai (Free Cambodia)—had been crushed, the CIA revived it steadily and built it into an army of 5000 ethnic Cambodians. Most of these men were recruited from Cambodians living in Thailand and South Vietnam. The mercenary army was based on Thai territory, from which it launched sabotage missions. Son became a front for these operations and plots, mounted jointly by the CIA and U.S. Army Intelligence in Bangkok and Saigon, against Sihanouk and Cambodian neutrality.

The Khmer Serai, transformed into the "National Liberation Front of Cambodia" (sic), announced on May 15, 1970 its support for the regime which grew out of the coup under Gen. Lon Nol. Son, however, secretly entered the capital as his supporters began to prepare for a return to power. Lon Nol, who had the full backing of the Pentagon, wasn't about to step down for the CIA's man. Son had to settle for the post of principal advisor to the premier.

But Cambodian public opinion remains very unfavorable to Son. The urban youth is violently hostile to him. He therefore continues to live in Saigon, where he has the solid support of the South Vietnamese puppets and the entourage of U.S. Ambassador Bunker. More importantly, he enjoys the loyalty of the Cambodian armies trained by American Special Forces units, who consider him a "spiritual father." Son has also renewed his ties with the Japanese groups which carried him to power in 1945. Representatives from Tokyo consult him on their Indochinese political and economic questions.

Son Ngoc Thanh wants to redeem the defeats that impeded his political life, and now anxiously awaits his hour. The CIA, which has backed Son for fifteen years, will be happy to make good his losses.

Charles Meyer was editor-in-chief of the magazine Etudes Cambodgiennes (Cambodian Studies) and Nokor Khmer. From 1957 through 1970 he was a counselor to the cabinet of Sihanouk and continued as such to Lon Nol until June 1970.

CHARLESTON, W.VA.
GAZETTE MAY 2 7 1971
M - 63,943
GAZETTE-MAIL
S - 106,775

Must We Pay Asians to Fight?

Sen. William Fulbright, asked by newsmen how many Thai troops are being paid by the CIA to fight in Laos, replied: "It's not very secret. I think it's 4,800."

Among conclusions to be drawn from this is that the 4,800 Thais are being paid by America to do the fighting against Communists in Laos because America can't get anyone else to fight. Not even Laotians.

Why does America persist in the futile endeavor? If Asians aren't interested in preserving their systems against the Communists, the vast treasury of America isn't big enough to pay them forever.

It must be frustrating, too, to the needy of America to learn that $260 million has been paid from the American treasury to Thai troops fighting in Vietnam, if fighting is the word.

No wonder Americans are turning to isolationism. National leaders who first encouraged America to assume a role in international affairs didn't envision that role to be paymaster to reluctant allies.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
CHRONICLE

M - 480,233

MAY 24 1971

Royce Brier

CIA's Little Army From Thailand

FROM JERSEY, General Washington hired a schoolteacher named Nathan Hale to spy on the British in Manhattan. It was bad judgment. Hale had no experience in espionage, as he soon proved by being captured and hanged, to become an American immortal.

In the Civil War the government hired the Pinkerton outfit to set up an espionage system. It was never much good, but neither was the Confederate.

In World War II we set up a spy system in Switzerland, and after the war it was consolidated as Central Intelligence Agency. It has grown every year of the 26 since, encircling the globe with its tentacles, becoming a dense empire defying the President and the Congress to comprehend or control its global activities.

Excepting its frequent blunders, nobody knows or can discover what it is up to in a given time or place. Compared with it, Hoover's FBI is an open book.

★ ★ ★

FOR FBI AGENTS are subject ultimately to court examination of their activities, which involve constitutional rights. CIA agents don't deal with those having constitutional rights, and nobody says how or why it disburses moneys voted to it by a generous and spellbound Congress.

Most CIA action naturally focuses on trouble areas abroad, Europe in general, Latin America, the Mediterranean and the Far East. Since we have been engaged for 20 years in Asian intrigue, half of that time in warfare with Asiatics, that is where the CIA sleuths and provocateurs congregate and conspire in this or that policy, which is removed from the hands of the President and the will of Congress.

This has become a savage and slippery maze of blind forces at work, which no extraneous power on earth can unravel.

★ ★ ★

IT IS A PREPOSTEROUS and dangerous situation for the Americans, and bears no relation to their traditional integrity of purpose and responsibility.

Senator Chase of New Jersey, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, said last week he has learned from government sources there are "4000-6000 Thai troops in Laos, and the United States is paying them through CIA."

He avers this is a violation of a congressional directive last year, prohibiting financing mercenaries in Laos except to help free POWs or facilitate American troop withdrawals. The committee is currently taking testimony from two aides recently in Indochina. The Senator said he wrote to Secretary of State Rogers about it a month ago, and has received no reply.

Then why not invite the Secretary to tell the committee what he knows about it, which might not be much, as there is no evidence Mr. Rogers talks to CIA, or vice versa.

But congressmen enjoy complaining, and don't enjoy doing. If they enjoyed doing they would adopt a joint resolution calling for an audit of CIA expenditures over the past few years. The howling would be pitiful that this would uncover supersecret investigation abroad, and work untold harm to vital American "interest." Who say? Who knows if CIA conniving is beneficial or detrimental to vital American interests anywhere, since nobody has ever yielded an inkling of what it is all about?

May 24, 1971

BOSTON, MASS.
HERALD TRAVELER
MAY 23 1971
M - 194,557
S - 260,961

The boys in Bangkok

by Elliott R. Thorpe

Where Dragons Dwell
by Frederick King Poole.
243 pp. Harper and Row $6.95.

"Where Dragons Dwell" can be reasonably described as a caudal view of Bangkok. If you are enamored of pimps, prostitutes, panhandlers and perverts you will find there is no shortage of them in Mr. Poole's book.

Local color is developed by the opening description of monkeys urinating from the living room lighting fixture while the master of the house picks his way through animal droppings on the floor. The inhabitants of this charming menage are not quaint Siamese but Princeton men who refused to be "trapped" in the workaday world of America. Their bedroom playmates include a Bennington College dropout, a Bangkok Bar Girl and other luscious bits of anatomy.

Brigadier General Elliott R. Thorpe (Ret.) is a Knight Commander of the Most Noble Order of the Crown of Thailand and a former member of the Council of the Siam Society.

The principal characters include Andy Harris, who writes pornographic travel guides between his innumerable bouts with bed and bottle. There is Simon Vandyke, a fellow Princetonian, who engages in various shady enterprises and like Andy possesses amazing sexual prowess. Then there is Gary Macfarland, another Ivy-Leaguer, who presumably is a CIA agent. Nit Noi the Thai bar girl and Ho Bee Lee the devious Chinese trader are also present.

If all the sex and booze were removed from its pages "Where Dragons Dwell" would become a very small volume, but surprisingly other things are also mentioned—how the principal characters drifted to Bangkok and their reasons for leaving home Frustration is a prominent ingredient. Their comings and goings seem to have little motivation other than to make a fast buck at the expense of the American soldiery in that part of the world.

When he takes time out from the brothels and bars the author gives quite a good portrait of life in this city beside the Menam Chao Phya where waterways are still the principal avenues of communication. He mentions Sanskrit street signs but I doubt if he ever saw any in that language. It is true that modern Thai is a derivative of Sanskrit and Pali but Sanskrit characters are not used. The present day Thai alphabet is Cambodian Pali.

There is a little name dropping of prominent Thai leaders of whom two are friends of this reviewer. I doubt if they will feel honored to be mentioned in "Where Dragons Dwell."

Another aspect of this book gives it some importance to those who interest themselves in American military ventures overseas. Here is a good description of the camp followers that trail the American troops abroad. In the American Civil War camp followers literally followed the troops down the road hoping to sell the goods brought along in a pack or wagon.

Today's camp followers are a different breed. They don't follow the troops into the boondocks. They settle themselves in good houses or hotels in such places as Manila, Saigon, Tokio or Bangkok. Here they set up shop with unexpected and usually crooked projects, so varied in nature it would be hard to enumerate them. They cut themselves in on such rackets as slot machines, beer sales to clubs, cut rate sales of automobiles to be delivered back home and the sale of narcotics.

In most Far Eastern cities prostitutoon was too well established business for the newly arrived Americans to cut themselves in. As for prostitution in Bangkok, it has always been there on a fairly small scale. It was the arrival of the American troops that really developed the wholesale aspect.

The Thai are quite a decent people and have a moral code like most law abiding Americans and they don't like the idea of their country being used by sticky American camp followers. However, they fully realize their chance of surviving a Communist take over depends heavily on American good will and assistance.

Somehow or other the educated American camp followers have been able to fix in the minds of the Thai that they are a part of the American military aid and that it would be extremely inadvisable to interfere with their doings.

"Where Dragons Dwell" is not deathless prose but if you would read about the seamy side of the war in Southeast Asia here it is.

STAR
22 MAY 1971

CIA Is Financing Thai Unit in Laos, Senate Aides Say

Two investigators for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have reported that the Central intelligence Agency is financing a 4,800-man army of Thais in support of the Laotian government.

A 1970 law prohibits U.S. payments to mercenaries in Laos except to protect American withdrawal.

The heavy U.S. involvement in Laos has been an open secret for some time. But the size of the Thai force was stated publicly yesterday by Sen. J. W. Fulbright, D-Ark., who is chairman of the committee. The report was presented in closed session by James G. Lowenstein and Richard Moose, former Foreign Service officers who resigned to become Senate investigators.

A committee member, Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., emerged from the meeting and told reporters that during a 12-day visit to Laos last month Lowenstein and Moose had confirmed Case's earlier disclosures concerning the Thai Army.

Case had taken his information from newspaper reports including a January dispatch by Tammy Arbuckle in The Star that detailed movements of the CIA-based Thai troops in central and northern Laos.

Fulbright Tells Secret

No government official had ever publicly confirmed that, however. When a reporter asked Fulbright how many CIA-supported Thais are operating in Laos, Fulbright responded "about 4,800" before a staff member signalled him that the information remained classified.

Last year Congress passed a provision in the 1970 Defense Appropriations Act which bars payment of mercenaries in Laos and Cambodia, except to protect a safe and orderly American withdrawal or disengagement from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of U.S. prisoners of war.

Case said the Thai troops violate that provision, although, he said, the State Department contended that U.S. withdrawals would be jeopardized if the Laos government fell.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., said the confidential committee report indicated clearly that the State Department's response to committee inquiries had been "incomplete and in some cases inaccurate."

Case said he wrote to the State Department seeking information on the Thai troops after reading a lengthy article in the April 17 Christian Science Monitor by George W. Ashworth.

Ashworth quoted earlier reports by Arbuckle from Vientiane and battlefield areas in and around the Plain of Jars in Laos.

Ashworth estimated, from sources in Washington, that the U.S. was financing between 4,000 and 6,000 Thais in Laos.

[redacted]

STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST

MAY 1971

[redacted]

Case Says U.S. Secretly Pays Costs of Thai Troops in Laos

[redacted]

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States is secretly paying "through CIA" for the costs of "four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos" without any direct action by Congress, Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) said yesterday.

Case called on the administration for "the specific terms of the agreement," which he said he first read about in the press last month. "Congress has never directly voted a penny to pay Thai troops in Laos," said Case, and both Congress and the public have "a right to know" what is happening.

Thailand has denied having any troops in Laos; its officials have said only that there may be Thai "volunteers" or "ethnic Thais" serving in Laos. U.S. officials have been publicly silent on the subject, except to refer back to the elliptical Thai statements.

Case finally got a reply yesterday to a letter he sent on April 23 to the State Department—but he said the reply was marked secret.

The substance of the reply to Case, according to State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray, was that "nothing is being done that is not within present legislative authority." Bray said the subject had been discussed in closed session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which Case is a member, and State could discuss the matter further only in the same manner.

Case said last night that "I'm still not satisfied . . . We should have been advised before the thing started, rather than having it dribble out afterwards in a way in which we can do little more than wring our hands."

The senator said that as he recalls, the subject of Thai units in Laos was only "touched on" by Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms, in a closed meeting.

After reading press accounts last month about a new U.S.-Thai agreement "for a sharp increase in Thai troops to be used in Laos," said Case, he made his own inquiries.

"I was able to ascertain," said Case, "on an absolutely not for quotation basis, from government sources that there are four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. government, through CIA, is paying for them."

Case said that "If an action by our country cannot stand up to public exposure, then our leaders should seriously reconsider that action."

His letter to Secretary of State William P. Rogers asked if financial support for Thai troops in Laos violated a congressional ban on payment of mercenaries in Laos except to aid American troop withdrawals or aid in release of U.S. prisoners; the terms of the Thai agreement, and whether the United States agreed to provide support "in event the Thai troops in Laos encounter difficulties."

WASHINGTON STAR
21 MAY 1971

[redacted]

Case Says CIA Pays 'Army'

STATINTL

[redacted]

Associated Press

Sen. Clifford P. Case has accused the Central Intelligence Agency of violating a congressional ban by secretly financing mercenary soldiers in Laos.

The New Jersey Republican said in a Senate speech yesterday he had learned from government sources "there are 4,000 to 6,000 Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. government, through the CIA, is paying them."

Congressional Curb

"There are presumably government funds being paid to Thailand," he said. "But Congress has never voted a penny to pay Thai troops in Laos."

Congress last year prohibited payment of U.S. funds for mercenaries in Laos, except to help free American prisoners of war or facilitate U.S. troop withdrawals.

Case is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, which met in closed session today to hear a report on Thai operations in Laos from two staff aides, James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, just back from Indochina.

Case said he asked Undersecretary of State John Irwin about the mercenary issue at a hearing May 3 and was told: "Any discussion of the Thai troops would be proper for an executive session."

Writes to Rogers

Case said he wrote Secretary of State William P. Rogers about it a month ago and has not received an answer.

"I am sure that at some future time," Case said, "an administration representative will sit down with the Foreign Relations Committee behind locked doors and inform us how and why the United States is paying for Trai troops in Laos.

"But this will be months after the fact, and we shall undoubtedly be told about an ongoing program which would be difficult to stop even if we were so inclined."

the opium trail



HEROIN and IMPERIALISM

This pamphlet was written collectively by a study group supported by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. The group included Pat Haseltine, Jerry Meldon, Charles Knight, Mark Selden, Rod Aya, Henry Norr, and Mara. Thanks to all who helped, especially Jim Morrell, Tod McKie, and Jancis Long.

[redacted]

STATINTL

Second Edition
April, 1972

continued

STATINTL
NEW YORK TIMES
12 MAR 1971

C.I.A. ROLE IN LAOS: ADVISING AN ARMY

150 U.S. Agents Help Direct Secret Guerrilla Forces

By HENRY KAMM
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, March 11—A month after the enemy attack on the American compound at the northern Laotian military headquarters at Long Tieng, the station chief, case officers and other officials of the American Central Intelligence Agency continue to perform their functions there and at other regional headquarters in Laos.

Though it conducts only ordinary intelligence activities elsewhere, the C.I.A. in Laos takes an active part in managing an army at war. This came about because the 1962 Geneva agreement on the neutrality of Laos barring foreign countries from playing a military role led the United States to turn over its assistance to the agency with the greatest experience in undercover activities.

