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Our opinions

Secret war makers

DISTASTEFUL as it may be, the survival of any society, totalitarian or free, depends to some degree upon the quality and quantity of information it is able to accumulate about the military plans and capabilities of potential adversaries. But a broad chasm separates the business of espionage and those of diplomatic maneuvering or military operations and it is its routine disregard of this essential division that has prompted critics both in and out of government to question the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As a matter of ordinary course, the CIA reportedly meddles in domestic affairs of other countries, setting up a coup here, shoring up a "sympathetic" government there — activities which are conducted with neither public mandate nor knowledge. The CIA even wages war on what can only be presumed to be largely its own initiative. Some 5,000 Thai troops under CIA supervision are fighting in Laos, a country whose neutrality this government ostensibly respects.

Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent the CIA from financing military operations without congressional authorization. Sen. Case says his purpose is to prevent the CIA and the Defense Department from making "end runs around the Cooper-Church and Fulbright amendments," which prohibit the use of American ground forces in Laos or Cambodia and the use of Pentagon funds to provide military support to the governments of those nations.

The case for the measure, however, is not confined to our clandestine activities in Indo-China, for there is no justification for the CIA to carry out military operations anywhere without congressional approval. The CIA's budget, estimated to be as much as a billion dollars, is hidden among the routine budgets of various federal agencies. Espionage funds may well have to be kept under cover but Congress must insist that the CIA confine its activities to gathering information and not expand them to the point of making war.

14 JUL 1971

Laotian Forces Said to Regain Plain of Jars

SAIGON, July 13 (AP)—American-backed Meo tribesmen were reported today to have extended government control over all of the rain-swept Plain of Jars in northern Laos.

The Laotian Defense Ministry in Vientiane said Meo special forces met no significant resistance in a week-old operation to take the area from the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces.

U.S. B-52 and smaller tactical bombers struck inside Laos, hitting at the Ho Chi Minh supply trail in the panhandle and also along Route 7 leading from North Vietnam to the eastern edge of the plain.

Every year, the Meo forces, trained, equipped and paid by the Central Intelligence Agency, have moved on to the plain during the summertime rainy season only to be pushed back by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao during the dry season, which starts in the fall.

For the most part, the plain has been Communist-held territory since 1964.

[An official report issued today said that North Vietnamese soldiers massacred 51 civilians, mostly women and children, and wiped out much of an undefended village north of the Plain of Jars, UPI reported from Saigon.

[The slaughter was discovered last Saturday by the troops of Gen. Vang Pao, military sources said. Charred and mutilated bodies of the villagers were strewn around the refugee village of Phou Bia, where 70 homes were found gutted by fire, the sources said.]

Across South Vietnam, a near-total combat lull extended through a ninth day and even U.S. air strikes were heavily curtailed by tropical storms.

14 JUL 1971

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Facts Surface on the Heroin War

STATINTL

By Flora Lewis

AT LAST the facts of the heroin war in Indochina are trickling out. Many officials, and others, have been aware of them for a long time. But the officials weren't very interested, and secrecy about the war in Laos and American clandestine operations made it extra hard for others' to pinpoint the route of heroin from the mountaintop poppy fields of Southeast Asia to American blood-streams.

The CIA, which has prime responsibility for the Laotian war, long denied any knowledge of the drug traffic. Now it has provided Congress, through the Bureau of Narcotics, with a report naming the sites of heroin refineries in Burma, Thailand and Laos. Further, the public report says that "a senior Laotian officer may hold an ownership interest in some of these facilities." The officer, named elsewhere, is Gen. Ouane Rathikone, chief of staff of the Laotian army, which exists entirely on U.S. subsidy. Army units provide a "military defense perimeter" to guard the refineries.

The report also confirms for the first time on the record that Laotian air force planes and Laotian and South Vietnamese commercial planes take the drugs on to markets, both the GI market in South Vietnam and international centers which ship to Europe and the United States. It does not mention Air America, the CIA-operated airline in Laos and Vietnam. But there have long been numerous reports that Air America's secret flights supporting the Laotian war also often transport opium.

Rep. Robert Steele of Connecticut, an ex-CIA man himself, has named Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu who commands South Vietnam's Second Military region as one large-scale organizer of the traffic.

THE opium, from which heroin is refined, is grown chiefly by Meo tribesmen who live in what is called the "golden triangle" area of western Burma, northern Thailand and Laos. The CIA organized the Meo of Laos into the Armee Clandestine and has accepted responsibility for large numbers of them.

Although it normally denied having any awareness or interest in the drug trade, from time to time the CIA claimed progress in persuading the Meo under its influence to switch to food crops. Its own report now says that "in areas (in Laos) where the tribesmen have been encouraged to grow corn, the poppies are planted among the corn. When the corn is cut the poppies continue to grow until they too can be harvested."

Vice Adm. William C. Mack, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,

has testified that the only thing that "will save our men" from the tremendous drug problem in Vietnam is troop withdrawal. But the supply routes are organized now. The high-ranking officials, and by no means all the highest have as yet been named, still have U.S. support and every prospect that support will continue after most troops have gone. So the heroin can be expected to follow the GIs home, a continuing souvenir of the war.

TWO developments have begun to bring into the open the relation of heroin and the war. One is the huge increase in GI use in the past two years, while the military were assiduously fighting marijuana and virtually ignoring the opium-heroin trade. The other is mounting public revulsion as each piece of news appears here.

But the situation isn't very new. Capt. Robert Marasco, the former Green Beret who was accused of killing a double agent, tells of camping on the Cambodian border in the Parrot's Beak sector in 1969. "There was a big market field there; people went back and forth as though there were no border. The price of heroin was astonishing; for \$25 you could get what sells for \$500,000 in the United States," he told me. "It was being bought by South Vietnamese soldiers, obviously flunkies for the higher-ups."


On another occasion, he trailed 30 pounds of pure opium brought down the Ho Chi Minh Trail by Pathet Lao Communists along with medical supplies and found they were sold to South Vietnamese military and sent on to Saigon. "I didn't pay much attention," Marasco says; "that wasn't our concern."

It is time, late but not too late, for American intelligence which does know quite a lot about the drug traffic to make it their concern. It is time to stop defoliating Vietnamese fields and start defoliating poppy fields. It is time to stop subsidizing high Asian officials who use American support to deal in drugs with impunity.

John Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics, has written Congress that "It is probable that opium production in Southeast Asia will be brought under effective control only with further political development in these countries."

If that means that the United States can't successfully fight heroin and Vietnamese Communists at the same time because too many allies are on the side of heroin, it shouldn't be hard to choose the worst enemy. There can be no national defense, even on this continent if the invasion of drugs is not stopped.

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Our readers say

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THE DAILY WORLD
205 WEST 19th ST.
NEW YORK 10011

WHOSE OPIUM WAR NOW?

From a third to a half of the returning S.E. Asia invasion veterans have used or are addicted to drugs. Traffic in opium is common among the government officials who are our puppets, according to John Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics before the House Select Committee on Crime on June 1st. "He said the heroin traffic is costing the U.S. \$3.5 billion a year," according to I. F. Stone (June 14/71), and that 176 pounds of opium were found a few weeks ago on a plane of Air America, the CIA's airline operating illegally in Laos. ✓

Weapons supplied Chiang Kai Shek with our tax money were exchanged for opium which was sold to American soldiers in Vietnam with aid of a top general in Laos, according to Rep. Paul C. Rogers of Florida. Now, Senator Frank Church of Idaho reports that the State Dept. is opposing Congressional bills that would cut off aid to countries that are sources of dope. Such laws would hurt diplomatic relations, according to Washington.

If Nixon is not in the dope business, you figure it out. The morals of this administration are straight from the gutter. And now Kissinger, Laird, and Rogers are out pimping in the provinces of the empire. Nixinger policy will make us a leper among nations. How stupid can the Republicans get, LBJ included?

PROFESSOR S.X., San Diego, Cal.

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ST. PAUL, MINN.
DISPATCH

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Editorials

Controls for the CIA

Two Republican senators, John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky and Clifford Case of New Jersey, have introduced separate bills to give Congress greater control over activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the present state of public opinion, their proposals may have a better chance of approval than similar efforts made in past years.

The CIA finances (from taxpayer money) and directs mercenary armies of hired Asian soldiers in Laos and has been active in the political and military affairs of Cambodia and Thailand. It has engaged in behind-the-scenes operations in South Vietnam. What other political intrigues it may be running elsewhere in the world are unknown to members of Congress and to the public.

Sen. Cooper's bill would require the CIA to keep Congress more fully informed "to enable the Congress to be better able to share with the Executive Department its responsibilities in making national security policies."

Sen. Case is more specific. He would limit covert use of funds and military equipment by the CIA for supporting foreign troops in Laos or

elsewhere without prior approval by Congress. He said his purpose is "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operations of the Executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

Both Cooper and Case are, in essence, trying to restore lost congressional influence in foreign affairs and to restrict secret interventionism. The CIA has legitimate functions as an intelligence gathering agency, but over the years it has moved into other fields, including the implementing of its own recommendations of international policy by hiring foreign armies to do its bidding, as in Laos.

In the CIA, as in other branches of the Executive Department, the combination of power, secrecy and practically unlimited funds has produced the potential for dangerous involvements in foreign affairs. Congress should assert its right to fuller knowledge of CIA operations. As the Pentagon papers have shown, too much authority in the hands of a few men constantly shielded from public view and accountability is not suited to the democratic form of government.

AKRON, OHIO
BEACON JOURNAL

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JUL 12 1971

Editorials

Can This Be The Right Way To Rebuild Our Confidence?

Admission that special commando battalions, led by Americans, are conducting operations in northern Laos adds new elements of deception and illegality to the conduct of the war in Indochina.

The operation is aimed at regaining control of the Plain of Jars and destroying enemy food supplies and arms. Some eight battalions of Thai, Lao and Meo troops are involved. Laotian sources say Americans are leading the commando teams. American aircraft are also involved.

This operation is in direct violation of the State Department's pledge last Feb. 8 that no U. S. ground forces or advisers would cross into Laos.

The operation also violates provisions of the Defense Department appropriations bill which prohibited financing by the U. S. of military operations in support of the Cambodian or Laotian governments except for actions to "promote the safe and orderly disengagement of U. S. troops from Southeast Asia or aid in the release of U. S. prisoners of war."

The secret war in northern Laos also violates the Geneva neutrality pact of 1962 endorsed by the United States.

At a time when the U. S. in moving toward withdrawal of U. S. troops from Vietnam and negotiations at the Paris peace talks appear to be closer to a cease-fire than ever before, the operations in Laos are not only untimely but foolhardy. They could upset an already delicate balance that holds hope for an end to the fighting in Indochina and the return of Americans, including prisoners of war, to their homes.

It has been no secret that Thai "volunteers" and Meo mercenaries, trained by the CIA, have been fighting in Laos. Now American commando leaders are admittedly there.

When the Nixon administration pledged that no Americans would be sent to Laos, we expected the President to keep his word.

How can Mr. Nixon permit the "secret" war in Laos to go on and hope to retain the confidence of the American people?

S 10760

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE

July 12, 1971

evidence presented is substantially the same as that presented earlier.

Subsection (c) permits a subsequent board unlimited by previous findings or recommendations only if fraudulent evidence submitted by the respondent formed the basis in whole or in part for the findings of the first board.

Section 964(a) prescribes the standards for the types of discharges permitted.

Subsection (b) provides that a member discharged for unsuitability may receive an honorable or general discharge based upon his military record considered in the light of his mental and physical capabilities.

Subsection (c) authorizes an undesirable discharge on the grounds of misconduct after a civil conviction for a crime involving narcotics or sexual perversion, where State law authorizes imprisonment for one year or more; after conviction of a crime classified as a felony under title 18, United States Code, or the District of Columbia Code, or for which the Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes the award of a punitive discharge; or after conviction of a crime of sexual perversion for which the respondent was adjudicated a juvenile offender.

Subsection (d) authorizes a discharge for misconduct for unauthorized absence of more than one year or for fraud or misrepresentation at the time of enlistment which if known at the time would have resulted in the rejection of the member by the service.

Subsection (e) authorizes an undesirable discharge on the grounds of unfitness based upon frequent involvement with authorities, sexual perversion, a pattern of shirking duties, or a pattern of dishonorable failure to pay debts.

Subsection (f) authorizes an undesirable discharge on the grounds of security.

Subsection (g) permits the issuance of a discharge other than undesirable in cases where the respondent has received a personal decoration by his service, or where otherwise warranted by the facts of the case.

Subsection (h) prohibits the execution of a discharge for misconduct for civil conviction if an appeal is still pending unless the Judge Advocate General of the service certifies that the appeal is frivolous or without merit. If a discharge is executed prior to the final disposition of the appeal and the appeal later results in the member not having been legally convicted of a felony, he must receive all pay and benefits he would have received if he was not so discharged. An undesirable discharge so issued shall be changed to a general or honorable discharge, and a general discharge may be changed to an honorable discharge if warranted by the individual's record.

Section 965 authorizes honorable or general discharges based upon grounds other than those prescribed in this chapter, as prescribed by law or provided in regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense.

Section 966 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations providing for the review of discharge actions to determine that all proceedings were fair and impartial and that they were conducted consistent with the provisions of the chapter. No decision on review may be less favorable than the action ordered by the discharge authority. Review by the Court of Military Appeals may be obtained. No decision upon review by the Court may be less favorable than the action ordered by the discharge authority.

Section 3 conforms the table of chapters of subtitle A, title 10, United States Code to the changes made by the addition of chapter 48.

Section 4(a) amends section 867 of title 10 to provide for review by the Court of Military Appeals of cases in which petition for review is made under section 966(b).

Subsection (b) limits review of such cases to issues of law specified in the grant of review or raised by the armed force.

Subsection (c) specifies that cases reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals are to be returned to the reviewing authority specified by section 966(a) for further consideration or action in accordance with the decision of the court.

The other subsections of section 4 make technical changes in accordance with these provisions.

Section 5 provides for the amendment of section 867(b) (4) to authorize the representation by appellate military counsel of respondents whose cases are before the Court of Military Appeals.

Section 6 adds the definition of "respondent" to section 801.

Section 7 makes section 266 of title 10, relating to the composition of boards for appointment, promotion, demotion and involuntary release of Reserves, subject to the provisions of chapter 48.

Section 8 amends section 1161 of title 10, relating to dismissals of commissioned officers, to provide that no commissioned officer may be discharged for reasons of misconduct, unfitness, or security under conditions other than honorable, except pursuant to chapter 48.

Sections 9-11 amend sections 1161-1165 of title 10 to make discharges under those provisions subject to provisions of chapter 48.

Section 12 amends section 1166 of title 10 to require that in actions considering the separation of regular warrant officers the burden of justifying the separation is on the government.

Section 13 amends sections 3781, 3782, 3783 and 3785 of title 10 to require that in the proceedings of selection boards, board of inquiry, and boards of review considering the removal of regular commissioned officers because of substandard performance of duty, the burden of justifying the removal is on the government. All rights and procedures set forth in chapter 48 govern these proceedings.

Sections 14-15 make similar changes with respect to such boards considering the removal of general officers.

Section 16-20 make similar changes in the sections of title 10 concerning analogous proceedings in the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force.

Section 21 amends sections 321-323, and 325 of title 14, United States Code, to make similar changes in analogous proceedings in the Coast Guard.

Section 22 provides that the amendments made by the Act are to be effective on the first day of the sixth calendar month following the month in which it is enacted.

By Mr. CASE:

S. 2251. A bill to provide that the President notify Congress of his intention to exercise certain special authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF FOREIGN MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TRANSFERS

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I am today introducing legislation which would require the President to give Congress advance notice of money transfers within the foreign military and economic assistance programs.

I have long been concerned by the so-called "flexibility" written into the Foreign Assistance Act. The President now has authority to shift large amounts of money programed for one country to another country, with the proviso that he notify Congress within 30 days.

Thus, the law as presently written allows the administration to make a significant commitment to a foreign coun-

try without informing either the Congress or the public in the debate.

Under this authority, the administration shifted nearly \$100 million to the Cambodia Government during 1970. The largest portion of this transfer was made before the 1970 elections, but Congress was not notified until the end of November.

I firmly believe that such a large commitment of U.S. Government funds to Cambodia should have been widely discussed in advance, for it involved a significant step toward our becoming entangled in that country.

Then in December 1970, the administration came to Congress for a large supplemental foreign aid appropriation, and we were asked to vote money for those other aid programs from which money had been borrowed in order to send the nearly \$100 million to Cambodia.

Frankly, I was disturbed by the whole process, and that is why in December I introduced with Senator SYMINGTON an amendment requiring the President to give the Congress advance notice of aid increases in Cambodia. Happily, the Case-Symington amendment was accepted by the Congress and then signed into law by the President.

But in the case of Cambodia, almost all the horses had escaped by the time we got around to closing the barn door.

So in the future, I am proposing that the President give the Congress 30 days advance—or 10 days in case of an emergency—before he shifts scheduled levels of foreign military or economic assistance funds to any country.

If decisions are to be made that affect our country's foreign policy, let them be made with full congressional and public knowledge prior to the event—not 30 days after the fact.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2251

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 652 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as added by section 8 of the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 652. Limitation Upon Exercise of Special Authorities.—The President shall not exercise any special authority granted to him under section 506(a), 610(a), or 614(a) of this Act unless the President, at least thirty days (or 10 days if he certifies, in addition, that the national interest requires it) prior to the date he intends to exercise any such authority, notifies the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in writing of each such intended exercise, the section of this Act under which such authority is to be exercised, and the justification for, and the extent of, the exercise of such authority."

Sec. 2. The last sentence of section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is repealed.

By Mr. CASE:

S. 2252. A bill limiting the total amount of excess defense articles that all Government agencies may make available to foreign countries;

clined to advertise publicly or used ads showing only whites some "signal that minority families were unwelcome."

The commission's criticism of the 235 program was a followup salvo to a barrage aimed at the program last year and earlier this year by the House Banking and Currency Committee. The committee charged that the poor were being swindled by unscrupulous speculators who unloaded rundown and frequently unsafe houses on them at inflated prices.

PLEDGE MADE

HUD Secretary George Romney pledged to clean up the 235 program, and at one time early in 1970 suspended purchases of existing homes with FHA mortgage subsidies until appraisal and inspection practices could be perfected to protect the low income buyers. Later, Romney announced a series of new rules were being put into effect to safeguard the poor against real estate speculators trying to get rid of deteriorated houses at prices higher than they were worth.

Under the 235 program, the FHA not only insures long-term mortgages for poor families seeking their own homes, but pays part of the interest charges to keep the payments low.

LAOS: SECRET SHAME

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, anyone who believes in the Christian Ethic can only read with sadness and shame an article entitled "Laos" written by H. D. S. Greenway, and published in the July Atlantic Monthly.

I would hope that every Senator would read the article. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LAOS

(By H. D. S. Greenway)

The springtime in Laos is very dry. Save for the brief Mango rains, the heat is unrelieved, and shriveled green leaves lie like dead frogs in the dusty roads. The sun is dull red in the smoke and haze, for in the springtime the hill people slash and burn the brush off the hillsides. The pilots say that the haze stretches all across the northern marches of Southeast Asia from North Vietnam across to Burma. The Air America helicopters must pick their way carefully among the fantastic limestone outcroppings that rise like castles from the wooded hills tumbling out of China. One realizes that the misty mountains of the classical Chinese landscape paintings were not the product of artistic imaginations, but faithful reproductions of nature.

Here in these hills, fifty miles northeast of Vientiane, there is an airstrip known to the pilots as site 272. It is the center for American refugee relief in Northern Laos and the fall-back point for Long Cheng, the secret CIA base twenty-five miles to the north. Long Cheng is the headquarters for the Meo General Vang Pao's "Armée Clandestine," supported by the CIA. All this past winter and spring the base has been under siege by the North Vietnamese. The hill peoples, the highland Lao and the Meo dependents of Vang Pao's army, have been fleeing south by the thousands, pouring into the hills and valleys near site 272. They make temporary bamboo shelters, and Air America drops rice to them, for they have no food. There is the despair of uncertainty. No one can tell them what their future will be. Like Laos itself, they have long since lost control of their own destiny.

In one such makeshift settlement the village chief greets visitors with a gold-toothed smile. There are over nine hundred people in his immediate area—four hundred

of them are children. One night, the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese had come to his village. The soldiers in a nearby government outpost had detected no enemies in the area: "So we went to be happy," the village chief said.

"But at four o'clock in the morning we were attacked. Before we knew it, they were in the village shooting and the houses were burning." Squatting down on his haunches, the village chief described with his hands in the dirt how the enemy had come and the attack on the outpost—the short, sharp explosions, the flames, the rifle fire, the measured hammering of the fifty-calibers, and then silence. Death had come in the classic Indochina way: a small, isolated outpost overrun in the night. It was a scene that has been played a thousand times in the last twenty-five years of war.

The villagers escaped into the surrounding woods, and for two days they marched over some of the most impenetrable and inhospitable country on earth. "We were so sorry to leave everything behind," the chief said, "and the march was very difficult. We walked two days, and the people cried and cried over the mountains. Two people died; one was an old person and the other was a child." There was talk that the men might be conscripted into Vang Pao's army, but the chief did not know for sure, and he did not know what would happen to his people. "I am afraid," he said.

"FOR WHAT?"

At site 272 the Air America planes continue taking off and landing in a rear of red dust, bringing rice, pigs, and ducks to the refugees. But one senses the end of a decade of American policy in Laos. Ten years ago, when the Americans first began to train and equip the Meo tribesmen, Vang Pao's guerrillas operated all over Northeastern Laos—far behind enemy lines to the borders of North Vietnam itself. Fewer than two dozen American servicemen have been killed in these mountains. Asians fight Asians. But ten years of costly, vainglorious offensives and unremitting pressure from North Vietnamese counteroffensives have pushed the Meo beyond their endurance. Vang Pao's losses in the last three years have been so heavy that the Armée Clandestine is no longer an exclusively Meo force. Almost half their numbers are now made up of other highland peoples. And in the last three or four years, the Meo have been organized to fight in battalion-sized units of over five hundred men instead of small guerrilla units. As a result, the slaughter has been magnified. Vang Pao's army can no longer hold Long Cheng alone, and by early April it was reliably reported by Lao and American sources that no fewer than five thousand Thai troops had been flown in to bolster the Long Cheng front. (The Thai government still denies the presence of Thai troops in Laos, but their presence is common knowledge in Vientiane.)

For ten years the Meo people have been running and dying, and today there are few mountain ranges left into which to escape. American officials estimate that fully 15 percent of the 250,000 to 300,000 people in the military region that makes up Northeast Laos have died within the last three years.

The official Laotian and American Embassy position is that the Long Cheng airstrip must be held at all costs, but there is a general realization that the game is almost played out as far as the Meo are concerned. Officials speak of an eventual accommodation with the Communists, and say that the Armée Clandestine is all but finished as an effective fighting force.

Many of the Americans who have worked with the Meo have become profoundly disillusioned. The senior USAID official in the Northeast, Edgar Buell, the former Indiana farmer known as "Pop," who in ten years

has become a Lawrence of Arabia figure to the Meo, is himself a casualty. Recovering now from a serious heart attack, burdened by overwork and worry during the last few years of disasters, Buell said: "All of this is difficult for us who have worked with these people since the beginning. Some of my boys are beginning to wonder, what was it all for?"

Some Americans are beginning to wonder why, if there is to be an accommodation now, we didn't encourage one ten years ago. Perhaps the arming and supplying of guerrillas so close to the North Vietnamese border provoked greater North Vietnamese retaliation in an area that has nothing to do with the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the war in Vietnam. Although it is true that the Meo had asked for arms in the first place, some Americans argue that they were urged to fight on for U.S. interests beyond their capacity and beyond anything that could be considered in their own interest.

"You know, over two thirds of the 170,000 people we are supporting in the Northeast are refugees," said one American with many years' experience. "Few have been permanently located, and they are milling about in limbo. Anthropologists call the Meo a seminomadic people, but before the war they would move only when they ran out of land. Normally, they might move only ten kilometers or so, and they might take a year to make the move. But to be uprooted as they are now is a great trauma for them."

"In these large refugee moves over the last four or five years we have found that about 10 or 15 percent die during the move or just afterwards," the American said. One always knew that the long marches were killers. When whole populations were on the move, walking for days on end through the mountains, one knew that the old, the weak, and the very young died. But, said the American, experience showed that about the same number of people died anyway even if they had been carried out by plane or helicopter. "We have American doctors waiting for them with mosquito nets, malaria pills, penicillin, the works. But they die anyway. It is the move itself—the adjusting to a new area, different food and water. Of course, part of the problem is that, like all Southeast Asians, a lot of these people are sick and weak to begin with. But a lot of it is psychosomatic—bad phi [spirits]. Just the trauma of moving kills them. They think they are going to die, and they do."

Edgar Buell expressed the phenomenon a little differently. "Just moving causes a kind of sickness," he said. "I wouldn't go so far as to say they die of a broken heart or anything like that, but, yes—you can just about say that for a lot of people, moving means dying."

"UP IN THE SKY"

In the summer of 1969, in what may prove to have been Vang Pao's last successful offensive, the Armée Clandestine, with American logistical and air support, captured the Plain of Jars from the overextended North Vietnamese. But some people thought that the brilliantly executed offensive was a foolish escalation of the conflict. By February of 1970, Vang Pao had been pushed back off the plain, with heavy losses.

The raid produced one of the biggest refugee movements of the Laotian war. Fifteen thousand inhabitants from the Plain of Jars were resettled in camps near Vientiane. The last airplaneload left on the tenth of February, 1970. A silver C-130 with the American markings painted over landed in a rooster tail of dust on a makeshift strip on the western edge of the Plain of Jars. The last terrified refugees—it was their first plane ride—were herded aboard against the hurricane blast of the prop wash; nothing was left behind except their dogs, forming in packs and snarling among the refuse of their encampment.

TRIBUTE TO LEE TREVINO

(Mr. WHITE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Speaker, I am sure my colleagues would be surprised today, if I did not remind them that the No. 1 figure in sports, the man whose picture appears on the cover of Time magazine today, is a fellow Texan, and a fellow resident of the Proudest City in America today, El Paso, Tex. I can also say with pride that Lee Trevino is a fellow veteran of the Marine Corps.

Lee Trevino made golf history when he won, in turn, within the space of 3 weeks, the United States Open, the Canadian Open, and the British Open. He is also making history as a great sportsman—a great, likeable human being. He likes to win, and affects no false modesty when he is successful. He does not like to lose, but when he loses, he blames no one but himself.

Mr. Speaker, there had been comments in the press about the behavior of the British gallery, so, in his interview following his victory, Lee took occasion to comment on the good behavior of the gallery.

The golf world will talk for years about the calm courage of this great sportsman who rallied from a double bogey on 17 to a birdie on 18, to win a one stroke victory over a great competitor.

Lee Trevino is proud of his Mexican-American heritage. He laughingly accepts the title "Supermex" with the rich humor that has opened a new era in a game that is sometimes considered "stuffy." Today, it's everybody's game, and Lee Trevino is everybody's hero.

(Mr. RARICK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

(Mr. RARICK addressed the House. His remarks will appear in today's Extensions of Remarks.)

NEW PEACE OFFER IS FOR SENATE DOVES

(Mr. DENNIS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Speaker, we may be hopeful that the allegedly new proposals by the Vietcong actually contain something new, but we must remember: First, that this is a demand for the setting of a withdrawal date, "without posing any condition"—a thing this House has rejected and which a current poll of my own district rejects by approximately 80 percent; and

Second, that these proposals include provision for some sort of coalition government, pending elections—a thing always basically unacceptable to the United States.

The allegedly new Vietcong proposals seem to be directed at American doves—particularly in the other body—at least as much as they may indicate any intent of serious negotiation.

I commend to the attention of my colleagues a recent column by William S. White, which points up this situation, and which I insert in the RECORD at this point:

NEW PEACE OFFER IS FOR SENATE DOVES
(By William S. White)

WASHINGTON.—The North Vietnamese have made another offer of peace in the Viet Nam war that is ostensibly directed to the United States government, but is in reality addressed to the doves in the Senate.

The Nixon administration does not dare to brand this fresh Communist thrust for what it is—a Communist demand for an unconditional surrender and a total abandonment of the commitment of five American Presidents to South Viet Nam.

THERE ARE TWO REASONS

There are two reasons for this state of affairs.

One is that the administration is bruised from all too many encounters with its peace critics here at home and knows that to spurn this new Communist rubbish outright would be to open itself to its old litany that Washington is simply inflexible.

The other is that the President and his associates—not to mention John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower as his predecessors—are under siege by the Pentagon Papers pilfered by Daniel Ellsberg to the point where all of them have been or will be made to appear either foolish or against peace.

Moreover, there may be even a third reason why the State Department is acting as though there really might be some ounce of concession in these latest Communist proposals. This government has been conducting some highly sensitive contacts with certain third party, and far from pro-American, nations—meanwhile hoping that the identities of these parties are not going to come out, thus requiring them to run for cover—and is concerned to walk in the softest way possible on every aspect of this whole business.

The Senate doves, meanwhile, are of course delighted with North Viet Nam's suggestions. For, like the doves, North Viet Nam is demanding that the United States fix a precise date for the withdrawal of all American forces from South Viet Nam. Given this and an American abandonment of the anti-Communist government in Saigon, Hanoi would, so it says, open its cages and release the American prisoners of war.

Precisely this form of approach—let Washington promise a one-sided troop withdrawal and then Hanoi surely would release our men—already has been tried in the Senate and knocked down when roll call time came. All things considered, however, the doves undoubtedly have a better chance than ever before—and they are not slow in grasping the opportunity.

THEY MAY TRY AGAIN

Sen. George McGovern [D., S.D.], a Democratic Presidential aspirant from the far left, and Sen. Mark Hatfield [R., Ore.], a maverick Republican, have already said they may have a go at yet another resolution demanding one-sided American withdrawal.

Just such a McGovern-Hatfield paper, setting Dec. 31 as the deadline for what in fact would be an unconditional American surrender, was defeated by 55 to 42 three weeks ago. But a lot has happened in two weeks to the administration and to the bipartisan supporters of the war, all of it bad, and McGovern and Hatfield may just have something this time.

If not, there are always Senators Frank Church [D., Idaho], and John Sherman Cooper [R., Ky.]. They, too, are making ready to put in "end the war" papers.

The net of it all is simply this: This government is hanging on only by its fingernails

to its resolution not to run out on our pledges to South Viet Nam and not to leave there until the South Vietnamese have some chance of being able to defend themselves.

THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from California (Mr. McCloskey) is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. McCLOSKEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, a few days ago I had the opportunity to read a copy of a speech made on June 26, in the city of Burlingame in my district, by my colleague from California, the gentleman from Santa Clara County, Mr. GUBSER. The gentleman was kind enough to title his speech, "Neo-McCarthyism and the New Left," thereafter arguing that the McCarthyism of the early 1950's had become "McCloskeyism," and concluding: "Neo-McCarthyism, now McCloskeyism, has served the cause of the New Left." The thrust of the gentleman's remarks was specific: in speeches about Southeast Asia I had been guilty of libeling the image of the United States with "half truths and distortion," in particular with respect to the allegation that the United States has been guilty of first, "indiscriminate bombing of civilians in Laos," and second, "war crimes like those for which the Nuremberg trials decreed the penalty of death."

Both my allegations and my colleague's comments constitute serious charges, and I have taken this special order today, inviting the gentleman from Santa Clara County to share in a discussion of the issues involved so that the record of debate may be as complete as possible on a matter of grave national concern—U.S. policies and actions in the destruction of rural villages in Laos and Vietnam.

I think it regrettable when legislators, each sincere in their beliefs, extend their disagreement to attacks on the personal integrity of those with whom they disagree. The issues on which reasonable minds differ today are too important to the Nation to be clouded by attacks on the motives and veracity of those who espouse opposing views. We confuse the merits of the issues when we lapse into personal attacks on one another.

I believe this is why we have long had rule XIV in the House, requiring that a Member, in speaking to the House: "Shall confine himself to the question under debate, avoiding personality."

In earlier days, accusations of untruthfulness resulted in canings, fist-cuffs, and duels. These hardly add to the legislative process, but sharp debate quite often can. In precise cross-examination and heated debate, I believe our democratic processes achieve the highest chance of ascertaining truth, the most elusive goal of all our deliberations. Until his recent personal attacks, I had considered my colleague a friend; I hope we can resume that friendship. He is an able Member of Congress despite our disagreement. I feel the Nation is particularly indebted to him for his leadership last year

July 12, 1971

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Corps merger with Action and discuss my amendment.

In addition to hearing Mr. Blatchford, Director of the Peace Corps, the committee will take testimony from others who ask to be heard. They are requested to get in touch with Mr. Arthur M. Kuhl, chief clerk of the committee.

The hearing will take place in public at 10 a.m. in room 4221 in the New Senate Office Building.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS BY SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS AND PROCEDURES

Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. President, I should like to announce that the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures will continue its series of hearings on the recommendations of the National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws on July 19 and 20, 1971. The hearings will begin each day at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2228, New Senate Office Building. Further information on the hearings can be obtained from the subcommittee staff in room 2204, extension 53281.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

LAOS—FURTHER U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THIS SECRET WAR

Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, several recent news articles report a new, hitherto secret, military operation being conducted in Laos by irregular units under the command of Gen. Vang Pao, commander of Military Region No. 2. The first of these was a story by Tammy Arbuckle, published in the Washington Star of July 7, and reprinted in the New York Times of July 8; also an article by D.E. Ronk, published in the Washington Post of July 8. As these reporters make clear, considerable American support has been involved.

An article, by Marilyn Berger, published in the Washington Post of July 9, reports the statements of U.S. and Lao officials on the operation, statements indicating a certain amount of confusion as to the respective responsibilities of the Lao and U.S. Governments for the new offensive.

Apparently this operation by Lao and Thai irregulars, whose costs are paid by U.S. funds appropriated by Congress, has been under way since late June; but we in the Congress, who have appropriated the funds, have had to learn about it in the press. In fact, had there been no press reports, we might never have learned about it. Indeed, as Mr. Arbuckle reported in another article, published in the Washington Star, American officials in Laos did not acknowledge the true scope of the operation until July 9. Mr. Arbuckle notes in his article of July 7:

It is almost unbelievable that after Senate censure and publication of the Pentagon documents, a U.S. mission in Laos should once again resort to secrecy, particularly concerning a United States-run operation close to North Vietnam and China.

Surely we will all agree with that statement.

The press stories report that these irregular units are being led by American military men in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency and that top Lao military officers insist that the operation is being coordinated by the CIA. A State Department spokesman has said that American are not actually leading any of the forces in this operation. But he has admitted that we are providing logistic and air support and I am sure he would not deny that these irregular units are directed by U.S. Government officials.

Both Mr. Arbuckle and Mr. Ronk report that American Embassy officials in Vientiane put the responsibility for the operation on Gen. Vang Pao, saying that he "is very much his own man." Mr. Ronk adds that American sources say:

No matter what anyone says, he does pretty much what he wants.

Knowing what I do know now about our activities in Laos, this statement is ridiculous on its face. We recruit and train these irregular forces. We provide them with all their equipment and ammunition. We transport them to battle in American planes, as the press stories make clear. It is further reported that American engineers were involved in clearing mines from landing strips on the plain and that U.S. Air Force crane helicopters were used to move heavy equipment into forward areas.

Furthermore, it is inconceivable that offensive actions of the magnitude described could have been undertaken without direct air support by U.S. fighter bombers based in Thailand. It is, therefore disingenuous if not actually deceitful to shift the blame on Gen. Vang Pao so as to absolve ourselves of any responsibility for this military engagement.

Actually, if we were able to accept as accurate the statement that Gen. Vang Pao "does pretty much what he wants," we should be even more disturbed; because if this statement were true, it would mean that, despite the enormous U.S. involvement and participation in this Laotian war, we cannot control actions on the part of local Lao military commanders which risk causing a new escalation of the fighting, the costs of which fighting is borne by the United States.

One might well ask also about what additional risk arises from the involvement of Thai troops in an operation of this type and character. Given the fact that the United States is committed by treaty to the defense of Thailand, should not the Congress seek assurance that the use of U.S.-financed Thai troops in Laos will not provoke a North Vietnamese response that would result in that Thailand commitment being invoked?

The risks inherent in this new offensive, particularly the possibility that it may undercut the tentative progress which has been made toward talks between Prime Minister Souvanna and the Pathet Lao looking toward a reestablishment of the 1962 Accords, raise once more the question: Just what are the objectives of U.S. policy in Laos?

Do we intend to continue to prosecute the war in northern Laos as an adjunct to the war in Vietnam, or do we support with sincerity efforts toward a Laotian political settlement?

One explanation could be that there is disagreement within the executive branch on our objectives in Laos. Would it not be interesting to know, for example, whether the principal force behind this new offensive was the Department of State, or the influence of military planners who view Indochina as one vast American theater of operations.

We of Congress have a right to question the wisdom of this latest Laotian operation, and to deplore the secrecy which surrounds it. We also have the right to resent the high-handedness of the executive branch in not consulting Congress before undertaking a major military operation with funds Congress appropriated; an operation which may seriously affect not only our interests in Laos, but also in all of Indochina as well as in Thailand.

I would earnestly hope that the Senate would bear this case in mind when considering the amendment I have proposed to the Defense authorization bill that would limit the funds which can be obligated or expended in Laos, exclusive of air operations over the Ho Chi Minh Trail area in southern Laos, to \$200 million.

It is only through some control of the funds it appropriates that the Congress can have any real knowledge of, or exercise any restraint on, this dangerous situation.

Also, I invite the attention of Senators to a brief news item, following the summary of the Washington Star report from Laos, in the July 8 issue of the New York Times entitled "Cambodian Plan Said To End." This report quotes "United States sources" as saying that the United States has abandoned its secret program of training regular Cambodian troops in Laos, but is continuing to train Cambodian guerrillas.

This is a program which has heretofore been kept classified by the executive branch. Let us hope that its confirmation by U.S. sources will end that ban, and that knowledge of that portion of the report on Laos by two members of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee which related to this subject will no longer be withheld from the American people.

While on the subject of declassification, the subcommittee staff was told by the State Department this morning, specifically by Mr. Joseph Wolf, that the memorandum to the Secretary of State on the declassification of certain portions of the June 7 closed session of the Senate on Laos has not yet been acted on but is still being considered. I remind Senators that, as I have reported to them on both June 30 and July 7, by Friday, June 25, the specific points had been defined on which there was disagreement between representatives of the Foreign Relations Committee and representatives of the executive branch on the need for continued security classification. Over 2

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Many In Congress Happy To Stay Ignorant

Some Want Information, But House Voted To Keep Status Quo

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Does Congress really want to know everything the United States government does?

On balance, the answer is probably no, despite a renewed drive in Congress to dislodge foreign policy secrets from the executive branch.

Resolution Rejected

In fact, the House last week rejected, 261 to 118, a resolution asking the State Department for documents related to U.S. bombing and CIA operations in Laos.

Representative Joe D. Waggoner, Jr., (D., La.) said during the debate: "There are some things that some people in this country had better not know for the security and future well-being of this country. Therefore, they [the administration] must keep some information from me and they must keep some information from you for the benefit of the future security of this country. It is better that information as a rule be overclassified than underclassified."


Mr. Waggoner also expressed a widely held view that some members of Congress, if given secret information, could not resist the temptation of leaking some of it "to the New York Times or some other whistle blower."

The debate underscored a tacit assumption long held in Congress that the country is better served if legislators—except for a select few—are not told of everything the United States has done or is currently doing in the field of foreign affairs.

Being Challenged

This assumption, however, is now being challenged, unsuccessfully in the case of the House resolution asking for more information on Laos.

But an even more sweeping bill has been introduced in the Senate by John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.), who wants to give every member of Congress regular access to all intelligence reports and **Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170004-0** for the executive branch by the CIA.



SENATOR COOPER
Seeks more disclosures

Mr. Cooper is one of the most highly regarded members of the Senate, and this is a factor of some importance in its club-like atmosphere in which the success or failure of a bill can hinge on who its sponsor is.

But Senator Cooper—a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee—must get his bill through the Armed Services Committee, which together with the Appropriations Committee has jurisdiction over the CIA. And even without national security considerations, congressional committees instinctively resist encroachment upon their areas of competence.

The last time an attempt was made to break the Armed Services Committee's lock on the CIA was in 1966, when then Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (D., Minn.) made a comparatively modest proposal to create a special CIA committee, made up of representatives of Armed Services, Appropriations and the Foreign Relations committees.

The late Senator Richard B. Russell (D., Ga.), then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, blocked the bill from coming to a floor vote on a procedural point, effectively killing the measure.

The Cooper bill is not likely to get far in the legislative process either. Aside from the jurisdictional problems, most members of Congress appear to be ambivalent about being told too much.



RICHARD HELMS
Knows all the secrets

Leverett Saltonstall, a Massachusetts Republican, was quoted recently as saying when he was a member of the Senate: "They [the CIA] do things I'd just as soon not know about."

Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, at least once a year gives separate intelligence briefings to small groups within the Armed Services and Appropriations committees in both houses of Congress and even to the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even though it does not have direct jurisdiction over the agency.

The annual briefings, according to congressional sources, consist of "around-the-world" assessments of the United States' military and intelligence posture. Other special briefings might deal with such topics as deployment and strength of Soviet nuclear missiles.

George H. Mahon (D., Texas), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, and F. Edward Hebert (D., La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said, as did Senate sources, that Mr. Helms has never refused to answer a question during these briefings.

Mr. Hebert said there was only one exception, when he instructed Mr. Helms not to answer a question put to him by a member of his panel.

"I took it on my own responsibility," and, of course, I won't tell you what the question was."

Of Secrets

Senate sources indicate that senators, too, impose a certain amount of self-censorship during these intelligence briefings. One source said he has never heard a question pertaining to the so-called "dirty tricks" aspect of CIA operations.

"For example," he said, "we've never asked, 'Mr. Helms, how many people did you lose in your clandestine service last year?' Maybe we should ask it, but we never have."

But it is virtually impossible to ascertain precisely what even the select few who attend CIA briefings know about the agency's activities.

As Mr. Mahon, the Appropriations chairman, notes, he picks only those "who won't talk." Then, he refused to say who they are.

He said he was opposed to the Cooper bill, saying, "If you give it [CIA information] to every member of Congress it would be like giving it to the New York Times."

Chairman Hebert of Armed Services questioned the need to know everything.

"I don't know everything," he said, "and I'm not bitching about it."

On the other side of the issue, critics of the present system say that congress had deliberately remained ignorant to avoid responsibility.

Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) said during the House debate last week: "I fear Mr. Speaker, that many of us did not want to know all of the facts of our involvement in Vietnam in 1965 or 1968 or even yesterday. I think that the Congress has remained much too long in self-imposed insulation... We feared that more knowledge would mean more responsibility for us."

Others argued that the information the House was seeking was already well known to the enemy so it could not be withheld for national security reasons. As the House vote indicated, they represented a minority view.

For the moment, at least, the House does not want to share fully in executive branch secrets.

STATINTL

To Curb Secret Warmakers

Distasteful as it may be, the survival of any society, totalitarian or free, depends to some degree upon the quality and quantity of information it is able to accumulate about the military plans and capabilities of potential adversaries. But a broad chasm separates the business of espionage and those of diplomatic maneuvering or military operations and it is its routine disregard of this essential division that has prompted critics both in and out of Government to question the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. ✓

As a matter of ordinary course, the CIA reportedly meddles in domestic affairs of other countries, setting up a coup here, shoring up a "sympathetic" government there—activities which are conducted with neither public mandate nor knowledge. The CIA even wages war on what can only be presumed to be largely its own initiative. Some 5000 Thai troops under CIA supervision are fighting in Laos, a country whose neutrality this Government ostensibly respects. ✓

Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent the CIA from financing military operations without congressional authorization. Mr. Case says his purpose is to prevent the CIA and the Defense Department from making "end runs around the Cooper-Church and Fulbright amendments," which prohibit the use of American ground forces in Laos or Cambodia and the use of Pentagon funds to provide military support to the governments of those nations. ✓

The case for the measure, however, is not confined to our clandestine activities in Indochina, for there is no justification for the CIA to carry out military operations anywhere without congressional approval. The CIA budget, estimated to be as much as a billion dollars, is hidden among the routine budgets of various federal agencies. Espionage funds may well have to be kept under cover but Congress must insist that the CIA confine its activities to gathering information and not expand them to the point of making war.

Congress Turns to the CIA

Congress, in its continuing Vietnam-inspired effort to break the Executive's near monopoly of powers in foreign affairs, is now tackling the Central Intelligence Agency. This is understandable, and was to be expected, too. The agency's powers are great—or so one suspects; no one representing the public is really in a position to know. Yet because it operates under virtually absolute secrecy, it does not receive even that incomplete measure of public scrutiny which the Defense and State Departments undergo.

The proposals in Congress affecting the CIA fall into two categories. Those in the first category start from the premise that the CIA is essentially an operations agency and an ominous one, which is beyond public control and which must somehow be restrained—for the good of American foreign policy and for the health of the American democratic system alike.

So Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent CIA from financing a second country's military operations in a third country (e.g., Thais in Laos) and to impose on the agency the same limitations on disposing of "surplus" military materiel as are already imposed on Defense. The thrust of these provisions is to stop the Executive from doing secretly what the Congress has forbidden it to do openly. Unquestionably they would restrict Executive flexibility, since the government would have to justify before a body not beholden to it the particular actions it wishes to take. The advantage to the Executive would be that the Congress would then have to share responsibility for the actions undertaken. Since these actions involve making war and ensuring the security of Americans, if not preserving their very lives, we cannot see how a serious legislature can evade attempts to bring them under proper control.

Senator McGovern's proposal that all CIA expenditures and appropriations should appear in the budget as a single line item is another matter. He argues that taxpayers could then decide whether they wanted to spend more or less on intelligence than, say, education. We wonder, though, whether a serious judgment on national priorities, or on CIA's value and its needs, can be based on knowing just its budget total. In that figure, critics might have a blunt instrument for polemics but citizens would not have the fine instrument required for analysis.

In the House, Congressman Badillo recently offered an amendment to confine the CIA to

gathering and analyzing intelligence. This is the traditional rallying cry of those who feel either that the United States has no business running secret operations or that operational duties warp intelligence production. The amendment, unenforceable anyway under existing conditions, lost 172 to 46, but floor debate on it did bring out a principal reason why concerned legislators despair of the status quo: Earlier this year House Armed Services chairman Hebert simply abolished the 10-man CIA oversight subcommittee and arrogated complete responsibility to himself. Congressman Badillo is now seeking a way to reconstitute the subcommittee. This is a useful sequence to keep in mind when the agency's defenders claim, as they regularly do, that CIA already is adequately overseen by the Congress.

Between these proposals and Senator Cooper's, however, lies a critical difference. Far from regarding CIA as an ominous operational agency whose work must be checked, he regards it as an essential and expert intelligence agency whose "conclusions, facts and analyses" ought to be distributed "fully and currently" to the germane committees of Congress as well as to the Executive Branch. He would amend the National Security Act to that end. His proposal is, in our view, the most interesting and far-reaching of the lot.

To Mr. Cooper, knowledge is not only power but responsibility. A former ambassador, he accepts—perhaps a bit too readily—that a large part of national security policy is formulated on the basis of information classified as secret. If the Congress is to fulfill its responsibilities in the conduct of foreign affairs, he says, then it must have available the same information on which the Executive acts—and not as a matter of discretion or chance but of right. Otherwise Congress will find itself again and again put off by an Executive saying, as was said, for instance, in the ABM fight, "if you only knew what we knew . . ." Otherwise Congress will forever be running to catch up with Executive trains that have already left the station.

The Cooper proposal obviously raises sharp questions of Executive privilege and of Executive prerogative in foreign policymaking—to leave aside the issue of keeping classified information secure. But they are questions which a responsible Congress cannot ignore. We trust the Cooper proposal will become a vehicle for debating them in depth—and in public, too.



FORT WORTH, TEX.
STAR TELEGRAM
JUL 31 1977
M - 102,470
S - 218,306

Demands for Secrets Growing in Congress

Efforts are being made in both houses of Congress to get the administration to give Congress detailed information on American undercover operations in Laos and Vietnam and on intelligence activities in general.

The House has rejected five resolutions by Rep. Paul McCloskey of California calling upon Secretary of State William Rogers to provide information. There is a move in the Senate

by Sen. Gen. William of South Dakota to bring the figures on Central Intelligence Agency financing out in the open.

Both of these movements are led by men who are ardent crusaders against the administration's Vietnam policies. They are asking that the administration be made to reveal what no government responsible for the national security should have to reveal.

Fortunately, they do not seem at the moment to be having much luck. As it is the chances are that there will be less instead of more confidential information made available to Congress, or there will be more caution in choosing those to whom such information will be given. Sen. Mike Gravel of Alaska has just demonstrated the inadvisability of turning over secret documents to the whole Congress and expecting them to remain confidential.

 *International News* **New U.S. offensive in Laos**

VIENTIANE — The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has launched a new offensive against Lao patriotic forces in northern Laos and is imposing a "news blackout" on the whole operation, the Washington Evening Star and Washington Post reported on Thursday and Friday. The U.S. newspapers' reports on the massive new attacks were confirmed in radio broadcasts from Sam Neua, headquarters of the Lao Patriotic Front.

The CIA's offensive began about a week ago and is focused on the strategic Plain of Jars area in northern Laos. The Washington Post reported that large forces of Meo tribesmen — part of the "Secret Army" led by Gen. Vang Pao — are taking part in the operation. Command is vested in four of Vang Pao's junior officers since he is still recovering from wounds and injuries suffered last year. However, actual direction of the military operations is in the hands of CIA advisers.

It is known also that about 3,500 regular Thai Army troops are taking part in the offensive. The U.S. has admitted it has escalated its air war on Laos in the last few days.

CHRONICLE

JUN 1 0 1970

E - 279,608

S - 333,807

What is U.S. role in Laos?

"What we are doing in Laos is totally inconsistent with our kind of society." This is what a U.S. diplomat in Vientiane, Laos, recently told a correspondent.

The official, who did not want to be quoted by name, added: "We are fighting a war by covert means and an open society cannot tolerate that."

If this is correct, the administration has much to answer for to the American public. The disclosures made so far raise more questions than they answer.

For example: Officially the public has been told that the United States is contributing \$52 million a year to the Laotians in economic aid. Unofficially, it has been reported that \$100 million has been approved for military assistance.

Tuesday, following a rare closed session of the United States Senate to discuss our activity in Laos, different senators put total expenditures at \$200 million, \$250 million, and one went as high as \$350 million.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., a for-

mer secretary of the air force, said he told his Senate colleagues that "what was actually going on in Laos was quite different in some details than we have been told."

One reported activity in Laos is the financing of 4800 Thailand troops in Laos by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Another is financial support for Royal Laotian troops and irregulars.

The Republican leader in the Senate, Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, claimed that nothing new had been disclosed in the secret session of the Senate; that the Thai troops are not mercenaries; and the activity is justified because, "If Laos were to fall it would greatly decrease the already slim chances of successful negotiations with the Communists who would then have completely outflanked the rest of Indochina."

He could be right on all counts, but why should the facts be kept from the American people? The Communists are certainly aware of much of what we are doing in Laos. The American public should know at least as much.

The secrecy on the part of the administration raises the fear that the United States may be enlarging operations in Laos when a majority of Americans favor a withdrawal from Indochina; that in winding down the war in Vietnam, the administration is at the same time increasing our involvement in other Indochina nations which would be contrary to laws passed by Congress. Specifically a law forbidding the use of U.S. funds to support foreign forces fighting for the governments of Cambodia and Laos.

Sen. Symington has urged the administration to approve release of the transcript of the secret session as well as a report on financing of Thai troops in Laos. If our society is open and, as administration supporter Scott said, nothing new was disclosed, there is nothing to hide. It is the people know.



SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
DESERT NEWS

E - 84,855

[JUL 10 1971]

Stop The Blank Check On Spending In Laos

If the United States isn't careful, it can let itself get dragged into Laos the same way it got dragged into Vietnam.

So it's understandable that the Senate wants to set a ceiling — \$200 million has been proposed — on U.S. spending in Laos.

And it's hard to swallow the Pentagon's story that such a ceiling won't work because nobody knows exactly how much American money is being spent there.

Granted that precise figures are hard to come by because much of the money going into Laos is being funneled through the Central Intelligence Agency — and CIA spending is properly kept secret as a security matter. But the CIA ought to know how much of its funds is going into Laos, and lumping that amount in with overall spending in Laos could be no breach of security.

Granted that keeping track of U.S. spending in Laos could involve complicated accounting procedures that may not be inexpensive. But the Pentagon ought to know for its own purposes how much the support of Laos is costing in American dollars as well as possibly in American lives.

Granted, too, that as more U.S. troops are brought home from Southeast Asia, more U.S. funds will have to be sent there to help replace them. But this can't be an open-ended arrangement, since America's treasure is not inexhaustible.

There's room for quarreling with the specific level of the proposed ceiling. Already the U.S. is said to be spending some \$174 million a year more than the proposed limit of \$200 million.

But the Pentagon can't be handed a blank check on Laos. If the Defense Department really doesn't know how much it is spending in Laos or any other individual country in Southeast Asia, that's sufficient reason for setting a ceiling to find out.

Operation in Laos Conceded by U.S.

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — U.S. officials have admitted for the first time that large-scale operations are being conducted on the Plain of Jars in north Laos and three battalions of special commandos are in control of two-thirds of the plain's area.

"Hundreds of tons" of food, ammunition, and arms have been found in caches on the plain by 12-man commando teams, officials said yesterday.

Eighty percent of the caches contain food and the remainder arms, the sources said, mentioning one item found—25 cases of Vietnamese canned candy.

Little Farming Noted

The teams have seen no local population to date, officials said, and this, coupled with the high percentage of food in the caches, indicates the 5,000 people who chose to remain with the Communists during the 1959 evacuation have not farmed on the plain in the past 18 months.

With no population to grow food, the Vietnamese were forced to bring in food to the plain area. Hence, the large caches, U.S. officials reason. Commando teams have received a few rounds of mortar fire but no contact by fire with Vietnamese troops.

U.S. officials insist the operation is small, with no intention to occupy the plain. The sole objective is to destroy Communist supplies, slow Hanoi's next dry-season offensive and perhaps relieve the pressure on Bouam Long north of the plain. Meo troops there, encumbered with 15,000 civilians, have been taking hundreds of rounds of shelling nightly, and at least 44 civilians have been killed.

Even U.S. B52 strikes failed to remove enemy gunners. The plain operation appears set to continue for some time with Air America planes stacking up over commando bases near the Plain of Jars airstrip, known as Lima 22, in the central plain. Commandos cleared landing places for the first aircraft, and U.S. engineers worked to clear mines from the regular airstrips.

Another five battalions of Thais, Lao and Meos are in the new positions on the plain's south rim.

The U.S. admission to the operation on the plain comes after a 72-hour coverup. Asked about the missions, earlier claims that commandos were only on the south and west approaches to the plain, a U.S. Embassy official said, "That was a mistake." Presumably, this also applies to similar claim by State Department briefers in Washington.

Gen. Thongphanh Knoksy, the Lao military spokesman, tells the press here to ask the Americans about the operation. Top Lao military officers insist the operation is coordinated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Led by Americans

Lao military men say the teams on the plain are led by Americans. In some cases on some teams there are two Americans who the Meo say are "commando leaders" based at Site 14 Pakkao, 10 miles southeast of the main U.S. base at Long Chen. There are also American military men in advisory positions.

It is relatively easy for reporters to find out about American team leaders from Meo and Lao military personnel in conversation. One must prefer these sources to State Department denials, particularly when the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane takes every step possible, first to cover up these operations, particularly the present ones on the plain, and, second, to prevent correspondents seeing the operations.

Thousands of Meos and Lao of the Laos hill populations see Americans engaged in military pursuits in their mountains.

Some of them inform North Vietnamese troops, making nonsense of embassy claims that these operations should be hidden because of U.S. national security. The CIA has certainly run an efficient operation in north Laos in many respects, but the fact that the agency is operating in the area has in itself become an excuse and a tool to cover up the deep U.S. military and political involvement in the area.

STATINTL

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 536,108
S - 709,123

JUL 9 1971

Dove, Nixon feud on Laos grows

By John H. Averill

Los Angeles Times Special

WASHINGTON — The Nixon administration's feud with Senate doves over the war in Laos escalated Thursday with a Pentagon claim that a \$200-million-a-year limit on U.S. aid to Laos would infringe on the President's constitutional powers.

Disclosing the Defense Department position, contained in a memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) called the Pentagon arguments intriguing and disturbing.

Strong opposition

In the memo, the Pentagon strongly opposed legislation by Symington that would limit U.S. assistance to Laos to \$200 million, exclusive of funds spent for U.S. combat air operations over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos.

Although the administration acknowledges spending only \$52 million a year in economic assistance to Laos, it has been estimated that U.S. aid is running at a rate of at least \$350 million a year.

A large portion of these funds are believed to be spent by the Central Intelligence Agency to finance clandestine Thai troops and Meo tribesmen operating in Laos.

Challenges them

Symington challenged the Pentagon arguments in a Senate speech.

"The President, as commander-in-chief, has the con-

stitutional authority to direct military operations," Symington said, "but under our system of checks and balances he can do so only with the funds authorized by the Congress."

Symington's attack was the latest in a series of skirmishes between the administration and the Senate's anti-war bloc over Laos.

Symington has chided the State Department for its delay in authorizing release of the transcript of the Senate's closed-door session on Laos on June 7. During that session, Symington and others accused the administration of conducting illegal military operations in Laos.

A gloss-over

Thursday, State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray, asked about the U.S. involvement in a military offensive in the Plain of Jars, glossed over a split between

regular Laotian forces and the CIA-supported Meos.

Bray said that the United States was providing logistic and air support for this operation "as we have in other operations in Laos."

EXPOSE THE CIA?

Several attacks on the Central Intelligence Agency (Richard Helms, director) began Wednesday in the Senate. Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) urged that CIA funds

be reported in one line of the federal budget, instead of being masked as for decades past in other budget items.

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) introduced a bill to force the CIA to furnish Congress regularly with intelligence information hitherto given only to the government's Executive branch.

The Cooper proposal, it seems almost needless to say, got friendly comments from Democratic Sens. J. W. Fulbright (Ark.), Mike Mansfield (Mont.), and Stuart Symington (Mo.).



Richard Helms

Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) promised to introduce bills to forbid the CIA to sneak money to Thailand for Thai troops fighting in Laos.

Some things which these and other CIA-baiters seem not to have learned in all the years of the agency's existence:

The CIA is a big organization engaged in the difficult, dangerous, sometimes distasteful but utterly necessary work of espionage around the world. It has to be as secret in its operations as is humanly possible if it is to be effective. And if the CIA cannot go on being at least as effective in the future as it has been in the past, then God help the U.S.A.

NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST

EVENING - 623,245
WEEKEND - 354,797

JUL 9 1971

What You Don't Know...

The more the pot bubbles, the more desperate the effort to keep the lid on. Day before yesterday the House tabled Rep. Pete McCloskey's resolution calling for Congress to be given "the entire truth" about American operations in Laos; the rejection was on the ground that it "would not be compatible with the public interest" to explore material of such "a highly sensitive nature."

Almost as the House acted, or didn't act, the cables were humming from Vientiane with word of a secret commando operation—flown in by U. S. aircraft, led by CIA "employees"—against the Communists in the Plaine des Jarres of northern Laos. [Paren-

thetical paragraph: "In Washington, State Dept. officials said they were checking the situation and had no immediate comment."]

The next day—yesterday—the "secrets" were official. Gen. Thongphanh of the Laotian Defense Ministry said of the commando raids: "You should ask the American Embassy. This is their affair . . . the [Laotian] government is not responsible for this operation." The American Embassy declined comment.

Not compatible, you see, with interest of the American public. As Gen. Maxwell Taylor says, there are some things it is better for the people not to know.

Both U.S., Laos Claim Other Is Running New Offensive

STATINTL

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Laotian government said yesterday that a new offensive on the Plain of Jars is the responsibility of the U.S. embassy, while American officials in Washington sought to describe the action as a Laotian operation.

The unusual statement by a Defense Ministry spokesman in Vientiane appeared to grow out of a feud within the Laotian government over the conduct of military operations.

This statement came as Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) was informing the Senate that the Pentagon was opposing his amendment to limit U.S. military assistance to Laos to \$200 million during fiscal 1972.

The Associated Press reported that Gen. Thongphanh Knoksy, the Defense Ministry spokesman, said in Vientiane that there was a new drive on the Plain of Jars by special forces, but he declined to discuss details. "You should ask the American embassy," Thongphanh said. "This is their affair."

Andrew P. Guzowski, a U.S. embassy spokesman, declined comment. But, the AP reported, it is no secret that the Central Intelligence Agency pays, equips and advises the special forces and the Meo tribal army under Gen. Vang

Pao, who is in command on the Plain of Jars region with a base at Long Chen.

Asked whether Vang Pao had informed the Laotian government about his operations, Thongphanh replied, "No, the government is not responsible for this operation."

Analysts here indicated that Vang Pao, who reports directly to Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma and not to the Ministry of Defense, had apparently hit a sensitive nerve. The statement attributing the military operation to the United States was seen here as the ministry's way of hitting back.

State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray, asked about U.S. involvement in the Plain of Jars drive, glossed over the split between regular Laotian forces and the CIA-supported Meos.

"We know that the Royal Lao government is attempting to improve its defensive positions by pushing the North Vietnamese forces out of high ground to the west and to the south of the Plain of Jars," Bray said. "These are the kind of actions the Royal Lao government has traditionally undertaken in the rainy season when the North Vietnamese have difficulty in supplying their forces, so that the Royal Lao government will be in a better position when the North Vietnamese return to the offensive during the dry season which begins in November."

Bray said the United States was providing logistic and air support for this operation "as we have in other operations in Laos."

Bray added that, contrary to some news reports, "No Americans of any description are leading any of the forces in this operation or any other operation in Laos." When questioned, however, he left open the possibility that U.S. advisers were involved. Other American officials said that U.S. advisers stayed at headquarters and did not go into the field.

U.S. officials here said that Vang Pao's forces have won control of the high points all around the Plain of Jars except for the northeastern section, making the plain untenable for the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao.

Symington, whose Foreign Relations subcommittee has put the spotlight on U.S. operations in Laos—both acknowledged and covert—yesterday read into the record a Pentagon statement in opposition to his amendment to limit spending in Laos. That statement said such a limit "would substantially impair our on-going operation in Laos, operations which have

been undertaken at the request of the government of Laos to assist it in resisting military takeover by North Vietnam."

While Symington sought in his amendment to put a ceiling of \$200 million on obligations or expenditures for military and economic aid, Secretary of State William P. Rogers has said that the United States is spending "in the neighborhood of \$350 million," exclusive of the cost of U.S. bombing operations, in Laos.

The Pentagon statement said the Symington amendment "would intrude into matters properly within the constitutional authority of the President; as commander-in-chief, to direct military operations in Southeast Asia."

Symington called this an "intriguing comment" in which the Department of Defense "would appear to be saying that the responsibilities the Congress has under the Constitution to raise and support armies does not mean what it says."

The Pentagon also said the amendment could not be administered by the Executive Branch which, according to the statement, maintains records for military assistance service for Southeast Asia "only on an estimate basis." Symington called this a "disturbing" practice. "How can the Executive Branch be certain that expenditures do not exceed obligations in each country?" Symington asked.

Instead of being an argument against his amendment, Symington suggested that the admission of this practice served as an argument for its adoption. "It could well force the Executive Branch to institute procedures which will provide an accurate accounting . . ." he said.

In Vientiane, meanwhile, Souvanna sent a reply to Prince Souphanouvong, head of the Pathet Lao, about the latter's cease-fire proposal of June 25. Souvanna proposed a general cease-fire within a ra-


dius of 30 kilometers (about 20 miles) around the Plain of Jars and discussions at the plain to reach agreement on a full cease-fire.

Souphanouvong had proposed a full cease-fire that would include an end to the American bombing. He suggested meetings alternately at the Plain of Jars and in Vientiane.

Informed sources here said they did not expect Souphanouvong to accept Souvanna's proposal but said that the reply would serve to keep the exchanges going.

9 JUL 1971 STATINTL

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Lao Troops Advance on Plain

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star Staff Writer

VIENTIANE — Special secret army units under the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, but nominally controlled by Meo General Vang Pao, are reported in virtual control of north-eastern, eastern, and southern

portions of the Plain of Jars in north Laos.

spokesman Gen. Thongphanh Knoksy admitted yesterday that friendly forces had reached the area just south of Woodpecker Ridge. The ridge overlooks the northeast entrance to the plain.

The general said teams were roving over the Plain of Jars searching for Vietnamese and Pathet Lao caches with some success. He said three quarters of the caches found are of food and only one quarter are arms caches. These proportions are directly opposite to the amounts of food and arms caches found when the government took the plain in August 1969.

Gen. Thongphanh said he did not believe the secret army forces are strong enough to cut Route 7 entering the Plain of Jars as they did in 1969. Thongphanh claimed the operation was to prevent Communists at-

tacking Bouam Long, just north of the plain, and concentrating against the joint U.S. Meo base at Long Chen.

U.S. airpower, according to other sources, is active in the plain area and U.S. engineers are working on strips south of old Meo strongpoint Lima 22. The U.S. Air Force uses flying crane helicopters to bring and remove heavy equipment.

Gen. Thongphanh declined to give further information on the Plain of Jars operation. He directed correspondents to ask the U.S. Embassy. U.S. officials, however, refused to give information. One official's reply to persistent press queries was "go to hell."

In the picture of the operation which appears, however, five or six battalions of clandestine army forces are placed south and southeast of the rim of the Plain of Jars centered on Banna which Vang Pao's forces

took Tuesday. There and at other places near the rim, two special battalions were fanning out across the plain in teams searching for caches. Well-informed sources say

Well informed sources say there is no intention of taking territory, only knocking out enemy supply lines for a more effective defense of Long Chen. To hold the plain would be militarily and politically unwise. Undoubtedly team sweeps is the best plan. North Vietnamese forces remain east of Long Chen and if their supplies are cut off Long Chen would be in a better military position.

