

29 SEP 1971

## CIA Seeks Men For Laotian War, McCloskey Says

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington -- Representative Paul N. McCloskey (R., Calif.) yesterday accused the Central Intelligence Agency of recruiting American mercenaries to fight in Laos.

The accusation was based on information from an electrical engineer who reported he was told at an Oakland (Calif.) employment agency that such jobs were available at \$1,000 a week.

### Not Verified

Mr. McCloskey, a critic of the administration's war policies who will challenge President Nixon in the New Hampshire primary, admitted he personally had not checked out the charge.

Independent inquiry suggested the incident indeed took place, but the employment agency president said he doubted whether his Oakland office manager, since fired, would have mentioned either mercenaries or the CIA.

Clarence C. Holben, of Lafayette, Calif., the engineer, insisted that he did.

Contacted at his home, Mr. Holben recalled visiting the Oakland office of Overseas Services in April or May and being told he could earn \$1,000 a week working for Air America, an ostensibly private airline operated by the CIA, handling logistical support for guerrilla operations in Laos.

### Worked At Laboratory

Until June 30, Mr. Holden was employed at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore which is run by the University of California.

Discouraged by the interviewer's comment that "I might come back in a box," Mr. Holben said he never asked for detailed job specifications but "got the picture of running around with a gun slung over your shoulder."

Richard Lester, president of the Los Angeles-based Overseas Services, said it was "unlikely any office manager would even know what Air America does for a living."

He said the company places about 1,000 persons a year in jobs in 134 countries. It has filled slots for Air America, he added, but only pilots and aviation technicians, not troops.

"McCloskey is blowing smoke," Mr. Lester added.

### Almost An Aside

Mr. McCloskey's charge was made at a breakfast meeting with reporters yesterday during which he criticized the administration for "concealment and deception" in its relations with Congress.

At one point, almost as an aside, he observed that "we caught the CIA in Oakland recruiting mercenaries to fight in Laos."

He seemed surprised when the reporters pressed him for details, conceding he had not followed through on the allegation because "it's so consistent with their [the CIA's] procedures."

It developed the information had been sent not to Mr. McCloskey but to Representative Jerome R. Waldie (D., Calif.) in a letter dated July 11 from a constituent who knew Mr. Holben.

A spokesman for Mr. Waldie said as far as the congressman was concerned, the letter contained "unverified information" and that he had turned it over to Mr. McCloskey for checking.

## C.I.A. IS ACCUSED BY REP. McCLOSKEY

Recruits U.S. Mercenaries  
for Laos, He Says

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 28—  
Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr. of California said today that the Central Intelligence Agency was recruiting Americans to become combat mercenaries in Laos.

"We caught the C.I.A. a couple of months ago recruiting people in Oakland," he said.

Officials of the intelligence agency privately dismissed the charge.

Mr. McCloskey, a candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination, made the allegation to reporters during a breakfast meeting at which he asserted that the Nixon Administration habitually engaged in "concealment and deception."

The charge was based on the account of a job-seeking engineer from California who told of being offered "\$1,000 a week and a box to come home in" when he answered a newspaper advertisement for overseas work. Mr. McCloskey conceded that he had not made an attempt to verify the allegation since learning of it in July.

The engineer, Clarence C. Holben of Lafayette, Calif., said in a telephone interview today that he went last April to the Oakland branch of Overseas Services, a Los Angeles-based job placement company, after finding that he was to be laid off by the Atomic Energy Commission's radiation laboratory in Livermore.

### Decided to Stay Home

He said that the branch manager had told him he could make "real money" if he would sign on with Air America, a flight charter company that works for the Intelligence Agency in Southeast Asia. Mr. Holben said he was told that if he took the job he would actually be working for the C.I.A. He added he turned down the chance because, "at 47 I can't visualize myself running around with grenades and

According to Mr. Holben, the job was only one of several suggested by Overseas Services, whose Oakland representative pointed out a number of places on a map and said, "we've even placed people at the [United States] Embassy in Moscow."

At the Oakland office of Overseas Services today, the present manager, Kenneth McDonald, said it was "news to me" and that he had "never seen anything for the C.I.A."

But Mr. McDonald, who took over the office only two weeks ago, said he could not discount the possibility that Mr. Holben's account was correct. He said that he himself once had sought a job as a pilot with Air America with the understanding that "they have some divisions that get a little rough once in a while." He said he was rejected because he wears glasses.

"I don't know what's wrong with McCloskey," Mr. McDonald added. "People are shooting at other people all over the world."

He said his predecessor in the Oakland office, whom he identified as Grant Bryan, was recently dismissed and could not be located. Richard Lester, president of Overseas Services, said he did not know where to find Mr. Bryan.

Mr. Lester said that his company had helped to place hundreds of pilots and technicians with Air America, one of 1,000 or more American companies to which his concern submits resumes for job applicants. "But never a mercenary," he said.

Officials of the C.I.A. declined to speak for the record, but one official commented privately of Mr. Holben and his account: "What would we do with mercenaries in Laos? All the fighting there is done by Meo tribesmen. Is he Meo tribesman?"

Mr. Holben's account was first related to Representative Jerome R. Waldie, Democrat of California, by a constituent acquainted with the engineer. Mr. Waldie passed it on to Mr. McCloskey.

Mr. Holben said that neither Congressman had got in touch with him. He added that reporters were lucky to find him today because he was leaving California tonight for a new job — running a sporting-goods store in Lake Havasu City, Ariz.

STATINTL

E - 634,371  
S - 701,743

SEP 29 1971

# Drug Addiction Afflicts Children Of U.S. Officials in Southeast Asia

By THOMAS MARLOWE  
Special to The Bulletin

Vientiane, Laos — Last spring, two American teen-aged dependents of foreign aid employees were caught mailing 20 kilograms of pure heroin through the Army Post Office here.

The drugs were destined for Saigon, to be picked up by other dependents for use or sale.

As a result, no one under 18 years of age is now allowed to mail anything larger than a letter through the Vientiane APO. Dependents over 13 can be prosecuted if caught mailing drugs.

Several days later, the son of an embassy official admitted confidentially that "I was all ready to mail 10 pounds of heroin to the States."

"I had it all packed and a buyer waiting at the other end," he said. "But it is just too risky now. The APO is checking every package."

Heroin and other drugs are not only deeply entrenched in the American military, but in much of the American civilian community in Southeast Asia.

## Centered in Compound

Among those who will probably return to the United States with a habit are American teen-aged dependents of civilian and military officials.

Many live at K-M6, a compound outside of Vientiane for American officials and their families. At the K-M6 high school one ninth-grader said:

"Almost everyone past the sixth grade smokes grass

here. A lot of the older kids are using speed and heroin."

The hard drug problem in Laos has its roots in the so-called "fertile triangle" which borders Burma and Thailand. More than half the world's poppy crop is harvested there each year.

## Problem in Thailand

The poppies are harvested primarily by Meo tribesmen.

Some of the opium is reported to find its way to the secret Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Cheng,

where it is said to be transported via planes of the CIA-subsidized Air America to Bangkok, Saigon, Hong Kong, and even San Francisco.

Americans in Laos are not the only ones hit with the spreading drug problem. In Thailand, at least one American student at the Bangkok International School died from an overdose of narcotics during the past school year, and 14 others were expelled for drug usage.