The army functions separate from the Royal Laotion army, which is equally dependent on American logistic support and is equally financed by the United States, but is commanded by the general staff in Vientiane. The clandestine army is composed largely of mountain tribesmen. Its most active element are of the Meo tribe and its dominant figure is Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, who is also the principal leader of the Meo nation and the commander of the Military Region II of the Royal Laotion army.

Between 150 and 175 C.I.A. agents stationed in Laos are believed to be engaged in helping the guerilla army. They are augmented by agents who commute from Udorn and other bases in neighboring Thailand.

Their work is coordinated by the station chief. He and his local staff occupy the entire second floor of the two-story United States Embassy. The station chief at Udorn is reported to occupy an important but subordinate command function in C.I.A. operations in Laos that is said to lead to occasional duplication and confusion in the chain of command. For operations involving the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the station chief in Saigon is said to have primary responsibility.

Professionals Preferred

For its work with the Laotian clandestine army, which Americans prefer to call by its official designation—the strategic guerrilla units—the intelligence agency has engaged under two-year renewable contracts a number of former professional soldiers—showing a preference for men of the Special Forces, or Green Berets, and marines—in addition to men whose careers have been with the C.I.A. Their average age is around 30.

Their principal operating bases are Long Tieng, Savannakhet in the center of the southern panhandle and Pakse near the southern tip. Long Tieng is the most active station, because General Vang Pao's guerrilla units, which are the largest, are sitaioned there, although since the Feb. 14 attack most are spending their nights in Viuentiane. Long Tieng has its own station chief. He reports to the Vientiane chief, who figures on the diplomatic list as a special assistant to the ambassador.

The bulk of the agents are case officers, each entrusted with shepherding a combat position or unit of General Vang Pao's troops, whose present strength is estimated at more than 10,000.

Case officers visit "their" units daily, to check on their disposition and their needs. They fly out of Long Tieng in helicopters or STOL — short take-off and landing—planes operated under contract with the intelligence agency by Air America and the Continental Air Services.

They consult with their units officers, ascertain their needs in arms, ammunition, water and food, supplies, tactical air support and helicopter or plane transport for combat operations. They also help with troop morale matters.

Although the agents carry rifles or sidearms and favor camouflage uniforms, their assignment does not include active participation in combat operations.

In the past, there have been frequent violations, but the rarity of casualties indicates that the rule is widely respected.

While counseling Gen. Vang Pao and his officers, the C.I.A. does not command his army at any level, informed sources say. Laotians who know the Meo general well say that his pride and temper rule out anything more than an advisory role in combat operations com[illegible] to [illegible] the United States for all materiel, transport and pay.

After visiting their units, the case officers return to Long Tieng, where they arrange for the delivery of required supplies, supervise loading of planes or helicopters and submit air support requests to the C.I.A. contractors and the United States Air Force officers also posted at Long Tieng.

Once a week the station chief at Long Tieng submits a report to his superiors in Vientiane and Udorn on the disposition of all troops in the clandestine army.

Case officers also work closely with the Air Force forward air controllers who fly out of Long Tieng and direct fighter-bombers to targets in ground-support missions.

GUARDIAN
21 Feb 1971

ASIA

SOUTH VIETNAM

The massive Washington-led invasion of Laos bogged down last week and President Nixon admitted the bombing of the three countries of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos would continue to be unlimited. At the same time, several ground actions were reported in South Vietnam. By Feb. 18 fire support-base Scotch in northern South Vietnam had been surrounded for three days. A base for American troops, it is 10 miles northwest of the main jumping-off base into Laos—Khesanh.... U.S. and Saigon troops lost 500 tons of artillery shells and tear gas canisters when an ammunition dump outside Quangtri blew up.... There were five attacks in three days on U.S. military vehicles in Saigon. On Feb. 17 firebombs were hurled against the fence surrounding the U.S. embassy in Saigon. Two youths who threw the homemade bombs and fled on motorcycles scattered leaflets as they left, calling on people to burn U.S. vehicles throughout Saigon in retaliation against the sending of "South Vietnamese mercenaries" into Laos and the killing of civilians by a U.S. soldier in Quinhon.... The GI who killed a Vietnamese youth in Quinhon Dec. 10 was convicted this month of negligent homicide, sentenced to six months in prison, fined $360 and reduced from Pfc. to private. He shot the boy in an alleged attempt to prevent other hungry teenage boys near a Buddhist school from taking C-rations from a military truck.... Several hundred forced labor companies in the Saigon army are made up of captured deserters, the New York Times reported. These "field labor battalions," comprised of many men who have deserted for religious reasons, are assigned some of the most dangerous jobs of the war and suffer high fatalities. Without weapons and not allowed to speak to other soldiers, they bring water to the front lines, carry the dead from combat and run errands. Since by decree of puppet president Nguyen Van Thieu, the deserters' deaths are not reported, the men use the buddy system: when one is killed a friend writes the family telling where the body is buried so it can be reburied properly later on. Sentences to the forced labor battalions are usually for three years, the report said, but often service is extended for five.... Jack Anderson revealed in his Washington Merry-Go-Round column "a top CIA pilot [stationed in Thailand] can make as much as $100,000 a year flying high hazard missions" in the CIA's Air America planes. "Station allowances" of up to $320 a month are paid additionally.... The U.S. is financing the Saigon regime's notorious jails, according to the National Liberation Front's English-language newspaper, South Vietnam in Struggle. It said the U.S. paid $9.9 million for the current fiscal year to maintain the regime's 41 prisons.

NATION
22 FEBRUARY 1971

[redacted]

Don't Forget China

In one respect the Laos invasion differs decisively from the Cambodian invasion, and the difference makes it far more hazardous. Laos has a common border with Communist China. Thailand"s northern border is close to China—about 80 miles at the nearest point, or four minutes in a supersonic fighter. This geography had better be taken into account.

STATINTL

One may doubt that President Nixon is temperamentally able to acknowledge the risks of a U.S.-China confrontation. In 1954, when he was Vice President, he and Admiral Radford wanted to come to the aid of the French garrison trapped at Dienbienphu, reportedly with nuclear bombs if necessary. There is no sign that his judgment has improved.

Former U.S. Sen. Wayne Morse, one of America's most able analysts of foreign policy, said at a recent press conference in San Francisco that Mr. Nixon's Asian policies, if unchecked, will lead to an all-out war with China—a war in which the United States would probably stand alone. He pointed out that we do not have the manpower for such a war. Experience with non-nuclear bombing indicates that the air arm itself cannot conquer a small country like Laos, much less the giant China. According to Mr. Morse, it was the view of Robert S. McNamara, when he was Secretary of Defense, that not only aerial bombing on a vast scale but also 3 million foot soldiers would be needed to cope with China, even if nuclear weapons were brought to bear.

The Chinese, we know, are cautious. During the Korean War they remained aloof, but as General MacArthur approached the Yalu they sent repeated warnings through Indian diplomatic channels, and when these warnings were ignored they moved. Man for man, and with equal weapons, the Chinese foot soldier is at least as formidable as the American. Our people are superior technologically; from a purely military standpoint, one can only admire the agility with which the U.S. Army engineers and other units reactivated the base at Khesanh. But we had better not take on the Chinese.

The risk is that, without intending it, we may be dragged into such a situation as we abet the South Vietnamese militarists logistically and with air power in the forays into Laos. There are understandings, perhaps only nebulous at the moment, among the rightist generals of Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand. Thai troops are operating in Laos now, and if the Ho Chi Minh "trail" is shifted to the west the Thais may react in accordance with their interest which, together with their opposite numbers in the other countries of Indochina (with the exception of North Vietnam), is to batten on American aid. The United States has commitments in Thailand, the scope of which is known only in the top echelons of the Pentagon, the CIA and the Administration. The present American incursion into Laos appears to have been initiated by Thieu and CIA people who have long been operating in Laos. Repeated often enough, it may have results that are not envisoned under the Nixon doctrine.

GUARDIAN
2 MAR 1971

Laos invasion is turning sour

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

Sixty-six helicopters and 22 fixed-wing aircraft have been downed in southern Laos in the first four days of the U.S.-sponsored invasion. Two battalions of Saigon troops were completely put out of action on Feb. 13; all their arms were seized and many of them were taken prisoner.

The huge CIA base at Long Cheng is expected to fall at any moment since all its approaches are in Pathet Lao hands. As of Feb. 14, only the airfield was still functioning. It was being used to evacuate vital equipment and U.S. personnel until U.S. planes bombed the airfield, apparently thinking it had already been abandoned. Americans were among those killed by U.S. bombs and the airfield became unusable at least temporarily. About 1000 badly demoralized commandos



Chinese view of U.S. defeats in Indochina.

of "General" Vang Pao, actually CIA mercenaries, fled into Vientiane on Feb. 13-14.

In Cambodia, the Phnom Penh airport was bombarded by rockets on Feb. 14, forcing its closure just a few hours after semi-paralyzed Lon Nol, the puppet premier, had left for a few months of medical treatment in Hawaii after he had suffered a serious heart attack.

[Over 60,000 people demonstrated against the invasion of Laos in the U.S. last week (page 3).

In Peking, hundreds of thousands of people held a protest Feb. 12. People's China has issued three formal protests against the invasion, describing the action as "a grave menace" to China. In a Viewpoint (page 8), the Guardian speculates that the invasion may be intended to broaden the war to China.]

These are some of the fruits of Nixon's latest military adventure in Indochina. It will be necessary to capture inconceivable amounts of resistance equipment and rice stores to offset the losses already suffered by the U.S. and its puppet forces, not to mention the irretrievable loss of U.S. credibility. American pilots have been captured in Laos. Despite what the Nixon administration is saying about non-participation of U.S. ground troops, there were six Americans wearing South Vietnamese uniforms found among the corpses of Saigon troops killed during a single engagement deep within Laos.

Big Saigon Losses

In order to make losses appear minimal, the U.S. command is only announcing the loss of planes and helicopters piloted by Americans and which have been completely destroyed. The greatest losses, by far, have been suffered by helicopters and planes having pilots from the Saigon forces. And these losses have not been made public.

The biggest casualty of the invasion, so to speak, has been "Vietnamization." The Saigon army has proved that it is incapable of moving without U.S. transport; it cannot function without massive U.S. air and artillery support; it cannot fight without U.S. tactical commanders either on the ground or flying in helicopters at tree-top level. Yet with all its unprecedented support from U.S. airborne supplies, bombing and artillery, the Saigon forces in Laos are heading for certain disaster.

The U.S. news blackout still continues because the operation continues to go badly.

In particular, journalists are being prevented from seeing what is happening on the Bolovens Plateau where there are at least three Thai battalions operating; nor can newsmen go to Long Cheng where Thai troops have been rushed in to replace the fleeing Meo mercenaries; and they are not allowed to go to the CIA base at Udorn, Thailand, to which the equipment and personnel from Long Cheng are being evacuated.

With rightest forces and their battle lines cracking everywhere in Laos, Thailand has concentrated its troops along the Laotian frontier and declared a state of alert. Prince Souvanna Phouma has also instituted a state of emergency for the small portion of Laos that remains under his control. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has issued new warnings against extension of military activity on its territory by the U.S. or its puppets.

What is Nixon trying to do? It appears that he is trying to turn back the clock all the way to the 1954-55 policies of John Foster Dulles, based on evidence of Nixon's visceral anti-communism, the Dr. Strangelove attitude toward world politics of presidential advisor Henry A. Kissinger and the overweening conceit of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, now Army chief of staff but who is still trying to prove that when he was the U.S. commander-in-chief in Saigon he could have won if he had been given free rein to do what he had wanted.

Dulles had been the god-father of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization whose purpose was to "contain Communism" or even "to roll it back." In practical terms, SEATO was intended to counter the Vietnamese victory over the French in Indochina in 1954. As Dulles conceived it, the mainland part of SEATO was to be a broad wedge composed of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, adjoined by Laos—all under disguised U.S. military control. That would have brought U.S. military forces to the borders of the two socialist states—the People's Republic of China

Continued

[redacted]

WASHINGTON POST
18 FEB 1971

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

CIA Life in SE Asia Is Not All Intrigue

By Jack Anderson

The popular impression of CIA men in Southeast Asia is of lean-faced James Bonds talking in whispers to Indochinese beauties in dingy bars or of bearded guerrilla experts directing Meo tribesmen in the Laotian jungles.

The real McCoy, more often, is a rumpled civil servant going to lard, who worries about when his refrigerator will arrive from the States and plays bingo on Tuesday nights.

This is the unromantic picture that emerges from an instruction sheet handed to CIA pilots leaving for Udorn, Thailand. The CIA uses a front called Air America to fly missions out of Udorn over Indochina.

Instead of pressing cyanide suicide capsules upon new recruits, the stateside briefer slips them a bus schedule for CIA personnel between Udorn's CIA compound, schools and banks.

"A bowling alley in Udorn has league bowling," the CIA confides to its pilot-agents. Their wives are given such hush-hush CIA tips as "water should be boiled three to five minutes prior to drinking, but it is safe for cooking and washing dishes of it is brought to the boiling point."

The cloak-and-dagger boys are told they will have a supermarket, swimming pool, free movies, the "Club Rendezvous" (which doubles as a chapel on Sundays) and bingo on Tuesday and Saturday nights. The CIA bars are called The Pub and the Wagon Wheel and shut down at midnight.

The same humdrum life style can be found at such CIA outposts as Vientiane, Laos, where CIA men usually live with their families in villas and dine at the town's few French restaurants.

One lonely CIA flier, who had left his family in Florida, worried about their safety after reading about racial demonstrations at home. "I'm going to bring them out here where it's safe," he confided solemnly to my associate Les Whitten in Vientiane last summer.

But if the CIA living conditions are vintage suburbia, some of the missions are dangerous. The CIA pilots fly supplies to CIA-backed Meo tribesmen in Laos hinterlands. There are also more hazardous missions, such as flights along the Red Chinese border and ammo deliveries to tiny airstrips in Communist-infested country.

Footnote: Much of the recruiting for CIA pilots is done out of a modern, gold-carpeted office in downtown Washington with "Air America" on the glass doors. One of my reporters, posing as a pilot, was interviewed by H. H. Dawson, a beefy man in shirt sleeves. He said prospects were dim right now, because the number of fixed-wing pilots had been cut back from 600 to 500.

Dawson said the basic pay is $22.93 an hour for captains, $13.93 for first officers, with bonuses for special "projects." A top CIA pilot can make as much as $100,000 a year flying high hazard missions. In addition, station allowances run $320 a month at Saigon, $215 at Udorn and $230 in Vientiane.

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
14 NOV 1970

[redacted]

WORLD IN REVOLUTION

BOLIVIA

Gen. Juan Jose Torres, who gained the presidency in a military coup last month, refused to allow former interior minister Antonio Arguedas to return to Bolivia from exile in Cuba. Arguedas, who sent the 1967 field diary of Che Guevara to Cuba, maintains a CIA plot forced him to leave his country. . . . A report in Muhammad Speaks said more than half the children born in Bolivia die before their fifth birthday and more than 40% of the population is stricken with tuberculosis.