However, informed military sources fear Vang Pao will be tempted to take the plain. This may cause another severe defeat, such as in February when Hanoi troops swept him from the plain.

July 8, 1971

Perpetuation of American aid to Pakistan is not, in fact, likely to help persuade the military regime there to move toward restoration of genuine democratic government any more than continuing American support for the Athens junta has helped restore democratic rights to the Greek people. It will, however, put the United States in the untenable position of underwriting policies of repression, which have led to the ruthless and continuing slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Bengalis in East Pakistan. These policies have already driven more than six million East Pakistanis into exile in India where their presence creates grave political, social and economic tensions and a rising threat of domestic and even international conflict.

President Yahya's recent proposals for restoration of civilian rule offer little hope for significant change since they continue to exclude the outlawed Awami League, the party which won an overwhelming majority of the votes in East Pakistan and an absolute majority of the seats in the unconvened National Assembly in last December's elections. Under these circumstances, can anyone in Washington explain how additional military or developmental aid to Pakistan can be justified morally or in terms of this country's pragmatic self-interest in peaceful, democratic development on the Indian subcontinent?

"THE WILD BLUE YONDER
OVER LAOS"

HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 8, 1971

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker I have just read an article detailing some of the activities of the American Government in and over Laos. This latest piece of writing comes from Fred Branfman and appears in the July 1971, issue of Washington monthly magazine. Mr. Branfman was in Laos from March of 1967 to February 1971, first with International Voluntary Services, and then as a writer, researching the bombing of Laos on his own. He interviewed thousands of refugees who lived under the bombs, plus many American officials and pilots. My interest in reading about the effects of our bombing on the people and land of Laos is tempered with a deep sadness. I am saddened by the fact that I am forced to read in the press of this Nation information my Government claims is too sensitive for the American public to be exposed to. Just as it is a tragedy for this esteemed body to be forced to rely on the newspapers of the United States to break the truth to us about our present and past activities in Vietnam, so it is equally troubling that Members of Congress are forced to rely on brave and tenacious members of the press, such as Mr. Branfman, for our information on what our country is actually up to in Laos.

As long as the House of Representatives votes, as it did on Wednesday, against being fully informed by the proper official sources as to what our actual activities over Laos are, we will have to continue to depend on persons such as Mr. Branfman for the truth about our Nation's continuing war upon that al-

ready shattered little country of Laos. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Branfman's article be printed in the RECORD.

[The Washington Monthly, July 2, 1971]

THE WILD BLUE YONDER OVER LAOS

(By Fred Branfman)

War is no longer the desperate annihilating struggle that it was . . . It is a warfare of limited aims. This is not to say that . . . the conduct of war . . . has become less blood-thirsty or more chivalrous. On the contrary. . . . But in a physical sense war involves very small numbers of people, mostly highly trained specialists. The fighting . . . takes place on the vague frontiers whose whereabouts the average man can only guess at . . .
George Orwell, 1984

Conventional land warfare, George Orwell predicted, would inevitably give way to automated war as military technology developed. The war in Indochina today appears to be undergoing such a transformation.

Perhaps unaware of this, Americans who watch the war have not yet learned to look up in the air. While most people believe that bringing the troops home is synonymous with getting out of Vietnam, ground troops are becoming irrelevant to the war effort. The real war has taken off. The skies are being filled with American planes as the land is emptied of its foot soldiers.

The Nixon Administration has accomplished massive aerial escalation, perhaps more devastating than President Johnson's troop buildups of 1965, with minimum public notice or concern because the country still thinks it is fighting with the Green Machine—the ground army—of the 1960s. But the war of the 1970s is that of the Blue Machine—U.S. air power—several thousand feet above the grunts, climbing away from any American agony. With the inexorable development of American air technology, Indochina is already becoming Orwell's battlefield.

Since Nixon took office, and as ground troops have been withdrawn, more than 2.7 million tons of bombs, by Pentagon estimate, have been dropped on Indochina. This is more American ordnance than was absorbed by both the European and Pacific theaters during World War II, plus the Korean war. We are dropping six million pounds of bombs a day, 4,000 pounds every minute.

The people underwent another war: the air war. They learned another form of civilization: the holes. We dug day and night, the planes bombed day and night. Our village was filled with bomb craters, the land made barren. I grieved very much to see my village in ruins, my animals vanished, my crops destroyed. . . . Each day, news came about such and such a village being bombed, more and more deaths and wounded . . .—from essay by teenage refugee, Laos

The bombing of Laos has doubled, erasing whatever restrictions on striking civilian targets that formerly existed. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of villages have been destroyed. Tens of thousands of peasants have been killed and wounded, hundreds of thousands have been driven underground. The Plain of Jars, formerly a thriving society of some 50,000 people, has been leveled and emptied of its inhabitants.

The Laos pattern has been repeated in Cambodia. Numerous towns and villages have already been decimated. As *The Washington Post* reported on January 21, 1971, "the United States is now waging a full-dress air war across Cambodia [that] now rivals in scope, although not in intensity, the air war in Laos."

The bombing of North Vietnam has also resumed. By June 1, air raids had occurred on 43 days since the first of the year, an average of twice a week. As Randy Floyd, a Marine pilot who bombed North Vietnam 37 times, puts it, "Anywhere in North Vietnam is basically a free drop zone . . . if you

didn't find any particular targets you wanted to hit, then normally you'd just drop your bombs wherever you wanted to." One may or may not accept Hanoi Radio claims that civilian targets are constantly struck. But all informed American sources say that "protective reaction" strikes are going far beyond enemy missile sites.

During these escalations, there has been a significant decrease of U.S. air activity within South Vietnam, both because of the slowdown in ground activity there and because some 500 aircraft have been transferred to the Vietnamese Air Force. Monthly American air sorties have been about 70 per cent lower this year in South Vietnam than they were in 1968.

It is assumed, however, that should fighting flare up again, American squadrons will be returned from their present resting locations in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, or the United States—squadrons that can be made operational in three days, according to a Seventh Air Force information officer. Most Air Force personnel I interviewed tended to minimize the importance of the reductions in Vietnam itself.

In any event, more than 350,000 tons of bombs—200,000 pounds every hour—will be dropped before the end of the year. Clearly, as they say out in Cam Ranh Bay, "The name of the game is air."

There wasn't a night when we thought we'd live until morning . . . never a morning we thought we'd survive until night. Did our children cry? Oh, yes, and we did also. I just stayed in my cave. I didn't see the sunlight for two years. What did I think about? Oh, I used to repeat, "please don't let the planes come, please don't let the planes come, please don't let the planes come . . ."
—Refugee from the Plain of Jars

Many Americans believe that the pattern of the war fought on the ground in Vietnam will spread to the other countries. Actually, the opposite seems to be true. The air war in Laos has been going on for several years, a concurrent experiment with the land war in Vietnam. Neither experiment has been successful in stopping guerrilla forces, but at least the air war has a possibility for surviving the domestic politics while at the same time delaying communist takeovers in Indochina. It is perhaps the only solution for an Administration that wants to keep from losing wars abroad and elections at home.

The air war also involves a change in the tactics of battle. If a guerrilla is a fish among the sea of the people, the objective of the land war is to remove the fish. The air war, however, drains the sea. It has paralyzed the civilian populations. Vietnam is not the future of Laos, but Laos may be the future of the war all over Indochina. The Era of the Blue Machine has arrived.

This is my daughter, Khanphong. She's three years old. I was fishing in a stream with all seven of my children on February 23, 1969. Suddenly jets came and dropped anti-personnel bombs all around. Six of my seven children were hit. See, you can still feel many pellets in Khanphong's legs and back. There was no soldiers nearby—refugee from Plain of Jars.

For the last two-and-a-half years, bombing has been the heart of U.S. policy. Historians may come to date this era from January 20, 1969. In it, war is waged primarily through the aerial bombardment of populated areas. Heavy bombing of civilian targets has, of course, occurred during other wars, and in the Vietnam war before 1969. But in each of these cases, the bombing powers have also deployed large numbers of ground troops, with the bombing seen as a support effort.

What the Era of the Blue Machine means is no better illustrated than in portions of Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao. Pathet

8 JUL 1971

House Rejects Call For More Facts On Laos

STATINTL

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, July 7—The House rejected today a resolution asking the administration for information about its military operations in Laos, while in the Senate two bills were introduced to provide Congress with CIA information and greater budgetary control over the agency.

The rejected House resolution was offered by Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. (R., Calif.). It would have directed the secretary of state, "to the extent not incompatible with the public interest," to turn over to the House documents containing policy instructions given to the U.S. ambassador in Laos.

The period covered by the resolution was from January 1, 1964, to June 21, 1971. Specific information the resolution sought pertained to:

1. Covert CIA operations in Laos.
2. Thai and other foreign armed forces operations in Laos.
3. U.S. bombing in the country, other than along the Vietnam-related Ho Chi Minh trail.
4. U.S. armed forces operations in Laos.
5. U.S. Agency for International Development operations in Laos connected with CIA or military operations.

The House voted to table, or lay aside permanently, the resolution by a 261 to 113 vote. The House Foreign Affairs Committee opposed the resolution on the grounds that the information sought was of a "highly sensitive nature," that its disclosure "would not be compatible with the public interest" and that the administration already has privately briefed appropriate committees on the subject.

Cooper Proposal

In the Senate, John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.) introduced a bill to require the CIA to give to certain congressional committees all information, including intelligence analyses, that the agency gives to the executive branch.

The committees would be the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

These committees, in turn, would be required to make available the CIA information that they receive to any member of Congress who asks for it, in accordance with rules and procedures each committee may establish.

Senator Cooper's proposal is drafted as an amendment to the 1947 National Security Act. Mr. Cooper noted that the law does not prohibit the CIA from giving intelligence information to Congress, but it does not require the agency to do so.

At present, the CIA reports regularly to a small group of senators and representatives within the appropriations and armed services committee of both houses. But other members of Congress are not given access to this information.

In introducing his bill, Senator Cooper noted that Congress is asked to support the administration's foreign and national security decisions by providing money for the deployment of weapons, stationing American troops abroad and sending them into combat, and by approving binding commitments to foreign countries.

Such congressional approval, he said, "should be given upon the best information available to both the executive and legislative branches."

Right To Secrecy

Senator Cooper said his bill would not touch upon the constitutional question of the government's right to secrecy, which was raised recently by the publication of the "top-secret" Pentagon papers. But he said he believed that his bill, if enacted, would "result in much declassification of information for the Congress and the public as a whole."

Senator George S. McGovern (D., S.D.) introduced a bill to require all expenditures and ap-

propriations for the CIA to appear as a single line in the executive budget. The measure would require the CIA to disclose only its total annual budget.

At present, CIA expenditures are hidden in the budgets of other agencies, and only a few members of Congress—members of small subcommittees within the appropriation committees of both houses—know how much the CIA is spending.

McGovern's Complaint

"I believe that CIA funding is now so substantial," Senator McGovern said, "that such a single-line item for the agency in the budget would not communicate usable information to potential adversaries."

Because Congress does not know how much it is actually appropriating for the CIA, he said, it cannot set priorities and balance expenditures for intelligence operations with other domestic and defense needs.

Senator Clifford Case (R., N.J.) said he will introduce tomorrow three other bills, all designed to restrict CIA activities abroad. The bills, which Mr. Case outlined last month, would place congressional controls over CIA military operations abroad, including the hiring of foreign mercenaries and the use of U.S. surplus weapons.

In the House, several other resolutions requesting more information were rejected by voice vote after the roll-call on the first McCloskey resolution.

Other resolutions, also offered by Mr. McCloskey, asked for documents related to U.S. bombing operations in northern Laos, together with aerial photographs of 196 Laotian villages that Mr. McCloskey says have been damaged or destroyed by the bombing, and documents pertaining to the U.S.-supported pacification program in South Vietnam.

But the main fight was over the first McCloskey resolution, which its supporters said would turn over to the House only information that already is well known to the enemy.

Maryland Roll-Call

Opponents contended, however, that disclosure of the information could endanger national security. Representative Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen (R., N.J.) argued further that if the information were made available to members of Congress, there might be those who would "leak" it to the public.

On the roll-call, the Maryland delegation voted as follows: Goodloe E. Byron (D.), Edward A. Garmatz (D.) and William O. Mills (R.) voted against the resolution; Gilbert Gude (R.), Clarence D. Long (D.), Warren J. Mitchell (D.) and Paul S. Sarbanes (D.) voted for it. Lawrence J. Hogan (R.) was absent.

8 JUL 1971

House Defeats McCloskey Bid for Laos Data

BY THOMAS J. FOLEY
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The House Wednesday knocked down an attempt by Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R-Calif.) to force the State Department to reveal details of secret U.S. operations in Laos.

Members voted 261 to 118 against McCloskey's resolution of inquiry that would have asked the State Department to furnish documents "compatible with the public interest" containing policy guidelines to U.S. ambassadors in Laos over the last seven and one-half years.

A short time later, McCloskey and Deputy Undersecretary of State William B. Macomber Jr. engaged in an exchange at a House freedom of information subcommittee hearing when the congressman sought to question Macomber on the same subject.

Televised Hearing

McCloskey's repeated questions at the televised hearing about Laotian bombing policies brought a reminder from Macomber that he had appeared before the subcommittee to testify on State Department classification procedures.

"I didn't come up here to engage in a political discussion with you," he told McCloskey.

When McCloskey rephrased the questions in terms of whether Congress had the right to know about U.S. policy in Laos, Macomber finally said sharply:

"I'm not an expert on Laos, Pete, and I must say, this is the kind of thing that makes it difficult to cooperate with the legislative branch of government. If you want to use television time to belabor the State Department on this, I suggest you wait until you get somebody up here who is prepared to testify on Laos."

'Out of Order'

Rep. Frank Horton (R-N.Y.) called McCloskey "out of order" for his questions. Subcommittee Chairman William Moorhead (D-Pa.) said William Sullivan, former U.S. ambassador to Laos, will testify later this month and suggested that McCloskey wait until then to ask his questions.

McCloskey, who plans to run against President Nixon in the 1972 GOP presidential primaries, has been seeking release of information on CIA and other government activities in Laos since he made an 11-day trip to Indochina last April.

His resolution of inquiry that the House turned down is a seldom-used device designed to give the legislative branch a lever to obtain information from the executive branch. If approved by the House, the department would have had 15 days to reply.

Laos Bombing

McCloskey told the House the United States has been involved in the war in Laos for seven years. He said more bombs have been dropped there than on Germany in World War II.

Noting that the Senate has held a secret session on the Laotian war, McCloskey said it was "incredible" that the House should not also be informed.

Rep. Peter Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.) replied that it would be naive to think that 435 members of the House could have access to classified information and that none of it would be made public.

Meanwhile, in the Senate:

—Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) introduced legislation that would require the executive branch to give appropriate congressional committees Central Intelligence Agency reports and analyses now available only to the Administration.

—Sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.) proposed that the total amount spent each year by the CIA be made public.

STATINTL

JUL 1971

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0
Cooper Acts to Force C.I.A. to Report to Congress

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 7 — John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, one of the most influential Senators on foreign policy matters, introduced legislation today that would require the Central Intelligence Agency to give detailed intelligence information to Congress regularly.

Mr. Cooper, a Republican, said that Congress needed this kind of evaluation and analysis, now available only to the executive branch, to participate in the formation of foreign policy.

Meanwhile, the House rejected a series of resolutions demanding that the Nixon Administration provide Congress with additional information on United States operations in Laos.

Two other Senators also offered proposals relating to the C.I.A.

Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single-line item in the budget. Agency funds are now concealed in other items in the budget.

Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, said he would offer measures that would prohibit such C.I.A. activities as the funding of Thai troops to fight in Laos.

Senator Cooper emphasized in a Senate speech that his proposal was not aimed at any C.I.A. operations, sources or methods, but was "concerned only with the end result — the facts and analyses of facts."

"Congress would be in a

much better position to make judgments from a much more informed and broader perspective than is now possible," he said.

Senator Cooper, an aide said, had been considering the legislation for three years but disclosures in the Pentagon papers on United States involvement in Vietnam had now provided an impetus.

The aide referred specifically to C.I.A. analyses during the Johnson Administration that full-scale bombing of North Vietnam would not be effective in halting infiltration or breaking the will of Hanoi.

Senator Cooper's proposal was supported on the floor by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, the only Senator belonging to both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

Mr. Symington said that it was "no secret that we on various committees have not been entirely satisfied with the intelligence information we have obtained.

"If the proper committees are not acquainted with what we're doing," Mr. Symington went on, "how we can function properly?"

Because Senator Cooper is so influential, it seemed likely that his proposal would be the subject of hearings and, perhaps, floor debate this year.

A measure of the respect said his views came from Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader. "Anything John Cooper says would be given the most serious consideration by me," Mr. Mansfield said.

Regular Reports Asked

Senator Cooper's proposal would require the C.I.A. to make regular reports to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and to the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees.

The agency would also be required to make special reports in response to inquiries by these committees.

Mr. Cooper said that the agency would have to decide for itself what information to present to its committees, but he specified that the data would have to be "full and current."

There are now "oversight" committees in the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, that review the C.I.A. budget and operations. But these committees are not concerned with the substance of the information the agency gathers.

In the House debate today, the major fight came over a

document dealing with operations of the United States military and the C.I.A. in Laos from 1964 to the present.

The resolution, which was sponsored by Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Republican of California, was set aside by a vote of 261 to 118. Critics of the measure contended that the information was too sensitive to be given to Congress.

Following this vote, the House, without debate, set

aside resolutions seeking information on bombing operations in northern Laos and on the Phoenix program, which is designed to neutralize the effect of underground Vietcong operations. The House also set aside a resolution seeking another set of the Pentagon papers that the Administration made available to Congress last week.

The supporters of the resolution were, for the most part, Democrats opposed to the war.

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8 JUL 1971

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-

C.I.A. Aides Reported Leading Commando Raids in North Laos

The Washington Star

VIENTIANE, Laos, July 7—A secret operation involving commando raiders, some led by employes of the Central Intelligence Agency, is reported under way against the Communist-held Plaine des Jarres in northern Laos.

According to well-informed sources, United States aircraft have been landing on the plain, and one C-123 transport was stranded with its American crew there for a night.

The informants said the commandos had penetrated as far as an airstrip in the east central part of the plain called Lima 22.

United States and Laotian officials here have refused to comment on the reported operation.

[In Washington, State Department officials said they were checking the situation and had no immediate comment.]

One American source said privately that the Meo leader, Gen. Vang Pao, whose C.I.A.-backed forces are based at Long Tieng, southwest of the plain, was "strengthening and improving his defensive position."

Some military sources suggested that the reported operation was being conducted by the Meo base of Bouam Long, north of the plain.

Informants said two Thai battalions and six Meo battalions were involved. The Pathet Lao radio said the operation was being conducted by three regiments of General Vang Pao's forces.

In 1969, a joint United States-Laotian operation took the plain from Communist



The New York Times July 8, 1971

troops briefly but this led to a large North Vietnamese counterstroke, which drove the Meos back and almost resulted in the fall of Long Tieng.

Cambodian Plan Said to End

PNOMPENH, Cambodia, July 7 (UPI)—The United States has abandoned its secret program of training regular Cambodian troops on Laos, United States sources said today, but is continuing to train Cambodian guerrillas.

The sources said that the program, financed by the Central Intelligence Agency, ended last month when a 500-man Cambodian army battalion wound up a three-month training course in the Laotian panhandle.

8 JUL 1977

CIA Report Bill Backed In Senate

By RICHARD DUDMAN

Chief Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, July 8 — Senator John Sherman Cooper (Rep.), Kentucky, has obtained strong bipartisan backing for a proposal to require the Central Intelligence Agency to report to Congress as well as to the Executive Branch.

Cooper, a moderate opponent of the Vietnam War and of the antiballistic missile system, introduced his proposal yesterday as an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the CIA.

Senators Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, and Jacob K. Javits (Rep.), New York, announced their support for the measure on the Senate floor. Fulbright spoke of holding hearings on the proposal.

Symington, chairman of a foreign relations subcommittee on overseas commitments, told of difficulties he had had in obtaining full information about secret U.S. military preparations and operations abroad, including the clandestine warfare being conducted in Laos.

Symington noted that he was a member of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Joint Atomic Energy committees. He said that his best information had been obtained from the last of these, attributing that fact to a requirement in the Atomic Energy Act that the Atomic Energy Commission keep Congress "fully and currently" informed.

Cooper used that phrase in his proposed amendment on the CIA. An aid said that Cooper had found CIA information generally reliable on such matters as Soviet military preparedness and the Indochina War but had noted that it was rendered only in response to specific questions.

Under his amendment, the CIA would have to take the initiative in sending Congress its analyses of problems of foreign policy and national security.

The aid said that Cooper had been considering such a measure for several years. He said the publication of the Pentagon papers had demonstrated once more the value of CIA reports and probably had broadened support in Congress for a requirement to make them available.

In a Senate speech, Cooper proposed that the CIA be required to make regular and special reports to the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees and to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. Additional special reports could be requested by the committees.

Any member of Congress or designated member of his staff would have access to the information. All such persons would be subject to security requirements such as those in the Executive Branch.

Cooper said that the best information should be available to the Executive and Legislative branches as a basis for national decisions involving "vast amounts of money, the deployment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in combat, and binding commitments to foreign nations."

Two other Senators offered proposals relating to the CIA.


George S. McGovern (Dem.), South Dakota, suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single line item in the budget. Agency funds now are concealed in other items in the budget.

Three bills were introduced by Senator Clifford P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey, to limit covert use of funds and military equipment by the CIA for

fielding foreign troops in Laos or elsewhere without specific approval by Congress.

Case said they were designed "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the Executive Branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

Meanwhile, the House rejected a proposal that the Administration be required to tell it



John Sherman Cooper

what the military and CIA were doing in Laos.

By a vote of 261 to 118, members tabled -- and thus killed -- a resolution introduced by Representative Paul N. McCloskey (Rep.), California, that would have ordered the Secretary of State to furnish the House with the policy guidelines given to the U.S. ambassador in Laos.

The ambassador has responsibility for overseeing the clandestine military operations in Laos aimed at assisting the royal Laotian government in its struggle with the Pathet Lao.

William B. Macomber Jr., deputy under secretary of state, clashed yesterday with McCloskey over whether the Department of State was directing U.S. bombing attacks in Laos.

Macomber denied the allegation and suggested that if McCloskey wanted to pursue the issue he ought to invite an East Asia expert from the State Department to testify.

The exchange occurred as Macomber testified before a House foreign affairs subcommittee on ways to improve declassification of Government records by the State Department.

Macomber said 10 to 12 years' retention ought to be adequate to protect Government secrets while not being so long as to delay the public's need to know about operations.

STATINTL

Typhoon Wanes; B-52 Raids Resume

From News Dispatches

SAIGON, July 8 (Thursday) —American B-52 bombers resumed bombing near the Demilitarized Zone in South Vietnam last night and this morning after having been kept away from the area for one day by rough weather from Typhoon Harriet, military sources said.

But U.S. battle communique showed the lull in enemy attacks against American ground forces continuing. There have been no Communist ground attacks on GIs anywhere in Vietnam since just after midnight Monday, when a rocket barrage killed five American soldiers and wounded more than 30 at the Danang air base.

Military sources said the north Vietnamese army kept a trickle of supplies moving down the trail system in Laos. But fewer than 200 truck movements were detected Tuesday night compared with well over 2,000 at the height of the dry season.

Meanwhile, military sources said battlefield action in South Vietnam dropped to one of the lowest levels in the war last week.

News agencies reported these other developments:

- In Phnom Penh, American sources said the United States had ended its secret program of training regular Cambodian troops in Laos, but are continuing to train Cambodian guerrillas.

U.S. officials declined to say how many Cambodian troops were trained by the CIA, but other sources put the number at "several thousand."

- Capt. Ernest L. Medina, accused of murdering 102 South Vietnamese civilians in the 1969 My lai massacre, flew into the U.S. airbase at Bien-Hoa near Saigon with his army lawyer, Capt. Mark J. Kadish.

Maj. William Eckhardt, the Army prosecutor at Medina's court-martial set for July 26, wanted to question two South Vietnamese army sergeants in connection with the case and asked Medina and his attorney to accompany him to South Vietnam.

- In Paris, France indicated today it played some kind of behind-the-scenes role in bringing about the latest Vietcong peace initiative on Vietnam.

At the weekly cabinet meeting Foreign Minister Maurice Schuman noted that the peace formula presented by the Vietcong contained new elements favorable to a solution of the war.

Efforts to Quiz Macomber on Laos Raid Fail

By SHIRLEY ELDER

Star Staff Writer

Deputy Undersecretary of State William B. Macomber Jr. has declined to answer insistent questions from Rep. Paul N. (Pete) McCloskey, R-Calif., about U.S. bombing in Laos.

Macomber told a House freedom of information hearing yesterday he knows little of what goes on in Laos.

He said he was invited to testify about the State Department's system of classifying documents and any further effort to try and get him to talk about Laos would further strain relations between State and Congress.

McCloskey has been hammering at what he feels is a calculated administration effort to hide a clandestine war in Laos from Congress and the public. He said each bombing strike in that country is personally controlled by the U.S. ambassador.

Rebuffed by House

Earlier yesterday, McCloskey, who has vowed to oppose President Nixon's bid for re-election next year if the war is not over, was rebuffed by his own colleagues in an information-gathering effort.

On a 261-118 vote, the House killed a McCloskey resolution that would have directed the secretary of state to tell Congress about U.S. involvement in Laos.

Then, by voice votes, the House tabled similar resolutions of inquiry seeking data about other U.S. activities throughout Southeast Asia.

One resolution sought copies of the once-secret Pentagon papers, which already have been made available on a top security basis, and another sought a report of the so-called Phoenix assault against Viet Cong agents.

7-Year War Claimed

McCloskey told the House that the United States has been at war in Laos for seven years and more bombs have been dropped in that one country than were rained on Nazi Germany.

But Rep. Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, R-N.J., argued that the resolution was an unwise attempt to obtain highly sensitive information.

Although Macomber, in his testimony before the subcommittee headed by Rep. William Moorhead, D-Pa., declined to talk about Laos, he agreed that many State Department documents are over-classified.

Half of the approximately 400,000 documents accumulated at State each year, he said, are marked Top Secret, Secret of Confidential.

About 6,000 State Department officers have authority to classify documents, Macomber said, and some misuse that power to simply limit distribution of the papers involved.

He suggested there should be some kind of automatic system for declassifying documents after a period of time, perhaps 10 years.

A shorter declassification period—some have suggested two years—would be unrealistic, Macomber said, and just lead to new and bigger bureaucratic problems.

In the Senate, meanwhile, Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., introduced legislation requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to provide Congress regularly with detailed intelligence information.

Cooper said Congress needed this kind of evaluation and analysis, now available only to the executive branch, in order to participate in the formation of foreign policy.

Two other senators also suggested proposals relating to the CIA.

Sen. George S. McGovern, D-S.D., suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single line item in the budget. Agency funds currently are concealed in other budget items.

Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., said he would offer measures prohibiting such CIA activities as the funding of Thai troops to fight in Laos.

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House of Representatives

WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1971

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.
Rev. James Clark Brown, the First
Congregational Church, San Francisco,
Calif., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray.

Let us remember the words of our Lord
Jesus Christ when He said: "Those unto
whom much has been given, of them will
much be required."

O God, mighty, merciful, mysterious,
before whose judgments nations and
individuals rise and fall, inspire the
leaders and people of this land that we
may more faithfully know and do Thy
holy will. O God, there is a hunger in our
land; a hunger for moral heroes; for
men and women whose passion is to bring
into being the kind of world where every
privilege and dignity which is enjoyed by
the few may be made available to be en-
joyed by all people. To that end, direct,
comfort, and guide Members of the Con-
gress.

"O Thou, whose Spirit first fashioned life,
Intending all creation Thy love to
share,

Use us, O God, to do Thy work
Until the earth be fair."

Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has ex-
amined the Journal of the last day's pro-
ceedings and announces to the House
his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands
approved.

There was no objection.

THE REVEREND JAMES CLARK BROWN, OUR CHAPLAIN FOR TODAY

(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was
given permission to address the House
for 1 minute, and to revise and extend
his remarks.)

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I am
proud today that our opening prayer has
been given by an Oklahoman whom I
have known for many years, a young man
who grew up in Okmulgee County in the
city of Henryetta, and who once served
here in the House of Representatives as
one of the staff rendering faithful service
to this country.

Today James Clark Brown is minister
of the First Congregational Church of
San Francisco, and carrying on there a
great ministry.

Many Washingtonians will remember
him as the pastor for a number of years
of the Cleveland Park Congregational
Church here in Washington, D.C. With
his wife, Verne, and their lovely children,
David Edmond and Edith Louise, he is
doing a great work in the State of Cali-
fornia.

Again I say I am proud and pleased
that that he could be with us today in a
place he has always loved, to lead the
House of Representatives in today's
devotions.

A SALUTE TO WADE LUCAS

(Mr. HENDERSON asked and was
given permission to address the House
for 1 minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)

Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Speaker,
scarcely a day goes by without our na-
tional news media publicizing a conflict
between Indians and civil authorities
over the title to Federal property, alleged
violations of legal or moral commitments
or other basic differences of opinion.

It is refreshing to know that on Satur-
day of this week, Mr. Wade Lucas, a con-
stituent of mine will be visiting Niagara
Falls, N.Y., as a guest of the Tuscarora
Indians. While there, he will be made an
honorary chief and, with the authority of
Gov. Robert Scott of North Carolina, will
sign a formal peace treaty with the Tus-
carora Indian Nation.

I might add that Wade Lucas, unlike
so many "Honorary Chiefs" we see at
campaign time, is not a politician run-
ning for office and seeking to court favor
with Indian voters. Instead, Wade is a
retired newspaperman with no aim or
purpose in mind other than to cement
a personal and official friendship with
these Indians which dates back to Mem-
orial Day more than 8 years ago when
he visited the Tonawanda Reservation in
an official capacity as public information
officer for the State of North Carolina
under the administration of Gov. Terry
Sanford.

The Tuscarora Indians of the Tona-
wanda Reservation are a lot like many
other Americans of all races and creeds
throughout our Nation. They respond
warmly to a genuine show of friendship
and interest. Wade Lucas' longtime per-
sonal friendship with them is the kind
of "people to people" relationship which
will solve our international differences
if they are ever to be solved.

INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATION INCREASING FEDERAL SHARE OF EMPLOYEES' HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his remarks
and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I am
pleased today to introduce a bill calling
for increasing the Government's share of
the Federal employees' health benefits
program.

Under the present cost-sharing system,
the Federal Government pays 40 percent
of the basic cost of the health insurance
of Federal employees.

This 40-percent figure was reached
only last year. The House of Representa-
tives had passed legislation calling for
increasing the Government share to 50
percent, but after considerable pressure
from the administration, including the
threat of a Presidential veto, House-
Senate conferees agreed to a reduced
figure.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the attitude
of the administration may have changed
in the course of the past year. On Febru-
ary 18 of this year, President Nixon called
for private employers to provide 65 per-
cent of the cost of basic health insur-
ance coverage for employees as of July 1,
1973, and 75 percent of the total cost
3 years later.

The President based this appeal on
the need to spread health insurance cov-
erage to more of the Nation's citizens.

Mr. Speaker, I fully agree with the
President on this matter.

Further, I believe it to be fully con-
sistent and proper for the Federal Gov-
ernment to lead the way for the private
sector in meeting the President's goal of
75 percent of the costs for employees'
medical insurance.

I hope that the Retirement, Insurance,
and Health Benefits Subcommittee,
which I chair, will hold hearings on this
important legislation in the very near
future, and I am hopeful of administra-
tion support for this proposal, which in-
corporates the President's own sugges-
tions.

DIRECTING THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO FURNISH TO THE HOUSE CERTAIN INFORMATION RESPECTING U.S. OPERATIONS IN LAOS

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I call up
House Resolution 492 and ask for its
immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as fol-
lows:

H. RES. 492

Resolved, That the Secretary of State, to
the extent not incompatible with the public
interest, is directed to furnish to the House
of Representatives, not later than fifteen
days following the adoption of this resolu-
tion, any documents containing policy in-
structions or guidelines given to the United
States Ambassador in Laos for the purpose
of his administration of those operations con-
trolled or directed by the country team in
Laos, between January 1, 1964, and June 21,
1971, particularly with regard to—

- (1) covert Central Intelligence Agency op-
erations in Laos;
- (2) Thai and other foreign armed forces
operations in Laos;

H 6377

July 7, 1971

S 10508

STATINTL

would perform the function of governing the local agencies, as the Farm Credit system now operates.

Another agency, the Rural Development Investment Equalization Administration, would handle the subsidy end of this proposal. It would be handled separately to avoid problems of getting loan and grant money mixed into the same financial pot.

It has been alleged by those who claim that industry will not move to rural America that it costs more money to operate away from the population centers, and as a result, the chance for a major dispersal of industry is doomed to failure.

The sponsors of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act do not necessarily agree with this conclusion, but a number of states have proved that investment incentives do draw industries.

Rather than provide under-the-table or backdoor subsidies, this legislation would make open subsidies available, but only under stringent and controlled circumstances, and this would be done on a national basis rather than the state-by-state effort now going on.

It must be stressed that these would not be relief payments to fiscally healthy industries, but they would be incentives to American industry to disperse.

There would be two kinds of subsidies:

1. *Interest supplements:* If a firm cannot pay his interest out of local earnings without dipping into its capital, the company can be given an interest supplement by the Rural Development Investment Equalization Administration. The payment could not bring the firm's interest level lower than one-percent.

2. *Rural Development Capital Augmentation Payments:* If a community wanted to build a sewer system, a calculation would be made of how much such a system would cost, and then it would be determined how much the people in the community could reasonably be expected to pay for it. The difference between these two figures would be the Rural Development Capital Augmentation payment. The same formula could be used for development of new industry, but again it must be stressed that this procedure would be under strict controls so that this money would not be used for fly-by-night or doomed-to-fail businesses.

THE REORGANIZATION

Under this bill farm and non-farm credit would come under a new Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. Under him, in two separate agencies, would be the Farm Development Administration, which now handles all farm credits (under the title Farmers Home Administration) and the Rural Enterprise and Community Development Administration, which would handle all non-farm rural credit.

The new assistant secretary would be assigned to no other duties than to oversee all rural credit. At present, the assistant secretary handling this task, must also supervise a wide range of other activities.

The 19 members of the Rural Development Credit Board would have five members appointed by the President of the United States; five nominated by the President Pro tempore of the Senate; and five nominated after consideration of the recommendations of the Speaker of the House.

The Secretary of Agriculture would appoint the same person who is his representative to the Farm Credit Board. The governor of the Farm Credit Administration would be another member of the board. The Executive Director of the Rural Development Credit Agency, and the Rural Development Investment Equalization Administration would sit on the board as ex-officio members.

By Mr. COOPER:

S. 2224. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep

the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency. Referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, by unanimous consent.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the formulation of sound foreign policy and national security policy requires that the best and most accurate intelligence obtainable be provided to the legislative as well as the executive branch of our Government. The approval by the Congress of foreign policy and national security policy, which are bound together, whose support involves vast amounts of money, the deployment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war, yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in combat, and binding commitments to foreign nations, should only be given upon the best information available to both the executive and legislative branches.

There has been much debate during the past several years concerning the respective powers of the Congress and the Executive in the formulation of foreign policy and national security policy and the authority to commit our Armed Forces to war. We have experienced, unfortunately, confrontation between the two branches of our Government. It is my belief that if both branches, executive and legislative, have access to the same intelligence necessary for such fateful decisions, the working relationship between the Executive and the Congress would be, on the whole, more harmonious and more conducive to the national interest. It would assure a common understanding of the purposes and merits of policies. It is of the greatest importance to the support and trust of the people. It is of the greatest importance to the maintenance of our system of government, with its separate branches, held so tenuously together by trust and reason.

It is reasonable, I submit, to contend that the Congress, which must make its decisions upon foreign and security policy, which is called upon to commit the resources of the Nation, material and human, should have all the information and intelligence available to discharge properly and morally its responsibilities to our Government and the people.

I send to the table a bill amending the National Security Act of 1947, which, I hope, would make it possible for the legislative branch to better carry out its responsibilities.

I read the amendment at this point:

To amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency.

That section 192 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403), is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

"(g) It shall also be the duty of the Agency to inform fully and currently, by means of special reports in response to requests made

by, the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs, of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate regarding intelligence information collected by the Agency concerning the relations of the United States to foreign countries and matters of national security including full and current analysis by the Agency of such information.

"(h) Any intelligence information and any analysis thereof made available to any committee of the Congress pursuant to subsection (g) of this section shall be made available by such committee, in accordance with such rules as such committee may establish, to any member of the Congress who requests such information and analysis. Such information and analysis shall also be made available by any such committee, in accordance with such rules as such committee may establish, to any officer or employee of the House of Representatives or the Senate who has been (1) designated by a Member of Congress to have access to such information and analysis, and (2) determined by the committee concerned to have the necessary security clearance for such access."

The bill would, as a matter of law, make available to the Congress, through its appropriate committees, the same intelligence, conclusions, facts, and analyses that are now available to the executive branch. At the present time, the intelligence information and analyses developed by the CIA and other intelligence agencies of the Government are available only to the executive as a matter of law. This bill would not, in any way, affect the activities of the CIA, its sources or methods, nor would it diminish in any respect the authority of already existing committees and oversight groups, which supervise the intelligence collection activities of the Government. My bill is concerned only with the end result—the facts and analyses of facts. It would, of course, in no way inhibit the use by the Congress of analyses and information from sources outside the Government. It is obvious that with the addition of intelligence facts and their analyses, the Congress would be in a much better position to make judgments from a much more informed and broader perspective than is now possible.

The National Security Act of 1947 marked a major reorganization of the executive branch. This reorganization made it possible for the executive branch to assume more effectively the responsibilities of the United States in world affairs and the maintenance of our own national security. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the unified services as we now know them.

Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, established the Central Intelligence Agency under a Director and Deputy Director, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Under the direction of the National Security Council, it was directed to advise the National Security Council on matters relating to national security and "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities."

The language does not specifically bar the dissemination of intelligence to the Congress, but it does not provide that

Plain of Jars Operation With U.S. Aid Reported

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — The United States has launched a new secret operation against the Plain of Jars, a Communist-held area in northern Laos, well-informed sources say. "Commando raiders, some led by American military men in CIA employ have penetrated as far as Lima 22, an air strip in the east central plain.

U.S. aircraft are landing on the plain. An Air America C123 transport was stranded with its American crew on the plain for a night, according to well-informed sources. U.S. officials, however, refuse to discuss the operation making it difficult to assess the operation's exact magnitude or objectives.

One American source claimed Meo Gen. Vang Pao was "strengthening and improving his defensive position." Sources said Vang Pao took Ban Na, a key hill overlooking the plain last Tuesday. Unfortunately this claim of strengthening defenses does not jell with the U.S. presence on the plain or the excessive secrecy cloaking the operation on the part of U.S. and Lao officials.

Fraught With Danger

To clear North Vietnamese from the hills south of the plain and establish positions on hill-tops overlooking the plain would be excellent, as it would give Vang Pao's forces a breather until the next dry season.

However, to go onto the plain is fraught with both military and political danger.

In 1969, a joint U.S. and Lao operation, About Face took the plain from the Communists briefly, but resulted in massive Hanoi retaliation which drove CIA-led Meos back farther than ever before and almost resulted in the secret base of Long Chen falling. A new offensive could mean that final end to feelers for talks between the government and Communists and lead to fresh Hanoi offensives Hanoi has frequently made clear it will not tolerate a U.S. or government presence on the plain of

Jars and has sufficient force to push the corrupt, ill-managed Lao forces off plain again whenever it wants.

Some military sources have suggested that the Plain of Jars push is to relieve the pressure on the Meo base of Bouam Long, north of the plain.

When correspondents tried to find what the operation was about, Gen. Thongph Knoksy, the government spokesman, dodged into the corridors of Lao-headquarters. U.S. officials adamantly refuse to speak unless Thong Puuh speaks first.

It is almost unbelievable that after Senate censure and publication of the Pentagon documents, a U.S. mission in Laos should once again resort to secrecy particularly concerning a U.S. run operation close to North Vietnam and China.

The operation previously resulted in tough Communist retaliation and caused considerable government and civilian loss in 1969. There can be no doubt the operation is considerable in size. The Pathet Lao radio which, although it is Communist, has been most truthful to date on Lao operations, says three regiments of Vang Pao's forces are involved. Vientiane military sources say two Thai battalions and six Lao Meo battalions are involved. U.S. air power is again extremely active over the plain, where some 5,000 civilians are still living. American embassy officials are trying to blame Vang Pao for the operation. "Vang Pao is very much his own man," three American officials said separately.

As all three used the same words, one can only assume somebody told them to say this. Vang Paos' forces are advised, paid, armed, clothed and sometimes led by CIA employes and it is impossible for the general to do anything big without American approval. Some middle-level Americans are already having second thoughts.

They fear that if Vang Pao finds no early Hanoi opposition he may continue to advance, bringing the U.S. into a new northern Laos debacle.

ATLANTIC CITY, N. J.
 JERSEY TIMES
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Clifford Case

Much has been said lately about the effort of Congress to reassert and redefine its authority in the field of foreign policy.

I am much interested in this, not as an exercise in congressional self-aggrandizement, but as a means of forcing our government to conduct foreign policy in the open so that the public may know what is going on and have the controlling voice in important decisions.

Our recent history in Southeast Asia shows that wars approved by simply a handful of presidential advisors may well be not only unconstitutional but relatively unsuccessful, too.

Like most Americans, I have been shocked by the cynical manipulation of our political processes revealed in The New York Times series on the origins of the Vietnam War. I believe that our country should not go to war as part of a carefully plotted scenario which involves secret attacks on the

other side -- some apparently with the aim of provoking retaliation against us and our allies.

But I do not want to get into an extended post mortem on Vietnam. Our primary task should not be to engage in re-cremations or assign blame but to bring an end to the war. That is why last year, and this year, I voted for the Hatfield-McGovern proposal to set a definite date for U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

The term "secret war" has now come into our national vocabulary. We started off in Vietnam operating in secret and we are currently fighting a war in Laos in the same way. We are spending annually about \$350 million on the ground in Laos, not to mention an estimated \$2 billion to bomb that country of less than three million people. All this is done without any real congressional or public knowledge or approval.

Successive administrations have been able to carry on the secret war in Laos, as they did earlier in Vietnam, by use of that vast billion-dollar treasure chest which Congress has appropriated, but never controlled, for discretionary intelligence and military programs. And it has been the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which has been assigned to carry out the administrations' policies such as the running of a 30,000-man private army and the funding of

Thai troops in Laos.

I do not direct criticism against the CIA, for it has only been following orders issued by several Presidents. I simply question whether a secret intelligence organization should be assigned a war-making role abroad.

This is why I have recently proposed three bills which would increase congressional control over certain CIA programs. These are:

1. A bill to extend all existing limitations on Defense Department funding such as the prohibitions against payment of mercenaries in Laos and the Cooper-Church provisions for Cambodia to all U. S. government agencies overseas, including CIA.

2. A bill to prohibit the funding by any U. S. government agency of foreign mercenaries operating outside their countries without specific congressional authorization. I would hope this would eliminate the confusing trail of Thais in Laos, Cambodians in Laos, and even Thais in Cambodia.

3. A bill to extend existing limitations on the use of military surplus materiel to all government agencies abroad, including CIA.

My three proposals would close some loopholes in the law. But the executive can find ways to skirt around any prohibition, if it is so inclined. The solution to the problem lies, in the long run, not in a tighter drafting of the law but in the acceptance by the executive of Congress and the public as partners in the conduct of the people's vital business.

Congressman lashes executive secrecy

By TIM WHEELER

WASHINGTON, D.C., June 29—Rep. John E. Moss (D-Calif.) warned the Nixon Administration today that government officials could be cited for "contempt of Congress" for refusing to furnish information on U.S. foreign policy decisions vital to the interests of the American people.

In a sharp exchange with an official of the Justice Department, Moss, during hearings before the Sub-Committee on Government Operations took the confrontation between Congress and the executive branch one step further.

Evidence that the U.S. has engaged in 20 years of cold war by a systematic policy of presidential deceit is spurring both Senators and Representatives toward a Congressional crackdown on the executive branch.

The immediate issue is Executive Branch secrecy but the larger issue is the untold cost of the cold war policy itself—hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded GI's in two undeclared wars and one trillion dollars in taxpayer funds since World War II.

Plans shrouded in secrecy

The hearings before the Sub-committee, sparked by the 47-volume Pentagon study on how the U.S. got into the Indochina war, is revealing to the people that the government systematically concealed its policy aims.

Rep. Moss told Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, that the use of "executive

privilege" has shrouded from the people the foreign policy plans of five consecutive administrations.

He said that "executive privilege," first claimed by President Nixon in Executive Order 10501, is subject to be overruled by Congress.

Executive privilege, he declared, "is not a constitutional authority. . . Congress is not without power to punish for contempt of Congress an official who refuses to furnish information to Representatives of the people."

Rehnquist admitted that "congress could supersede Executive Order 10501 by passing legislation stipulating rules for classification and declassification of secret information. But, he added the President would have to decide whether or not the act was constitutional.

Moss bridled at this suggestion demanding, "The President? Not the courts? Are you saying that the President could suspend the law?"

Rehnquist flushed and corrected himself. The President, he said, could seek a ruling from the courts on the constitutionality of the measure.

Meanwhile, Sen. Clifford Case (R-NJ) accused the Nixon Administration of "overt manipulation or suppression" of a scientific report that could lead to quick ratification of a ban on underground nuclear tests.

Case said scientists have invented an instrument that can detect explosions as low as 4.0 on the Richter Scale, making unnecessary "on-site inspections" which have been a stumbling block in negotiations.

New findings suppressed

Case said the findings were suppressed because they "conflict with entrenched interests or cause the government embarrassment.

Case has also taken steps to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from engaging in "secret wars," such as the war in Laos.

He will shortly introduce a bill denying any funds for CIA secret wars. He said his purpose is to force "our government to conduct foreign policy out in the open so that the public may know what is going on and have the controlling voice in important decisions. The Constitution does not give the President authority to declare a secret war."

in the future, it will be decided upon later through consultation by the liaison personnel of two sides."

¹¹ "A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of America," *People's Daily*, March 8, 1963.

¹² Speech made by Chiao Kuan-hua, Peiping's "vice minister" of foreign affairs, at a cocktail party hosted by the Yugoslav "embassy" in Peiping on November 27, 1970.

¹³ Mao Tse-tung, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," *Selected Works* (Foreign Language, Peking, 1961), Vol. IV, p. 415.

¹⁴ The 13 "theories" include those of "limited sovereignty," "socialist big family," "justified aggression," and "economic unity."

¹⁵ Speech by Yugoslav "ambassador" to Peiping at a cocktail party on November 27, 1970.

¹⁶ A dispatch filed by the Agence France Presse from Belgrade on January 5, 1971. Yugoslavia and Albania were locked in a feud over the question of Stalin. In 1958 the two sides exchanged charges d'affaires. Since the Czech incident in 1968 the relations between the two countries have gradually improved.

¹⁷ "Revolutionary Storm of the Polish People," *People's Daily*, December 22, 1970.

¹⁸ NCNA dispatch from Peiping on December 21, 1970.

¹⁹ "Welcome the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and Canada," editorial, *People's Daily*, October 14, 1970.

²⁰ Edgar Snow, a pro-Communist American journalist, and author of *Red Star Over China*, in a telegram sent from Peiping to Milan on February 3, 1971, mentioned some production figures which he said had been disclosed to him by Chou En-lai. For the last ten years, the Chinese Communists have not revealed any production figures. The figures revealed by Snow greatly exceed even the most optimistic estimates made by the free world.

²¹ According to an Agence France Presse dispatch from Peiping on October 25, 1970, an NCNA correspondent wrote a long article pointing out that the Japanese are not satisfied with their pre-war imperialist status. They are now trying to join the club of "superpowers" consisting of "U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism."

²² Mao Tse-tung, "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and Their Running Dogs," *Peking Review* (special issue, May 23, 1970), p. 9.

²³ This point was stressed by both Lin Biao and Chou En-lai in their speeches during the "National Day" celebrations on October 1, 1970. However, earlier on July 14, 1970 Chou in an interview with French correspondents already pointed out that the time when big countries can dominate the world had already passed and could never return.

²⁴ Speech by Ceylonese minister of trade at a reception on January 15, 1971, in honor of Pai Hsiang-kuo, Peiping's "minister" of foreign trade, who led a trade delegation to visit Ceylon.

²⁵ See the "Joint Communiqué Between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan," November 14, 1970.

²⁶ The Chinese Communists opposed the application of principle of "peaceful coexistence" to the relations between the "oppressed people and the oppressing people," between "the oppressed country and the oppressing country," and between "the oppressed class and the oppressing class." (See "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," *op. cit.*) Even while chanting the slogan of "peaceful coexistence," the Communists never forget to stress the necessity to oppose the "aggressive policy and war, policy of imperialism." Actually, this is a united front tactic against "imperialism."

²⁷ *Peking Review*, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²⁸ Two dispatches filed by NCNA from Tokyo on October 24, 1970.

²⁹ NCNA dispatch from Peiping, November 9, 1970, the Pakistani president arrived in mainland China on November 10 and stayed there until November 14.

³⁰ "All Anti-U.S. Imperialism Forces in the World Unite!" editorial, *People's Daily*, January 21, 1964.

³¹ An AP dispatch from London on December 9, 1970 disclosed that during the previous year at least five Soviet trade officials, three Polish foreign officials and several unidentified Communist delegates were ordered by the British government to leave Britain.

³² "What Does the Conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers Show?" *People's Daily*, February 2, 1971.

³³ See NCNA report from Peiping on February 2, 1971, concerning the coup in Uganda.

³⁴ A CNA dispatch from Hongkong on January 30, 1971 cited some figures from an article by Harvard economics professor concerning the economic situation on mainland during the past 10 years. He said that even the highest estimate would put development rate of Peiping's agricultural and industrial production from 1957 to 1967 at an yearly rate of only 3 to 3.5 per cent, while the economic growth of the most of other Asian countries has already reached the rate of 7 to 9 per cent.

³⁵ See note 25.

³⁶ See news reports and statements issued by Peiping following its nuclear tests as well as the editorial of the *People's Daily*, August 1, 1970.

³⁷ NCNA dispatch from Peiping on December 5, 1970. The diplomatic personnel were "ambassadors" from Mauritania and Mali and the charge d'affaires from Guinea.

³⁸ NCNA dispatch from Peiping on January 2, 1971.

³⁹ NCNA dispatch from Peiping, January 27, 1971.

fits of an end to our involvement in and over Indochina by December 31, 1971, conditional solely upon the safe return of our prisoners of war. Arguments favoring this view already have been made by a number of our colleagues, however, and accordingly, I would like to limit my testimony today to an issue which is equally important, the obligation of the House to be fully informed by the Executive Branch on the great issues of foreign affairs, and particularly the intervention by the United States in the affairs of foreign nations, either by covert CIA-operated action as in Laos or military intervention as in Viet Nam.

There is reasonable disagreement in the House over what our course of action in Southeast Asia should be: There should be no disagreement, however, on our need to know, and our right to know, all of the facts which may bear on our ultimate decision.

It is true that Congress is not suited to negotiation and day-to-day decision making in intelligence and military operations. We do hold, however, the sole constitutional power, and I might add, constitutional responsibility, for providing for the common defense, declaring war, funding the standing army, but for a period not to exceed two years; we in the House of Representatives who face our constituents every two years, not four or six, must initiate the revenue measures necessary to support the nation's expenditures for war and foreign operations of every kind.

All of these provisions were clearly intended by the framers of the Constitution to give Congress the controlling decisions in matters of war and peace. We make the laws; the President as Commander-in-Chief only executes those laws.

If Congress is to make wise decisions, however, we must be fully informed. We cannot authorize a war without complete information; we should not permit a war to continue without complete information.

The recent excerpts from the Pentagon documents published in the *New York Times* and other newspapers bring home to us most forcefully that we have not met our constitutional obligations to keep fully informed. Who amongst the Members of the House were aware, for example, that country team members in Viet Nam aided and encouraged the overthrow of Premier Diem in 1963?

Who amongst our Members knew the true facts of U.S. military and covert activity in and over Laos, and in the coastal waters of North Viet Nam prior to the Tonkin Gulf incidents of early August, 1964? Or that during October, 1964, prior to the re-election of President Johnson over Senator Goldwater, that

"Two of the teams (of U.S./South Vietnamese agents operating inside North Viet Nam) carried out successful actions during October. One demolished a bridge, the other ambushed a North Vietnamese patrol."

(This quote was taken from a State Department memo, dated November 7, 1964, for Assistant Secretary of State Bundy, and is noted at page H5107 of the Congressional Record of June 14, 1971).

If these facts had been known to the Congress, would it have affected subsequent votes on appropriations for Viet Nam, or the approval of escalation of the war implicit in the House appropriations process?

What would have been the House's reaction, for example, had we been fully informed in March, 1965, before U.S. troops were sent to Viet Nam, that our true goals in Viet Nam were those described by Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton in a memo to Secretary McNamara in March, 1965:

"70%—To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).

"20%—To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

CONGRESSMAN PAUL McCLOSKEY'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

HON. DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR.

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1971

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, our colleague from California (Mr. McCloskey) testified before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. His testimony related to the need for Congress to be fully informed, and described a series of incidents where the executive branch over the years, had withheld information from the Congress or deliberately deceived the Congress. While reasonable minds may differ as to the course this Nation should now pursue with respect to terminating our involvement in Vietnam, I believe all of us can agree on the need for Congress to demand that it be fully informed on all aspects of the situation in Southeast Asia.

For this reason, I am inserting in the RECORD Mr. McCloskey's testimony in full:

STATEMENT OF PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR., BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JUNE 29, 1971

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I had hoped originally to testify before you today with respect to the Viet Nam Disengagement Act of 1971, urging the bene-

KEY VIETNAM TEXTS

THE KENNEDY YEARS

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, dealing with the Administration of President John F. Kennedy up to the events that brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis Of Threats to Saigon Regime

Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960.

As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-Communist in origin but Communists can be expected to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current Communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-nam to Communists. These two dangers are related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over in Viet-nam.

Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers.

Security recommendations have been made in our 539 and other messages, including formation internal security council, centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with our political and economic recommendations. I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most [word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means normal.

normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following:

1. I would propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position. I would tell him that, while matters I am raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in Washington on appropriate measures to assist him in present serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under instructions.) I would particularly stress desirability of actions to broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1961 presidential elections required by constitution before end April. I would propose following actions to President:

2. Psychological shock effect is required to take initiative from Communist propagandists as well as non-Communist oppositionists and convince population government taking effective measures to deal with present situation otherwise we fear matters could get out of hand. To achieve that effect following suggested:

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
4. Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department of government with right to question President himself. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A) find some mechanism for dis-

CIA in Laos

I. ANDRONOV
Our Special Correspondent
in Indo-China

RECENT events have again focussed public attention on the Valley of Jars. Once this green valley framed by a chain of rocky hills presented an idyllic scene: rice fields, peaceful villages drowsing in the shade of coconut palms, small flourishing towns, and scattered over the fields the enormous roughly fashioned stone jars marking the burial places of an ancient civilization. Now all of it has been reduced to ashes. For many years under the control of the Laotian guerillas, the Valley of Jars was the target of massive strikes by the U.S. B-52 super-bombers, of "total defeat bomb strikes," to use Washington's lingo. Every B-52 strike meant 30 tons of bombs, a rain of fire and iron, the total killing of hundreds of Laotian peasants with their wives and children. Those who survived hid by day in deep bomb craters, only emerging at night to bury their dead and find food. Early this month the Americans resumed their air raids while simultaneously transport planes chartered by the CIA landed the cut-throat rangers it had hired in the Valley. The flames of war have flared up with renewed force in the heart of long-suffering Laos.

Little Laos lies on a major strategic crossroads of war-torn Indo-China, but why has it again become the object of Washington's criminal aggression at this particular moment? If the American press is to be believed, President Nixon and his close assistants are not inclined to challenge public opinion and reject out of hand the new proposals put forward by the patriotic forces of Vietnam, which open the way to peaceful settlement in all of Indo-China, not only Vietnam. This peace programme is strongly supported by broad sections of the American people as well as world public opinion. Yet it is reported from Washington that the CIA has submitted to President Nixon a special



report with a "negative appraisal" of the Vietnamese patriots' new peace initiative. There appears to be a hidden connection between this report and the present action in Laos. Perhaps those quarters in Washington which wish to quash all hope of peace in Indo-China have chosen to avoid an explosion of public indignation by torpedoing the efforts of the peace supporters under a cloak of secrecy, with the aid of that well-tried tool of American reaction, the CIA and its hirelings. It will not be the first time the CIA has handled dirty work of this sort.

The CIA military venture in Laos also has the aim of disrupting the present contacts in Vientiane between Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of the Vientiane government, and Tiao Souk Vongsak, special envoy of Prince Souphanouvong, president of the Lao Patriotic Front. Since officially the Americans have no part in these contacts, the Laotians would seem to stand a good chance of reaching agreement on preliminary conditions for negotiating a peace in their country. That possibility arose anew on June 22, when Prince Souphanouvong, acting on behalf of the Patriotic Front, proposed a draft agreement on a ceasefire, including cessation of American air raids on Laotian territory. A week later the

head of the Vientiane government fought shy of accepting the proposals opening the way to termination of the war and restoration of peace in Laos. And immediately after this, the CIA sent its planes and mercenaries to the Valley of Jars.

When, on July 8, foreign correspondents in Vientiane requested the Laos Defence Ministry to explain the character of the hostilities in the Valley of Jars, General Knoksy replied:

"The government is not responsible for this operation ... you should ask the American Embassy, this is their affair."

The U.S. Embassy, however, promptly disavowed the Laotian General's statement and denied that it was involved in the attack on the Valley of Jars. The Washington diplomats were obviously resorting to one of their habitual lies, easily seen through by observers of the American aggression in Laos, where the U.S. Embassy works hand in glove with the CIA.

IN DEFIANCE OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

Vientiane is a small city so that the swarm of Americans in it is very conspicuous. A big section in the centre of the capital is occupied by the buildings of the American Embassy and the office of Washington's Agency for International Development. Next to the biggest cinema theatre, the Lanxang, is the office of the United States Information Agency (USIA). At the edge of the city, behind a wire enclosure, are rows of cottages for the American personnel. And at the airfield there is a mass of transport planes of various makes, all with "Air America" on their fuselage. None carry identification marks on their wings or tail.

Officially, Air America is a private company, owned by Pacific Corporation. The director of the latter, George Doole, usually parries questions about Air America's activities with a jest:

"I don't know all of our customers' private business and relations. So help me, that's a fact."

The Air America manager in Vientiane, James Cunningham, also evades giving a direct answer.

"We operate on a you-call, we-haul basis. We don't go into details."

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
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The Wild Blue Yonder Over Laos

This drawing and those on pages 32 and 33 were done by people from the Plain of Jars, Laos, depicting their life as it was during the bombing of their villages by American planes.

They are presently living in refugee camps around the capital city of Vientiane. The bombing continues.

A bomb hit the hole and people died inside it.
 —by a man, age unknown



Viet Combat Role Urged on JFK in '62

talions began training in May, 1961." Here were signs of danger.

Then Lemnitzer, if he followed the "talking paper" prepared for him, was to quote the President to himself:

"The President on 22 November 1961 authorized the Secretary of State to instruct the US Ambassador to Vietnam to inform President Diem that the U.S. Government was prepared to join the GVN (Government of South Vietnam) in a sharply increased effort to avoid a further deterioration of the situation in SVN (South Vietnam)." Next, were listed the military steps the President had approved less than two months earlier.

One chart showed "approved and funded construction projects" including improvements at airfields at Pleiku, Bienhoa and at Tan Son Nhut (Saigon). Here was the commitment thus far. But, the "talking paper" indicated, that was not enough.

Some of the projects listed, such as defoliation were characterized as having "all the earmarks of gimmicks that cannot and will not win the war in South Vietnam." The documents do not show that the President had yet committed himself to "win the war" but that was the clear premise. The "commitment of US units" in support of President Ngo Dinh Diem's forces in one form or another "should make it obvious to the Vietnamese and the rest of the world that the United States is committed to preventing Communist domination of South Vietnam and Southeast Asia."

Yet "all of the recent actions we have taken may still not be sufficient to stiffen the will of the government and the people of SVN sufficiently to resist Communist pressure and win the war without the US committing combat forces."

The documents available do not include any proposed moves Lemnitzer was to put to Mr. Kennedy. But a Na-

tional Security Action Memorandum of Jan. 18, nine days later, shows that the President was focusing not on sending in combat forces but on counterinsurgency.

He ordered establishment of "a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)" to "assure unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries." The new group was to be headed by Gen. Maxwell Taylor. An annex to the memorandum listed the "critical areas" assigned to it as Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand.

The same day Gen. Lemnitzer sent a memorandum to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, who had been dealing with insurgencies for years, stating that "now a strong case can be made for increased direct participation by US personnel in the planning and supervision of Vietnamese counterinsurgency operations. Inherent in such increased direct participation should be some assurance of US support for Diem personally."

Lemnitzer was responding to Lansdale's statement that Diem was worried about a coup against him and that this had made him reluctant to let his field commanders "implement the task force concept that was an important part of the over-all plan of operations against the Vietcong."

On Jan. 26, the State Department came up with some suggestions. Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson suggested to Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric that if the Vietnamese armed forces were to be increased at the time "we would envisage strategic plans made in Saigon giving priority to areas to be cleared and held and setting forth general methods to be used. We believe these should be accomplished by numerous small tactical actions planned and executed by American and spot to meet the local situation at the moment."

Johnson wrote that State felt "our training program for ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) be based primarily on the concept that the Vietnamese army will start winning on the day when it has obtained the confidence of the Vietnamese peasants. As a specific example I suggest that we immediately seek Vietnamese implementation of a policy of promptly giving a small reward in rice, salt or money (commodities in short supply) to every person who gives information to the army. Similarly, villages which show determination to resist the Vietcong should receive the promptest possible support."

The Joint Chiefs were concerned with the larger view. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara sent the President a memorandum that illuminated their frame of mind.

Entitled "The Strategic Importance of the Southeast Asia Mainland," the Jan. 13 paper was signed by Lemnitzer for all the chiefs. It began this way:

"1. The United States has clearly stated and demonstrated that one of its unalterable objectives is the prevention of South Vietnam falling to communist aggression and the subsequent loss of the remainder of the Southeast Asia mainland. The military objective, therefore, must be to take expeditiously all actions necessary to defeat communist aggression in South Vietnam. The immediate strategic importance of Southeast Asia lies in the political value that can accrue to the Free World through a successful stand in that area. Of equal importance is the psychological impact that a firm position by the United States will have on the countries of the world—both free and communist. On the negative side, a United States political and/or military withdrawal from the Southeast Asian area would have an adverse psychological impact of even greater proportion, and one from which re-

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GENERAL LEMNITZER

... a grim chart talk.

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

The year 1962 opened for President Kennedy with the grim word that he had not done enough to save South Vietnam.

According to documents from the Pentagon study available to The Washington Post, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had prepared one of those Pentagon flip-chart talks for Mr. Kennedy. Although there is no direct evidence, it seems a reasonable assumption that the talk was delivered. In any case, it is likely that the dreary word reached the President.

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, then the JCS chairman, was prepared to discuss China's problems (things must be bad because wheat had been purchased from Canada and Australia), the setup of the 16,500-man Vietcong military establishment and the belief that North Vietnam then was running a training center near the city of Vinh "where pro-Vietcong South Vietnamese receive an 18-month military course interspersed with intensive Communist political indoctrination."

"Two 600-man battalions already have completed training," said Lemnitzer, "talking paper" for the Jan. 9 meeting with the President, "and another two bat-

continued

REPORTS & COMMENT

LAOS

The springtime in Laos is very dry. Save for the brief Mango rains, the heat is unrelieved, and shriveled green leaves lie like dead frogs in the dusty roads. The sun is dull red in the smoke and haze, for in the springtime the hill people slash and burn the brush off the hillsides. The pilots say that the haze stretches all across the northern marches of Southeast Asia from North Vietnam across to Burma. The Air America helicopters must pick their way carefully among the fantastic limestone outcroppings that rise like castles from the wooded hills tumbling out of China. One realizes that the misty mountains of the classical Chinese landscape paintings were not the product of artistic imaginations, but faithful reproductions of nature.

Here in these hills, fifty miles northeast of Vientiane, there is an airstrip known to the pilots as site 272. It is the center for American refugee relief in Northern Laos and the fall-back point for Long Cheng, the secret CIA base twenty-five miles to the north. Long Cheng is the headquarters for the Meo General Vang Pao's "Armée Clandestine," supported by the CIA. All this past winter and spring the base has been under siege by the North Vietnamese. The hill peoples, the highland Lao and the Meo dependents of Vang Pao's army, have been fleeing south by the thousands, pouring into the hills and valleys near site 272. They make temporary bamboo shelters, and Air America drops rice to

them, for they have no food. There is the despair of uncertainty. No one can tell them what their future will be. Like Laos itself, they have long since lost control of their own destiny.

In one such makeshift settlement the village chief greets visitors with a gold-toothed smile. There are over nine hundred people in his immediate area—four hundred of them are children. One night, the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese had come to his village. The soldiers in a nearby government outpost had detected no enemies in the area: "So we went to bed happy," the village chief said.

"But at four o'clock in the morning we were attacked. Before we knew it, they were in the village shooting and the houses were burning." Squatting down on his haunches, the village chief described with his hands in the dirt how the enemy had come and the attack on the outpost—the short, sharp explosions, the flames, the rifle fire, the measured hammering of the fifty-calibers, and then silence. Death had come in the classic Indochina way: a small, isolated outpost overrun in the night. It was a scene that has been played a thousand times in the last twenty-five years of war.

The villagers escaped into the surrounding woods, and for two days they marched over some of the most impenetrable and inhospitable country on earth. "We were so sorry to leave everything behind," the chief said, "and the march was very difficult. We walked two days, and the people cried and cried over the mountains. Two people died; one

was an old person and the other was a child." There was talk that the men might be conscripted into Vang Pao's army, but the chief did not know for sure, and he did not know what would happen to his people. "I am afraid," he said.