"Those were only the constant violators," explained one student. "You know, the kids who go into the bathrooms and shoot up between classes."

The psychiatric ward at Bangkok's 5th field hospital has grown accustomed to American dependents.

## Little Girls, Too

"There's almost always a 13- or 14-year-old kid in there for smack," a medic said. "They usually bring them in at night and give them a urine test in the morning."

A hospital psychologist said:

"It hurts when a 12- or 13-year-old girl is brought in with an overdose. I've seen little girls with needle marks on their arms. Their parents often cry and want to know why."

To support their habits, or just to make money, some kids sell drugs. They rationalize that "somebody will do it, why not me?"

Shortly after last Christmas, the 17-year-old son of a U. S. foreign aid employe was shot to death in a Bangkok alley.

"He had not," according to one of his former associates, "paid his Thai supplier the full amount for the last shipment (of heroin) he received."

28 SEP 1971

# CIA Recruiting Mercenaries For Laos, McCloskey Says

By PAUL HOPE  
Star Staff Writer

Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr., charged today that the Central Intelligence Agency is recruiting American mercenaries to fight in Laos.

McCloskey, a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, also accused the Nixon administration of practicing "concealment and deception" and claimed that "truth in government" is a major issue in his campaign.

The California congressman indicated, however, that if he does "poorly" in the nation's first primary in New Hampshire March 7, he will drop out of the race.

He said it would be "absurd" to ask people to give him financial support if he does not make an acceptable showing there.

## Doubts About Nixon

McCloskey indicated he would be hard-put to support President Nixon as the Republican nominee. He said there is little evidence to indicate that Nixon in-

tends to withdraw all U.S. troops from Vietnam or to discontinue all American bombing in Southeast Asia.

He made the charge against the CIA while discussing Nixon's policy with a group of reporters.

"We caught the CIA in Oakland recruiting mercenaries to fight in Laos," he said.

Pressed to explain that, he said he had received a letter from a "constituent" — an unemployed aerospace engineer who was offered \$1,000 a week to fight in Laos.

When his office produced the letter, it turned out to be one to Rep. Jerome R. Waldie, D-Calif., with whom McCloskey recently made a visit to South-

## Second-Hand Report

The letter was not from the engineer whom the CIA reportedly had tried to recruit but from another Californian who was relaying the incident to Waldie.

The letter writer, Donald H. Fibush of Walnut Creek, identi-

fied the man as Clarence C. Holben of Lafayette, Calif.

The letter, dated July 11, said in part:

"Do you know that 'Air America,' an arm of CIA, is hiring mercenaries to fight in Laos at \$1,000 per week for each mercenary?"

"I just learned about this a couple of weeks ago. A friend of mine is an engineer and one of the many long-term employes of the rad lab at Livermore who were laid off July 1.

"In looking for employment he answered an ad of an employment agency, Overseas Services, 1939 Harrison St., Oakland, and they offered him the employment as a mercenary in Laos paying '\$1,000 per week plus the box to bring him back.'

"... Today I telephoned him for verification and told him I would like to inform you. Even though he is somewhat a conservative Republican, he has been a strong dove for four or five years...

"I hope that you and/or McCloskey, at your instigation, will verify this information and use it to the fullest extent."

## Investigation Sought

McCloskey said he has "asked a field representative to go over" and investigate the matter but that he hasn't done it yet.

"This is the first time I've ever heard of hiring mercenaries by ad," McCloskey said.

"It draws attention to the fact that Congress says there shall be no American ground combat troops in Laos. It raises the question of whether the CIA can recruit an army (and) at what point does an army of irregulars become an American army... At what stage does the CIA get authorized to fight a private war."

STATINTL



BALTIMORE, MD.

SUN

M - 164,621

E - 189,871

S - 323,624

SEP 27 1971

# DOVES AWAIT AID MEASURE

## Senators Likely To Use Bill For Policy Amendments

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington -- When Congress sent the draft bill to the White House last week Senate doves lost what seemed to be an ideal vehicle for foreign policy amendments, but an even better one is on its way: foreign aid.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has the foreign aid bill bottled up for the moment because of a fight with the administration over information, but Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), the chairman, has said the panel will report out a bill eventually.

### "Christmas Tree" Bill

When it does come out, however, the expectation is that there will be a number of "hookers" in it, possibly even an amendment to cut off funds for the war in Vietnam. In any case, committee sources acknowledge that the foreign aid bill will be a "Christmas tree," ornamented with amendments to affect foreign policy and to increase congressional influence in the field.

The administration considers the foreign aid bill vital, particularly the portions affecting Southeast Asia. The \$3.3 billion authorization bill contains \$565 million for Vietnam and \$201 million for Cambodia, Laos and Thailand in economic supporting assistance. It contains an additional \$209 million in military aid for Cambodia (military aid to Vietnam, Laos and Thailand, is contained in the Defense budget.

But there is growing opposition to foreign aid in Congress, and many members--including both liberals and conservatives--would not be adverse to seeing the entire program terminated. Thus the Senate--more loaded with foreign policy activity than the House--could present the House and the administra-

take-it-or-leave-it basis.

The bill to extend the draft gave Senate liberals a similar, though weaker, strategic position.

At least 30 senators were willing to suspend the draft and to hold the bill as hostage for a strong anti-war national policy, including a nine-month deadline for total U.S. withdrawal from Indochina.

They held up the draft bill for 2½ months after the selective service law expired, but finally lost the fight in the face of intensive pressure put on by the administration, which asserted that the Senate was jeopardizing national security.

It is doubtful that the administration can exert as much pressure in behalf of foreign aid. President Nixon, himself, de-emphasized foreign aid when he included in his latest economic recovery package a 10 per cent cut in the program.

Public opinion polls have shown that this cut in foreign aid was the most popular of the steps taken by the President. Thus there is not likely to be any backlash from delaying action on a foreign aid bill.

Those contemplating ornaments for the foreign aid bill include the McGovern-Hatfield forces, who favor cutting off funds for the Vietnam war at a certain time, even though the Senate has already rejected the funds cut-off approach on several occasions.

Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the majority leader, has said he intended to reintroduce an amendment to force a reduction in the U.S. troop level in Europe. He failed in his attempt to attach such a rider to the draft bill, but in view of the increasing deterioration of the U.S. economic position in the world, Mr. Mansfield has indicated he will try again.

While the majority leader is leaving his options open, the most obvious vehicle for a troop-cut amendment seems to be the foreign aid bill.

Besides the majority leader, Senator Fulbright, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, also has his irons in the fire.

For example, he will try in committee to amend the foreign aid bill to require annual authorization for the State Department budget as well as that for the United States Informa-

tion Agency. At present only appropriations bills are needed annually for these agencies and such bills are outside the Foreign Relations Committee's jurisdiction.

### Budget Approval

Mr. Fulbright has noted that one reason that the Armed Services Committees wield such influence with the Pentagon is that they must approve its budget annually.

The committee is also likely to tighten provisions in the foreign aid law that provides for an automatic funds cut off if the executive branch refuses to provide certain information.

At present, the President can waive the requirement by simply stating his reasons for not providing the requested information.

Last month, Mr. Nixon withheld a five-year plan on military aid from the Foreign Relations Committee on the ground that it was a tentative internal document.

### Other Provisions

There are numerous other provisions for presidential discretion that are likely to come under attack.