THAILAND

The pending transfer of U.S. B-52 bombers from Okinawa to Thai bases was denounced by "The Voice of the People of Thailand" radio. . . . The Bangkok regime has admitted CIA planes presently taking off from Takli base to bring arms, military supplies and provisions to mercenaries in Laos. . . . Time magazine estimates some 280 U.S. "phantom" jets are based in Thailand and South Vietnam and said the U.S. has lost 7316 planes and helicopters in nearly 10 years of war in Southeast Asia. . . . Direct investment by U.S. groups in Thailand has reached some $2 billion, with over 150 U.S.-owned companies, factories, banks and offices established in the country. Dominated sectors of the economy are finance, oil extracting and refining, tin refining, rubber processing and textiles. "In addition," according to Hsinhua, the China news agency, "U.S. and Japanese monopoly capitalists are dumping large quantities of commodities in Thailand, bringing about an unprecedented deficit in the latter's foreign trade."

The Dominoization of Thailand

IN 1861, KING MONGKUT of Siam offered Abraham Lincoln elephants to aid the Union cause in the Civil War. The President politely refused the help, but that was not the end of military relations between the two countries. Thailand is no longer whimsically isolated from world realities; nor does it have a choice in the way it lines up on international issues. Over the past two decades, Thais have watched their country become a giant airstrip, where American B-52s, fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships roar off on missions of death for other Southeast Asian countries. They have seen their own troops become U.S. mercenaries, and their borders used as staging points for Special Forces and CIA personnel on missions of subversion into Laos and North Vietnam.

Thais have watched helplessly as their nation has become an American military base and neo-colony. U.S. Senator Gale McGee stated in a recent speech that "Southeast Asia is the last major resource area outside the control of any one of the major powers on the globe." And the mammoth Chase Manhattan Bank has been even more specific: "Thailand promises to be an excellent investment and sales area for Americans," its Economic Research Division writes, "if rebel insurgency can be contained."

The various minorities that make up Thailand have tried to resist the destruction of their culture and their forcible integration into a U.S.-controlled political economy. But the U.S. military advisors who train Thai troops to fight in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have also trained them to fight rebels at home. Meanwhile hordes of AID and American university personnel comb the countryside, studying every aspect of Thai life and recommending and implementing programs of counter-insurgency.

Thailand has changed greatly in the century since its king naively offered a U.S. President military aid. Since then America has decided to fight its wars abroad, not at home—wars that make sure countries like Thailand stay in the Free World bank account.

[I]

THE THAI ELITE, whose body and soul is now completely owned, once prided itself on an ability to resist colonial domination. In the 19th century, the Thais closed their country to the probes of imperialism, and tried to modernize by selective contact with the West. This relative independence was validated by a British-French agreement to let Thailand remain a buffer state between their respective colonial empires in Malaya-Burma and Indochina.

Thailand's privileged status was ended by an event which has shaped the course of its history for the last quarter century: the United States' victory over Japan in World War II and its emergence as the dominant power in the Pacific Basin. The U.S. quickly decided that Thailand's position was critical for consolidating an American foothold on the Southeast Asian mainland; by 1950, U.S. military and economic aid began to flow to the Thai government, then headed by General Phibun, a former Japanese puppet whose military regime rode to power on a 1948 coup.

Urged on by U.S. money and by the long shadow of the Chinese Revolution, the Thai army and police began an anti-communist crusade in the early '50s. Their campaign was focused on Thailand's Chinese Community, and it began officially in 1952 with the passage of the Un-Thai Activities Act (sic), supposedly aimed at combating "communist subversion," even though the Thai Chinese Community was notoriously apolitical. But if General Phibun's attack could not rid his country of a communist menace that did not exist, it could establish his control over the Chinese Community which had traditionally been the backbone for Thailand's indigenous economy. The Chinese entrepreneurs and businessmen responded to the anti-communist hysteria by paying a kind of "protection" money to the Thai elite—offering them positions on the boards of directors of Chinese corporations and other financial incentives.

Even though it was borne of intimidation, this alliance might have been able to slowly industrialize Thailand by relying on domestic rather than Western capital and thus avoid the disastrous controls that were always attached to investment. But this last hope for economic autonomy in Thailand was quickly foreclosed by the U.S.

THAILAND'S SMALL MEASURE OF economic independence had rested upon the government's ability to finance the infrastructure for development from export surplus. But after the Korean War, the U.S. dumped large quantities of tin, Thailand's third largest export, on the world market; meanwhile, the price of rubber, Thailand's second largest export, was forced down by the falling off of war-time demand and by American corporations' marketing of new synthetics; the price of rice, Thailand's largest single export, was also plummeting.

As this surplus dried up, the U.S. and its international financial arm, the World Bank, prepared to appear at the moment of Thai financial crisis with offers of financial and technical assistance. All that was asked in return for this subsidy was that the Thai military regime abandon any attempts to create an autonomous economy and allow Thailand to become an object of U.S. corporate expansion.

Since Thailand's status as a bona fide U.S. colony has been guaranteed, American financial commitments—now totaling nearly $600 million in economic assistance and some $900 million in military aid—have been accelerated. But the U.S. was not content with being the Thais' guardian. It wanted to be their mentor as well. And thus, while systematically destroying what chance the Thais might have had for economic independence, the U.S. has also set about the task of re-ordering Thai society—from rebuilding its military and government administration, to introducing new agricultural techniques and a Western-oriented educational system. To coordinate and implement this massive cultural onslaught, it has called in the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), which has its own kind of Catch 22: While AID is supposed to help Third World nations help themselves, it in fact helps American businesmen help themselves to the Third World. This is AID's mandate.

By Banning Garrett

THE WASHINGTON STAR
31 Aug 70

Soft Soap in Thailand

The latest word from Southeast Asia is that the United States, not content with winning the minds and the hearts of the people, has now progressed to winning their faces and forms.

A secret weapon has been devised to this end and has been distributed to a Thailand. It is a bar of soap, manufactured in Taiwan, which is imprinted with a whole series of patriotic, anti-Communist messages. As the user soaps up in shower or tub, the bar peels and reveals its thought for the day.

"Fight Communism," it might say, for example, while being vigorously rubbed into the back of the neck, and "Support the CIA" on the soles of the feet. The more you wash your body, the more you wash your brain. It's an adman's dream and that may be the trouble with it.

This sort of tricky sloganeering is ideally suited to the merchandizing of marginal products or marginal values such as are commonly attributed to many of the personal cleansing preparations sold on television in this country. Surely, the most boondock-bound Thai wants a little more than that as a reason to support the Bangkok government and shun the Communists.

Without our cult of the superbath, the Thais may even regard the effort as a joke of the inscrutable occidentals. The program should be washed out.

THE WASHINGTON POST
28 JUL 1970

Thai Troops Training Secretly for Cambodia

By T. D. Allman
Special to The Washington Post

CAMP ETOH, Thailand, July 27—At this former Boy Scout campground halfway between Bangkok and the Cambodian border, Thailand is training theee battalions of troops to go into Cambodia to support the regime of Gen. Lon Nol.

The existence of Camp Etoh is supposed to be "top secret," as the civilian-clad security officer here told us after offering visiting journalists—first assumed to be CIA agents—Pepsi Cola and politely escorting them away from the campsite.

But in fact the camp's presence is well known in Bangkok and in the provincial capital of Prachinburi, long headquarters for Thai and American-backed Khme Serai insurgents, a guerrilla organization that pestered Prince Sihanouk during the late 1950s and early 1960s but that now has pledged its loyalty to the new government.

During the last two months, speculation in Bangkok and other capitals has centered on the issue of whether or not a hesitant Thailand denied massive United States aid would unilaterally assume the responsibilities and risks of sending its troops into Cambodia.

Anticlimax

An affirmative decision apparently was reached in Bangkok about two weeks ago when Camp Etoh, a collection of army tents surrounded by monsoon mud, was set up.

But as the chief center for training Thai troops to go to Cambodia, Camp Etoh is something of an anticlimax. It is very small. The number of troops being trained numbers only 1,885 even though estimates as high as 10,000 have circulated in Bangkok.

In a gray tent that serves as a command post, Thai officers headed by a colonel pore over a large and apparently unfamiliar map of Cambodia, but it is not yet decided where the troops will go, or when or if they will be followed by further batches.

The Lon Nol government wants more combat troops, specialists and trainers. The Thai government, according to Bangkok sources, would like to have the troops in or around Phnom Penh where they would be most useful politically.

The camp still looks raw and the recruits for the moment seem no more expert than the Boy Scouts they replaced, but the Thais have set up the camp according to the textbook. Newly dug latrines complete with corrugated-steel fences to insure privacy and cleanliness are scattered through the lightly defended compound. The recruits eat and live in simple but weathertight tents. The officers sip Pepsi and Mekong whisky in their canvas officers' club.

Secrets

The nominal secrecy surrounding the training operation apparently is for several reasons.

The Bangkok government has claimed that the Thai soldiers who will be going to Cambodia are all "Khmer volunteers" drawn from Thailand's sizable Cambodian minority, much of which is concentrated in this border province.

In fact many of the recruits being trained here are of obviously Cambodian descent—darker, shorter and with hair wavier than their ethnic Thai compatriots. But many others, perhaps a majority, are pure ethnic Thai.

Apparently the Thais are drawn to volunteer for service in Cambodia in hopes of gaining the prestige and higher pay that has attracted Thai soldiers to Vietnam, Laos and Korea.

Perhaps the most important reason for the secrecy besides the fact that the Thai decision to send troops to Cambodia is equivocal and has not been approved by parliament may well be the very modesty of the program.

The Camp Etoh program obviously is a low-budget operation designed to create a token force for political rather than military ends as quickly as possible.

According to some Thai sources it is being financed entirely out the personal contingency funds alloted to strongman Praphas Charusathien.

The small contingent training at Camp Etoh, no matter what use it is put to in Cambodia, is not going to shift the balance of power in a country where there are already 20,000 to 40,000 Communist troops, 20,000 South Vietnamese troops, more than 10,000 Cambodians under the colors, and a sizable intervention involving the U.S. Air Force and reported clandestine U.S. operations.

The chief reason the Camp Etoh program is so small is money. Bangkok sources say the Americans trying to implement the Nixon doctrine simply have not given the Thais the cold cash they wanted to finance a large operation.

The Thai cabinet soon plans to present formally to parliament a new national budget that would contain an increase in military expenditures.

However, Thailand's financial resources, as was emphasized during a recent parliamentary debate over the tax increases, are fragile and sending troops to Cambodia even in small numbers already has provoked some parliamentary and press opposition in a country where the percentage of children in school has declined slightly over the last 10 years.

For these reasons the Thai government apparently hopes to win a political stake in the outcome of the Cambodian war as cheaply as possible. Reliable sources in Bangkok say Thailand would prefer to finance its Cambodian expenses mostly through reducing the Thai troop commitments in Korea, where another token force has been serving for 20 years, and in South Vietnam.

JEFFERSONIAN
NEWS

M - 4,944

JUN 25 1970

Whose side are some of our senators on?

The United States Senate, once held in the highest esteem in the Congress, continues to deteriorate to new lows. There are times when one wonders whose side the senators are on.

The most recent in a series of trying tests came with a highly censored report on U. S. military assistance to Thailand for providing some 10,000 troops to fight the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.

The report was released by a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by color-blind Sen. J. William Fulbright. The report was made public in a fashion which made it appear our country was sunk in deep secrecy under a cover provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. Presumably, this is a dastardly act in the eyes of Senate isolationists and peaceniks.

It should surprise no one that Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) is among those looking aghast. He opposes giving the Thais any "greenbacks" and he wants to see an end to financing of Thai troops going into other countries.

Sen. Mansfield's reaction is typical of all doves and dupes in this country who don't want to fight communism diplomatically or any other way. They apparently do not care what happens to the freedom-loving people of Indochina.

Use of Thai troops would mean that 10,000 fewer American troops are needed to battle the enemy. Even if the cost is comparatively high, it amounts to little when compared to the countless millions Washington can and does squander in questionable social experiments.

The United States is not developing a program of hiring mercenaries. It long has been our practice to provide military assistance and material to nations to help themselves in their own defense.

Thailand is part of Indochina. So, too, are Laos and Cambodia. They along with South Vietnam have been an integral part of the Vietnam War since the outset. The Communists have been the instigators of the warfare in each of these countries.

If such assistance to Thailand or any other nation in Indochina is extravagant, what about the annual wheat sales that the U. S. made to Soviet Russia, our professed enemy, on American credit? And transported in Soviet vessels contrary to agreement. And what about the military supplies Soviet Russia sends to Southeast Asia and the Middle East to keep the fires of war flaming in both areas?

How about the extravagant waste in the Food for Peace allocations to Egypt's Gamel Abdel Nasser? He got his wheat even after he told the U. S. in effect "to go to hell" with our food, which cost him virtually nothing.

Moreover amounts far in excess of $200 million have been given in foreign aid to Communist countries through the "Preferred Nations" program. And this program was approved by Congress, granting the President such discretion.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular has made it appear that our government was and is furtive and is deceiving the people. Of course, any war requires some degree of secrecy. Certainly this is true with respect to counter moves against the Communist.

Sen. Fulbright and some other color-blind member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee apparentl ignore that we are in fact fighting the Soviet Union plu Hanoi, a ruthless and tenacious enemy which does not recog nize the Marquis of Queensberry rules. Or the Geneva cor ventions on warfare. The bitter truth is we are fightin an enemy which has no sense of decency and whic capitalizes propaganda-wise on every bit of information h can glean from us.

One would think members of the Senate Foreig Relations Committee, long exposed to the trickeries international politics, would be aware of the natu of the Vietnam War and our ruthless enemy in Southea Asia. Tragically, they are not.

Instead, they and some of their colleagues in th U. S. Senate appear to be hell-bent on humiliating ou nation and opening the door to a major blood-bath Southeast Asia. In our view, the actions of a numbe of our U. S. senators are treasonous.

TAMPA, FLA.
TRIBUNE

M - 161,892
S - 185,885
JUN 12 1970

STATINTL

[redacted]

Her Last Job Was With CIA In Thailand

By MARLENE DAVIS
Tribune Staff Writer

When Mygnon Evans began her studies in political science she had no idea she would be hearing jets taking off in Thailand while she was teaching American service men the history of the Indo-China War.

BUT THEN she didn't know she would also gain first-hand knowledge of poverty conditions in India or become a world traveler.

Most of all, she didn't know she would get the silent treamtent right here in Tampa.

She laughed. That's the way people respond when they find out she and her husband worked for the CIA.

"PEOPLE DON'T know what to say," she said. "It's like the reaction a woman gets when she says she just got a divorce."

She said many people think of the CIA in terms of the little man with glasses who sneaks into a dark room and steals a paper out of a drawer.

'It's much more sophisticated," she said.

And when she said it, the word "sophisticated" seemed to stay around her like an aura.

THIS IS the kind of atmosphere she has created for the last two months in the role as director of the News Bureau office at Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce.

The informed young woman recently took over the job of publicizing Tampa throughout the country after a two-and-a-half year tour of duty with her husband, Robert, in Thailand.

Both were analyists with CIA.

Although she won't talk about that job, there is plenty of excitement in her background to keep a lively, but sophisticated conversation going for hours.

AS A FULBRIGHT scholar who spent a year teaching and doing research in India, she has been able to make comparisons between the people of India and Thailand and in the process gain appreciation for the values of others and for the American socio-economic system.

When she went to India, it was the first time she had been out of the southeastern United States.