"For what?"

At site 272 the Air America planes continue taking off and landing in a roar of red dust, bringing rice, pigs, and ducks to the refugees. But one senses the end of a decade of American policy in Laos. Ten years ago, when the Americans first began to train and equip the Meo tribesmen, Vang Pao's guerrillas operated all over Northeastern Laos—far behind enemy lines to the borders of North Vietnam itself. Fewer than two dozen American servicemen have been killed in these mountains. Asians fight Asians. But ten years of costly, vainglorious offensives and unremitting pressure from North Vietnamese counteroffensives have pushed the Meo beyond their endurance. Vang Pao's losses in the last three years have been so heavy that the Armée Clandestine is no longer an exclusively Meo force. Almost half their numbers are now made up of other highland peoples. And in the last three or four years, the Meo have been organized to fight in battalion-sized units of over five hundred men instead of small guerrilla units. As a result, the slaughter has been magnified. Vang Pao's army can no longer hold Long Cheng alone, and by early April it was reliably reported by Lao and American sources that no fewer

CONFIDENTIAL**THE ASIA LETTER**

AN AUTHORITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by THE ASIA LETTER Co. Tokyo Hong Kong Washington Los Angeles

No STATINTL

29 June 1971

STATINTL

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (II): No intelligence operation in Asia is as well-heeled as that of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.).

The annual working budget of the C.I.A. runs over US\$600 million.

That's just a starter.

The agency spends far more than that in Asia alone if you count the cost of some of the "borrowed" services from other U.S. Government agencies. For instance:

---U.S. Air Force planes are used to monitor foreign nuclear tests and collect air samples. The agency, while having its own cryptographers, draws on the Army's corps of 100,000 code specialists and eavesdroppers to tap Asian communications.

---C.I.A. specialists often operate off U.S. Navy ships in the Pacific, usually involved in electronic surveillance.

---The agency also is privy to information from the Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) which has a substantial operation of its own in Asia.

The D.I.A. spends from its own budget more than US\$1 billion a year flying reconnaissance planes and keeping satellites aloft.

Those satellites allow C.I.A. analysts to know more---from photographs taken 130 miles up---about China's topography than do the Chinese themselves.

---The U.S. State Department's intelligence section also feeds a considerable amount of confidential data it collects through its embassies, consulates and travelling diplomats to the C.I.A. This includes information gathered by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) the Justice Department and the U.S. Treasury (Secret Service) often attached to diplomatic missions abroad.

The C.I.A. also works closely with the intelligence services and police forces of the countries considered America's allies in Asia, exchanging information with them.

Where does all the C.I.A. money go?

It funnels out in myriad directions: To pay for the agency's overt intelligence gathering activities, to finance "dirty tricks" and other clandestine capers, to prop up ousted or failing politicians and to pay for "disinformation" and other psychological warfare ploys.

Despite the C.I.A.'s oft-deserved sinister image, a good deal of its funds are expended on open intelligence gathering operations.

These go for subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals and other publications and salaries for those who must scan them for intelligence tidbits.

It is estimated that more than 50% of the C.I.A.'s world-wide intelligence input comes from such overt sources. (An estimated 35% comes from electronic spying and less than 15% from JAMES BOND-type, cloak-and-dagger operations.)

An exception is Asia.

A greater amount of the C.I.A. funds expended in Asia go into covert activities.

-2-

C.I.A. "bagmen" ride regular circuits in Asia making monthly payoffs to informers, subsidizing "friendly" politicians or now-outsted political leaders who once served U.S. interests, or dropping off funds to underwrite businesses used as covers for agents.

In Indo-China, some of these "bagmen" move around with hardly any attempt to hide what they are up to. In places like Djakarta or Hong Kong or Tokyo, more sophistication is attached to the game.

C.I.A. funding activities in Asia cover a wide and varied scope.

Despite a pledge by President Nixon to remove the C.I.A. from such activities, it is still engaged in supporting foundations, institutes and other ostensible research organizations and study groups.

Quite a few Asian students are enjoying educational opportunities as a result of C.I.A.-supplied "scholarships", sometimes without the students' knowing where the money originates.

It's no secret that more than a few of those young American Ph.D. candidates doing sociological studies in the jungles of the southern Philippines or the highlands of Malaysia are full-time agents.

Another activity falls under the category of "disinformation" or counter-intelligence and ranges from the spreading of rumors to the under-writing of publications in local languages, both aimed at swaying opinion in a certain direction.

That grey-haired Thai scholar ensconced in a small but comfortable Bangkok house writing a book on the historical reasons why Thais should stand firmly against Communism might well have more than a publisher bank-rolling his effort. ✓

Gathering documents, political and otherwise, also accounts for some of the C.I.A.'s large expenditures in Asia.

More than a few Canton-Macso ferry crew members pocketed healthy sums during the Cultural Revolution by selling Red Guard and other documents to C.I.A. agents. ✓

And then there are the covert and quasi-covert, military or para-military operations financed by the C.I.A., including the 25,000-man force in Laos--- once known as the "opium army"---commanded by Meo tribesman Gen. VANG PAO and advised by 150-175 C.I.A. men, and the continuing C.I.A. supply of arms and ammunition to Tibetan rebels who make periodic raids on Chinese Communist troops in Tibet. ✓

As is the usual practice, funds come by circuitous routes.

Nearly half of all American aid earmarked for war refugees in Laos is in fact C.I.A. funds being supplied to the Vang Pao forces.

And then there's that shadowy airline known as Air America, which someone once described as the world's "most shot at airline" and which is partially funded by C.I.A. money.

With millions of dollars to work with, the C.I.A.'s hand is felt in many places and many ways.

Next: The C.I.A. In Asia (III)---Modus Operandi.

BIRTHDAY GREETINGS TO:

(1) The Communist Party of China (50 on July 1), the largest political party in the world.

(2) Ourselves, THE ASIA LETTER, (7 this week), the best and most informative publication specializing in Asian affairs.

DESPITE THE PURGES during the past few years, the Chinese Communist Party still is by far the world's largest political party.

As the Party celebrates the 50th anniversary of its 1 July 1921 founding, however, it is still in considerable disarray as a result of the virtual destruction of the Party organization during the Cultural Revolution.

GOLDSBORO, N.C.
NEWS-ARGUS

JUN 29 1971
E - 16,034
S - 16,322

Price Was Too High

Whether the Pentagon papers contain anything that might jeopardize national security remains a topic of international debate.

But there can be little debate over the impropriety of a story printed Sunday by the Philadelphia Bulletin and the Seattle Times.

The newspapers reported that the Central Intelligence Agency is sending Laotian hill tribesmen on spying missions from Laos into Communist China.

Their purpose is to obtain in-

formation as to troop movements and political developments.

Publication of a story informing an avowed enemy of this country of such activity, it seems to us, is a reckless form of irresponsible journalism.

It could jeopardize the acquisition of intelligence information necessary to competent planning. It could jeopardize the lives of intelligence agents.

If the two newspapers regard this as some colossal "scoop", it wasn't big enough to justify the potential cost.

NEW BRUNSWICK, N. J.
HOME NEWS

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000

JUN 29 1972

E - 50,927

S - 52,421



What Congress Can Do

By SEN. CLIFFORD P. CASE

Much has been said lately about the effort of Congress to reassert and redefine its authority in the field of foreign policy.

I am much interested in this, not as an exercise in congressional self-aggrandizement, but as a means of forcing our government to conduct foreign policy in the open so that the public may know what is going on and have the controlling voice in important decisions.

Our recent history in Southeast Asia shows that wars approved by simply a handful of presidential advisers may well be not only unconstitutional but relatively unsuccessful, too.

Shocked

Like most Americans, I have been shocked by the cynical manipulation of our political processes revealed in The New York Times series on the beginnings of the Vietnam war. I believe that our country should

not go to war as a part of a carefully plotted scenario which involves secret attacks on the other side -- some apparently with the aim of provoking retaliation against us and our allies.

But I do not want to get into an extended post mortem on Vietnam. Our primary task should not be to engage in re-cremations or assign blame, but to bring an end to the war. That is why last year, and this year, I voted for the Hatfield-McGovern proposal to set a definite date for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

The term "secret war" has now come into our national vocabulary. We started off in Vietnam operating in secret, and we are currently fighting a war in Laos in the same way. We are spending annually about \$350 million on the ground in Laos, not to mention an estimated \$2 billion to bomb that country of less than 3 million people. All this is done without any real Congressional or public knowledge or approval.

Successive administrations have been able to carry on the secret war in Laos, as they did earlier in Vietnam by use of that vast billion dollar treasure chest which Congress has appropriated, but never controlled, for discretionary intelligence and military programs. And it has been the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which has been assigned to carry out the administrations' policies such as the running of a 30,000 man private army and the funding of Thai troops in Laos.

I do not direct criticism against the CIA, for it has only been following orders issued by several Presidents. I simply question whether a secret intelligence organization should be assigned a war-making role abroad.

Three Proposals

This is why I have recently proposed three bills which would increase Congressional control over certain CIA programs. These are:

1. A bill to extend all existing limitations on Defense Department funding such as the prohibitions against payment of mercenaries in Laos and the Cooper - Church provisos for Cambodia to all U.S. government agencies overseas, including CIA.

2. A bill to prohibit the funding of any U.S. government agency of foreign mercenaries operating outside their countries without specific Congressional authorization. I would hope this would eliminate the confusing trail of Thais in Laos, Cambodians in Laos, and even Thais in Cambodia.

3. A bill to extend existing limitations on the use of military surplus material to all government agencies abroad, including CIA.

My three proposals would close some loopholes in the law. But the Executive can find ways to skirt almost any prohibition, if it is so inclined. The solution to the problem lies, in the long run, not in a tighter drafting of the law but in the acceptance by the Executive of Congress and the public as partners in the conduct of the peoples' vital business.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0



STATINTL

CIA Is Reported Sending Laotians To Spy In China

Philadelphia, June 27 (AP)—The Philadelphia *Sunday Bulletin* has quoted "qualified sources" as saying the Central Intelligence Agency has been sending reconnaissance teams from Laos into China to obtain information on troop movements, political developments and other data.

"Those forays," the *Bulletin* said in a copyright story, "involve sending reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as much as several hundred miles into southern China's Yunnan province."

The newspaper said the sources reported that United States officials in Vientiane, Laos, discounted any potential threat to slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking.

The members of the intelligence teams, the *Bulletin* said, are native hill tribesmen of the same ethnic stock prevalent in southern China.

"They have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, political developments and other data."

Officials at CIA headquarters in McLean, Va., declined any comment on the story, as did American Embassy officials in Vientiane, the newspaper reported.

The *Bulletin* said its sources reported U.S. authorities believe local security needs and the intelligence value of such operations justify their continuation.

Pentagon Papers: The Secret War

Sec

To see the conflict and our part in it as a tragedy without villains, war crimes without criminals, lies without liars, espouses and promulgates a view of process, roles and motives that is not only grossly mistaken but which underwrites deceptions that have served a succession of Presidents.

—Daniel Ellsberg

THE issues were momentous, the situation unprecedented. The most massive leak of secret documents in U.S. history had suddenly exposed the sensitive inner processes whereby the Johnson Administration had abruptly escalated the nation's most unpopular—and unsuccessful—war. The Nixon Government, battling stubbornly to withdraw from that war at its own deliberate pace, took the historic step of seeking to suppress articles before publication, and threatened criminal action against

that the Government was fighting so fiercely to protect. Those records afforded a rare insight into how high officials make decisions affecting the lives of millions as well as the fate of nations. The view, however constricted or incomplete, was deeply disconcerting. The records revealed a dismaying degree of miscalculation, bureaucratic arrogance and deception. The revelations severely damaged the reputations of some officials, enhanced those of a few, and so angered Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield—a long-patient Democrat whose own party was hurt most—that he promised to conduct a Senate investigation of Government decision making.

The sensational affair began quietly with the dull thud of the 486-page Sunday New York *Times* arriving on doorsteps and in newsrooms. A dry Page One headline—VIETNAM ARCHIVE: PEN-

John Mitchell charged that the *Times's* disclosures would cause "irreparable injury to the defense of the United States" and obtained a temporary restraining order to stop the series after three installments, worldwide attention was inevitably assured.

A Study Ignored

The *Times* had obviously turned up a big story (see PRESS). Daniel Ellsberg, a former Pentagon analyst and superhawk-turned-superdove, apparently had felt so concerned about his involvement in the Viet Nam tragedy that he had somehow conveyed about 40 volumes of an extraordinary Pentagon history of the war to the newspaper. Included were 4,000 pages of documents, 3,000 pages of analysis and 2.5 million words—all classified as secret, top secret or top secret-sensitive.

The study was begun in 1967 by Sec-



JULY 1965: JOHNSON DISCUSSING VIET NAM POLICY BEFORE TELEVISION SPEECH

Always the secret option, another notch, but never victory.

the nation's most eminent newspaper.

The dramatic collision between the Nixon Administration and first the New York *Times*, then the Washington *Post*, raised in a new and spectacular form the unresolved constitutional questions about the Government's right to keep its planning papers secret and the conflicting right of a free press to inform the public. The constitutional question (see story page 17). Yet, even more fundamental, the legal battle focused national attention on the records

TAGON STUDY TRACES 3 DECADES OF GROWING U.S. INVOLVEMENT—was followed by six pages of deliberately low-key prose and column after gray column of official cables, memorandums and position papers. The mass of material seemed to repel readers and even other newsmen. Nearly a day went by before the networks and wire services took note. The first official action was to refrain from comment so as not to give the series any greater "exposure." But when Attorney General

retary of Defense Robert McNamara, who had become disillusioned by the futility of the war and wanted future historians to be able to determine what had gone wrong. For more than a year, 35 researchers, including Ellsberg, Rand Corporation experts, civilians and uniformed Pentagon personnel, worked out of an office adjoining McNamara's. With their help, they were able to obtain Pentagon documents dating back to arguments within the Truman Administration on whether the U.S. should help

WALL STREET JOURNAL

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28 JUN 1971

World-Wide

CIA reconnaissance teams from Laos have been sent into Communist China to obtain information on troop movements, political developments and other data, the Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin said. The intelligence team members are native tribesmen of the same ethnic stock as is prevalent in southern China, the paper said, quoting "qualified sources." The sources said U.S. officials in Vientiane, Laos, discounted any potential threat the operations pose to slowly improving U.S.-China relations. CIA officials declined any comment.

28 JUN 1971

STATINTL

CIA Reported Sending Spies Into China

Associated Press

The Central Intelligence Agency has been sending Laotian hill tribesmen on spying missions from Laos into Communist China to obtain information on troop movements and political developments, according to a report published by the Philadelphia Bulletin and the Seattle Times.

"Those forays involve sending reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as much as several hundred miles into Southern China's Yunnan Province," said a copyright story written by Arnold Abrams, published by the two newspapers yesterday.

The dispatch, as published in The Bulletin, said unaffiliated sources reported that U.S. offi-

cial in Laos discounted any potential threat the operations may pose to slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking.

"They believe this threat is small, according to reliable sources, because the operations are not commando raids or sabotage efforts and Americans do not participate in them," the Bulletin said.

Native hill tribesmen are of the same ethnic stock as found in southern China. "They have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, political developments and other data," the Bulletin said.

Abrams said his sources claim

such intelligence missions have long been known to Chinese authorities and that several teams have been captured in recent years.


"Consequently, American officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate these terri-

torail incursions as long as they are conducted solely to gather intelligence."

Officials at CIA headquarters in McLean, Va., declined any comment on the story, as did American Embassy officials in Vientiane, the Bulletin said.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN

E - 640,783
S - 681,831
JUN 27 1971



these operations. Qualified sources report, however, that U. S. authorities believe local security needs and the intelligence value of such operations justify their continuation.

Moreover, U. S. authorities largely discount any potential threat the operations pose to slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking.

They believe this threat is small, according to reliable sources, because the operations are not commando raids or sabotage efforts and Americans do not participate directly in them.

Sources note, in addition, that such intelligence missions have long been known to Chinese authorities; several teams have been captured in recent years.

Consequently, American officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate these territorial incursions as long as they are conducted solely to further intelligence.

Worse Threats Elsewhere

U. S. authorities also believe that, if the Chinese want an excuse to reverse the friendly trend of their ping-pong diplomacy, they can do better than focusing on these operations.

"We're still fighting in Vietnam, we have a military presence on Taiwan, and we are standing by our treaty commitments to Chiang Kai-shek," observes one source close to U. S. policy-making levels. "If the Chinese are looking for something to whip us with, any one of those three will do."

In Laos, American officials' major security concern about the Chinese stems from a Peking road-building project in the north. An estimated 14,000 Chinese, including several thousand soldiers, are constructing a road network leading toward the Thai border.

Thais Disturbed

Thai authorities repeatedly have expressed deep concern

about the road's potential as a supply route for Communist-led guerrilla forces in northern Thailand.

American officials privately voice similar concern. While conceding that Chinese forces in Laos have not been acting hostile, they insist the project must be kept under scrutiny.

Peking's construction project originally was requested by the tripartite government established in Laos with the signing of the 1962 Geneva Accord. While technically still existent, the coalition was abandoned in 1963 by Communist Pathet Lao representatives.

Ironically, while American officials privately fret about Chinese intentions in Laos, Peking's pingpong diplomacy has prompted positive reaction from the leader of this nation's neutralist government.

In an interview, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma stressed China's historically nonaggressive attitude toward Laos.

Prince Souvanna noted that the unhappy history of this landlocked kingdom includes invasions by neighboring Thais, Cambodians, Burmese and Vietnamese -- but not by the Chinese.

Reds Aware

CIA Sends Spies Deep Into China From Laos

By ARNOLD ABRAMS

Special to The Bulletin

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Vientiane, Laos--Intelligence operations that penetrate deep into China have been directed from here for years by the Central Intelligence Agency and are continuing.

These forays involve sending reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as much as several hundred miles into Southern China's Yunnan Province.


The team members are native hill tribesmen of the same

ethnic stock prevalent in southern China. They have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, political developments, and other data.

U. S. Won't Talk

[A Bulletin inquiry at the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in McLean, Va., brought this response: "The CIA never comments about news stories concerning its operations."]

American embassy officials in Vientiane refuse to discuss



Newsday Map by Phillip Dionisio

Chinese Communists are building a road network, indicated by the dotted line, in northern Laos toward Thailand. At the same time, intelligence teams trained and financed by the CIA are entering Yunnan Province in China.

Report From Laos: China Watch

By Arnold Abrams
Newsday Special Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—The recent thaw in Sino-American relations has not halted U.S.-directed intelligence operations that penetrate deep into Communist Chinese territory.

Those operations, which have been conducted for years here by the Central Intelligence Agency, send reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as far as several hundred miles into southern China's Yunnan Province.

The agents are native hill tribesmen of the same ethnic stock prevalent in southern China. They have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, political developments and other pertinent security matters.

American embassy officials in Vientiane refuse to discuss the intelligence operations. Qualified sources report, however, that U.S. authorities believe that local security needs and the intelligence value of such operations justify

authorities largely discount any potential threat that the operations may pose to the slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking.

American officials believe that any such threat is small, according to reliable sources, because the operations are not commando raids or sabotage efforts, and Americans do not participate directly in them. The missions supplement activities of the Laotian government's so-called secret army, which has been covertly directed and supported by the CIA for the past decade.

Informed sources add, moreover, that the intelligence missions have long been known to Chinese authorities; several teams have been captured in recent years. Consequently, American officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate the territorial incursions as long as they are conducted solely to gather information and do not pose a direct security threat.

U.S. authorities also believe that if the Chinese want an excuse to reverse the friendly trend of their Ping Pong diplomacy, they can do better than focusing on the operations. We're still fighting in Viet-

E - 35,280
S - 35,969

JUN 25 1971

Have CIA buy up the opium



By JACK BELL
Gannett News Service

WASHINGTON — President Nixon is making a tragic mistake in his assessment that the use of drugs by U.S. servicemen in Vietnam is "by no means a major part of the American narcotics problem", as he said in his drug abuse control message to Congress.

The accelerated movement of the bored or scared "grunts" into the legion of those who smoke or snort heroin strikes at the heart of the narcotics cancer of the future, if not of the present.

What happens to those young men when they come home hooked with a habit they can stand off for \$5 a day in Saigon, where the dope is pure and cheap? They will find the price of their habit has gone up to \$100 a day in the United States, where the drug is so cut that to get any charge from it they will have to pump it directly into their blood.

CHAIRMAN Vance Hartke, D-Ind., of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, estimates there are more than 375,000 men

returned from Vietnam now looking for jobs. Almost none of them — and those who are joining them weekly — are likely to latch on to any payroll check that would support an addict's habit. The addict will turn naturally to crime.

Nobody really knows how many unformed young Americans in Southeast Asia are mortgaging their future lives by using dangerous drugs. Only recently and belatedly has officialdom become grudgingly alarmed at the spread of this menace.

Rep. Seymour Halpern, R-N.Y., who bought heroin easily on the streets of Saigon to demonstrate its availability, estimates there are 60,000 users of the drug in uniform. This works out close to one quarter of the U.S. troops in the war zone.

Reps. Morgan F. Murphy, D-Ill., and Robert H. Steele, R-Conn., who made their own investigation in Vietnam, think 30,000 to 40,000 have a serious heroin habit.

NIXON'S new program is aimed primarily at reducing the number of GI addicts who will come home untreated and at providing followup treatment for them. Urine tests will be given all returning veterans. Detected addicts will be put through a seven-day course of detoxification in Vietnam, followed by three weeks of treatment at home.

This is all very well as far as it goes. But it does nothing for the thousands of addicts who still have time to serve in Vietnam. Steele's suggestion that all U.S. servicemen be tested at least once a month ought to be followed.

Nixon has promised to attack the narcotics supply on an international plane. He is having some success in Turkey, where the government is struggling to control the growing of opium poppies. Smuggled opium from Turkey is said to be the source of three-fourths of the heroin entering this country.

THIS progress in Europe, however, has not been matched in Asia. There, the friendly countries of Burma, Laos and Thailand produce about 700 tons of opium annually, about half of the world's illicit output.

Production of the raw drug and its refining is carried on in the "Golden Triangle" border area that feeds heroin into South Vietnam. There it is sold on the streets — often by children — to American servicemen. The Nixon administration has put the screws on Saigon's President Nguyen Van Thieu to crack down on the traffic. But this fails to get at the supply.

Discussions with the governments of Burma, Laos and Thailand are not going to get very far. Unfortunately, these governments have very little clout in the Mekong River tri-border area, where irregular "armies" and Chinese buy the opium crops, run the refineries and transport heroin.

Crop

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, under fire for its paramilitary activities in Laos, knows about these operations. What would be wrong if it were commissioned to buy up the opium harvest of the area at premium prices? Opium has legitimate medical uses and the project would not be a total loss.

This would be no more costly nor fantastic in its concept than the CIA's equipping, training and transporting troops that won one revolution (Guatemala) and lost another (Cuba). And if it could be carried out, it might salvage a great many twisted lives among the Americans who remain in South Vietnam.

The News Business

Few "Revelations" for Those Who Had Been Listening

By Richard Harwood

THE continuing storm over publication of secret Pentagon papers contains lessons for all of us in the news business and for the country and the government as well.

The newspapers are learning from this episode and from the national loss of memory that has occurred since 1964 that their impact on public opinion in the United States is tragically limited. The substance and in some cases the precise details of virtually everything The Washington Post and The New York Times have printed from the Pentagon papers is ancient history. It was nearly all published while it was happening. And it was largely a futile enterprise; neither the public nor the congressional politicians were listening.

The government is learning something, too. It is learning that policy is poorly communicated and public opinion is poorly shaped by proxy. All through the early 1960s, government officials were anonymously "leaking" their fears and "options" for Vietnam through the press as a substitute for public candor and direct communication with the people. This produced considerable support for the government's zig-zag policies by most of the major newspapers, including The Post and The Times. But newspaper editorials are not necessarily the voice of the people, and newspapers, as is now evident, are inadequate instruments for public education.

What the public and politicians could learn from this experience is that if they sit there asleep in the back row while their destinies are being debated, they are in a poor position when the slumber ends to cry foul and search for scapegoats.

THE FACTS of this particular case are that The Post and The Times and other large news organizations published thousands of stories, editorials and essays in 1964 describing the deteriorating military and political situation in Vietnam—just as it was described in the official memoranda and cables in the Pentagon papers. The various options and contingency plans being put before the President at that time were reported repeatedly and accurately—as they are now reported in the official papers.

The growing combat role of American forces was laid out in impressive detail on front pages all over the country—the first uses of napalm against suspected enemy villages, the commitment of U.S. helicopters and crewmen to the battlefields, the reconnaissance, bombing and strafing missions of U.S. aircraft in South Vietnam and Laos, the U.S. role in the training and transport of South Vietnamese raiding parties into North Vietnam, the participation of U.S. advisers and Special Forces teams in major battles, the use of U.S. troops in perimeter defense at military bases. The circumstances of the Tonkin Gulf incident, the first of a series of prior raids by South Vietnamese forces against North Vietnamese territory, were

reported accurately at the time. The possibilities of U.S. air raids on North Vietnam were reported and discussed in the press repeatedly far in advance of the event. U.S. casualty lists and the new funerals at Arlington National Cemetery received increasing prominence in the news as the war revved up in 1964.

"Today," one of our correspondents wrote in February, 1964, "there are 15,500 military personnel in South Vietnam; some 275 Americans have died, about 100 of them in combat, but there has been no outcry whatsoever at home for pulling out our troops. This attitude, one hopes, is an expression of maturing American opinion, of a willingness to face up to wars that are neither 'won' nor 'lost'; to accept the fact that the Korean War was the first of what probably will be a host of 'mean, frustrating and nerve-racking wars,' the term Secretary of State Dean Rusk applied last April to the struggle in South Vietnam."

FOLLOWING the Gulf of Tonkin incidents The Times editorialized: "United States determination to assure the independence of South Vietnam, if ever doubted before, cannot be doubted now by the Communists to the north or their allies."

A few days later The Times said: "The Americans went into Vietnam in 1954 to fill the vacuum left by the French and to contain the advance of communism in that part of Southeast Asia. The motives are exemplary and every American can be proud of them, but the crucial questions are: Can it be done? . . . Is this war necessary?"

These readings of "mature" and "united" American opinion toward the war were probably wrong. What the evidence from that time suggests is that despite the pre-occupation of the newspapers and of the government with Vietnam, the public was both ill-informed and not greatly interested. The Gallup Poll in May, 1964, reported that 63 per cent of the American people had no opinion about the war or how it was going or what the United States should do. The reason for that, Gallup explained, was that this 63 per cent were paying no attention to developments in Southeast Asia; neither the newspapers nor the government had gotten their attention. Six months later, when the war fever in Washington and in the press was rising, the Council on Foreign Relations reported the results of another poll. One in four adult Americans, the council found, was not even aware that a war was going on in Southeast Asia.

What had they been told by the press? If had been told in February that Secretary Rusk was saying that retaliation against

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CIA Slipping Spy Teams Into China

By Michael Merrow

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VIENTIANE, Laos — U.S. intelligence operations include the sending of armed Laotian reconnaissance teams into China from northern Laos. Teams are reported to have gone as far as 200 miles into China, dispatched from a secret CIA outpost 15 minutes' flying time north of the Laotian opium center of Houei Sai.

According to sources close to the Central Intelligence Agency, and confirmed by Western diplomatic sources in Vientiane, the CIA is sending out hill tribesmen armed with American weapons, a three-pound radio with a range of 400 miles and equipment to tap Chinese telegraph lines, watch roads and do other types of intelligence gathering.

"There is always a team in China," according to sources close to the CIA.

Staging area for the operation is a small, Luntain-valley airstrip called Nam Lieu (also known as Nam Yu). The strip, which one Air America pilot describes as "difficult as hell to get into," is surrounded by mountains. It is serviced by both Air America and Continental Air Service and is also a way-station for opium traders from northern Laos and Burma enroute to drug factories at Houei Sai.

DURING 1968, five Chinese functionaries caught up in the purges of the cultural revolution defected to a Nam Lieu reconnaissance team. They were treated well by the Americans for a time but eventually were turned over to the Royal Laotian government.

According to sources close to the CIA, the five were thrown into a 12 by 12 by 12 foot pit exposed to the elements. They were eventually executed.

Like most CIA operations in Laos, the one out of Nam Lieu is directed from a headquarters at Udorn Air Base in northeastern Thailand. There are several Americans at Nam Lieu, however, including CIA and military intelligence personnel. Source close to the CIA report the number has increased recently from 4 to more than 10.

In addition to activities inside China, the Nam Lieu Americans also help direct a joint operation of "SGU" (Special Guerrilla Units) and the Thai army at Xieng Lom south of Houei Sai on the Lao-Thai border. They also run intelligence gathering missions, on a road being built by the Chinese government (under an agreement reached with the now defunct coalition government of Laos) in the same vicinity.

UNTIL MID-SEPTEMBER of last year, the Nam Lieu operation was headed by a tough-and-tumble veteran guerrilla organizer named Anthony (Tony) Poe. Poe is a legendary figure in Laos known best for his dislike of journalists, disregard for orders and radio codes, capacity for Lao whisky and expertise at clandestine guerrilla operations.

Poe was removed almost immediately after an article last September by Dispatch News Service International on the Nam Lieu operations, ostensibly because the article "blew his cover." According to sources close to the CIA, however, this rea-

son was an excuse used by the American Embassy here to get rid of Poe, whose dashing style has been a source of long-term friction with members of the American Mission in Laos, including Ambassador McMurtrie Godley.

As for the missions into China, however, sources close to the CIA and Western diplomatic sources both report that to their knowledge they continue.

Since leaving Nam Lieu Poe has spent most of his time at Udorn Air Base, although one source reports Poe continues to do "odd jobs" on the Thai-Cambodian border. Those who know him say he is unhappy away from Nam Lieu.

POE IS AN ex-Marine noncommissioned officer, wounded at Iwo Jima, who remained in Asia after World War II. In the 1950s he helped organize CIA-trained Tibetan insurgents, escorting them to Colorado for training and going back with them into Tibet.

Later he worked in the Thai-Cambodian border area with the Khmer Serai, anti-Sihanouk guerrillas receiving assistance from the CIA, and other parts of Thailand. He has been in and out of Laos since before the Geneva accords of 1962 and was one of the first Americans involved in arming and training paramilitary groups in Laos.

Poe is considered stubborn and brusque, sometimes going into fits of anger over the radio, his life-line with the outside world. He is said to prefer working with hill tribes to working with Americans and looks down on most American operations because of their heavy reliance on American personnel.

He has been wounded at least once during his career in Laos and reportedly a price has been put on his head by the Pathet Lao. He is perhaps the only American legally married to a woman of the hill tribes.

L.A. Times/Washington Post Service

initiated to solve problems of intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties and the civil liabilities for oil pollution damage. International conventions on those subjects are now before the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

However, previous efforts have concentrated on action after the pollution casualty has occurred. What is needed now is action to prevent casualties. And that is what Senator Magnuson's bill is designed to accomplish. It is a tough bill, that goes to the root of the problems—construction, maintenance, and operation of tankers and other vessels carrying certain liquid cargoes in bulk, and regulation of the movement of all vessels and placement of structures in navigable waters of the United States. These are essential actions that we must take, particularly in the face of the rapidly increasing amount of ocean transport of liquid cargoes in bulk.

At the same time, it is important that other countries join us in applying equally stringent regulations on construction, maintenance, and operation of vessels, and on their movement in international commerce. The problems are of international magnitude. And while strong domestic legislation such as the Magnuson bill will contribute enormously to their solution, the problems cannot be solved unilaterally by the United States. International agreement is essential, and I urge that immediate steps be taken by the United States to strengthen our efforts to reach agreement in IMCO on these important problems. And to strengthen our international negotiations, I urge passage of the Magnuson bill and swift establishment of its enforcement, particularly in those areas—such as vessel traffic control systems—where we are lagging behind other countries.

INCREASED CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER CIA

Mr. CASE, Mr. President, much has been said lately about the efforts of Congress to reassert and redefine its authority in the field of foreign policy. For myself, I am scarcely at all interested in this as an exercise in congressional self-aggrandizement. I am very much interested in it as a means of forcing our Government to conduct foreign policy in the open so that the public may know what is going on and have the controlling voice in important decisions.

In a moment I shall mention briefly several measures I shall soon be proposing to allow Congress to exercise increased control over certain Central Intelligence Agency—CIA—and Defense Department programs.

My purpose is to place some outside control on what has been the freewheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars.

To be perfectly honest, our system has gotten out of whack, and it is time to restore a better balance.

The Constitution does not give the President authority to declare a secret war, and I do not accept that there are any precedents in our history which would permit

Moreover, our recent history in Southeast Asia shows that wars approved by simply a handful of Presidential advisers may well be not only unconstitutional, but relatively unsuccessful, too.

Like most Americans, I was shocked by the cynical manipulation of our political processes revealed in the New York Times' account of the McNamara study on the origins of the Vietnam war. I believe that our country should not go to war as part of a carefully plotted scenario which involves secret attacks on the other side—some apparently with the aim of provoking retaliation against us and our allies. This approach has no place in our open society.

I do not want to get into an extended postmortem on Vietnam, however. Our primary task should not be to engage in recriminations or assign blame, but to bring the war to an end. That is why, last year and earlier this week, I voted for the Hatfield-McGovern proposal to set a definite date for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

The Vietnam war, at least during the last several years, has been waged essentially in the open. The same cannot be said for the war in neighboring Laos. A top American diplomat was quoted recently by the Washington Star saying:

What we are doing here in Laos is totally inconsistent with our kind of society. We are fighting a war by covert means and an open society cannot tolerate that.

I agree with this diplomat's appraisal and consequently I have done everything I can to bring the facts on the war in Laos before the American public.

For example, I stated several weeks ago that there apparently was an agreement between the U.S. and Thai Governments for the financing and support through CIA of thousands of Thai troops in Laos. Only when the administration became aware of my speech did the Senate receive any kind of explanation of what was going on. And the explanation was incomplete and partially inaccurate despite its secret classification which prevented it from being made known to the public.

Even today, the Government tries to maintain a thick veil of secrecy over some of its programs in Laos. Every so often news trickles out in dribbles as an energetic newspaperman digs out a story or a government official leaks out a revelation.

But essentially, we are only told things after they have somehow gotten into the public realm, despite the \$350-odd million in taxpayers' funds which are being spent annually in Laos, to say nothing of the estimated \$2 billion annual cost of U.S. air activity over Laos.

Successive administrations have been able to carry on the secret war in Laos, as they did earlier in Vietnam, by use of that vast billion dollar treasure chest which Congress has appropriated, but never controlled, for discretionary intelligence and military programs. And the U.S. Government agency assigned to carrying out the administrations' policies such as the running of the 30,000 man Secret Army—Armée Clandestine—and the funding of Thai troops has usually been the CIA.

I do not direct criticism against the

issued by several Presidents. I simply question whether a secret intelligence organization should be assigned a war-making role abroad. Certainly this was not the intent of Congress when it originally voted to establish CIA. STATINTL

So I come to my three proposals to limit the Executive's authority to wage a secret war. These are not all-inclusive, but they are an attempt to get at the questions of the circumvention of congressional intent and the hiring of mercenaries. The specific proposals are:

First, a bill to extend the limitations which now apply to the use by the Defense Department of its funds overseas to all U.S. Government agencies, including CIA. This would prevent the circumvention of congressional intent in the funding of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through CIA rather than through more open Government agencies. It would also eliminate the possibility that the Cooper-Church prohibitions against the use of American troops or advisers in Cambodia could be skirted by using CIA personnel.

Second, a bill to prohibit the funding by any U.S. Government agency of military operations by any country outside its borders without specific congressional authorization. This would eliminate the confusing trail of Thais in Laos, Cambodians in Laos, and even Thais in Cambodia. It would not affect the present programs for U.S. payments to Koreans, Thais, and Filipinos in Vietnam, since Congress has specifically voted money for these troops. My bill would, however, require the administration to inform the Congress, on a confidential basis, if necessary, of the details of any agreements with foreign governments to finance their military operations abroad. I would hope this would prevent our Government from offering lavish inducements to foreign governments in return for the use of their troops. As you may remember, it was revealed last year that the U.S. Government in some cases had been secretly paying Koreans and Thais in Vietnam higher levels of combat pay than were being paid to American troops fighting in the same country.

Third, a bill to extend existing limitations on the use by the Defense Department of surplus military materiel to all Government agencies. I make this proposal because of reports I have received of the relatively unrestricted use of surplus materiel by CIA. I have no means of verifying these reports, but if they are untrue, my bill would not interfere with any existing Government programs.

The three proposals I have outlined would serve to plug some loopholes in the law. Of course they would by no means close them all. The Executive can find ways to skirt almost any prohibition if it is so inclined. The solution to the problem lies, in the long run, not in a tighter drafting of the law but in the acceptance by the Executive of Congress and the public as partners in the conduct of the peoples' vital business.

Our country was founded on the principles of democracy, and the essence of a democracy is the participation of the people and their representatives in the decisions which affect their very nation-

21 JUN 1971

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THE WAR IN INDOCHINAThe Not-So-Secret War

For good reason, the U.S. military involvement in Laos has often been called the "secret war." Unlike Vietnam, where most of the American military role is out in the open, the U.S. activities in Laos—a supposedly neutral country—have necessarily been obscured by successive Administrations. And with equally good reason, Congress from time to time has grown uncomfortable over the lack of clearcut information about Laos—a restlessness that was manifested once again last week in a rare secret session of the United States Senate.

The meeting was called by Sen. Stuart Symington, chairman of a subcommittee on national commitments. Basing his charges partly on a report compiled by two subcommittee aides who recently visited Indochina, Symington contended that the U.S. is spending far more money in Laos than the \$52 million a year voted by Congress in economic aid and the estimated \$90 million allotted for military assistance. The real figure, claimed the Missouri senator, was closer to \$100 million a year, with the difference coming from secret Central Intelligence Agency funds not controlled by Congress. Symington also pointed out that B-52s are bombing Communist forces in northern Laos and that the U.S. is supporting Thai troops fighting there. The latter program, the senator charged, was a breach of the Fulbright amendment to this year's defense appropriations bill prohibiting the use of Congressionally approved money for the funding of "mercenaries" in Laos or Cambodia. "I have been hoodwinked," Symington thundered. "I don't want to serve as a figurehead, and I don't want to be in the Senate if we write laws that are flouted."

Loophole: Unfortunately for the doves, there was little new in the information put forth at the session. That the B-52s have been bombing northern Laos has been common knowledge—even to senators—for some time. That the CIA is supporting Thai mercenaries at enormous cost has also been discovered and rediscovered. And it was not so easy to establish that the Nixon Administration was

violating the Fulbright amendment. It was, in fact, simple enough for Administration spokesmen to point out that the amendment also contained a clause stating that nothing in the amendment should be construed as prohibiting military actions designed to insure a "safe and orderly withdrawal from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war"—a loophole if ever there was one.

As a whole, the Senate treated Symington's secret session with a massive yawn, and as it rambled on, more and more legislators rose and strolled out of the chamber. "I must say that I heard nothing yesterday that I had not heard before," Senate Republican leader Hugh Scott reported the day after the three-and-a-half-hour meeting. "I believe that what we had was a rather lengthy tempest in our ancient and honorable teapot." And Sen. J. William Fulbright summed up Symington's performance with the observation: "It was very disappointing that the Senate as a whole . . . [was] not more interested in it. They are apparently reluctant to be interested even as to the facts of what is going on in Laos."

The whole experience left many doves wondering what had happened to the "no more Vietnams" movement. The answer to that question seemed to be that, as long as President Nixon continued to wind the war down visibly by withdrawing U.S. troops from Indochina, few senators of either the hawkish or dovish persuasion were disposed to question what he did in the "invisible" sector of the conflict.

STATINTL

Senator Would Bar CIA From Combat

Case Seeks To Prevent Secret Wars Fought
By Agency Behind Congress's Back

By GENE OISIII

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, June 19—Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) announced today that he intends to introduce legislation to prevent the CIA from secretly engaging in military operations.

The legislation will be drafted as amendments to the foreign aid authorization bill, which is expected to reach the Senate floor next month. The series of amendments would:

1. Extend congressional restrictions on the use of Defense Department funds overseas to all government agencies, including the CIA.

Specific Authorization

2. Prohibit any U.S. government agency from financing military operations abroad without specific congressional authorization.

3. Extend the existing limitations on the use by the Defense Department of surplus arms to all government agencies.

Mr. Case said he did not believe his proposal would completely cut off the executive branch's ability to wage secret wars, but said he was approaching the matter "piecemeal" because he did not believe Congress was ready to pass more comprehensive legislation.

The reluctance of Congress to assert its full authority was demonstrated, he said, by the defeat in both houses earlier this week of legislation to impose a deadline for total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina.

Foreign Mercenaries

The House, in fact, also rejected by a 172-to-46 vote an amendment similar to what Senator Case is proposing. The defeated amendment would have prevented the CIA from using Defense Department funds for conducting "paramilitary" operations or hiring foreign mercenaries to fight in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.

Representative F. Edward Hebert (D., La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, opposed the amendment, saying its enactment would be "very dangerous to the security of our country."

Mr. Hebert, as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is one of a handful of congressmen who have access to information pertaining to the CIA.

While all CIA operations are officially secret, there have been numerous newspaper reports as well as statements by congressmen and senators on the agency's operations in Southeast Asia.

The most publicized activity of the CIA has been its operations in Laos, where the agency reportedly has equipped and trained a secret army of Meo tribesmen and now is supporting Thai mercenaries to fight there.

Without disclosing his sources, Mr. Case also suggested that the CIA is financing Cambodian troops in Laos as well as Thai troops in Cambodia.

He said he has also received reports that the CIA has relatively unrestricted use of surplus arms in its covert military operations.

Only Following Orders

"I do not direct criticism against the CIA," Mr. Case said, "for it has only been following orders issued by several Presidents. I simply question whether a secret intelligence organization should be assigned a war-making role abroad. Certainly this was not the intent of Congress when it originally voted to establish the CIA."

The rationale behind secret military and paramilitary operations is that the United States should have some means of militarily protecting its interests abroad, short of engaging in open warfare.

Mr. Case said that while he agreed that secret operations might in certain instances be useful he felt they were incompatible with "an open system of government."

Senator Proposes Curb on Secret CIA Activity

Case's Move Prompted by Disclosure Spy Agency Is Financing Operations in Laos.

BY JOHN H. AVERILL
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — In a move to end clandestine U.S. military involvement in Laos, Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) proposed legislation Saturday to bar the Central Intelligence Agency from financing military operations in any country without congressional authorization.

Case's proposal was prompted by disclosures that the CIA is financing and supervising the use of between 4,500 and 5,000 Thai troops against Communist forces in Laos.

"I do not direct criticism against the CIA, for it has only been following orders issued by several Presidents," Case said.

"I simply question whether a secret intelligence organization should be assigned a war-making role abroad. Certainly this was not the intent of Congress when it originally voted to establish the CIA."

Case, who has become an increasingly outspoken critic of U.S. involvement in Indochina, advanced his proposal in a speech before the New Jersey Press Assn. at Spring Lake, N.J. The text was released here.

In an interview, Case said he planned to offer his legislation as amendments to the Administration's foreign aid bill pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which Case is a senior member.

No End Runs

"My purpose," he said, "is to prevent the CIA and the Defense Department from making any moves around the Cooper-Church and Fulbright amendments."

Both amendments were enacted into law last year. The first, sponsored by Sens. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Frank Church (D-Ida.), prohibits the use of U.S. ground combat forces in Laos or Cambodia.

The second, by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), prohibits use of Pentagon funds "to support Vietnamese or other free-world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia and Laos."

Fulbright contends the U.S. financing of Thai troops in Laos is a violation of his amendment. Although the State Department reluctantly acknowledged Thai troops are in Laos, it denied any violation of the Fulbright amendment on grounds the Thai troop program was inherited from the Kennedy Administration.

With his proposed amendments, Case said he hopes to prevent the CIA from claiming exemption from the Fulbright amendment. Since Fulbright's amendment applies specifically to Defense Department appropriations, Case proposed that the Fulbright ban be broadened to include all funds and all government agencies — including the CIA.

Hidden Budget

The CIA budget, estimated to run annually anywhere from \$500 million to \$1 billion, is hidden among the budgets of various departments and only key members of Congress are aware of its magnitude and the purposes for which it is intended.

In his speech, Case described his proposals as "a means of forcing our government to conduct foreign policy in the open so that the public may know what is going on and have the controlling voice in important decisions."

"To be perfectly frank," Case continued, "our system has gotten out of whack and it is time to restore a better balance. The Constitution does not give the President authority to declare a secret war and I do not accept that there are any precedents in our history which would permit him now to do so."

Dovish Committee

It has been disclosed in recent weeks that the United States is spending at least \$350 million annually in military and economic assistance to the royal Laotian government. This presumably includes the cost of financing the Thai mercenaries. The Administration acknowledges spending only \$52 million in Laos and that for economic assistance.

By attaching his amendments to the foreign aid bill, Case would put them within jurisdiction of the predominantly dovish Foreign Relations Committee rather than the hawkish Senate Armed Services Committee, which has jurisdiction over the CIA.

Case said, however, that he might offer his proposals as amendments to the Armed Service Commit-

STATINTL

JUN 20 1971

Case Asserts CIA Is Funding Secret Laos War

By KNIGHT KIPLINGER

Times Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) charged yesterday that the Nixon administration is conducting a CIA-funded "secret war in Laos," the extent and cost of which is unknown to Congress and the American public alike.

The Senator made the charge while announcing plans to introduce three bills to "limit the executive's authority to wage a secret war" overseas without congressional approval.

One bill would extend to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities similar requirements of congressional approval that now exist for Defense Department spending overseas.

The second bill, a broader version of the first, would prohibit funding by an U.S. government agency of the military operations of a foreign nation without congressional approval.

A third proposed bill would extend to all government agencies present limitations on the use of surplus military material by the Defense Department.

Case made the announcements in a brief speech before a meeting of the New Jersey Press Association at Spring Lake.

As A Preventative

He said he hopes his bills will "prevent our government from offering lavish inducements to foreign governments for the use of their troops" as mercenaries.

In a speech on the Senate floor May 20, Case said that the CIA is currently paying for the military operations of about 4,000-6,000 troops from Thailand operating in Laos.

In the same speech, which focused national attention on U.S. policy of funding Asian mercenaries, Case said CIA operations in Laos are a "widening of American involvement in Southeast Asia" and are a violation of the Cooper-Church Amendment.

The Cooper-Church legislation prohibits U.S. payment for the use of mercenaries in Laos or Cambodia, except to protect U.S. troops as they withdraw or to aid in the release of American POWs.

The senator has charged that covert CIA funding has enabled the administration to circumvent Congress' decrees against broadening the war.

Case estimated that nearly \$2.5 billion of U.S. money is being spent annually in ground and air operations in Laos.

Secret Briefing

Soon after Case's May speech, the Nixon administration sent officials up to Capitol Hill for an unusual closed-door briefing of the entire Senate on the subject of operations in Laos.

The briefing, Case said Saturday, was "incomplete and partially inaccurate, despite its secret classification which prevented it from being made known to the public."

He continued, "Even today the government tries to maintain a thick veil of secrecy over some of its programs in Laos."

The senator told the New Jersey Press audience he was "shocked by the cynical manipulation of our political processes revealed in the New York Times account of the McNamara study of the origins of the Vietnam War."

He said he believes the United States "should not go to war as part of a carefully plotted scenario which involves secret attacks on the other side — some apparently with the aim of provoking retaliations against us and our allies."

The "secret attacks" to which Case referred were the August, 1964, raids on North Vietnamese islands, revealed by the Pentagon study to have been executed by South Vietnam on the orders of U.S. officials in Saigon.

Tonkin Story

The raids provoked North Vietnamese attacks on a U.S. ship in the Gulf of Tonkin, which were used by the Johnson administration as a rationale for requesting the carte blanche powers that Congress extended in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

The truthfulness of the government account of the Gulf of Tonkin incident has long been disputed, with many authorities charging that the second of two alleged North Vietnamese attacks never occurred, but was later fabricated.

Case and 97 Senate colleagues, including all the major opponents of the war policy in subsequent years, voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The only two negative votes were cast by Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) and Sen. Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska), who were later defeated in reelection bids.

9-0 JUN 1971

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LBJ Shown as Crafty, but No Liar

By Bernard D. Nossiter
Washington Post Staff Writer

A comparison of the Johnson administration's public remarks with the material that has been published from the Pentagon's private study of the Vietnam war discloses a public record marked by half-truths, careful ambiguities, and misleading and deceptive statements rather than flatfooted untruths.

What appears at first glance to be the grossest misstatement in public frequently turns out, on close examination, to contain a phrase or word that saves it from the label "lie."

For example, on April 1, 1965, according to the published documents, President Johnson secretly made a fateful decision, ordering the 3,500 Marines in Vietnam to shift from a static defense of the base at Danang to offensive actions. This was the beginning of an offensive combat role for U.S. ground troops.

The first public hint of this change came on June 8 when a State Department spokesman said that "American forces would be available for combat support." The next day, the White House put out a statement asserting:

"There has been no change in the mission of United States ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to Gen. Westmoreland recently or at any other time."

This appears to be the lie direct. But the statement continued:

"The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the airbase at Danang. They have the associated mission of actively patrolling and securing action in and near the areas thus safeguarded."

"If help is requested by appropriate Vietnamese commanders, Gen. Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned area to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese

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forces faced with aggressive attack . . ."

Thus, the last two paragraphs, although still avoiding the full truth, soften the impact of the first and patently false paragraph.

Again in late November 1964 the Administration's top-most circle, according to published material, agreed to adopt a "determined action program" aimed at putting pressure on Hanoi and raising South Vietnamese morale. A draft position paper of Nov. 29 charts a two-phase bombing program as a key element in this plan—possible reprisal strikes against North Vietnam and a U.S. readiness to conduct sustained bombing against the North.

At a press conference on Nov. 28, a president reporter asked the President:

"Is expansion of the Vietnam war into Laos or North Vietnam a live possibility at this point?"

Mr. Johnson, in a lengthy reply, allowed that his top advisers were then meeting, but in the operative part of his response said:

"I anticipate that there will be no dramatic announcement (emphasis added) to come out of these meetings except in the form of your speculation."

This was literally true but substantively misleading. No dramatic announcement was made but the meetings all but sealed the dramatic decision to launch the two-phase bombing program that began in February.

Administration leaders rarely made outright misstatements about the crucial events in the 20 months up to July 1965 when, as the already published Pentagon documents say, the United States entered into an open-ended commitment and an Asian land war.

Perhaps Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara came as close as any to complete falsification in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-

tee in February, 1968.

The Committee was exploring the origins of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the authority on which the Johnson regime relied to enlarge the war. Sen. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), the chairman, was attempting to discover whether the administration had decided well in advance of the August incidents in the Tonkin Gulf to ask Congress for a broad grant of authority. The dialogue went like this:

The Chairman: Mr. Secretary did you see the contingency draft of what became the Southeast Asia resolution before it was ready?

Secretary McNamara: Mr. Chairman, I read in the newspaper a few weeks ago there had been such a contingency draft. I don't believe I ever saw it . . . But I can't testify absolutely that I didn't. My memory is not clear on that.

Executive Committee

In fact, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council — which included McNamara — had decided after its meetings on May 24 and 25, 1964 to seek a Congressional resolution authorizing "all measures" to assist South Vietnam. Thus, McNamara and the others had approved a draft of the Tonkin Gulf resolution nearly ten weeks before the attack on the American destroyers in those waters.

Even here, McNamara's choice of words to the Senate Committee is artful. He says he didn't believe he saw the draft and it is conceivable that he approved the substance without reading all the language. Moreover, he tells the committee that his memory isn't clear on the crucial point and he won't "absolutely" deny having seen it.

At the same hearing, Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, skirted perilously close to untruth. Whether he was using higher semantics,

Chairman Fulbright asked Wheeler whether in the period around July 1964 the military had recommended extending the war to the north by bombing or other means.

Gen. Wheeler replied: "I don't believe so, Mr. Chairman. I think that the proper answer would be that there were certain intelligence activities (deleted) but to the best of my knowledge and belief during that period there was no thought of extending the war into the North in the sense of our participation in such actions, activities."

Then, for the record, the Pentagon supplied an insertion:

"We have identified no such recommendation. A check of the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is continuing."

In fact, published records show, as early as Jan. 22, 1964 — six months before the period about which Fulbright was inquiring — the top brass sent McNamara a lengthy memo saying:

"Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder actions in Southeast Asia to:

" . . . h. Conduct aerial bombing of key North Vietnam targets, using U.S. resources under Vietnamese cover, and with the Vietnamese openly assuming responsibility for the actions .

"j. Commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam . . ."

Wheeler was stretching the truth to say the Chiefs harbored "no thought" of extending the war North. On the other hand, he could argue that a proposal "to make ready" northward actions is less than a recommendation and that he equates "thought" with an unqualified proposal.

The gap between public oratory and private belief is strikingly illustrated by Mr. Johnson's State of the Union address on Jan. 4, 1965.

STATINTL

LAOS

Change of Tune

BY ARNOLD ABRAMS

Vientiane: The thaw in Sino-American relations has not halted US-directed intelligence operations which penetrate deep into Chinese territory. These operations, which have been conducted for years by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), involve the sending of reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as far as several hundred miles into southern China's Yunnan province. Team members are native hill tribesmen whose ethnic stock — Meo — is prevalent in southern China.

The tribesmen have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, politi-

Chinese authorities have known for some time about the missions; several teams have been captured in recent years.

Consequently, American officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate such territorial incursions as long as they are conducted solely for intelligence-gathering purposes and do not pose a direct security threat. US authorities also believe that, if the Chinese want an excuse to reverse the friendly trend, they can do better than simply focus on these operations.

"Americans are still fighting in Vietnam, they have a military presence on Taiwan, and they are standing by their treaty commitments to Chiang Kai-shek," observes one source close to the US embassy here. "If the Chinese are looking for something to whip them with, any one of those three will do."

In Laos, American officials' major security concern about the Chinese stems from a Peking road-building project in the north. An estimated 14,000 Chinese personnel, including several thousand soldiers standing guard and manning anti-aircraft batteries, are constructing a route leading toward the Thai border.

Thai authorities repeatedly have expressed deep concern about the road's potential as a supply line for communist-led guerilla forces in northern Thailand. American officials privately voice similar concern. While conceding that Chinese forces in Laos have not shown hostility, they insist the construction project must be kept under closest scrutiny.

The Peking project originally was requested by the tripartite government, established in Laos with the signing of the 1962 Geneva Accord, which collapsed in 1963.

Ironically, while American officials fret about Chinese intentions in Laos, Peking's new diplomacy has prompted a positive reaction from the leader of this nation's neutralist government. In a recent interview, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma stressed China's historically non-aggressive attitude toward Laos.

The 70-year-old prince noted that the unhappy history of this landlocked kingdom is replete with tales of invasion by neighbouring Thais, Cambodians, Burmese and Vietnamese — but not by the Chinese. He also expressed the hope that China's attitude, coupled with a

possible Sino-American rapprochement, would restrain further North Vietnamese aggression in Laos.

Although Souvanna Phouma is still said to harbour private fears about Peking's longrange designs on this region, his current public stance marks a departure from the position he assumed earlier this year, prior to the US-supported South Vietnamese invasion of his country. Then, he warned that the allied move might prompt open intervention by Peking in the Indochina war. Now, his tune is different. Like everyone else, he can only guess about the intentions of China's leaders.

Fateful Flowering


BY A CORRESPONDENT

Vientiane: Asia's latest opium war is hotting up. East of the Annamite mountains, the US military is reported to be reeling under the effects of heroin, and in Saigon US leaders have been pressing the government into a series of emergency measures to stop the flow of supplies — including a mass transfer of customs agents from Ton Son Nhut airport, the centre of large scale trafficking, and sweeps through the city to arrest suspected peddlars.

A widely publicised amnesty-cure programme has been offered addicted soldiers. All chemists and known peddling centres have been placed "off limits" and medical tests instituted to detect addicts among homeward bound troops.

But these measures are preliminary skirmishes in the great war. The problem of stamping out or otherwise controlling opium can only be solved by an international campaign of which Laos is already feeling the impact. An American narcotics investigator is in Vientiane tracing the legend that heroin is produced in Laos and seeking information to map out strategy in the war against opiates. Early this month Laotian national police were pressured into a general round-up of Vientiane's opium den operators, most of whom have a licence from the Laotian government. More than 120 operators were held for questioning.

But Laotians find it difficult to take seriously a campaign which conflicts with local customs, tolerances and economy. The opium den operators were



Souvanna Phouma: Stressing China's non-aggressive attitude towards Laos.

cal developments and other pertinent security data. American embassy officials in Vientiane refuse to discuss these operations, but qualified sources report that the officials believe local security needs and the intelligence value of such operations justify their continuation.

American authorities largely discount any potential threat these operations pose to slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking. They believe this threat is small because the operations are not commando raids or sabotage efforts, and Americans do not participate directly in them. Moreover,

June 17, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BADILLO

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BADILLO: Page 7, line 4, before the quotation marks insert the following new sentence: "Nothing in clause (A) or (B) of the first sentence of this paragraph or in the immediately preceding sentence shall be construed to authorize the use of any of such funds by the Central Intelligence Agency (or by any agency or person operating on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency) to engage, in any manner or to any extent, in the organization, supervision, or conduct of any military or paramilitary operation of any kind in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand (including any operation of the kind commonly called 'guerrilla warfare' operation) which will be executed by forces composed in whole or in part of (i) mercenaries, (ii) regular or irregular personnel of any armed force of any foreign nation or area, or (iii) personnel other than those listed in clause (i) or (ii) who are under arms and are indigenous to any foreign country or area."

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, this is a very specific amendment limiting the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency to the gathering of intelligence, and specifically prohibiting the Central Intelligence Agency from conducting guerrilla operations in Southeast Asia. The necessity for the amendment arises because the enabling act which created the Central Intelligence Agency provides that the CIA may perform "such other functions and duties related to intelligence and affecting national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

There has been clear evidence from news accounts over the years, which I am sure all of you have read, that the Central Intelligence Agency is conducting guerrilla operations in Laos and Cambodia. This last week, as you know, the Senate had a secret session involving our activities in Laos and Senator SYMINGTON in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD indicated as follows:

In the case of Laos one is unable to cite a figure for the total cost of this war to the United States. First, because what the United States is doing, and the cost of what we are doing, continues to be cloaked with official secrecy by the executive branch. Second, one cannot cite a figure for the total cost to us of the war in Laos because, it must be said in all frankness, neither you, nor I, nor any other Member of Congress is in position to know what those costs actually are.

Yesterday, my colleague the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE), questioned the chairman of the committee as to whether this bill specifically included funds for the Central Intelligence Agency, and the chairman answered that it does. The chairman also refused to say what the amounts were and said that only he and the ranking minority member of the committee knew.

The gentleman from California Mr. WALDIE also asked the chairman as follows:

What is the purpose of the CIA activity in Laos?

The chairman answered as follows:

Mr. HEBERT. The activity of the CIA in all sections of the world, in Laos, the Middle

East and everywhere is the gathering of intelligence for the protection and security of the United States.

If that is the understanding of the activities of the CIA by the chairman, then he should be in support of this amendment, because all I am saying is that that should be precisely the activity of the Central Intelligence Agency, to gather information, and not to engage in guerrilla activities. But because we do not know exactly what funds are available either in this body or in the Senate, and we do not know exactly to what purpose they are being put, this amendment is prepared so that we can be sure that the activities are limited.

I seek only to insure that the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency be limited to those specified in the law, and that is to the gathering of intelligence. Certainly after the recent disclosures it becomes all the more important that we insure that the agencies of the executive department comply with the mandates of the Congress.

Even before the New York Times published parts of the Pentagon study of our involvement in the Vietnam war, it had become apparent that the CIA had literally been running the entire military operation in Laos, including the hiring, training, and leading of a mercenary army of Thais and Meo tribesmen and the tactical control of an air war which has made the Laotian people refugees in their own land.

As early as 1964, the CIA recruited Thai pilots to fly planes with markings of the Royal Laotian Government against Communist forces in Laos and there is evidence these Thai pilots are still flying missions in Laos, under CIA control and supervision. Reliable estimates given recently to the Senate indicate that the CIA currently is paying about 5,000 Thais to fight in Laos.

Enactment of this amendment is necessary if Congress is to regain some measure of meaningful control and oversight in the field of foreign affairs. Regardless of how individual Members might feel about the recent articles in the New York Times, it is clear that the nature and extent of our involvement in Southeast Asia has repeatedly been hidden from and misrepresented to the American people and their elected Representatives. I strongly suspect that the pattern of subterfuge and outright misrepresentation continues. This amendment represents a step toward squaring with the American people. I urge its adoption.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. Would the amendment preclude the CIA from supporting such things as have been reported in national magazines, such as the pay for personnel in the Saigon Police Force, which police force is being used, of course, for campaign purposes to support the Thieu government in Southeast Asia?

Mr. BADILLO. Yes it would, because it would seek to limit the Central Intelligence Agency to the gathering of intelligence and to its functions as approved

by the Congress. Specifically it excludes the support of activities commonly called guerrilla warfare, support of mercenaries, support of regular or irregular personnel of any armed forces of any foreign nation or area within Southeast Asia.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CONYERS. I want to commend the precision with which the gentleman has formulated this amendment. I believe it is an exceedingly important one. I applaud his courage and support him.

Mr. BADILLO. I thank the gentleman very much.

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

The gentleman's amendment seeks to place a restriction upon the use of any funds authorized in this proposed act for military or paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia organized or supervised by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Central Intelligence Agency was established by the National Security Act. It functions under the National Security Council under the President of the United States. It initiates no activities of its own without direction from the President and/or the National Security Council.

I do not propose to debate on the floor of the House the activities or functions of the Central Intelligence Agency. I will state categorically that the intelligence activities conducted by our Government are essential to the security of this Nation.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, as I read it, seeks to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from organizing, supervising, or conducting any so-called military or paramilitary operation of any kind in Southeast Asia which would be executed by mercenaries, regular or irregular personnel of any armed force of any foreign nation or area, or any other personnel of a foreign nation. I will not go into the ramifications of such a restriction should it be enacted. I will merely tell the House that in my opinion, as well meaning as this amendment may be, it is very dangerous to the security of our country. Secrecy is one of the prices we must pay for survival. Today, there seems to be a penchant for exposing Government secrets which wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the enemy.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York would seriously restrict our intelligence activities in Southeast Asia and would certainly most seriously affect, and perhaps even prevent, the further withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

I am not going to expand upon my statement any further.

I urge the House to overwhelmingly defeat this amendment.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

In the end, millions of Americans go without adequate medical care. They cannot afford it. They are afraid it will break them. Or they cannot find a doctor. Some of them die. Others are left destitute. And most of them fall victim to needless pain and needless suffering. They are your parents or mine—your children or mine—our friends and our fellow citizens.

The disaster we call medical services makes most Americans forgotten Americans. It betrays each of them and all of us. Our system of medical care is in fact a system of medical neglect. It is in the deepest sense un-American.

Despite our power and our strength, despite our trillion dollar G.N.P., we have let young people die before their time and old people die when there was some precious time left. How will history judge us, a country which was first in the wealth of its resources, but far from first in the health of its people? And more importantly, how will we judge ourselves in those quiet, inner moments, when we remember that what finally counts is not how much we have, but what we are?

It is time for us to do more until we have done enough to sustain and enhance the health of our nation.

Countless medical students and some doctors have already answered the call to a new kind of service. In the early 1960s, student health organizations from Los Angeles to Boston pioneered concepts for comprehensive health care. In the summer of 1967, students like you joined together in New York City to found the student health project of the South Bronx. Their historic initiative was a sign of a new generation's determination to make medicine work for people.

But the young and the concerned in the medical profession cannot do the whole job alone. Your voices have been heard—and sometimes even heeded. But your own efforts will take too long. And the results will be too uncertain. The only certainty is that entrenched and established forces will oppose you every step of the way. We cannot wait or gamble on the outcome. Human life and human health hang in the balance.

Four decades after organized medicine almost adopted a report favoring uniform financing for medical services—four decades and a hundred million illnesses too late—we must enact a medical bill of rights for all Americans. The Constitution commits our country to protect political freedom. Now, by legislation, the Congress must commit America to protect the physical health which alone makes possible the exercise of liberty.

The first medical right of all Americans is care within their means. Admission to a hospital or a doctor's office should depend on the state of an individual's health, not the size of his wallet. And we cannot depend on reform on half-way measures and half-hearted compromise. A right to medical care which left the burden of cost on the poor and the near poor would mock its own purpose. The only sure security is federally funded universal health insurance. That is our best hope for the future—and a priority goal in 1971.

We must take the dollar sign out of medical care. We must destroy the financial barrier between deprived people and essential medical services. We must end the terrible choice so many Americans face between losing their health and losing their savings.

The second medical right of all Americans is care within their reach. Even if we guaranteed the payment of health costs, millions of our citizens could not find sufficient medical services. The system is not only inequitable—it is also undermanned and inefficient. It is on the verge of collapse. The Nation must now respond with Federal financial incentives that will insure real reform.

There are not enough doctors. But Federal

incentives can persuade medical schools to follow Einstein's lead and expand their enrollment. New schools can be created and sustained by Federal loans and grants. And Federal funds must also be provided to help medical students who should have something better than money to worry about. A program of scholarship aid must include all who are in need—and it must encourage minority students who intend to return to the old neighborhoods.

Yet the number of doctors is not the whole answer. If we produce 50,000 additional physicians and plug them into the current structure, our efforts for reform will certainly fail. Some of the health manpower legislation now before the Congress would do just that—and the result would be too many more doctors serving too few people at too high a cost.

Here, too, Congress must set up financial incentives that can move medicine in a new direction. We must encourage a shift from a system dependent on the individual doctor to a system built around the concept of the health team, composed of primary care physicians and other medical professionals. Teams would allow us to allocate medical resources with maximum efficiency and to maximum effect. They would employ para-professionals to relieve nurses and doctors from routine, time-consuming tasks. They would gather together diverse skills—from internists to pediatricians—and patients would deal with the team, not just a single physician. Einstein has experimented with the health team concept. The Federal Government must make Einstein's experiment national policy.