For example, the President can now shift up to 10 per cent of the funds in any one category of foreign aid to another, and he has special authority to use up to \$250 million to help a country that is "important to the security of the United States" and is "a victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression."

These provisions in the law, according to committee sources, allowed the administration to give military aid last year to Cambodia, deepening the U.S. commitment to the defense of Indochina without specific congressional authorization.

The committee is also expected to endorse the House action of cutting off military aid to Greece and Pakistan, but will probably remove the escape clause that allows continued aid to Greece if the President decides that the national security of the United States requires it.

### Floating Around

Other foreign policy proposals are floating around Congress and could eventually find a home in the foreign aid bill. They include legislation to restrict the President's war-making powers, to require publication of the total CIA budget, to ban the CIA from engaging in military operations, to make CIA intelligence data available to Congress and to place a ceiling on U.S. expenditures in Laos.

While these proposals are not directly related to foreign aid, the Senate does not usually balk at attaching riders to bills simply because they are unrelated to the subject matter.

STATINTL

# The Nonwar War

By HERBERT MITGANG

The uncontested nonelection next Sunday for the South Vietnamese presidency has its counterpart in creative fantasy for over 200,000 Americans there: from the Delta to the DMZ and beyond they are shooting and being shot at in an unofficially undeclared nonwar.

The biggest public relations triumph of the Administration thus far is planting the impression that, like Pan Am's commercial, President Nixon is making the going great. He told Congress and the country this month about "our success in winding down the war" but, skeptical Senators and Vietnam-watchers say, he has only succeeded in winding down persistent opposition to the war.

This year the casualties and body counts have dropped sharply but the going is slow, costly, still perilous and pegged to politics. Senator Mansfield's original amendment to the draft-extension law calling for a nine-month troop withdrawal deadline was weakened into phrasing that is open-ended. The only "date certain" for withdrawal there is considered to be the '72 election here.

It was not Mao but Confucius who said that the best way to leave is simply by going through the door. But the revived fury of United States aerial strikes in the last fortnight indicates that our exit is through the bomb bays.

The air war is very costly in human and financial terms. A year ago about 5,000 American planes (1,000 fixed-wing and 4,000 helicopters) were operating over Indochina. There are still 3,500 American planes (500 fixed-wing, 3,000 helicopters) in action today. One and at times two aircraft carriers are in coastal waters. Plane losses by hostile fire and accidents have been heavy: more than 3,300 fixed-wing and more than 4,500 helicopters in the war up to now.

Nor has the theater of combat been narrowed in this twilight time of disengagement. Five states are still directly involved. Thailand remains the base of operations for B-52 missions; Laos and Cambodia are regularly interdicted to hinder the enemy's supply system; North Vietnam above the demilitarized zone is photographed by reconnaissance planes and struck by fighter-bombers on "protective reaction" missions; South Vietnam is one big free-fire zone when required to bail out Saigon's soldiers.

In the semantic acrobatics of the Vietnam war, "protective reaction" strikes against military installations and missile and fuel sites have been stressed. But far more dangerous

in the future are the actions behind two less-familiar phrases: "pre-emptive attack" against troop infiltration on the trails and "ancillary effect" bombing—meaning, in support of South Vietnamese forces. When ARVN troops retreated from a Cambodian town a few months ago, under heavy United States air cover, Gen. Creighton Abrams remarked, "Dammit, they've got to learn they can't do it all with air. If they don't, it's all been in vain."

In this withdrawal phase of Vietnamization, American troops are supposed to be in a defensive posture. On-the-ground combat responsibilities now belong to the ARVN; it is their turn to search-and-destroy and carry the fight. But an Air Force colonel explains, "Consistent with this concept we support ARVN ground operations with air and artillery. Both B-52's and tactical fighter-bombers have been involved." In these operations the American Air Force's role is restricted to "air logistical support and close air support."

Translated into what has taken place this month alone, the clear implication of these terms seems to be that American "advisers" and fliers are very much part of offensive actions. They have been engaged in a two-front war in September: carrying South Vietnamese infantrymen into battle deep in the Mekong Delta 145 miles southwest of Saigon and backing them up with helicopter gunships; bombing in the southern panhandle of Laos in direct support of Royal Lao forces and C.I.A.-trained guerrilla battalions. These activities hardly accord with the periodic announcements from Washington about "winding down the war" through Vietnamization.

It is difficult to predict what American casualties will be in the next twelvemonth of nonwar if no settlement is achieved in the Paris talks (and the Administration shows no eagerness to advance the prospect of a settlement there). The present rate of fewer than 100 killed a month is an encouraging drop but it could go up or down, depending not on American-originated actions but on the support given to sustain the governments of client states. The United States has become their hostages militarily.

The probability at this point is that the Air Force activity will be kept at a steady level. Two years ago there were 1,800 sorties (one aircraft on one mission) a month; currently the monthly rate is 1,000. It has gone up in Southeast Asia today—for fuel and bombs alone—is between \$35,000 and

\$45,000. Multiplied, this comes to more than \$35 million a month.

Many moribund national programs—for education, housing, employment, parklands—could be revived by the hundreds of millions of dollars now falling out of the bomb bays on South-east Asia. Perhaps a more meaningful local measure, even though Federal funds are not directly involved, is to compare just the financial costs of the B-52 bombings with what it would take to reopen the main branch of the New York Public Library evenings (\$350,000), Saturdays (\$350,000) and Sundays and holidays (\$200,000) for a full year.

A few nonflying days, not to mention peace, would do it.

*Herbert Mitgang is a member of the editorial board of The Times.*

27 SEP 1971

# Policy Shift Reported on U.S. Bombing in Laos

By D.E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Sept. 26 —

U.S. bombing in most of Laos is no longer subject to prior approval by the U.S. embassy in Vientiane, according to American government sources.

Instead, final say in the choice of most targets has been shifted to the U.S. Air Force's tactical headquarters at Udorn, Thailand, these sources say. The principal exceptions are major populated areas of Laos and targets adjacent to China, according to the sources.

In most other cases, the embassy reviews the targets only after bombing, they say, by checking "after-action" reports from Udorn.

The sources say that this appears to be a major bombing-policy shift in Laos, although embassy spokesmen in Vientiane deny knowledge of such a shift in targeting methods or policy. There has been no public announcement of any shift in policy in recent weeks.

Reports that there has been a major change in bombing policy in Laos follow continued reports of bitter disputes at higher echelons over target-selection methods and delays in decisions affecting operations in this country.

Tactical and operation quarters of the American command, including the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency, have long contended that they need greater decision-making authority for quick and decisive response to targets of opportunity which, they say, under the previous system often managed to slip away.

Previous practice was out-

lined in the Moose-Lowenstein report released by the Symington Senate subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad on Aug. 3. That report, widely regarded as authoritative, outlined earlier changes in U.S. operations in Laos, including bombing.

According to the report, although there were prevalidated targets in Laos, or "free-fire zones," most targets required prior approval from the U.S. embassy here after being proposed by a committee meeting at Udorn Airbase, Thailand.

Under the old method, the list of targets was previewed by a junior foreign service officer and a U.S. Air Force sergeant in Vientiane under advisement of a member of the embassy's air attache office, usually the same office who attended the committee meetings at Udorn.

The "bombing officer," as he came to be known, could delete targets proposed for bombing or, in special cases, pass the decision upward in the embassy for higher approval.