A native of Tallahassee, she received her bachelor's and master's degrees in government from Florida State University. She also worked as a reporter for the Tallahassee Democrat and Leesburg Daily Commercial, was assistant editor of the FSU news bureau and was a writer for Florida State News Bureau.

MYGNON SAID she found the people in India extremely poor, but willing to accept things as they were. In contrast, she added, she saw no starvation in Thailand. The country had its hardships, but the people are enterprising, she said, explaining how you can give a man $10 and he immediately starts thinking of how he can invest it to make more money.

Mygnon feels she has grown more economically conservative as a result of living in these two countries. She has also learned one cant' transplant the American free enterprise system to another country "unless the soil is right."

"I have serious doubts it would work in India," she said, "but I feel it would in Thailand."

HER MEMORIES of Thailand involve everything from "being under attack, but out of danger" to learning to live with electricity that would frequently go off. And sometimes, she added, there was no water.

One of the things she dreaded the most, other than the giant lizard which stayed over her classroom blackboard, was the flight to Bangkok about every six weeks to two months to buy meat. It involved a one-and-a-half hour flight plus an hour taxi ride to the store.

Although fruit and vegetables could be bought where she lived, she and other Americans preferred to shop in Bangkok.

SHE FOUND the people extremely friendly, no trouble buying American-type clothing, and housing adequate ("comparable to an American wood and stucco beach cottage.")

Her trips to these countries made it possible for her to become somewhat of a world traveler. She has visited almost all the countries of Europe and many Eastern Bloc countries.

A little tired of the vagabond life, she and her husband came to Tampa "to put down roots." He is an agent for Connecticut Life Insurance Company. And they both have discovered a passion for gardening on the one-and-a-half acres surrounding their home.

MYGNON SAYS someday they would like to travel again, back to Turkey and Greece, down to Africa "before they destroy all the wildlife," south of the border.

But for now her interest in government has taken a back seat to her interest in writing and letting people know just how great Tampa is.

Yet those who have talked to Mygnon in her new role can't help but feel the magnetism of her background.

STAT [redacted]

GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
NEWSDAY

E - 427,270

JUN 9 1970

'Mind you, this $200 million is not an inducement'

SHEBOYGAN, WISC.
PRESS

E - 30,317
JUN 9 1970

Thailand

The acknowledgment by government sources that the CIA has been totally involved in the foreign aid program in Thailand for over three years was made over the weekend. Security reasons were given for not divulging all of the details of the agreement but the fact of the agreement has now been made public.

Payments in the amount of $200 million were included in an agreement on the part of Thailand to supply troops for the Viet conflict. The money was apparently used for indemnifying Thailand for any cost or loss of security that it might incur by reason of equipping, training and stationing its troops in South Vietnam.

The agreement was not handled as an ordinary military assistance program, but instead, it caused the funds to be channeled through the foreign aid agencies under the supervision of the CIA. The payments that are being made are highly disproportionate to those made to other allies in the Far East under the military assistance programs that have been publicly acknowledged in the past.

The disclosure at this time necessarily raises a number of questions which will ultimately have to be answered. Since the agreement was initiated in 1965, prior to the present Nixon administration, to what extent does this sort of agreement, made in secret without public discussion, cause a newly elected president to have his options in foreign affairs partially removed by decisions made by his predecessor?

To many Americans the existence of troops of other nations in South Vietnam fighting as allies caused us to believe that, we though larger, were one of several countries coming to the aid of a beleaguered ally. Does this recent disclosure indicate that neither the cause of freedom in South Vietnam nor opposition to the encroachments of Communism is the motivational element that places soldiers of other nations in the field of combat with our GIs? Are these "allies" purely mercenaries of the Central Intelligence Agency? Will the disclosure that the Thais were perhaps better negotiators for their military assistance now cause Uncle Sam to up the ante for Koreans and Filipinos, and others whom we have assisted militarily?

The foreign aid bill has been an item of national debate over the years. Each year opponents of foreign aid have been successful in making substantial slashes in the administration's initial recommendations. Did the $200 million of Thai funds come from the regular foreign aid budget or were they part of the CIA funds that are never publicly debated? Will the opponents of foreign aid now have another string in their bow to shoot down, or more properly cut up, future foreign aid appropriations?

We have been told in the past that the national interest requires that secrecy must surround appropriations for the CIA. Knowing that some areas of intelligence gathering must of necessity not be publicly discussed or disclosed, have we gone too far in this regard? Are we not discovering now that instead of buying a present for a girl friend, we are in fact keeping a mistress? Are we finding out that while we thought our political ideas had charm it is really only a bribe that has paid off?

TUCSON, ARIZ.
STAR
APR 21 1970
M - 42,069
S - 72,623

New Crises In Asia—II

Small Nations Are Restless

By EDWARD NEILAN
Copley News Service

Second of four articles

WASHINGTON — The other "dominoes" are getting restless. After dutifully girding themselves to stand or fall in the wake of the Vietnam-Laos conflagration, the four spectator nations of Southeast Asia find themselves going through a period of reorientation. In Cambodia, it is worse.

According to the much-publicized domino theory, if South Vietnam fell to the Communists then Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and Cambodia might be toppled in turn.

In each of those countries, abrupt social change is taking place against a background of varying economic pace. Severe stresses are being felt on national fabrics and unfulfilled dreams are being forcibly reconciled with reality.

Presures are building in each of those nations for faster, more even economic development.

For three of them, the euphoria that followed independence from colonial rule has been replaced with a sense of disenchantment.

For Thailand, the only Southeast Asian nation to escape colonization, the torment is just as pronounced, but for different reasons

Thailand is contiguous to the other three and has problems with all three as well as some cooperative projects. Though each of the four has unique internal problems, all share anxiety about the intentions of Communist China.

A capsule look at the seeds of crisis in each of the four countries:

THAILAND

The Peking-backed Thailand Liberation Movement already has a foothold in Northeast Thailand where it is fed by outside aid and the dissent prevalent among the neglected hill people.

Bangkok has avoided seeking American involvement in eradicating these insurgents, but has accepted U.S. aid in cash, equipment and advice. There have been times when the fighting in Thailand was more heated than in Laos.

Because the American commitment to Thailand is more definite than to Laos, both through bilateral treaty and through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a new crisis in Thailand is only a headline away.

The Communists are rebuilding their infrastructure after some effective search-and-destroy missions by the government but have the capability to cause trouble

American Agency for International Development (AID), U.S. Information Service (USIS), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) programs to assist the Thais are fused through an office called the U.S. Counter-Insurgency Coordinator. The idea is to avoid the competition and working at cross-purposes among U.S. agencies that characterized the early days of the Vietnam war.

The Thais, after committing themselves heavily to the American position, have had trouble grasping the "Nixon Doctrine" fully. There have even been hints that the Thais — who had an "arrangement" with the Japanese during World War II — might have make a deal with the Commu-

nists eventually.

Fears of a precipitate American withdrawal have been allayed, however, and Thai qualms have been steadied by the country's economic progress and continued U.S. aid.

Apprehensions in Bangkok, along with expectations for outbursts of violence in the seventies, are underscored by the presence of Communist units not only in the northeast but also along the border with Malaysia to the southeast, in Cambodia to the southwest and in the high country of Burma to the west.

An awakened government, strong military establishment and the world's most thoroughly Buddhist population are Thailand's strengths in resisting new crises.

After his 1962 military coup, Gen. Ne Win guided the country along a path he called the "Burmese way to socialism."

He drew the shades on the charming country, shutting out foreign investment and even tourists except for overnight stops.

"We must get our own house in order," he told me during one of those 24-hour visits in 1964, "before we invite others to come in."

Ne Win's first mistake was to boot out Indian and Chinese merchants who held a grip on the commercial economy. With their abrupt departure went capital and business know-how. The economy entered a period of stagnation from which it has never recovered.

Up country, Ne Win faces problems with "White Flag" or pro-Peking Communists who are plying dissident Kachin, Karen and Shan tribesmen military goodies made in China.

Official Rangoon worries that Peking might decide to consolidate these rebel elements in a massive revolt against the Ne Win regime.

Only internal purges have kept the "White Flag" group from crystalizing into a more serious threat.

For these reasons, Ne Win places smooth relations with Communist China high on his priority list. He has also seen the economic light and seems ready to open the door a crack to the outside.

Given a chance, Burma has development possibilities, and her people are bright and relatively industrious by Southeast Asian standards.

But all the elements for trouble are present in the country. The United States has no military treaty with Burma, but any Communist activity could have an effect.

continued

NATION

20 APR 1970

Clandestine Militarism

The United States today is largely run by the military services and the Central Intelligence Agency. The ordinary citizen doesn't see this, but just two items appearing in *The New York Times* on April 5 should have opened his eyes: Richard Halloran's story, "Air America's Civilian Façade Gives It Latitude in East Asia" and Peter Grose's "Pentagon Slips Its 'Goodies' to Its Friends."

Reporters must watch their wording when they write stories of this type. Thus Halloran, noting that Air America and subsidiaries, with 167 aircraft and 9,300 employees, performs diverse missions, ranging from Korea to Indonesia, says cautiously that it "is believed to be a major link for the CIA's extensive activities throughout Asia." His long story leaves no doubt that Air America is a major airline in personnel, aircraft and ground facilities, and if the reader questions that it is a CIA operation he must also question that the moon is a satellite of the earth. Who but the CIA would be parachuting Meo tribesmen and assorted secret agents behind North Vietnamese lines in Laos, or training mechanics for the aviation division of the national police in Thailand, ferrying U.S. Air Force men from Okinawa to Japan and South Korea, and dispatching intelligence flights from Taiwan toward or over Communist China?

One of the excuses for keeping these operations under a flimsy civilian cover is that it enables the U.S. Government to disclaim responsibility when certain "dirty tricks" miscarry. But the cover is itself a dirty trick on the American people and, to some extent, the Congress. In the March 9 *Nation*, Michael Klare described "The Great South Asian War." Air America is a key organization enabling the military (including the CIA) to carry on that war with a minimum of publicity. Of course, this is done with the approval of the Nixon Administration, as of the Johnson administration before it, but a large degree of initiative and operational freedom remains with the military, who can get credit in Washington for their successes and play down their failures.

The other story was largely covered in a *Nation* editorial, "The Phantom Phantom Jets" (February 2) and is further amplified by Rep. Silvio O. Conte (R., Mass.) who discovered by accident that nearly $160 million worth of military equipment had been slipped to Chiang Kai-shek's government on Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalists are not the only beneficiaries of this Pentagon gimmick. The technique is to declare items as surplus, whereupon they may be disposed of on an accounting basis of one-third their value, or less. Congress has been cutting down on the Military Assistance Program (MAP). By discounting its equipment, the Pentagon can triple the amount of hardware it distributes to anti-Communist governments without exceeding the dollar ceiling. Thus Greece, Turkey, South Korea and Nationalist China receive large stocks of military equipment practically free.

The Downfall of Sihanouk: Don't Blame It on CIA

By DONALD KIRK
Star Staff Writer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — The American Central Intelligence Agency could not claim the credit for overthrowing Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Cambodian chief of state even if it wanted for some reason to publicize its role here.

All the ingredients exist in this pleasant, intrigue-filled capital, only 80 miles from the South Vietnamese border, for high-level international spy drama, but no one here has found a shred of evidence to indicate the CIA was even remotely involved in Sihanouk's downfall.

The truth of the CIA's non-role in Cambodian politics strains credibility, particularly in view of Sihanouk's hostility to America's role in Vietnam and the desire of American military leaders and diplomats for Cambodian cooperation in fighting the Vietnamese Communists based in "sanctuaries" along the frontier.

Yet the American presence in Cambodia, when Sihanouk was overthrown on March 18, was limited officially to only two diplomats and a small embassy staff. No American businessmen lived here.

American newsmen visited the country only rarely, and then usually on tourist visas, and no American military advisers, AID officials or information officers had been here since Sihanouk expelled them all in 1963 and 1964.

The CIA may well hire operatives from among the sizable French community or among Cambodians, but the agency's activities in all other countries in Southeast Asia seem to depend basically on the existence of large American embassies and aid missions.

The CIA "station chief" in most countries holds the title of "special assistant to the ambassador," and members of his staff serve as embassy "political officers," American AID officials and the like.

In neighboring Thailand, for instance, the CIA assigns agents under the auspices of the AID mission's public safety program, ostensibly an effort aimed solely at building up the Thai national police force. In South Vietnam, CIA agents in the field often advise the Phoenix program, the South Vietnamese government's American-inspired intelligence gathering operation.

The almost complete lack of an American presence here before Sihanouk's downfall does not of course exclude the possiblility that CIA-hired operatives could somehow have engineered the movement against him.

The anti-Sihanouk drive among intellectuals politicians and cabinet ministers was so overwhelming, however, as to contradict any impression it might have been the result of a plot among a limited circle of American-paid operatives.

The pressure against Sihanouk, mounting almost unnoticed for the past two or three years, already had become apparent to analysts here when the prince appointed his conservative military commander, Gen. Lon Nol, as prime minister in August.

The reason for discontent, besides Sihanouk's reluctance to attempt to drive the Vietnamese Communists from frontier base areas, was his failure to cope with mounting economic problems.

The national assembly in December approved a bill undoing his Socialist economic policies.

Sihanouk clashed openly with Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, the first deputy prime minister, whom he accused of attempting to "undermine" Lon Nol.

Sihanouk's accusation against Sirik Matak, a member of a rival branch of the royal family, epitomized the manner in which he was accustomed to playing his ministers against each other in order to maintain his own position.

And yet Lon Nol, although he did not directly oppose the prince, was already known to have allied with Sirik Matak, the prime mover behind the opposition to Sihanouk's economic outlook.

Sihanouk was also confronted by increasingly vocal, though subtle, hostility among a handful of deputies who persisted in posing embarrasing questions about the influence of his wife, Princess Monique, and his in-laws and personal friends.

He attempted to cut down the influence of some of these deputies by police investigations of their activities, but he was always afraid of the reaction he might provoke by arresting them or attempting to expel them from the assembly.

"He did not mind jailing little people, because they posed no rebellious deputies, "but with ministers and assemblymen he used threats and intimidation. He was strong enough to keep anyone from urging him to resign."

One of the strangest ironies of the drama of Sihanouk's decline and fall was that his opponents in the assembly critized him for his militant campaign against indigenous Cambodian Communists, who were supported by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops.

"I said he must have the proof," said Rasy, "but he said he had the right to suspend the constitution if he wished and jail these people without trial."

The reason Sihanouk's anti-communist critics objected to the manner in which he fought the Cambodian Communists was their fear he might employ the same tactics against them.

Sihanouk's opponents were afraid he might finally suspend the constitution entirely and turn the country into a complete dictatorship.

In their campaign against the prince, however, none of Sihanouk's opponents seemed particularly aware of the consequences in terms of the United States, much less the Central Intelligence Agency. Most of them, including Lon Nol, do not speak English, do not seek out the company of Americans and do not seem attuned to "American influence" in general.

The main Western influence on Cambodia is France, which ruled the country until Sihanouk himself led a bloodless campaign for independence after World War II. Sihanouk, after obtaining complete independence in 1953, developed close ties with France and permitted French business interests to remain here.

The French also maintain a military advisory mission as well as advisers in all the ministries. Frenchmen helped Sihanouk write his speeches and edited some of his magazines.