And health teams must be sufficient in distribution as well as in number. Federal bonuses must make it worthwhile to practice in the inner city and in rural America. Medical care cannot reach people unless people can reach doctors. And people must have more than geographic reach. A health team should also be subject to the reach of local influence.

Location incentives for health services must be designed to create responsive, personal structures. It was never right—and it is no longer possible—to satisfy Americans with distant, impersonal medical care. The system must respect everyone's identity—and sacrifice no one's dignity. And we must always remember that it is easier for a patient to reach a health team that he knows—than a shining new medical center walled off from surrounding rural poverty or a nearby urban ghetto.

The third medical right of all Americans is care within their needs. The present health insurance system is heavily biased toward high-cost hospital treatment and against preventive health care. That is incredibly expensive—and incredibly insensitive to the real needs of people. It has filled hospitals with patients who should not be there and would be better off elsewhere. A new national health program must reverse the old priorities. It must guarantee a range of medical services, comprehensive in scope, preventive in emphasis, and restricted only by the scope of scientific knowledge.

America's concern over the quality of health care has reached a high water mark in 1971. You are graduating from medical school at a time when the whole medical profession may be profoundly altered. You should welcome change—and work for change. Only in the context of a medical bill of rights for every American, can each of you truly and in the most literal sense profess your profession—which is nothing more and nothing less than the protection of human life.

And that requires not just a medical bill of rights, but a social bill of rights. The real cure for lead poisoning is not hospital care, but decent housing. The most effective treatment for malnutrition is adequate food.

And the best guarantee of good health is a physically and emotionally health environment.

As health professionals, you must commit yourselves to total health care. And total care includes virtually everything that determines whether we are sick or well. You cannot confine yourselves to the technical skills you have learned here. You must also practice the fundamental human concern of a school like Einstein.

You must speak out for a fair and sensible medical care system.

You must stand up for social progress and for people—whether they are your patients or migrant workers two thousand miles away.

You can cure individuals—and you must help America build a compassionate society.

It will take time. There will be setbacks and frustrations and defeats. But men and women who come from Einstein have good reason to believe that we can finally fashion a country that is great enough to be good. You have seen in your own lives what a difference one school can make. Now all of you have a chance to make a real difference in the lives of others.

The practice you choose and the practices you follow may not change our country overnight. But you can remind us by example of Aristotle's ancient truth: "Health of mind and body is so fundamental to the good life that if we believe men have any personal rights at all as human beings, they have an absolute moral right to the measure of good health that society is able to give them."

That is our challenge and our chance. Two thousand years after Aristotle wrote, we must secure a medical bill of rights for our own people. We can wait no longer—in health care or in society. In our individual lives and in our national life, whatever we can do, and whatever we dream we can do, we must begin now.

THE CIA FIGHTS ILLEGAL DRUG TRAFFIC

Mr. HANSEN, Mr. President, earlier this year I had the pleasure of addressing an ROTC group who was in the audience, questioned me in regard to certain allegations made in Ramparts magazine that the Central Intelligence Agency encouraged the opium traffickers of Indochina.

I doubt that such allegations have been given credence by many Americans, but apparently Mr. Ginsberg either believed them to be true, or chose to pretend that he believed them. But because I do not take such serious charges against our Government lightly, and believe that none of us should allow unjust criticism of our Government to stand unchallenged, I recently asked the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to set the record straight on these accusations.

Bureau Director John Ingersoll replied this week, and his remarks are timely in view of the major initiatives President Nixon is expected to announce today to help deal with the illegal drug problem.

Mr. President, Mr. Ingersoll has reported to me that the CIA is his Bureau's strongest ally in identifying foreign sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics. I ask unanimous consent that his letter of June 15 be printed in the Record, followed by a report on recent trends in the illicit narcotics market in Southeast Asia, and my telegram of May 11 which was printed in the final spring semester edition of the University of Wyoming student newspaper, the Branding Iron.

Mr. WALDIE. Can the gentleman tell me in what portion of the bill these funds are contained?

Mr. HÉBERT. No, I cannot tell the gentleman that.

Mr. WALDIE. Is it available so that a Member of this House of Representatives can go to the committee and examine the classified documents involving the amount of money available for the Central Intelligence Agency in this bill?

Mr. HÉBERT. No, sir, it is not. The chairman takes the full responsibility of not discussing the matter further.

Mr. WALDIE. So whatever those sums are and to whatever purpose they will be put, that is only known to the chairman of the committee?

Mr. HÉBERT. It is known to the chairman and the ranking minority member of the committee. This is a policy which has prevailed throughout the years in all administrations.

Mr. WALDIE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think I understand the policy that no other member of the committee knows that information.

Mr. HÉBERT. That is correct.

Mr. WALDIE. May I ask this question?

In title IV there is a prohibition against using any of the moneys appropriated in this bill for the payment of free world forces serving in Laos. Are there any funds being appropriated by this bill for the payment of any forces in Laos?

Mr. HÉBERT. No, there is not any provision for the payment of those forces. The only moneys that are involved in this bill are those providing for the intelligence agencies of this country.

May I make a further correction, I do not want to mislead anybody by saying that the chairman and the ranking minority member know about these funds and only them, because the entire committee is briefed by the CIA on its functions. So I do not want to have that misconception carried away that the members of the committee do not know of the activities of the CIA and of the other intelligence agencies, this we do know. This year, for the first time in the history of the committee, at the chairman's request, the CIA was invited to appear before the entire committee. Its director, Mr. Helms, appeared and subjected himself to all kinds of questions and all the questions were answered by the director, Mr. Helms.

Mr. WALDIE. May I ask the chairman one final question?

What is the purpose of the CIA activity in Laos?

Mr. HÉBERT. The activity of the CIA in all sections of the world, in Laos, the Middle East and everywhere is the gathering of intelligence for the protection and security of the United States.

Mr. WALDIE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HUNGATE).

(Mr. HUNGATE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, we will soon be called upon to vote on the Nedzi-Whalen amendment, or some House ver-

sion of the McGovern-Hatfield amendment. Since I fear there may have been a considerable amount of high-pressure, slick, oversimplification of this problem, I believe the following editorial in the Washington Post is illuminating:

CONGRESS VOTES ON THE WAR

The McGovern-Hatfield and Nedzi-Whalen amendments, which are to be voted on today in the Senate and House respectively, would not "end the war" or automatically retrieve the American POW's or guarantee the safe exit of American forces or, least of all, assure a Vietnamese reconciliation. Any such claim promises more than either amendment can deliver and invites further frustration and disillusionment. Not only does fulfillment of claims like these lie to a great extent in other than American hands. But the American system of Government gives the President broad authority to conduct a war. It is idle to pretend while the fighting goes on that Congress can remove that authority; in fact, McGovern-Hatfield explicitly concedes the point.

So it is misleading the public to talk of these proposed congressional restraints in terms of a "date certain" for our withdrawal, however comforting and convenient that piece of shorthand may be to supporters of both measures; Vietnam has given us enough deceptive shorthand, and also enough easy— and offensive—sales pitches—.

My colleagues, as you are well aware, I voted in favor of fixing December 31, 1971, as the date for withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Southeast Asia. I have voted three times this year to end the draft on June 30, 1971, in the belief that if wars in Southeast Asia can be fought with volunteers, they will prove they have the popular support of the American people. If they cannot, and I would assume this one cannot be fought with volunteers since 80 percent of combat troops are draftees, then the President could come to Congress and ask us for troops and prove his justification for the request. Then we could restore to Congress a meaningful voice in foreign policy.

However, since a majority of this Congress sees fit to draft our young men and ship them halfway around the world to fight 10,000 miles from home, I find it difficult to vote against funds to provide them with supplies, equipment, arms and ammunition they need to defend themselves and our country's position, even though we might not have selected their mission in Southeast Asia. As one who served in the combat infantry in World War II, I would consider it irresponsible to send a draftee into a combat zone without providing him with all the support those fortunate enough to stay at home can provide.

Therefore Mr. Chairman, I must oppose the Nedzi-Whalen amendment.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. NEDZI. Did the Washington Post editorial recommend voting for or against?

Mr. HUNGATE. The Washington Post wrote these very skillful lines, I thought, with which I agree and found that in essence my construction would be meaningless and then it came out for it.

I think it is very much like the story you have all heard of a man coming in

the House and speaking about 10 minutes, and another Member said I heard you speak and I cannot tell where you stand. Can you tell me whether you are for or against it? The guy speaking said—

I watched the gentleman when he came in this House and raised his hand and took the oath to become a Member and I said, "There is a man, and no matter how long he is here, he will never know what's going on."

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GUBSER. Would you not summarize the Washington Post editorial this way—that they gave all the reasons for voting against Nedzi-Whalen in order to justify their point that you ought to vote for it?

Mr. HUNGATE. The gentleman's point seems accurate to me.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WHALEN. I would just like to read for the Record the editorial's conclusion.

The amendments as written are by and large thoughtful and responsible, though limited. A wise Congress would enact them, and a wise President would welcome them as reinforcement of his own policy and his own concern for the Nation.

Mr. HUNGATE. I appreciate the gentleman's contribution, but I would say as to the expression "a wise Congress," I presume its wisdom will be revealed in the future hours today.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ARENDS. When you must make a decision on what the Washington Post article sets forth as to whether this is a wise Congress or not—that is a far stretch of imagination.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. ABZUG).

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from New York is recognized.

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, we have all been very concerned about the shocking revelation in the last few days, that there have been secret military and political decisions by our Government without the consent or knowledge of this great body. These decisions were all the more shocking because they indicate that Government policy on Vietnam was constructed and conducted by lies and deceptions. There was a discussion that took place earlier in the debate between two members of your committee, Mr. Chairman, in which they suggested that classified material concerning the needs of our defense was available for inspection to the Members of this House.

Subsequent to this an inquiry was made of you, Mr. Chairman, by the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) with respect to information available concerning the CIA, and you indicated that it was not available for inspection by Members of either the Armed Services Committee or the House.

My question to you, sir, is this: Is classified material concerning the needs of our defense and the matters about

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16 JUN 1971 STATINTL

U.S. uses Thai troops in Laos

By Richard E. Ward
Second of two articles

A rare secret session of the Senate was held at the request of Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) June 7 to hear a report on U.S. clandestine activities in Laos. Following the session, Senators Symington and J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) openly charged that the use of Thai mercenaries, just admitted that same day by the State Department which calls them "volunteers," was violating congressional restrictions on U.S. operations in Laos.

Some details of the nearly 3½-hour closed door meeting were given in the June 8 Washington Post in an article by Spencer Rich who reported:

--Symington, who revealed that the administration wants \$374 million for military and economic programs in Laos for the 1972 fiscal year (a figure which does not include the \$2 billion estimated costs of bombing), said that he wanted the Senate to know the details of "the secret war" before appropriating funds for it.

--Of the request, \$120 million is said to be earmarked for funding CIA operations in Northern Laos, including the use of Meo mercenaries from Laos as well as at least 4800 Thai troops.

--A major issue in the secret debate centered upon whether the use of Thai forces was in contravention of the 1970 Fulbright amendment to the 1971 Defense Appropriations Act, signed into law by President Nixon Jan. 11 this year. The amendment barred use of Defense Department funds to support what the Pentagon calls "free world forces" in actions "designed to provide military support and assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos."

--The massive bombing of Northern Laos, which has nothing to do with the movement of supplies from North Vietnam to the South or Cambodia, was questioned by several senators, including Fulbright and Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.).

Nixon the lawbreaker

After the Senate meeting, Rich reported that Symington stated: "My personal opinion is...that the law has been contravened. The amendment said you couldn't spend money to train and put people of foreign governments into Laos or into Cambodia." That was also Fulbright's view. State Department sources later said, according to Rich, "that the Thais being used aren't recruited on a government-to-government basis, but were individuals recruited from the borderside Thai population."

The Post report obviously left out many details of the Senate discussion, assuming the legislative body got a full account of U.S. activities. Symington's disclosures were based on a report by two staff members of his subcommittee of the Foreign Relations committee, James Lowenstein and Richard Morse, who had recently made an inquiry into Laos.

Reportedly the Symington subcommittee now has a relatively accurate account of U.S. activities in Laos that is more complete than was provided by the administration at secret hearings in October 1969, released after "security" deletions by the administration in April 1970. What might be called the battle of Laos in Washington, concerns the attempt by antiwar senators to get U.S. activities in Laos itself into the public record. Initially and perhaps still, some senators have been reacting against the administration's deception of themselves along with the public. However, the issue of Laos is now being put forward to oppose administration policy in Indochina as a whole because it so clearly reveals the White House aim of maintaining—if not expanding—the war. This point remains clouded during discussions focusing on Vietnam because troop withdrawals are still used by the administration to justify its policy. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0

As has been previously noted by the Symington subcommittee, the lid of U.S. official secrecy conceals little that is not known by informed journalists or "the other side." Certainly the Pathet Lao knows what is happening in Laos. They are obviously fully aware of the bombings by the Air Force as well as the array of CIA programs. Although no reliable figure had been released on U.S. spending on its Laotian programs, the Pathet Lao accurately estimated it last summer as greater than \$300 million (again apart from bombing).

Number of Thai troops growing

Concerning the use of Thai troops, the Pathet Lao stated last year that they numbered about 1000 during the Johnson administration (a figure that has recently been corroborated in the press and by Sen. Fulbright) and that the increase in Thai forces was undertaken by Nixon. However, according to the Pathet Lao, the number of Thai troops now exceeds the 4800 figure used by Fulbright.

In April of this year, Prince Souphanouvong, head of the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao), charged that the number of Thai troops was being augmented by the U.S. Shortly after this, George W. Ashworth reported in the April 17 Christian Science Monitor: "Nixon administration officials have hammered out an agreement with the government of Thailand for sharply increased use of Thai forces in Laos."

Thai troops were previously used in the ill-fated U.S.-backed attempt to hold the Plain of Jars, which ended in an important Pathet Lao victory in February 1970. Presumably the losses then were an element leading to the more formalized agreement for use of Thai troops. Bangkok may relinquish some of its sovereignty to Washington, but not without a price.

Thai "volunteer" troops used in South Vietnam were given a bonus by the U.S. considerably augmenting their regular pay while Bangkok received military hardware and other considerations from the Johnson administration to agree to use of Thais in Vietnam. There is no reason to assume that Bangkok's price has gone down, more likely it is up. Confirming this, a Senate source has noted that the cost of the mercenaries was high. Symington on June 7 referred to both regular and irregular Thai troops being used in Laos, so it is possible that part of the deal with Bangkok involves freedom for the CIA to recruit directly in Thailand. Taking all evidence into account, Thai troops in Laos may now number 10,000 or higher.

Senators Symington and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) attacked administration activities in Laos in statements issued a day before the secret debate. Symington emphasized the administration furtiveness while Kennedy charged that U.S. military activities in Northern Laos lacked constitutional authority, which seemed to be implicitly saying that the U.S. was conducting a war against the Laotian people without a declaration of war or congressional authority.

Wide destruction

Among the facts to emerge from the recent congressional debate is the acceleration of U.S. bombing in Laos, or rather, of the liberated zone since the autumn of last year, and the increased use of B-52s, a plane whose bombing reaches the peak of indiscriminate destructiveness. The step-up in B-52 activity in Laos has largely coincided with the accelerated "protective reaction strikes" being carried out against North Vietnam, and it is quite possible that one of the real purposes of these attacks is an effort to prevent the DRV from utilizing its potent aerial defenses to assist their Laotian neighbors.

continued

POTTSTOWN, PA.

MERCURY

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Strong Indictment

Long after the last American has been withdrawn from Indochina, the United States will still be facing the consequences of its participation in that theater in terms of human misery. Hundreds of thousands of wounded, many with permanently crippling injuries, will remind generations yet unborn of the cost America paid.

Perhaps more destructive, in terms of human lives, are the thousands returning from Indochina with sound limbs but bodies hooked on narcotics. Reports of drug usage by American servicemen serving in Vietnam have appeared almost from the beginning of the involvement. But the full extent of addiction on drugs such as heroin has not been revealed until recently.

A report prepared by two congressmen who toured Indochina and prepared their findings on drug usage for the House Foreign Affairs Committee reveals how widespread the problem has become. The study by Rep. Robert Steele of Connecticut and Rep. Morgan F. Murphy of Illinois backs up earlier allegations by the House Armed Services Committee on widespread corruption among Asian officials in drug traffic.

"In Laos, government armed forces

are major wholesalers of opium and heroin and have been directly involved in large scale smuggling activity," the two congressmen reported.

"Reliable sources report that at least two highranking Laotian officials, military and governmental, including the chief of the Laotian general staff, are deeply involved in smuggling activity," they said.

"In Thailand, a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reported to be one of the key figures in the opium, morphine base and heroin operations in that country and throughout Southeast Asia."

South Vietnamese and Laotian Air Force planes are used to move the illicit cargo into South Vietnam, Steele and Murphy charged. They also said there is evidence some of the narcotics are being shipped by diplomatic pouch on Air America, a CIA-backed airline.

Steele estimates as many as 20 percent of Americans in Vietnam have used heroin. If only half the charges made by this latest study are true — and thus far no part of the report has been refuted — it is a damaging indictment of the allies America has paid such a high price to defend in Southeast Asia.

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ment in Veterans' Administration hospitals.

The VA has made plans to provide 30 special units to care for narcotics victims by July 1972, with five units already in operation capable of treating 200 addicts each. Yet those dishonorably discharged prior to the enlightened Pentagon policy still cannot receive VA treatment.

Therefore, I am introducing today a bill which would authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to provide care and treatment for certain former members of the Armed Forces addicted to narcotic drugs. The "certain" members are those who were discharged dishonorably, because of drug addiction.

I believe it is important for the Armed Forces to assert national leadership in identifying drug abusers, and once recognized, insure that treatment and rehabilitation are available to all who have served their country. This is no less important for those addicts now serving on active duty who are now receiving treatment as it is for those who were treated punitively in being released dishonorably from the Army. Military leadership in handling the drug problem would be a distinct contribution toward the abatement of this national tragedy.

The bill which I am introducing today provides the possibility of treatment for thousands who have been sent home with an addiction which is all too often supported by regular criminal activity. It is madness to allow the military to return addicts to civilian life and not provide for their treatment.

OPIMUM TRAFFIC IN INDOCHINA

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the RECORD a news article on the recent testimony of John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, before the House Select Committee on Crime during hearings on the importation of opium into the United States. The article was written by Tom Foley and appeared in the Los Angeles Times on June 3.

Mr. Foley's coverage of the proceedings of that day are excellent and describe some of the startling findings we learned on the involvement of the governments and some high officials in many Southeast Asia countries in illegal drug traffic.

I commend this article to the attention of all who have an interest in this subject.

[From the Los Angeles Times, June 3, 1971]
ASIAN OFFICIALS PROTECT HEROIN SALE, PANEL TOLD—THEY MAY PROFIT FROM SUPPLYING DRUGS TO U.S. SOLDIERS, NARCOTICS CHIEF SAYS

(By Thomas J. Foley)

WASHINGTON.—The government's chief narcotics enforcement officer said Wednesday that officials of friendly Southeast Asia governments are protecting and profiting

have an interest in heroin traffic to American servicemen in Vietnam.

In testimony before the House Crime Committee, John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, also said Heroin had been unwittingly smuggled into South Vietnam on airplanes of the CIA-operated Air America.

Committee Chairman Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) and other members urged the Administration to take a stronger stand with foreign friendly governments to force a halt to illicit drug traffic.

These included Turkey and France, which respectively grow and process the overwhelming amount of the opium smuggled into the United States as heroin.

RIGHT TO ASK AID

"We're committed to risk our own cities in a nuclear war if any French city is attacked by the Communists," Pepper said, "and we have the right not only to ask but to demand that the French take emergency action to help us."

Ingersoll, who recently returned from discussions with Southeast Asia leaders on the heroin problem, said he doubted that any policy-making officials of the countries—Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam—are involved in the illicit drug traffic.

Burma, Thailand and Laos account for about 80 percent of the world's opium production, he said.

But he told newsmen after the hearing that many lower-level officials, including members of the South Vietnamese Legislature, deal in opium. He said some legislators have friends in President Nguyen Van Thieu's cabinet.

Ingersoll told the committee that heroin refineries were under control of insurgents in Burma and Thailand but that those in Laos are protected by elements of the royal Laotian armed forces.

RAMPARTS DISCLOSURES

He said that white management and ownership of the Laotian refineries appear to be primarily in the hands of ethnic Chinese citizens of that nation, "some reports suggest" that a senior Laotian air force officer may have an ownership interest in some of the plants.

When Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D-Calif.) noted that Ramparts magazine had identified the official as Gen. Ouane Rathiquone, Ingersoll replied that "general speculation" concealed this.

Ingersoll denied one contention of the Ramparts article. It maintained that remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang army left in the area are involved in heroin production and are in the employ of the CIA for operations on the China mainland.

But Ingersoll conceded that Air America planes had been used in the past for smuggling heroin—just as regular commercial airliners have been used to smuggle it into the United States.

He told newsmen later that 80 kilograms were seized on an Air America plane at the huge Tan-Son Hut Air Base outside Saigon only three or four weeks ago.

During the hearing, Waldie also asked Ingersoll about a Ramparts report that the secret CIA base of Long Cheng, used to support the U.S.-paid Meo tribesmen, was a distribution point for heroin to be shipped into South Vietnam.

Ingersoll said he had not heard of that. However, he later said he had discussed the general illicit drug problem with CIA Director Richard Helms. He said Helms denied the CIA was involved in any way, and that he believed him.

"The Meo tribesmen are something else," Ingersoll said, "but I don't blame the CIA for what the tribesmen do."

POOR CIA SECURITY

Waldie said CIA security was apparently "abysmal" since those in the CIA em-

ploy used the base and facilities for the illicit traffic."

The narcotics chief sought to allay criticism by congressmen of U.S. efforts to get the cooperation of the Asian governments to crack down on the drug traffic.

He said the United States had virtually no leverage over the Burma government, since the last existing aid program is being phased out. The opium-growing area in Thailand is in the hands of insurgents, Ingersoll said, but the Bangkok government is taking steps to try to control it.

He said Laotian officials were "most responsive" even though some high-ranking officials were involved.

VIETNAM SMUGGLING

Ingersoll said the Saigon government had taken several steps to crack down on the smuggling, including a shakeup of its customs officials, an increase in the size of its central police force dealing with the problem and the appointment of a special task force by President Thieu.

He also said he was assigning three additional agents to the Far East and that the Defense Department had placed off limits areas of open heroin dealing.

A SYMBOLIC FLAG CEREMONY

HON. FRANK HORTON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, during these times, when, on one hand, the patriotism of some of our Nation's finest leaders is questioned; and when, on the other, it is often scorned to be patriotic, we must stop to consider what the flag and patriotism actually mean.

Sunday, in Rochester, N.Y., in my congressional district, I attended a flag ceremony at the Rochester Polish People's Home. It was the first flag raising at the home. I would like to share the ceremony with my colleagues for it vividly made the significance of the flag clear to all who attended.

Mr. Ray Gatz, president of the home, introduced the guests, who represented local, county, State, and Federal legislative bodies, as well as the Polish-American and American Legion Posts.

Officials included Rochester Mayor Stephen May, State Assemblyman Raymond Lill, City Councilman Urban Kress, Monroe County Legislators Nicholas Santaro and Sam Poppick.

County Judge Arthur Curran also attended. Judge Curran was especially aware of the value of the flag. He recently received the flag from the coffin of his son, a marine, who was killed in Japan.

Also present were James O'Grady, commander of the Michalski Post; Joseph Zabuchek, commander of the Pulaski Post; Joseph DeMeis, commander of the Monroe County American Legion Post; and Edmund R. Przynsinda, president of Hudson Avenue Area Association.

During the ceremony, I presented a flag which had flown over the Capitol to Mr. Gatz. It was blessed by Father Pietrzykowski and raised by Mr. Gatz. County Commander DeMeis led the Pledge of Alliance

June 15, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--Extensions of Remarks

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Our world is made up of individuals, and I think that in the individual is where any kind of a change or solution must start. It can't stop there, though, because it must eventually reach the top. For example, if a person is happy he won't mind separating his garbage for recycling, giving away some of his food or money, thinking of the other party before he demands more rights or throws a bomb. If he is happy he will have a concern for other people. If everyone did his individual part in helping to solve such major problems, and took down just one brick that wall would be gone in no time.

That is a lot of if's. How can a person be happy so he will want to do his part? As I've already said, happiness means different things to different people, but a full stomach, a roof over one's head, and a feeling of acceptance and security among one's peers usually helps. For those of us who are lucky enough to have these things already, happiness should be helping others to find them, also. Happiness is contagious, and even if you can't give a person what he needs most, a smile or a hello can sometimes mean just as much. Then maybe he will pass that smile on to another person.

Sometimes I have to stop to think, and assure myself that we, the people of this planet, are not going backwards—or becoming more violent, egotistical, and antagonistic. I always manage to convince myself that we aren't although sometimes it appears that way because it's always the negative and not the positive things that we hear about. The number of people who truly care about other people is growing, and man is beginning to spread his concern over a wider circle of humanity. We usually care about our family and friends and we want them to be happy, but as the years go by there are more and more of us who care about the people in our city, state, county, and world as individuals. By caring, I mean wanting each person to be happy and secure and, wanting this bad enough to do something about it. If each inhabitant of this earth cared about the rest of mankind as individuals our brick wall would disappear, and I hope that we can destroy it before it crushes us.

I'd just like to see everyone here really happy and able to show it. Sometime—try saying HI to someone you don't know—take off the mask for awhile—really feel the smile you are giving everyone—forget your problems—make someone else happy—and if you can't do that at least you can be happy.

Well, I know what I can do to make everyone happy now—that is to end this speech so that we can all get out of this wind. Have a happy day tomorrow! and make it happy for someone else too. The world is only what we make it—so let's make it happy!

ANNIVERSARY CONGRATULATIONS
TO FATHER WALSH

HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR.

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, congratulations are in order for Father Gerald W. Walsh who celebrated the 25th anniversary of his ordination to the Holy Priesthood on June 1, 1971. Father Walsh returned to St. Mary's Church in Nutley, N.J. where he had spent his early priesthood to perform a special mass with St. Mary's pastor, Msgr. John J. Feeley.

Father Walsh is an ardent contributor to both his parish and his community.

His humane spirit pervades all who know him. Let me offer my warmest thanks for his devoted service and wish him continued personal fulfillment in the future.

THAIS "VOLUNTEERS" IN LAOS

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the Record a second article by Tammy Arbuckle on his recent findings in Southeast Asia which appeared June 7th in the Washington Evening Star.

I believe it sheds further light on the military interests and activities of the Thai Army in Laos and the corresponding role of the United States.

The article follows:

THAIS IN LAOS IDENTIFIED AS REGULARS
(By Tammy Arbuckle)

VIENTIANE, LAOS.—Despite official statements that the Thai forces serving in Laos are volunteers without official sanction from the Bangkok government, informed sources here say they are regular Thai army troops.

The sources said the troops sent here keep their Thai army rank and salary as well as the salary paid by the Americans.

Some Thai units come here in a group, said the sources, adding that Thailand's 9:0th Battalion presently is garrisoned on Hill 1663 west of Ban Na on the southwest rim of the Plain of Jars in northern Laos.

The Thais are sent to Laos on temporary detachment for six months or a year, the sources said. There are cases where units are formed from Thais of different units who have volunteered for certain duties in Laos, the sources said. However, these units remain part of the Thai army on loan to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the sources said.

The only voluntary aspect of their duty is that Thai soldiers are anxious for assignment to Laos because of the financial benefits.

Officials of the United States and Thailand governments insist the Thai troops in Laos, numbering at least 3,200, are volunteers. Thai officials, in particular, claim the troops have no official sanction from Bangkok.

(Even the number of troops is in dispute. As a result of U.S. Senate inquiries into the operation, the figure of 4,800 troops presently is given in Washington as the number of Thai troops on duty in Laos.)

The Lao military attributes the official Thai position to corruption. They say only certain members of the Thai government are pocketing payments from the United States, so the entire Thai cabinet may not be informed of the entire U.S. arrangements for Thais to fight in Laos.

Thai troops have been fighting in Laos since late 1964. The first Thai unit in Laos was a battery of 155mm howitzers based near Ban Khay village in the Plain of Jars.

Thai officers and men then were sent separately to guerilla units run by the CIA.

On Feb. 1, 1967, a reporter met one of these Thais at NAM Bac, Lao fortress 40 miles southwest at Dien Bien Phu. The Thai said he was a captain in the Thai army and came from Bangkok.

An American in civilian clothes was commanding his unit and was responsible for payment, he said.

There were at least 20 Thais with the captain at Nam Bac and Sits 217.

On June 25, 1969, the Thai Artillery unit

(which remained in the same place for five years while men were rotated) was overrun when North Vietnamese tanks broke through the neutralist Lao troops.

Following this attack, in which at least 30 Thais were killed, Bangkok insisted on having Thai troops protect the Thai gunners. Thai gunners also were sent to Long Cheng, further south, but this time several hundred—some sources say 800—Thai infantrymen were sent to protect the artillery.

Part of these units now are at Fire Base Zebra northeast of Long Cheng.

Recently Thai troops have served on the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos and on operations against Route Seven, the main Hanoi resupply route to its troops in northern Laos.

All troops under American control who need medical help are sent to Thailand directly, American officials say, so Thais have no worries if they are sick or wounded.

The Communist Lao radio claims over 300 Thais have been killed in action in Laos, but American officials say it's less than 200.

The Thai role, according to U.S. officials is to make up for heavy losses among the Meo tribesmen of Gen. Vang Pao, who have been fighting since 1960 against the North Vietnamese, suffering in the last three years over 8,000 killed in action.

The Lao army claims it's under strength and unable to substantially help Vang Pao because it's spread the length of Laos, facing the enemy. This claim, however, is suspect. Hundreds of unemployed young men roam around Vientiane in motorbikes. When Gen. Kouprasith Abhay, the Vientiane military boss, tried to conscript them, he found they are the sons of influential Laotians who protested conscription and forced Kouprasith to cease his activities.

Also, several thousand Lao troops are not gainfully employed but act as bodyguards, chauffeurs, office personnel or are building new villes for Lao officers.

Despite all this, it may be said that Laos still is woefully short of manpower as well as good field officers and some military discipline. Therefore, Lao needs help from its ethnic neighbors, the Thais.

The Lao however, don't want their neighbors in the western provinces of Champasac and Sayaboury, which the Thais covet nor in Mekong River towns where the Thai propensity for the spoils of war may match that of Saigon troops in Cambodia. Therefore, they are in the mountains of northern Laos where the Thais can do the most fighting and the least mischief.

HORTON PRAISES MRS. DONALD
LOETZER FOR HER AFFIRMATION
OF AMERICA

HON. FRANK HORTON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, during these times of protest by our Nation's youth, the very philosophies upon which this country was established are being questioned. At times, anti-American sentiments and acts seem to overshadow positive feelings for this country and our leader's goals.

There is little doubt that we must do what we can to foster respect for and understanding of this country among people of all ages, especially among our youth.

Concerned about the destiny of this country and about the young people who

AKRON, OHIO
BEACON JOURNAL

JUN 15 1971

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McCartney:

By JAMES MCCARTNEY
Beacon Journal Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Secret studies of U. S. involvement in Vietnam have confirmed -- in spades -- the worst suspicions anybody in this town ever voiced about government lying.

The so-called Pentagon papers show that the Johnson administration literally talked peace and planned war in 1964 — the year of decision.

They show that officials led the public deliberately and carefully into war — without telling what they were doing.

They show that U. S. involvement in the war was planned — orchestrated — by U. S. officials over a long period of time.

All this is laid out in meticulous detail in the 7,000-page analysis, excerpts of which have been made public the the New York Times.



Barry Goldwater

MOST SHOCKING is the careful documentation of behind-the-scenes war planning in 1964 while Lyndon Baines Johnson was campaigning for re-election as a "peace" candidate against Barry Goldwater.

The studies say that a "general consensus" was reached at the White House as early as Sept. 7, 1964, that air attacks probably would have to be launched against North Vietnam.

Yet — long after the Sept. 7 meeting — LBJ was specifically discouraging the notion that the U. S. had any plan to enlarge the war.

In a campaign speech on Sept. 28 in Manchester, N. H., he said: "As far as I am concerned, I want to be very cautious and careful, and use it (bombing) only as a last resort — when I start dropping bombs around that are likely to involve American boys in a war in Asia with seven hundred million Chinese.

"So just for the moment, I have not thought that we were ready for American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys."

THE "SECRET WAR" had been going on for months — with no announcement at all to the public.

A major phase of the "secret war" had begun on Feb. 1, 1964. The studies describe it as "an elaborate program of covert military operation against the state of North Vietnam."

'Pentagon Papers' Document Uninhibited LBJ Lying

The operation included:

ATTACKS by 25 to 40 U. S. fighter-bombers in Laos, most flown by CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) pilots.

U-2 SPY-PLANE flights over North Vietnam.

KIDNAPPINGS of North Vietnamese citizens.

PARACHUTE DROPS by sabotage and psychological warfare teams.

COMMANDO RAIDS to blow up bridges.

BOMBARDMENT of North Vietnamese coastal installations from the sea.

The Pentagon papers — prepared three years ago by a team of 30 to 40 government officials and private historians — say that the war actually was slowed down so LBJ could run as a "peace candidate." Officials were agreed on the need of military operations against North Vietnam — but held back on open action because of the election campaign.

THE U. S. ELECTION was considered a "tactical" problem which prevented the start of bombing in the North.

The studies say action was delayed because LBJ "was in the midst of an election campaign in which he was presenting himself as the candidate of reason and restraint."

"Trigger-happy" Barry Goldwater at the time was publicly advocating full-scale bombing of North Vietnam.

THE STUDIES convey an impression, say the Times, "that the war was . . . considered less important for what it meant to the South Vietnamese than for what it meant to the position of the U. S. in the world."

One secret memo said that 70 pct. of the U. S. objective in Vietnam was "to avoid a humiliating U. S. defeat," 20 pct. to keep South Vietnam out of Chinese hands, and 10 pct. to bring a better life to the South Vietnamese.

The U. S. has consistently taken the public position that it wants a negotiated peace in Southeast Asia — a position still taken by the Nixon administration.

The studies indicate that behind the scenes, officials did not want negotiations with the Communists in 1964 and often pursued policies deliberately designed to discourage negotiations.

What's the real truth now?

U.S. WAR PILOTS EXPOSE SPURS QUIT-VIET VOTE

STATINTL

By S.W. GERSON

NEW YORK, June 14 -- Despite President Nixon's feeble denials, official Washington is in a tailspin over publication of top secret Pentagon documents revealing massive government deception to sell the American people on U.S. aggression in Vietnam.

Impact on the government at home and abroad was regarded by most political observers as incalculable. In another country, such revelations would have brought down a government.

Repercussions of the exposure of systematic lying to the American people by a succession of American presidents to carry on an imperial aggressive policy were not clear as of today, but that official Washington is in a state of alarm was evident. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird called for a Justice Department investigation of the "leak."

The New York Times yesterday and today published -- apparently after some soul-searching in its editorial sanctum -- detailed stories on and excerpts from a 40-volume, 7,000-page Pentagon report on the origin and development of the war.

Commissioned in 1967

Former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, now head

of the World Bank, had commissioned the study in June, 1967. About 25 to 30 Pentagon experts helped draft the report, along with some figures in the academic world, according to the Times.

The revelations come shortly before a key vote Wednesday in the Senate on the amendment to set the date for withdrawal from the war, sponsored by Senators George McGovern (D-SD) and Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.).

The McGovern-Hatfield measure would order withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam by the end of the year.

Tracing the steady escalation of the war -- beginning with President Truman's support to the French colonialists in 1950 -- the Pentagon document also reveals details of the CIA-run war in Laos. On this score, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo) in a televised NEC interview yesterday termed the revelations "startling."

Senator Symington apparently had missed the series of exclusive article in the Daily World in June, 1970, by co-editor John Pittman, the only American newsman to have visited the liberated areas of Laos.

Pittman's first article, published more than a year ago in the Daily World, are today corroborated by the secret Pentagon study. Other facts that emerged from the huge report included these:

o President Truman gave military aid to France in her colonial war against the Vietminh and "set" U.S. policy.

o President Eisenhower sought to support the puppet South Vietnam regime, undermine the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (North Vietnam) led by Ho Chi Minh, and helped upset the 1954 Geneva settlement.

o President Kennedy moved from his inherited "limited-risk gamble" to a "broad commitment" to back the South Vietnamese puppet regime.

Johnson deceived voters

o President Johnson stepped up covert warfare against North Vietnam and began planning in the spring of 1964 to wage an overt war against Hanoi. In his election campaign that year, when he ran against Sen. Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate, Johnson sought to reassure the American people of his peaceful intentions.

o Long before the Tonkin Gulf resolution was adopted by the Senate in August, 1964, the Johnson Administration was planning provocative moves to create a justification for escalating the war and for heavy bombing attacks on North Vietnam. In fact, the term "provoking" appears in a number of the official memoranda made public. Assistant Secretary of Defense James McNaugh-

Continued

JUN 15 1972

STATINTL

CIA Trains Guerrillas

By Donald Kirk

Newsday Special Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has armed, equipped and helped to train a 2,000 man guerrilla force on and near the Communist-controlled Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos.

Highly informed sources here report that the CIA has built up the force, composed mainly of local tribesmen, in the past year in response to the threat posed by North Vietnamese troops, who overran the Bolovens a month ago and now are menacing the Mekong River lowlands.

According to those sources, the CIA is training tribesmen in half a dozen centers west of the plateau from Savannakhet to Pakse, key military and commercial towns on the Mekong still held by Lao troops. Lao Army officers provide the basic training, the sources said, but CIA operatives advise them and supply arms and ammunition daily.

The sources compared the buildup in southern Laos of the Special Guerrilla Unit Battalions, as they are known, with the formation a decade ago of a much larger force of Meo tribesmen in the north. The Meo army, after reaching peak strength of 40,000 men in the mid 1960s, has dwindled to approximately 6,000 after suffering a series of crushing defeats at the hands of North Vietnamese troops. Informed sources here and in Pakse indicated that the new clandestine battalions would not attempt to confront the North Vietnamese directly—or to recapture ground lost to the enemy on the Bolovens Plateau. Unlike the Meos in the north, the southern tribesmen specialize entirely in hit-and-run guerrilla tactics aimed at harassing and frustrating the Communists in regions never penetrated by regular Lao troops.

"These guerrilla units are much more aggressive than the Lao soldiers," an American official said. "They know the jungle. They're bush men. They can operate with a pocketful of bullets and a pocketful of rice." The official said that the guerrillas, drawn almost entirely from two tribes on the Bolovens, the Lo Ven and the Nghia Huen, often

were deployed on ambush patrols along the Ho Chi Minh Trail network, over which North Vietnam sends men and material through southern Laos to South Vietnam and Cambodia.

"They go on foot in groups ranging up to 18 or 20 men," an experienced military source said. "They carry claymore mines and other weapons, establish themselves in likely places and wait for something to come. They're supposed to ambush trucks and columns." The various sources admitted that they were uncertain of the success of such expeditions. "Sometimes they really do well," one analyst said. "And sometimes they sit around for a week and hit nothing. Other times it's hard to get accurate reports on just what they do hit."

Officials estimated that "a dozen teams" of guerrillas were generally posted on the trail network all the time. Still other teams ambush North Vietnamese troops further west, where the Communists are attempting to solidify their gains on the Bolovens Plateau and enlarge their road system.

One prime inducement for joining a Special Guerrilla Unit is the pay, which is considerably higher than that granted to Lao army soldiers and astronomical compared to the subsistence income on which most tribesmen manage to live. The sources said that the average was around \$50 a month when the guerrillas were engaged in full-time field operations. That figure compares with an average Laotian per capita income of approximately \$65 a year.

Another inducement is the assigning of recruits to the regions where they were born and have lived all their lives. "They're fighting for their ancestral lands," an official said. "They know the terrain, and they're highly motivated."

Other sources, however, noted that tribesmen tend to desert quite frequently and return to their homes and visit friends and relatives. "There isn't too much can be done about desertions or long leaves," a military analyst said. "They have a way of coming and going when they please." Lao officials—and their CIA advisers—attempt to imbue some sense of national spirit into guerrillas during their training. "There's not that much you can tell them about jungle fighting," one source said, "But you can try to propagandize them."

in Laos

The Central Intelligence Agency avoids as much as possible an appearance of direct involvement in the operation. "It's done by remote control," an American said, explaining the CIA's relationship to the guerrilla units. "The direct commanders are Royal Lao Army officers. The Americans are well in the background." CIA operatives, in fact, work out of offices in Savannakhet and Pakse ostensibly run by the civilian U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). The official CIA cover is the Research Management Bureau to which CIA personnel are often assigned. Research Management headquarters for Laos is on the main AID compound here.

CIA operatives also participate directly in certain training and ambush missions, according to some informants. Analysts said that a "hard core" of one-time Special Forces officers, until recently assigned by the CIA to train the Meo army in the North, has moved to southern Laos to assist in forming the Special Guerrilla Units. The CIA, besides, is reported to be training Cambodian and Thai guerrillas to penetrate regions controlled by North Vietnamese troops in Northern and Northeastern Cambodia. One such camp purportedly is on an island in the Mekong River south of Pakse.

A bitter irony in the creation of guerrilla units in Laos, however, is the little appreciation shown there by the lowland Lao, who view all tribal members as racial, social and intellectual inferiors. In southern Laos, for instance, Lao refer to tribesmen, regardless of their tribal affiliation, as "kha." "The word meant 'slave' originally," an American in Pakse said. "It's almost as bad as calling a black man a 'nigger.' The 'kha' are the only people fighting on our side beyond the Mekong River valley, but the Lao don't give a damn as long as they don't have to do the fighting themselves."

HACKENSACK, N. J.
RECORD

E - 144,254
S - 164,048

JUN 15 1977

Watchdogs As Coconspirators

Sen. Clifford Case is disturbed, and rightly so, about the power of the Central Intelligence Agency to have his colleagues keep secrets from one another. Especially incensing Mr. Case is the subterfuge by which all the members of the Senate, including those on the Foreign Affairs and Appropriations Committees, were kept in the dark on the United States financing of Thai mercenaries fighting in Laos.

It seems that a tight little Senate watchdog subcommittee was privy for more than a year to the fact that CIA funds were being paid to the Thais but never told their colleagues. This watchdog group was appointed originally to oversee CIA use of funds that are never specified in the agency's budget.

The CIA is a curious organism whose intelligence activities have a considerable effect on United States foreign policy. Often the agency acts as a government within a government. It gathers intelligence data, digests it, and uses the conclusions to mount operations of its own, sometimes without consultation even with the military. Its operation phase is not divorced from its gathering of data. There is, therefore, no check on whether the operations being carried out are consistent with the data gathered or

even whether they are in the interest of U.S. global policy.

To curb this almost limitless leeway the congressional watchdog group was appointed in 1955. The committee has met only three times in the past two years. Far from being watchdogs, the committee members appear to have become coconspirators, a role never intended.

Sen. Case's point is well taken. There is room for secrecy in a democracy when the defense of the nation is at stake. There is little room for a kind of secrecy that not only doesn't trust the elected Congress of the United States but causes individual members to keep secrets from one another.

If the public doesn't have a right to know what the CIA is doing, its elected representatives should be presumed to be patriotic enough to know and keep the information to themselves, unless what they discover runs counter to the established policy and law of this country. In the case of the Thai mercenaries this was information that concerned the conduct of the war in Indochina. Congress did not declare this war. Its members should at least have the right of access to information on how and for what reasons it is being continued.

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the opening of the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam in the first half of 1965. Except where excerpting is indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Letter From Rostow Favoring Commitment of Troops by U.S.

Personal letter from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dispositions and Political Signals."

Following on our conversation of last night I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we wish to send.

The signal consists of three parts:

a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 accords;

b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage;

c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if they are so minded.

Four points follow.

1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a US ground force commitment of some kind:

a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sit during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.

b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; and, therefore the possibility of radically extending their position on the ground at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out.

c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two moves ahead; namely, they might be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected US retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack.

2. The first critical military action against North Vietnam should be designed merely to install the principle that they will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to retaliatory attack in the north for continued violations for the 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words, we would signal a shift from the principle of no retaliation to the principle of retaliation.

This means that the initial use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as possible. It is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for tat.

3. But our force dispositions to accompany an initial retaliatory move against the north should send three further signals lucidly:

a. that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up direct and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required;

b. that we are prepared to face down any form of escalation North Vietnam might mount on the ground; and

c. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the form of increased aircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sitting off China distinguished from the force in the South China Sea.

4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions without raising seriously the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to land immediately in the Red River Delta, in China, or seek any other objective than the re-installation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

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Nov. 23, 1964
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appreciation of the view in Hanoi and Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem. I agree almost completely with SNIE 10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the critical passages:

"While they will seek to exploit and encourage the deteriorating situation in Saigon, they probably will avoid actions that would in their view unduly increase the chances of a major US response against North Vietnam (DRV) or Communist China. We are almost certain that both Hanoi and Peiping are anxious not to become involved in the kind of war in which the great weight of superior US weaponry could be brought against them. Even if Hanoi and Peiping estimated that the US would not use nuclear weapons against them, they could not be sure of this. . . .

"In the face of new US pressures against the DRV, further actions by Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a considerable extent on their estimate of US intentions, i.e., whether the US was actually determined to increase its pressures as necessary. Their estimates on this point are probably uncertain, but we believe that fear of provoking severe measures by the US would lead them to temper their responses with a good deal of caution. . . .

"If despite Communist efforts, the US attacks continued, Hanoi's leaders would have to ask themselves whether it was not better to suspend their support of Viet Cong military action rather than suffer the destruction of their major military facilities and the industrial sector of their economy. In the belief that the tide has set almost irreversibly in their favor in South Vietnam, they might

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's history of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 1964, to February, 1965, the period in which the bombing of North Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Rusk Cable to Embassy in Laos On Search and Rescue Flights

Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the United States Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug. 26, 1964. A copy of this message was sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing Americans, Thais and Lao. You are also hereby granted as requested discretionary authority to use AA pilots in T-28's for SAR operations when you consider this indispensable rpt indispensable to success of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever situation permits.

At same time, we believe time has come to review scope and control arrangements for T-28 operations extending into future. Such a review is especially indicated view fact that these operations more or less automatically impose demands for use of US personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increased AA capability clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not

be desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize T-28 operations are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna's position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of operations and-or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible extension T-28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septel.)

On central problem our understanding is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Command Center with [word illegible] in effective control, but that this not true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm control.

Request your evaluation and recommendations as to future scope T-28 operations and your comments as to whether our impressions present control structure correct and whether steps could be taken to tighten this.

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it might be used by Souvanna as bargaining counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that he attend conference as head of Laotian Government. Remaining condition would be cease-fire. While under present conditions cease-fire might not be of net advantage

to Souvanna--we are thinking primarily of T-28 operations--Pathet Lao would no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could press for effective ICC policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of importance in upcoming period.

3. Above is written with thought in mind that Polish proposals [one word illegible] effectively collapsed and that pressures continue for Geneva [word illegible] conference and will no doubt be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRV naval attacks. Conference on Laos might be useful safety valve for these generalized pressures while at same time providing some deterrent to escalation of hostilities on that part of the "front." We would insist that conference be limited to Laos and believe that it could in fact be so limited, if necessary by our withdrawing from the conference room if any other subject brought up, as we did in 1961-62. Side discussions on other topics could not be avoided but we see no great difficulty with this; venue for informal corridor discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicoms could be valuable at this juncture.

4. In considering this course of action, key initial question is of course whether Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdrawal precondition and whether, if he did, he could maintain himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about

Rusk Query to Vientiane Embassy On Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire

Cablegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the United States Embassy in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, with a request for comment, to the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Moscow, Phnompenh and Hong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the mission at the United Nations.

1. As pointed out in your 219, our objective in Laos is to stabilize the situation again, if possible within framework of the 1962 Geneva settlement. Essential to stabilization would be establishment of military equilibrium. Moreover, we have some concern

that recent RLG successes and reported low PL morale may lead to some escalation from Communist side, which we do not now wish to have to deal with.

2. Until now, Souvanna's and our position would require Pathet Lao withdrawal from areas seized in PDJ since May 15

14 JUN 1977

Hanoi Spreads Out

Despite its proximity to the main theater of operations in Indochina, the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos long remained one of the war zone's most tranquil oases. For years, a spirit of accommodation between the highlanders and the local Communists kept the lush, coffee-rich region comparatively peaceful. And even the presence of a few bands of U.S.-sponsored guerrillas did not drag the plateau into the larger conflict. Last month, however, in a series of well-coordinated attacks, Communist battalions suddenly swept into the area, forcing Laotian units into a hasty retreat and taking full command of the plateau. And by last week, the North Vietnamese were busily carving out storage areas in the plateau's deep, dark gullies and building new roads that seemed destined to become part of the growing Ho Chi Minh Trail network.


The effort to expand their north-south supply system seemed to be at the root of the North Vietnamese thrust. Since the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville (now Kompong Som) was closed to Communist ships early last year, Hanoi has had to rely almost exclusively on trails through the Laotian panhandle to supply its forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia. And four months ago, the U.S.-supported South Vietnamese invasion of southern Laos placed an added strain on Hanoi's narrow logistical pipeline. For although the operation by no means succeeded in wiping out the durable Ho Chi Minh Trail, it did momentarily disrupt the eastern portion of the intricate network—and sparked apprehension in Hanoi that the South Vietnamese might come back again and again.

Route: Confronted by that fear—and the fast-approaching monsoon season—the North Vietnamese had little alternative but to expand the trail westward. Using firepower and manpower that have long been more than a match for even the best units of the woefully weak Royal Laotian Army, the Communists routed some thirteen Laotian battalions that were guarding the approaches to the Bolovens Plateau. Even the CIA-trained Jungle Tiger mercenaries were no match for the advancing Communists. In less than a day of heavy fighting, the North Vietnamese captured the key city of Pak Song. They also gained firm control over Routes 23 and 16, leading from the eastern trails to the Mekong River, and over other open roads to the south.

For the time being at least, few ob-

servers expected the North Vietnamese to push any farther. In order to take the strategic Mekong River towns of Pakse and Savannakhet, the Communists would have to fight through stiff Laotian fortifications—and might risk a tough reaction from the neighboring Thais. And with the plateau and the provincial capitals of Attopeu and Saravane (both seized last year) under North Vietnamese command, Hanoi seemed to have achieved its primary goal: securing reliable supply lines to its forces in the south.

Hot Water: Yet despite the Communists' apparently limited objectives, the latest North Vietnamese thrust has caused unusual reverberations in the sleepy Laotian capital of Vientiane. Even the politically sure-footed Laotian Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, has found himself in hot water. In the wake of the fighting, a powerful group of right-



Southern Laos: Expanding the trail

wing generals and politicians urged the neutralist Prince to "get tough" with Hanoi. Instead of trying to placate these power brokers, however, Souvanna issued his most conciliatory plea yet for peace negotiations with the pro-Communist Pathet Lao.

Souvanna's policy of quiet moderation has left him at odds with Prince Boun Oum, the influential head of the Champassak family, which owns virtually all of southern Laos. An ardent neutralist in the past, Boun Oum was reported to be outraged over the North Vietnamese take-over of his plateau. In fact, some observers believed that the loss of his private "plantation" might just push Boun Oum into joining with the generals to oust Souvanna. That still appeared to be only a distant possibility. But even before the North Vietnamese launched their wide-ranging attacks, one Laotian general had predicted: "It may take us some time, but if the Bolovens falls, Souvanna Phouma is finished."

14 JUN 1977

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U.S. Planned Before Tonkin For War on North, Files Show

By Murrey Marder
and Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Johnson administration planned for major American military action against North Vietnam nearly five months before the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident, according to secret government documents made public yesterday by The New York Times.

These plans were made, the documents show, at a time when the United States already was directing clandestine sabotage operations in the North.

Two months before the attack on two American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, the administration sent a Canadian diplomat, J. Blair Scaborn, on a secret mission to Hanoi where he is quoted as telling Premier Pham Van Dong that "in the event of escalation (of the war) the greatest devastation would result for the D.R.V. (North Vietnam) itself."

It was the Tonkin incident—called totally unprovoked by the administration—which led Congress on Aug. 7, 1964, to pass a resolution declaring that the United States was "prepared, as the President directs, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force," to assist South Vietnam. It was on this resolution that President Johnson subsequently leaned heavily to widen the war.

The documents are part of a multi-volumed collection of records and comments assembled under the direction of then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The bulk of the documents disclosed thus far by the Times are of military origin but include some White House and State Department papers that reached the Pentagon. Other documents were only alluded to or quoted from in the newspaper's story.

A National Security Action Memorandum of March 17, 1964, presumably the result of a presidential decision, set out both the administration's political aims and the basis for its military planning. A cable sent three days later by the President to Henry Cabot Lodge, then the American ambassador in Saigon, illuminates his intentions.

The memorandum says that "we seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam" but "do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security."

Repeating language from a McNamara memorandum of March 16 to the President (language in part drawn in turn from a memorandum to McNamara on Jan. 22 from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor) the National Security Council document reflects the prevailing belief in what President Eisenhower had called the "domino effect" of the loss of South Vietnam.

Unless the objective is achieved in South Vietnam, it says, "almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance" or accommodate to Communism. The Philippines, it was judged, "would become shaky" and "the threat to India on the west, Australia and New Zealand to the South, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north would be greatly increased."

The policy decision, then, was to "prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian 'border control actions' as well as 'the retaliatory actions' against North Vietnam and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of 'graduated overt military pressure' against North Vietnam . . ."

The President's cable to Lodge says that "our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis on grounds—that 'overt military

action" then was "premature." Mr. Johnson offered as one reason that statement that "we expect a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties and action against the North will be more practicable after than before a showdown."

The President also told Lodge that part of his job then was "knocking down the idea of neutralization" of Vietnam, an idea advanced by then French President Charles deGaulle, "wherever it rears its ugly head and on this point I think that nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can."

The resulting contingency planning is shown in several documents. But other documents also show that as early as Dec. 21, 1963, a memorandum from McNamara to President Johnson referred to "plans for covert action into North Vietnam" that "present a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations" that should "provide maximum pressure with minimum risk."

This clandestine program became "Operation Plan 34-A," launched on Feb. 1, 1964. It was described in a National Security memorandum the next month as "a modest 'covert' program operated by South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalist)—a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect . . ."

One source yesterday said, in retrospect, that these covert operations were in fact "very modest—and highly unsuccessful." But they came to have profound significance in the Tonkin Gulf incident. McNamara, even in 1968 testimony reexamining the 1964 Tonkin affair, professed to know little about the plan 34-A operations. He told Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) that they were carried out by South Vietnamese against the North, "utilizing to some degree U.S. equipment."

"I can't describe the exact nature of the operations," Fulbright, "although I will be happy to try to obtain the information for you."

It was charged by then Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) that the South Vietnamese attacks on North Vietnamese forces in the Gulf of Tonkin caused the North Vietnamese to fire upon U.S. destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy. McNamara, in 1968, told the Senate committee, however, that it was "monstrous" to insinuate that the United States "induced the incident" as an "excuse" to take retaliatory action. The retaliatory action was the opening rounds of U.S. bombing attacks upon North Vietnam.

According to the information disclosed by the Times, the Plan 34-A operations against the North during 1964 ranged from U-2 spy plane flights to parachuting sabotage and psychological warfare teams into the North Vietnamese hinterland, sea-launched commando raids on rail and highway bridges and bombardment of coastal installations by PT boats.

These attacks were described as being under the Saigon control of Gen. Paul D. Harkins, then chief of the U.S. military assistance command, with joint planning by the South Vietnamese who carried out the operations themselves or with "hired personnel."

Even before these covert operations began, however, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were reported recommending "increasingly bolder actions" including "aerial bombing of key North Vietnamese targets" and use of "United States forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam."

After the August, 1964, Gulf of Tonkin breakthrough to more open U.S. involvement in the fighting, the published documentation shows recommendations for considerably expanded covert operations against the North.

A memorandum prepared for Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy shows that part of the clandestine operations against the North were suspended immediately "after the first Tonkin Gulf incident" on Aug. 2, 1964, but that "successful maritime and airborne operations" were carried out in October.

The documents discuss clandestine operations carried out not only from South Vietnam but from Laos, against North Vietnam and against enemy-held areas of Laos. One docu-

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COLUMBUS, OHIO
DISPATCH

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S - 318,040

JUN 13 1971

Oversight of CIA Is Vital

AMERICANS are fully aware their government, like every other nation, has an intelligence gathering apparatus and while the whole business of spying is inherently evil, it is necessary.

The primary U.S. spy group is called the Central Intelligence Agency and it operates pretty much in the dark as it seeks to provide its own unique kind of shield against any threat to this nation's security. Because of the very nature of the spy business, the CIA writes its own rules and laws and they very well may be in conflict with established statutes and mores.

EVEN THOUGH the CIA necessarily must operate in its own shadowy sphere, it requires financing. That comes from the American taxpayer, yet these funds are entirely secret, being seeded here and there in various departments of the federal budget.

Congress does attempt to maintain some contact with the CIA's doings through a little-known Senate watchdog subcommittee established in 1955. But this panel has met only three times in the last two years and not once so far in 1971.

A RECENT closed door session of the entire Senate delved into the doings of the CIA in Indochina. It was then re-

vealed the CIA, using American tax money, had been financing 4,800 mercenaries from Thailand to cross their border and fight Laotian and North Vietnam Communist troops in Laos.

Sen. Clifford Case of New Jersey is incensed by the revelation, contending this activity is not only a violation of a 1970 congressional ban against such incursions but is an example of the CIA "setting major policy."

THE INCURSION aspect of the Thai-Laos operation is nothing new on the CIA agenda. Witness history's recording of such places as the Bay of Pigs and an earlier bit of action in Guatemala.

But if the CIA is "setting major policy" by its Indochina program, then Americans are faced with a touchy problem. It well could be a case of one government agency creating a new "front" in one part of Indochina while the President is making a concerted effort to extract the American presence from another, Vietnam.

AN OVERSIGHT of the CIA is necessary. Its secrecy must be protected. But it cannot be permitted to "set policy" while carrying out its intelligence-gathering duties. Policy must be established by duly elected and appointed officials operating clearly in the open.

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 CHRONICLE

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Watchdog Panel Plan Challenged in Senate

BY MILES BENSON

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Washington—When the Senate barred its doors Monday and sat down to hear details of how the United States was financing mercenary Thai troops fighting in Laos, it was the first most senators had heard about the operation.

But a privileged handful apparently had known all about it for more than a year. They just never had told their colleagues.

This incenses Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., who feels his colleagues keep too many "major policy" secrets from each other—and from the public.

Watchdog Panel

The "insiders" were members of a little-known subcommittee set up in 1955 to act as a watchdog over activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The committee has met only three times in the last two years. It is the CIA that has been financing 4800 Thai mercenaries—the State Department calls them "volunteers"—in violation of a 1970 congressional ban, critics contend.

The secrecy surrounding the operation was defended by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., who argues that if all the other senators knew of it, it would not have been a secret.

But Case insists such a major policy move should be public business.

Burying Information

Case challenges the usefulness of the CIA committee, saying that it "serves as a means for burying information rather than bringing it out into the open."

And it's not just the CIA committee, Case contends, that is guilty of such "institutionalized secrecy." Another special panel operating the same way, he charges, is the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

"Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., for instance, never knew anything about the location of missiles around the world until he got on that committee, and he was startled by the information he got," Case declared.

The AEC committee is given access to classified information on the location and power of nuclear warheads the United States keeps at the ready around the world.

"The point is that information on major policy ought to be public information," Case said. "And the public's participation in these matters, through their representatives in Congress, is the real goal we are seeking."

Prior to the closed Senate session on Laos, Case doubted that even the CIA oversight committee had been informed of the mercenary operations.

Case's criticism of the CIA and AEC committees is countered by Jackson, who serves on both panels. He says they work so well that he wants another one set up to oversee the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a proposal he has been quietly pushing.

"These committees were set up on the theory that certain sensitive things should be on a 'need-to-know' basis," he said. "If you let everybody know, there is no longer a secret."

Asked if the CIA committee had been informed of the CIA support for Thai mercenaries in Laos, Jackson replied: "Yes, we were told. They have kept us currently informed."

The CIA oversight subcommittee, chaired by Sen. John Stennis, D-Miss., who also heads the parent Senate Armed Service Committee, has yet to meet this year. It last met March 20, 1970. It also sat Jan. 30, 1970. In 1969 it met only once, on Feb. 21. At each of the three meetings, the only witness was CIA Director Richard Helms. The committee met twice in 1968 and five times in 1967.

Besides Stennis and Jackson, other members of the committee are Symington, Peter H. Dominick, R-Colo., and Barry M. Goldwater, R-Ariz.

Laos:

How to Fight a War While Nobody's Looking

WASHINGTON—Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, who has something of the single-mindedness of the bulldog mascot of Yale, his alma mater, likes to recall how he wanted to go to Laos in 1965, only to be blocked by the American Ambassador in Vientiane. The Ambassador, it seems, did not want a Senator poking around in the clandestine war that that the United States was waging there.

Senator Symington eventually got to Laos a couple of years later, and in the past two years he has sent staff investigators from his Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee to that isolated Indochinese country. Last week, before an unusual secret session, Mr. Symington presented to the Senate the first detailed, comprehensive report on how the United States got involved in a clandestine war in Laos without the knowledge, much less the consent, of Congress.

Out of the Symington report emerged these principal facts about the American involvement in a war between the Royal Laotian Government on the one side and the pro-Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops on the other:

• The United States is spending at least \$350-million annually in military and economic assistance to the Royal Laotian forces. The Administration has publicly acknowledged only some \$52-million in economic aid.

• For nearly 10 years, American planes based in Thailand have been providing combat air support in northern Laos. In the past year, increasing reliance has been placed on the saturation tactics of B-52 bombers, raising a question in some quar-

ters of Congress as to whether American bombing is not contributing to the flow of refugees. They now total at least 700,000 Laotians out of a population of fewer than 3 million.

• On White House orders going back to the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the Central Intelligence Agency has been supporting a paramilitary force of at least 30,000 mountain tribesmen. With the Meo tribesmen decimated by heavy fighting in the past two years, Thais, now numbering 4,600, have been recruited with United States financial assistance to supplement the paramilitary force.

The Symington report was enough to force a public acknowledgement by the State Department that the United States was giving support to some "ethnic Laotians" from Thailand and "some Thais" who were fighting in Laos. But the way the State Department described it, they were just "volunteers"—the department took deep umbrage at use of the word "mercenaries"—who were in Laos at "the request" of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.

Fulbright's Comments

"A misrepresentation of the facts," spluttered Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The "volunteers," he said, "are recruited in Thailand," given "special privileges" for going to Laos and "are under the immediate tactical command of Thai officers."

The Laos issue is becoming another test case in the foreign-policy power struggle between the Executive Branch and the Senate. What brought this issue to a head was the introduction of the Thai "volunteers"—an action that may violate the spirit, if not the letter, of an "anti-mercenary" amendment by Senator Fulbright that was incorporated into this year's Defense Appropriations Bill.

The Fulbright amendment provides that no defense funds can be used "to support Vietnamese or other free-world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Governments of Cambodia or Laos." The amendment contains an escape clause that says that such support is permissible if required to insure the safe withdrawal of American

forces from Indochina.

At one point, in a letter to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the State Department argued that the President's authority to engage in a war in northern Laos was based upon Mr. Nixon's powers as Commander-in-Chief to take reasonable "measures" to carry out the withdrawal of troops.

But that was not the justification offered by the State Department for the recruitment of the Thai "volunteers." Rather, its justification was that the Nixon Administration had inherited a program "initiated" by the Kennedy Administration and which "evolved" in the two succeeding Administrations. Since this program of "volunteers" was already in effect, the department argued, it was not banned by the Fulbright amendment.

Legislative Haymaker

The more the State Department weaved and bobbed with its legal justifications, the more apparent it was that the Executive Branch was on the defensive about continuing surreptitious military activities in Northern Laos. And now Senator Symington is about to throw his legislative haymaker. He plans to introduce this week an amendment to the Defense Procurement Bill—an amendment stipulating that no more than \$200-million can be spent annually for military and economic activities in Laos without Congressional consent.

With that limit, virtually all the secret military activities would have to come to an end. Win or lose with his amendment, Senator Symington will have forced the secret war out into the open—and that has been one of his objectives ever since an Ambassador said he couldn't visit Laos.

—JOHN W. FINNEY

13 JUN 1971

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIET STUDY

Following are the texts of key of the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam December, 1963, through the Tonkin 1964, and its aftermath. Except where the documents are printed verbatim, typographical errors corrected.

McNamara Report to Johnson On the Situation in Saigon in '63

Memorandum, "Vietnam Situation," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.

In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.

(and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.

As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate time to secure the remaining government-controlled areas and work out from there.

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tially in recent months. General Harkins still hopes these areas may be made reasonably secure by the latter half of next year.

In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on the government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for cross-border operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would not be politically acceptable or even militarily effective. Our first need would be immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and this we are measuring on an urgent basis.

1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.

2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving little or no direction because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A specific example of the present situation is that General [name illegible] is spending little or no time commanding III Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs full-time direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has been pointed out to him both by Dean Rusk and myself

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 541,086
S - 697,966


JUN 12 1971

Flora Lewis

Press under fire from within

NEW YORK — It is hard to think of a time when the news media of this country were under heavier attack, certainly not during those years of yellow journalism early in the century nor during the purple journalism of the '20s.

Vice President Spiro T. Agnew keeps making news by calling the news media names. The latest is "paranoid"; "paranoid with fear, suspicion and loathing" is the way he put it to a group of broadcasters convening in the Bahamas.



FLORA LEWIS

So it may come as a surprise to the public that Agnew isn't as he poses, a lonely knight on horseback battling single-handed with the fiery dragon of the media. The much broader, much more devastating, much more painful attack is coming from within the news profession itself.

It hasn't made headlines. That privilege has been reserved for Agnew, and he would be right to criticize this sin of omission. But it has become an intense and sometimes stormy battle behind scenes.