The Udorn targeting committee is composed of representatives from the ambassador's office in Vientiane, military attaches from Vientiane, the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Air Force headquarters in Saigon and Udorn.

Sources say that the Udorn targeting committee remains functional, but that it is no longer required to submit all targets to Vientiane for prevalidation since it now has authority to bomb in most cases.

No area-size limitation of Laos requiring specific ap-

proval for bombing is known, but reliable estimates place it at perhaps less than 20 per cent of the country's area.

"After-action" reports are now reviewed daily and mapped by the bombing officer, according to the government sources. He sets aside those he finds "suspicious," reviewing the questionable targets weekly and requesting aerial photographs of those still believed questionable.

Photographs are routinely provided, the sources say, although there is no means of checking their authenticity.

The sources also say that every U.S. overflight of Laotian territory is reported to the embassy in Vientiane, including those over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Embassy spokesmen have consistently denied in the past that such information is available to them, directing newsmen's questions to Saigon.

Introduction of forward air guides as an important element in bomb-targeting — guides lead airplanes to targets from the ground — is seen here as an adjunct to any justification for the reported new system.

Having a man on the ground directly observing a target and evaluating its military significance theoretically makes the rules of engagement more foolproof.

As reported by Moose-Lowenstein, however, the majority of forward air guides are of Thai origin with the remainder professional Lao soldiers. Both groups, according to Westerners who have talked with them, seem unclear in their attitudes toward the distinctions between military and civilian targets.

27 SEP 1971

*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

# U.S. and the Agony of Laos

VIENTIANE, Laos—Dark apprehension inside the Royal Lao government over this country's future stems from the questioned credibility of the Nixon doctrine in protecting small Asian states from Communist aggression.

The facts are brutally simple: This small kingdom can maintain its sovereignty against invading North Vietnamese troops only with continued U.S. military aid. But that aid is being reduced under Washington's budgetary pressures. Far worse, Lao officials live in daily dread that the U.S. Congress—if not this year, then next—will effectively end military aid here and thereby throttle resistance to the invaders.

Apprehension in Laos, then, tends to confirm the worst suspicions about the Nixon doctrine when first enunciated in 1969: That it is not really a system for helping Asian countries wishing to defend themselves but is a cosmetic covering American withdrawal from Asia. Fear grows in this capital that Laos may lose its independence as the price of American disillusionment over mistakes in Vietnam.

CERTAINLY, Laos fully meets Nixon doctrine specifications. The problem is not ineffective Communist Pa-

thet Lao guerrillas but four divisions of North Vietnamese regulars. To resist them, Laos receives from Washington neither American troops nor the lavish multi-billion-dollar spending still maintained in Vietnam but a lean, dedicated cadre of professional military advisers from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and a \$375 million ceiling on annual aid.

There is no realistic diplomatic alternative. Hanoi's Pathet Lao puppets will not even admit the existence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos, making negotiations impossible. In truth, Hanoi properly views Laos as part of the overall Indochina war. That means a peaceful settlement here short of capitulation by the Vientiane government is impossible without a settlement in Vietnam itself.

Given such bleak diplomatic prospects, there is doubt how long Laos can hang on with American aid. Defense Minister Sisouk na Chamassak told us frankly he questions whether resistance can last even two or three more years because of the attrition of Lao manpower.

But American aid is steadily diminishing. Whereas the war in Vietnam is still fought essentially without dollar ceilings, this is a pinch-penny struggle where

every military operation has a budget limit.

THE RESULT: Lao troops are badly outgunned. Only 40 per cent of Lao guerrilla forces, the country's most effective units, have M-16 automatic rifles. Sorties by U.S. Air Force jets have been drastically reduced. Only two new T-28 propeller-driven bombers arrive for the Royal Lao air force each month, an inadequate replacement rate. Washington refuses to supply tanks against Soviet armor increasingly used by North Vietnamese units. Nor are any armored personnel carriers or M-60 machine guns supplied.

Congressional reductions of this threadbare level could stifle resistance to the North Vietnamese. In particular, a congressional proposal to ban U.S. payment of salaries for some 5,500 volunteer troops from Thailand would be fatal. Its own manpower base depleted, Laos could not have survived in 1971 without Thai army units.

The fact that American liberals are outraged by 5,500 invited Thai troops and ignore 57,000 invading North Vietnamese is part of the topsy-turvy reasoning which rightfully baffles the Lao government. Similarly, shamefully erroneous reports of systematic Ameri-

can bombing of Lao villages caused an uproar in Washington, which ignores certifiable devastation of villages by Communist mortars.

SELF-IMPOSED bombing restrictions were dramatized during the recent recapture of Paksong from the North Vietnamese. Hovering over the battle in a helicopter some 2½ hours, we watched U.S. and Lao bombers carefully exclude the town from attack even though Lao troops were being butchered by North Vietnamese mortars intentionally set up in the center of Paksong.

Facing uncertain support from Washington, high Lao officials desperately place their hopes—almost surely unfounded—on President Nixon's visit to Peking somehow resolving the Vietnam war and, with it, the agony of Laos.

Therefore, the future of Laos depends upon American help, whether it be military or diplomatic. Ngon Sahanikone, Minister of Public Works and Transport, puts it poignantly. "We are a small country dependent upon the great powers for our fate," he told us. "We chose to put our fate in the hands of the United States." In Vientiane, officials now fear that choice may have been tragically in error for this country's future.

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## Drumfire on China

It is a topsy-turvy world when Premier Chou En-lai rebukes James Reston for having said the President lacks courage: "Deciding to come to China at this time is something which even the opposition party says others dare not do. So on this point he has some courage." How much courage it will take has yet to be fully determined. The new China policy was roundly rejected by the AFL-CIO executive council, 24 to 4 with two abstentions, while the American Legion has given it grudging approval on the express condition that no concessions are made by our side.

Anyone who rejects political acts because of the possible motives behind them had better avoid politics altogether. No doubt the President was fully aware of the domestic gains in his announcement, although we can hardly believe that he thought they could outweigh the gut issue: the domestic economy. More to the point is Chou's remark: Nobody thought the old China lobby amounted to much anymore. But the White House needed no Geiger counter to alert it to hostile right-wing reaction. The Vice-President's celebrated midnight remarks last April against the first flush of "ping-pong diplomacy" provided the modern instant communications counterpart to Paul Revere's ride. Immediately after the trip announcement in July, twelve conservatives, headed by William F. Buckley, announced suspension of "support" for Nixon, and a few weeks ago delegates representing 67,000 Young Americans for Freedom voted to dump Nixon, in part because the trip will threaten "the national sovereignty of the United States." The antics of the Rev. Carl McIntyre with his Taiwan table tennis team raise little more than smiles from sophisticated infighters. But in Middle America confusion and concern can become bitter hatred if properly aroused. Toward this end various reactionary revivalists of the early 1950's witchhunt are once again on the conspiracy trail. This time they can move against the background of an admitted betrayer of secrets, Daniel Ellsberg, as compared with the earlier accused but unproven "traitor," Alger Hiss.