One difference between Sihanouk and his opponents was that most of them did not share his antipathy to the U. S. Military officers, although they gladly accepted Chinese and Russian arms and equipment, did not think he should have expelled the American Military Assistanco and Advisory Group in 1963.

Cambodian officers in particular like to recall the training they received in the U.S. This phase of the American effort, in the opinion of

Continued

DAILY WORLD
8 APR 1970

U.S. building roads in Nepal

KATHMANDU — The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), recently identified as the CIA "front" for operations in Laos and Thailand, is busily engaged in building a road in Nepal, the strategically-located Himalayan kingdom between India and the People's Republic of China.

The road starts in western Nepal, on the Indian border at Dhangarhi, and will eventually tie in with another road to be built to Jumla, 100 miles to the north. A third road is planned, which will link Pokhara, in central Nepal, with the Mushtang enclave about 90 miles to the north. Pokhara is already connected by road with a network that extends south to the border with India. The Indian government, with Nepalese agreement, maintains reconaissance teams on the northern Nepalese frontier with China.

THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Nihon Denpa News

Asian tinderbox: Cambodian leaders parade as Red envoy arrives in Laos



UPI

Indochina: The Calm Before the Storm?

In a land where he was once slavishly adored, Prince Norodom Sihanouk's name was suddenly mud. The cabal that overthrew the Cambodian Chief of State two weeks ago diligently set about destroying his reputation in the hope of heading off any popular outcry for his return. Newspapers ran obscene cartoons of Sihanouk and his wife, Monique, and the same radio announcers who had sung his praises so extravagantly a short time ago now vied in berating him. Pictures of Sihanouk and his mother, Queen Sisowath Kossamak, were ripped from walls all over the country, and there was talk of abolishing the monarchy. As a special gesture in honor of the coup, Phnom Penh's Sihanouk Street was renamed "March 18, 1970, 1 p.m. Street."

To those who had feared that the Cambodian coup might trigger a wider war in Indochina, these activities seemed reassuringly parochial. "At this point," said a junior diplomat in Saigon, "the so-called 'Indochina war' is the greatest non-event in history." But later, events took a more ominous turn. In Cambodia, pro-Sihanouk rioters forced the government to call up reserves, and there were unconfirmed reports that Viet Cong troops were moving toward Phnom Penh. In Laos, the Communists appeared to be massing for another attack. And in South Vietnam, the government took advantage of the Cambodian coup by attacking enemy forces across the border. In short, it seemed much too early to write off the possibility that Indochina might explode.

In Laos, [illegible] attack on the key government outpost at Long Cheng did not materialize, and [illegible] looked as though the North Vietnamese and their local allies, the Pathet Lao, had stalled after taking nearby Sam Thong. But the Laotians were not yet out of the woods. "The North Vietnamese apparently tried to take both Sam Thong and Long Cheng in a rush," said an official foreign observer. "It only worked halfway, and now they are regrouping for a massive, more conventional assault on Long Cheng." No one had much faith that the force of Meo tribesmen defending Long Cheng could hold out for long, and there were fresh reports last week that transport planes laid on by the CIA (box) had carried several hundred Thai soldiers in as reinforcements. (Thailand denied that it had any regulars in Laos, but officials conceded that "volunteers" might have joined the fray.) This transfusion, however, was no sure-fire cure. "Sending the Thais up there is not like having a Panzer division defend the place," said one U.S. military man. "The Thais spook as badly as the Laotians."

Unavailing Efforts: Diplomacy failed to ease the crisis. President Nixon sent a strong note to Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin asking Moscow to reconvene the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, of which it is co-chairman, in order to stop the fighting. But most observers gave that effort little chance for success. Another letter was sent by messenger from the Pathet Lao's titular leader, Prince Souphanouvong, to his half-brother, Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma. The "peace offer," however, turned out to be nothing [illegible]

If the outlook was disturbing in Laos, it was even more disheartening in Cambodia. One of the principal aims of the new regime is to expel North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops from their sanctuaries along the border with South Vietnam. But the triumvirs in Phnom Penh—the Prime Minister, Lt. Gen. Lon Nol, Deputy Prime Minister Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak and Chief of State Chen Heng—wisely decided that their best chance for survival was to follow the neutralist path that Sihanouk trod so nimbly for many years. Accordingly, they asked the Soviet Union and Britain, the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, to do the job for them by restoring the International Control Commission that had been set up by the conference partly to police Cambodian neutrality (Sihanouk sent the commission packing in 1969 as an economy measure). The new leaders also tried to maintain working relations with Communist diplomats in the hope that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops could be negotiated off Cambodian soil. And Lon Nol's government even held onto the Columbia Eagle, the hijacked American munitions ship, for fear that by releasing the vessel it might appear to favor the U.S.

But Lon Nol seemed to be having trouble balancing on the tightrope. It was unlikely that the Communists could be persuaded to lend a hand, for Hanoi, Moscow and Peking were all convinced that the new regime in Phnom Penh was leaning toward the West. For one thing, the government began to clamp down on the shipment of Communist military supplies through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville—continuing a process be-

NEW YORK TIMES
5 APR 1970

WAR PROTESTERS SCORE THAI LINK

Many Are Expected to Skip Classes on April 15

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON April 4— The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam says it expects hundreds of thousands of high school and college students to stay away from classees on April 15 and to demonstrate against United States involvement in Southeast Asia.

A major issue for the student strikers, according to the committee, will be this country's involvement in Thailand, especially the involvement of university and college "advisory" projects dealing with counter insurgency and financed by various Government agencies.

The national headquarters here has begun to disseminate to its campus units excerpts from about 700 pages of documents that the committee says "show widespread manipulation of universities and scholars for the purposes of counter-insurgency research."

This information will be used in a campaign, beginning April 15, to get these Government-sponsored programs off the campuses and out of existence.

Demands Rolled Into One

The student antiwar group lists several main demands that add up to "ending all campus complicity in war research" and "ridding the campus of counter insurgency research."

The student protesters indicated that they placed first priority on acting "where the students actually have the raw power" to act on the campuses.

For this reason, they say they are "particulary outraged" by three programs—the Academic Advisory Counsil for Thailand; the Defense Department's Project Jason; and the American Instutute for Research—which "directly involve professors from many universities across the country."

Student MOBE has memos, contracts, working papers and minutes of meetings of these three programs. None appear to have been classified, but spokesmen said they had been kept secret in university files.

The antiwar group believes that this is the first time such documents have been gathered to reveal the extent of American involvement in Thailand, and they quote extensively from the documents in exhorting their supporters to act against the campus counter-insurgency programs.

One of the documents being quoted is a Sept. 1, 1968, contract amendment between the University of California at Los Angeles and the Agency for International Development.

The amendment states that the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand was established by the agency "to provide coordination between the academic community of Thai scholars and A.I.D."

It says that under the agreement the university will "organize, coordinate and conduct meetings, seminars, or conferences" under the council's auspices, "dealing with development and counter insurgency problems, issues and activities, including research, relating to A.I.D. operations in Thailand."

A spokesman for the Agency for International Development said the agency did not believe that "A.I.D.'s economic advisory program in Vietnam had escalated into a war" and did not believe "these programs in Thailand are leading us in that direction."

Another document the students are using contains the minutes of a "Thailand study group" of the "Jason summer study" that met in Falmouth, Mass., in the summer of 1967.

Student MOBE statements identify Project Jason as a program through which scientists advise the Government, in general, and the Defense Department, in particular. Project Jason is identified as the creation of the Institute of Defense Analysis, which makes studies for the Pentagon.

Support for Thai Police

Among the quotes is the following by Louis Lomax, the author: "We are committed to take over counter-insurgency where Thai can't do it. I put it to Graham Martin [United States Ambassador in the early 1960's] if any group is to threaten the Thai Government would he defend it. He said yes."

The minutes from the Jason Project meeting on Thailand are detailed on American involvement in supporting the Thai police force as well as certain politicians.

The discussion ranged from worry over the fact that American presence might contribute to counter-insurgency to worry over the affect of American spending on the Thai economy.

Gen. Maxwell Taylor is quoted as telling the group that "when we get our contracts in September we should have a number of full-time people working on the developing nations and you can have a Jason type group to supplement them."

The student dissenters identify the American Institute for Research as a privately run research organization funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, a Pentagon division.

The students attack the suggestion in this program that "in many of our key domestic programs, especially those directed at disadvantaged subcultures, the methodological problems are highly similar to those described" in dealing with Thailand.

NEW YORK TIMES

5 APR 1970

Air America's Civilian Facade Gives It Latitude in East Asia

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 4—As the American-supported clandestine army went on the attack in Laos again this week, pilots of a flamboyant airline called Air America took to the skies once again to move troops, provide supplies and evacuate wounded.

Air America is a flight charter company that, like the clandestine army, is widely considered to be the servant of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

With its assorted fleet of 167 aircraft, Air America performs diverse missions across East Asia from Korea to Indonesia. It is believed to be a major link for the C.I.A's extensive activities throughout Asia.

Air America parachutes Meo tribesmen and other secret agents behind North Vietnamese lines in Laos, trains mechanics for the aviation division of the national police in Thailand, hauls American aid cargo for the Agency for International Development in South Vietnam, ferries United States Air Force men from Okinawa to Japan and South Korea, and dispatches intelligence flights from Taiwan along the coast of Communist China.

The company also transports helicopters from France and Italy for assembly in Southeast Asia, flies prospectors looking for copper and geologists searching for oil in Indonesia, and provides pilots for commercial airlines such as Air Vietnam and Thai Airways and for China Airlines, which is on Taiwan.

Air America's civilian facade permits the United States to do things that would otherwise be impossible or, at least, politically embarrassing. The 1962 Geneva accords, for instance, prohibit foreign military aircraft in Laos but they say nothing about civilian planes. The facade also averts public attention in countries such as Japan that are sensitive to the American military presence.

Then too, intelligence services the world over have always used businesses as a cover. Air America gives the C.I.A. and other Government agencies controlled and secure transport. On the economic side, commercial work enables the company to keep its large fleet busy when part might be idle.

The outfit exudes an air of Oriental adventure out of Milton Caniff's comic strip "Terry and the Pirates." It has the flamboyance of the late Lieut. Gen. Claire L. Chennault's wartime Flying Tigers, from which it is descended. Working for Air America demands the resourceful skill of the bush pilots who have explored the unknown beaches of northern Canada, the South American highlands and Africa.

Those who have seen Air America's pilots on the job in Asia say they have a sense of dedication and duty. They take more than routine risks and some have gone down in Asian jungles, not to be seen again.

Asian Art on the Walls

Most of the company's aircraft, like those of regular airlines, carry its name, though some are unmarked. The fleet includes long-haul jets, the C-46 and C-47 propeller craft that were the workhorses of World War II, a variety of helicopters and the latest in single-engine and twin-engine utility planes. Air America also borrows Air Force planes.

The line's headquarters in Washington looks much like the offices of other medium-size businesses—conservatively dressed executives, miniskirted secretaries, bits of Asian art on the walls, a reddish-orange carpet to lend a touch of cheer.

The chief executive of Air America is George A. Doole Jr., a low-key 60-year-old businessman who holds a master's degree from the School of Business Administration at Harvard. Before joining Air America in 1953 he was the chief pilot for Pan American and pioneered trans-Atlantic air routes before World War II.

In Asia the general manager is Hugh L. Grundy, 55, who is described by acquaintances as a quiet, shy man. He too is an alumnus of Pan American, having been an engineer with the line before the war and then having served in China. His headquarters is in Taipei, Taiwan.

The C.I.A. evidently has at least two channels into Air America—one through the holding company atop the corporate structure of Air America and its affiliates, the other through charter arrangements under the guise of contracts with A.I.D. Gleanings from those contracts, which have been made available to The New York Times, show the extent of the operations.

The C.I.A. declines to comment on this subject, and A.I.D. officials refuse to discuss intelligence operations.

Mr. Doole, in an interview, brushed the matter aside. "If 'someone out there' is behind all this," he said, "we don't know about it."

Incorporated in Delaware

The parent company of Air America is the Pacific Corporation, which was incorporated in Delaware in 1950 with $10,000. Mr. Doole said the shares were privately held, mostly by the five members of the board of directors. The corporation and its subsidiaries employ about 9,300 people.

The Pacific Corporation owns 100 per cent of Air America, which is also a Delaware corporation founded in 1950. The line owns 125 aircraft and leases 42 more. It employs about 4,700 people, some 400 of them pilots, and has bases in Okinawa, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos.

Air America, in turn owns 99 per cent of Air Asia, which was set up on Taiwan in 1955. Air Asia claims the finest aircraft maintenance and repair facility in Asia, at Tainan.

In addition, the Pacific Corporation owns 40 per cent of Civil Air Transport, incorporated under Chinese Nationalist law on Taiwan. It was founded in 1946 by General Chennault, the United States air commander in China during World War II who died in 1958, and is manned by many of the pilots who flew with the Flying Tigers against Japan during the war.

Civil Air Transport, known as C.A.T., which originally functioned as a regular airline as well as carrying out clandestine missions, is also generally believed to have been operated and partly financed by United States intelligence agencies. Air America took over C.A.T. in 1950.

When the Chinese Nationalists wanted to establish a Chinese-run airline, C.A.T. had to get out of the passenger business. Most of its other operations have since been absorbed by Air America but it still flies some special missions.

There is also a separate operating division of Air America known as Pacific Engineering. Its functions are obscure.

"We're all one family," Mr. Doole said. "You can't tell one from the other. We tie them together with contracts and don't even keep separate books except for tax purposes."

Air America and its affiliates appear to be self-sustaining operations in that they are paid by A.I.D. and commercial clients for their work. Because more than 50 per cent of it is done under Government contract, it is impossible to say whether the line makes a profit in the commercial sense. Moreover, its financial transactions and earnings are unavailable because the Pacific Corporation, being closely held, does not have to report them publicly.

The boards of directors of the companies are closely tied together. Most of the directors serve on several boards, which are made up of reputable businessmen chosen to give the entire complex respectability and a cover that looks genuine.

Samuel A. Walker, chairman of the Pacific Corporation, is a managing partner of Joseph Walker & Sons, a New York banking house. He is also a director of Air America.

Pilots Are Greatest Asset

The chairman of Air America and Air Asia is Adm. Felix B. Stump, who was commander in chief of United States forces in the Pacific from 1953 to 1959. Mr. Doole holds the titles of president of the Pacific Corporation and chief executive of Air America and Air Asia.

Robert G. Goelet, William A. Read and Arthur B. Richardson are directors of all three companies. Mr. Goelet has extensive holdings in New York real estate, Mr. Read is a retired member of the investment house of Dillon, Read & Co., and Mr. Richardson was formerly president of Chesebrough-Pond's.

Air America's greatest assets are its pilots, mostly Americans but including some Chinese and Thais.

"We hire the same pilots that Pan American and United hire," Mr. Doole said, "except that ours are a bit more experienced."