TV and radio are somewhat less affected than the press because they depend on federal licensing and therefore are more frightened by sniping from the second-highest U.S. official than by the skirmishing behind the lines. Newspapers are becoming more upset by the argument within the craft.

AGNEW, EVER QUIXOTIC, tossed a bouquet saying that the United States has "the best, most professional news fraternity in the world," and then he went on to insist that they ought to turn their criticism on themselves "rather than screaming intimidation every time they are criticized by a public official."

The administration's aim, he said, was to get the press to "police itself against excesses that on occasion have been so blatant they have undermined the confidence of the public."

That is exactly what the trouble inside the newsrooms is about. Not only do few believe there is anything but misguided flattery in Agnew's compliment, but many believe it is quite true that it is our own fault that we've been losing trust.

But the insiders' criticism is that the media have far too long and too docilely done what Agnew wants them to do — taken officialdom's word without question. To the extent that public confidence has been lost, it is clear in the newsrooms that it is because the press has been too servile toward the men in authority and hasn't poked vigorously enough into

their pronouncements and explanations to find out what really has been going on.

There are periodical journalism reviews in this country and, of late, some little local papers devoted to the question of the problems and failings of the media. The need for critique is indeed felt to be urgent.

WHY DIDN'T WE SEE during the build-up in Vietnam that it was an open-ended commitment, as no-longer-so-secret records show, and why did we supinely accept official claims that only another 10,000 or another 25,000 troops would be sent? Why did we wait for the underground press to break the stories of the huge stockpile of poison gas and the trail of heroin along CIA-run routes in Laos into the blood-stream of thousands of GIs in Vietnam?

Why did we wait for Ralph Nader to find out what's wrong with our autos and for the surgeon-general to find out that cigarets can cause lung cancer and for riots to show how people were living in the ghettos?

These are the kinds of questions the U.S. media are having to face, mostly from the young reporters who are willing to look about them as well as look at public relations-type hand-outs.

They haven't been asked enough yet, or persistently enough. And if what Agnew sees in the responses are indeed signs of "paranoid," it's from having to acknowledge such a bleak record.

12 JUN 1971

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Americans Are Barred From Spy Raids in Laos

By WILLIAM JOECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 11 — The Nixon Administration has decided that Americans will no longer be permitted to enter southern Laos as leaders of teams keeping watch on enemy movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail network.

Before the South Vietnamese drive into Laos in February and March, Americans had been assigned to such missions. But they were then barred for fear an embarrassing incident might arise that would appear to contradict President Nixon's pledge that no American military men would be involved in ground combat in that Laotian campaign.

Well-placed Nixon Administration sources said that plans to resume the use of Americans on trail-watching teams after the South Vietnamese drive ended had been vetoed by officials at the White House and the Pentagon. The informants said that the decision had been made partly because of growing Congressional criticism of American military activity in Laos and partly because all military missions are being turned over to the South Vietnamese as the United States disengages from the war.

Officials conceded that the enemy's infiltration activities has gone down recently as small teams made up of South Vietnamese and Montagnard tribesmen have taken over the trail-watching missions. But they said there were other means of collecting information, among them aerial reconnaissance and special sensors planted along the trail.

American participation in the missions had come under a secret military unit known officially as the Studies and Observation Group. Established in 1964 as a joint venture of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army, it has been

involved not only in watching trails but also in attempts at rescuing prisoners and other highly sensitive missions in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam.

After a closed-door briefing of the Senate earlier this week, Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, declared, "Our activities in Laos have been carried out largely in secret, without Congressional sanction and outside the normal appropriations process."

Air Strikes a Factor

The main focus of Congressional concern has been American support of Thai and Laotian tribesmen who, led by Americans working for the Central Intelligence Agency, have been conducting both combat and surveillance missions against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in Laos. Extensive American air strikes throughout Laos have also been cited as a source of concern.

When the Studies and Observation Group was established, it was intended primarily for missions in and around North Vietnam.

Some of its teams are known to have slipped into North Vietnamese waters in fast boats to kidnap fishermen, who were brought to South Vietnam for interrogation on conditions in the North and then released. Other teams made up of refugees from North Vietnam were occasionally sent back by helicopter on spy or sabotage missions.

All such operations required advanced approval in Washington, the informants said.

In 1966, the unit was also authorized to watch trails and to spot targets for American bombers. The informants said that these tasks were undertaken by the Army alone, without C.I.A. participation. In late 1966 or early 1967, similar activity reportedly was extended to include Cambodia, again

without the participation of C.I.A.

Although the size of the trail-watching teams varied, a typical unit consisted of nine men—three Americans and six Vietnamese or Montagnard tribesmen. At the height of this activity, there were as many as 30 teams assigned to the Laos mission, but usually no more than two or three would be operating at any one time. The missions were said to have lasted from several hours to several days.

Information was sent by radio to a special aircraft flying along the border for relay to Air Force units and intelligence centers in South Vietnam.

According to the informants, the teams operated no more than about 20 to 30 miles inside Laos. Any watching of trails beyond that point, it was said, was assigned to special guerrilla units organized in Laos by the C.I.A.

Pentagon and other sources said that with the start of the South Vietnamese thrust into Laos, the leaders of the Studies and Observation Group were told that the Administration did not want to risk the embarrassment that would result from the capture of soldiers on an intelligence mission in Laos, even though, strictly speaking, they would not have been involved in combat.

'Still Has Some Missions'

After the South Vietnamese pulled out of Laos, the group, which has headquarters in Saigon, circulated a memorandum saying that it planned to resume its trail-watching activities. When the memorandum reached Washington, the group was told that the watching of trails would be carried out exclusively by the South Vietnamese.

"While the group's teams are under specific orders not to get involved in fighting," one officer said, "their job is to move in and out undetected. There are times when they have been discovered and have had to exchange fire with the enemy as helicopters came in to take them out."

The Studies and observation Group, it was reported, is not being disbanded at this point. "It still has some missions," an official said.

He added that the group could still be called upon to stage rescue attempts while American prisoners remain in Southeast Asia. He refused to discuss any other missions.

STATINTL

PONTIAC, MICH.
PRESS

E - 88,749

JUN 11 1970



Robert Barr

Secret Senate Sessions Are Rare and Strange

WASHINGTON—Secret sessions of the United States Senate are nothing common but in recent years the senators have managed to hold one or two every year.

Like the one last Monday, when the doors were locked, the guards stationed, and for three hours and 20 minutes the senators talked about whether or not the CIA was spending money to support Laotian troops.

It may be weeks before the "sanitized"—a polite word for censored—version of that debate shows up in the Congressional Record. Besides the Senators, the Nixon Administration gets a crack at deleting things it doesn't want outsiders to hear.

But even while that session was drawing to a close Monday afternoon the process of speculation and unofficial comment had begun.

Sen. Clifford Case, R-N.J., stood near the Senate chamber and the longer he chatted with reporters the more he revealed . . . but he kept telling everyone most of it was not new, anyway.

He said at least some of the senators had been unaware that about \$250 million—rather than \$150 million—was being spent by the United States for Laos to arm its own soldiers and keep its country strong. Sooner or later most of it will come out.

Meanwhile it will give reporters, historians and the more curious observers of Congress another chance to talk about secret sessions.

They appear to be an invention of the Senate. Reporters who watch the House have never heard of that body locking the doors for a secret session.

In the Senate the secret session, according to the records, got popular in World War II, when two were held in 1943 to talk about the war and about housing conditions in the country.

Then in 1963 during the Kennedy Administration the Senate held one to talk about the Pentagon.

Another was held in 1966 to discuss foreign policy and one occurred in 1968 to talk about the antiballistic missile system (ABM).

Then in 1969 ABM was discussed again in a secret Senate session and another was held that year to talk about the Pentagon.

Last year the Senate held two more but then it was to think and discuss the legislative plans of the Senate.

It may be that some day a courageous reporter will print something really secret that occurs at one of these sessions and that could be enough to stop the practice. (FNS)

(Robert Barr is a member of our Washington bureau)

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
 CHRONICLE
 JUN 1 1 1973
 M - 480,233

Waldie Says Envoy Picks AF Targets

Congressman Jerome R. Waldie said yesterday that U.S. Ambassador to Laos G. McMurtrie Godley had told him that he (the ambassador) made daily selections of targets for the U. S. Air Force.

"The ambassador was very frank," the Democratic Congressman who represents Contra Costa county said in a telephone interview from Washington.

"I saw his bombing room. It was about 10 x 10 feet with its walls covered by maps. The ambassador said he chose the targets and was responsible for them."

Waldie, who visited Indochina with Republican Congressman Paul N. McCloskey Jr. of San Mateo county in April, charged in a letter to his constituents that military decisions in Laos are not made by American military forces.

Instead, he said, military orders come from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "in the person of our Laotian ambassador."

"Congress could have and should have long ago voted to end appropriations to fund this mistaken policy," Waldie wrote,

The Congressman reported on an interview with a young American infantry lieutenant he met in the course of his visit to Indochina.

"A war can end in only two ways — it can be won or lost," Waldie quoted the 23-year-old officer as saying.

"When we leave, the Army of South Vietnam will make that decision. Since they are now the best equipped army in Indochina, they could decide to win. They might decide it will be easier on them and better for them, individually, to lose.

"But whatever they decide, that will occur whenever we leave — but not before . . . Vietnamization seeks to impose an American decision on the South Vietnamese. We won't succeed. They will decide in the last analysis."

CHARLESTON, W.VA.

GAZETTE

M - 63,294

GAZETTE, MAIL

S - 106,775 10 1977

Editorials--

U.S. Diplomacy's Utter Despondency Is Exposed

The State Department, in a rather roundabout way, has finally come out with an admission that it is paying Thai "volunteers" to fight in Laos on behalf of the Laotian government.

There was no accounting for the number of Thai mercenaries under contract to the State Department at the expense of U. S. taxpayers, although Sen. J. William Fulbright earlier had indicated that 4,800 Thai troops were so employed in Laos.

The cat was let out of the bag by way of a State Department defense of its clandestine activities as being "fully consistent with all pertinent legislation." This question was debated Monday in an

unusual secret session of the Senate to review the extent of American military involvement in northern Laos, and the State Department's defense of its action is highly questionable.

The fact is that, in approving defense appropriations for the current fiscal year, the Congress adopted a Fulbright amendment barring the use of mercenaries. But the State Department takes the incredible position that its continued employment of mercenaries is "fully consistent" with the law because the program of using "volunteers" in Laos predated enactment of the Fulbright amendment.

This is a position that defies reason, for it is to say that Congress lacks the power to outlaw any practice. The use of mercenaries may have been legal last year, but certainly it became illegal with adoption of the Fulbright amendment--and no amount of squirming can make it otherwise. The Fulbright amendment clearly was intended to stop the employment of mercenaries, and stop it must.

What is most distressing about the State Department admission, however, is that it exposes the utter despondency of American diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Instead of trying to inspire a defense of democracy by example and gifts of food and education, we permit the CIA to go on playing cloak and dagger games that would be laughable if they were not so tragic.

Certainly the State Department practice of employing troops of one country to fight in another kills off the domino theory, for if the Laotians are not interested in defending themselves no amount of propping up with U.S. dollars is going to make them more interested.

We should know by now that we can't buy allegiance, and if the Laotians show no inclination to put down the pro-Communist Pathet Lao in northern Laos, it is obviously futile for the United States to pay Thai troops to do so.

JERSEY CITY, N. J.
JOURNAL

JUN 7 0 1970

E - 86,224

Case Criticizes Colleagues

By MILES BENSON

Our Washington Bureau

When the Senate barred its doors Monday and sat down to hear details of how the United States was financing mercenary Thai troops fighting in Laos, it was the first time most of the members had heard about the operation.

But a privileged handful on the Senate floor apparently had known all about it for more than a year. They just never had told their colleagues.

This incenses Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., who feels his colleagues keep too many "major policy" secrets from each other — and from the public.

The "insiders" Monday were members of a little-known subcommittee set up in 1955 to act as a watchdog over activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The committee has met only three times in the last two years. It is the CIA that has been financing 7,800 Thai mercenaries — the State Department calls them "volunteers" — in violation of a 1970 congressional ban, critics contend.

The secrecy surrounding the operation was defended by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., who argues that if all the other senators know of it, it would not have been a secret.

But Case insists such a major policy move should be public business.

Case challenged the usefulness of the CIA committee, saying in an interview that it "serves as a means for burying information rather than bringing it out into the open."

And it's not just the CIA committee, Case contends, that is guilty of such "institutionalized secrecy." Another special panel operating the same way, he charges, is the joint committee on atomic energy.

"Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., for instance, never knew anything about the location of

missiles around the world until he got on that committee, and he was startled by the information he got," Case declared.

The AEC committee is given access to classified information on the location and power of nuclear warheads the United States keeps at the ready around the world.

"The point is that information on major policy ought to be public information," Case said.

"And the public's participation in these matters, through their representatives in Congress, is the real goal we are seeking."

Prior to the closed-door Senate session on Laos, Case doubted that even the CIA oversight committee had been informed of the mercenary operations.

"People, when they are given information in confidence," he said, "are very reluctant to even admit they've got any information."

Although the dispute continues over the legality of the CIA role in Laos, secrecy about the operation has been largely discarded. The State Department has confirmed that the United States is paying Lao and Thais from Northeast Thailand to cross the border and fight under Laotian command in Laos.

Case's criticism of the CIA and AEC committees is countered by Jackson, who serves on both panels. He says they work so well that he wants another one set up to oversee the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a proposal he has been quietly pushing in recent weeks.

"These committees were set up on the theory that certain sensitive things should be on a 'need-to-know' basis," he said.

"If you let everybody know, there is no longer a secret."

Asked if the CIA committee had been informed of the CIA support for Thai mercenaries in Laos, Jackson replied: "Yes, we were told. They have kept us currently informed."

Asked when the panel had been informed, Jackson said "it goes back several years." "Of course," he added, "that doesn't mean other senators knew about it."

The CIA oversight subcommittee, chaired by Sen. John Stennis, D-Miss., who also heads the parent Senate Armed Services Committee, has yet to meet this year. It last met March 20, 1970. It also sat Jan. 30, 1970. In 1969 it met only once, on Feb. 21. At each of the three meetings, the only witness was CIA Director Richard Helms. The committee met twice in 1963 and five times in 1967.

Besides Stennis and Jackson, other members of the committee are Symington, Peter H. Dominick, R-Colo., and Barry M. Goldwater, R-Ariz. It is customary for Stennis to invite top-ranking members of the Appropriations and Foreign

Relations Committees to sit with the CIA subcommittee when it meets.



KANSAS CITY, MO.
STAR

STATINTL

E - 325,351
S - 396,682

JUN 20 1971

Case Critical of Secrecy Inside Senate Committees

Newhouse News Service
Washington--When the Senate barred its doors Monday and sat down to hear details of how the United States was financing mercenary Thai troops fighting in Laos, it was the first time most of the members had heard about the operation.

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Cut Off The Funds For Laos

If it seems irregular in a democracy to convene a secret session of the Senate to discuss United States involvement in a secret war in Laos, it is. But there may be some justification for the former if not the latter. Senator Symington of Missouri has been engaged in a commendable effort to bring the Laotian situation to public notice, and arranging for a closed-door meeting is a good way to attract attention.

Mr. Symington says that in the three-hour session he passed on to other Senators a report by two staff members of a Foreign Relations subcommittee disclosing that what is happening in Laos is "quite a bit different from what we had known was going on." The report is to be made public as soon as it is declassified by Government agencies, Mr. Symington says.

We rather imagine that if the document is ever published it will not reveal many secrets, for the Administration has made every effort to prevent the American people from finding out what the United States is up to in Laos. One reason apparently is that the United States is breaking the Geneva peace accords (so are the North Vietnamese) and does not want to advertise it.

It is more than that. A *Washington Star* correspondent in Vientiane quoted a top American diplomat as saying recently, "What we are doing here in Laos is totally inconsistent with our kind of society. We are fighting a war by covert means and an open society can't tolerate that."

Mr. Symington pointed out it is generally understood that the U.S. is supporting some 4800 Thai mercenaries in Laos; the Central Intelligence Agency has been revealed as back-

ing an indigenous Laotian army of unsavory repute. Just how much money these and other activities are costing is not known to the public.

The Senator notes that the only publicly announced cost of U.S. involvement is \$52,000,000 a year for economic assistance. Senator Case of New Jersey said after the secret session that expenditures appeared to be about \$250,000,000 a year, not including the huge cost of regularly bombing the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos. The *Washington Star* correspondent reported the defense of Laos is costing Washington 2 billion dollars a year.

Whatever the figure is, it is far too high. Mr. Symington wants to limit the expenditures to \$200,000,000 annually, exclusive of the bombing costs. Why should the Senate approve spending anything at all for a clandestine war, one patently conducted in contravention of the Fulbright amendment prohibiting this sort of expenditure in Laos or Cambodia?

We think Senator Symington would do better to press for a cutoff of all military funds. Mr. Case says, "If we are involved in this, as we obviously are, how do we get out?" We get out simply by turning off the water. We have no business in Laos, and the proof of our wrongful involvement is the effort to keep it secret.

The American people ought to be given all the facts on Laos, not just the fraction interested Government agencies can be counted on to dole out. If what we are doing in Laos is inconsistent with our kind of society, let that be known and then let it be stopped. Let the Senate take a stand against any more funds for Laos.

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

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JUN 10 1971

Cut Off The Funds For Laos

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10 JUN 1971

STATINTL

VOLUNTEERS, BANGKOK INSISTS

Thais in Laos Identified as "Regulars"

By TAMMY ARBUCKIE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE, Laos — Despite official statements that the Thai forces serving in Laos are volunteers without official sanction from the Bangkok government, informed sources here say they are regular Thai army troops.

The sources said the troops sent here keep their Thai army rank and salary as well as the salary paid by the Americans.

Some Thai units come here in a group, said the sources, adding that Thailand's 946th Battalion presently is garrisoned on Hill 1663 west of Ban Na on the southwest rim of the Plain of Jars in northern Laos.

The Thais are sent to Laos on temporary detachment for six months or a year, the sources said. There are cases where units are formed from Thais of different units who have volunteered for certain duties in Laos, the sources said. However, these units remain part of the Thai army on loan to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the sources said.

The only voluntary aspect of their duty is that Thai soldiers are anxious for assignment to Laos because of the financial benefits.

Officials of the United States and Thailand governments insist the Thai troops in Laos, numbering at least 3,200, are volunteers. Thai officials, in

particular, claim the troops have no official sanction from Bangkok.

(Even the number of troops is in dispute. As a result of U.S. Senate inquiries into the operation, the figure of 4,600 troops presently is given in Washington as the number of Thai troops on duty in Laos.)

The Lao military attributes the official Thai position to corruption. They say only certain members of the Thai government are pocketing payments from the United States, so the entire Thai cabinet may not be informed of the entire U.S. arrangement for Thais to fight in Laos.

Thai troops have been fighting in Laos since late 1964. The first Thai unit in Laos was a battery of 155mm howitzers based near Ban Khay village in the Plain of Jars.

Thai officers and men then were sent separately to guerrilla units run by the CIA.

On Feb. 1, 1967, a reporter met one of these Thais at NAM Bac, Lao fortress 40 miles southwest at Dien Bien Phu. The Thai said he was a captain in the Thai army and came from Bangkok.

An American in civilian clothes was commanding his unit and was responsible for payment, he said.

There were at least 20 Thais with the captain at Nam Bac and Site 217.

On June 25, 1969, the Thai Artillery unit (which remained

in the same place for five years while men were rotated) was overrun when North Vietnamese tanks broke through the neutralist Lao troops.

Following this attack, in which at least 30 Thais were killed, Bangkok insisted on having Thai troops protect the Thai gunners. Thai gunners also were sent to Long Cheng, further south, but this time several hundred — some sources say 300 — Thai infantrymen were sent to protect the artillery.

Part of these units now are at Fire Base Zebra northeast of Long Cheng.

Recently Thai troops have served on the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos and on operations against Route Seven, the main Hanoi resupply route to its troops in northern Laos.

All troops under American control who need medical help are sent to Thailand directly, American officials say, so Thais have no worries if they are sick or wounded.

The Communist Lao radio claims over 300 Thais have been killed in action in Laos, but American officials say it's less than 200.

The Thai role, according to U.S. officials is to make up for heavy losses among the Meo tribesmen of Gen. Vang Pao, who have been fighting since 1960 against the North Vietnamese, suffering in the last

three years over 8,000 killed in action.

The Lao army claims it's under strength and unable to substantially help Vang Pao because it's spread the length of Laos, facing the enemy. This claim, however, is suspect. Hundreds of unemployed young men roam around Vientiane on motorbikes. When Gen. Kouprasith Abhay, the Vientiane military boss, tried to conscript them, he found they are the sons of influential Laotians who protested conscription and forced Kouprasith to cease his activities.

Also, several thousand Lao troops are not gainfully employed but act as bodyguards, chauffeurs, office personnel or are building new villas for Lao officers.

Despite all this, it may be said that Laos still is woefully short of manpower as well as good field officers and some military discipline. Therefore, Lao needs help from its ethnic neighbors, the Thais.

The Lao however, don't want their neighbors in the western provinces of Champassac and Sayaboury, which the Thais covet nor in Mekong River towns where the Thai propensity for the spoils of war may match that of Saigon troops in Cambodia. Therefore, they are in the mountains of northern Laos where the Thais can do the most fighting and the least mischief.

nist conspiracy is fixed and unchanging: the destruction and death of individual freedom.

Along the way, the communists have many intermediate goals. Continually being revised, these intermediate goals are steps toward the ultimate objective. Many of them can be stated in plain terms. Here are some of the current intermediate goals:

Bring about acceptance by the United States of the Soviet policy of "co-existence" as the only alternative to nuclear warfare.

Soften Americans into a willingness to surrender—even though it may be called something else—in preference to self protection.

Develop the fatal illusion that total disarmament by the United States would be a great demonstration of moral strength.

Develop free trade among all nations regardless of communist affiliations, and destroy barriers to trading of military wares.

Extend long-term loans to Russia and its satellites.

Bring about American economic aid to all nations including those dominated by communists.

Grant diplomatic recognition to Red China and admit it to the U.N.

Set up East and West Germany as separate states.

Promote the United Nations as the only hope for mankind. If the charter is rewritten, demand that it be set up as a one world government with its own independent, supranational armed force—in line with the communist desire to take over the world through the U.N.

Resist all efforts to outlaw the Communist Party, U.S.A.

Do away with all loyalty oaths.

Protect Soviet Russia's ready access to the U.S. Patent Office.

Exploit technical decisions of the courts to weaken basic American institutions.

Use schools as transmission belts for socialism, insert the Party line in textbooks, and gain control of teachers' associations.

Incite student riots and demonstrations to stir up public protests against anti-communist programs and organizations.

Infiltrate the press, gain control of book review assignments, editorial writing, and policy-making positions.

Gain control of key positions in the radio, television, and motion picture industries.

Discredit American culture by degrading all forms of native artistic expression; seek control of art critics and art museum directors.

Eliminate all laws governing obscenity by smearing them as "censorship" and a violation of the rights of free speech and a free press.

Break down cultural standards of morality by promoting—especially among young people—pornography and obscenity in books, magazines, motion pictures, radio and TV.

Infiltrate the churches, discredit the Bible and emphasize the need for "intellectual morality" which does not need a "religious crutch."

Eliminate prayer or any religious expression in the schools on the ground that it violates the constitutional principle of separation of church and state.

Discredit the U.S. Constitution by labeling it as inadequate, old-fashioned, and a hindrance to cooperation between nations.

Discredit the Founding Fathers, and discourage the teaching of American history on the ground that it was only a minor part of the "big picture."

Support any totalitarian movement tending toward centralized control over any part of U.S. life.

Transfer powers of arrest from police to social agencies and treat all problems of behavior as psychiatric disorders. Dominate the psychiatric profession, using mental health

laws as a means of gaining coercive control over those who oppose communist goals.

Discredit the family as an institution. Encourage promiscuity and easy divorce. Emphasize the need to bring up children away from the "negative influence" of parents.

Lend credence to the lie that violence and insurrection are natural phenomena of the American way of life.

Overthrow all colonial governments in the world before native populations are ready for self-government.

RESOLUTION

Creating a select committee to conduct an investigation into all crimes against humanity perpetrated by Communists or under Communist direction, and to express the sense of Congress that a monument be erected as a suitable memorial to all victims of Communist actions.

Whereas, The United States of America has an abiding commitment to the principles of freedom, personal liberty, and human dignity, and holds it as a fundamental purpose to recognize and encourage constructive actions which foster the growth and development of national independence and freedom, and

Whereas, the International Communist movement toward a world empire has from its beginning adopted the means of terrorism, assassination, and mass murder as official policies to apply when their application advances the Communist cause of world domination, and

Whereas, there is considerable evidence that Communists in the Soviet Union and in other countries have deliberately caused the death of millions of individuals in Russia, Ukraine, Mainland China, Poland, Estonia, Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba, and other Captive Nations, and

Whereas, thousands of survivors and refugees from Communist campaigns of terrorism and mass liquidation have been forced to flee to the United States as refugees to find the freedom and dignity denied to them by Communist regimes and have become productive citizens of the United States, and

Whereas, it is fitting that the full facts of Communist terrorism in all of its various forms including assassination and mass murder be made manifest to all the peoples of the world so that such policies can be properly understood and condemned by all mankind toward the purpose of eradicating such policies from the body of mankind: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That—(1) The Speaker of the House shall within fourteen days hereafter appoint a special committee of twelve Members of the House, equally divided between the majority and minority parties, and shall designate one Member to serve as chairman, which special committee shall proceed to investigate all crimes against humanity perpetrated under Communist direction. The special committee shall report to the House the results of its investigation, together with its recommendations not later than one year following the appointment of its full membership by the Speaker.

(2) For the purpose of carrying out this resolution, the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act during the present Congress at such times and such places within the United States, whether the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned to hold such hearings, and to require by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents as it deems necessary. Subpoenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any member of the committee designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or member.

Be it further resolved, That—It is the sense of the Congress that a monument be erected in the city of Washington, D.C., our nation's capital, as a suitable memorial to all victims of international Communist crimes against humanity.

SECRECY IN LAOS

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 9, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I have recently returned from a trip to Southeast Asia with Congressman McCloskey and while there I was made acutely aware of the shroud of secrecy covering U.S. operations in Laos.

We were denied access to one of the places we wished to see and had a difficult time obtaining information on many phases of U.S. activities there.

I thoroughly protest this secrecy. The American people, after years of deception, deserve to know exactly what military role we are playing in Laos. The U.S. Congress must know to what purpose we are committing funds and men. We can no longer be led blindly to a tragedy such as Vietnam.

A very excellent analysis of this situation appeared on June 7 in the Evening Star in an article by Tammy Arbuckle:

UNITED STATES SEEKS TO HIDE SCOPE OF ITS ROLE IN LAOS

(By Tammy Arbuckle)

VIENTIANE.—American officials admit the U.S. mission in Laos is deliberately hiding the extent of American military involvement here.

"Americans may think they know what we are doing here," one official said in referring to frequent press reports on U.S. activities in Laos. "but we do not want Americans to look into their television sets and be able to see Americans going into action in Laos."

The official made his remark in a complaint about an American Broadcasting Corp. team led by Ted Koppel which tried to film Americans getting into a helicopter in the south Laos combat area two weeks ago.

"What we are doing here in Laos is totally inconsistent with our kind of society," a top U.S. diplomat here told a correspondent recently. "We are fighting a war by covert means and an open society can't tolerate that."

The diplomat explained that the U.S. was breaking the Geneva peace accords in Laos and "we don't want to advertise it."

The same official feels the embassy's policy of secrecy has been successful in not advertising U.S. infringements of the accords.

* * * frankly discuss the U.S. role in Laos, but a close look at just what is being hidden and how it is being hidden refutes this claim.

An example of this is U.S. air activities over northern Laos and parts of Laos other than the Ho Chi Minh Trail area.

These activities—anything from 60 to 300 sorties a day—are described in Saigon communiques, telling of attacks on the Trail as "in addition U.S. Air Force aircraft flew combat support missions in Laos for royal Laotian forces."

There is no further information, such as the numbers of sorties, the nature of the targets, the results, etc.

Resolution No. 141

Concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of New York to memorialize the Congress of the United States to take all necessary steps to persuade the government of Turkey to immediately destroy its opium poppy fields before the 1971 harvest in return for reimbursement to its opium poppy farmers of the damages suffered thereby from funds appropriated for that purpose by the State of New York and the United States Congress

Whereas, Death from an overdose of heroin represents the greatest single cause of death among the youth of New York City; and

Whereas, All efforts by local, state and federal law enforcement agencies to interdict the smuggling of heroin into the United States and its sale within this state have failed to curb this traffic; and

Whereas, On April 7, 1971, the New York State Commission of Investigation reported to the governor of this state that "Law enforcement's approach to this problem has been ineffective. The traffic in heroin has not been curbed. Indeed, it is flourishing"; and

Whereas, The New York State Legislature has four times in the last twenty years amended the anti-narcotic laws of this state to provide for both more severe and mandatory punishments for heroin traffickers with little effect on the traffic itself; and

Whereas, Despite every effort by New York State to curb the increases in the number of persons addicted to heroin, the number of identified addicts has increased in New York City alone from 52,000 in 1968 to an estimated 103,000 in 1971; and

Whereas, New York State is required to spend over \$100,000.00 annually directly for the care, treatment, rehabilitation and retraining of a small fraction of the narcotic addict population; and

Whereas, The Addiction Services Agency of the City of New York will have spent over \$80 million during the 1970-71 fiscal year to assist 3,500 addicts and would require \$2½ billion to treat and care for only 100,000 of the addicts now residing in the City of New York; and

Whereas, There are an estimated 15,000 narcotic addicts presently receiving welfare assistance from the City of New York at a direct cost of over \$50 million annually; and

Whereas, The major portion of violent and other serious crimes committed in New York City and the other cities of this State results from the tragic need of heroin addicts to obtain funds to pay for the heroin they consume; and

Whereas, In 1960, there were 1841 felony arrests in New York State of persons charged with selling narcotics or possessing narcotics in an amount sufficient to create a presumption of intent to sell and in 1969 there were 18,489 felony arrests in New York State for this same crime, an increase of 1000% and in 1970, in New York City alone, there were 26,799 felony arrests in this category, a 44% increase over the entire state-wide figure for the year previous, so that our law enforcement agencies are being overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of narcotic sellers and addicts being processed through our criminal justice system; and

Whereas, It now appears that the only practical solution to halt the continued flood of heroin into the State of New York is the destruction of the opium poppy at its source; and

Whereas, It would be less expensive and more effective for the State of New York to contribute toward the cost of preventing opium cultivation than to concentrate its resources in treating heroin addicts or combating the huge and profitable traffic in narcotics taking place on the streets of its cities; and

Whereas, Eighty-five percent of all of the heroin sold in the State of New York is re-

financed from the sap of the opium poppy (*papaver somniferum*) grown in Turkey; and

Whereas, Opium, unlike other dangerous drugs, cannot be synthetically produced, nor can it be cultivated in any but selected areas within the world; and

Whereas, To date Turkey has failed and neglected to control the diversion of its opium crop to illegal channels; and

Whereas, By the end of 1970, the Turkish government and nation has received in excess of \$5 billion in military and economic assistance from our federal government which monies were raised in substantial part through taxation of the citizens of this state; and

Whereas, The public statements of members of the Turkish Government on the problem of limiting the cultivation of the opium poppy in Turkey have evidenced an appalling lack of concern about the crisis caused in this state as well as this nation by Turkey's failure to strictly enforce the international treaty binding it to destroy all opium poppy production not grown for legitimate purposes; and

Whereas, Opium can be harvested only during one twenty-four hour period each year, which period occurs during the last week of June or the first week of July each year; and

Whereas, The illegal opium poppy production in Turkey intended for diversion to the heroin traffic can only be harvested simultaneously and from the same fields as those devoted to the legitimate cultivation of the opium poppy; and

Whereas, The world supply of legitimate opium presently in stock is sufficient to satisfy all legitimate needs for the foreseeable future; and

Whereas, Eighty-five percent of the heroin supplied to the addicts of this state can be interdicted if all the Turkish opium poppy fields now under cultivation were destroyed prior to the approaching harvest date, which destruction can be accomplished for a fraction of the present cost to this state resulting from the traffic in heroin; now, therefore, be it

Resolved (if the Assembly concur), That the Congress of the United States be and hereby is memorialized to take all necessary steps to persuade the government of Turkey to immediately destroy its opium poppy fields before the 1971 harvest in return for reimbursement to its opium poppy farmers of the damages suffered thereby from funds appropriated for that purpose by the State of New York and the United States Congress; and be it further

Resolved (if the Assembly concur), That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the Congress of the United States by forwarding one copy to the Secretary of the Senate and one copy to the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and one copy to each member of the Congress from the State of New York and that the latter be urged to devote themselves to the task of accomplishing the purposes of this resolution.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield me 2 minutes?

Mr. JAVIERS. I yield.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment, which I have cosponsored with the Senator from New York. The statements I shall make are not related particularly to the amendment, but to the fact that I do not want the statements I have uttered this afternoon on this floor to imply, either to the Members of this body or to the people of the United States, that we have passed all the legislation that is essential in the field of controlling narcotics addiction and drug dependence in this country.

Twice last year, the Senate cleared a bill or an amendment, once by unanimous vote, which then went to the House of Representatives and was killed. The second time, an amendment was adopted to another bill, went to conference committee, and was ultimately lost.

The field, indeed, is fertile in this country for civilian programs for health, rehabilitation, recovery, and prevention in the fields of narcotics addiction and drug dependence. If statements were made here today implying that everything has been done that needs to be done, they would be absolutely erroneous, and I know that was not the intent.

It was simply my intent to be sure it is understood that there is much yet to do.

I also want to point out that I attended the Vienna Conference on the Control of Psychotropic Substances. Members of the staff of the subcommittee I chair were there for approximately 3 weeks. Many philosophical differences were represented in the protocol that was eventually adopted. I have great question in my mind to this day about the strength and balance of that protocol or convention. It is my hope that hearings will be held on it prior to the time it is brought up in the Senate for approval.

I simply want to recite that many questions still are unanswered. The Record today should show that.

Mr. JAVIERS. I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. President, I think the discussion has borne out the reason why I said what I did—that is, we are not trying, in the same spirit as the amendment dealing with domestic affairs, to meet every situation headon. I hope the amendment will win the support of the Senate, because it is drafted precisely in that sense.

I am ready to yield back the remainder of my time if Senator STENNIS is.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me one-half minute?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield one-half minute to the distinguished Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the New York Times of last Sunday, an article by Felix Belair, Jr., entitled "CIA Identifies 21 Asian Opium Refineries," describes in great detail an analysis of the opium refinery operations uncovered in at least three countries. It is most pertinent to this subject, and I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

C.I.A. IDENTIFIES 21 ASIAN OPIUM REFINERIES
(By Felix Belair, Jr.)

WASHINGTON, June 5.—United States intelligence agents have identified at least 21 opium refineries in the border area of Burma, Laos, and Thailand that provides a constant flow of heroin to American troops in South Vietnam.

Operated and protected in Burma and Thailand by insurgent armies and their leaders and in Laos by elements of the royal Laotian armed forces, the refining and distributing have grown until white heroin rated 95 per cent pure is turning up in Pacific coast cities of the United States as well as in Saigon.

The Burma-Laos-Thailand border area,

AKRON, OHIO
BEACON JOURNAL

JUN 9 1971
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S - 203,112

Editorials

Outlawed Or Not, Our Use Of Mercenaries Continues

The secret war in northern Laos — secret because it violates a 1962 neutrality agreement which the United States endorsed — goes on unabated. At the expense of the United States, 4,800 Thai mercenaries and 32,000 Meo tribesmen, trained by the CIA, fight Communists.

U. S. involvement in this kind of war-by-proxy was supposed to have been stopped by an amendment which Congress inserted in the foreign aid appropriations bill last year.

But it hasn't stopped. In fact, according to Sen. Stuart W. Symington (D-Mo.), the Nixon administration wants to step up the pace of activity in Laos and has asked for \$374 million in economic and military aid for this little country next year. This would be far more than the administration has ever admitted.

In a 3½-hour closed session of the Senate Monday, Symington, J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) and Clifford P. Case (R-N. J.) are said to have demanded that the administration come clean with Congress and the American people on what is happening in northern Laos.

Meanwhile, the Nixon administration does not bolster its credibility with its legalistic justification of a mercenary operation which Congress sought specifically to outlaw.

Before the Senate went into secret session Monday, the State Department declared that the employment of Thai "volunteers" in north-


ern Laos was "fully consistent with all pertinent legislation."

How could this be?

Because, the State Department said, the mercenary program already was in effect when the legislation to stop it was passed.

Do contracts with Thailand and deals between the CIA and Meo tribesmen take precedence over laws passed by Congress?

President Nixon's State Department evidently thinks so.



STATINTL

Senate row over Laos builds

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The Senate heads toward new controversy over the United States military role in Laos, with Sen. Stuart Symington (D) of Missouri seeking a \$200 million ceiling on U.S. spending there.

While the Senate met in secret session Monday, June 7, to discuss Laos, the State Department confirmed that the United States is providing financial and other support to troops in Laos that it described as volunteers. The department said that the program is consistent with existing law. But Senator Symington said his personal opinion is that the law has been contravened.

A classified report prepared by two members of the Foreign Relations Committee staff reportedly tells of Central Intelligence Agency financial support for 4,000 Thai troops fighting in Laos.

The Christian Science Monitor, in a story by correspondent George W. Adiworth, reported last April 17 that Nixon-administration officials had hammered out an agreement with the Thai Government for financial backing for Thai troops to boost the South Vietnamese-U.S. position in Laos.

At that time, the Monitor reported, the U.S. was providing most of the financial backing for a force of between 4,000 and 6,000 Thais and that the Pentagon refused to discuss Thai involvement in Laos. On June 1 the Monitor reported that the U.S. role in Laos was causing contention in Congress.

Senator Symington said security classification prevented him from disclosing the amount spent on U.S. air and support operations for forces fighting in Laos. Some sources estimated the total to be at least \$250 million a year, and possibly much more.


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What's Happening in Laos Is Not Just the Senate's Affair

The U. S. Senate rarely goes into secret session. The time before last was in December, 1969, on the subject of Laos and charges of an escalating secret war in that landlocked semi-country bordering—moving counterclockwise—on North Vietnam, China, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

That session produced a heavily censored transcript and congressional action to bar the introduction of American ground troops in Laos and the expenditure of defense appropriations to finance foreign mercenaries in Laos as well as Cambodia.

This week, the Senate went into another secret session and on the same subject.

Two Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff members, after an inspection trip to Laos, reported that the U. S. is financing some 4800 Thai troops to defend the beleaguered Laotian government. Other charges have been made that the U. S. is financing mountain tribesmen for further fighting and is conducting heavy air support of government forces in the northern part of the country, where they are contending with the North Vietnamese.

So far, no transcript, censored or otherwise, has emerged from the Senate's secret proceeding. Presumably, one eventually will be issued. Meanwhile, more confusion than facts about our involvement has been brought to—we started to say "light" but that is definitely not the word—public attention.

The State Department has at long last conceded publicly that those 4800 Thai troops are fighting in Laos. But the State Department insists that they are legitimately being financed by the U. S. under a provision in the law permitting the President to take needed actions "to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U. S. forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

Is this a matter of semantics or substance? Impossible to tell, because like the rest of the press we weren't in the Senate galleries to hear the evidence which Sen. Stuart Symington, who had called for the secret session, submitted to his colleagues and the attending debate in which Sen. Clifford Case reportedly made an effective and "emotional plea to bring this thing out in the open."

How much bombing is going on, and where? Rep. Paul N. McCloskey, who spent three days in Laos recently, has charged that the government has deliberately concealed the extent to which American bombers have plastered villages in northern Laos, and the figures on cost range as high as \$2 billion a year.

Senator Symington, who comes from Missouri, says he intends to introduce an amendment to limit the amount that the U. S. can spend on its sundry operations in Laos to \$200 million—for economic, military and CIA assistance. Well, we come from Missouri too, in the figurative sense, and we would raise a couple of further questions.

If, as charged, the administration is flouting the will of Congress where its amendments of two years ago are concerned, what makes the senator think that it would not do the same again? But if, as the administration holds, it is acting "fully consistent with all pertinent legislation," the place to make its case is not in a secret session but in public.

We agree with Sen. Case. This thing should be brought out in the open. Our adversaries may be presumed to know what's going on in Laos. The people in Laos may also be presumed to know. The senators have informed themselves, more or less. But what about the America people's right to know?

The Senate ought to forget about secret sessions and open its doors to the public and the press.

Heroin trade profits behind GI addiction

By Irwin Silber

The U.S. Army is many things: an instrument for colonial war, the military extension of American foreign policy, a force for suppressing domestic unrest, a power base for the military elite.


But the several million soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines—and most especially those on duty in Southeast Asia—also comprise another unit of always inordinate interest to American capitalism: a market.

The GI marketplace has long been one of the most lucrative for thousands of enterprising businessmen who are earning fabulous profits on a great variety of products and services ranging from transistor radios and popular records to comic books and love beads.

One of the most profitable deals going in Southeast Asia these days is the marketing of hard drugs—mostly 95% pure heroin—to American GIs. The drug trade has become so big recently that a special congressional investigating committee just returned from Vietnam says, "The problem has reached epidemic proportions."

What's an "epidemic?" Conservative estimates concede that 10 to 15 per cent of all American enlisted men in Vietnam regularly use "scag," the popular term for heroin. With some 250,000 GIs still in Vietnam, this averages out to a minimum of 25,000 men. But the "experts"—the specialists in narcotics addiction and drug rehabilitation—assert that the actual figures are much higher. Some of these experts, defying Pentagon pressure to minimize the problem, estimate that some 60,000 American GIs in Vietnam, mostly draftees, are heroin addicts. Various surveys have shown that some field units have a 50% rate of "scag" users.

But it's dollars that tell the real story. The average



price for the unadulterated heroin most common in Vietnam is \$3 a "hit." Many GIs are getting five and six "fixes" a day, but using the most conservative figures, it all adds up to the fact that GI heroin addiction in Vietnam is at least a \$50,000 per day—\$20 million per year-operation. The Army admits to more than 100 deaths from overdoses in 1970. The 1971 rate is already higher, with 35 OD's reported for the first two months alone. These figures do not include what the Pentagon euphemistically calls "drug-related" fatalities.

The extent of drug addiction in Vietnam has been an open secret for several years. Songs and jokes about the use of marijuana began to crop as early as 1965. It is generally agreed that anywhere from 80 to 90 per cent of American enlisted men in Vietnam had access to and used "grass" with some degree of regularity.

But the switch to the "hard" stuff a couple of years ago has changed the name of the game. Now some 20,000 heroin addicts are being discharged from the armed forces every year. They are returning to civilian life with an expensive and deadly habit. Add to the ex-GI's addiction his familiarity with weapons—and probably a somewhat easier access to them—and it is not difficult to see how this would have an impact on the growth of drug-related crime back home.

Undoubtedly it is this new social fact of tens of thousands of newly made addicts returning to civilian society that has led to congressional concern. But on looking into the situation, various representatives and senators have discovered what GIs and antiwar activists have known for some time. The drug traffic in Southeast Asia is big business. It's organized. It is run by people in the highest echelons of the puppet governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. And the U.S. military machine itself is, at the least, an active accomplice in the entire operation.

A special subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, headed by Rep. Robert H. Steele (R-Conn.), has concluded that the heroin traffic is protected—and in some cases directed—by government and military figures at the highest official levels in Southeast Asia. Among them is the chief of the (Royal) Laotian general staff. High-ranking South Vietnamese officials, both members of the National Assembly and military figures, are also deeply involved.

Vientiane, the administrative capital of the puppet Laotian regime, is apparently the center for heroin production. Utilizing an extensive network of the Saigon regime's customs officials, and with the tacit agreement of people high in the American diplomatic corps, the drug is "smuggled" into Saigon in prodigious quantities. (The word "smuggled" is used advisedly, since until the recent publicity, the traffic was so open that known dealers were personally escorted through immigration by top customs officials.) The key official in the operation is Tran Thien Khoi, chief of the National Customs Investigation Division and a brother of Premier Tran Thien Kiem.

The heroin comes into Saigon by commercial aircraft and also by South Vietnamese and Laotian Air Force planes. Air America, a "special" airline financed by the CIA, has also been utilized as a means of transporting the drug.

STATINTL

two years while increasing number of wards from three to nine:

	Yes	No
Ward I (City Hall)-----	452	374
Ward II (Garfield)-----	451	406
Ward III (Harding)-----	611	542
Total-----	1,519	1,322

Advisory measure calling for complete withdrawal of American forces from Southeast Asia by Dec. 31, 1971:

	Yes	No
Ward I-----	404	344
Ward II-----	352	391
Ward III-----	521	320
Total-----	1,317	1,265

Advisory measure supporting policies of President Nixon in Southeast Asia:

	Yes	No
Ward I-----	337	311
Ward II-----	402	300
Ward III-----	427	263
Total-----	1,216	979

Advisory measure calling for no withdrawal from Vietnam without release of prisoners of war:

	Yes	No
Ward I-----	328	373
Ward II-----	364	339
Ward III-----	463	450
Total-----	1,173	1,062

SITUATION IN LAOS

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, yesterday the doors of the Senate were closed at 11 minutes after 1 in order to discuss this tragic and secret war now going on in Laos. They were opened again at 20 minutes before 5.

Upon returning home last evening, I read two series in the Washington Evening Star. The first, by James Doyle, was entitled "Senate Discusses Laos in Secret."

The second, with a Vientiane dateline Arbuckle, is entitled, "The United States Seeks To Hide Scope of Its Role in Laos."

These two articles illustrate well the somewhat incredible position in which the people of this country and their elected representatives now find themselves with respect to the continuing tragic and clandestine war which the executive branch of the United States is both supervising and conducting in this little country of Southeast Asia.

Information which is given to the people and the Congress, in Washington, by this administration about these secret hostilities has been and is plenty weaker; but thanks to the able and courageous efforts of news media people such as the resourceful Tammy Arbuckle, at least part of the truth is now being made public. This is a wise development from the standpoint of what our democracy is all about--the people's right to know.

Mr. President, I would hope that these closed hearings held yesterday will be declassified and published at earliest opportunity; also that a maximum amount of the information presented will be declassified, so our citizens will know more of the truth about this war.

Some apparently believe part of the report in question tends to bear out denials of criticism that has been made in the past. Other aspects of said report, however emphasize both the logic and the wisdom of criticisms that have long been made in the past by those who have taken the trouble to go out and observe on the ground. If an attempt is made to

declassify the report on a slanted basis, we will have the obligation to consider what additional information should be released, inasmuch as the staff of the subcommittee I have the honor to chair are the ones who classified this report in the beginning.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the article entitled, "Senate Discusses Laos in Secret," published in the Washington Evening Star of Monday, June 7, 1971, and the article by Tammy Arbuckle, entitled, "U.S. Seeks To Hide Scope of Its Role in Laos," which also was published in the Washington Star of June 7, 1971.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

(From the Evening Star, Washington, D.C., June 7, 1971)

SENATE DISCUSSES LAOS IN SECRET

(By James Doyle)

The Senate holds a secret session today to discuss U.S. participation in the war in Laos, itself an open secret in Washington and Vientiane for the past several years.

Today's session is another attempt by some senior senators to focus on executive actions taken without specific congressional approval or knowledge, in a continuing debate over the war powers of both the President and the Congress.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., requested the session, first of its kind this year.

"This session is being requested in light of the increasingly grave situation in that country, along with the implications of that situation for the United States," Symington said in remarks prepared for today.

"These implications may not be too clear to some members of the Senate, as our activities in Laos have been carried out largely in secret, without congressional sanction and outside the normal appropriations process."

At the session, lengthy debate was expected on the question of whether President Nixon has violated the spirit and perhaps the letter of an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act passed last January. It provided that none of the defense funds could be used "to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia or Laos."

The Meese-Lowenstein report is known to contain published reports that between 4,000 and 6,000 Thai troops are operating in Laos under the financial auspices of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Other estimates, which may be discussed, indicate that the CIA has been financing 32,000 Meo and other tribesmen in northern Laos. The Meo have been the main U.S.-sponsored fighting force to face the North Vietnamese in the Plain of Jars, and their numbers reportedly are declining now.

(From the Evening Star, June 7, 1971)

U.S. SEEKS TO HIDE SCOPE OF ITS ROLE IN LAOS

(By Tammy Arbuckle)

VIENTIANE.-American officials admit the U.S. mission in Laos is deliberately hiding the extent of American military involvement here.

"Americans may think they know what we are doing here," one official said in referring to frequent press reports on U.S. activities in Laos, "but we do not want Americans to look into their television sets and be able to see Americans going into action in Laos."

The official made his remark in a complaint about an American Broadcasting Corp. team led by Ted Koppel which tried to film Americans getting into a helicopter in the south Laos combat area two weeks ago.

"What we are doing here in Laos is totally

inconsistent with our kind of society," a top U.S. diplomat here told a correspondent recently. "We are fighting a war by covert means and an open society can't tolerate that."

The diplomat explained that the U.S. is making the Geneva peace accords in Laos and "we don't want to advertise it."

The same official feels the embassy's policy of secrecy has been successful in not advertising U.S. infringements of the accords.

"You could write a lot worse about what we are doing here," he said declining to go into further details.

Unfortunately, any diplomat in Vientiane will call this Geneva accords excuse hogwash.

The U.S. since President Nixon's remarks last year, has admitted in general terms the gamut of its operations here.

The Russians, who are cochairmen with the British of the Geneva accords, have not raised any question about U.S. violations of them. Soviets in Vientiane admit the presence of North Vietnamese in Laos in violation of the accords and seem to think it natural Americans should try to counter this.

Now U.S. officials prefer to offer national security as the reason for their refusal to frankly discuss the U.S. role in Laos, but a close look at just what is being hidden and how it is being hidden refutes this claim.

An example of this is U.S. air activities over northern Laos and parts of Laos other than the Ho Chi Minh Trail area.

These activities--anything from 60 to 300 sorties a day--are described in Saigon communications, telling of attacks on the Trail as "in addition U.S. Air Force aircraft flew combat support missions in Laos for royal Laotian forces."

There is no further information, such as the numbers of sorties, the nature of the targets, the results, etc.

In Vientiane, the air attache's office in charge of preparing these strikes refuses even to speak to correspondents.

A favorite tactic in Saigon is to refer a correspondent to Vientiane for information. In Vientiane, Americans suggest a correspondent should go to Saigon for information.

To claim that such information is withheld for national or military security reasons is somewhat ridiculous.

Obviously, the North Vietnamese or Pathet Lao know the strike was made. It's difficult to see how the number of sorties and their cost could help the enemy.

Information on targets and strikes is given in South Vietnam after operations. Why not in Laos?

The only answer to this seems to be that President Nixon, despite his promise in March 1970 to "continue to give the American people the fullest possible information" on the U.S. role in Laos, does not wish the public to realize just how large U.S. air support of the Laos government is daily and that air strikes are not limited to the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Then there is the matter of the U.S. ground involvement in Laos.

There can be no doubt this includes a combat ground involvement by personnel hired by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Laotians and Meos talk constantly of American "commando leaders" based at Pakkao, a few miles southeast of the U.S. base at Long Cheng in northeast Laos.

Besides these "commando leaders," there are CIA case officers hired by the agency from the U.S. military who run Laos and other ethnic guerrilla units as well as Thai units.

This operation has put the U.S. in the position of being responsible for the defense of Laos through what is supposed to be a U.S. intelligence gathering agency.

These guerrilla units are stationed in front of royal Lao regular troops and the brunt of combat with North Vietnamese regulars.

The Lao military, whose understanding of guerrilla warfare is limited, berate the CIA

8 JUN 1971

SYMINGTON BLASTS U.S. LAOS ROLE

Says Financing Of Thai Troops There Breaks Congressional Edict

BY GENE OISHY

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, June 7—Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) told a secret session of the Senate today that the administration was violating congressional restrictions by financing Thai mercenary troops to fight in Laos.

After the three-hour closed session, Mr. Symington repeated the charge to reporters, adding that he intended to introduce legislation to limit United States expenditures in Laos to \$200 million a year.

That amount, he said, is what the administration says publicly it is spending in Laos for military and economic assistance.

Comment Declined

Mr. Symington declined to say whether the U.S. was actually spending more, pleading that he was dealing with classified information.

But in a statement released yesterday he said, "Our activities in Laos have been carried out largely in secret, without congressional sanction and outside the normal appropriations process."

Meanwhile, Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.), who had previously disclosed that the U.S. was financing 4,000 to 6,000 Thai troops in Laos, said the secret session revealed that the U.S. was spending \$100 million a year more in Laos than Congress has specifically authorized.

The 4,000 to 6,000 estimate has since Mr. Case's original disclosure been refined to 4,000 by

(D., Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. After today's session, Senator Case said there was no indication that the number of U.S.-financed Thai troops in Laos have been increased beyond the 4,000 level.

Thai "Volunteers"

In another development today, a State Department spokesman acknowledged that Thai "volunteers" are fighting in Laos, adding that they are sometimes called mercenaries.

He declined to say how many there were or how they are financed. Asked whether the Thai troops in Laos were supported by the U.S. on the same basis as in Vietnam, he replied: "There are no comparable arrangements."

When reminded that Thai troops in Vietnam are paid by the U.S. and provided equipment and transportation as well, the spokesman said, "No, arrangements are quite different" in Laos.

The State Department spokesman began his briefing by stating that the U.S. operations in Laos were begun during the Kennedy administration and developed and continued by two succeeding administrations.

The "volunteers" in Laos, he added, are there at the request of Prince Souvanna Phomma, the Laotian prime minister, and "U.S. support of this program is fully consistent with all pertinent legislation."

The legislation at issue was attached by Congress last year to the 1971 Military Appropriations Act. The amendment, offered by Senator Fulbright, banned "the use of any funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia and Laos."

This amendment, however, was modified further in a Senate-House conference committee to state that "nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support or action required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of American prisoners of

It appeared that the administration was relying mainly on this second clause for legislative justification for its operations in northern Laos.

Letter To Kennedy

David M. Abshire, assistant secretary for congressional relations, said recently in a letter to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) that the operations in northern Laos were linked to the Vietnam war.

"If the North Vietnamese were to conquer all of Laos they could divert thousands of their forces now engaged in north Laos to the war against South Vietnam and greatly enhance their position in those areas of Laos bordering on South Vietnam from which they launch attacks on U.S. and allied forces," he wrote.

Senator Jacob K. Javits (R., N.Y.) commented after the closed session that the issue was primarily a "legal question" as to what constituted "free world forces" and whether there was a separate war going on in Laos or whether it had a bearing on the security of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

But the session, attended by about half the Senate, he said, was "useful" in that it again raised the question of what the limits of an undeclared war are.

"The Answer To Me..."

"The answer to me is to get out of Indochina," he said, "then you wouldn't have these questions raised."

Most senators emerging from the session said little new material had been disclosed. This was the seventh secret meeting held by the Senate in the last five years on a variety of subjects.

Senator Symington, chairman of the foreign relations subcommittee on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad, requested the session so that the contents of a special staff report on Laos could be disclosed.

The report was believed to contain information pertaining to the depletion of the Meo tribesmen, who have carried the brunt of the fighting against Communist forces in Laos, and their replacement by Thai mercenaries, financed through the CIA.

The report was also believed to contain details on B-52 bombings in northern Laos, which has only recently been acknowledged by the administration.

STATINTL

Huge War Fund for Laos Told

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

WASHINGTON, June 7 — Senators were told in a secret session today that "\$190 million more than anyone suspected" is being spent on a 4,800-man army of Thai troops fighting in Northern Laos.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), who got the Senate to go into the chamber and lock its doors to outsiders for 3½ hours, announced he would seek to put a \$260 million ceiling on such spending next year.

Viet Nam war doves and hawks testily debated whether there had been unauthorized use of Defense Department funds in Laos; whether the defense amendment of Sen. J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.) prohibiting spending to aid the Laotian government was being violated; and whether the war in Laos was a separate war or "had a direct bearing on the security of United States troops in Viet Nam."

Total Cost Estimated

Sen. Clifford Case (R., N. J.), a dove who said that \$100 million more than anyone suspected was being spent on the war in Laos, put total expenditures there at about \$250 million. Symington refused to comment on the totals.

The administration so far has confirmed the spending of only \$52 million in economic aid to Laos.

Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, acknowledged today for the first time that the U.S. is providing financial aid to maintain a Thai volunteer contingent in Laos. He refused to divulge the number of men.

Plans Amendment

But Symington and Case both confirmed the total of 4,800 let slip last week by Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee. Case thought additional troops might be needed. Symington said he did not believe additional troops were planned.

Symington said he would offer an amendment to the Defense Department defense spending authorization bill to establish the \$260 million ceiling on the Laotian war.

Symington said any additional needs by the Nixon administration for the war in Laos would have to be obtained with a "special request."

Symington said the ceiling would not cover the cost of air operations in Southern Laos against the Ho Chi Minh "trails."

"Notice, I said 'Trails,'" he told reporters.

Case said the money being spent in Laos now is "for military assistance and the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]."

Case was of the opinion that the Fulbright amendment to the current year's defense appropriations bill was being violated. The Fulbright amendment provided that none of the funds in the bill could be spent "to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia and Laos."

Use of Money Debated

Bray told a press conference that the money being spent on the Thai and Laotian troops in Laos was "fully consistent with all pertinent legislation." This point was heatedly debated during the Senate's secret session, members reported.

Symington had reported recently that two staff members of the Foreign Relations Committee learned in Laos recently that the CIA was supporting the 4,800 troops. Bray refused to discuss the number of troops receiving U. S. aid, or the CIA involvement.

Bray said there was no direct arrangement with the Thai government for the Thai troops in Laos and that the arrangement for their support was "quite different" from the equipment, pay and transportation provided for the Thais fighting in Viet Nam.

Bray took exception to references to the Thai troops as

his way to emphasize that they are volunteers. He said their presence in Laos had been requested by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos.

Legal Question Raised

Asked if such U. S. assistance was not in violation of the Fulbright amendment banning the hiring of mercenaries, Bray said:

"I do not expect the amendment to affect what has been going on in Laos—that is, the bombing of the trail, our assistance to Laos, or what our people are doing there—because it does not affect that."

Sen. Jacob Javits (R., N. Y.), a dove, said a legal question has been raised as to what are "free world troops" as defined in the Fulbright amendment. "If you have volunteers [in Laos] are they free world troops?" Javits questioned.

"My interest is in knowing the facts and getting them out to the American people so that they can judge whether this [army in Laos] makes sense," Case said.

Bray would not say how long the Thai troops have been in Laos. He said the present program was under way when the Senate debate of aid to Laos and Cambodia peaked last Aug. 20.

State Department officials estimated that 10,000 to 15,000 North Vietnamese troops moved into Laos after March 6, last year, when President Nixon reported 67,000 of the enemy there.

Today's closed Senate session on Laos was sparked in part by the testimony last April of William H. Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary of state. He told the Foreign Relations Committee that the war in Northern Laos had nothing to do with military operations in Cambodia or South Viet Nam.

STATINTL

GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
NEWSDAY

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JUN 8 1971

S. Viets Kill 330 Reds In DMZ Fighting

Combined News Services

South Vietnamese forces backed by U.S. helicopters and B-52 bombers have killed 330 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in three days of fighting in jungles below the demilitarized zone, military spokesmen said in Saigon today.

The Saigon High Command said that 22 Communists were killed in the clashes yesterday four miles south of the demilitarized zone and eight miles southwest of Cam Lo.

At the opposite end of the Indochinese peninsula, South Vietnamese Rangers who were on a new Cambodian thrust southeast of Phnom Penh clashed with a Communist force. Nine Viet Cong were killed and the Saigon troops captured a single Communist rifle. The south Vietnamese reported no casualties of their own.

In Washington, hundreds of professional, religious and former government leaders gathered yesterday for a week of campaigning "to persuade those few doubting Thomases they should vote to end this war now and forever."

Addressing a kickoff news conference for the long-planned "Lobby of Americans," former Sen. Ernest Gruening, (D-Alaska), declared that the Nixon administration's Vietnamization program "is not ending the war, but extending it. Now it's the Indochina war, not Vietnam."

Dozens of anti-war delegations from business, church, civil rights, union, legal and women's groups met at several points throughout Washington, mapping strategy for their coalition effort to enhance prospects for Senate and House proposals to set a Dec. 31 deadline for U.S. involvement in Indochina.

A late-evening convocation sponsored by an estimated 2,500 attorneys drew more than a dozen speakers, and a separate meeting at a Capitol Hill church was attended by about 1,000 protestant, Jewish and Catholic leaders.

Behind barred doors, meanwhile, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) told a rare secret session of the Senate yesterday that President Nixon had violated a congressional ban against U.S. financing of foreign mercenary troops fighting for the government of Laos.

Symington, who said that he wanted the Senate to know all the details of "the secret war" in Laos before voting any more funds for it, was quoted by senators as saying that the administration wanted \$374,000,000 next year for Laotian economic and military assistance. That includes \$120,000,000 for financing a covert Central Intelligence Agency military operation in Northern Laos which arms about 32,000 Meo and other tribesmen and now is making use of about 4,800 troops recruited in Thailand. Symington, among others, has urged the administration to make public the details of this nation's Laotian involvement.

Symington said later that he planned to introduce an amendment to the defense procurement authorization bill, holding



Nixon has violated ban, Symington tells secret Laos session

By SPENCER RICH

Globe-Democrat-Washington Post News Service

WASHINGTON—Behind barred doors, Sen. Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, told a rare, 3-hour-and-22-minute secret session of the Senate Monday that President Nixon has violated a congressional ban against U.S. financing of foreign mercenary troops fighting for the government of Laos.

Symington, who said he wants the Senate to know all the details of "the secret war" in Laos before voting any more funds for it, was quoted by senators present as saying that the administration wants \$374 million next year for Laotian economic and military assistance.

THIS INCLUDES \$120 million for financing a covert CIA military operation in northern Laos which arms some 22,000 Meo and other tribesmen and now is making use of some 4,800 troops recruited in Thailand.

Symington, Clifford P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey, and J. W. Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, among others who have urged the administration to make public the details of this nation's Laotian involvement, stressed that the figures cited in the closed Senate session were exclusive of the cost of B52 and other air raids in Laos being conducted by U.S. plants flying from Thailand, South Vietnam, other bases and carriers.

Fulbright said after the session that his staff calculates the cost of bombs alone for such raids at the rate of \$560 million a year. Other Senate sources said this figure was probably low and said the total cost of bombing and air activity conducted by the U.S. over Laos might actually be up to \$2 billion a year. Their reasoning:

Testimony before Symington's subcommittee on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad disclosed that the bomb load of planes smaller than the B52 cost an average of \$3,190 per sortie. With 10,000 or more sorties a month being flown over Laos, north and south, and with larger-load B52s now in use, the bomb and flight cost is at between \$1 billion and \$2 billion a year.

ONE SENATOR who was present said Symington, after charging that the administration was violating a 1970 congressional ban on the hiring of mercenaries to fight for the government of Laos, angrily asserted that "he wouldn't be in the Senate if it wrote laws that anyone could flout, including the President."

"Case was very effective also, he made an emotional plea to bring this thing out in the open, find ways to end the war not enlarge it," a senator who was there reported.

Symington told reporters later that he plans to introduce an amendment to the defense procurement authorization bill, when it reaches the Senate floor, holding economic, military and CIA aid to \$200 million. He said the amendment, however, would not bar added expenditures for bombing the Ho Chi Minh trails in Southern Laos to interdict the flow of North Vietnamese men and supplies to South Vietnam.

A key issue in the debate and in a later long-range exchange between senators and the State Department was whether the use of CIA funds to hire Thais to fight on behalf of the Laotian government violates the 1970 Fulbright amendment. This is a provision of the defense appropriation bill signed into law Jan. 11, 1971, after a furious battle between the Senate and the House.

THE PROVISION bars the use of defense funds to support "free world forces" in actions "designed to provide military support and assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos," but specifies that it shouldn't bar the President from taking actions needed "to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

Symington told the Senate and then reporters, "My personal opinion is . . . that the law has been contravened."

"The amendment said you couldn't spend money to train and put people of foreign governments into Laos or into Cambodia."

Fulbright, too, told reporters later he thinks the law has been violated.

Minority Whip Robert P. Griffin (Rep.), Michigan, reportedly defended the financing of Thais as proper and within the law. Earlier, Charles Bray, official State Department spokesman, acknowledged publicly for the first time that the United States is financing Thai troops to fight in northern Laos.

CONTENDING THE actions were "fully consistent with all pertinent legislation," Bray said that the financing was first authorized by President Kennedy and that "the volunteers are in Laos at the request of the prime minister," Souvanna Phouma.

Case said, "At the time the Fulbright amendment was passed, I was not aware of the Thai mercenaries or the B52 raids." He added, "Our assent wasn't to these activities but to interdiction of Ho Chi Minh trails."

Jacob K. Javits (Rep.), New York, told reporters the basic question being raised was, "is this a new war, or is it really connected with withdrawal from Vietnam?"

State Department sources said later that the Thais being used were not recruited on a government-to-government basis but were individuals recruited from the borderside Thai population.

STATINTL

Senate Told Nixon Aid to Laos Illegal

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

Behind barred doors, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) told a rare, 3-hour-and-22-minute secret session of the Senate yesterday that President Nixon has violated a congressional ban against U.S. financing of foreign mercenary troops fighting for the government of Laos.

Symington, who said he wants the Senate to know all the details of "the secret war" in Laos before voting any more funds for it, was quoted by senators present as saying that the administration wants \$374 million next year for Laotian economic and military assistance. This includes \$120 million for financing a covert CIA military operation in northern Laos that arms some 32,000 Meo and other tribesmen and now is using some 4,800 troops recruited in Thailand.

Symington, Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) and J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), among others who have urged the administration to make public the details of this nation's Laotian involvement, stressed that the figures cited in the closed Senate session were exclusive of the cost of B-52 and other air raids in Laos conducted by U.S. planes flying from Thailand, South Vietnam, other bases and carriers.