Recently a Detroit FM station carried four hours of telephone interviews with a young American scholar on China. The moderator claimed no other program had evoked so many responses. The angry callers seemed awakened from a 20-years' sleep, so obsessed were they by the McCarran hearings, the Institute of Pacific Relations, and alleged Communist affiliations of such personages as Professor John K. Fairbank and Henry Kissinger. But these long-dormant memories did not spontaneously spring to life; they are cultivated. Visitors to San Clemente heard first-hand of the "hate Henry" campaign that is being waged in many localities in an effort to embarrass the President's trip through his emissary.

ciate the ignorance and fear that can be exploited against China. In this regard he faces a much tougher fight than did President Roosevelt in moving to recognize the Soviet Union in 1933. American business had built Russian factories. American journalists and tourists had traveled throughout that country. A positive subliminal image of Russia had established aesthetic and humanistic ties through intimate familiarity with Tchaikowsky and Rachmaninoff, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. The savagery of civil war and foreign intervention against the new Soviet state had been followed with the Hoover relief missions.

No such counterforce exists on the China question. The bitter heritage of two wars, Korea and Vietnam, fuses in American perceptions as the product of Chinese Communist aggression. Total isolation from the mainland for 20 years combines with the most remote and random newsreel images of the previous decades, broken only by the familiar figures of a sturdy little generalissimo and his striking Wellesley-educated wife.

New versions of old tales fuel opposition fires. On the day Senator Proxmire's Joint Economic Committee heard three prominent professors attack secret subversion against the mainland conducted jointly by the Chinese Nationalists and the CIA, Senator Eastland released a study by Professor Richard L. Walker which estimated that between 34 and 60 million Chinese died over the past 50 years as a result of Communist activity. Walker included all the intermittent civil wars of 1927-49 as well as wholly unsubstantiated and unverifiable figures from every kind of source, including Radio Moscow. Another hate-China theme focuses on drugs. A few days after the Eastland report came a headline-grabbing story from Saigon. According to an alleged "high-level defector" out of North Vietnam, poppy fields in that country are so large it takes a harvesting tractor one whole day to cover a single planting. The produce is secretly processed in China, he said, and smuggled out through Hong Kong. Interestingly the defector admitted he had not revealed this information when first interviewed a year ago, claiming it had not seemed important then. Its importance now was obvious since only the previous week, two detailed accounts—one by the Associated Press Pulitzer prize winner, Peter Arnett, and another in *The New York Times*, had traced the Asian drug traffic to specific villages on the Burma-Thai border. From there it moves over land and air routes to South Vietnam, with the certain knowledge if not connivance of Thai and South Vietnamese officials. No matter that the *Far Eastern Economic Review* states unequivocally that Hong Kong is not a conduit for drugs from mainland China, or that the US Narcotics Bureau lays no charge against the People's Republic of China, such as it does against Turkey, Iran and a host of other countries.

We see no evidence of an all-out US campaign at and thereby block

Mr. Nixon needs only to call his bluff. Approved For Release 2001/09/10 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600160001-1

Continued

*Cf. Curran, Barbara, Unavailability of Lawyer's Services for Low Income Persons, 4 Val.U.L.R. 308 (Sp. '69).*

<sup>85</sup> Jerome J. Shestack, a practicing lawyer in Philadelphia, is immediate past Chairman of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, a member of the National Advisory Committee to the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and a member of the Executive Committee of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.

<sup>86</sup> Shestack, Jerome J., "The Right to Legal Services," *The Rights of Americans: What They Are; What They Should Be* (Dorsen ed., Pamphlet, 1971) at page 126.

President has not made a final decision on whether or not to exclude these four countries from the cut in foreign aid. There is still time for Members of Congress to contact the President and urge him not to further feed the already fattened cows who have not cracked down on their merchants of death.

It is about time we stop bringing gifts to our allies when they are murdering American servicemen.

Four articles follow:

[From the New York Times, Sept. 12, 1971]

**FOUR INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES ARE REPORTED EXEMPT FROM NIXON'S ORDER TO CUT FOREIGN AID BY 10 PERCENT**

(By Tad Szulc)

WASHINGTON.—South Vietnam and three other Southeast Asian countries are being quietly exempted from the 10 per cent cut in foreign economic aid ordered by President Nixon last month, authoritative Administration officials said today.

The Administration has made no public announcement that economic assistance planned for Southeast Asia for the fiscal year 1972, which began July 1, is to remain intact despite the cut in the foreign-aid program. Official spokesmen have insisted for the last four weeks that no decision has been made.

Total economic aid, designed to complement United States military assistance, has been set for \$765.5-million this year for South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.

The largest slice is to go to South Vietnam with \$565-million, which is an increase of about \$160-million over economic aid given Saigon in the previous fiscal year.

Officials noted that in announcing his new economic policy on Aug. 15, Mr. Nixon confined himself to the statement that "I have ordered a 10 per cent cut in foreign economic aid."

The Administration's request to Congress for foreign assistance in fiscal 1972, prepared before the new Nixon economic policy, was \$3.3-billion. But the President ordered the cut only in economic aid, which accounts for \$2.09-billion of the total. The balance, \$1.21-billion, is earmarked for military grants and foreign military credit sales.

Inasmuch as Mr. Nixon did not elaborate on how the economic aid reduction should be administered, the interpretation now being placed on his order is that the cuts should be applied selectively, according to officials.

This means, they said, that the Administration is free to cut aid for some countries but not for others as long as the economic assistance package is reduced 10 per cent.

Officials concerned with United States policy in Southeast Asia indicated in private conversations that economic assistance to the four "critical" Southeast Asia countries could not be reduced while the war goes on.

They said that the White House took the view that cuts could undermine the economies in the four countries and hurt the conduct of the war.

Therefore, officials said, aid programs in the region are proceeding on the assumption that no cuts will be made unless Congress decides otherwise.

Foreign-aid legislation was approved by the House of Representatives last month and is now before Senate committees.

Officials suggested that the Administration preferred not to publicize the reported exemptions to avoid protests from other nations.

Another reason may be concern over opinion here. President Nguyen Van Thieu has come under considerable criticism for his decision to run unopposed in the Oct. 3 Presidential elections and there has been talk in Congress of reviewing the American assistance to South Vietnam.

The Administration believes, however, that increased economic aid to South Vietnam is vital at a time when American forces are withdrawing and last year's economic reforms are beginning to produce results.

Testifying before a Senate subcommittee on Wednesday, Secretary of State William P. Rogers asked for approval for the full \$665-million for South Vietnam is needed to offset the economic impact of the reduction in United States military expenditures as our troops are withdrawn.

Economic assistance to South Vietnam ranges from the financing of essential imports to agricultural land reform to programs for education, and health. But it also includes support for the South Vietnamese police in counterinsurgency and other activities.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 9, 1971]

**HEROIN PROMOTION**

(By Jack Anderson)

WASHINGTON.—At the same time that the U.S. command is striving mightily to stop GI drug addiction in Vietnam, a top South Vietnamese general has been using U.S. military equipment to hustle heroin. This is documented in a number of intelligence reports, all highly classified, which have now reached Washington from Saigon. The reports nail Lt. Gen. Ngo Dzu, military commander of South Vietnam's central highlands, as one of the chief heroin traffickers in Southeast Asia.

The incriminating details, including dates and places of heroin transactions, have been reported by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division, U.S. Public Safety Directorate, and Rural Development Support Team in South Vietnam.

Dzu's accomplices are also named, including a former South Vietnamese Senator, a Chinese businessman from Cholon, the South Vietnamese provost marshal in Qui Nhon, and several South Vietnamese navy officers.