He shied from the term "bush

Continued

CLEVELAND, OHIO
PLAIN DEALER

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S - APR 05 1970

Blames Public Gullibility for Expansion of Vietnam War

Now our federal government, pushed by the CIA and Pentagon, is expanding the Southeast Asian war into Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, the American people should be reminded of the following:

When Richard Nixon was vice president, on April 17, 1954, he addressed newspaper editors at Washington in what was supposed to be an "off the record" talk. He tried to torpedo the Geneva Peace conference, then about to begin, by saying: "If, to avoid further Communist expansion in Asia and Indochina we must take the risk now by putting our boys in, I think the executive has to take the politically unpopular step to do it."

Word leaked out the following day of what Nixon had said. The story was published. Americans should note that this is the same man who, since entering the White House, has been assuring the people "all we are interested in is to see the Vietnamese get the right of self-determination."

That right was thwarted when the late John Foster Dulles led the drive that prevented the free elections in Vietnam specified at Geneva. The CIA and Pentagon applauded. Since then, a succession of federal administrations has convinced our people we had to go there and invade Asia or the Vietnamese, with no bombers or Navy, would come over and attack us. Some 50,000 of our men have died in combat or of tropical diseases because of our gullibility. Is this really what the "silent majority" wanted?

JACK CLOWSER
1516 Bidwell Avenue,
Rocky River

LAOS WAR

How It Got That Way --Diplomatic Snafus

By John P. Wallach
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — American involvement in Laos began inconspicuously in the spring of 1946 in a remote province of Thailand.

An American office of Strategic Services veteran named James Thompson called on the Governor of Thailand's Nong Khai province. "Come upstairs," the governor said, "I have a Lao prince you might like to meet."

The governor's guest was Prince Souphanouvong, then a leader of the newly-formed Laotian independence movement and now head of the Communist Pathet Lao. Souphanouvong asked Thompson for pledges of U.S. support against the French colonialists who were re-establishing their control over Laos after the Japanese surrender.

The same spring, another meeting took place in Paris — between Ho Chi Minh, who had just begun his anti-French resistance movement (Viet Minh) in neighboring Vietnam, and America officials.

President Harry Truman refused to commit money or arms to the fight against the French, and six months later, in the winter of 1946, the bitter Indochina war began. It ended eight years later, after the siege of Dien Bien Phu, the French stronghold in North Vietnam, by Ho Chi Minh's forces who had turned to Russia and Communist China for help.

Partition

By that time, Viet Minh troops had invaded Laos, and joined Souphanouvong's Pathet Lao, and a Chinese force moved in from neighboring Yunnan province.

With the deterioration of the French position, the Western powers convened in April, 1954, an international conference in Geneva, also attended by North Vietnam and Communist China, to negotiate an armistice in Indochina.

The Geneva accords partitioned Vietnam, barred Laos and Cambodia from military alliances, prohibited foreign bases on their soil, called for the removal of all Viet Minh and French troops from Laos and called for the withdrawal of the Pathet Lao to the two Northern Laotian provinces.

The Geneva accords provided for the Laotian government to administer these provinces in collaboration with the Pathet Lao. Less than a year after the accords were signed, fighting broke out between Communists and government troops in the Communist-held provinces.

Some Laotian leaders, among them Souvanna Phouma, the half-brother of Souphanouvong, had urged the Geneva parties to set up a coalition instead of dividing the country in two.

Dulles Stand

By this time, however, President Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had decided to back an anti-communist government in Vientiane, the Laotian capital, and Souvanna Phouma, later to take over this government, was eclipsed.

From that point, the U.S. presence in Laos grew.

In 1955, North Vietnam began to infiltrate large numbers of troops to their Pathet Lao allies, and the U.S. began training the royal Laotian army. A year later, Prince Souvanna Phouma took over the government.

In a matter of months, he was able to get his brother to agree to a ceasefire, the reintegration of the Communist provinces, and to a coalition government. The U.S. continued to support Souvanna Phouma.

The Central Intelligence Agency is thought to have surfaced for the first time in December, 1959, by persuading Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, a right-wing nationalist, to stage a coup against then prime minister Phoumi Sananikone.

But the UN, in the name of restoring the Geneva accords, stepped in, and plans were made for general elections in which Pathet Lao candidates could run. All 59 seats in the National Assembly were won by supporters of Gen. Phoumi.

Once again, charges of CIA interference surfaced. A month after the elections, Prince Souphanouvong escaped from prison and returned north. The new government lasted eight months. An unknown paratrooper captain named Kong Le led a coup d'etat and returned Souvanna Phouma to power.

Meanwhile, Gen. Phoumi established rival headquarters, where he reportedly again turned to the CIA for support. Finally, in December, 1960, Phoumi led his forces against Vientiane, and drove Souvanna Phouma up to the Plain of Jars to join his communist half-brother.

WrongWar

While the U.S. was pressing to reconvene the Geneva conference, Hanoi infiltrated troops into the north. A general concurrence that Laos was the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time led to the 1962 Geneva Conference, at which 14 nations agreed to guarantee Laotian neutrality.

[redacted]

areas. Insofar as I know, we have not given full consideration to using these assets to influence population distribution. But it seems to me an extremely worthwhile suggestion, and I am passing it on to the appropriate people in the Administration.

Certainly, the enormous leverage of federal procurement contracts could be put to use in seeking a more evenly distributed population and full compliance with environmental protection programs. You will be glad to know that an inter-agency task force has been at work on just this problem since before the first of the year, and that we expect to have some initial proposals ready within a month's time.

I hope that this information is useful, and that you will be in touch should you have any further questions or suggestions.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

WILLIAM E. TIMMONS,
Assistant to the President.

PRESIDENT NIXON COMMENDED FOR DESEGREGATION STATEMENT

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, the Wall Street Journal recently commented on President Nixon's statement on school desegregation. The tone of the editorial is set by the first paragraph which describes the President's statement as "so sensible that it makes some of the criticisms sound rather ludicrous."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article, appropriately entitled "Rule of Reason," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RULE OF REASON

The striking thing about the President's statement on desegreation is its tone—a profound concern for the problem coupled with a wholly realistic approach. So sensible is it, in fact, that it makes some of the criticisms sound raher ludricous.

The chief objection of the critics is that Mr. Nixon did not demand instant school integration. But are they listening to what he said? He is not backing away from the goal of integration; indeed, he is providing considerable sums to assist court-ordered desegregation and improve education in racially impacted areas, North and South.

What Mr. Nixon does perceive is that in distinguishing between de jure and de facto segregation, the complexities involved in the latter are awesome and almost certainly not susceptible to a purely Governmental solution.

There is a Constitutional mandate, he notes, that dual school systems and other forms of de jure segregation be eliminated totally—and that is Administration policy as well. Within that requirement, however, is a degree of flexibility, a "rule of reason" permitting school boards to formulate desegregation plans that best suit the needs of their localities.

De facto segregation, stemming from housing patterns, is another matter altogether. The President holds it to be undesirable but observes that it is not generally considered to violate the Constitution. Even so, he seems to encourage local school officials to take reasonable steps, if they choose, to diminish racial separation.

Mr. Nixon is especially realistic in discussing the difficulties of doing away with de facto segregation: "'Racial balance' has been discovered to be neither a static nor a finite condition; in many cases it has turned out to be only a way station on the road to resegregation."

That is, whites leave the public schools, and the public schools founder for lack of support. Moreover, when whites flee the public schools in search of predominantly white schools in the suburbs, the central city itself becomes racially isolated.

"These are not theoretical problems, but actual problems. They exist not just in the realm of law, but in the realm of human attitudes and human behavior. They are part of the real world, and we have to take account of them."

One of the practical problems in trying to abolish de facto segregation is that it entails a wasteful diversion of resources. Thus a state court recently ordered all but uniform racial balance in the Los Angeles schools, and it is expected that it will cost $40 million the first year to lease buses, hire drivers and pay operating expenses. How much better if the money were to be spent to improve education.

In a deeper sense, insistence on total integration derives from a misconception of the source of much of the trouble in the education of Negroes. As the Presidential statement remarks, it is not primarily a matter of race at all; rather, it is a question of economic class and environment. Quite simply, a child from a very poor home, where there are no books or magazines or newspapers or parental encouragement to learn—that child is all too likely to have difficulty in school whether he is black or white.

Finally, to demand total integration (as distinguished from ending de jure segregation) is to overburden the schools. In Mr. Nixon's words, the schools "have been expected not only to educate but also to accomplish a social transformation. Children in many instances have not been served, but used—in what all too often has proved a tragically futile effort to achieve in the schools the kind of multiracial society which the adult community has failed to achieve for itself."

We agree with the President that the call for equal educational opportunity is in the American tradition and that the opportunity unquestionably can be extended at the same time that the quality of the education is being upgraded. But the process preeminently requires wisdom, the kind of basic common sense the President's statement reflects.

WE ARE NOW WAGING SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, this comes as no surprise to me. It is what one would expect from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the leaders of the all powerful military-industrial complex. It is evident that they seek to move our Nation into a militarist state. Unfortunately, it appears that President Nixon is yielding subservience to the militarists in the same degree as did President Johnson.

Now headlined in the Washington Post we read that General Westmoreland and other army leaders fravor a 6-month delay in U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam.

Pentagon officials, of course, claim that further withdrawal of ground forces from Vietnam at this time should be stopped so that our pacification program, so-called, and Vietnamization program may continue.

From 1961 to the present time, American military forces have been occupying Vietnam. There has been no Vietnamization, so-called, of South Vietnam. The militarists led by General Thieu and Air Marshal Ky in control of the Saigon Government represent but a small fraction of the Vietnamese. They have excluded Buddhists and neutralists, so-called, from their militarist government of Saigon. Theirs is a corrupt regime. South Vietnamese forces have no will to fight. Its leaders are continuing the suppression policies of the French colonialists. Eighty percent of the men and women of South Vietnam know that no land reform, not even a semblance of liberty has been offered them by the Thieu-Ky administration and its predecessors.

The Vietcong representing the National Liberation Front have an ideal. They are fighting for land reform and for national liberation. While in Vietnam in 1965 and 1968 I learned that 80 percent of the people living in the Mekong Delta, south of Saigon, supported the National Liberation Front. General Westmoreland and others of our Joint Chiefs of Staff by their actions prove that the Saigon regime is in power only by reason of the presence of the ground and air forces of the United States.

Mr. Nixon, as a candidate for the Presidency, stated repeatedly he had a secret plan to end our involvement in Vietnam. That is still his secret. The facts are this war is now expanding and the United States has now become involved in what should be termed the second Indo-Chinese war. The conflict has spread beyond South Vietnam now. Americans are fighting and dying in Laos and we have invaded Cambodia. Some Americans have been killed there and this conflict is even threatening to extend into Thailand.

The first Indo-Chinese war was waged by the French with the aid of John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower. When the Japanese suddenly left Southeast Asia in the closing weeks of World War II, the French immediately landed hundreds of thousands of troops and sought to reestablish their cruel but lush Indo-Chinese empire. President Eisenhower instead of enforcing neutrality or coming to the aid of the Vietnamese people seeking national liberation aided the French with billions of dollars in war supplies. He was restrained by action of leading Senators in 1954 from committing our air power to relieve Dienbienphu. Those orders secured on advice of John Foster Dulles and his brother, then head of the CIA, were cancelled at almost the last moment. Dienbienphu was overrun on May 7, 1954. More than 12,000 French Foreign Legionnaires were captured.

Following the surrender, the Geneva Agreement fixed a temporary demarcation line at the 17th parallel providing this was not a national boundary but merely a temporary demarcation line. An election was promised for 1956. President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, stated that Ho Chi Minh would have received 80 percent of the vote for President in both sections of Vietnam. Our puppet President Diem cancelled the election. Then the civil war in Vietnam was renewed.

Now we Americans are continuing the aggression of the French. In fact, the

15 MAR 1970

Udorn Air Base in Thailand U.S. Mainstay in Laos Fight

By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Asia Correspondent of The Star

UDORN, Thailand — When President Nixon admitted nine days ago the well-known fact that the U.S. Air Force is flying combat support missions for the government of Laos, he did not mention where the bases are.

The biggest of them is on the southern edge of this dusty northeast Thailand town.

The 36 F4D Phantom supersonic fighter-bombers stationed at Udorn fly day and night to attack North Vietnamese forces in Laos.

They also escort Udorn's unarmed RF4C Phantom reconnaissance planes over Laos and North Vietnam. They are authorized to attack antiaircraft weapons in North Vietnam if fired on—or perhaps if they only expect to be fired on; Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird refused to clarify this point when he was in Saigon last month.

The Udorn base is also busy with helicopter units, C47 "Spooky" gunships and some other ground-support firepower planes, not all of which are marked with U.S. Air Force insignia, and shuttles of supporting transport planes.

And sharing the 10,000-foot runway is Air America, the airline created by the Central Intelligence Agency to provide logistical support for Lao government forces.

The base is officially known as Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base, and the 6,500 U.S. military men here are guests of the Thai government.

The official base commander is Thai Lt. Col. Jaru Sanguanphokai. He commands a Thai Force squardron of propellor-driven T28s stationed here.

U.S. officials are careful to avoid anything which might imply Thailand lacks control of Udorn or the other six air bases used by the United States in this country. They do not want to give offense that might, among other things, become a cause for Thailand's restricting American activities.

But at the moment the Thai attitude seems to be the opposite.

Rather than being worried about Americans exceeding their authorization here, the Thai government fears that public opinion in the United States—or at least senatorial criticism—might cause a restriction of air operations over Laos from Thai bases.

Thailand wants a maximum U.S. air effort to check the North Vietnamese dry-season offensive in Laos. Laos lies just across the Mekong River from Thailand and this country sees itself threatened.

Anxiety Not Relieved

The current lull in the offensive while the Lao Communists propose peace talks has not relieved the anxiety in Bangkok. One top official there described it as "a diplomatic offensive to go with the military offensive."

Thai concern over Lao air war criticism in the United States means a continuation of the sensitivity which always has marked U.S. Air Force operations here, but for a reversed reason.

Originally, the United States was secretive about its Thai operations to avoid embarrassing the government in Bangkok. Although 80 percent of the U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam were flown from Thailand, this country did not want to appear too committed to Washington.

In the case of Lao operations, there also has been the same consideration which long kept Washington mum about American activities. That was the theoretical neutrality of Laos under the 1962 Geneva agreement.

History of Base

Those who get Thai government permission to visit the U.S. Air Force at Udorn—not an easy thing to do—are given a history of the base which only begins in 1964.

In May 1964, the State Department confirmed that U.S. reconnaissance flights were being made over Laos at the request of the Lao government, then as now fighting North Vietnamese troops.

A few days later, after a fighter-bomber had been shot down, the State Department confirmed that armed escorts [illegible] the Bangkok government. The Marines later left.

was being flown for the reconnaissance planes and the escorts were allowed to shoot back if fired upon.

For six years that was the official explanation of Phantom fighter operations over Laos from Udorn and other American planes' Lao operations from other Thai bases.

Interdictory Missions

But on March 6 Nixon said that in May 1964, U.S. planes "began flying certain interdictory missions against invaders" of Laos. That means bombing North Vietnamese.

The United States, he said, has continued "to fly combat support missions for Laotian forces." The North Vietnamese offensive has caused an increase in missions, making Udorn busier than it has been since the bombing of North Vietnam ended in 1968.

Nixon's statement has not yet filtered down through channels to provide a more comprehensive explanation of what goes on from Udorn. U.S. officers here are cautiously noncommittal and they let visitors look but not talk to people.

The 1964 date is deceptive.