Fulbright said after the session that his staff calculates the cost of bombs alone for such raids at \$500 million a year. Other Senate sources said this figure was probably low, and said the total cost of bombing and air activity conducted by the U.S. over Laos might actually be up to \$2 billion a year. Their reasoning:

Testimony before Symington's Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad disclosed that the bomb load of planes smaller than the B-52 cost an average of \$3,190 per sortie.

With 10,000 or more sorties a month being flown over Laos, north and south, and with larger-load B-52s now in use, the bomb and flight cost is between \$1 billion and \$2 billion a year.

One senator who was present said Symington, after charging that the administration was violating a 1970 congressional ban on the hiring of mercenaries to fight for the government of Laos, angrily asserted that "he wouldn't be in the Senate if it wrote laws that anyone could flout, including the President."

"Case was very effective also; he made an emotional plea to bring this thing out in the open, find ways to end the war not enlarge it."

Symington told reporters later that he plans to introduce an amendment to the defense procurement authorization bill, when it reaches the Senate floor, holding economic, military and CIA aid to Laos to \$200 million. He said the amendment, however, would not bar added expenditures for bombing the Ho Chi Minh trail in Southern Laos to interdict the flow of North Vietnamese men and supplies to South Vietnam.

A key issue in the debate and in a later long-range exchange between senators and the State Department was whether the use of CIA funds to hire Thais to fight on behalf of the Laotian government violates the 1970 Fulbright amendment. This is a provision of the defense appropriation bill signed into law Jan. 11, 1971, after a furious battle between the Senate and the House.

The provision bars the use of defense funds to support "free world forces" in actions "designed to provide military support and assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos," but specifies that it shouldn't bar the President from taking actions needed "to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

Symington told the Senate and the reporters, "My personal opinion is ... that the law has been contravened."

"The amendment said you couldn't spend money to train and put people of foreign governments into Laos or into Cambodia."

later he thinks the law has been violated, and it was his amendment.

Minority Whip Robert P. Griffin (R-Mich.) repeatedly defended the financing of Thais as proper and within the law. Earlier, Charles Bray, official State Department spokesman, acknowledged publicly for the first time that the United States is financing Thai troops to fight in Northern Laos.

Contending these actions were "fully consistent with all pertinent legislation," Bray said that the financing was first authorized by President Kennedy and that "the volunteers are in Laos at the request of the Prime Minister," Souvanna Phouma.

Bray read to reporters a letter from Assistant Secretary of State David Apschire to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.).

In the context given by Brady, the thrust of the letter (made public Sunday by Kennedy) is that support of the Thai troops in Northern Laos is legal despite the Fulbright amendment, in order to protect U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, as allowed in the amendment.

Bray also cited an Aug. 20, 1970, statement in the Senate by Fulbright that his amendment doesn't bar "what is going on in Laos, that is, the bombing of the trail, our assistance to Laos or what our people are doing there."

Fulbright told reporters yesterday that at the time he was speaking basically about interdicting the Ho Chi Minh trail in Southern Laos. He said he didn't even know about, and therefore certainly had not been condoning, the B-52 raids in northern Laos, which were started last year, or the financing of Thais to fight in Northern Laos.

Earlier, Fulbright had read to the secret session a statement from William Sullivan former U.S. Ambassador to Laos, now deputy assistant secretary of state, which Fulbright said indicated Sullivan saw no real link between the northern Laotian operations and those far to the south on the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Case said, "At the time the Fulbright amendment was passed I was not aware of the Thai mercenaries or the B-52 raids." He added, "Our assent wasn't to these activities but to interdiction of Ho Chi Minh trails."

Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) told being raised was, "Is this a new war or is it really connected with withdrawal from

State Department sources said later that the Thais being used aren't recruited on a government-to-government basis, but were individuals recruited from the borderside Thai population.

STATINTL

Senate Sets Secret Session Today For Report On Laos

Washington, June 6 (AP)—The Senate meets tomorrow behind locked doors to receive a secret report on a multimillion-dollar clandestine United States operation in Laos. Some senators contend it has deepened American involvement in Southeast Asia and violates congressional restrictions.

On the eve of the senators-only session, the Nixon administration said the efforts in behalf of the Laotian government are directly related to American troop withdrawals from South Vietnam. This justification came in a letter from a State Department official to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.).

"Wholesale Evasion"

Mr. Kennedy today called it inadequate and contradictory and said the administration has been guilty of "a wholesale evasion of responsible discussion over U.S. military activities in northern Laos."

The secret session, the second on Southeast Asia in two years, was requested by Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) to discuss a still-secret report by two staff members from the Foreign Relations Committee who visited Laos in April.

Committee members said after a briefing on the report that it details how the CIA underwrites 4,800 Thai troops in Laos and shows that the administration has given the committee incomplete and at times inaccurate data on the Laotian situation.

Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the majority leader, told reporters that Mr. Symington may seek a dollar limit on U.S. actions in Laos and said the session "gives the whole Senate

a chance to comprehend what has happened there."

"This session is being requested in light of the increasingly grave situation in that country, along with the implications of that situation for the United States," Senator Symington said in a statement today.

He added, "Our activities in Laos have been carried out largely in secret, without congressional sanction and outside the normal appropriations process."

Although the only publicly announced U.S. program in Laos spends \$52 million on economic aid, Mr. Symington said, "the cost of United States-supported military operations runs the amount we are actually spending well into the hundreds of million of dollars."

He said that, based on the report of James G. Lowenstein and Richard Moose, he will tell the Senate about B-52 bombing raids in northern Laos; U.S. financial support of the Royal Lao Army, irregular Lao forces and Thai troops, "and the increasing Chinese presence in Laos."

"I will describe what the United States is now doing in Laos; and under what legal authority, or in possible violations of what legislative restrictions, these activities are being carried out; and at what cost to the United States," he said.

Congress last year prohibited

U.S. funds for foreign forces to support the governments of Laos and Cambodia but made an exception for actions that would aid U.S. troop withdrawals or the release of American prisoners.

The relation between the activities in Laos and U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam was cited in a letter from David M. Abshire, assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, to Senator Kennedy, who had asked the administration April 23 about the authority for the Laotian operations.

"If the North Vietnamese were to conquer all of Laos they could divert thousands of their forces now engaged in north Laos to the war against South Vietnam, and greatly enhance their position in those areas of Laos bordering on South Vietnam from which they launch attacks on United States and allied forces," Mr. Abshire wrote.

Noting President Nixon's policy of withdrawing U.S. forces, he said, "The President's constitutional powers as commander in chief and in the field of foreign relations provide authority for him to take reasonable measures to carry out these withdrawals, to protect our troops and to bring the hostilities which were under way when he took office to an end in a way that will contribute to a durable peace."

STATINTL

U.S. Pours In Record Aid

By Donald Kirk

Newsday Special Correspondent

Pakse, Laos—Gleaming, unmarked cargo planes were thundering on or off the sun-baked runway every 10 or 15 minutes. Half a dozen Lao Air Force T-28s squatted on an apron beside the airstrip revving their engines. A small observation plane circled lazily over head.

"Just normal operations," said a brawny, tanned American, driving a truck of supplies from the offices of Air America and Continental, the two Central Intelligence Agency-financed contract airlines flying the unmarked planes. "This goes on every day," the American added for emphasis as a four-engined C-130, also unmarked, roared onto the runway and began taxiing toward a distant corner of the base.

The scene, in fact, epitomized America's desperate efforts to defend not only this vital commercial center on the Mekong River in southern Laos but also a series of other lowland towns threatened by North Vietnamese troops who have already conquered the entire Bolovens Plateau 40 miles to the coast. "The North Vietnamese could overrun this whole town in two or three hours," said one American official, whose wife and children had had to leave on orders for evacuation of all American dependents. "There's only two or three battalions of Royal Lao troops around Pakse, and they'd probably just scatter if the North Vietnamese made a determined effort to take this place."

Despite the seeming hopelessness of the situation, American officials are pouring in record amounts of arms and ammunition to brace the Lao forces, who vanished rather than fight the Communists in battles for critical positions on the Bolovens, crisscrossed and dotted by North Vietnamese supply routes and storage depots. "We're just in the business of providing economic assistance," said an affable, graying official for the U.S. Agency for International Development, but lettering on the tops of bomb crates clearly designated USAID as responsible for their distribution. USAID officials—some of them really with the CIA—were assigned to expedite the flow of materiel from Air America and Continental planes to Lao units.

Americans admitted that Lao ground forces, depleted and demoralized after years of back-and-forth warfare, could probably not use the materiel adequately, but they were optimistic about tiny Lao Air Force T-28s, propeller-driven planes capable of carrying four 500-pound bombs apiece. "They're maneuverable as hell," one American said as the planes began zooming off the airstrip and banked toward the first foothills of the Bolovens Plateau. "They operate fine as close air support." The 500-pound bombs for the T-28s are probably the most important item on the American aid inventory here. Con-

voys of civilian trucks carrying the bombs under loose-fitting tarpaulins arrive here almost every day by road from Thailand, bordering Laos 20 miles east of the Mekong. The trucks belong to the Express Transport Organization, a Thai company contracted by the U.S. government.

The U.S. would doubtless not rely on Lao Air Force T-28s were it not for restrictions imposed on the use of American aircraft near the Mekong River lowlands. American jets fly round-the-clock missions over the Ho Chi Minh Trail region of southern Laos from half a dozen bases in Thailand, but they seldom bomb within 50 miles of here. "We need special permission from the Lao government to do so," said an American official, "and sometimes they don't grant it. All they've got beside the T-28s are some gunships which fly every night. It's really not much in a showdown."

This kind of air support was of only minimal value, in fact, when about 3,000 North Vietnamese troops attacked the town of Paksong, the last important Royal Lao outpost on the Bolovens Plateau, three weeks ago. Lao soldiers simply vanished into surrounding jungles while the North Vietnamese not only overran the town but also blocked the main road from Paksong to Pakse. "The fall of Paksong was the worst disaster in southern Laos in more than a year," said an American responsible for providing aid and relief for about 6,000 refugees who fled the town and nearby villages for the relative safety of Pakse. "There's very little chance the Lao army can retake the town. They just don't have the men."

The only real hope for Pakse and other towns in the lowlands seems to lie in the priorities set by the North Vietnamese. Their aim apparently is to solidify their control over the Bolovens Plateau, where they already have established a road network as an alternative to the Ho Chi Minh Trail system further east. "They need the second network to compensate for American bombings," explained a knowledgeable source. "They seem to want all of Laos except the lowlands so they'll have all the room

continued

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Two Senators Assail U.S. on Laos War

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 6--Senator Stuart Symington said today that instead of the \$52-million publicly acknowledged by the Administration, the United States was spending "hundreds of millions of dollars" in a clandestine war in northern Laos.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, meanwhile, protested that the Administration was indulging in "contradictions" and "white-washes" on the American involvement in the war in northern Laos and advancing a logic for the involvement that "justifies new military adventures by the President anywhere in Southern Asia."

The Kennedy protest was prompted by a State Department contention that the President has constitutional authority to "take reasonable measures" in northern Laos as part of his program of withdrawing American forces from South Vietnam. The contention was made in response to a letter from Senator Kennedy that asked what authority the President had for United States military activities in northern Laos.

The dual attack on Administration policies in Laos came as the Senate prepared to hold tomorrow afternoon one of its infrequent closed sessions to review the extent of the American military involvement in Laos.

The session will be held at the request of Senator Symington, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on foreign commitments. The subcommittee has been investigating the generally unpublicized American military activities in northern Laos over the last two years.

During the session, the Missouri Democrat said, he plans to present a report showing that the United States is spending far more for military activities in Laos than as ever been publicly acknowledged by the Administration.

The only publicly announced cost of United States activities in Laos, he noted, has been \$52-million in economic aid this year.

"In fact, however," Senator Symington said, "the cost of United States-supported military operations runs the amount we are actually spending well into the hundreds of millions of dollars."

The Symington statement was based on a still-secret report prepared by two Symington subcommittee staff members -- James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Meese -- who visited Laos in April. On the basis of that report, Senator Symington said, he would describe to the Senate "the increasing Chinese presence in Laos, such as B-52 bombing raids in northern Laos and the introduction of Thai troops into the Laotian war, "with a mantle of secrecy."

Senator Kennedy made his statement in releasing an exchange of correspondence with the executive branch on the Administration's constitutional authority to engage in hostilities in northern Laos.

Mr. Kennedy's letter, addressed to Mr. Nixon, had been prompted by testimony in April by William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Senate judiciary committee on refugees. Mr. Sullivan said at one point that the war in northern Laos has "nothing to do with military operations in South Vietnam or Cambodia."

On the basis of that Sullivan statement, Senator Kennedy wrote to President Nixon inquiring as to "the precise authority for continuing United States military activities in northern Laos" in view of earlier Administration statements that American activities in Laos were related solely to the protection of American forces as they were withdrawn from Vietnam.

The reply, from David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, said:

"The President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief and in the field of foreign relations provide authority for him to take reasonable measures to carry out these withdrawals, to protect our troops and to bring the hostilities which were under way when he took office to an end in a way that will contribute to a durable peace."

Earlier in the letter, Mr. Abshire stated that "if the North Vietnamese were to conquer all of Laos they could divert thousands of their forces now engaged in north Laos to the war against South Vietnam and greatly enhance their position in those areas of Laos bordering on South Vietnam from which they launch attacks on United States and allied forces."

STATINTL

MORNING - 292,789
WEEKEND - 306,889
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Symington Says U.S. Bankrolls Laos War

From The Globe-Democrat
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, will tell a closed-door session of the Senate Monday afternoon that secret American involvement in Laos is costing "hundreds of millions of dollars."

Symington, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad, requested the closed session because of what he calls the "increasingly grave situation" in Laos.

The Missouri Democrat will discuss a classified report by two staff members of his subcommittee, James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, who recently visited Laos.

Symington said the report included the charge that the Central Intelligence Agency is secretly financing 4,800 Thai troops fighting in northern Laos in support of the Laotian government.

DEMOCRATIC Senate leader Mike Mansfield of Montana said Symington may seek a dollar limit on U.S. action in Laos.

Mansfield said the session "gives the whole Senate a chance to comprehend what has happened" in Laos.

In a statement Sunday, Symington indicated that U.S. action in Laos may violate congressional restrictions.

He said: "I will describe (to the Senate) what the United States is now doing in Laos and under what legal authority, or in possible violation of what legislative restrictions these activities are being carried out and at what cost to the United States."

Congress last year barred U.S. funds for foreign forces to support the governments of Laos and Cambodia but made an exception for actions that would aid U.S. troop withdrawals or the freeing of American prisoners.

SYMINGTON SAID he will discuss "the increasing Chinese presence in Laos," as well as U.S. support of both the regular Royal Lao Army and "the irregular Lao forces."

Also to be covered, he said, will be the U.S. role in the presence of Thai forces in Laos and American B52 bombing raids in northern Laos.

Criticizing refusal of the Nixon administration to supply information on Laos to the Senate "through normal channels," Symington said the only publicly announced cost of U.S. activities has been an economic assistance program, which this year costs \$32 million.

"In fact, however," Symington declared, "the cost of U.S.-supported military operations runs the amount we are actually spending well into the hundreds of millions of dollars."

An administration defense of its Laotian operations was contained in a just-released letter from David M. Abshire, assistant secretary of state for congressional relations.

SEN. EDWARD M. KENNEDY (Dem.), Massachusetts, who released the Abshire letter, written to him in response to his query about authority for the Laotian operations, termed the answer inadequate.

Abshire wrote: "If the North Vietnamese were to conquer all of Laos, they could divert thousands of their forces now engaged in North Laos to the war against South Vietnam and greatly enhance their position in those areas bordering on South Vietnam from which they may launch attacks on U.S. and allied forces."

The President's constitutional powers as commander in chief and in the field of foreign relations give authority for him to "take reasonable measures" to carry out withdrawal of U.S. troops, to protect those troops and to bring hostilities to an end," Abshire said in his letter.

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Senate Discusses Laos in Secret

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

The Senate holds a secret session today to discuss U.S. participation in the war in Laos, itself an open secret in Washington, and Vietnam for the past several years.

Today's session is another attempt by some senior senators to focus on executive actions taken without specific congressional approval or knowledge, in a continuing debate over the war powers of both the President and the Congress.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., requested the session, first of its kind this year.

"This session is being request-

ed in light of the increasingly grave situation in that country, along with the implications of that situation for the United States," Symington said in remarks prepared for today.

"These implications may not be too clear to some members of the Senate, as our activities in Laos have been carried out largely in secret, without congressional sanction and outside the normal appropriations process."

At the session, lengthy debate was expected on the question of whether President Nixon has violated the spirit and perhaps the letter of an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act

passed last January. It provided that none of the defense funds could be used "to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia or Laos."

The Meese-Lowanstein report is known to confirm published reports that between 4,000 and 6,000 Thai troops are operating in Laos under the financial auspices of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Other estimates, which may be discussed, indicate that the CIA has been financing 32,000 Meo and other tribesmen in northern Laos. The Meo have

been the main U.S.-sponsored fighting force to face the North Vietnamese in the Plain of Jars, and their numbers reportedly are decimated now.

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy today disclosed an aspect of the Laotian situation which he was expected to bring up in the secret session.

There are, by news reports from the scene, two wars in Laos. In the south, where the recent South Vietnamese invasion failed, the major allied thrust is an attempt to seal off the Ho Chi Minh Trail, by massive bombing and by ground fighting, to stop men and goods from reaching South Vietnam.

INTERPRETIVE REPORT

STATINTL

U.S. Seeks to Hide Scope of Its Role in Laos

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star Staff Writer

VIENTIANE—American officials admit the U.S. mission in Laos is deliberately hiding the extent of American military involvement here.

"Americans may think they know what we are doing here," one official said in referring to frequent press reports on U.S. activities in Laos, "but we do not want Americans to look into their television sets and be able to see Americans going into action in Laos."

The official made his remark in a complaint about an American Broadcasting Corp. team led by Ted Koppel which tried to film Americans getting into a helicopter in the south Laos combat area two weeks ago.

"What we are doing here in Laos is totally inconsistent with our kind of society," a top U.S. diplomat here told a correspondent recently. "We are fighting a war by covert means and an open society can't tolerate that."

The diplomat explained that the U.S. was breaking the Geneva peace accords in Laos and "we don't want to advertise it."

The same official feels the embassy's policy of secrecy has been successful in not advertising U.S. infringements of the accords.

"You could write a lot worse about what we are doing here," he said, declining to go into further details.

Unfortunately, any diplomat in Vientiane will call this Geneva accords excuse hogwash.

The U.S. since President Nixon's remarks last year, has admitted in general terms the gamut of its operations here.

The Russians, who are co-chairmen with the British of the Geneva accords, have not raised any question about U.S. violations of them. Soviets in Vientiane admit the presence of North Vietnamese in Laos in violation of the accords and seem to think it natural Americans should try to counter this.

Now U.S. officials offer national security as the reason for their refusal to

frankly discuss the U.S. role in Laos, but a close look at just what is being hidden and how it is being hidden refutes this claim.

An example of this is U.S. air activities over northern Laos and parts of Laos other than the Ho Chi Minh Trail area.

These activities—anything from 60 to 200 sorties a day—are described in Saigon communique, telling of attacks on the Trail as "in addition U.S. Air Force aircraft flew combat support missions in Laos for royal Laotian forces."

There is no further information, such as the numbers of sorties, the nature of the targets, the results, etc.

In Vientiane, the air attache's office in charge of preparing these strikes refuses even to speak to correspondents.

A favorite tactic in Saigon is to refer a correspondent to Vientiane for information. In Vientiane, Americans suggest a correspondent should go to Saigon for information.

To claim that such information is withheld for national or military security reasons is somewhat ridiculous.

Obviously, the North Vietnamese or Pathet Lao know the strike was made. It's difficult to see how the number of sorties and their cost could help the enemy.

Information on targets and strikes is given in South Vietnam after operations. Why not on Laos?

The only answer to this seems to be that President Nixon, despite his promise in March 1970 to "continue to give the American people the fullest possible information" on the U.S. role in Laos, does not wish the public to realize just how large U.S. air support of the Laos government is daily and that air strikes are not limited to the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Then there is the matter of the U.S. ground involvement

There can be no doubt this includes a combat ground involvement by personnel hired

by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Laotians and Meos talk constantly of American "commando leaders" based at Pakkao, a few miles southeast of the U.S. base at Long Cheng in northeast Laos.

Besides these "commando leaders," there are CIA case officers hired by the agency from the U.S. military who run Lao and other ethnic guerrilla units as well as Thai units.

This operation has put the U.S. in the position of being responsible for the defense of Laos through what is supposed to be a U.S. intelligence gathering agency.

These guerrilla units are stationed in front of royal Lao regular troops and the brunt of combat with North Vietnamese regulars.

The Lao military, whose understanding of guerrilla warfare is limited, berate the CIA when these units retreat from positions under shellfire, or let North Vietnamese through to attack regular Lao units.

The high ethnic casualties are being replaced by Thai regular troops who are fighting in the Laotian mountains.


The U.S. Embassy does its utmost to prevent correspondents getting to areas of Laos where American-led guerrilla units operate.

Correspondents are refused permission to fly on U.S. aircraft to these areas, which is the only means of getting there unless one wants to risk a 5 or 10-day walk through territory mined and patrolled by Communist Guerrillas.


While reporters are not allowed on the planes, Laotian civilians with official status are.

"National security" is invoked against correspondents wanting to go to Long Cheng even though there are at least 20,000 Asian civilians living there. And anyone from Vientiane who has a relative or friend at Long Cheng can visit.

U.S. officials also refuse to discuss American casualties in Laos (currently 700 dead and missing) or how much is spent for the defense of Laos (about \$1 billion annually).



EXHAUSTED G.I.s AFTER COMBAT MISSION



SOLDIER SNIFFS HEROIN VIAL

New Withdrawal Costs

WITH the horror of a nightmare, the U.S. is discovering that getting out of Viet Nam has a price that it did not anticipate. One longtime supporter of the American cause—sympathetic enough so that President Nixon granted him a lengthy private interview only last February—is Peregrine Worsthorne, columnist and assistant editor of London's *Sunday Telegraph*. Now, Worsthorne argues, the U.S. presence in Viet Nam "may have become more a curse than a blessing, may now actually be doing the cause of South Viet Nam's independence more harm than good." The problem, says Worsthorne, is that American troops—once necessary to inspire the laggard South Vietnamese—have become dangerously demoralized. "Drug-saturated, mutinous, defeatist, incompetent, they constitute more of a threat to the South Vietnamese than do the Viet Cong," he contends.

Ominous Mutant. Worsthorne's brutal language is plainly exaggerated, but he has properly pointed to an ominous new mutant of the American tragedy in Viet Nam. The most melancholy statistics to come out of the war are, of course, the casualty figures of dead and wounded. Yet there is another, subtler casualty list that will haunt American society even after the last G.I. has left Viet Nam—the troops who became addicted to heroin while serving in Southeast Asia. The number is staggering: between 10% and 15% of U.S. troops in Viet Nam have developed a heroin habit. That represents from 26,000 to 39,000 Americans hooked. Some estimates are even higher—20% or more, which means upwards of 50,000 G.I. addicts. Only a small number, about 5,500, have enrolled in a military rehabilitation program since the first of the year.

These figures are not the work of anti-war propagandists. They were brought back by retiring Army Secretary Stanley Resor from a recent visit to Viet Nam, and repeated last week in a study conducted for the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Connecticut Republican Robert H. Steele. Steele made this chilling observation: "The soldier going to South Viet Nam today runs a far greater risk of becoming a heroin addict than a combat casualty." In all seriousness, he recommended that the President order all Americans home unless the governments of South Viet Nam, Laos and Thailand put an end to the traffic in illegal drugs. Corruption is so ingrained in Viet Nam, however, that stamping out the heroin trade would be a monumental task (*see THE WORLD*).

One reason for widespread G.I. addiction is the high quality of the "No. 4" crystalline white heroin distributed in Viet Nam. In the U.S., where most heroin is diluted with milk sugar or quinine to 5% strength or less, the drug is usually mainlined with a needle, a process that not only is unpleasant but also carries a considerable social taboo. In Viet Nam, by contrast, the heroin is so pure—95% or better—that it can be smoked with an equally powerful effect. Many G.I.s long since caught up in the pervasive marijuana culture have fallen prey to the myth that heroin is not addictive if smoked. Now a joint of heroin is passed around a group of soldiers in exactly the same manner as a joint of marijuana.

Off Limits. Under pressure from the U.S., the Saigon government is trying to curb the narcotics traffic and other smuggling. Several arrests were made in March, and two U.S. pilots for Air Force were pulled out of Laos and is often used by the CIA, were fired for carrying narcotics

into Viet Nam. The U.S. command declared all Vietnamese drugstores off limits to U.S. servicemen in order to discourage the buying of amphetamines and barbiturates. The Army followed suit by banning troops from bars, hotels and other businesses where drugs are known to be sold. But such measures have no effect on the thousands of other outlets, where most of the heroin is bought. A member of TIME's Saigon bureau asked a pedicab driver outside the U.S.O. club for "skag." After perfunctory hesitation ("You cop?"), the driver took the correspondent to a heroin source ten minutes away.

Palliative. No one can reckon the moral and emotional coin that the U.S. must eventually expend for the war in Viet Nam. General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Viet Nam, felt it necessary last week to warn against any form of "laxity" among the remaining G.I.s as the American pullout continues. Said Abrams: "It requires a herculean effort to keep alertness up." President Nixon acknowledges that heroin addiction in the military has become a serious problem; he is about to announce an ambitious federal program to combat the narcotics crisis through a new Government agency. It would confront the national drug problem generally, and would have specific authority to take over all cases of addiction in the armed forces and among veterans who became hooked while in uniform. That is at least a palliative gesture. Still, the President has often cautioned his countrymen against the hazards of a premature American withdrawal from Viet Nam; the dimensions of drug addiction among American troops offer one more heart-rending reason why the U.S. should get out as rapidly as possible.

SAN DIEGO, CAL.

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S - 246,007

Seeing Laos Through A Village Chief's Eyes

CONFLICT IN LAOS: The Politics of Neutralization, By Arthur J. Dommen (Praeger: 406 pages, \$12.50).

The Central Intelligence Agency, writes Arthur Dommen in this 1971 revision of his original 1964 work, exerted enormous effort to know what was going on in the kingdom of Laos.

Even with great expenditure of time and effort, however, the CIA "could not know one-tenth as much as what was in the head of a single Laotian village chief" about the intrigue of the country, he insists.

If Dommen, a serious and urbane bachelor in his late 30s, ever tires of being a foreign correspondent (Saigon bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times), there is little doubt that he would qualify as a Laotian village chief. He is probably the United States' foremost expert on Laos and there is more significance to that mantle than the average reader might suspect.

For Laos has long been — and is so recognized by diplomats as well as by the CIA and other such shadowy outfits of other nations — as the pivot of the entire Indochinese situation.

Were it not for the Ho Chi Minh Trail routes through Laos, North Vietnam would not have the slightest hope of maintaining its level of political and military activity in the south. These passages through Laotian jungles and mountains have been as useful to the North Vietnamese against the Americans as they were against the French.

Dommen has added some chapters in this revised edition and other wise polished up some judgment and inter-

pretations from the original manuscript. I remember well his hard work on this project in Hong Kong back in 1962 and 1963.

This new edition reveals how a plan worked out jointly by the governments of Laos and South Vietnam to counter North Vietnamese infiltration through Laos was abruptly dropped in 1959 when the United States cut off funds to finance it because of fear of provoking Hanoi.

The hitherto secret plan involved the construction of roads and airfields and operations by South Vietnamese commandos in Laos. It was designed to foil North Vietnamese use of the jungle trail network.

President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam and his generals strongly favored the plan, according to Dommen.

The book discloses further that the North Vietnamese government was using a strip of territory adjoining the western end of the demilitarized zone to infiltrate cadres regrouped to the North from South Vietnam after the 1954 partition of Vietnam at the Geneva conference. A dispute over the location of the border between Laos and Vietnam had left the ownership of the strip of territory in question ambiguous. When the demilitarized zone was drawn on the map of Indochina in 1954 it followed the border claimed by the French and inherited by the Royal Lao Government.

The Communist government in Hanoi, however, claimed that the border actually lay several miles further west. Thus in Hanoi's view the 1954 partition left a strip of territory actually in the hands of the Communists and allowed the Communists to

move their cadre southward to resume the war for liberation of the south, circumventing the international inspection of the DMZ in the process.

North Vietnam's use of the strip of territory was kept under such tight wraps that a series of clashes between Lao and North Vietnamese soldiers in the region in December, 1958, was passed off abroad as a mere border incident, whereas it was one of the first engagements of the Second Indochina War.

Journalists' books on foreign affairs are generally either anecdotal memoirs or "This Is How It Was" reports that lose their timeliness before the ink is dry on the first printing.

But Dommen breaks from this pattern and combines in his book the best attributes of the historian and the journalist.

One might wish that he had more generously sprinkled some personal anecdotes to enliven the narrative somewhat. But then again, there is nothing very humorous about the geopolitics of the kingdom of Laos.

—Edward Neilan
Copley News Service

NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST

E - 702,637

S - 368,841

JUN 4 1971

A Secret Study of Secrecy

There have been frequent occasions on which Senators seeking facts about U. S. military activity in Laos have found themselves groping in an official information blackout. It is hard to account for their current reluctance to enlighten the public.

Yet a Senate session scheduled to last 90 minutes next Monday will be kept dark at the request of Sen. Symington (D-Mo.), himself one of the most articulate and informed investigators of the secret story in Laos.

The subjects at the closed-door session will apparently include the

recent finding by Sen. Case (R-N.J.) that somewhere between 4000 and 6000 Thai troops are serving in Laos and are supported by the CIA.

That topic is well worth developing—fully and accurately. As Senate critics of Indochina secrecy have often pointed out, the Communists have little more to learn about covert American operations whereas the U. S. public is still being denied information, and a widening war is a far greater threat to U. S. troop security than new disclosures about Laos. If the Senators have facts, they should be made public.

FT. COLLINS, COLO.,
COLORADOAN

JUN 4 1971

E - 11,254

S - 11,320

STATINTL

*editorials***Strong indictment**

Long after the last American has been withdrawn from Indochina, the United States will still be facing the consequences of its participation in that theater in terms of human misery. Hundreds of thousands of wounded, many with permanently crippling injuries, will remind generations yet unborn of the cost America paid.

Perhaps more destructive, in terms of human lives, are the thousands returning from Indochina with sound limbs but bodies hooked on narcotics. Reports of drug usage by American servicemen serving in Vietnam have appeared almost from the beginning of the involvement. But the full extent of addiction on drugs such as heroin has not been revealed until recently.

A report prepared by two congressmen who toured Indochina and prepared their findings on drug usage for the House Foreign Affairs Committee reveals how widespread the problem has become. The study by Rep. Robert Steele of Connecticut and Rep. Morgan F. Murphy of Illinois backs up earlier allegations by the House Armed Services Committee on widespread corruption among Asian officials in drug-traffic.

"In Laos, government armed forces are major wholesalers of opium and heroin and have been directly involved in large scale smuggling activity," the two congressmen reported.

"Reliable sources report that at least two highranking Laotian officials, military and governmental, including the chief of the Laotian general staff, are deeply involved in smuggling activity," they said.

"In Thailand, a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reported to be one of the key figures in the opium, morphine and heroin operations in that country and throughout Southeast Asia."

South Vietnamese and Laotian Air Force planes are used to move the illicit cargo into South Vietnam, Steele and Murphy charged. They also said there is evidence some of the narcotics are being shipped by diplomatic pouch on Air America, a CIA-backed airline.

Steele estimates as many as 20 per cent of Americans in Vietnam have used heroin. If only half the charges made by this latest study are true--and thus far no part of the report has been refuted--it is a damaging indictment of the allies American has paid such a high price to defend in Southeast Asia.

3 JUN 1971

STATINTL

Asian Officials Protect Heroin Sale, Panel Told

They May Profit From Supplying Drugs to U.S. Soldiers, Narcotics Chief Says

BY THOMAS J. FOLEY
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The government's chief narcotics enforcement officer said Wednesday that officials of friendly Southeast Asian governments are protecting and may even have an interest in heroin traffic to American servicemen in Vietnam.

In testimony before the House Crime Committee, John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, also said heroin had been unwittingly smuggled into South Vietnam on airplanes of the CIA-operated Air America.

Committee Chairman Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) and other members urged the Administration to take a stronger stand with foreign friendly governments to force a halt to illicit drug traffic.

These included Turkey and France, which respectively grow and process the overwhelming amount of the opium smuggled into the United States as heroin.

Right to Ask Aid

"We're committed to risk our own cities in a nuclear war if any French city is attacked by the Communists," Pepper said, "and we have the right not only to ask but to demand that the French take emergency action to help us."

Ingersoll, who recently returned from discussions with Southeast Asia leaders on the heroin problem, said he doubted that any policy-making officials of the countries — Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam — are involved in the illicit drug traffic.

Burma, Thailand and Laos account for about 80% of the world's opium production, he said.



John E. Ingersoll
in Wirephoto

But he told newsmen after the hearing that many lower-level officials, including members of the South Vietnamese Legislature, deal in opium. He said some legislators have friends in President Nguyen Van Thieu's cabinet.

Ingersoll told the committee that heroin refineries were under control of insurgents in Burma and Thailand but that those in Laos "are protected by elements of the royal Laotian armed forces."

Ramparts Disclosures

He said that while management and ownership of the Laotian refineries appear to be primarily in the hands of ethnic Chinese citizens of that nation, "some reports suggest" that a senior Laotian air force officer may have an ownership interest in some of the plants.

When Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D-Calif.) noted that Ramparts magazine had identified the official as Gen. Ouane Rathi, Ingersoll said that "general speculation" conceded this.

Ingersoll denied one contention of the Ramparts article. It maintained that remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang army left in the area are involved in heroin production and are in the employ of the CIA for operations on the China mainland.

But Ingersoll conceded that Air America planes had been used in the past for smuggling heroin — just as regular commercial airliners have been used to smuggle it into the United States.

He told newsmen later that 80 kilograms were seized on an Air America plane at the huge Tan Son Hut Air Base outside Saigon only three or four weeks ago.

During the hearing, Waldie also asked Ingersoll about a Ramparts report that the secret CIA base of Long Cheng, used to support the U.S.-paid Meo tribesmen, was a distribution point for heroin to be shipped into South Vietnam.

Ingersoll said he had not heard of that. However, he later said he had discussed the general illicit drug problem with CIA Director Richard Helms. He said Helms denied the CIA was involved in any way, and that he believed him.

"The Meo tribesmen are something else," Ingersoll said, "but I don't blame the CIA for what the tribesmen do."

Poor CIA Security

Waldie said CIA security was apparently "abysmally poor, since those in the CIA employ used the base and facilities for the illicit traffic."

The narcotics chief sought to allay criticism by congressmen of U.S. efforts to get the cooperation of the Asian governments to crack down on the drug traffic.

He said the United States had virtually no leverage over the Burma existing aid program is being phased out. The opium-growing area in Thailand is in the hands of insurgents, Ingersoll said, but the Bangkok government is taking steps to try to control it.

He said Laotian officials were "most responsive" even though some high-ranking officials were involved.

Vietnam Smuggling

Ingersoll said the Saigon government had taken several steps to crack down on the smuggling, including a shakeup of its customs officials, an increase in the size of its central police force dealing with the problem and the appointment of a special task force by President Thieu.

He also said he was assigning three additional agents to the Far East and that the Defense Department had placed off limits areas of open heroin dealing.

STATINTL

3 JUN 1971

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STATINTL

Rain May Bring Respite for Laos

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Staff

VIENTIANE, June 2—It is starting to rain in this quiet little capital. The broad bed of the Mekong River fills a bit more every day, the dusty sidewalks will soon turn to mud. Another dry season is ending and Laos has survived.

There is nothing magical about the monsoon, but the fighting has been going on here for eight years and patterns have developed. The advance of the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao, according to the conventional wisdom, stops when the rain begins.

Most experienced diplomats believe it unlikely, but this year could be different. "No matter when," said a ranking American official this week, "the Royal Lao government is always on the verge of losing the war."

For Prince Souvanna Phouma's fragile neutralist government, the past six months have been especially bad ones and if there is anything at all to be happy about, it is only that they could have been worse.

The government's 70,000 regular troops and CIA-backed tribal guerrillas have recorded no meaningful military gains, the country's already tattered sovereignty was finally undone by the American-backed South Vietnamese invasion of the Ho Chi Minh trail (code-named Lam Son 719), and the hopes for negotiation with the Pathet Lao have greatly faded.

In the southern panhandle, Communist forces have easily pushed farther west than ever before, taking the strategic Bolovens Plateau and in the process expanding their supply trails to Indochina's southern battlefields.

But so far, the two major towns in southern Laos, Pakse and Savannakhet, have been spared.

On Sunday, government forces were positioned 18 miles from Pakse. On Monday, the position was only 17½ miles away.

Planes arriving here from the town are filled with fleeing women and children. Fifty American dependents were evacuated two weeks ago, but about 100 U.S. civilians and military officials remain.

Still, military analysts doubt that Pakse will fall. "The North Vietnamese got what they wanted," said a neutral diplomat. "They now control the Bolovens. Marching into Pakse would be more trouble than it's worth."

As for the market town of Savannakhet, the enemy appears to have stopped after toppling Dong Hene some 25 miles away.

U.S. military experts give the Laotians some chance of retaking the western edge of the Bolovens in the months ahead. In past years, government guerrillas, able to move in the rain, have recovered lost ground during the monsoon.

However, American "information" shows that, come what may, the North Vietnamese are intent on holding Dong Hene. The town, now 75 per cent destroyed and uninhabited, is near the western end of Highway 9 and gives the North Vietnamese broad control over the road that the South Vietnamese made a focus of Lam Son 719.

To the north, the royal capital of Luang Prabang has been heavily threatened and on March 22 the enemy shelled the airstrip destroying some buildings and aircraft. Then, however, they began to withdraw, either because they did not intend to take the town in the first place or as some Western military sources believe, they ran out of ammunition. In any event, the threat has eased.

The important CIA-maintained government base at Long Cheng was under such great pressure several months ago that many observers thought it was about to fall. The North Vietnamese divisions in the area and the base survived.

Communist strategy in this war has been not to seize population centers. Perhaps this explains why Pakse, Savannakhet and Luang Prabang are not thought to be in any great danger.

Long Cheng, on the other hand, is a strategic military base of the first rank and a major U.S. installation as well, leading some Americans here to conclude that the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao will make another determined stab in the next few weeks.

Similar Step-up

Throughout the country, and especially in the south, the Communists have stepped up activity since the end of Lam Son 719. Observers here see a strong connection even though there was a similar step-up last year, coinciding then with the Cambodian invasion.

The South Vietnamese thrust on the ground and the continuing massive U.S. bombardment of the trail have little to do with the war elsewhere in Laos, since the only objective is to stop men and equipment from reaching South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Nevertheless, Laotian and foreign observers now agree that Lam Son 719 had several important negative consequences for Laos.

In the first place, it encouraged the North Vietnamese to expand their supply system both to make up for lost time and increased the area that has to be interdicted by U.S. jets. This has been done in the panhandle.

Secondly, well-informed neutral diplomats believe the North Vietnamese were angered by the relative mildness of Souvanna's protest against the invasion and his plea to preserve neutrality. One result of the Communist anger may have been the symbolic pressure on Luang Prabang, home of the king to whom even the Pathet Lao declare loyalty.

Negotiations Set Back

Finally, the invasion set back prospects for negotiations which had already failed because of the failure of Souvanna and the

Pathet Lao delegate, Souk Vongsak to agree on preconditions.

One key issue was the preeminent role of the North Vietnamese on the Communist side, which Souvanna insisted be curtailed. Chances of any kind of North Vietnamese disengagement from Laos disappeared immediately once Lam Son began.

Souk Vongsak returned to Vientiane in mid-May with a new proposal for negotiations, calling for a total U.S. bombing halt and a cease-fire to precede the talks. Souvanna, in a reply considered notable here for its moderate tone, said the proposals lacked concreteness and should be clarified.

Significantly, for the first time in the contacts between the two sides, Souvanna did not mention the North Vietnamese.

Failing an agreement to talk, some diplomats see the possibility of a tacit arrangement among the Laotians to scale down the war in northern Laos, something the North Vietnamese might favor as it would free their troops there for duty elsewhere.

Souvanna's Role

Such an arrangement could be made, it is thought, even while the United States continues to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the North Vietnamese continue to send troops through southern Laos.

Souvanna plays a unique role among Indochina's non-Communist leaders. Unlike President Thieu or Lon Nol, Souvanna might be acceptable to the Communists in a restructured Laotian coalition.

For this reason, among others, U.S. officials here have repeatedly and vigorously made it clear that they favor Souvanna's remaining in office. They discourage talk of coups among some right-wing generals who favor taking a tougher line with the Communists by forging an alliance with Thailand and South Vietnam—ending the pretense of Laotian neutrality.

The South Vietnamese invasion in February quieted the generals for a time, but

Continued

STATINTL

Drugs in Vietnam cited in plea for end to draft

By TIM WHEELER
Daily World Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, June 1--Leaders of the movement to dump the military draft have declared that 40,000 heroin addicted GIs in Vietnam should convince the U.S. Senate to let conscription die on June 30.

Their statement was a reaction to a report last week by two congressmen that 30-40,000 U.S. GIs in Vietnam have been hooked on heroin.

Chris Sayer, organizer of a nationwide citizen lobby to back Senate efforts to repeal the draft, declared, "The fact is, the draft takes people against their will. It exposes them to a double danger. They are 90 percent of the casualties and 65 percent of the army deaths are draftees. It is a clear and present danger."

And now, he added, there is the danger of drugs.

He said the authorities in sounding the alarm about heroin addiction have talked only about Turkey and Marseilles.

"But the vast bulk of the heroin is produced in Laos and then processed in South Vietnam and Singapore and Hong Kong before it is shipped to the U.S." he said.

The drug epidemic in the U.S., he argued, is one of the poisonous by-products of the Vietnam war.

"What is the role of the CIA if the drugs are being flown openly in Air America planes?" he

asked.

He linked the entire problem to the Selective Service System and the recruiting of people for the military.

Senate vote due Friday

The drive against the draft is centered in the U.S. Senate, where a vote is scheduled this Friday on a measure by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore) to repeal the draft law.

Sayer, a coordinator of a group called Enddraft, is bringing citizens in a steady stream to visit Senate offices to demand a vote for the Hatfield measure.

Senator Mike Gravel's plan to filibuster against the draft until draft authority expires June 30 is backed by Senators George McGovern (D-SD), Harold Hughes (D-Iowa), Vance Hartke (D-Ind), Allen Cranston (D-Calif), William Proxmire (D-Wis) and Marlow Cook (R-Ky). They will join the Senator from Alaska for the round-the-clock showdown on the Senate floor.

Enddraft is not discouraged by the 42-31 vote against a pay increase for first term troops--taken by some observers as an indication of weakness in the "dove" ranks.

"People will be coming in and then the pressure will build," Sayers said.

1 JUN 1971

U.S. role in Laos stirs rumblings in Congress

By George W. Ashworth
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

American activities in Laos—and the administration's extreme reluctance to talk about them—threaten now to increase the President's difficulties on Capitol Hill and with the public.

Little is known outside administration circles of the precise extent of American involvement in Laos. This administration—like the Democratic administration before it—simply does not want to discuss the subject at all. Senators have run into difficulty finding out even in private just what is going on.

That fact is much more worrisome to the regular critics of the President's policies in Indo-China, such as Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D) of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, than it is to those more favorably inclined to the President's war policies.

But Laos provides a source of contention, and the administration now is urged by critics to level with Capitol Hill and with the public.

This newspaper reported a month ago that the administration has worked out an agreement with the Government of Thailand for sharply increased use of Thai forces in Laos in support of the neutralist government.

It was reported that, as a consequence, the use of Thai forces had sharply risen in Laos over some months from well under 1,000 to a figure believed in excess of 4,000. And, from all indications, the Thai Government was willing to provide far more if the American administration would provide funds.

The story prompted Sen. Clifford P. Case (R) of New Jersey to fire off a letter to Secretary of State William P. Rogers asking comment on the accuracy of the reports, and, as-

suming correctness, answers on five points:

○ Does the administration consider the financial support of Thai troops in Laos to be in accord with the Cooper-Church provisions in the 1970 Defense Appropriations Act that bans the payment of mercenaries except to protect a safe and orderly American withdrawal or disengagement from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of United States prisoners?

○ In the agreement with Thailand to be presented as a treaty to the Senate?

○ What are the agreement's specifics, including cost and duration?

○ Will supplemental appropriations be asked, or is reprogramming envisioned?

○ Has the U.S. Government given the Thais assurance of support in the event Thai troops encounter difficulties?

Brief response

According to sources, the administration's written response was far from elaborate. Further elaboration is being sought. After comparing the State Department report with information given by two Foreign Relations Committee aides just back from Laos, Senator Case described the administration reply as "incomplete and in certain respects inaccurate."

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern and Pacific Affairs, is expected in the near future to be available to brief the committee in secret session on the Laos operations.

The Thai troops are not the only issue related to Laos that has drawn senatorial interest. So far, the costs of various activities in Laos are sketchy at best. The only generally available figure is \$50 million or so per year for activities of the Agency for International Development (AID).

Military aid disclosed

Total military assistance funded by the services in Laos in fiscal 1970 was disclosed in subcommittee hearings as

\$50 million. But the figures for fiscal 1971, which now is drawing to a close, and fiscal 1972, beginning July 1, are so far not on the record.

Nor is the cost of the U.S. establishment in Laos or of bombing missions in support of the fighting in northern Laos on the record.

This administration and the one before it argue that full or relatively full disclosure would make the U.S. in clear violation of the Geneva Accords that established the theoretical neutrality of Laos.

The North Vietnamese have been extremely active in Laos for years. And the Americans have been in the fray as a counter to that North Vietnamese activity.

Reason for reluctance

Since the North Vietnamese will not admit what they are doing, the Americans are also reluctant to be open on the matter. To do so would not only hurt the bargaining position of the South Vietnamese side, but it would also give the North Vietnamese substantial ammunition for propaganda warfare. And, beyond that, disclosure could, it is argued,

make it almost certainly impossible to reestablish neutrality under the present Geneva Accords.

As a result of this policy, however, the North Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao, the Royal Lao Government, the Americans involved, all Communist-bloc nations, and other interested parties have a pretty clear idea of what the North Vietnamese and the Americans are doing. Left out in the informational cold are the Congress and the American public.

Overseeing function

In such a circumstance, critics argue, the overseeing function of the Congress cannot be exercised, and it is necessary to take the administration on blind faith in such matters. For doubters, such as Mr. Fulbright and Mr. Case, blind faith is not enough.

Much of the American effort in Laos is being carried out under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency. One skeptic said, "From what I can gather, the CIA is doing a very capable job in Laos. No other group, such as the Army, could do nearly so well. From the point of view of how well what we are doing in Laos is being handled, there probably isn't much argument. But there is the question of just how much of what we

1 JUN 1971

STATINTL

Key Town in Laos Girds for Red Push

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

PAKSE, Laos — North Vietnamese forces are trying to isolate this Mekong River town from its hinterland, the Bolovens Plateau, which the communists want to use as a staging area for new attacks on South Vietnam and Cambodia, Col. Cummal, the chief of staff in the fourth military region of Laos, says.

The plateau fell into North Vietnamese hands May 16, and Cummal sees continuing North Vietnamese pressure on Laos forces west of the plateau as a sign of the Communist intention to isolate Pakse.

Cummal stabbed his pen at a map, making a red cross over the road joining Laos Ngam, a town on the north edge of the Bolovens to the northeast of Pakse, with Pakse.

"The Communists took Lao Ngam and cut the road joining it to Pakse three years ago," Cummal said.

Another stab of the pen and a red cross blossomed on the road linking Pakse with Cambodia.

Road Cut Last Year

"This road was cut last year. It's still cut," the colonel said.

The pen moved with an indignant flourish and red blotches appeared on Route 23 and at Paksong on the edge of the Bolovens, 30 miles east of Pakse.

"Now the Vietnamese have overrun Paksong," Cummal said. Fighting, according to the colonel, is continuing 20 miles east of Pakse among coffee plantations bordering the winding ribbon of Route 23.

Yesterday 61 North Vietnamese dead were found after air strikes close to the road and fighting which lasted for 14 hours as the North Vietnamese tried to drive the Lao down Rt. 23 away from the plateau toward Pakse.

Cummal admitted that Lao losses were heavy in the fighting around Paksong.

In two weeks, 63 Lao were dead and 134 were missing. Another 146 were wounded, requiring hospitalization.

Cummal said he expected the North Vietnamese to hook around the plateau north of Pakse, cutting Rt. 13 linking Pakse to the rest of Laos and completing the isolation of the town. This would put the Lao

forces in a defensive posture where they cannot interfere with new Hanoi bases aimed against South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Second Largest Town

Pakse, Laos second largest town, would also be in deep economic trouble, cut off from Lao Ngam, Paksong and Cambodia.

"Paksong is our sister town," Pakse's Chinese merchants say. Pakse depends for its livelihood on the export of coffee from Paksong.

Without Paksong's coffee, Tobacco fruit and vegetables to sell, Pakse will wither away and die, local merchants said.

Col. Cummal and American officials, despite their belief the Communists only intend to isolate Pakse, are coppering their bets and preparing for the defense of Pakse itself.

"The decks are cleared for action," an American official said. Dependents of Americans and high-ranking Lao officials have been evacuated to Vientiane.

In Pakse, there is a 9:30 p.m. curfew. Armored cars move along the main streets.

Pakse has organized its own civil defense and at night all major buildings are manned by their daytime staffs. But they are carrying carbines and walkie talkies instead of papers and typewriters.

Pakse is bisected by a wooden bridge over the Sadoe River connecting the town with military headquarters and the airport. "It's perfect sapper target," Americans say. At night armed troops sleep on the bridge, searchlights play on the bridge supports and Lao gunboat patrols the bridge piles.

On the other side of the river, Lao troops man wire fences around CIA headquarters. More than 30 Americans stay at night in Pakse. Some are regular U.S. military ad-

visers from the Army attaches' office, some are CIA ground advisers to Lao units, some are CIA accountants who pay Lao special units, and some are straght AID employes in agriculture, refugee work and education or roadbuilding. Some are U.S. Air Force forward air controllers.

Weapons Available

Arms are available in case of an attack. At night Lao air force T28 bombers fly to Ubon in Thailand for safety.

Despite the warlike aspect at night, Pakse is normal in the day. Air America pilots in blue shirts lounge at Kenry's, a Chinese-run cafe.

There are no refugees to be seen. Most of Paksong's people had relatives in Pakse who they are staying with. AID has only 530 new refugees on its books, but some are now trickling in after being released by North Vietnamese forces from a prison camp east of Paksong.

These people report seeing tank tracks or hearing tanks, supporting the military reports of the presence of North Vietnamese armor on the Bolovens.

Patrol Sees Tank

Lao military reported one of their patrols on the plateau met a vehicle they thought was a tractor until it swung a gun muzzle on them; sending them fleeing.

The presence of North Vietnamese armor and anti-aircraft leads the Lao to believe Hanoi is determined to defend the plateau against any counter attacks.

Some of Pakse's merchants, however, and some Lao military believe Hanoi cannot keep the plateau.

"The plateau produces only 200 bags of rice a year," Cummal says. He explains tribes on the plateau exchange their produce for Pakse rice.

American skeptics somewhat cynically point out that Laotians in Pakse interested in commerce may sell rice themselves to the North Vietnamese. It's been done by top-ranking Lao in Pakse in the past and Americans point out that with the North Vietnamese now chosen, the costs of transportation are less and the profits greater.

Some Americans tried to raise prices during the current emergency, but have

been stopped by the town's governor, who warned they would be shot if caught.

With clashes continuing among the coffee plantations and the elephant grass 20 miles east of here, military sources expect more hard fighting as the Laos situation continues to deteriorate.

BALTIMORE, MD.

SUN MAY 29 1971

M - 164,621

E - 189,871

S - 323,624

Symington Plans Secret Laos Talk In Senate

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, May 28—Senator Stuart S. Symington (D., Mo.) said today that he will ask for a secret session of the Senate to brief members on the full extent of American involvement in the war in Laos.

Staff Aides' Report

Mr. Symington, chairman of the foreign relations subcommittee on United States security and commitments abroad, recently dispatched two members of his staff on a fact-finding visit to Laos.

After their return, he told reporters that the staff report indicated the administration had not previously given accurate or

complete information on American activities in Laos.

Today, in a speech prepared for delivery before the faculty club at Harvard University, Mr. Symington said he was asking for a closed-door session of the Senate "in order that the facts about these additional military developments are known to the members before they appropriate more funds for this clandestine war."

The secret staff report prepared for his subcommittee, he said, "shows conclusively that the people, as well as most of their congressional representatives, have little or no knowledge of the long and tragic war being conducted in that country, and, therefore, even less knowledge of the amount of money involved."

5 Secret Sessions

There have been five secret sessions in the Senate since 1968, and, according to Francis R. Valco, Senate secretary, they are granted automatically at the motion of any senator.

The last such session was held last year, in the waning days of the 91st Congress, to discuss a procedural question. Before that there had been secret sessions on such types as the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system and the CIA.

Details On B-52's

The subcommittee staff members, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, reported their findings last week to the parent committee. But because their report was based on classified briefings and documents, it could not be made public.

Senator Symington, at the

time, said he would attempt to get administration agreement to declassify as much of the report as possible.

The report is understood to have included details on B-52 bombings in northern Laos, which the administration has only recently confirmed, as well as the presence of 4,600 U.S.-financed Thai troops in Laos.

Mr. Symington's decision to ask for a secret session of the Senate appeared to be a move to bypass the administration's security restrictions.

It took more than six months of negotiations with the administration before the Symington subcommittee was able to make public portions of the transcripts of its October, 1969, hearings on Laos.

Made Public Last Year

The heavily censored transcripts were made public in April, 1970. They outlined for the first time the extent of U.S. bombings in northern Laos.

The air strikes had begun in 1964 and been continued secretly. President Nixon acknowledged them in March, 1970, without giving details. That B-52's, used for high-altitude saturation bombing, were also being used in northern Laos, was confirmed by State Department officials early this month.

ST. LOUIS, MO.
GLOBE-DEMOCRAT

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MORNING - 292,789

WEEKEND - 306,889

MAY 29 1971

Symington to Seek Secret Laos Session

By EDWARD V. O'BRIEN
Chief of The Globe-Democrat
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON. — Sen. Stuart Symington (Dem., Missouri), announced Friday he will seek a secret session of the Senate on Laos so that congressmen can learn "the facts" about the "long and tragic war" being waged in that country by the United States.

He charged that most senators and representatives "have little or no knowledge" of American military operations in Laos and have been given "even less knowledge of the amount of money involved."

In a speech prepared for the Harvard University Faculty Club at Cambridge, Mass., he implied that the Nixon administration has withheld information about the "clandestine war" in Laos from Congress and the public.

TWO STAFF INVESTIGATORS OF the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, just back from a week in Laos, reported to members last Friday in closed session.

Symington said their findings on "what is actually going on" showed "conclusively" that neither Congress nor the American people know the true story.

Congressmen should be told the full truth before they have to vote on money for "these additional military developments," Symington said.

The investigators, Richard Moose and James Lowenstein, are attached to a Symington-headed subcommittee on foreign commitments.

SECRET SENATE SESSIONS ARE HELD infrequently, when classified information is to be discussed. Symington's request is expected to be granted, and he probably will relay the investigators' observations.

After the committee session a week ago, Chairman J. W. Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, told reporters the CIA is covertly financing 4,800 Thai troops fighting in northern Laos in support of the Laotian government.

Two investigators' findings show neither Congress nor the public know the true story, senator charges.

Another published leak was that total United States costs in Laos were more than \$100 million, with much of the money not showing up as such in budget documents provided to congressional committees.

In his Harvard speech, Symington charged that Congress has "lost control" of the multi-billion-dollar defense budget. Laos, he said, proves it.

IN SOME CASES, HE WENT ON, THE NIXON administration in turn "has lost control of the military" and the Pentagon's money requests.

As an example, he said that after the civilian heads of the Defense Department recently decided against seeking money to build a new Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, "the military" still "explained" at a congressional hearing "why they felt this carrier decision was a mistake."

Symington said he believes this country's military power to deter major war is "currently adequate."

But, he said, the value of the dollar and strength of the economy are "slipping," and "there is some waning of confidence" among Americans.

29 MAY 1971

Secret War Report Planned

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said yesterday he will demand a rare secret session of the Senate to give senators the full story about U.S. involvement in "the long and tragic war being conducted" in northern Laos.

This will mark the second time in two years that the Senate has gone into secret session on the Laotian war.

On Dec. 15, 1969, the Senate also went into secret meeting to discuss the extent to which the United States was financing and assisting the the Royal Laotian government against Communist and Pathet Lao foes in northern Laos.

Immediately afterwards, it approved by an 80-to-9 vote a prohibition against introduction of U.S. ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. It is still in effect.

Although little has been made public about the details of U.S. involvement, it is estimated that the CIA has been financing an army of as many as 32,000 Meo and other tribesmen in northern Laos. It has also been covertly financing Thai troops fighting on the side of the Royal Lao Forces.

The United States has also been conducting B-52 raids against the Communists in northern Laos and providing

money and supplies to the government. The United States, according to some sources, has been supplying most of the Lao government budget, 90 per cent or more.

No public estimate has ever been given of the total costs to the United States, but one source has put the figure as high as \$334 million in a past year and \$230 million in the current year. These may be only partial figures, however.

Symington is not expected to ask for the secret session until the week after next at the earliest, because he wants to let debate on amendments to the draft bill finish first. He will have no trouble obtaining it, because, according to a Senate official, any senator can demand and obtain a secret session if seconded by another senator.

Symington said yesterday that before the Senate votes any more money "for this clandestine war," it should be informed about "additional military developments" in Laos.

The Symington announcement, made in a speech at Harvard University last night, reflects a new fear among some members of the Senate that U.S. involvement in the Laotian war, which has been dragging on for a number of years, may be a tunnel with no light at the end.

Two staff members of Symington's Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad testified last week that they learned during an April visit to Laos, that the CIA is now financing 4,800 Thai troops fighting in northern Laos on behalf of the Laotian government. The figure apparently was increased from only 1,000 a year ago.

Senators present at the closed meeting said the CIA felt those troops were needed because the Meo tribesmen supported by the CIA had been decimated in years of fighting.

DAILY WORLD
28 MAY 1971

Congressmen tag Ky as drug pusher

By TIM WHEELER

WASHINGTON, May 27—Two U.S. Congressmen revealed today that President Nixon's allies in Saigon, including vice-dictator Nguyen Cao Ky, are drug pushers who have hooked 30,000 to 40,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam on heroin.

Also implicated in the dope pushing racket is "Air America," the Central Intelligence Agency's air supply wing. The report declares that CIA planes have been used to fly dope into Vietnam.

Rep. Thomas E. Morgan, (D-III), and Rep. Robert H. Steele, (R-Conn), were the two Congressmen who released a 46-page report titled "The World Heroin Problem," at a press conference today.

The report contains findings of a 21-day trip the two took through Southeast Asia on which they found rampant drug addiction of "epidemic" proportions among U.S. troops.

They reported that drug pushers in Saigon "are so blatant that several attempts were made to sell heroin to members of the study mission as they walked the streets of Saigon accompanied by a uniformed member of the United States Army."

Withdrawal "only solution"

They warned that unless the "Allies" curb the soaring traffic in heroin "the only solution is to withdraw all American servicemen from Southeast Asia."

"We are not optimistic," they said, "that the government is either willing or able "to curb the drug traffic."

The report states that heroin is smuggled into Vietnam aboard aircraft of the Laotian and South Vietnamese air forces, and in rented and commercial aircraft.

"Heroin," it added, "has also been smuggled in Air America aircraft although there is no evidence that any official of the U.S. agency has ever been involved in the traffic into South Vietnam."

"The U.S. agency," which the two House members found themselves unable to identify by name, is the CIA.

Both House members have been supporters of President Nixon's war policies, but today Rep. Steele told reporters, "The bleak prognosis is that thousands upon thousands of junkie Johnnys will come marching home hooked on heroin."

The report declares, "It is assumed by the U.S. military that this activity reaches high levels of command, to include politicians, both in Laos and in South Vietnam. In Thailand a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reputed to be one of the key figures in the opium, morphine base and heroin operations in that country and throughout southeast Asia.

"There have also been reports that Vice-President Ky is implicated in the current heroin traffic."

Deaths zooming

Drug addiction in some U.S. units in Vietnam has reached 25 percent, the report continues. Between August and December, 1970, 90 deaths were suspected to have been drug-related. Autopsies confirmed 59 were from heroin overdose.

Last January, the rate shot up: 17 for that month alone were drug deaths and in February it rose again to 19.

"Figures for March and April are not yet available, but if this trend continues, over 200 young Americans will die of heroin addiction in 1971," the report warns.

Most of the opium is grown in Laos, but the major exporter of the drug to Vietnam and the U.S. is Thailand, the staunchest anti-Communist ally of the U.S. in Southeast Asia.

Heroin from Thailand, says the report, "is smuggled to the U.S. by couriers on commercial or military aircraft. Some is mailed to the U.S. by U.S. military personnel using both commercial and military postal services."

The disastrous impact of this drug flow from Indochina to the U.S. is reflected in the estimated 250,000 heroin addicts in the U.S., the report states. One half of these are in New York City, where 1,154 persons died from drug overdose in 1970, and one half of these fatalities were below the age of 23. In the nation's capital, heroin addiction rose from 10,400 in 1970 to 15,800 at present, a 60 percent increase.

"Five years ago," the report says, "the heroin problem was restricted to the ghetto areas of our major cities. Now it is spreading to the suburbs and is found among the children of the wealthy and well-to-do as well as among the poor."

The report charges the U.S. military command supplied U.S. Saigon ambassador Ellsworth Bunker "with the names of high-ranking Vietnamese officials it suspects of involvement in the heroin trade." To date, Bunker has remained silent on the subject.

House Team Asks Army to Cure Addicts

By FELIX BELAIR Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 27—A Congressional investigating team urged in a report made public today that the Army be required to identify and rehabilitate the 28,000 to 39,000 American heroin addicts in South Vietnam before returning them to civilian life.

The report to the House Foreign Affairs Committee—parts of which became known earlier this week—said that so many G.I.'s in South Vietnam were becoming addicted to heroin that President Nixon should order all troops home unless authorities in that country, as well as in Laos and Thailand, halted the drug traffic.

Representatives Morgan F. Murphy, Democrat of Illinois, and Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, suggested that corruption at the highest levels of the Governments and the Military of the three countries left little hope for halting the traffic. But they forecast "major moves" by the White House in the next six weeks to put pressure on the Southeast Asian Governments.

Legislation Introduced

The authors of the report visited nine countries in Europe, the Middle and Far East and Indochina and interviewed government, military and diplomatic officials of those countries and the United States. Their investigations outside the United States extended over 21 days.

Legislation requiring all armed services to retain addicted servicemen in active status until cured was introduced in the House recently by Representative John M. Monagan, Democrat of Connecticut.

Known as the Drug Abuse Control Bill of 1971, the meas-

ure would require all branches of the service to certify that men being discharged from active duty were free from drug addiction. It would establish a drug abuse control corps for each branch with responsibility to enforce its provisions.

One of the Congressional report's 19 recommendations urged the President to "take personal command of the struggle to eliminate the illegal international traffic in narcotics, particularly heroin, and commit the full resources of the county to that battle."

To identify heroin addicts before discharge, the report proposed that all military personnel be required to submit to a urinalysis and that the Defense Department provide "acute care and detoxification as well as basic rehabilitation services" for addicts.

3 Years' Treatment Urged

The report recommended that if military rehabilitation efforts proved unsuccessful, an addict's commanding officer "be required, prior to the addict's discharge, to civilly commit the addict to the administrator of the Veterans Administration for a period of three years for treatment and rehabilitation."

At a news conference on the report, Representative Steele said, "The soldier going to South Vietnam today runs a far greater risk of becoming a heroin addict than a combat casualty."

Representative Murphy observed that "a soldier suffering from a wound or even venereal disease can be retained in the service until restored to health, but one suffering from the sickness of heroin addiction is discharged and returned to society and denied the facilities

of the Veterans Administration because of the nature of his illness."

The Illinois Congress said it was "a national disgrace" that the Veterans Administration was not equipped to rehabilitate addicts.

The report estimated that heroin addicts in the United States armed forces in all of Southeast Asia numbered between 30,000 and 40,000, most of them in South Vietnam.

U.S. Planes Reported Involved

The report said that many high-ranking Laotian, Thai and South Vietnamese officials—both civilian and military—are making large profits from the illegal sale of heroin and other narcotics to G.I.'s. It said that in some cases United States planes and diplomatic pouches had been used to smuggle opium and heroin into Saigon.

"In Laos, Government armed forces are major wholesalers of opium and heroin and have been directly involved in large-scale smuggling activity," the report said. "Reliable sources report that at least two high-ranking Laotian officials, including the chief of the Laotian General Staff, are deeply involved in smuggling activity."

"In Thailand a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reputed to be one of the key figures in the opium and heroin operations."

The report said that South Vietnamese and Laotian Air Force planes provided by the United States are frequently used to bring heroin into South Vietnam. Smaller amounts are smuggled in on Air America, an airline financed by the Central Intelligence Agency, it added.

STATINTL

PATERSON, N. J.

NEWS

MAY 28 1971

E - 49,251

IN MONTCLAIR STATE TALK

McCloskey Says Taft Tries to Hide War Vote

MONTCLAIR -- Sen. Robert Taft Jr. is trying to shield President Nixon from a genuine vote on his war policies by running in the May Ohio GOP primary as a favorite son candidate, Rep. Paul McCloskey Jr., R-Cal., said Thursday.

"It looks like we're getting to the White House a little bit," McCloskey said, replying to newsmen's questions about Taft's announcement earlier in the day.

"I think he is trying to protect the President from having a vote on the war policies in the primaries," he said in an address at Montclair State College.

Taft has said he hoped his candidacy would provide a focal point around which Republicans could rally in support of President Nixon. He pointed to McCloskey and former Republican Sen. Charles E. Goodell of New York as two men who are trying to "embarrass" the President in a "Dump Nixon" move.