Dzu was first named a heroin dealer by Rep. Robert Steele (R-Conn.), in testimony last July before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee. The Congressman told of his fact-finding mission to Indochina where, he said, widespread corruption among officials had blocked efforts to halt the heroin traffic.

The day after Steele's testimony, South Vietnam's President Thieu went through the motions of ordering a narcotics investigation. It's doubtful, however, that Dzu will ever be tried and convicted.

One of Dzu's most vigorous defenders was his senior American advisor, John Paul Vann, who assured the press: "There's no information available to me that in any shape, manner, or fashion would substantiate the charges Congressman Steele has made."

The incriminating intelligence reports would indicate that Vann either was woefully incompetent or, worse, was helping Dzu to cover up his dope-smuggling operations.

The first intelligence report linking Dzu to the heroin trade was filed on January 6, 1971, by the CID. Citing highly sensitive sources, the CID charged that the narcotics traffic in the Central Highlands had increased tremendously, since Dzu had taken command of the region in September, 1970. The CID's sources asserted that Dzu not only protected the key traffickers who kicked back part of their profits to him but also took a direct part in the smuggling through his father Ngo Khoung. At that time Ngo Khoung was described as an "important" heroin dealer.

It was also alleged that Dzu often used his personal plane—furnished, of course, by the U.S.—to smuggle heroin. A CID report dated May 12, 1971, told how Dzu and his father took ingenious advantage of the funeral of a South Vietnamese general in Saigon to fly in heroin from the highlands.

Yet General Dzu, a power in South Vietnam, is expected to be given a whitewash. In

**WHY ARE WE PAYING OUR FRIENDS TO CONTINUE KILLING OUR CHILDREN?**

**HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 23, 1971

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, the press has recently reported that President Nixon may exempt South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand from his announced 10-percent cut in economic aid.

Official figures reveal that between 5.7 and 14 percent of our servicemen returning from duty in Southeast Asia are drug dependent.

The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs has reported that at least 80 percent of the world's opium is produced in Southeast Asia. Two of those four countries—Laos and Thailand—are part of the "fertile triangle" which raises more than half of the poppy plants grown in the world.

The Criminal Investigation Division of the U.S. Army has allegedly compiled reports linking top South Vietnamese leaders to the heroin trade. Lt. Gen. Ngo Dzu, military commander of South Vietnam's central highlands, and other military and naval personnel and Government officials are leading figures in the narcotics traffic that preys upon American servicemen in Southeast Asia.

There have also been reports that the Central Intelligence Agency is supplying arms, transportation, and funds to drug-producing hill tribes in Laos and north-eastern Thailand.

The governments of these four countries have failed to take decisive action to stop the production, processing, and transport of illicit drugs for our GIs. While we continue to expend billions of dollars and thousands of American lives to defend and support these friendly governments, they continue to kill our servicemen.

These are the governments that President Nixon may exempt from his cut in economic assistance. These are the accomplices to murder whom the President may reward.

The administration has even requested an increase in economic aid to South Vietnam of between \$150 to \$160 million. The Thieu government may get even fatter if President Nixon has his way.

My most recent inquiry to the Agency for International Development in the Department of State indicates that the

23 SEP 1971

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*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

## Grim Showdown in Laos

LONGTIENG, Laos—Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, a great guerrilla leader now shackled by Washington, may soon take his irregular army of Meo tribesmen out of the Laos war—an event of catastrophic dimensions, certainly for Laos and perhaps for all Indochina.

In his mountain headquarters at Longtieng, Vang Pao told us that he is nearing the end of the line. If the U.S. government does not let him resume his offensive in the last remaining month of the monsoon season, he cannot defend the Plain of Jars north of here once the North Vietnamese invaders begin their annual dry season offensive. But this time, he said, he will not fall back, as in past years, to defend Longtieng. Instead, he will lead his army and the Meo people out of the war and perhaps out of Laos.

"If we go, Laos is dead," Vang Pao told us bluntly. It is no exaggeration. Abandoning Longtieng would mean losing nearly all northern Laos, quite possibly leading to capitulation by the government in Vientiane—a decisive victory for Hanoi in the generation-long Indochina war. No longer would four of its divisions be pinned down in Laos; no longer could the United States bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos with permission of the Vientiane government.

In Vientiane, optimists believe that Vang Pao will be talked into defending Longtieng once again. But the chances are no better than 50-50, thanks principally to the inconstancy of Washington policy under pressure from the neo-isolationist peace bloc in Congress. Having been promised abundant military aid by a self-confident U.S. government in the early 1960s in return for resisting the Communists, Vang Pao now finds that solemn commitment gradually whittled down.

LONGTIENG was menaced by the Communist invaders the past two dry seasons, surviving last winter when volunteer army units arrived from Thailand. But once last spring's monsoons began, Vang Pao broke out in guerrilla-style flanking actions to recapture the Plain of Jars. He was then ordered to press eastward by King Savang Vatthana and Prince Souvanna Phouma, the prime minister.

Indeed, tactical errors by North Vietnamese commanders gave Vang Pao the opportunity for a major outflanking of the enemy. That, he reasoned, would push the North Vietnamese far enough eastward to make the Plain of Jars safe for settlement by Meo tribes who for years have lived off

U.S. food drops in refugee camps.

Then came Washington's order: go no farther. At U.S. request, the prime minister also asked Vang Pao to slow down. But, in fact, Washington's wish was a self-enforcing command. Vang Pao's army, trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, depends on U.S. military aid. The overt reason for Washington's order was a highly dubious argument by U.S. policymakers that Vang Pao would somehow provoke Hanoi and blight pie-in-the-sky possibilities for negotiations. However, the underlying reason was official Washington's willing before incessant congressional attacks against fulfilling commitments to Laos.

With his guerrillas now forced into untenable fixed positions, internal pressures are mounting on Vang Pao. Meo elders tell him they will not spend another dry season defending Longtieng and want to migrate to Sayaboury in western Laos or, if necessary, cross the frontier into Thailand.

BEYOND THAT, his army is terribly tired and understrength, actually 4,000 below its paper strength of 10,200 (including many teen-aged boys). In a tragic case of genocide ignored by American liberals, the young Meo manhood has

been destroyed by the North Vietnamese.

Still, Meo guerrillas would revive if Washington unleashed Vang Pao. A case in point is Group Mobile 21, a Meo unit we visited on the Plain of Jars. Its 27-year-old commander, Lt. Col. Tong Long, bone weary and suffering from malaria, told us that his men's morale collapsed last June after the Americans halted their progress. But even now, he added, they would eagerly take the offensive if it meant a new home for the Meos.

Everybody knows Meo guerrillas cannot hold defensive positions. So, volunteer Thai infantry and artillery, superbly equipped and stolid defensive fighters, have dug in on the Plain of Jars to try keeping the North Vietnamese winter offensive from driving down to Longtieng again.

But while Thai artillery will take a heavy toll of North Vietnamese troops, the consensus here is that it cannot hold the Plain of Jars against Communist reinforcements. Then will come Vang Pao's fateful decision whether to lead 250,000 Meos out of these mountains. If he does, the blame for the Communist triumph must be placed neither in Longtieng nor Vientiane, but in Washington.