A plaque on the wall of the U.S. consulate here marks eight years of Air America operations from Udorn—March 1961 to March 1969.

This base was obviously a key point in U.S. support for Lao anti-Communist forces long before Washington was asked in 1964 to help the government legally established in Vientiane by the 1962 agreement.

That long support from here reflects long Thai concern over the danger of Laos falling completely under Communist control.

On April 1, 1961, the Chinese Communist newspaper, People's Daily, complained that "the United States has built an Air Force base capable of handling large aircraft at Udorn in Thailand, only 50 miles away from Vientiane across the Mekong River . . ."

It was to Udorn that U.S. Marines, helicopters and weapons were rushed in 1962 when the North Vietnamese rout of Lao forces at Nam Tha, in northwest Laos, panicked the Bangkok government. The Marines later left.

Guerrillas Trained

The Air America date of March 1961 is about the time the first U.S. Special Forces teams went into Laos to train Lao guerrillas—what have become today the "secret army" of Gen. Vang Pao. These guerrillas could not exist without Air America's aerial support.

Recently Air America advertised in the Bangkok Post for Thais to work in Udorn at a long list of jobs, mostly technical ones like aircraft mechanics. Two job listings, however, were "stock control clerks with military supply experience" and "supply storekeepers with military warehouse activities experience."

U.S. military supplies trucked from ports on the Gulf of Siam are flown by Air America to hazardous little air strips in the Lao mountains.

The separately fenced Air America part of the air base has a wide variety of planes, from small liaison craft to four-engined transports. Some are marked "Air America," some have no markings.

Used to Train Pilots

A few unmarked T28s are used by Air America to train Lao Air Force pilots. T28s, slow old planes originally built as trainers, are used by Laos to bomb enemy positions.

The Lao T28 operations have to be coordinated with U.S. Air Force strikes in Laos, which are ordered from Saigon. Udorn is a link in the control system, which ends with U.S Air Force officers stationed at Lao T28 bases up and down Laos.

Udorn is the headquarters for the 7-13 Air Force, which directs all U.S. Air Force activities in Thailand.

It comes under the 7th Air Force at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Air Base for operational matters and under the 13th Air Force at Clark Field, the Philippines, for logistical support.

The A1 Skyraider prop-driven fighter-bomber that was shot down over northern Laos Tuesday, and announced as part of the post-March 6 policy of reporting American losses in Laos, came from Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base.

Continued

Nation
7 March 1970

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STATINTL

THE GREAT SOUTH ASIAN WAR

MICHAEL KLARE
Mr. Klare, a staff member of the North American Congress on Latin America, is completing a book on counterinsurgency planning in the United States.

To gain a world-historical perspective on the war in Vietnam, one must see it as but one episode in a Great South Asian War that began almost immediately after World War II, and can be expected to continue into the 1970s, if not well beyond them. The Great War has already encompassed the Indo-Chinese War of Independence (1946-54), the guerrilla war in Malaya (1948-60), intermittent warfare in Laos (continuing), guerrilla skirmishes in Thailand (continuing), and other armed struggles in Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia. Combatants in these conflicts have included, in addition to troops of the countries named, the armies of Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Nationalist China and, of course, the United States.

These episodes constitute a common war not only because they occupy overlapping zones in a single theatre of war but also because they spring from a common cause: the determination of the advanced industrial nations of the West (led by the United States) to intensify their control over the destinies of the underdeveloped lands of Asia. The Western presence in South Asia is naturally a military and economic challenge to Communist China, whose real or imagined influence has been a factor in each of these struggles. But it is not the threat of Chinese bellicosity that lends unity to all these episodes; it is rather the determination of the region's indigenous peoples to secure a future that will be free of foreign control. Because the nations of South Asia are frozen in a state of underdevelopment, and because national boundaries (which, more often than not, were established by European powers) do not always conform to ethnic distribution, these conflicts often take the form of "insurgencies"—i.e., local struggles against centralized authority—and the response to them has been a succession of "counterinsurgencies." Although the doctrine of counterinsurgency was originally formulated to substitute a strategy of "limited warfare" for the obsolete strategies of "all-out" (i.e., nuclear) warfare, in South Asia counterinsurgency threatens to become *unlimited* in its duration.

At the end of World War II, the United States and its allies in Western Europe agreed to sanction the re-establishment of one another's spheres of influence in Asia. The United States, having conquered Japan, was to be dominant in the western Pacific (China, Japan, the Philippines, etc.); France would remain in Indo-China, and Britain in the Indian Ocean area (India, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, etc.). The Allies also apportioned responsibility for the maintenance of a defense perimeter, corresponding to their colonial holdings, which encircled the eastern half of Asia from Korea to Kashmir, and pledged to assist one another if any point on the perimeter came under heavy attack. This "gentleman's agreement" was soon put to the test, for the restoration of colonial regimes in South Asia (revoking wartime promises of independence) produced guerrilla warfare throughout the region. Several countries won their independence this way, where continued occupation would have been unprofitable (Burma) or beyond the capacity of the home economy (Indonesia). But in Southeast Asia proper, the colonialists were prepared to engage in protracted counterguerrilla struggles to maintain their control of the area's resources. In Malaya it took Britain (with the aid of Australia and Gurkha tribesmen) twelve years to force the last remnants of the Malayan Races Liberation Army across the border into Thailand. In Indo-China, France faced an even more formidable foe. In 1950, confronted with a deteriorating military situation in Vietnam and growing discontent at home, France appealed to the United States to honor its commitment and help prevent a breach of the Asian defense perimeter. Although the United States had already deployed its troops in South Korea to protect the northern flank of the perimeter, it nevertheless agreed to supply France with arms and badly needed funds (the total U.S. contributions to the French military struggle in Indo-China amounted to $2.6 billion, or 80 per cent of the cost of the war).

Despite this help, the Viet Minh won at Dienbienphu, and the French army withdrew from Southeast Asia, leaving a substantial military vacuum at the mid-point of the Asian defense perimeter. The United States—which until this time had considered Southeast Asia to be of secondary importance to its Pacific territories—quickly moved in. The French colonial

continued

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U.S. Officials Concede CIA Aides Are Operating in Laos

By JOHN P. WALLACH
Record American Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Administration officials privately conceded Tuesday that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is involved in military operations in Laos against the Communist Pathet Lao.

But the officials denied reports that perhaps as many as a thousand civilian agents were helping to train the irregular army of anti-Communist Meo tribesmen. They said that — at most—there are a hundred intelligence agents in the beleaguered Asian kingdom.

This disclosure was prompted by a Pentagon admission Monday that two civilians were among the regular U. S. military personnel feared dead or missing in Laos.

A pentagon spokesman refused to confirm whether the two civilians, later identified as intelligence agents, were originally included in the 193 airmen acknowledged last week as missing.

But the spokesman disclosed that one of the civilians was seen being captured and presumably is still alive. Defense Dept. sources said that they would release the names of the two men in the next few days.

The acknowledgement of the CIA role in Laos, an open secret for several years, is evidence of the difficulty that the U. S. government is having keeping confidential the nature and extent of American involvement.

In the apparent absence of a uniform White House directive on what is public and what is private, State Dept. and Defense Dept. spokesmen are citing conflicting versions of what they assert is the situation.

Last week, the Pentagon disclosed the U. S. had lost 193 servicemen since 1961. Monday a Defense Dept. spokesman corrected the record to reflect that loss since 1964—a three year mistake in sombody's figuring.

State Dept. officials are so concerned about figures leaking out that the Laotian desk officer refuses to confirm a figure used by a senior department official in public testimony before a congressional subcommittee.

According to the American embassy in Vientiane, there are 2350 Americans in Laos —833 U. S. government employees and the rest dependents. This does not include American personnel assigned for three-to-six months tours of duty, or CIA men who commute back and forth from a border village in Thailand.

The U. S. has attempted to cloak its activities in Laos because the 1962 Geneva accords, which provided for Laotian neutrality, prohibited the introduction of foreign troops in any capacity.

The U. S. began to train the clandestine army of Maj. Gen. Vang Pao and to provide tactical air support for Laotian government troops when it became evident that North Vietnam was training rebel Pathet Lao tribesmen to overthrow the neutralist government.

When the Communist trained Pathet Lao recently stepped up their attacks, the U. S. increased its military operations, reportedly including the diversion of B-52 bombers from attacks on the strategic Ho Chi Minh trail to Communist strongholds in northern Laos.

This has brought a barrage of criticism from Congress that the U. S. is falling into the same kind of bottomless "Vietnam pit" that will take years of fighting and countless casualties to get out of.

WASHINGTON STAR
APR 1970

CARL T. ROWAN

'Hanoi Using Laos to Test 'Nixon Doctrine'

Like a recurring stomach ache that eventually starts you worrying about ulcers, a miserable crisis called Laos just keeps coming back.

And it poses the most serious challenge yet to "the Nixon doctrine" of a "low profile" for the United States in the Far East.

Laos again is in danger of being overrun completely by Communists, especially North Vietnamese troops. President Nixon is faced with showing that he can handle this crisis better than his three predecessors in the White House.

Dwight D. Eisenhower agonized over Laos, beat down a Thailand proposal to put troops in and clean out the Communists, then bequeathed a rising crisis to young John F. Kennedy.

Kennedy quickly saw that he could either let the Communists have this Idaho-sized country or he could put in U.S. combat troops to stop them or he could try to work out a peace agreement.

Kennedy tried the latter, extracting an agreement from Nikita Khrushchev during the 1961 summit meeting in Vienna, that the United States and the Soviet Union would not risk war over Laos. Their deal was consummated in Geneva in 1962. Both sides agreed to pull out foreign troops, and the United States complied by withdrawing 666 "military advisers" before the Oct. 7, 1962, deadline. But only 40 North Vietnamese troops came out past the International Control Commission checkpoints, leaving Laos's neutralist premier, Souvanna Phouma, to complain that thousands of North Vietnamese troops were staying to try to overthrow his government.

Lyndon B. Johnson found a halfway point between the extremes of letting the Communists take Laos and sending in U.S. combat forces. He committed U.S. planes, bombs, commando raiding units, and CIA operatives to a secret war and encouraged the Thais to do some things Eisenhower was reluctant to have them do. Thus Johnson waged almost full-scale war against the Communists in Laos while everyone's attention was focused on the unsecret war in Vietnam.

Now that indigestible crisis called Laos is on Nixon's plate. And whatever else it represents in terms of a Communist threat to all Southeast Asia, it is a special challenge to this President.

First, it will force the President to reveal some practical specifics about "the Nixon doctrine."

As the Communists take the Plain of Jars and sweep onward, the military situation is about the same as it was nine years ago when Kennedy concluded he had to go to Geneva or go to war.

But a Geneva conference is out of the question for Nixon. He has made it clear that he finds the Paris peace conference a bore, so he could hardly opt for a conference on Laos, not that the Communists are likely to agree to one.

Yet, the Nixon doctrine would seem to have ruled out sending combat troops to Laos, although the President might decide that this is overt aggression from North Vietnam, a circumstance in which he vaguely left the door open for a commitment of U.S. forces.

What makes it more troublesome for Nixon is his certain knowledge that the Laos offensive is Hanoi's lefthanded way of intensifying the Vietnam war in defiance of all of Nixon's not-so-veiled warnings and in violation of commitments made at the time the United States stopped bombing North Vietnam.

There is no greater fiction than to pretend that the war in Laos is separate from the conflict in Vietnam. From the big air bases at Sattahip, Korat, and Udorn in Thailand, across Laos and onward to the farthest reaches of South Vietnam, it has been one war for years. Planes out of Thailand have struck at Communist units in Laos as often as a target in North Vietnam. Airfields in Laos have been used to strike at targets in North and South Vietnam, as well as to harass Communist units moving down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.

The first time I heard Nixon warn that the United States would take stern action if the Communists increased the level of warfare, I knew that it was inevitable that Hanoi would test him. When he went to Asia to talk about a lowered profile for the United States in that part of the world, I knew that it was inevitable that the Communists would soon start probing to find out just how low that profile might be.

Well, the moment of truth seems to be near. With characteristic devilishness, the Communists have challenged in a little landlocked piece of real estate that might not be worth a dollar an acre in the normal context of things.

But in the context of world politics and world power — not to mention U.S. domestic politics — Laos is worth a bundle.

We learned a lot about Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson from the way they handled — or did not handle — the challenge of Laos. As Nixon grapples with it, we shall learn a lot more about him and his foreign policy than we could divine from 13 months of press conferences and televi-

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Thais face economic hurdles

BY JAMES FOSTER
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

BANGKOK — Thailand must surmount formidable economic hurdles in the next two years if it is to contain the threat of Communist insurgents.

Rice exports, source of 30 per cent of Thailand's foreign exchange income, are at a 15-year low. Last year's crop was of poor quality. World demand was off generally.

The outlook for teak and rubber is not much better. Tin and corn exports are little above levels of four years ago.

At the same time, U. S. Government spending in Thailand, grown to about $250 million per year, is expected to drop by one-third this year and another third in 1971 because of cutbacks in the 50,000-man U. S. military force here.

* * *

AMERICAN SERVICEMEN on rest and recreational leave from Vietnam pour about $60 million — one third of Thailand's tourist dollars — into quick circulation here. This will shrink with U. S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam.

Thailand's balance of trade has shown a $500 million deficit for two consecutive years. Its balance of payments this year is expected to show a deficit, first in a decade. During the peak of construction of U. S. Air bases, more than 40,000 Thai workers were employed at better-than-average wages. These airfield complexes are largely completed and operating as launch points for U. S. air strikes against the Communists in Laos and Vietnam. The workers are jobless and restless.

Despite this bleak outlook, Thai officials face the prospect of record spending — up 14 per cent this year on top of a 10 per cent increase last year — to finance a double-barreled attack against Communist insurgency in the north and northeast.

* * *

SOCIAL PROGRAMS are aimed at raising the standard of living, but military programs must keep the insurgency under control until the social programs have a chance to take root.

Rural police have been increased from 34,000 to 47,000 in the past three years. Special counterinsurgency schools have been established, staffed mainly by former Green Berets now working for the CIA. Also, men must be trained to use the increased amount of military hardware the United States is pouring into Thailand as part of the Nixon policy of letting Asians fight their own wars.

The United States admits to supplying "an array of modern weapons," including M41 tanks, M16 rifles, HU1 helicopters, F5 supersonic fighters, jet-powered gunboats, ordnance, fuel, vehicles, and construction materials. Also there is considerable communications and intelligence activity.

These weapons are not used in the massive, clandestine U. S. operation against Communist forces in Laos and Vietnam. They are intended for Thais to use on each other and on their neighbors from bordering Laos and Cambodia who have been infiltrated and stirred up by Communist agitators.

These financial demands are saddling a country where per capita income is only $150 per year and corruption is said to skim at least 15 per cent of the cream of all tax revenues.

WASHINGTON STAR
17 JAN 1970

RICE RUNS—AND ARMS

Lao Units in Field Supplied By CIA-Chartered Planes

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — The United States is almost totally responsible for the logistics of Lao government forces in the current war against North Vietnamese and Communist Pathet Lao forces in Laos, well-informed sources here admit.

Top Lao officials no longer bother to deny the fact. "We could not do without American logistic support. We need it to survive against the Communists," says one Laotian.