Why He's in Race

McCloskey emphasized his own candidacy is directed at bringing Nixon's war policies home to the public.

He named New York Mayor John V. Lindsay, Oregon Sen. Mark Hatfield, John Gardner, Illinois Sen. Charles H. Percy, and Maryland Sen. Charles Mathias Jr. and men "preferable to Nixon and to me" as Republican presidential candidates.

He said since he personally began speaking out against the

President he has received 35,000 letters and an unsolicited \$10,000 supporting him, plus another \$10,000 contribution to set up an office from Norton Simon.

He told some 300 students they can expect to see Central Intelligence Agency activities brought up in Congress in the near future.

"I think you're going to see a debate begin next week in Congress on the CIA," he said.


He said a provision giving the CIA power to carry out "covert operations" would be the target. He said this includes those other activities than simple gathering information, such as "influencing elections, arming warlords, leading the tribes against the Pathet Lao in Laos."

How 250 Spied on Reds for Month Told

By ROBIN MANNOCIE
Associated Press Writer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — Twelve-man teams of Cambodian spy troops, trained by American Central Intelligence Agency personnel at an undercover base in Laos, successfully infiltrated deep into Communist territory in Cambodia two months ago, reliable Western sources in Phnom Penh report.

The sources said about 20 intelligence teams of a dozen men each were flown last March from a base near Pakse in southern Laos to secret landing zones in Rattanakiri, Stung Treng and Preah Vihear provinces in northern Cambodia. The entire region has been con-



Marshal Lon Nol
... gave permission

trolled by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces since early last summer.

The sources said the Cambodian spy teams were flown aboard helicopters from the U.S. air base at Udorn, Thailand. American pilots and crewmen in uniform were aboard some of the aircraft, the sources said.

OTHER helicopters were manned by Thai crews, according to the sources. Thai and American aircraft were also used to keep the teams supplied with food, including American C-rations. American and Thai helicopters

operated the enemy-held region to pick up a number of Vietnamese soldiers captured by the Cambodians.

The helicopters returned after a month to bring the intelligence agents out, and the teams are now located in territory controlled by the Cambodian government, the sources said.

Some details of the accounts were confirmed by U.S. officials, but these officials said they had not been informed of the full extent of the infiltration teams' activities.

The sources gave this account:

IN JULY 1970, about 250 young Cambodians were selected from volunteers of the 15th Brigade, commanded by Lt. Col. Lon Non, younger brother of Cambodia's ailing government leader, Marshal Lon Nol.

All those picked had completed the equivalent of the ninth grade. Many were students and all were eager to fight the Vietnamese invaders.

The soldiers were flown to Pakse and at a camp nearby underwent eight months of training. Americans in civilian clothes who lived in Pakse supervised their instruction in map reading, radio communications, explosives, first aid, coordination of air drops and other activities.

Discipline was strict, with minor lapses punished by solitary confinement.

The Americans who trained them did not reveal for whom they worked, but the Cambodians were told by their interpreters that the CIA.

PERMISSION to train Cambodians in Laos was obtained from Prince Boun Oun, former rightist premier who rules southern Laos largely independent of the Royal Laotian government in Vientiane.

According to one source, agreement to train Cambodian soldiers in Laos was arranged by Lon Nol, possibly through his brother, Lon Non is believed to have made at least one visit to Laos last summer, and Boun Oun flew to Phnom Penh on one or more occasions.

The sources said the Cambodian intelligence teams were trained alongside a force known as the "White Scarves" made up of ethnic Cambodians from South Vietnam as well as Cambodians from Cambodia.

Despite Cambodia's desperate need for elite troops with specialized training such as that given to the White Scarves, the Western sources said they were used to fighting for the Bolovens Plateau in the heart of Boun Oun's territory. The White Scarves are still in Laos, according to the sources.

BEFORE being flown to their zone of operations in northeast Cambodia last March, the intelligence teams were given North Vietnamese uniforms. This ruse was intended to fool the local Khmer Loeu, hill tribesmen whose loyalty to Phnom Penh was then suspect. The disguise was not expected to fool North Vietnamese units; for one thing, the Cambodians were armed with U.S. M16 automatic rifles rather than the Communists' AK47.

The teams were under orders to avoid head-on clashes with North Vietnamese. Their mission was to spy on North

Vietnamese and Viet Cong troop and supply movements and send back information about the northeastern provinces.

One team came upon an enemy camp in Rattanakiri province, near where the Ho Chi Minh Trail runs through Cambodia. The team called for air strikes which plastered the camp with napalm and caused heavy casualties. But the bombs also alerted the enemy, and soon after Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's ousted former head of state, singled out Lon Non's 15th Brigade for an especially strong attack in one of his broadcasts over Peking Radio.

THE AGENTS were considered highly successful for beginners. According to one source, the force of some 250 men lost only two men, one to enemy fire and one to malaria.

But the teams reportedly had leadership problems during the month they spent inside enemy territory, and as a result they have been receiving special additional training.

Where they will be dropped next is not known.



STATINTL

CHARLESTON, W. VA.

GAZETTE

M - 63,2943 7 1971

GAZETTE-MAIL

S - 106,775

Must We Pay Asians to Fight?

Sen. William Fulbright, asked by newsmen how many Thai troops are being paid by the CIA to fight in Laos, replied: "It's not very secret. I think it's 4,800."

Among conclusions to be drawn from this is that the 4,800 Thais are being paid by America to do the fighting against Communists in Laos because America can't get anyone else to fight. Not even Laotians.

Why does America persist in the futile endeavor? If Asians aren't interested in preserving their systems against the Communists, the vast treasury of America isn't big enough to pay them forever.

It must be frustrating, too, to the needy of America to learn that \$260 million has been paid from the American treasury to Thai troops fighting in Vietnam, if fighting is the word.

No wonder Americans are turning to isolationism. National leaders who first encouraged America to assume a role in international affairs didn't envision that role to be paymaster to reluctant allies.

27 MAY 1971

**CAMBODIAN FORAYS
BY SPIES REPORTED**

PNOMPENH, Cambodia, May 26 (AP)—Twelve-man teams of Cambodian troops, trained by Central Intelligence Agency personnel at a base in Laos, successfully infiltrated deep into Communist-held territory in Cambodia two months ago, according to Western sources here.

The sources said about 20 such intelligence teams were flown last March from a base near Pakse in southern Laos to

secret landing zones in Rattanakiri, Stung Treng and Preah Vihear provinces in northern Cambodia. The entire region has been controlled by North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces since early last month. The teams were said to have returned after a month.

The sources said the Cambodians were flown aboard helicopters from the United States air base at Udorn, Thailand. American pilots and crewmen in uniform were aboard some of the aircraft, the sources stated.

Other helicopters were manned by Thai crews, according to the sources.

STATINTL

DAYTON, OHIO
JOURNAL HERALD

MAY 26 1971
M - 111,867

Drug Traffic

... U.S. allies in Asia, CIA implicated

The disclosure by U.S. congressmen of the involvement of high-ranking Southeast Asian officials in illegal narcotics traffic lends special irony to the growing drug abuse problem among U.S. forces in South Vietnam.

Of particular concern is the accusation by U.S. Reps. Morgan F. Murphy, D-Ill., and Robert H. Steele, R-Conn., that the Central Intelligence Agency is an accomplice and that some of the opium produced by the Meo tribesmen in an area that includes portions of Laos, Thailand and Burma is flown out of the area in U.S. aircraft.

✓ The Meos make up the irregular army trained and supported by the CIA in Laos. Opium is the cash crop of the Meos, and it is from opium that heroin is derived. The Meos have been so engaged for many

years, but the market has grown substantially in recent years, in part because of the rising use of heroin by U.S. troops.

There is considerable doubt that the United States will be any more successful in suppressing narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia than it has been in New York City, or Dayton, Ohio. But Congress should undertake an immediate inquiry into the alleged CIA complicity in this traffic, and should re-examine the basis of U.S. support for governments and individuals whose business enterprise poses such a threat to the well being of U.S. servicemen stationed in these countries and to the health and stability of U.S. society.

The unhappy truth is that the principal world market for illegal narcotics is the United States, whether the poppies are grown in Mexico, Turkey or Laos.

Number 361

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25 May 1971

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE ASIA LETTER

AN AUTHORITY ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by THE ASIA LETTER Co. Tokyo Hong Kong Washington Los Angeles

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (I): When United States Central Intelligence Agency Director RICHARD HELMS was getting ready to visit Saigon last fall for talks with South Vietnamese President NGUYEN VAN THIEU, he sent ahead an unusual calling card.

It was in the form of a news leak to the New York Times.

A story quoting "government officials" related in considerable detail the C.I.A. finding that there were some 30,000 agents of the Vietcong that had insinuated themselves into the Saigon government apparatus.

The findings revealed Hanoi intentions to increase that number to 60,000 by the end of 1971.

The conclusion was that the Saigon government would not be able to cope with these agents in shaping the country's future.

The information had very little to do with fact.

The figures came out of a hat--Richard Helms' hat.

The story was, frankly, designed to scare the hell out of President Thieu and make Helms' bargaining position a little easier.

What Helms was selling was the C.I.A. line of a need for a tougher security stance internally. Basically, President RICHARD NIXON had asked Helms if there was something he could do about the rampant corruption inside the Thieu government---officers squandering aid funds on luxury cars, wine and women and allowing an unacceptable amount of Uncle Sam's cash to turn up as flight capital to Swiss and French banks.

It was one of the rare (but increasing) instances when Helms and the C.I.A.---generally close-mouthed adherents to the "no comment" school---had ever used the press for leverage.

But it tells a lot about the C.I.A., which often feels frustrated about "not getting its message across" to the people it wants to reach in and out of the administration.

For the last few months, for example, the C.I.A. has been peddling in Washington and elsewhere details of an intensified Communist Chinese road-building effort in northern Laos.

But correspondents involved with Peking ping-pong and other developments have found the story not glamorous enough, nor different enough, from earlier ones on the same subject to get much space.

Helms visited Laos, which has come to be known as "C.I.A. Country", after twisting Thieu's arm and then went on to Tokyo to discuss Red China's nuclear, rocket and submarine developments with officials of Japan's intelligence-defense establishment.

These events were not reported in your daily newspaper and the exact details will never be known.

The C.I.A. is a many tentacled thing.

It operates in many diverse ways.

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FH

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE ASIA LETTER

AN AUTHORITY ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by THE ASIA LETTER Co. Tokyo Hong Kong Washington Los Angeles

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25 May 1971

~~MAY 24 1971~~

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The C.I.A. is a many tentacled thing.

Hanoi Drive In Laos Seen As Supply Bid

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, May 24 — North Vietnam's recent successes in toppling important government-held positions in southern Laos are viewed in Saigon as part of a major effort by the enemy to expand and improve its supply system.

While there is agreement here that the effort is underway, Americans differ on whether the enemy is merely recouping time and materiel lost during the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, or instead, is preparing to increase pressure on the southern battlefields.

In any event, American analysts, see the taking of Pak-song last week as assuring the North Vietnamese of the strategic Bolovens Plateau for their trail network into South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The plateau used to serve as a base area for guerrilla units supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency who carried out harassment and surveillance of enemy operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The eastern side of the plateau was incorporated into the trail in a similar Communist offensive at about the same time last year.

To the east of the Bolovens, in the rugged mountainous region that has long been enemy territory, U.S. intelligence shows an unusually high level of activity despite the onset of the rainy season this month.

Truck Traffic High

Truck traffic, an imprecise but favored index, is twice what it was at this time last year, averaging about 600 trucks a day entering Ban Karai Pass on the North Vietnamese border.

In addition, there is a continuing spurt of roadbuilding, most of it in spurs around sections of the trail damaged by U.S. air strikes. Reconnaissance photos show piles of gravel and other roadbuilding equipment.

One reliable intelligence estimate is that 240 miles of road has been built in recent months, principally after the South Vietnamese drive into the Laos panhandle last February.

Another indication of the heightened stress on the trail is the reinforcement of artillery units so that there are now 650 pieces on either side of the North Vietnamese-Laotian border, more than there have ever been before, according to U.S. sources.

Despite the changing weather and average of 250 sorties a day of U.S. fighter-bombers, gunships and B-52s, the quantity of equipment flowing down the trail is said to be considerable.

One measure of how much is the amount Americans report as destroyed. On April 20-21, just as the rains were beginning, the U.S. claimed 4,200 secondary explosions at a storage point and depot on Route 92, about 16 miles west of the Demilitarized Zone.

There is less American air pressure on the Bolovens, U.S. sources said, because there are Laotians soldiers scattered around the area. The Laotians, said one of the small corps of Laos watchers here, still have forces on both sides of Pak-song.

As part of the same objective of widening their supply capacity, the North Vietnamese also overran the town of Dong Hene last week, near the western end of Highway 9,

which was the main artery of the South Vietnamese drive into Laos.

This brings them some 30 miles from Savannakhet, which lies on the Mekong River about 125 miles to the north of the Bolovens. But it is generally felt here in Vientiane that seizing major towns is still not the enemy's intention.

American here are prone to see events in southern Laos primarily as they effect South Vietnam. Presumably, that is what the emphasis here is on the enemy's effort to improve its logistics situation and not on the consequences of increased military pressure on Prince Souvanna Phouma's government.

Conclusions Differ

"As always for the North Vietnamese, this remains the main show," said one civilian source.

The apparent determination of the North Vietnamese to do as much as possible to utilize and develop their trail network even during the rainy season, leads experts to different, although not necessarily contradictory, conclusions.

"They've got to run to keep up," said one military source, "the South Vietnamese got a bloody nose in Laos, but they tied up the enemy for 45 days and we all know a lot more about the trail now."

U.S. intelligence concludes that less of the materiel being sent down the trail reaches its destination than did a year ago. One reason given for this is that American air strikes are pounding away at targets pinpointed by South Vietnamese forces during the invasion.

At the same time, a supply buildup could indicate an in-

attention to step up activity in the northern sectors of South Vietnam, particularly the vulnerable Central Highlands, as the October presidential election here approaches.

"What would be more effective," an American adviser in the highlands said recently, "than knocking off one province just as the election hoopla reached its peak."

STATINTL

Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden

Intelligence Boss Is Needed



THE TROUBLE with the intelligence service of the United States is that it has no commander. This is the point perceived by President Nixon during a recent secret White House briefing at which the President literally threw up his hands in a display of impatience at the vast, expensive and complicated bureaucracy which had been described.

The President had asked for the briefing because of three recent and irritating intelligence failures.

The first was at Sontay, in North Vietnam, where the Army mounted a dangerous operation to recover prisoners who weren't there.

Second was the failure to learn that the North Vietnamese were using the Port of Sihanoukville in Cambodia as a vast supply center—a fact discovered only after we barged into Cambodia thinking the supply center was somewhere else.

Third was the failure of the U.S. command in South Vietnam to forecast the speed with which the North Vietnamese could send reinforcements into Laos, and the Army's failure to estimate how many South Vietnamese ground troops and American airmen would be needed to do the job.

ALL THESE failures caused the President to ask for a clear explanation of how our intelligence system

works—and why it sometimes doesn't work. What he received was an accurate account of confusion.

The first point Mr. Nixon learned is that the \$2 billion-a-year intelligence effort is not commanded but coordinated. Richard Helms, a careful objective analyst, commands CIA but not the Defense Department's intelligence arm, which is headed by Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett. General Bennett, in turn, doesn't really command his own forces because he is often dealing with intelligence requests from officers who outrank him and whose wishes must be regarded as orders.

Thus compromise frequently substitutes for decision in determining Defense Department intelligence priorities. Bennett must try to satisfy an admiral who insists that developments in submarine detection must come first, a general who is more interested in the thickness of Soviet armor, and an Air Force man who insists on priority for new developments in the Soviet SAM. Helms must balance all this with the importance of finding out what the Russians are putting in their ICBM bases and why.

Nobody is boss. Nominally, Helms is "coordinator" of the intelligence effort, but since most of the

money for intelligence comes through the Department of Defense, there is a natural inclination to tell the coordinator how the money should be spent.

PRESIDENT NIXON would like to bring Helms into the White House. That is usually the first thought of the boss who wants a clear picture of what he may have to deal with, and one man to whom he can turn to get it. But if Helms makes this move, he will have to give up running the Central Intelligence Agency, where he first made his mark as a master of spy networks and into which he has brought both order and a healthy sense of restraint. (It was not Helms' wish to involve the CIA in Laos.)

With Helms in the White House, the intelligence effort would soon be domi-

nated by the Defense Department. On the basis of recent performance, this would be a disaster. Former CIA Director John McCone, who was also asked to move to the White House, argued that he would become merely a go-between while the agency he commanded withered into an anachronism, much as the State Department has withered with the advent of resident foreign affairs aides.

One compromise open to the President is to give Lt. Gen. Bennett another star, thus putting him on an equal footing with those who are asking him to make their priorities his own. But if this President—or any other—really wants a better intelligence system, he will eventually have to put somebody in charge.

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STATINTL

May 24, 1971

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Even this diffusion of power by no means guarantees security; all one has to do is to recall the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to see the folly of that thinking. Nonetheless, the way to a little clearer view of the problem Mr. Reston poses—How do you separate the nuclear danger from a continuous war involvement such as Vietnam?—can be seen in the resolutions that strengthen the power the President already has to respond to immediate attack or threats, while making him come back within a specified time to Congress for authority to continue any armed conflict that may have arisen. This makes sense, and we hope something like it passes.

It makes sense, just as Senate adoption of Senator Byrd's Resolution by vote of 63 to 14 some 18 months ago told the White House that the Senate believed any reversal of Okinawa to Japan must take place by treaty, since Okinawa came under our jurisdiction by treaty. There was talk at the time, and as late as last month, that the President ought to bypass the Senate and come to agreement with the Sato government by executive agreement. Perhaps it was not Mr. Nixon's intention to bypass, as President Johnson did when he handed the Bonin Islands and the Northern Ryukyus back by the executive agreement route; but the Senate action raised a warning flag which Mr. Nixon seems determined to keep in view.

He seems so determined, in spite of the advice of *The New York Times* that he ought to go ahead and ignore the Senate and just write a little note handing back Okinawa. *The Times*, on April 19, deplored the decision by Mr. Nixon to use the treaty route, advice that would do more to exacerbate the present difficulties between the White House and Capitol Hill than anything we can at the moment think of, short of opening another Indochinese front. So if Mr. Reston really wishes something might be done to help matters along in the governance of this country, we'd like to suggest that the advice given by Dr. Lippmann to pursue "common council and continuing accountability" has not yet reached the *Times* editorial pages.

As for us, we support the general idea of limited powers for the Presidency; we believe in binding down the man with the chains of the Constitution. Few ambitious men are to be trusted with power, and if it comes to the clutch we'd put ours in the diverse ambitions of the 100 Senators plus the President far sooner than we would any President acting alone.

BALANCING POWER, REALITY (By James Reston)

The ancient dilemmas of American politics are back in the headlines again: How to give the President the powers necessary to defend the nation in a time of nuclear weapons and international ballistic missiles, and still maintain control of the Congress? How to keep him strong enough to govern the nation without allowing him to impose his will on the people and their representatives in the Congress?

There is another question which is central to the present debate: How to keep the President from using the authority he clearly must have in a major nuclear crisis—when the nation could be devastated before the Congress could even be assembled—in more limited emergencies like the Vietnam war.

This is the new element in the old struggle between the executive and legislative branches. The invention of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles has clearly destroyed the old concept of an "equal balance" between the President and the Congress, and another invention—national television—has added to the President's advantage in the ancient struggle.

But the struggle goes on because President Johnson and President Nixon have been assuming that the new presidential powers

of the nuclear missile age, which are almost unlimited, may be applied to limited wars and limited emergencies.

This is the assumption that is now being challenged by Sens. Mike Mansfield, William Fulbright, Jacob Javits, and others. They are trying to draw a distinction between presidential power in major emergencies and presidential power in lesser emergencies. They recognize that the balance of power between the executive and the legislature has moved to the White House, and must do so in a nuclear crisis, but they don't want to lose all legislative control to the President in the usual non-nuclear crises of foreign and defense policy.

Unfortunately, Mansfield and Fulbright have not done much better than Presidents Johnson and Nixon in clarifying this distinction between presidential power in primary emergencies and presidential power in secondary emergencies.

In the conduct of the Vietnam war, for example, Nixon has asserted his right, as he sees it, to invade Cambodia and Laos even without prior consultation with the Congress and Mansfield and Fulbright, among others fearing that the Congress may be losing all effective control over presidential power, are now trying to compel him to get all American troops out of Vietnam by the end of this year, and cut the American forces in Europe in half in the coming fiscal year.

So there is a new and more subtle aspect now to the old struggle of executive versus legislative power. It is not merely who rules—the President or the Congress—but when and under what circumstances.

The controversy in the Capital goes on and will continue to do so, for the founding fathers, when they were allocating power at Philadelphia, were consciously and purposefully ambiguous.

They knew conditions would change. They wanted the executive and the Congress to struggle for power and to clarify the problem in the struggle.

Passing bills to give the Congress more power to restrain the President is not likely to be more effective than the power the Congress already has over money, and refuses to use.

So, though candid and trustful consultation between the White House and Congress is, and always has been, hard to come by, there is really no more effective compromise, particularly after the inventions of the atomic bomb and the long-range missile.

Since then, the President cannot be deprived of decisive power. As Walter Lippmann said back in 1941, even before the use of the atomic bomb, "this difficulty can be resolved, but only by the display of self-restraint, objectivity of mind, and magnanimity which are rare indeed in public life. The difficulty will be restored by those who, if they like the President, are for him regardless; who if they do not like him, incite Congress to resist him. . . . It is no good depriving him of necessary power. It is no good arguing that mechanical provisos and limitations are a real substitute for consultation, common council, and continuing accountability."

That is a fairly good description of where the President and the Congress are in May of 1971.

CIA OPERATIONS IN LAOS

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 24, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, recently Senator CLIFFORD CASE in a Senate speech accused the CIA of violating a congressional ban by secretly financing

mercenary soldiers in Laos. He is right. I have written him of further areas of CIA involvement in foreign policy in Laos that demand clarification. I enclose a copy of that letter for the benefit of the appropriate committees in the House of Representatives, whoever they are—and, if they exist—that have the responsibility of oversight of the CIA.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., May 21, 1971.

HON. CLIFFORD P. CASE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CASE: I noted your charges concerning the CIA financing Thai troops in Laos. Not only is that accurate, but Congressman McCloskey and I were told in the presence of Ambassador Godley by Suvanna Phouma, while in Vietnam, that those troops aren't Thais—they are really Laotians living in Thailand. And he told us this with a straight face!

Furthermore, General Veng Pao's Army of MEO's is financed by the CIA and answerable only to them. "We fire and hire their generals and pay their survivors a widows mite", so we were told by Ambassador Godley.

No one can convince me this policy need be concealed from the American public. If it is a worthy policy its disclosure and Congressional examination would be consistent. If it is not worthy, we should desist from it.

I hope you will insist on further revelations in this murky and disturbing area of American involvement. I am unable to do so given my lowly status. You can and should do so and I would be pleased to assist.

Sincerely yours,

JEROME R. WALDIE,
Member of Congress.

SOME CONCLUSIONS ON VIETNAM

HON. FRED SCHWENGEL

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 24, 1971

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, the editorial page of the Washington Post contained an article by the former Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles Yost.

He places Vietnam in the kind of perspective badly needed today. His analysis of the situation demonstrates his tremendous grasp and understanding of the Vietnam War and its meaning.

We, in the Congress, would do well to take seriously Mr. Yost's point of view. It seems to me we would do even better by taking his advice.

I commend this article to the attention of the House.

[From the Washington Post, May 23, 1971]

LOSING AND WINNING THE WAR—SOME
CONCLUSIONS ON VIETNAM

(By Charles W. Yost)

(NOTE.—Mr. Yost was charge d'affaires at Bangkok in 1945-8, ambassador to Laos in 1954-6 and served two years in the Nixon Administration as ambassador to the U.N. Since February, he has been associated with the Columbia School of International Affairs.)

One of the most compelling factors causing successive U.S. administrations to escalate our participation in the Vietnam war and to move very slowly in our withdrawals from it has been the fear of domestic backlash if the area were "lost." It has been argued, partly by analogy from the domestic consequences

NEW BRUNSWICK, N.J.
HOME NEWS

MAY 24 1977

E - 50,927

S - 52,421

Case's Charges Call for Answer

Sen. Clifford P. Case has leveled the very serious charge against the Central Intelligence Agency that it is violating a congressional prohibition by paying some 4,000 to 6,000 Thai troops serving in Laos. Case says he learned this from government sources.

Just as serious—or perhaps even more serious, because of its long-term implications—is Case's charge that he wrote to Secretary of State William P. Rogers about this matter a month ago and that Rogers did not answer his letter.

Case is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In this post he is entitled to know what is going on in our relationships abroad.

Case says bluntly, "I am sure that at some future time, an administration representative will sit down with the Foreign Relations Committee behind locked doors and inform us how and why the United States is paying for Thai troops in Laos. But this will be months after the fact, and we shall be told about an ongoing program which would be difficult to stop even if we were so inclined."

There is no doubt that the people of the nation want the war in Indochina to be wound down. President Nixon has pledged to accomplish this. He has been withdrawing troops on a regular pledged time table.

But the Nixon administration has got to level with the Congress if we are to achieve the withdrawal from military activity in Indochina we all want. And, if we are actually hiring Thai mercenaries to fight in Indochina, this is a widening of our involvement in Indochina, and Congress ought to be consulted.

We believe in the people's right to know, but even more strongly than that in the right of the people's leading legislators like Case to at least be told, officially, about what is going on in Indochina.

SAN FRANCISCO
EXAMINER

E - 204,749

EXAMINER & CHRONICLE

S - 640,004

MAY 24 1971

Addict Warning

U.S. Faces GI Heroin Peril

WASHINGTON — (CST) — Two congressmen have found that a heroin epidemic is raging among U.S. troops in Vietnam and they will report officially next week that the implications for U.S. society are ominous.

Their report, a draft copy, estimates that between 10 and 15 percent of all U.S. troops in Vietnam are heroin addicts.

One of the congressmen, Rep. Morgan Murphy (D-Ill.), said in an interview, however, that addiction may run as high as 30 percent.

With U.S. forces currently at a level of 262,500, the numbers involved range from a low of 26,000 men to a possible high of 78,000. The National Institute of Mental Health estimates the total number of addicts in the United States at 250,000.

Many Involved

Murphy and Rep. Robert H. Steele reported a bizarre array of interests involved in the Southeast Asian drug trade, including hill tribesmen aided by the Central Intelligence Agency, a division of Nationalist Chinese troops, prominent families in Thailand and U.S. veterans and deserters.

According to Murphy and Steele, heroin is transported in aircraft owned by CIA and the U.S. Air Force, apparently without the knowl-

edge of U.S. officials and by the air forces of Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, apparently with the full knowledge of high-level officials in those countries.

Murphy said he made an effort to check persistent reports the CIA and Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky are actively involved in the opium-heroin trade, but could find no evidence that they were.

According to the report, "the possession and sale of heroin in South Vietnam is illegal. Yet sales on the streets of Saigon are so blatant that several attempts were made to sell heroin to (the congressmen) as they walked the streets of Saigon, accompanied by a uniformed member of the U.S. Army."

rt for pu

Heroin that is sniffed, smoked or injected by the servicemen, Murphy reported, is 94 to 97 percent pure, unlike the product sold in the United States which has been diluted to a purity of 4 to 6 percent.

According to the report, "The ominous implications are obvious" that unrehabilitated servicemen addicts will have to inject heroin when they return.

Murphy said that "men who have acquired an appetite for the Vietnamese product are going to have to have more fixes a day back here. When you're talking about fixes, you're talking about money and that means you're talking about crime."

The congressman said estimates are that an addict must steal property worth \$150 a day to buy \$30 worth of diluted U.S. heroin.

Murphy and Steele prepared their report on the worldwide heroin problem after a three-week 10-nation trip that included visits to the major poppy-growing areas of Turkey and Southeast Asia and the heroin-refining centers of Marseilles, France, and Hong Kong.

Royce Drilon

CIA's Little Army From Thailand

FROM JERSEY, General Washington hired a schoolteacher named Nathan Hale to spy on the British in Manhattan. It was bad judgment. Hale had no experience in espionage, as he soon proved by being captured and hanged, to become an American immortal.

In the Civil War the government hired the Pinkerton outfit to set up an espionage system. It was never much good, but neither was the Confederate.

In World War II we set up a spy system in Switzerland, and after the war it was consolidated as Central Intelligence Agency. It has grown every year of the 26 since, encircling the globe with its tentacles, becoming a dense empire defying the President and the Congress to comprehend or control its global activities.

Excepting its frequent blunders, nobody knows or can discover what it is up to in a given time or place. Compared with it, Hoover's FBI is an open book.

* * *

FOR FBI AGENTS are subject ultimately to court examination of their activities, which involve constitutional rights. CIA agents don't deal with those having constitutional rights, and nobody says how or why it disburses moneys voted to it by a generous and spellbound Congress.

Most CIA action naturally focuses on trouble areas abroad, Europe in general, Latin America, the Mediterranean and the Far East. Since we have been engaged for 20 years in Asian intrigue, half of that time in warfare with Asiatics, that is where the CIA sleuths and provocateurs congregate and conspire in this or that policy, which is removed from the hands of the President and the will of Congress.

This has become a savage and slippery maze of blind forces at work, which no extraneous power on earth can unravel.

* * *

IT IS A PREPOSTEROUS and dangerous situation for the Americans, and bears no relation to their traditional integrity of purpose and responsibility.

Senator Chase of New Jersey, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, said last week he has learned from government sources there are "4000-6000 Thai troops in Laos, and the United States is paying them through CIA."

He avers this is a violation of a congressional directive last year, prohibiting financing mercenaries in Laos except to help free POWs or facilitate American troop withdrawals. The committee is currently taking testimony from two aides recently in Indochina. The Senator said he wrote to Secretary of State Rogers about it a month ago, and has received no reply.

Then why not invite the Secretary to tell the committee what he knows about it, which might not be much, as there is no evidence Mr. Rogers talks to CIA, or vice versa.

But congressmen enjoy complaining, and don't enjoy doing. If they enjoyed doing they would adopt a joint resolution calling for an audit of CIA expenditures over the past few years. The howling would be pitiful that this would uncover supersecret investigation abroad, and work untold harm to vital American "interest." Who say? Who knows if CIA conniving is beneficial or detrimental to vital American interests anywhere, since nobody has ever yielded an inkling of what it is all about?

STATINTL

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL...
CHRONICLE

M - 480,233

MAY 24 1971
Royce Brier

CIA's Little Army From Thailand

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May 24, 1971

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S - 541,868

MAY 24 1971

Secret War For Whom?

When reporters asked Senator Fulbright how many Thai troops were being paid by the CIA for fighting in Laos, the Arkansas Senator said: "It's not very secret. I think it's 4800."

Everything else about a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report on what Senator Symington of Missouri terms the "secret war" remains secret, however. As a condition for supplying any information to the committee staff, the Administration required that it be classified. Even so, Senator Case of New Jersey, a Republican, charges that some of the information supplied was incomplete and inaccurate.

Nevertheless, Foreign Relations Committee members have disclosed some disturbing summaries: there are those 4800 Thais fighting in Laos, they are paid by the Central Intelligence Agency to do so, and these mercenaries are doing the fighting because the CIA cannot get anyone else, including Laotians, to do it.

Senator Case flatly charges that this activity violates last year's act of Congress prohibiting use of American money for mercenaries to support the governments of Laos and Cambodia--

except to facilitate U.S. troop withdrawal and to help free prisoners. Naturally the State Department has seized upon that exception. Its explanation, says Senator Case, is that American troop withdrawals would be jeopardized if the Laotian government fell; therefore any aid to Laos is legal.

Both the excuse and the activity itself are reminders of things past. Senator Symington had to dredge out the fact that the United States had spent \$280,000,000 for Thailand troops fighting in Vietnam. And, of course, any Vietnam war policy has been excused under the Tonkin Gulf resolution, by which a Congress more naive than it is now permitted presidential intervention.

Today Senators are struggling not just to recover congressional war powers but to learn elementary facts about wars in which the United States is engaged. The secret war in Laos may not be a secret to Laos, the Pathet Lao, Thailand, North or South Vietnam or even the Chinese and Russians. It is only an ill-kept secret from the American people.

23 MAY 1971

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001

Is the CIA Involved In Opium Traffic? We Should Find Out

DENVER:

A LLEN GINSBERG, the poet, made a bet this month with Central Intelligence Agency chief Richard Helms, that he (Ginsberg) would soon present incontrovertible evidence of CIA involvement in international opium smuggling.

The Helms-Ginsberg exchange comes at the early stages of what may yet be one of the year's big political furors. For months rumors of government dope privateering have circulated in underground press and political channels. Ginsberg is among the principal figures behind the speculation.



Steven Levine, 18

The first in-depth investigation was "The New Opium War," an article published in the May issue of Ramparts magazine. The authors are Frank Browning and Banning Garrett.

For centuries, write the investigators, opium has been a staple cash crop of the Meo tribesmen living in northern Laos, Burma and Thailand. Originally exported solely for intra-Asian use, it has, since World War II, become a salable commodity on the world market. For a time Sicilian Mafiosi purchased it directly from local warlord smugglers, but the politicization of Indochina has brought in competition.

The opium trade is now in the hands of Chinese mercenaries, Vietnamese, Laotian and Thai racketeers and the CIA, say Browning and Garrett. During the Dulles period, it was decided that the opium growing area was of strategic importance, demanding clandestine American involvement. This involvement took the form of equipping and training certain prominent military factions in the region as anti-Chinese counterinsurgents. The Meos, the Thai border patrol police and the Kuomintang, the 93d division of Chiang Kai-shek's army now exiled in northern Laos, all come under the protective and supportive wing of the CIA. The oil that keeps everything in this alliance running smoothly is opium money. With the Thai border patrol police looking the other way the Meos grow the stuff, the KMT deals it to smugglers who, in turn, deal it to the Viet, Lao and Thai gangsters who process it either as straight smoking opium or injectible smacks, and export it to Taiwan or Hong Kong from whence it proceeds to the United States.

According to Garrett and Browning, 80 percent of the American heroin supply comes in through these channels. They charge that the CIA lends technical and logistical support, alleging that harvested opium collected at Long Cheny in Laos is flown to processing and dealing installations in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam in Air America and U. S. military planes. All the parties to the action are equipped with CIA supplied ordnance.

If ever there was a public issue which commands a full airing and immediate action commensurate with what that airing brings to light, I would submit, this is the issue. We all need to know the outcome of Allen Ginsberg's bet.

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Laos: a Case of Overkill

By Laurence Stern

The writer, an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post, was its chief correspondent in Indochina in 1970.

THE SEVEN-YEAR-OLD American air war in northern Laos has been waged, by and large, out of the range of television cameras and newsmen and—until recently—Senate debates.

Only within the past year has there been a dawning of public awareness in the United States of the punishing intensity with which American airpower has been brought to bear on the little Indochinese kingdom. By the admissions of American officials closely associated with the war there, Laos has been the most heavily bombed country in the history of aerial warfare.

Yet today, despite the hundreds of thousands of tons of explosives dumped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the south and populated "enemy-held" village in the north, the Communists control more territory than ever before in Laos. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces are threatening the Mekong Valley population centers from Luang Prabang southward to Pakse, areas which have been under the control of the Royal Laotian government since the 1962 Geneva accords.

The bombings began without public notice in 1964, both against Communist infiltration trails and also in support of Royal Lao government forces in the Plain of Jars, which has been traded back and forth between the opposing sides of the struggle for many years.

Gradually the pace of the bombing stepped up to its peak in 1968 and 1969 after the halt in the bombing of North Vietnam. If it were not for the development of new targets in Laos, combat operations of the 7th and the combined 7th/13th Air Forces, based in Vietnam and Thailand, would have been drastically reduced. The planes and bombs were available as a result of the halt, and so they were turned on Laos. The number of daily sorties by American jet bombers then rose to more than 700, according to testimony given to congressional committees by State Department and military witnesses.

A Pointless Bludgeon?

SOME DAY IT MAY BE argued that Laos—even more than Vietnam—could be the supreme example of air power's ineffectiveness against a determined though primitively equipped subpower.

But the more immediately discernible truth is that the chief casualties of the war that has been waged from the air as well as on the ground have not been the Communist military forces but the thousands of civilians driven from their villages into crowded government centers or the jungle.

There has been a dispute of near-theological intensity over whether the great refugee flood in Laos (roughly 700,000 in the past decade) has been generated by the bombings or by Communist military activity. The official U.S. view, as it is expressed by former Ambassador to Laos William H. Sullivan, is that the bombings have not, under our rules of engagement, been directed against populated villages. The targets, it is asserted, are primarily the Ho Chi Minh Trail as it traverses the Laotian panhandle, and enemy military concentrations in the north.

There have been American officials in Vientiane, however, who concede privately that American bombs have fallen on population centers in Laos by "stupidity and confusion" rather than by intentional violation of the public rules of engagement.

And there are yet others, both in and out of government, who feel on the basis of their own investigations in Laos that the U.S. agencies involved in prosecution of the war are deliberately bombing villages in order to destroy the Pathet Lao "civilian infrastructure."

One classified survey of refugees from the Plain of Jars, which was forced into the public domain by Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R-Calif.), revealed that 97 per cent of the sample had been driven from their homes by attack; 75 per cent said their homes had been damaged by bombing.

The survey was conducted by the United States Information Service, which operates as an arm of the American embassy. It sharply contradicted the claim by U.S. officials in Vientiane that bombing of villages was a rare and accidental occurrence.

In March of last year I visited a refugee camp some 20 miles east of Vientiane, where 900 residents of a village on the Plain of Jars were trying to resettle under the supervision of the Agency for International Development. An interpreter was provided by AID officials.

The refugees told a consistent story. They had been evacuated from the Plain of Jars, then in its customary state of being contested, by Air America pilots on Feb. 5, 1970. It was the first day of a massive airlift that carried some 17,000 Laotian men, women and children from their embattled villages to the Vientiane plain, beyond the range of the shooting and bombing.

These simple villagers could describe with chilling precision the nomenclature of American fighter-bomber aircraft, such as F-4s and F-105s. They were also intimately acquainted with the various explosives dropped from the skies: antipersonnel cluster bomb units (CBU's), white phosphorus bombs, napalm. The villagers fashioned curtains from the flare parachutes used for night bombing and made lamp bases of the flare tubes.

Although the Pathet Lao had first moved into the Plain of Jars in 1964 and their village see-sawed between Communist and government control repeatedly, life did not become intolerable, they said, until the last two years of the intensified bombing—in 1968 and 1969. Today, whatever is left of their native village of Moung Koun is still under Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese control.

During his recent and controversial visit to Laos, McCloskey heard the refugees in government camps have given visiting journalists and government investigators since March of last year

MILWAUKEE, WISC.
COURIER

WEEKLY - 17,000

MAY 22 1971

Looking for smack? CIA runs it

'You can salute an officer with your right hand and take a 'hit' in your left,' an enlisted man in Vietnam is quoted as saying in "The New Opium War" in the May issue of Ramparts magazine.

Anyone who claims to be concerned about smack, junkies and teenage (and younger) overdose deaths should consider the Ramparts article required reading.

The mind blowing theme of the story suggests that well meaning citizens who talk of "offing pushers," methadone clinics, et cetera should take a cooler look at what's happening. According to co-authors Frank Browning and Banning Garrett, what's happening is that the Indochina opium trade - which grosses an estimated \$500 million a year - has the tacit approval of the U.S. government and the active involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency.

'At the same time the government starts crash programs to rehabilitate drug users among its young people, the young soldiers it is sending to Vietnam are getting hooked and dying of overdoses at the rate of one a day. While the President is declaring war on narcotics and on crime in the streets, he is widening the war in Laos, whose principal product is opium and which has now become the funnel for nearly half the world's supply of the narcotic, for which the U. S. is the

chief consumer.'

For the Meos hill tribespeople in Laos, opium is their only cash crop. A kilo which goes for \$50 in the hills is \$200 in Saigon and \$2,000 - the article says - in San Francisco.

A large part of the crop is simply dropped off in Saigon for the 'convenience' of U.S. army addicts. 'Probably a fifth of the men in his unit have at least tried junk,' the authors said of rehabilitated addict August Schultz. 'But the big thing, as his buddy Ronnie McSheffrey adds, was that most of the officers in his company - including the MP's - knew about it. McSheffrey saw MP's in his own division (6th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 9th Division) at Tan An shoot up, just as he says they saw him. He and his buddies even watched the unit's sergeant major receive payoffs at a hear-by-whorehouse where every kind of drug imaginable was available.'

One opium lord described in the article utilizes an army of 1,000-2,000 armed men with mile long mule drawn caravans which move from 15 to 20 tons of opium-worth about a million dollars - out of Burma to syndicate men in Laos and Thailand in one journey from the hills.

To get to his destination, however, the opium lord must pay about \$80,000 a trip in protection money to the 93rd division of Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan army which has remained in

Burma - up to 9,000 strong - since the end of World War II when most of his troops fled the mainland for the island of Taiwan.

These Kuomintang (KMT) troops are said to be responsible to Shiang's son, Chiang Ching-Kuo, who is the head of the Taiwan secret police. The authors claim that the KMT supports itself by exacting such tribute, by buying opium directly from the Meos and reselling it, and by making occasional forays into China and Burma for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Ramparts article documents the involvement of U.S. planes and helicopters in the dope operation, in some instances overtly and sometimes under the guise of the Royal Laos Air Force which uses donated U.S. aircraft.

The role of the 'China Lobby' in the U.S. opium trade is also described. Involved are such patriotic stalwarts as J. Edgar Hoover and Nixon's State Department intelligence chief, Ray Cline. Instrumental is Governor Warren Knowles' sometime romantic interest Madame Chennault (who helped raise a quarter million dollars for Nixon's campaign). Her deceased husband, General Claire Chennault of World War II 'flying boxcar' notoriety, founded the Civil Air Transport just after W.W. II. In the 1950s it was renamed "Air America" and

now - as a CIA front - it keeps busy transporting opium as the "official" Indochina airline.

The U.S. government - operation presided over by General Ky - has squeezed out the Corsican Mafia, former holders of the southeast Asia heroin industry.

The Ramparts authors suggest that when Richard Nixon in his recent 'state of the world' speech - rapped about drying up world drug traffic, the Indochinese opium business was intentionally overlooked. The President commented, "We have worked closely with a large are often unable to get any refund, and at the same time, they are told that they cannot receive the "free" wig without paying an additional \$8- or \$9 styling charge.

This practice is both time consuming and frustrating to the consumer, Warren said.

Warren urged consumers who have knowledge of this scheme to contact his Office of Consumer Protection or the postal authorities.

02 MAY 1971

CIA Is Financing Thai Unit in Laos, Senate Aides Say

Two investigators for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have reported that the Central intelligence Agency is financing a 4,800-man army of Thais in support of the Laotian government.

A 1970 law prohibits U.S. payments to mercenaries in Laos except to protect American withdrawal.

The heavy U.S. involvement in Laos has been an open secret for some time. But the size of the Thai force was stated publicly yesterday by Sen. J. W. Fulbright, D-Ark., who is chairman of the committee. The report was presented in closed session by James G. Lowenstein and Richard Moose, former Foreign Service officers who resigned to become Senate investigators.

A committee member, Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., emerged from the meeting and told reporters that during a 12-day visit to Laos last month Lowenstein and Moose had confirmed Case's earlier disclosures concerning the Thai Army.

Case had taken his information from newspaper reports including a January dispatch by Tammy Arbuckle in The Star that detailed movements of the CIA-based Thai troops in central and northern Laos.

Fulbright Tells Secret

No government official had ever publicly confirmed that, however. When a reporter asked Fulbright how many CIA-supported Thais are operating in Laos, Fulbright responded "about 4,800" before a staff member signalled him that the information remained classified.

Last year Congress passed a provision in the 1970 Defense Appropriations Act which bars payment of mercenaries in Laos and Cambodia, except to protect a safe and orderly American withdrawal or disengagement from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of U.S. prisoners of war.

Case said the Thai troops violate that provision, although, he said, the State Department contended that U.S. withdrawals would be jeopardized if the Laos government fell.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., said the confidential committee report indicated clearly that the State Department's response to "incomplete and in some cases inaccurate."

Case said he wrote to the State Department seeking information on the Thai troops after reading a lengthy article in the April 17 Christian Science Monitor by George W. Ashworth.

Ashworth quoted earlier reports by Arbuckle from Vientiane and battlefield areas in and around the Plain of Jars in Laos. Ashworth estimated, from sources in Washington, that the U.S. was financing between 4,000 and 6,000 Thais in Laos.

NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST

E - 702,637
S - 368,841

MAY 2 2 1971

The CIA's Mercenaries

It is a major tenet of the "Nixon Doctrine" that Asian nations must assume the burden of their own defense. But if they want to "defend" any other states by helping mount offensives in Indochina, Washington will pay the bill.

That seems to be the unannounced—and untenable—Administration policy just unearthed by Sen. Case (R-N. J.), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, who has ascertained that Thailand now has between 4000 and 6000 troops in Laos and that they are being supported financially by the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The story is all too familiar. Nearly a year ago, it came out that the U. S.

had been paying Thailand \$50 million annually for maintaining combat troops in Vietnam. At about the same time, Bangkok announced it was sending "volunteers" into Cambodia—at Washington's expense.

Now it develops that not only is a Thai expeditionary force in Laos but substantial reinforcements are apparently planned. To date, the Administration has repeatedly refused to give public replies to the inquiries opened by Sen. Case into this operation—which, on its face, is clearly in violation of a general Congressional ban on U. S. support for mercenaries in Laos. It is vital that Congress track down this fraud.

NEW YORK, N. Y.
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 TIMES

M - 899,231
 S - 1,443,738

MAY 22 1970

U.S. SAID TO PAY THAIS AIDING LAOS

Fulbright Says Financing of
 4,800 Violates the Law

By JOHN W. FINNEY
 Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 21—

Senator J. W. Fulbright said today that 4,800 Thai troops, financed by the United States, were fighting in Laos in support of the Royal Laotian Government.

Mr. Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, suggested that such support by Thai troops in Laos was "inconsistent with the spirit" of the "antimercenary" amendment that had been incorporated in the Defense appropriations bill at his suggestion.

The amendment provided that none of the defense funds could be used "to support Vietnamese or other free-world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

Among other aims, this provision was specifically designed to prevent the introduction of American-financed Thai troops into Laos or Cambodia.

But as part of the compromise leading to House and Administration acceptance of the Fulbright "antimercenary" amendment, a clause was included specifying that the amendment would not "prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of United States forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

The State Department refused to confirm or deny the figure of 4,800. But its spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, said the department had informed Senator Fulbright, an Arkansas Democrat, and Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, a Republican member of the committee, that American support of Thai troops in Laos did not violate the "antimercenary" amendment.

There have been recurring reports of Thai battalions fighting the Communists in Laos, particularly in the north in support of the Royal Laotian Government. The mountain tribesmen financed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

However, Mr. Fulbright offered the first authoritative estimate of the size of the Thai contingent. He made his statement after the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Commitments, headed by Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, had received a secret briefing from two committee staff members, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, who recently returned from a 10-day inspection trip to Laos.

The State Department sent letters yesterday to Senators Case and Fulbright that clearly indicated that the Thai participation in the war in Laos was being supported financially by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Letters Classified Secret

The letters, responding to questions by the Senators about reports of Thai troops in Laos, were classified secret, and the State Department and the Senators therefore refused to make the texts public.

But department officials said that the letters had declared that the costs of supporting the Thai troops did not come within the State Department's jurisdiction, thus clearly pointing to the C.I.A. as the agency providing financial support.

The letters, department officials said, contended that financial support for Thai troops in Laos did not violate the "antimercenary" amendment.

The executive branch could argue — although the State Department did not in the letters — that the use of Thai troops in northern Laos was related to the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam and thus permissible under the Fulbright amendment.

But the Administration would be somewhat handicapped in advancing such an argument because of a statement made last month by William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Senate Refugee Subcommittee headed by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts.

In his prepared testimony, Mr. Sullivan said that the "other war" in northern Laos "has nothing to do with military operations in South Vietnam or Cambodia."

Alternatively, the Administration could argue that the "antimercenary" amendment applied to military operations and not to funds provided to the C.I.A.

In protesting yesterday on the Senate floor against the financing of Thai troops in Laos without the knowledge or approval of Congress, Mr. Case observed that "the money comes out of that vast treasure chest, which Congress has appropriated but never controlled, for discretionary military and intelligence purposes."

The agreement to provide financial support to the Thai troops apparently predates enactment of the Fulbright amendment last December.

According to reports from Vientiane, the Laotian administrative capital, the Thai battalions were first introduced about a year ago when the C.I.A.-supported army of mountain tribesmen, commanded by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, was under severe pressure from the Communist forces.

BALTIMORE, MD.
 SUN
 M - 177,087
 E - 205,425
 S - 344,023

MAY 21 1971

Case Reports Confirmation U.S. Finances Thais In Laos

By GENE OISHI
 Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, May 20—Senate Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) said today "government sources" have confirmed that the United States is financing 4,000 to 6,000 Thai troops in Laos in accordance with a still-secret agreement.

In a speech on the Senate floor, Mr. Case said he first read about the U.S.-Thai agreement in the *Christian Science Monitor* on April 17, but that the State Department still has not responded to his queries on the article.

"Through The CIA"

Since then, Mr. Case said, "I was able to ascertain, on an absolutely not-for-quotation basis from government sources, that there are 4,000 to 6,000 Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. government, through the CIA, is paying for them."

While he places no faith in the credibility of Radio Hanoi, he added, he was also aware of its broadcasts discussing the presence of Thai troops in Laos.

"My perhaps plaintive ques-

tion is: should a U.S. senator who is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee have to learn of important agreements our government has made by reading the newspapers, by talking privately with government officials who do not wish to be quoted and by listening to foreign radio broadcasts?" Mr. Case said.

Constitutional Violation

He suggested that the alleged agreement with Thailand violated the Constitution in two respects: the Senate has not ratified it and Congress has not appropriated any funds for paying Thai troops in Laos.

Meanwhile, Mr. Case joined Senator Harold E. Hughes (D., Iowa) and Senator Richard S. Schweiker (R., Pa.) in co-sponsoring today two amendments to the draft bill which is pending on the Senate floor.

The two amendments, designed to lead to an all-volunteer Army, would extend the draft for only one year instead two as the bill now provides, and sharply increase military pay.

Case Says U.S. Secretly Pays Costs of Thai Troops in Laos

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States is secretly paying "through CIA" for the costs of "four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos" without any direct action by Congress, Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) said yesterday.

Case called on the administration for "the specific terms of the agreement," which he said he first read about in the press last month. "Congress has never directly voted a penny to pay Thai troops in Laos," said Case, and both Congress and the public have "a right to know" what is happening.

Thailand has denied having any troops in Laos; its officials

have said only that there may be Thai "volunteers" or "ethnic Thais" serving in Laos. U.S. officials have been publicly silent on the subject, except to refer back to the elliptical Thai statements.

Case finally got a reply yesterday to a letter he sent on April 23 to the State Department—but he said the reply was marked secret.

The substance of the reply to Case, according to State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray, was that "nothing is being done that is not within present legislative authority." Bray said the subject had been discussed in closed session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which Case is a member, and State could discuss the matter further only in the same manner.

Case said last night that "I'm still not satisfied . . . We should have been advised before the thing started, rather than having it dribble out afterwards in a way in which we can do little more than wring our hands."

The senator said that as he recalls, the subject of Thai units in Laos was only "touched on" by Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms, in a closed meeting.

After reading press accounts last month about a new U.S.-Thai agreement "for a sharp increase in Thai troops to be used in Laos," said Case, he made his own inquiries.

"I was able to ascertain," said Case, "on an absolutely not for quotation basis, from government sources that there

are four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. government, through CIA, is paying for them."

Case said that "If an action by our country cannot stand up to public exposure, then our leaders should seriously reconsider that action."

His letter to Secretary of State William P. Rogers asked if financial support for Thai troops in Laos violated a congressional ban on payment of mercenaries in Laos except to aid American troop withdrawals or aid in release of U.S. prisoners; the terms of the Thai agreement, and whether the United States agreed to provide support "in event the Thai troops in Laos encounter difficulties."

STATINTL

21 MAY 1973

STATINTL

Case Says CIA Pays 'Army'

Associated Press

Sen. Clifford P. Case has accused the Central Intelligence Agency of violating a congressional ban by secretly financing mercenary soldiers in Laos.

The New Jersey Republican said in a Senate speech yesterday he had learned from government sources "there are 4,000 to 6,000 Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. government, through the CIA, is paying them."

Congressional Curb

"There are presumably government funds being paid to Thailand," he said. "But Congress has never voted a penny to pay Thai troops in Laos."

Congress last year prohibited payment of U.S. funds for mercenaries in Laos, except to help free American prisoners of war or facilitate U.S. troop withdrawals.

Case is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, which met in closed session today to hear a report on Thai operations in Laos from two staff aides, James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, just back from Indochina.

Case said he asked Undersecretary of State John Irwin about the mercenary issue at a hearing May 3 and was told: "Any discussion of the Thai troops would be proper for an executive session."

Writes to Rogers

Case said he wrote Secretary of State William P. Rogers about it a month ago and has not received an answer.

"I am sure that at some future time," Case said, "an administration representative will sit down with the Foreign Relations Committee behind locked doors and inform us how and why the United States is paying for Thai troops in Laos.

"But this will be months after the fact, and we shall undoubtedly be told about an ongoing program which would be difficult to stop even if we were so inclined."

STATINTL

NEWARK, N. J.
NEWS

MAY 20 1971

E - 267,289
S - 423,331

Case Blasts Nixon On Thai-Laos Role

By JOHN J. FARMER

Evening News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., charged today that the Nixon administration has negotiated and is financing a sharp increase of Thai troops in Laos without congressional consent.

"This is an apparent widening of American involvement in Southeast Asia, and the administration should have consulted with us before embarking on a new policy," he asserted in a speech for delivery on the Senate floor.

The speech continues—indeed steps up—Case's criticism of the Nixon administration's war, information and defense budget policies.

He expressed particular anger that even his position on the Foreign Relations Committee provided no access to the agreement with Thailand. He discovered it first in the Christian Science Monitor, Case said.

Letter Unanswered

The New Jersey Republican said he wrote to Secretary of State Rogers seeking information. The letter remains unanswered, Case said, but other government sources indicated "that there are four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. Government, through the CIA, is paying for them."

The agreement violates the constitutional right of the Senate to review treaties, Case charged.

Some, he said, might argue that the agreement is not a treaty, but executive agreement, a practice done early in American history to facilitate the handling of minor business with foreign governments.

"I find it hard to believe that the framers of the Constitution would not have considered as a

ten of millions of dollars and which might lead the country into a serious military involvement if we had to bail out the Thais," he declared.

No Direct Vote

Congress, he continued, has sole constitutional authority to appropriate these funds but has never voted directly on the issue. The Cooper-Church amendment prohibits American financing of mercenaries in Laos, except to protect an American withdrawal, Case said.

"The money," he declared, "comes out of that vast treasure chest which Congress has appropriated but never controlled for discretionary military and intelligence purposes. I strongly believe that Congress should control this money. Certainly we should know how it is being spent."

Although his letter remains unanswered, Case said, the State Department tried to persuade him not to press the issue when Acting Secretary of State John Irwin appeared before a May 3 Foreign Relations Committee meeting.

Case raised the issue nevertheless — "I felt that both Congress and the American people had a right to know" — but Irwin refused to discuss it except in a closed session, the senator said.

Case predicted that eventually administration representatives will provide details of the Laos operation "behind the locked doors."

"But this will be months after the fact, and we shall undoubtedly be told about an ongoing program which would be difficult to stop even we were so inclined," Case said.

The events mock Rogers' recent protests of the administration's recognition of the need for consultation with Congress, Case indicated. At the same time the senator stressed his own awareness that some foreign agreements must be negotiated in secrecy.

"But Congress and the people should be informed," he said, "before our country is indelibly committed to a position . . . for the people must be the ultimate arbiter of the course our nation follows."

20 MAY 1971

Last Laotian Stronghold on Plateau Is Said to Fall

VIENTIANE, Laos, May 19 (Agence France - Presse)—The town of Houei Kong, the last stronghold of Government forces on the Boloven Plateau, reportedly fell to enemy forces today.

This development marked the third major defeat for Laotian troops in the country's southern panhandle. The plateau town of Paksong fell to the enemy on Sunday, and Dong Hene, about 115 miles to the northwest, fell yesterday.

According to first reports, the battle for Houei Kong was short. The town has an airstrip and a civilian population regroupment center run by Americans.

Also based there was a 1,500-man garrison, which was said to be under the control of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Meanwhile, the Government reported the reoccupation of a deserted enemy position in northern Laos 12 miles north of the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The position, at Paksong, had been held by enemy forces since March 20.

Ashau Battle Reported

SAIGON, South Vietnam, May 19 (UPI)—Thousands of South

Vietnamese troops moving in the Ashau Valley reportedly fought a six-hour battle today with large enemy forces entrenched there.

Reports from a base near the valley, which has long been a major North Vietnamese infiltration corridor from nearby Laos into the northern quarter of South Vietnam, said an American helicopter was shot


down and two other helicopters and a reconnaissance plane were damaged by intensive ground fire.

Military sources at the base were quoted as having said that a United States fighter-bomber destroyed an emplacement of heavy machine guns.

Initial battle reports were said to list 14 enemy soldiers killed and four South Vietnamese marines wounded.

Lieut. Col. Nguyen Quang, commander of the Third Regiment of the South Vietnamese First Infantry Division, said at a command post six miles southeast of the valley: "We expect a lot more fighting in the next few days. Our men are fighting well and our morale is good."

The Government troops reportedly were flown to positions in the mountains surrounding the valley on Sunday to begin their long-delayed sweep to clear the enemy stronghold. Clearing the valley is the primary objective of the American-backed South Vietnamese operation, known as Lamson 720, which began in mid-April.



The New York Times May 20, 1971

20 MAY 1971

Reds Display Capability To Hit Throughout Laos

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

STATINTL

Communist forces in Laos are showing a capacity to strike at new and widely scattered points across the country, intensifying military pressure on the American-supported government.

In the last four days the North Vietnamese offensive has penetrated further westward than ever before, toward the Mekong River which forms the border between Laos and Thailand. Relatively small Communist troop units, about 120 air miles apart, are now in position to threaten—but not necessarily take—strategic points in the western sector of the Laotian panhandle, U.S. officials acknowledged yesterday.

Because the style of fighting in Laos is often to mount a threat for military or diplomatic purposes, and often both, the State Department yesterday labeled the situation "serious," rather than alarming.

The message that the Communist forces apparently intend to convey to Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma, one U.S. source said, is "we can hit you from north to south."

There are divided opinions among Washington officials about the cause and effect relationship between the current Communist offensive in Laos and the U.S.-supported assault into Laos by South Vietnamese troops in February and March, called Operation Lam Son 719. The Communist and allied sides each claimed that operation was a success for itself and a defeat for the adversary.

Some U.S. officials contended yesterday that the current Communist attacks provide proof of the success of the February-March assault on the Ho Chi Minh infiltration trail network into South Vietnam, for it has forced the Communists to move westward to try to recoup the damage inflicted.

But other sources point out that it is Laos that is paying the penalty, with the Communist forces showing that they can recoup in the west for

damage done to them in the east—at the heavy expense of Laos and its protector, the United States.

North Vietnamese attacks, with elements of three regiments, on Tuesday overran the town of Dong Hene, near the western end of Highway 9. This was the road along which South Vietnamese forces attacked from the east earlier this year to interdict the North Vietnamese infiltration network. Communist troops are now within striking distance of the main east-west, north-south road junction in the western sector of the Laotian panhandle, Highway 9 and 13. Just beyond it is Savannakhet, a major town and base on the Mekong River.

Two days earlier, North Vietnamese troops to the south captured Paksong, the last remaining base of significance on the Bolovens Plateau, once dominated by guerrilla units financed and directed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. From bases in this sector the guerrillas harassed and observed Communist troops and supplies moving down the Ho Chi Minh Trail network.

West of Paksong is Pakse, another major installation on the Mekong, and a headquarters for open and covert U.S. support for the official and clandestine Laotian forces and civilians.

U.S. sources yesterday said they regard it as unlikely that Communist troops will attempt to take Pakse. American officials reiterated that the Communist forces in Laos for years have held dominant military strength and a wide choice of targets if they chose to expend the resources to take them.

The current spring offensive in Laos is traditional for the Communists, between the end of the dry season and the start of the rainy season, U.S. officials noted. If the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces choose to risk a major test of

military strength, officials said, it could come at Long Cheng in the north, headquarters for the CIA-supported guerrilla army of Gen. Vang Pao.

The State Department officially confirmed yesterday that the United States has evacuated from Pakse to Vientiane 44 American women and children and 51 dependents of foreign employees of the United States and 17 nationals of friendly countries. Most of the Americans were dependents of Agency for International Development employees.

AID has been embarrassed by disclosures that its funds were used to assist Laos military and CIA-directed paramilitary units and their employees. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) announced Sunday that AID had assured him that this AID funding will be terminated by July 1, with most of the funding already transferred to other U.S. agencies.

D.E. Ronk filed this report on the situation in Laos in a special dispatch to The Washington Post from Vientiane:

A major Communist offensive is unmistakably underway in Southern Laos, with scores of refugees swarming into this capital city last night. They filled hotel lobbies and restaurants, amidst nervous laughter, crying children, and small bundles of personal effects.

North Vietnamese troops are reported regrouping 25 miles east of Pakse, in Laos' panhandle, after successfully capturing control of the Bolovens Plateau in swift, coordinated attacks last weekend.

Monday night a meeting was held in Pakse and the senior American official called for evacuation of dependents as a "precautionary move," according to U.S. spokesmen. Evacuees said the atmosphere in Pakse was "charged" and some said it "bordered on panic."

Non-American refugees, including Filipino, Thai, Vietnamese and Chinese employed by the American mission and its contractors, say their hurried evacuation heightened the tension in Pakse.

"Certainly the Laotians were scared and wanted to go too," said a Filipino housewife, "but there was nowhere for them to go."

"They [the Laotians] stood around confused when we loaded our things and children into cars for the airport," said another Filipino.

To the east of Pakse in Paksong, called the "key to the Bolovens" because of its location on the strategic Highway 23, 10,000 residents remain behind the new lines created by the swift North Vietnamese push. Their presence has hampered bombing in the area, according to informed sources.

The situation in Pakse is described by knowledgeable sources as "quite worrisome at best," and confused because there is no readily identifiable center of command.

Observers flying over the Bolovens reported that a house to house search of Paksong was conducted by the North Vietnamese as they occupied it.

Operation Brotherhood, a Filipino hospital group, reported a number of their Laotian personnel and most patients remained in Paksong.

Twenty miles south of Paksong two battalions of Cambodian irregulars receiving training in guerrilla warfare under a CIA program are reported unmolested and not expected to engage in combat because their officers are on leave in Phnom Penh.

North of Paksong an estimated two companies, and possibly a battalion of Thai soldiers ordered from Houei Sai to assist in the defense of Paksong Sunday, have not been heard from since they began their march three hours before the town fell.

Air observers report that a North Vietnamese force is moving toward the remaining government position on the Bolovens at Houei Kong.

May 18, 1971

precisely what he accuses my committee of doing and I am disappointed that Mr. Epstein's widely publicized lesson in elementary journalism has been so little regarded.

RICHARD H. ICHORD,
Chairman.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

LAOS: A LAKE OF BLOOD

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 17, 1971

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, a legal resident of Minnesota, Mr. James E. Malia, is the director of the International Voluntary Services program in Laos. I ask permission to insert in the RECORD after these remarks two letters, one addressed to me, the other to the President, written recently by Mr. Malia. I also want to place in the RECORD an April 7, 1971, New York Times piece by Fred Branfman entitled "A Lake of Blood."

Mr. Speaker, we should not be surprised by these descriptions of the decimation of the Lao and Meo people in Laos. The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, chaired by the senior Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), has made our role in this slaughter "perfectly clear." See the February 24, 1971, RECORD at page S1872 for a number of press articles detailing the human costs of the "unknown war" in Laos.

As Mr. Malia writes the President:

We recognize that ours is not the only violence against these people. We condemn also the destruction and killing brought by the North Vietnamese. But we do not believe that their presence in Laos, nor the presence of an indigenous Communist movement, justifies U.S. military activity against an entire society.

Few of those who live in the geographical area of Indochina known to us as Laos have any understanding of Laos as a nation. U.S. involvement in that tragic land has, in conjunction with the aggressive Vietnamese, insured that hundreds of thousands, already dead, or dying or marked for death, will not live to be Laotians. To talk of self-determination in such circumstances is hypocrisy. U.S. noninvolvement will not lead to either a bloodbath or most likely, to Vietnamese withdrawal. But as Mr. Malia concludes his letter to me:

The peoples of these countries, who must live with the solutions to their mutual problems, must be allowed to work them out amongst themselves. The results may not be acceptable to us, but they will undoubtedly in some way be acceptable to those who must live with them. This is what is most important.

Our intervention in Laos has made the ultimate reconciliation more difficult and it will be most likely less advantageous to the peoples of Laos. The lesson is clear. In areas not vital to our national security, any military intervention must have the sanction of the world community and it must be agreeable to those peoples most intimately involved in the area.

Any other policy can only lead to other Laotian tragedies.

The material follows:

INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTARY
SERVICES, INC.,

APO San Francisco, March 18, 1971.

Hon. DONALD FRASER,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Sir: I am a resident of Minnesota and am presently the Director of the International Voluntary Services program in Laos. I have been in Laos for the past three and a half years and thus feel that I speak with some credibility when talking about Laos, its people, and what the American military presence is doing to these people and this country. It is my conviction that the American military presence in Laos and the para-military activity that supports it is not in the best interest of Laos or its people and that it should be withdrawn by the end of this year.

A basic reality in Southeast Asia is North Viet-Nam. They are a strong, competent, aggressive people. The other peoples of Southeast Asia must in some way come to terms with them. This is not a new phenomena as for the past five hundred years peoples in this part of the world have had to in some way reconcile themselves with North Viet-Nam. This is still the case today. Continuing American involvement in Southeast Asia only forestalls this reconciliation and at a price devastating to the indigenous people and to ourselves.