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THE WASHINGTON TIMES  
20 SEP 1971

# WAR OF WORDS

## The House in the Alley: CIA 'Ears' in Asia

BY JACK FOISIE  
Times Staff Writer

BANGKOK—In a strange house in an alley off Soi 39 (39th St.) here, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency produces documents that quite often end up in the hands of fishmongers as wrapping paper.

The house, with faded green walls, red-tiled roof and surrounded by a corrugated tin fence of forbidding height, is conspicuous by its shabbiness in an otherwise reasonably manicured neighborhood.

It is also conspicuous by the abnormal number of antennas it sprouts.

It is the regional office of an American government agency blandly identified as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, or FBIS.

Under its roof, approximately 20 American-employed foreign nationals monitor the outpouring of enemy and friendly news and propaganda broadcasts originating in eight Southeast Asia nations.

Supervised by a handful of Americans, the spew of words is recorded and translated into English. The process turns the clutter of 14 languages and dialects gathered from the air waves into a digestible product to be read by FBIS clients.

### Defecting Political Trends

The clients are mostly Americans—Asian political specialists and military men assigned to intelligence duties. They read the FBIS reports to detect trends, alterations in political positions, and the rise and fall of leaders in Asian countries.

For the monitors, working around the clock in three shifts, listening to the diatribes or oily persuasion broadcasts can be deadeningly dull. Much of the propaganda is repetitious in theme, and is meant to be.

But there can also be moments of exhilaration for even the most jaded monitor. Recently, a "Prince Sihanouk" broadcast came on the air, but the FBIS specialist realized almost immediately that the voice was fake.

The deposed Cambodian monarch, now living in Peking, has been a standout performer in propaganda work for the Chinese Communists. Had he died? Had the Chinese cut him off the air?

### Intercepted Own Broadcast

It was later learned—much to the embarrassment of FBIS Americans—that the bogus Sihanouk voice had really come from an American-financed Cambodian government station.

With such goings-on, it seems surprising that the daily FBIS summary of "significant" broadcasts is not a secret document. But it is one of the few products of the CIA, of which FBIS is a part, that is not stamped secret.

"We are the straight-forward outfit in the agency," an FBIS employe explained.

While other CIA sections monitor certain types of coded enemy—and sometimes friendly—radio traffic, FBIS eavesdrops on programs that peasants are hearing over a communal radio, and soldiers in barracks or in bivouac are listening to ex transistorized sets. That explains why the monitoring is not considered a classified project.

Not that the bulky stapled sheaf of blue-ink summaries is available to just anyone. But copies of the daily

report can be begged, borrowed or purloined. In Vientiane, the Lao capital where both sides in the Indochina war have diplomats, FBIS is "must" reading in every embassy.

Eventually the discarded FBIS copies end up in the market place, where peddlers use them to wrap fish.

The FBIS distillation of Southeast Asia's war of words is probably most eagerly read by military briefers, who must put pins on maps and inform their generals of daily combat action. While enemy radio broadcasts describing "great victories" are read with a jaundiced eye, their exaggerations are sometimes no greater, one officer admitted, than what the friendly governments of Laos, Cambodia and Thailand are reporting about the same actions.

"By having both versions, we're in a position to judge what really happened," he explained.

### First Reports

In times of turmoil, weakly powered clandestine stations often give the first reports as to whether a government has fallen, or a secessionist movement is still viable. The East Pakistan "Bengla Desh" movement was more active on radio than in battle the first few months.

The FBIS station on Okinawa, which devotes its main effort to monitoring the radios on the Chinese mainland, has the added responsibility of "cruising." Patient operators "twirl the dial" on all possible wave bands and frequencies to detect new radio stations, be they but a gasoline-powered "one-lung" transmitter set in the jungle.

Diplomatic feelers are sometimes first voiced, or replied to, on clandestine radios. For a year, the allied-backed Lao premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and his half-brother Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the Communist Pathet Lao, have been making peace proposals. Souphanouvong, often as not, has been voicing his ploys through a pair of Lum-and-Abner "uncles," Hak and Sat, who hold a 30-minute conversation over clandestine Radio Pathet Lao every Sunday morning.

### Folksy Chat

A folksy chat, or a slightly risque sing-song exchange, is standard entertainment in Laos. To assure an audience, the Pathet Lao make most of their propaganda points to the people in these forms.

Uncle Hak and Uncle Sat discussed Souvanna Phouma's latest peace offer in a broadcast recently. Recorded and translated by FBIS, the Mutt-and-Jeff dialog included this portion:

Hak: Prince Souvanna Phouma's letter to Prince Souphanouvong this time is not different from the previous ones. That is, it avoids coming to grips with the main question

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Continued



The Washington Merry-Go-Round

## Ex-CIA Man Tells Secret War Effort

By Jack Anderson

A former insider has charged that the Central Intelligence Agency has provided the President with the military wherewithal to wage his own private wars around the world and is geared to fight still new clandestine wars.

In a confidential memo to Rep. Herman Badillo (D-N.Y.) former CIA official Victor Marchetti makes these allegations:

• The White House has used "vague phraseology" in the law to build up a vast military arsenal and paramilitary force. Past presidents have ordered the CIA to wage secret wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America without the traditional constitutional safeguards and congressional oversight.

• The CIA "has bought and sold air transport companies all over the world" from the Congo to Nepal, so the President could mount paramilitary operations almost anywhere. Marchetti claims one such company, Air America, "has grown so large, owning more aircraft than most major U.S. airlines, that it was a source

of embarrassment within the agency. A senior officer had to be assigned the full-time job of keeping an eye on George Dole (the founder) in the hope of cooling his fantastic business success in the Far East."

• Southern Air Transport, a Miami-based firm, is also fingered by Marchetti as a CIA subsidiary. "The sole purpose for the existence of SAT," he asserts, "is that the CIA be ready for the contingency that some day it will have to ferry men and material to some Latin American country to wage a clandestine war."

### Fire Fighters

Marchetti also identifies Rocky Mountain Air of Phoenix as "one of the more colorful companies owned by the CIA." This outfit specializes, he says, "in training and air-lifting parachutists, ostensibly for fire fighting purposes." But he then points out that the CIA has no need of fire fighting capability "unless it is to put out military brushfires south of the border."

• The CIA's "air capabilities, its warehouses full of unmarked military supplies in the Midwest, a secret demolition training base in North

Carolina, even a secret airbase in Nevada, and its connections with international arms dealing firms," Marchetti charges, give the President a formidable, secret war-making capability.

A CIA spokesman acknowledged that Marchetti formerly held a position of trust at CIA headquarters. He resigned several months ago to write a novel, "The Rope Dancer," based on his CIA experiences. But he abandoned fiction recently to write a detailed background memo for Congressman Badillo, who has introduced legislation to restrict the CIA to intelligence gathering and to prohibit clandestine wars.

Declare Marchetti: "Airports and huge supply bases were secretly established up-country, close to the action. Arms and material were delivered by the boatload from the CIA's warehouses in the Far East and the United States.

"Guerrilla chieftains were recruited to lead the Meos, who would actually fight the war for the CIA. The government of Laos was placated and finessed into turning things over to the CIA opera-

tors who could conduct the conflict.

### Swashbuckling Agents

"The chief of station—the CIA's top post in the field—during the crucial mid-60s, was .... His previous assignment had been Berlin, where he announced to the CIA contingent there upon his arrival that he intended 'to tear down that blankety-blank wall.' He was transferred to Laos before he had the opportunity to carry out his threat, in part because of his ferociousness.