This American logistics operation is carried out entirely by American civilians and by U.S. military men in civilian-cover roles. This is because Washington shies away from admitting its military involvement in Laos for political reasons.

Both the men and aircraft concerned in these operations, therefore, are claimed by U.S. officials to be — and often are — part of the yearly $52 million aid program in Laos.

The operations include the movement of troops, ammunition and food to battle areas in the mountains, and evacuation of government wounded. The missions are often under fire and are carried out by two American companies — "Air America" and "Continental Airlines."

Questioned by reporters about these companies, U.S. Embassy officials give the stock reply that the firms are private companies under charter to the American Agency for International Development. According to the embassy officials, the two companies are engaged in flying rice to 200,000 refugees made up mostly of tribespeople fleeing North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops.

The beauty of this reply is that Air America, besides its military activities, does fly many thousands of tons of rice and other foodstuffs to the refugees.



To bolster this image, correspondents are allowed to go on these rice-drop flights.

The aircraft, usually a C47 transport, is loaded with 5 tons of rice by Filipino, Thai and Lao cargo handlers at Vientiane's Wattay Airport. Anywhere from 20 to 50 minutes after takeoff, the plane drops into a mountain bowl or circles over a ridge partially hidden by clouds.

While the craft circles, two Americans in the cockpit scan the drop zone for recognition signals showing the area is in friendly hands. Then a bell buzzes, signalling the drop is on. "Kickers" (cargo handlers) — usually Thais — trundle the rice sacks stacked on plywood pallets down a roller coaster of metal strips and wheels to the fuselage door. Then the sacks are sent cascading down to the drop zone. The plane flies 7 times round under the mountain peaks, then heads back to Vientiane for another load.

Base in Thailand

Correspondents, however, are not officially permitted on the arms flights. These flights originate from what pilots refer to as "Tango" —America's Udorn airbase in northeast Thailand, 32 miles from the Lao border.

Ammunition and other supplies are trucked from Bangkok to Udorn. There they are stored in concrete warehouses encircled by a series of wire fences with manned sentry towers and floodlights. Storage areas are spaced wide apart to prevent attacks by Thai Communist terrorists.

At Udorn, ammunition is loaded aboard C123 transports. These transports, colored silver, have no identification marks apart from a "Stars & Stripes" on the tail.

Informed sources say the planes are chartered to the Central Intelligence Agency for these particular flights.

Each plane's load and destination is decided by American "Requirements Office" personnel. The Requirements Office, though it is situated in the American aid compound in Vientiane comes under CIA and Pentagon auspices, Americans say.

Its location is the aid compound is part of the cover story.

There are presently 87 requirements officers in Laos. They are ex-military personnel hired by the CIA. Some of them control warehouses bulging with arms and other military equipment upcountry. The warehouses are marked as aid warehouses.

Dropping or landing zones for both AID and arms cargoes are known by Air America pilots as "sites." These sites are assigned numbers from 1 up to as high as 200; names are seldom used. Other sites have girl's names such as "Mary," or names derived from code such as "Hotel India."

The sites are divided into "Lima," sites where larger aircraft can land, and STOL sites (short landing and takeoff) for Air America's single engined Helio Couriers and Pilatus Porters.

Some sites can only take a helicopter.

Over 200 Pilots Used

Cargoes are taken by transports to Lima sites, then distributed by light aircraft and helicopters.

Air America employs 133 American pilots, Continental employs 73.

The two companies have approximately 70 aircraft and 20 helicopters which carry out both AID and arms flights. Air America pilots receive base pay of around $20,000 per year for 70 flying hours, a month. Hours over 70 are overtime at higher pay rates.

The pilots are worth every dollar. Laos terrain and weather mean dangerous flying conditions. Craggy mountains are covered by layers of thick fog, smoke from tribesmen burning off forest for opium fields, or are hidden by monsoon rains.

Aboard a green, unmarked Air America H34 "Sikorsky" helicopter with an American crew, this correspondent sat on boxes of M36 hand grenades with two teen-aged Lao troopers who clutched their carbines fearfully as we circled looking vainly in a thick mountain fog for our landing zone north of the royal capital, Luang Prabang.

Finally we skimmed between two barely seen peaks to land on a site 100 yards square encircled by a shallow trench with bunkers. Government troopers unloaded the grenades, and within minutes, the chopper was back in the air. The crew was in a hurry because Communist troops were on surrounding ridges and the tiny garrison feared a mortar attack on the helicopter.

Americans Nervous

Sitting later in a Lao command post under Communist fire, this reporter heard a Laotian major talking nervous Americans onto their drop run. "What the hell is going on down there," asked one nervous pilot, seeing the bursting rounds from a Communist mortar.

"It's all right, come on in," the Lao major radioed calmly. Some of the C123s missed the drop zone but the last aircraft put its load of lots of 200 105 mm. howitzer ammunition on the center of the zone — and Lao troops whooped it up.

Other American crewmen are drawing more dangerous assignments.

One helicopter pilot said he been landing Lao commandos "right on top of Pathet Lao command posts" under automatic gun fire.

Guardian
17 January 1970

Traced across U.S. imperialism

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

When the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution Dec. 15 which appeared to end further American intervention in Laos and Thailand, there was a public sigh of relief.

The resolution was the result of a Senate inquiry, stimulated by public and Congressional alarm over U.S. activities in Laos and the disclosure of a secret agreement to move into Thailand whenever the Pentagon thought necessary. But when the text was published, it became clear the measure would permit the Nixon administration to continue and perhaps to intensify those acts of intervention the Senate was supposedly concerned with stopping.

Thus it was not surprising President Nixon could tell the Senate the resolution was "definitely in line with administration policy" or that White House press secretary Ron Ziegler could say it represented an "endorsement" rather than a "curbing" of that policy. The actual wording had been adopted at a secret Senate session after reporters had been cleared from the press gallery. The phrase responsible for the initial "misunderstanding" was in a rider to the defense appropriations bill stating "none of the funds appropriated by this act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground troops into Laos or Thailand. . . ."

Everything that had provoked the indignant outbursts that led to Senate hearings and the resolution would go on as usual. Thailand would continue to be used as a base for aggression against her neighbors. American B-52s would continue to use the giant air bases at Utapao and Khon Kaen for their murderous raids against the villages of South Vietnam. U.S. "Green Berets" would continue to run Headquarters 333 at Udorn and use it as a base for the American-officered Vang Pao mercenaries in their attacks against Laotian patriots. American fighter-bombers would continue to use the bases at Takhli, Korat, Udon and Ubon for their attacks against South Vietnamese and Laotian peasants. Thailand would continue to commit acts of war, at the Pentagon's bidding, against the peoples of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, just as it previously had permitted Thai bases to be used for the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

Not colonized

Until recent years the Thais were proud to claim that their country had never been colonized. In the days of the old rivalries of British and French imperialism in Southeast Asia, both striving for the richer prize of South China, there was a tacit agreement Thailand would not be colonized, but would be a sphere of British influence. Now the Thais realize they have been colonized by the U.S. through the "back door" with an officially-admitted 48,000 U.S. troops on their soil, U.S. "advisors" running the armed forces, U.S. helicopter pilots shooting down liberation fighters in the Northern and Northeastern regions of the country and Thai mercenary troops fighting in South Vietnam and Laos.

How did this happen? The official U.S. reply is, as with Laos, that it was all because of North Vietnamese "aggression" against Laos and South Vietnam. The actual reason is Washington's determination to establish hegemony over Southeast Asia, control the rich natural resources of the area and transform states bordering China into military bases for the "roll-back" policy initiated in the early 1950s.

American military intervention started in the second half of 1950 (economic penetration began much earlier), long before the Geneva Agreements had divided Vietnam into a "North" and "South" or the existence of "Ho Chi Minh trails" and other such post-datum pretexts for intervention. In August 1950, an American military mission headed by Gen. Graves B. Erskine arrived in Thailand to inspect airfield and port facilities, road and rail communications and make an appraisal of Thailand's military potential. The outcome was a treaty of "economic and technical cooperation" signed on Sept. 19, 1950, followed by a "Mutual Defense" treaty signed on Oct. 17, 1950 between Washington and the Thai military dictator, Marshal Pibul Songgram. (The latter had overthrown a liberal constitutional government in a military coup three years earlier and he headed the first of a series of military dictatorships which have continued in one form or another until the present day.

When SEATO was established under U.S. pressure in September 1954 to offset the Geneva Agreements and rob the Vietnamese of the legitimate fruits of their victory, Songgram, the recipient of lavish U.S. "aid," was one of the most enthusiastic participants. Bangkok became the SEATO headquarters, Thailand the site of annual SEATO military maneuvers. When the U.S. started pressuring Cambodia to abandon its neutrality and join SEATO and Prince Sihanouk refused, Thailand provoked frontier clashes coordinated with those on Cambodia's Eastern border staged by the Diem dictatorship in Saigon—and sent planes deep into Cambodian territory.

Later a CIA-subsidized organization, the so-called "Khmer Serei" (Free Khmer), chased from its bases in South Vietnam by the NLF was transferred to Thailand, from where bands of armed raiders were sent across the border to try and overthrow the neutral regime of Prince Sihanouk.

Gradually Thailand was pushed into more and more open war-like activities against its neighbors. When the right-wing Laotian dictator, Gen. Phoumi Nosavan was overthrown in August 1960 and replaced by the neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma in Laos, Thailand immediately clamped down a blockade on all supplies to Vientiane, the Laotian capital, but permitted U.S.-airlifted supplies to pour into Nosavan's base in Southern Laos. When Nosavan was ready, his troops were transported through Thai territory to attack Vientiane from the Thailand side of the Mekong river, which forms the Thai-Laotian border at that point.

Nosavan's troops captured Vientiane at the end of 1960 but the neutralist and Pathet Lao troops took "in exchange" the strategic Plain of Jars. The American response to this was to dispatch so-called "white star" teams of U.S. military "advisors" to stiffen Nosavan's forces—one team to each battalion. When this did not work and Nosavan suffered repeated defeats in his attempts to retake the Plain of Jars, the U.S. rushed the 7th Fleet to the Gulf of Thailand and the first 500 Marines with helicopter units to Northeast Thailand—the first step in the serious implantation of U.S. military forces there. This was in April 1961, over eight months before similar helicopter units were sent to South Vietnam.

In May 1962, after another catastrophic defeat of the Nosavan forces at the battle of Nam Tha, the 7th Fleet brought a few thousand more Marines into Thailand.

By that time more base facilities were "needed" in Thailand to support the U.S. effort in South Vietnam. Later, with the start of the bombings in North Vietnam and the commitment of U.S. combat troops in the South, there was still further expansion of

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Continued

U.S. base facilities and more troops to service and defend them. On March 21, 1967, the huge air base at Utapao was completed and Washington extracted a treaty enabling its use for B-52 raids against Vietnam, which started immediately.

For years, the fact that Thailand was an "attack-free sanctuary" for the U.S. Air Force, with over 80% of the raids on Vietnam staged from there, was kept secret from the American people. Obviously it could not be kept secret from the people of Thailand, especially for those whose villages and means of livelihood were destroyed.

Discontent gradually fanned into armed resistance in several parts of the country. Under the feudal military dictatorship of Bangkok, the tribespeople and the Laotian and Muslim minorities are treated as second-class citizens. The Laotians, almost all of whom have relatives on the other side of the frontier, have an added grudge against the Bangkok regime and its American backers, because they know what is happening to their kinsfolk in Laos and the U.S.-Thailand role in all this.

Trouble in the North started when Bangkok decided to enforce government control over an area where government had scarcely reached before. The first taste of government "presence" was in the form of troops and armed police. As in Laos and the mountain villages on the other side of the frontier in China, the tribeswomen wear their wealth in the form of silver ornaments, heavy bracelets, necklaces and ear-rings, passed down from generation to generation. The first troops and armed police to arrive in the Meo villages started arresting the women in the market places on the flimsiest of pretexts to steal the ornaments.

At the same time, Bangkok radio started a propaganda campaign in the tribal languages about the government being the "mother and father" of the people and that any problems should be brought to the notice of the nearest district headquarters. One village headman, who went down to the district government office to report about the outrages against the women of his village, was arrested and summarily executed as a "communist agent." The news soon got back to the village and revenge was taken.

The U.S. and Bangkok reaction was two-fold: planes to bomb the village and a team of American anthropologists to study what there was in the psychological and physiological make-up of the local tribespeople to turn them towards "communism." That was in the spring of 1967. Since then American-piloted helicopters and planes with orders "to shoot only if fired on"—the classic formula used at the start of operations in South Vietnam—have been supporting Thai troops to put down what has developed into a "chronic state of insurgency," in the language of the Pentagon.

International attention was dramatically alerted to the situation in the North in November 1968 when a guerrilla force, officially stated to number around 500 but which must have been much greater, virtually took over the three Northern provinces of Phitsanulok, Phetchabun and Loey. Tanks and aircraft and troops brought in by U.S. planes were used to try and suppress the revolt in a campaign that lasted over two months. Communiques issued in the name of the Thai People's Liberation Army in mid-January 1969 claimed guerrillas shot down 25 aircraft and helicopters and put out of action 300 troops and police.

The Thai People's Liberation Army was the name adopted Jan. 1, 1969, by the Peoples Armed Forces which were constituted shortly after the formation of the Thailand Patriotic Front in 1965 and in whose name guerrilla activities had been waged until that time.

In the Northeast regions resistance is also under way. Ambushes on police and troops and attacks on police stations—both aimed primarily at building up arms' stocks—have been frequent occurrences.

The area of most action recently has been in the South and Southwest where Chin Peng's guerrillas, battle-hardened from fighting the Japanese in World War II and the British afterwards, form the nucleus of a growing resistance movement. Repeated combined sweeps by the Malaysian-Thai security forces, have only reinforced the guerrilla ranks and swelled their stocks of modern arms. Of the 12 provinces in this area, nine are officially considered by Bangkok to be "infested by Communists," which is another way of saying the resistance movement is active throughout the whole region.

Although the resistance has started first in rural regions, among those who are doubly exploited for racial as well as class reasons, there is actually general discontent throughout the land. In the cities, especially in Bangkok, it takes the form of a demand for an end to U.S. intervention, the departure of U.S. troops, the withdrawal of Thai troops from South Vietnam, the adoption of a neutral policy in foreign affairs and recognition of People's China.

Campaigning in favor of such policies, the opposition Democratic party swept the polls in municipal elections in Bangkok Sept. 2, 1968, winning 22 out of 24 seats and 11 out of 24 in the twin city of Thonburi. In elections for the House of Representatives on Feb. 10, 1969, the Democratic party won all 21 seats in Bangkok-Thonburi. It was only in the capital that the ruling junta could not rig the elections in favor of the United Thai Peoples Party of the prime minister, Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn.

In the face of pressure of U.S. and Thai opinion, Washington has stated that it will reduce its forces in Thailand by 6000 men by July 1, 1970, according to a U.S. statement of Sept. 30. The fact that it is to take nine months to withdraw 6000 men is a measure of the reluctance of the Pentagon to give up its military presence in Thailand. Further revealing U.S. intentions, Nixon has just sent Vice President Agnew to Thailand to assure Field Marshal Kittikachorn that despite the U.S. Senate's resolution, "there will be no change in American policy."