In Laos, a land of diverse ethnic groups, cultures and traditions, we have used these divisions in our cause against Communism and North Viet-Nam. The Central Intelligence Agency arms and directs an army of tribal people, mostly Meo, against the communist insurgents and the North Vietnamese. With money we have exploited their traditional desire for independence for our objectives. For the Meo it has meant the destruction of nearly half their population and the establishment of a nearly irreparable breach between these people and the North Vietnamese. Now we arm boys to do most of the fighting. They have little training and little chance against the well trained Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops. Why do we continue to support this carnage? Isn't it time that someone said stop?

In the whole of Laos we support a right wing government controlled by the military. We have paid off the generals and upper class elite to keep the government loyal to us so as to be a vehicle through which we can carry out our objectives in Laos. We support an army which must conscript at gun point and which is slowly ridding the country side of its young men. To what end is all this?

We have bombed civilian areas in a systematic destruction of the human basis for society. People, homes, and communities were destroyed. Finally, when given the chance, the people left their homeland to come to an area where the Americans do not bomb. Is this in the best interest of Laos' people?

Laos and its people are slowly being destroyed by a continuing American military presence that uses this country and these people in our fight against communism. President Nixon's Vietnamization policy will only continue to use these people for the protection of American lives, for the perpetration of American objectives. Such activity is demeaning to a country which espouses to values of human dignity and equality. Thus I would urge that in your capacity as a United States Representative you do all that is possible toward bringing about a swift and total withdrawal of all American military activity in Laos and in Southeast Asia. The peoples of these countries, who must live with the solutions to their mutual problems, must be allowed to work them out amongst themselves. The results may not be

acceptable to us, but they will undoubtedly in some way be acceptable to those who must live with them. This is what is most important.

If I can be of any help to you in the future, please do not hesitate to ask.

Sincerely,

JAMES E. MALIA,
Director, IVS, Vietiane, Laos.

VIETIANE, LAOS,
March 15, 1971.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Sir: We are deeply distressed by your decision to encourage and to support the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos. We have heard and read your explanations of this decision, in terms of shortening the war and protecting American lives. But we know that the military reality will be further chaos and further suffering among people who have already suffered much because of American military activity. We condemn this policy which uses the Lao people as pieces in a grand global design which they neither understand nor care about. Though there would still be fighting without the American involvement, the intensity of the present destruction takes place for reasons which have virtually nothing to do with local political alignments or conditions. We condemn also the eagerness to protect American lives by the sacrifice of Asian lives.

We are not military experts or political analysts. We are volunteers concerned for our fellow man, working to help them in agriculture, social welfare, community development, and education. Collectively, we have lived and worked among the Lao people for many years, speaking their language, coming to know and understand many of their concerns. During this time, we have also come to know the destruction and sorrow brought to them by the United States military action.

The extensive bombing of civilian areas is particularly vicious. In talking with refugees, we have heard what the days and nights under bombardment are like. Refugees tell of being forced to live in holes and caves, of having to farm at night, of the systematic destruction by U.S. war planes of the human basis for a society. These people were not soldiers, nor were there soldiers in their villages. Yet they were bombed; their homes were destroyed and anti-personnel bombs were dropped to kill and maim people on contact. Children were particularly vulnerable. So now these people have fled their homeland to live in resettlement villages in areas where the United States does not yet bomb.

The CIA trains and supports its own clandestine army in Laos. A large proportion of the soldiers in this "secret" army are from the Meo and other tribal groups. The U.S. has exploited their traditional toughness and independence in our own crusade against Communism. The result has been the decimation and dislocation of the tribal populace.

The Meo have lost nearly half their male population, and much of the fighting is now done by young boys with little training of any kind. Much of their traditional culture has been destroyed in the repeated forced migration into inhospitable but "safe" areas. Our use of these people has also opened a nearly irreparable breach between the tribal people and the North Vietnamese. The need in Laos, as official American statements supposedly recognize, is for reconciliation, not greater division, greater bitterness.

Yet now, with strong backing from U.S. military forces, the South Vietnamese are fighting in southern Laos. This has upset a delicate status quo and expanded the fighting once more into populated areas west of the invaded territory, as well as aggravating already serious fighting elsewhere within

reflects the erosion of discipline and morale in our forces in Vietnam.

NOTHING TO DO

The American forces in Vietnam no longer have a genuine combat mission, and an army without a combat mission is an army without a real purpose. Of the more than 260,000 American troops now in Vietnam, only about a fifth are combat troops, and their principal mission now is to avoid combat. If you ask at the Pentagon what in heaven's name the other 200,000 are doing, you hear generalities about an "orderly withdrawal," or you are told the answer is secret.

In fact, what most of the 200,000 are doing is virtually nothing, other than going mad with boredom. Under the President's withdrawal program, there will still be around 150,000 noncombat troops in Vietnam next November, still going mad with boredom. Soldiers will choose almost any escape from an army that has lost discipline, morale and purpose, and this has a lot to do with the heroin epidemic.

This country has a profound moral obligation to provide logistic support for the million-man South Vietnamese forces, which have been made pathetically dependent on American support for the defense of their country. But the United States has no obligation to continue to field a big non-fighting army in which tens of thousands of young men are becoming heroin addicts. The bulk of that non-fighting army must be withdrawn from Vietnam quickly and urgently, for the same reason that people in a burning house have to be gotten out quickly and urgently.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. GRAVEL) laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

ONEIDA TRIBE OF INDIANS OF WISCONSIN, ET AL. V. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A letter from the Chairman of the Indian Claims Commission transmitting, pursuant to law, its report on the final determination with respect to the case of the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin for itself and on behalf of the First Christian and Orchard Parties of Oneida Indians, plaintiffs, versus the United States of America (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Appropriations.

INTERSTATE COMPACT ON MENTAL HEALTH

A letter from the Assistant to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia transmitting proposed legislation to authorize the District of Columbia to enter into the Interstate Compact on Mental Health (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EDUCATIONAL PERSONNEL ACT

A letter from the Assistant to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia submitting proposed legislation entitled "The District of Columbia Educational Personnel

Act (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

CURTAILMENT OF MAILING CERTAIN ARTICLES

A letter from the Postmaster General transmitting proposed legislation to curtail the mailing of certain articles which present a hazard to postal employees or mail processing machines by imposing restrictions on certain advertising and promotional matter in the mails, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING

A letter from the Acting Administrator of the Department of Transportation submitting, pursuant to law, a proposed highway safety program standard on accident investigation and reporting (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Public Works.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. EAGLETON, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

H.R. 5765. An act to extend for six months the time for filing the comprehensive report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia (Rept. No. 92-109).

By Mr. WILLIAMS, from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:

S.J. Res. 100. An original joint resolution to provide for an extension of section 10 of the Railway Labor Act with respect to the current railway labor-management dispute; and for other purposes. (Rept. No. 92-110).

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. CHURCH:

S. 1887. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to specify certain activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency may not engage. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. BYRD of West Virginia:

S. 1888. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to accept donations of land for, and to construct, administer, and maintain the Allegheny Parkway in the States of West Virginia, Virginia, and Kentucky, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BAKER:

S. 1889. A bill to amend the Interstate Commerce Act so as to exclude from Federal regulation the driver qualifications of operators of certain classes of agricultural vehicles. Referred to the Committee on Commerce.

By Mr. TAFT:

S. 1890. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to relieve employers of 50 or less employees from the requirement of paying or depositing certain employment taxes more often than once each quarter. Referred to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. SPARKMAN (for himself, Mr. Tower, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. GAMBRELL, Mr. BROCK, Mr. TALMADGE, and Mr. TUNNEY):

S. 1891. A bill to authorize emergency loan guarantees to major business enterprises. Referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. TAFT:

S. 1892. A bill to provide Federally guaranteed loans to corporations vital to the national defense which are in involuntary bankruptcy or are being reorganized under

Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act, and to maintain and expand employment in the United States. Referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. BIBLE:

S. 1893. A bill to restore the golden eagle program to the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, provide for an annual camping permit, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. WILLIAMS:

S. J. Res. 100. An original joint resolution to provide for an extension of section 10 of the Railway Labor Act with respect to the current railway labor-management dispute; and for other purposes. (Considered and passed today)

By Mr. GRIFFIN (for Mr. GURNEY):

S. J. Res. 101. A joint resolution to authorize and request the President to issue a proclamation designating July 20, 1971, as "National Moon Walk Day." Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. CHURCH:

S. 1887. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to specify certain activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency may not engage. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I introduce a bill today to amend the National Security Act of 1947, which would bar the Central Intelligence Agency from organizing, supervising, or conducting any military or paramilitary operation abroad.

This bill is identical to one introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. BADILLO.

In introducing his measure on May 31, 1971, the Congressman explained that the bill would close a loophole in the National Security Act which now permits the CIA to undertake such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as may be directed by the National Security Council.

It is this provision which apparently is the justification for the presence of the CIA in Laos—not to gather intelligence, but to train, finance, and lead tribal guerrillas and even the Royal Laotian Army as a covert adjunct to U.S. combat operations.

It is reliably reported that the CIA has more than 300 men in Laos, supplying and training government guerrillas and leading commando and reconnaissance teams. In addition, the CIA is mainly responsible for planning of the massive air bombardment of Laos, which has made a wasteland of this tiny nation and turned its people into refugees in their own land.

By its use of the CIA in this manner, our Government has developed a new and cynical formula for running a war, out of sight of the Congress and the American people. I fear that unless legislation such as the bill I offer today is enacted, we will find the CIA running military operations in Indochina long after other American combat forces have been brought home.

If enacted, this bill would restore the CIA to the role Congress originally in-

FRAMINGHAM, MASS.
NEWS

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MAY 18 1971

High Cost of Spies

President Nixon is reported to be weighing a major reorganization of the nation's foreign intelligence activities.

It is an effort worth Presidential attention, and not merely because of the vast amounts of money that are spent.

Economy is the prime motivation in the reorganization plan worked up in the White House. The nation spends \$5 billion annually on intelligence-gathering; five Federal agencies besides the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) have intelligence programs, and at least 200,000 people are involved.

Some White House officials are reported to believe \$500 million could be saved. That's 10 per cent of the spying budget; the savings alone sound like an enormous sum.

Mr. Nixon is reported unhappy with some of the failures of the vast intelligence network: not knowing that American prisoners had been removed from that North Vietnamese prison; not predicting the stiff resistance to the Laos incursion; not forecasting the Polish riots.

It may be that a leaner, more centralized operation would be more omniscient; that is certainly a goal worth pursuing.

But an equally important goal Mr. Nixon should not overlook is to

separate intelligence-gathering from subversion, and from clandestine pursuit of American foreign policy interests that could perfectly well stand the light of day.

It is the CIA that has financed a guerrilla army in Laos--a program that ought to be in the Defense Department's budget, if it is indeed worth doing.

It has been CIA money that has quietly underwritten student trips abroad and Radio Free Europe; the result has been to distort one of America's proudest traditions, that of individual action independent of government.

It has been CIA efforts to find "cover" for its agents as researchers and scholars -- and occasionally, in fact, to buy the services of legitimate scholars -- that have made Americans suspect in many parts of the globe.

Intelligence-gathering is a vital part of the conduct of our foreign policy. But it need not become so entwined in other activities and agencies, both public and private, that Americans abroad are automatically suspected of spying or subversion.

To remedy that problem is just as important as tightening up the budget.

S 7036

nerable to observation by other intelligence means at our disposal."

The Administration's sensitivity in public discussion of advances in seismic research was illustrated by the fact that the Pentagon, according to Senator Case, "ripped out" a section summarizing the findings on the Woods Hole conference from a report submitted to the Senator.

As a result, Senator Case said, he turned to "nationally recognized authorities," many of whom participated in the conference, for a summary of the findings.

In their summary, they said, "The essence of these findings is that there are two significant developments which make it much more feasible to distinguish between seismic disturbances caused by earthquakes and those caused by nuclear explosions.

"One of the developments noted was that new technology has revealed that explosions cause much smaller waves in the earth's crust than do earthquakes. A complementary and equally important finding is the ability to detect smaller seismic disturbances than had heretofore been possible."

THE WHALING INDUSTRY

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, many people today believe that the whaling business disappeared with the sailing ship. This view is entirely wrong and unfortunately is a tragic misconception. The whaling industry has continued at such a pace that whales are now, and have been for some period of time, an endangered species.

During the 1960's the total number of whales killed was the greatest 10-year kill ever made. In 1933 almost 29,000 whales were killed, yielding 2,606,201 barrels of oil. In 1966 almost 58,000 whales were killed, yielding 1,546,904 barrels of oil. While almost twice as many whales were killed in 1966 as in 1933, only half as much oil was gathered, which obviously means that whale hunters are killing smaller whales in larger numbers.

Scientists have predicted that main herds of whales have been brought to near extinction in the Antarctic. They have further predicted that if a 5-year moratorium on whaling had been established in the Antarctic between 1962 and 1967, the industry could have been harvesting the maximum sustainable yield from 1967 onward. But a moratorium was not established and it is now estimated that it will take 50 to 100 years to bring back the Antarctic whale stocks to the same size that they might have reached between 1962 and 1967.

In March of this year Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans announced that he had ordered an end to American participation in the destruction of the great mammals. However, despite the general recognition that all species of whales are endangered, Secretary Stans has now backtracked and issued a license to Del-Monte Fishing Co. of Richmond, a California firm, permitting the firm to engage in the 6-month season on fin-back whales and the 8-month season on Sei and Sperm whales. The season began on April 1.

This is indeed a disappointing development and I believe places in question the ability of this administration to handle the discretionary powers of the Endangered Species Act.

On March 23 I introduced S. 1315, a bill that would prohibit Americans killing ocean mammals.

walrus, polar bears, as well as whales. Even though the total U.S. kill of whales in 1970 came to only 125, the United States lost the opportunity this year to lead all other nations in stopping the killing of this endangered species. Other countries killed over 20,000 whales in 1970 and it is quite obvious that the protection of whales cannot be achieved unilaterally, and that Russia, Japan, and Norway, the major whalers, must join in the endeavor. My bill attempts to reach this problem by requiring the State Department to initiate an international treaty halting the slaughter of ocean mammals. Also my bill would help to remove the economic incentive for these other countries to continue the needless slaughter of ocean mammals by banning the importation of all products of these animals.

Last month while in Eastern Europe meeting with officials on East-West trade, I met with high ranking Russian officials in the Ministry of Fisheries on the problems associated with the killing of ocean mammals and the proposals in my bill. They agreed that public opinion requires more effective measures against taking ocean mammals. They also informed me that their ideas and the ideas in my bill had much in common; however, they were insistent that any measure in this area must have the adherence of all concerned nations. The Russians have taken the lead in protecting the polar bear since 1956.

I believe that it is essential that immediate hearings be held on S. 1315, which is cosponsored by 24 other Senators and which has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman DAVID PRYOR, Democrat of Arkansas, and is cosponsored by 20 House Members. Stronger action than that taken by Secretary Stans is certainly called for in view of the growing threat of extinction of all ocean mammals.

THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, on May 13, Robert Shaplen, one of the most experienced and perceptive observers of the war in Indochina, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Because I agree completely with Mr. Shaplen that "the Vietnam war, always essentially a political one, is rapidly becoming more political"; that "we do not understand much about the Vietnamese"; and that we should stay out of the process of accommodation through which the Vietnamese must work out their political differences, I have introduced a Resolution creating a congressional commission to implement a policy of strict U.S. neutrality in the coming South Vietnamese elections.

The purpose of this Commission is not to tell the South Vietnamese how to run their elections, but to keep us out of those elections. Mr. Shaplen has pointed out that many South Vietnamese believe that the United States is backing the Thieu government "to the hilt." Unless we act to dispel that impression, we will once again have interfered with a political event that is best left to the South Vietnamese themselves.

most constructive addition to the debate over the future course of our Indochina policy, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT OF ROBERT SHAPLEN, BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MAY 13, 1971

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee: I wish to thank you for your invitation to testify at these hearings. I have been a member of *The New Yorker* staff since 1952 and the Far Eastern correspondent of the magazine for the past nine years, but I am appearing here today on a private basis. My experience in China and Southeast Asia dates back to 1945. My first visit to South Vietnam was in June 1946. I was there most recently, and in Laos and Cambodia, in March and April of this year. I am the author of *The Lost Revolution, Time out of Hand, and The Road From War*.

I shall address myself first to the Vietnam war, specifically to the subject of these hearings—how to end it—and then to the problems of Southeast Asia in general. Ending the war as soon as possible is only a necessary first step to dealing with the vital question of re-formulating our whole foreign policy-making process, not only with regard to Asia but to the rest of the world as well.

My own position on the Vietnam war has been as follows: I believed in the original Vietnam commitment, and while I think we have made many disastrous mistakes since we became involved in that area—going back to 1945-46 but particularly since 1954—I still feel we had a legitimate initial political concern. But that concern should have been limited, in its expression and implementation, to a military assistance and advisory program, stressing unconventional rather than conventional warfare methods, and to programs of economic and social aid. The continuation of these programs, collectively, should have been predicated on the amount and substance of political and social reform the Vietnamese undertook. Unfortunately, we set no such standards and went ahead anyway, and once involved it was difficult to avoid becoming more involved. Hindsight criticism is easy, but this was our first big mistake.

I was against the bombing of North Vietnam and the overcommitment of American forces in the South. It is probably true, however, that had it not been for the number of American troops in the country in 1965 and 1966 it would have been cut in two, from the highlands across to the coast, and most of the northern half of South Vietnam would have fallen to the Communists. But after that, strategically and tactically, we continued to rely far too much on firepower and airpower, including indiscriminate bombing. If we helped save a series of unpopular governments, we increasingly alienated millions of South Vietnamese by our overpowering but invariably ineffective or inconclusive military actions, despite the fact that we killed several hundred thousand North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Simultaneously, we tried to ameliorate the destruction we caused by constantly shifting programs of so-called pacification. Real social and economic reform, including land reform, should have been far better conceived and implemented far sooner. Most importantly, the task of training the Vietnamese to fight alone, with modern weapons including M-16 rifles, should have been undertaken immediately after the military crisis of 1965-66, not several years later, as happened, after the 1968 Tet offensive. Nowadays, our belated efforts to bring about improvements in security and development, and to turn the war over to Vietnamese, are all part of what we call Vietnamization. Because of the heritage of



BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

M - 237,967
S - 566,377

MAY 16 1970

Army use of Laos AID funds ended

Blobe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — United States fund for refugee relief in Laos will no longer be diverted for military use, according to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy.

Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, said the practice of turning over substantial sums of American assistance funds to the Laotian military and the CIA-retained paramilitary forces has been ordered stopped.

In a letter to Kennedy, Dr. John A. Hannah, director of the Agency for International Development, stated that the transfer funds administered by his agency for refugee relief to the Laotian military forces "will be terminated" as of July 1.

The diversion of these funds had been revealed by Kennedy's subcommittee last September and subsequently documented by the General Accounting Office, the spending watchdog of the Congress.

Hannah told Kennedy that transfers of AID funds to the Laotian military operations began in July 1968 and over two years \$9.5 million has been so diverted. No dollar figures are available for the current year, he said.

In addition, Hannah reported that AID has taken several steps to upgrade the care and treatment of civilian war casualties in Laos. Medical personnel has been increased, along with hospital bed capacities and treatment facilities.

While applauding the change in AID practices, Kennedy said he is "distressed that it has taken a year of investigations and hearings . . . to rectify some very serious shortcomings in US programs."

For several years, Kennedy said, the "secrecy shrouding the war in Laos has permitted a great deal of whitewash by our national leadership."

STATINTL

16 MAY 1971

Letters To The Editor

The CIA's Contribution

I am moved to respond to your editorial "Taking the CIA on Faith" (April 18). The editorial contained some interpretations of statements made by CIA Director Richard Helms with which I must take exception.

The editorial repeated Mr. Helms' statement that the public cannot judge the value or the efficiency of the operations of the agency because of the secrecy requirements which surround it. This fact is unassailable and was stressed by Mr. Helms; however, the editorial ignored the common sense of this statement and continued to bemoan the lack of public scrutiny. While secrecy is an important component of the operations of an intelligence organization, a dearth of information does exist concerning the general theory and practice of intelligence operations; this information is available—without the need for a security clearance—to the interested individual. Furthermore, public information is available, often to the chagrin of CIA officials, concerning more specific details of certain agency operations, witness the operations of the Meo tribesmen in Laos and the U-2 operations over the U.S.S.R. (which was highly successful by all accounts until May 1960). Therefore, while much of its daily operations are necessarily veiled in secrecy, the agency is not the ultra-secret "invisible government" as some would have us believe.

Mr. Helms' statement that the CIA is not involved in drug traffic seem to me to be as definitive as he could make it. The nature of intelligence operations, however, often necessitates the conduct of business with certain individuals who may have connections with the traffic of drugs. So long as the operations of the agency do not promote the worldwide traffic of drugs, it must be accepted that we will occasionally have to deal with these individuals so long as they can be of value to these operations.

Finally, the editorial questions, "how

much intelligence is enough?" The obvious answer is that there can never be too much knowledge. The policy planners and decision makers who are charged with the responsibility for charting the course of the United States in the sensitive area of international affairs must be provided with, as Mr. Helms stated, "a broad and detailed base of foreign intelligence." The need for objectivity in the production of intelligence is paramount, as Mr. Helms stated in his speech. This objectivity is required in order to preclude the agency from becoming ambitious, and either making its own policy or inducing "policy makers to posit an American interest. . ."

The CIA continuously makes a great contribution to the security of this nation and to the well-being of its citizens. Mr. Helms' speech has served to inform the American public just a bit more as to the extent of that contribution.

PAUL D. WARREN SR.

Glen Burnie.

INTERPRETIVE REPORT

STATINTL

Laos Peace Talk Hopes Dim

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — Hopes for meaningful Laos peace talks dropped sharply in diplomatic circles this weekend as the Laotian Communists and the royal Lao government hardened their bargaining positions.

"I was optimistic a week or 10 days ago that the talks would really get somewhere, but the chances of agreement now are pretty poor," commented a knowledgeable diplomatic source.

Optimism had reigned in Vientiane last month when the titular chief of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao, Prince Souphanouvong, wrote his half brother, Premier Souvanna Phouma, saying he had "new proposals" to solve the Laos problem.

Tough New Proposals

Within days a Communist envoy, Prince Souk Vongsak, flew into Vientiane from Hanoi, but the "new proposals" were tougher than the old ones.

The Pathet Lao asked for an unconditional halt to American bombing throughout Laos, including the Ho Chi Minh Trail; an in-place cease-fire after the bombing halt, and discussions on the formation of a new provisional coalition government.

In talks last November, the Pathet Lao had been willing to begin negotiations with a bombing halt only in the northern two provinces of Laos.

Souvanna's appraisal of the "new proposals," according to the official government news agency, Lao Presse, was:

"It would be difficult for us to accept the new proposals by Prince Souphanouvong. We can certainly accept the cessation of bombing and the cease-fire, but only if this is immediately followed by the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos and on condition that the withdrawal be supervised by the International Control Commission.

"Otherwise the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese could profit by the cease-fire to reinforce themselves with men, arms and munitions, and if the Pathet Lao chose to

break off the talks an offensive could be launched immediately against us."

Bombing Halt Doubted

A diplomatic source, analyzing the "new proposals," said, "A total bombing halt which would include the Ho Chi Minh Trail could not be observed by the U.S. as long as American troops are in Vietnam, and it is impossible for Souvanna, too."

American airpower, the source said, "is Souvanna's only trump card and he is not going to throw it away just for Pathet Lao promises. The North Vietnamese must make a meaningful gesture.

"On the other hand, chances of a North Vietnamese military withdrawal are just as remote, so we are back at the old stalemate."

Diplomats find it difficult to assess the motives behind the new Communist proposals. Said one:

"They have asked for a complete bombing halt, which they know they won't get. They have told Souvanna, 'we don't accept your government, we want to talk about setting up another government.' Perhaps the idea is to make outrageous proposals first, then scale them down at later bargaining." Others, however, point out the Communists are in a strong military position now, and this position will become stronger still.

If the Vietnamization program of President Nixon is completed and U.S. forces are withdrawn from South Vietnam, then it will be difficult for the administration to continue bombing in Laos and Souvanna's best bargaining card will disappear.

North Vietnamese Attacks

North Vietnamese forces currently are hammering at 4,000 Thai troops and the CIA-led special guerrilla units which have been the most effective fighting forces for the government. But there already are signs that this effectiveness is diminishing, leaving only the royal Lao army to handle the North Vietnamese, a task which is a far cry from the capability of doing.

"The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao position can only get stronger politically and militarily," said a diplomat, "but Hanoi and the Pathets still seem to want some sort of settlement now, I think."

The reason they would like some sort of settlement, suggest some diplomats, is that the Communists hope to be able to again neutralize Laos to make any future South Vietnamese incursions politically difficult.

Hanoi also may want the Pathet Lao to take a role in the government of Laos to make the Pathet Lao politically stronger, diplomats suggest.

Souphanouvong's proposals are seen as a continuation of the Communists' combination of political and military moves to gain a bombing halt as quickly as possible. For the long term, they are seeking to get the Pathet Lao into a dominant position in a new neutralist government.

While diplomats predict the immediate future will see more hard fighting in Laos, they don't totally exclude some sort of political accommodation.

"By all the rules of diplomacy, the talks are dead, but the rules don't apply here," said a Western diplomat. "The Laos are apt to suddenly wind up in Paris. They are very good at quiet accommodations."

Are We Interfering Unduly?

A critical review of this country's foreign intelligence organizations is said to be under consideration by President Nixon. They cost too much (several billion dollars a year), and their performance has too often been seriously at fault. At important turns, they have provided inadequate or misleading information.

The latest example of this was seen in the invasion of Laos. The preparatory intelligence indicated that there would not be massive resistance. But that is precisely what Saigon's forces ran into—35,000 of Hanoi's troops as against 17,000 of Saigon's. The result was a rout.

That intelligence failure had been preceded by others. One concerned the supposed presence of American prisoners of war at Sontay. An elaborate and dangerous raid was undertaken; it was fruitless. Then, there was the supposed presence of a major Hanoi headquarters just over the Cambodian border. It was never found. Also, the massive Tet offensive some time back was altogether unexpected.

Indeed, the Vietnam war as a whole may fairly be characterized as a failure in intelligence. Thus, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker gave an interview in Saigon this week, in which he said, "We really didn't understand the kind of war we were engaged in. So it was difficult, it took time." And this after the notorious experience of the French in Vietnam, the British in Malaysia, and others elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Despite our costly intelligence, we just didn't know what we were getting into.

But perhaps more momentous for the future is what the Central Intelligence Agency is commonly believed to be doing in other countries, particularly those in Latin America.

All kinds of chicanery and violence are arbitrarily attributed to the C.I.A. That agency is represented as practically omnipresent and omnipotent, as well as totally unscrupulous and malicious. It would appear that in Latin America, for example, there is a prevalent obsession with the C.I.A., and everything adverse with the possible
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060017000-0
storms and hangnails—is blamed on the

C.I.A., much as, in our own country, a Communist plot is seen by some as accounting for anything from an early voting age to a late spring.

However, it is not only the feverishly imaginative and the bitterly anti-North American in Latin America who charge that the C.I.A. is interfering in the internal affairs of the countries to the south of us. This is also alleged by persons well informed, well balanced, and well disposed to us.

They are troubled by what they see as the intensification of Yankee economic imperialism in the Latin American world. This, they say, is what is effected in the last analysis by all our aid and development programs. Such undertakings are professedly designed to help the economic, social, and political progress of the indigent Latin American masses. But in fact they do nothing of the sort. Rather, they serve the immediate advantage of the already highly privileged oligarchies in the various countries, and enable North Americans to exert still more control over Latin America and wring still more wealth from it.

But where does the C.I.A. come into it? More and more people in Latin America are convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the C.I.A. is safeguarding the inordinate North American economic interest in the Latin American countries by secretly acting to keep complaisant regimes in power and to destroy native reformist or revolutionary movements. The alleged means run the gamut from the arrangement of political murder to the infiltration of the universities. It has been said that a turn to the left in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia has been facilitated by resentment of C.I.A. interference in the domestic affairs of those countries.

Sorting fact from fantasy in such matters is not easy. But at the very least it must be recognized that a popular impression of C.I.A. intervention in the internal business of friendly nearby countries is damaging to American prestige. If, while we are fighting a bootless battle on the other side of the world, we are alienating our neighbors by meddling in their affairs, we are making an incalculably expensive mistake.

STATINTL

LIVERMORE, CAL.
HERALD & NEWS

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M - 8,234
S - 8,209

MAY 14 1971

Waldie says U.S. officers dislike Viet war

By ROGER KENDALL

SAN RAMON—The attitudes of U.S. officers in the Vietnam War are changing, said Jerome Waldie, Contra Costa Congressman, who returned recently from a trip to Indochina with San Mateo Congressman Paul McCleskey.

The generals to a man support the effort and still believe they are fighting "a holy war against communism," stated Waldie Thursday.

From colonels on down, said the Contra Costa legislator, they don't like the war and call it "ugly and impossible."

The representative expressed approval of the developing "generation gap," adding, "I see no reason at all for us to remain there."

* * *

NO MATTER what happens in Indochina, stated Waldie, the result has been "total alteration of an existing culture."

The ultimate solution is going to be theirs, the legislator quoted from a young lieutenant in Vietnam, adding that a colonel had told him on his tour that the North Vietnamese can fight on a 600-mile supply line under the conditions they do because "they believe in what they are fighting for."

The North Vietnamese consistently best Laotian and South Vietnamese troops in combat even with U.S. air support, added Waldie.

* * *

THE BEST fighting force in Laos is a group of tribesmen employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), he noted, adding that "the entire war is run by the CIA."

In Laos, U.S. Ambassador McMurtree Dodley daily selects bombing targets for the 7th U.S. Air Force based in Thailand, stated Waldie.

Waldie also hit the armed forces for indiscriminate bombing in the Plain of Jars during 1939.

After talking with some 16 refugee groups, said Waldie, the reason given for leaving their homes was U.S. bombing raids. There were no military targets within one-to-ten kilometers of the villages, he added.

* * *

CLOSING OUT his impressions from his tour of Indochina, Waldie stated, "There is no reason I can justify another American killed or wounded."

Touching on other issues, the legislator noted that his

announced gubernatorial ambitions had opened the communications door for him in Southern California.

Before his announcement to run for governor in 1974, said Waldie, the Los Angeles news media virtually ignored his comments on the California water plan and other issues.

* * *

NOW, HE added, people in the south are listening to his objection that the plan would be bad for them by increasing the already serious growth and pollution problems of the Los Angeles area.

Waldie has been an outspoken opponent of the proposed peripheral canal which would carry water from the northern part of the state to allow further development of the San Fernando Valley area.

Speaking on the controversy swirling around FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Waldie praised the 76-year-old for running an honest and efficient organization. But the congressman added that Hoover should retire because of his age and let a younger man assume the responsibilities.

"I believe in a mandatory retirement age," said Waldie, adding that 65 or 70 should be the limit.

14 MAY 1971

Disarm CIA: Badillo

Washington, May 13 (AP)—Rep. Herman Badillo (D.-N.Y.) asked Congress today to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from organizing or supervising secret military operations of any kind. Badillo said a loophole in the 1947 law that set up the CIA as an intelligence-gathering organization



Badillo

“is apparently being used to justify the fact that . . . tribal guerrillas and the Royal Laotian Army have been . . . led by the CIA as a covert adjunct to the Indochina war.” He said more than 300 CIA men are involved in the Laotian secret army. ✓

May 13, 1971

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

orientation. Like most law students, and indeed like most lawyers, they were largely unfamiliar with the processes of the criminal courts, and with the many invisible not to say wondrous ways of the criminal justice system. Preconceived notions about what happened at various stages of the process, gleaned from casebooks, had to be dispelled. Well-learned principles of criminal procedure, gleaned from appellate court decisions, had to be put in perspective. And, perhaps most important, the students simply had to be familiarized with the often baffling maze of court parts, papers, clerks, and offices into which their cases would flow. There was, to say the least, a good deal of anxiety among the students at the outset.

After the orientation period, the students began doing intake work at the MFY office. At first they were closely supervised to assure that they would learn how to handle the vital initial contact between attorney and client. The results of these interviews were recorded on interview forms, and served as a basis for seminar discussion of interviewing techniques, and for planning strategy for the next stages of the case.

The students were responsible for all field investigations (observing, visiting and photographing or diagramming the scene, finding witnesses, interviewing complainants and police officers, etc.) and for the preparation of any motion papers required in their cases. Court appearances were handled by Mr. Rosengart at first, until the students became acquainted with the process. Ultimately, all court appearances—preliminary hearings, motions and trials—were handled by the students themselves, as were the all-important plea negotiations with the prosecution, with Mr. Rosengart present to give advice when necessary.

THE PROGRAM IN ACTION

By November, the students had gotten fairly comfortable in the courts. Each of them was responsible for four or five cases at any one time—the number kept low intentionally to assure the concentrated attention necessary to a thorough training experience. The students, by then, had learned their way around the courts physically, and had made substantial strides towards gaining the practical sophistication which one must possess to operate successfully there. They learned that the prepared and persistent attorney can often obtain good dispositions where a more casual approach might result in a client being lost, in effect, in the flood of cases entering the court.

In one such case, a student was able through repeated efforts to gain the ear of the prosecutor and the judge, to obtain an informal "hearing" at which she presented facts which convinced the judge that the charges against her client were unjustified. The case, which in the normal course might have been in the system for weeks or longer, was dismissed on arraignment. This experience was repeated many times, and often resulted in dismissals, lower bail, or substantial reduction in charges.

The students were also active at the dispositional stage, again learning that in many cases while proof of guilt might be overwhelming, there was still much that a defense attorney could be to move the court toward adopting a positive course at sentencing. This is particularly true in drug or drug-related cases, in which many if not most of the judges will impose a nonjail sentence (probation or conditional discharge) if the defendant is doing something about his drug problem.

The students have been instrumental in getting about a dozen addicts into either residential treatment programs or methadone programs. Most often the students have brought this about by getting personally involved with their clients and then persuading, cajoling and even physically bringing

them to the drug program. In one such case, the student attorney, prior to sentencing in a drug possession case, was able to place his client in a methadone program, make living arrangements for him, and enroll him in a job-training program. Despite a rather lengthy prior record, the defendant was not imprisoned. In the months which have followed, the student has remained in close touch with his client, who continues to work at his new trade and stay free of drugs.

As for formal litigative experience, each of the students has handled at least one preliminary hearing argument on motion, or trial, and in most cases has been successful. There has not, it should be noted, been as much formal courtroom work as we would have liked for educational purposes, mainly because there is very little such work in the system as a whole.

Because of the enormous volume of business handled in the courts, there is strong pressure for out-of-court settlement, usually through negotiation between counsel. On a number of occasions, the students came to court fully prepared and eager for trial, only to be offered an irresistible "deal" by the prosecution, or to see their cases dismissed on motion of the prosecutor, after presentation of the defense case to him before trial. In part to compensate for the frustrated urge of the students to engage informal advocacy in these cases, and in part to provide more skills training in litigation, we devoted a number of hours in our seminars to stimulation of the litigative experience.

THE ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE

As noted, the seminar component of the program was considered highly important. Not only was it the mechanism through which we provided the initial orientation, and a forum for discussions of tactics and strategy in pending cases, but it also served as the place for discussion of the broader legal, social and ethical problems involved in the administration of criminal justice. One cannot, I feel, understand the criminal process without coming to grips with the enormous gap between its theory and present practices.

The fact that 90 per cent of all criminal cases are resolved without trial; that a large percentage of defendants are detained prior to trial because of their poverty; that our jails and prisons do more harm than good; and that one's ability to maneuver—to delay, to "shop" for the right judge, and to bargain—are often of more practical importance than one's skills as an advocate, are subjects as worthy of contemplation as are abstract notions such as the "presumption of innocence," and "mens rea."

The fact that prominent Supreme Court decisions dealing, for example, with searches and seizures, interrogations, and effective assistance of counsel are not so much "good" or "bad" in practice, but largely irrelevant, is one with which every student of the criminal law must grapple. Far from being merely a "how to do it" experience, therefore, the clinical program can serve to effectively broaden the education of the student.

CONCLUSIONS AND PLANS

The first year of the program is now almost completed. My sense is that it has been a valuable learning experience for the students, although I concede that there are no simple ways to measure this. Their enthusiasm remained extremely high throughout, and they devoted long hours to their cases and to the lives of the clients whom they served. They obtained less formal litigative experience than I would have liked, but hopefully they learned some of the basics of successful litigation. They certainly obtained a perspective in this important field of law which could not have been obtained in the classroom.

And, contrary to what some feared, far from being turned away from the criminal

law as a result of seeing it in action, almost all of them are moving, or trying to move, further into the field upon graduation.

The second year of the program begins in September. We shall double the number of students involved, and add two more supervisors, the cost to be shared by CLEPR and the School of Law. We hope to be able to demonstrate to the school that the clinical experience is worthy of perpetuation in the curriculum, and to the legal community that the student practitioner is a valuable resource in the criminal justice field.

CONGRESS MUST BAR THE CIA FROM RUNNING GUERRILLA WARS

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing legislation today amending the National Security Act of 1947 to specify the intent of Congress that the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency is confined to the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence and does not include the organization, supervision, or conduct of any military or paramilitary operation abroad.

This bill would close a loophole in the National Security Act which permits the CIA to undertake "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security" as may be directed by the National Security Council.

It is this provision which apparently is the justification for the presence of the CIA in Laos—not to gather intelligence but to train, finance, and lead tribal guerrillas and even the Royal Lao Lian Army as a covert adjunct to U.S. combat operations in Vietnam.

It is reliably reported that the CIA has more than 300 men in Laos, supplying and training Government guerrillas and leading commando and reconnaissance teams. In addition, the CIA is mainly responsible for planning of the massive air bombardment of Laos, which has made a wasteland of this tiny nation and turned its people into refugees in their own land.

By its use of the CIA in this manner, our Government has developed a new and cynical formula for running a war, out of sight of the Congress and the American people. I fear that unless legislation such as the bill I offer today is enacted, we will find the CIA running military operations in Indochina long after other American combat forces have been brought home.

The bill follows:

H.R. 8371

A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to specify certain activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency may not engage

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new clause:

"Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to authorize the Agency to engage, in any manner or to any extent, in the organization, supervision, or conduct of any military or paramilitary operation of any kind (including any operation of the kind common-

NEW YORK, N.Y.

STATINTL

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E - 702,637

S - 368,841

MAY 13 1971

Badillo Urges: Get CIA Out of

By ANTONY PRISENDORF
N.Y. Post Correspondent

WASHINGTON—A bill prohibiting the CIA from organizing or supervising guerrilla armies in foreign countries was introduced today by Rep. Badillo.

The legislation, Badillo said would close a loophole in the National Security Act of 1947 that authorizes the CIA to undertake "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security" if directed to do so specifically by the National Security Council.

This widely interpreted provision, Badillo said in remarks prepared for delivery on the House floor, "is apparently being used to justify the fact that for several years, at least, tribal guerrilla troops and the Royal Laotian Army have been trained, financed and led by the CIA as a covert adjunct to the Indochina war."

And, Badillo charged, the CIA is "mainly responsible" for the air bombardment of Laos, which he said has made "a wasteland of this tiny nation and turned its people into refugees in their own land."

Under the main provisions of his bill, Badillo said, the National Security Council

could not authorize the CIA "to engage, in any manner or to any extent, in the organization, supervision, or conduct of any military or paramilitary operation of any kind" that involves either regular or guerrilla forces in a foreign country.

Badillo, a Democrat elected to Congress last year representing a triboro district encompassing parts of Manhattan, the Bronx and Queens, first disclosed that he was drafting the bill during his speech at the massive April 24 antiwar demonstration at the Capitol.

At that time, Badillo told the huge, peaceful crowd, "we must make sure that the Central Intelligence Agency can no longer run clandestine wars, as it has been doing for years in Laos."

In his brief speech today, Badillo said that based on information supplied by "well-informed sources," more than 300 CIA agents, many of them former special forces troops, are in Laos "supplying and training government guerrillas and leading commando and reconnaissance teams."

Guerrilla War

DAILY WORLD
12 MAY 1971

STATINTL

TV

By BEN LEVINE

Hot in ring

If Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif) wins the Republican nomination from Richard Nixon, and if he is elected President, he will take American troops and planes out of Indochina without any Nixon ifs and buts. This he pledged on the David Susskind program last Sunday night, and despite long and sad experience with Presidential liars on the subject of this war, we were moved to believe him.

McCloskey is a Republican, and his motives for ending the Vietnam war quickly are tainted with the argument that this war is weakening the U.S. fight against "world communism," but he did put first things first, and the first thing, on which all America except Nixon, Agnew and the lunatic ultraright are united, is to get out of Vietnam, bag, baggage and bombs.

McCloskey did not hesitate, as even liberals have done, before the question of what would happen to the South Vietnam friends of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. He said it was indecent to impose a face-saving interval of killing during a withdrawal.

"Nobody likes to get killed in the last day of the war," he said, echoing the Vietnam veteran John Kerry who had asked: "How can you tell the last soldier to

die for a mistake?"

McCloskey wants to save the honor of the American government, now headed by a liar.

Nixon, he said, doesn't tell the public that Laos had been infiltrated by the CIA before the invasion, that it was bombed constantly, and that the bombing has been doubled.

American cluster bombs, he added, each killing every living being in a 25-acre radius, are falling on civilians as well as soldiers.

He spoke quietly but with smoldering anger as he quoted Agnew to the effect that bombing is America's "greatest trump card."

American bombing, said McCloskey, has killed, 300,000 civilians in the last six years.

McCloskey is no pacifist. He is a Marine colonel now, he was a second lieutenant in the Marines when he fought in the Korean war, he wants to save the honor of the army which is besmirched by this wanton destruction of a small nation.

And so he says he will run in the Republican primary in New Hampshire, as a start, if the situation remains as at present. He has already received, he told the TV audience, 1,000 contributions, unsolicited, for a campaign.

N. Vietnam Diplomats Stoned

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, May 11—Several diplomatic representatives of North Vietnam were hit today by stones thrown by members of the Laotian army and other individuals believed to have been plainclothes police.

In another development, North Vietnamese Migs attacked American war planes near Ban Ban and south of the Plain of Jars, according to well-informed U.S. sources.

[A North Vietnamese Mig 21 interceptor attacked an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane twice over the Plain of Jars in northern Laos while a second Mig 21 circled overhead last Sunday, the U.S. Command disclosed Wednesday, according to AP.

["The aircraft was not damaged from the attack which lasted approximately five minutes," the command said.

[The Mig made two firing passes at the light observation plane which was supporting royal Laotian forces, it said. The pilot reported that he felt two explosions to his right rear and observed two large white airbursts.]

According to the sources, it was the first time the North Vietnamese have attempted air combat over Laotian territory.

Migs also reportedly threatened Air America planes 100 miles northeast of Vientiane. Air America is a private airline which makes supply runs and ferries troops for USAID and the CIA.

All Air America flights for later in the day were canceled.

The stoning of the North Vietnamese diplomats occurred at ceremonies marking Laos' constitutional day presided over by King Savang Vattana.

The North Vietnamese were leaving in protest over a passage in the King's speech condemning North Vietnam as "aggressors" in Laos.

They were just entering their Mercedes when they were set upon by soldiers throwing cartridges and what the North Vietnamese later described as "very large stones."

All windows of the sedan were broken out, and the chauffeur was said to have been seriously injured.

Charge d'Affaires Nguyen Giap, who was struck on the left arm and right leg during the 10-minute attack, later termed his own injuries as serious.

Giap issued a statement calling the attack a serious provocation and saying:

"We must underline that the presence of charge at the ceremony constituted a sign of goodwill to improve relations between our two countries."

- 12 MAY 1971

Ho Trail Extended in Laos

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE, Laos — North Vietnam is extending the Ho Chi Minh network of supply trails further west in the panhandle area of Laos in a move to keep them out of reach of South Vietnamese troops, sources report.

Reviewing Communist military activity in Laos since South Vietnamese troops drove across the border in an attempt to disrupt the trail in February, the sources said the North Vietnamese have constructed two new trails west of the Lao town of Muong Phine on Route 9.

Muong Phine is 30 miles west of Sepone (also called Tchepone), the furthest point in Laos reached by South Vietnamese troops during Operation Lamson.

Bustling Activity

The two new trails are reported bustling with activity as Hanoi sends supplies south toward South Vietnam and Cambodia in an attempt to get materiel to its forces before the Lao monsoon begins early in June.

Hanoi also is using a new trail across the Bolovens Plateau in the southern portion of the Laotian panhandle. Like the trails around Muong Phine, this trail is further away from the South Vietnam border.


A major clue to Hanoi's plan to shift its supply network west has been a series of attacks in the last 10 days against CIA-directed guerrilla operations in the area of the new trails.

North Vietnamese troops swooped down on guerrillas in the Muong Phine area, killing 80, then went on to capture Muong Phalane on Route 9.

CIA Badly Beaten

In these attacks, the Communists used four battalions of troops and had heavy anti-aircraft support. Four T23 planes of the Lao air force were shot down, including one piloted by the son of a member of the Lao National Assembly.

"The North Vietnamese have



—Star Artist Robert Hoke

A shifted Ho Chi Minh trail.

cleared the guerrillas out of the Muong Phine area. The agency (CIA) has taken a bad beating," a source here said.

Military sources expect the next move by Hanoi will be to strike at either Pak Song or Houei Kong, two towns still held by the government on the Bolovens Plateau. This would allow the use of additional trails in the west. A North Vietnamese buildup in these areas was reported going on last weekend.

Military and diplomatic sources traced the patterns of Communist actions in Laos since Lamson and the political reasons for the actions this way:

On March 21, Communist troops struck the royal capital of Luang Prabang, capturing the heights overlooking the town's airfield, the last remaining link with the outside world not previously subject to enemy pressure.

This had the effect of drawing Lao forces from southern Laos, where the Communists intended to expand to the west. Politically, the move against Luang Prabang served to warn the royal Laos government against agreeing to any more South Vietnamese incursions.

By mid-April, the Communists had withdrawn from Luang Pra-

bang. "They accomplished their mission, to warn the government of what could happen," said a diplomatic source.

Heavy Pressure

The North Vietnamese made sure the reinforcements for Luang Prabang would come from southern Laos by keeping heavy pressure on the Long Chen area in northeastern Laos.

Throughout late March and early April, the Communists worked on the new trails around Muong Phine. In early May the military campaign began to rid the area of government guerrilla forces so as to insure there would be no harassment of the supplies then beginning to move along the new trails.

The attacks on government guerrillas and troops which are continuing now in the Long Chen area resumed in April.

In one week, some 2,000 shells were fired at hill 163, Long Chen's forward position. Earlier, Ban Na Hill, 4,000 yards east, fell to the Communists after similar bombardment. The airstrip at Long Chen receives almost a daily ration of rockets and sappers abound in the hills around the town.

Communist tactics against Long Chen are reminiscent of those used in 1968 against Nam Bac, where the Laotians lost some 2,000 troops. There the North Vietnamese kept pressure for 10 months—sometimes attacking, sometimes retreating, but always shelling and probing—until it fell in one unexpected and well-prepared assault.

Diplomats speculate that the threat to Long Chen will be held over the government's head through the rainy seasons while talks between the government and the Communist Pathet Lao go on here.

If the Lao government refuses to provide the Communists with a larger share of the government, the North Vietnamese will assault Long Chen in the next dry season, say these diplomats.

CIA planes 'used to carry drugs'

Vientiane, May 10.—Mr. John Ingersoll, the head of the United States Justice Department's narcotics bureau, has said on his arrival here that one of the possibilities for wiping out drugs traffic in south-east Asia was the purchase of opium produced in Laos by the American Government.

Mr. Ingersoll, who is investigating the sources of marijuana and opium derivatives which are being used by American soldiers in South Vietnam, said the communist-controlled parts of Laos were one of the principal sources of drugs sent to South Vietnam.

Other important sources of opium were Thailand, Burma and China. Varieties of Indian hemp or marijuana, were grown nearly everywhere, he said.

Mr. Ingersoll said that opium grown in north Laos had been transported by aircraft belonging to the private American companies Air America and Continental Services which were under contract to the (Central Intelligence Agency).

LOS ANGELES TIMES SYNDICATE in association with

Newsday

THE FLORA LEWIS COLUMN

RELEASE DATE: Saturday, May 8, 1971
Sunday, May 9, 1971

THE QUESTION OF CIA AND DRUGS

by Flora Lewis

STATINTL

NEW YORK--Richard Helms, director of the CIA, is evidently much upset at charges that the CIA is involved in the flourishing drug traffic in Indochina, which is making a very substantial contribution to addiction among Americans.

Helms says flatly that the CIA is "not involved in the drug trade anywhere in the world." In the literal, organizational sense, he is probably right, although almost any ex-CIA man will testify that the field doesn't always tell the home office everything it knows. There is a tendency to protect headquarters from embarrassing insights and information.

Certainly, Helms is right when he says that drug control is not the CIA's responsibility. But two facts are inescapable.

1--Drugs are flowing into Vietnam and out of Indochina into the world underground network in dramatically increasing quantity. Not only is there a fearful growth in the amount of opium produced and exported from Southeast Asia. Alongside the traditional opium trade, heroin is being produced there now. This is new. The proof that it is true is the ready availability of heroin to GIs in Vietnam. Their powder doesn't come all the way from Turkey or France.

-MORE-

MGDR WAS

TP660 7 MAY 1971 REC'D WAS MAY 7 1971

SUBJ: REQUESTED PRESS INTERVIEW IN LAOS

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM BASE MANAGER VIENTIANE IS QUOTED

+

USIS DIRECTOR, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF AMBASSADOR AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, APPROACHED ME THIS AFTERNOON IN PRESENCE OF CASB REQUESTING AAM CONCURRENCE IN HAVING A MEMBER OF THE GLOBE NEWS SERVICE OF WASHINGTON DC DO A PHOTO STORY ON A +TYPICAL AAM PILOT AND HIS FAMILY.+ THE JOURNALIST IN QUESTION IS PEDRO OSULLIVAN, AN ARGENTINE SUBJECT ABOUT 30 YEARS OLD, WHO HAS BEEN IN LAOS FOR A WEEK OR TWO. APPARENTLY OSULLIVAN WHO HAS RECENTLY BEEN IN SGN IS INTERESTED IN DOING THIS STORY ON FO R. J. OCONNOR (C-46 PROGRAM) OR CAPTAIN G.T.VAN INGEN (HELIO PROGRAM). UNDERSTAND DCASB PRINCIPALS HAVE NO VISIBLE OBJECTION TO THIS STORY, DEPENDING ON UP COUNTRY LOCATION CHOSEN. SINCE OCONNOR IS IN C-46 PROGRAM AND CURRENTLY DROPPING RICE BELIEVE CHOICE OF HIM LOGICAL. APPARENTLY OSULLIVAN TIME LIMITED ON VISA LAOS AND EMBASSY WOULD LIKE AAM CONCURRENCE BY EOS IF POSSIBLE. UNDERSTAND ALSO OSULLIVAN INTERVIEWED OCONNORS WIFE IN SGN RECENTLY. MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE REASON FOR THIS KIND OF HIGH LEVEL SUPPORT OF AN OTHERWISE UNKNOWN NEWSMAN IS THAT EMBASSY DESIRES DO CERTAIN AMOUNT OF IMAGE POLISHING ON BEHALF OF CONTRACTOR AND THE U.S. MISSION OBJECTIVES THIS COUNTRY. CONCURRENCE AND OUR GUIDANCE REQUESTED. +

2. ADVISE ANY OBJECTIONS OR DESIRES REGARDING OUR PROPOSED APPROVAL OF REQUEST.

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


NEWSDAY
MAY 1971

Is the CIA Mixed Up in

Flora Lewis

Dope Traffic?

STATINTL



Vadillo—Siempre (Mexico)

New York—A weird series of incidents is bringing into focus the question of the CIA's relation to the booming Indochina traffic in heroin and the opium from which it is made.

Ramparts magazine has published a study of the drug trade in Indochina, pulling together many details of the widely but only vaguely known story and making a series of specific charges against top South Vietnamese, Laotian and Thai officials. Further, Ramparts charged that it is CIA operations and subsidies in the area which have made possible the big increase in the supply of heroin from Indochina.

Sen. George McGovern (D-N.D.) wrote a letter to CIA Director Richard Helms on April 13 asking six questions about it. One inquired whether the opium production in Laos was conducted with the knowledge of CIA officials, particularly around the CIA's secret army base at Long Cheng in Laos, and if the effect of CIA operations is to "protect the supplies (of opium) and facilitate their movement."

On April 29, CIA legislative counsel Jack Maury called on McGovern to give oral answers to the questions. He referred to a sheaf of legal-size papers for his information, indicating that the CIA has made a new investigation, but he didn't give McGovern the papers. He denied some of the charges, but said the CIA has been trying to convince the local people not to be in the drug traffic, which obviously implies that the CIA knows about it.

McGovern's query wasn't the first challenge to Helms on the subject. On March 4, Helms went with his wife to an evening event at the Corcoran Gallery

in Washington. The star happened to be Allen Ginsberg, the tousle-haired mystic poet. They met at a reception before the poetry reading, and Ginsberg took after Helms for what he says is CIA support of the dope trade.

The poet has been investigating drug traffic for seven years, and he has on the tip of his tongue a lot of precise names and places and figures. For one thing, he said, Long Cheng is a central collecting market for the opium flowing from northern Burma, northeastern Thailand and Laos (the fertile triangle) down into Vietnam and Bangkok and out around the world back to the United States.

Helms said it wasn't true, so Ginsberg said "I'll make you a wager." If he lost, Ginsberg promised to give Helms his "vajra" which he describes as "a Buddhist-Hindu ritual implement of brass symbolizing the lightning-bolt doctrine of sudden illumination." Helms was to meditate one hour a day for the rest of his life if he lost.

Some time later, Ginsberg sent Helms a clipping from the Far East Economic Review saying that a number of correspondents who sneaked into Long Cheng over the years saw raw opium openly piled up for sale in the market there, in full view of CIA armed agents. He also sent a note offering Helms suggestions about how to keep a straight back while meditating, the best sitting position and proper breathing.

He has had no acknowledgement from the CIA chief, but says "I have been tender toward him. I've been trying to get Helms into an improved mind-consciousness. Anything that might help save

continued

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BRFMERTON, WASH.

SUN

MAY 6 1971

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Sahl Blames CIA For Much Violence

By TRAVIS BAKER
Sun Staff Writer

Comic Mort Sahl, who was gaffing the establishment before a large segment of the country decided that was a treasonous pursuit, is still gaffing it.

Last night at Olympic College, Sahl delivered a scattergun condemnation of the state of the union, hitting the administration, military, Central Intelligence Agency, organized religion, his fellow comedians, consumerists like Ralph Nader and the media.

He painted a picture of a CIA agent behind every tree, responsible for the killing of John F. and Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, for the nomination of Gen. Curtis LeMay as George Wallace's running mate in 1968 and for much campus violence.


Students should assume everyone is with the CIA until they prove otherwise, Sahl said, and when someone new with left-wing credentials appears on the scene, "be a little more-paranoic."

The CIA, he claimed, has spent 70 per cent of its budget in recent years inside the country. He cited instances in Ann Arbor, Mich., at UCLA and in Chicago and New York in which he said paid police informers or government agents led or were prominent in student violence.

"If no one on your campus blows anything up, write to Washington. They'll send you someone directly."

The CIA is good at what it does, though, Sahl facetiously admitted. "The CIA owned Laos for 10 years and we didn't know it. The Army was in there for an hour and a half and had its footprints all over the walls."

On President Nixon, he said, "Talk about insulated!" Both JFK and LBJ visibly showed the



MORT SAHL READS FROM WEDNESDAY'S SUN

Fast-talking satirist speaks at OC

Sun Photo by Richard Ellis.)

strain after a short time in office, but "look at Nixon. What, me worry?"

He said the President has told him his favorite position in talking to a group is standing with a group in a circle around him -- so that he can assume any position easily -- "which is my basic objection to him."

JFK never received a proper autopsy, he said, because he was flown out of Texas, where state law requires a post-mortem on anyone who's killed, to Washington, where an Army major general allegedly intimidated Col. Pierre Finck, the

examining medic, into doing practically nothing.

Sahl claimed Kennedy was shot from in front, not from in back as the Warren Report says. "The Warren Report cost \$7 million and doesn't tell you anything about how the president was killed," he said.


He saw a similar plot in Rev. Martin Luther King's murder, and the government's subsequent reluctance to try James Earl Ray, putting him away for 99 years on a guilty plea instead.

He blasted Bob Hope as a hired government man: "A lot

of people say he's a great patriot, but I've never heard anyone say he's funny. John Wayne is also a great patriot. I felt sorry for him during World War II, biting his lip because he couldn't go enlist."

"A lot of comedians say when things are this serious, you can't joke about them. But you can joke about anything."

He admitted, however, that his drawing power is now limited pretty much to colleges. "Most audiences can't be joked with because they're threatened."



The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Laotians Accused in Heroin Traffic

By Jack Anderson

A Royal Laotian prince and the Laotian Army commander have now been identified as the principal traffickers in the heroin used by U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

Furthermore, a congressional investigation has confirmed our earlier allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency is involved in the Laotian heroin operations.

The investigation was made by Reps. Robert Steele (R-Conn.) and Morgan Murphy (D-Ill.), both members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Steele is preparing a report that will allege CIA Air America aircraft have been used to transport the drug from northern Laos into the capital city of Vientiane.

It says, however, there is no evidence that the CIA had any official policy of letting its planes be used to move the drugs. Furthermore, it adds that the agency has now cracked down on the practice.

According to the draft report, prepared by Steele for House Foreign Affairs Chairman Tom Morgan (D-Pa.), the deadly drug is transported from opium fields in Laos to the battlefields of South Viet-

nam in the following manner:

First the raw opium is hauled from deep in Northern Laos through Burma and into the Laotian town of Ban Bouei Sai, with former Nationalist Chinese soldiers-turned-drug smugglers riding shotgun on the shipments.

At Ban Bouei Sai, the Laotian Army commander, Gen. Ouan Rathikoun, takes over. He supervises the shipment of the opium into Vientiane, using American-supplied planes and protecting the smuggled cargoes with U.S.-supplied arms.

Once it reaches Vientiane, the morphine base is processed in Gen. Rathikoun's labs into "Number Four" heroin, a pure grade of the deadly drug almost unknown in Southeast Asia until traffickers began turning it out especially for American troops.

Protection and Payroll

Throughout Laos, the heroin operation is protected and abetted by Prince Boun Oun, Inspector General of the realm.

Once processed, the heroin is flown into South Vietnam aboard military and civilian aircraft from both Laos and South Vietnam.

Some of the carefully wrapped packages of the white powder are air-dropped near U.S. troop emplacements in the fields. Others reach the troops after being landed at outlying air strips or flown di-

rectly into Saigon's Tansonnhut airport.

With Vietnamese custom officials looking the other way, the heroin passes into illicit channels. The congressman identifies South Vietnamese Premier Tran Thien Kheim as the man behind the corruption of the customs agents, but they stop short of calling him an outright trafficker.

The angriest language in Steele's draft report is reserved for U.S. diplomats who have failed to use their leverage against such men as Rathikoun and Prince Boun Oun to get the drug traffic cut off at its source.

Steele points out that in Turkey some progress has been made, although slowly, though diplomatic channels to cut off the flow of heroin to the United States.

In a future column, we will detail how American ex-GIs and deserters, assisted by corrupt Thai officials, are beginning to move huge quantities of heroin into the United States to replace the Turkish supply.

Kosygin on Arms

The U.S. embassy, reporting to the State Department from Moscow on Sen. Ed Muskie's confidential conversations with Kremlin leaders, gave this account of the discussion on disarmament:

"Muskie began by talking about desire to reduce military expenditures. He said in

past two years, Senate had subjected defense budget to great scrutiny. As result, administration's budget in 1969 had been cut by six billion dollars.

"He expressed interest in MBFR (Mutual Balance Force Reduction) in Europe as part of desire to reduce armaments. He also advocated broadest possible agreement at SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks).

"Kosygin responded that U.S.S.R. has always favored disarmament. He asserted that Soviet military budget was 25-27 per cent of U.S. military budget, and nothing was hidden in other parts of budget.

"He said Soviet noticed and 'appreciated' Senate's action in cutting military expenditures by six billion dollars. Soviet also noticed President's statement that military budget might have to be larger next year.

"Soviets 'follow these events closely,' said Kosygin. Specifically on SALT, Kosygin said both sides are approaching question differently, with 'great wariness and care' but 'with great desire of finding a solution in limiting strategic armaments.'"

Footnote: The hush-hush report noted that Muskie had emphasized the "unofficial character of his visit and fact he carried no message and was not negotiating any agreement."

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GARDEN CITY, N.Y.

NEWSDAY

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Drugs and the CIA

In her last two Viewpoints columns—the second of which appears today—Flora Lewis has reported some shocking revelations about the heroin trade in Indochina; shocking in part because they suggest a tacit tolerance if not connivance on the part of the CIA. At the same time she quotes CIA Director Richard Helms as indignantly denying the implication that his agency is engaged in smuggling dope.

We believe they are both right—though they appear to be contradicting each other. Flora Lewis is a serious and responsible journalist and Richard Helms is an honorable man doing a sometimes distasteful but necessary job (given the reality of international power politics).

We believe that heroin is going into Vietnam from Laos and Thailand but we also believe Mr. Helms when he says his people are not directly involved in this rotten business.

The problem, as Miss Lewis rightly concludes, “isn’t whether to blame the CIA for the drug traffic.” The problem stems from an immoral war that for too long has been punishing innocent Asians and corrupting well-intentioned Americans.

The New Opium War

by Frank Browning and Banning Garrett

"MR. PRESIDENT, THE SPECTER of heroin addiction is haunting nearly every community in the nation." With these urgent words, Senator Vance Hartke spoke up on March 2 in support of a resolution on drug control being considered in the U.S. Senate. Estimating that there are 500,000 heroin addicts in the U.S., he pointed out that nearly 20 percent of them are teenagers. The concern of Hartke and others is not misplaced. Heroin has become the major killer of young people between 18 and 35, outpacing death from accidents, suicides or cancer. It has also become a major cause of crime: to sustain their habits, addicts in the U.S. spend more than \$15 million a day, half of it coming from the 55 percent of crime in the cities which they commit and the annual \$2.5 billion worth of goods they steal.

Once safely isolated as part of the destructive funkiness of the black ghetto, heroin has suddenly spread out into Middle America, becoming as much a part of suburbia as the Saturday barbecue. This has gained it the attention it otherwise never would have had. President Nixon himself says it is spreading with "pandemic virulence." People are becoming aware that teenagers are shooting up at lunchtime in schools and returning to classrooms to nod the day away. But what they don't know—and what no one is telling them—is that neither the volcanic eruption of addiction in this country nor the crimes it causes would be possible without the age-old international trade in opium (from which heroin is derived), or that heroin addiction—like inflation, unemployment, and most of the other chaotic forces in American society today—is directly related to the U.S. war in Indochina.

The connection between war and opium in Asia is as old as empire itself. But the relationship has never been so symbiotic, so intricate in its networks and so vast in its implications. Never before has the trail of tragedy been so clearly marked as in the present phase of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. For the international traffic in opium has expanded in lockstep with the expanding U.S. military presence there, just as heroin has stalked the same young people in U.S. high schools who will also be called on to fight that war. The ironies that have accompanied the war in Vietnam since its onset are more poignant than before. At the very moment that public officials are wringing their hands over the heroin problem, Washington's own Cold War crusade, replete with clandestine activities that would seem far-fetched even in a spy novel, continues to play a major role in a process that has already rerouted the opium traffic from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and is every day opening new channels for its shipment to the U.S. At the same time the government starts crash programs to rehabilitate drug users

among its young people, the young soldiers it is sending to Vietnam are getting hooked and dying of overdoses at the rate of one a day. While the President is declaring war on narcotics and on crime in the streets, he is widening the war in Laos, whose principal product is opium and which has now become the funnel for nearly half the world's supply of the narcotic, for which the U.S. is the chief consumer.

There would have been a bloodthirsty logic behind the expansion of the war into Laos if the thrust had been to seize supply centers of opium the communists were hoarding up to spread like a deadly virus into the free world. But the communists did not control the opium there: processing and distribution were already in the hands of the free world. Who are the principals of this new opium war? The ubiquitous CIA, whose role in getting the U.S. into Vietnam is well known but whose pivotal position in the opium trade is not; and a rogue's gallery of organizations and people—from an opium army subsidized by the Nationalist Chinese to such familiar names as Madame Nhu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky—who are the creations of U.S. policy in that part of the world.

The story of opium in Southeast Asia is a strange one at every turn. But the conclusion is known in advance: this war has come home again—in a silky grey powder that goes from a syringe into America's mainline.

MOST OF THE OPIUM in Southeast Asia is grown in a region known as the "Fertile Triangle," an area covering northwestern Burma, northern Thailand, and Laos. It is a mountainous jungle inhabited by tigers, elephants, and some of the most poisonous snakes in the world. The source of the opium that shares the area with these exotic animals is the poppy, and the main growers are the Meo hill tribespeople who inhabit the region. The Meo men chop back the forests in the wet season so that the crop can be planted in August and September. Poppies produce red, white or purple blossoms between January and March, and when the blossom withers, an egg-sized pod is left. The women harvest the crop and make a small incision in the pod with a three-bladed knife. The pod exudes a white latex-like substance which is left to accumulate and thicken for a day or two. Then it is carefully gathered, boiled to remove gross impurities, and the sticky substance is rolled into balls weighing several pounds. A fraction of the opium remains to be smoked by the villagers, but most is sold in nearby rendezvous with the local smugglers. It is the Meos' only cash crop. The hill tribe growers can collect as much as \$50 per kilo, paid in gold, silver, various commodities, or local currency. The same kilo will bring \$200 in Saigon and \$2000 in San Francisco.

There are hundreds of routes, and certainly as many methods of transport by which the smugglers ship opium—