"He has been succeeded by ...., former chief of station in the Belgian Congo. When things grew quiet there, he once dropped everything for a clandestine foray into the French Congo in hope of tracking down Che Guevara.

"He failed. But his fellow operators a couple of years later eventually caught up with the revolutionary in Bolivia.

"These are the kind of men who have led the CIA in Laos, and the CIA has led the U.S. into another humiliating, inextricable international dilemma."

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*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

## A Needed Victory for Laos



PAKSONG, Laos—At 10:30 a.m., Sept. 14, a visibly worried Col. Soutchay Vongsavanh grabbed his M-16 rifle and jumped aboard a helicopter on a mission central to his country's chances for survival—Laos against the inexorable invasion of North Vietnamese legions.

Col. Soutchay was attempting the impossible, moving the Royal Lao Army into battle against North Vietnamese. Specifically, the 7th and 9th Infantry Battalions had ignored orders to circle south of Communist-held Paksong in support of Lao irregulars—trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency—who were battling into town from the east. His mission affected not only the bloody campaign to recapture Paksong but also the drive to invigorate the hitherto somnolent regular army.

Typically for Laos, the outcome was mixed. After Soutchay's prodding, the two battalions belatedly got moving, but managed to avoid the thick of battle. Paksong finally fell two days later, but thanks mainly to irregulars, not the royal army. And by the time the town was recaptured, its North Vietnamese defenders had drifted northward into the jungle.

YET IN TERMS of the decade-old Laos war, it was a famous victory, one of the very few against North Vietnamese aggression. For the first time in the southern

Laos panhandle, Lao forces had harried and finally defeated North Vietnamese regulars—a victory coming amid increasing doubts over how long Americans will honor their commitments here and deepening pessimism that the days of an independent Laos may be numbered.

What made Paksong so important politically was a dramatic change early this year in southern Laos. Until then this region had seen precious little fighting. The commander of Military Region Four (the southern half of the panhandle), Maj. Gen. Phasouk Somly, had worked out secret accommodations with local Pathet Lao Communists which had the effect of shielding populated areas from the war.

But such accommodations were shattered this winter when North Vietnamese troops began pressing westward in southern Laos to secure the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the east—a movement accelerated by the South Vietnamese invasion against the trail. For the first time the North Vietnamese seized Paksong and moved westward to the gates of Pakse, the provincial capital. Government control in Southern Laos had nearly disappeared.


GEN. PHASOUK, a semi-feudal warlord more skilled in the arts of politics than warfare, was kicked upstairs to be the army's largely honorific chief of staff by his

cousin, Defense Minister Sisouk na Champassak. Phasouk's successor as Military Region Four commander was very junior, indeed—Col. Soutchay, a handsome, 6-foot-tall product of American military education with a brilliant record commanding irregular forces.

Thus, when the campaign to recapture Paksong began July 27, elements of the largely inactive 50,000-man Royal Lao Army were taking the offensive for the first time, seeking some element of government control in the panhandle.

The beginnings were sheer disaster. Royal Lao Battalions ran away in the face of the veteran, brilliantly commanded 9th North Vietnamese Regiment, requiring reinforcement from the better-led 30,000-man Lao irregular forces. As the Lao death toll grew around Paksong, complaints mounted from politicians such as Phoui Sananikone, president of the National Assembly in Vientiane.

MOREOVER, the replaced Gen. Phasouk had not left the south for his new post in Vientiane, but was hanging around, second-guessing his young successor. There was well founded suspicion that Col. Soutchay's problems commanding the 7th and 9th Battalions could be traced to Phasouk. Clearly the careers of Soutchay and Defense Minister Sisouk (perhaps the next prime minister of Laos)—as well as



their efforts to reform the Royal Lao Army—were in jeopardy.

They were saved by sustained airpower over Paksong (U.S. Air Force jets and Lao Air Force T28s) and the insertion of the four CIA-trained guerrilla battalions of Group Mobile 32, dropped east of Paksong by helicopter Sept. 12. Late in the afternoon of Sept. 14, with Lao forces having sustained nearly 1,000 casualties here since June, Group Mobile 32 fought in the outskirts of Paksong.

Early the next evening in a clearing on the edge of Paksong, while house-to-house fighting continued a few hundred meters away, we watched a jubilant Defense Minister Sisouk pin a brigadier general's star on the victorious Soutchay.

With the dry season offensive by the Communist invaders nearing, Paksong may not stay in government hands for long. Nevertheless, this was a rare victory to be savored. Ancient feudal regionalism had broken down with Soutchay, a northerner, leading southern forces and guerrilla battalions from other military regions brought here by airlift. Most of all, it was desperately needed morale boost, considering dire forebodings elsewhere in this tragically beleaguered country—subjects for future reports from Laos.

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18 SEP 57

STATINTL

Richard Wilson

## Pentagon Papers Are Fuel For Red Propaganda Mills

Washington. Scarcely a day went by for months when the secret Pentagon papers were not used in the international propaganda of Peking, Hanoi and Moscow to prove the perfidy of the United States.

It was the biggest propaganda windfall our adversaries have had in many a day. The Pentagon papers have been mentioned by Premier Chou En-lai in the propaganda interviews he has granted. They figure in international broadcasts constantly and are common currency in diplomatic conversations the world over.

The recent authoritative comment on the effort to normalize relations between the United States and China by Georgi Arbatov, which was accepted as the official Soviet evaluation, cited the Pentagon incident as emphasizing how deep is the political rift in America over the Vietnam war.

The more virulent broadcasts from Hanoi, from the so-called Liberation Radio beamed to South Vietnam, and from Peking weave together the Pentagon papers, disclosures of secret operations in Laos, and origins of the Gulf of Tonkin incident into a

scratchy hair shirt for Uncle Sam.

In this fuller light some conclusions may therefore be reached about the publication of the Pentagon papers. This damaged the United States in international relations beyond any shadow of a doubt.

But when that is said, it must also be added that many other incidents and happenings in the United States have damaged its position in international affairs.

The peace movement itself, demonstrations and disorders, the senatorial move to curb the President's war-making powers, the unremitting attacks on President Nixon for duplicity in winding down the war, have all been used against the United States in a damaging way.

The international propagandists have found their ammunition in the public record in the United States. The primary source, because the propagandists cannot view American television, has been the American press and it is rare, if ever, that the propagandists base their attacks on confidential communications between governments.

Picking up a line from the aforementioned Mr. Arbatov in another context, let us

leave the decision to publish the Pentagon papers on the conscience of American journalists who did so. What Mr. Arbatov wished was some of the commentary about the Nixon Peking visit to the effect that it might step up "anti-Soviet intrigues."

Perhaps Mr. Arbatov's line is worth following a little farther. Publication of the Pentagon papers may have been more a question of conscience than a constitutional question—a moral and ethical question in view of how the purloined papers were acquired, and a judgment on harming or not harming one's country by dis-

closing documents officially designated as secret.

As the Supreme Court has ruled, the Constitution of the United States justified no sanction in this case against publication. That was the effect of the ruling.

Still, it must be a heavy strain on conscience to know that day after day one's country is berated and maligned because secret papers were published at a critical moment during a sincere effort to bring the hated war to an end and that the publication did not advance that end by one hour.

HOUSTON, TEX.  
CHRONICLE

E - 303,041  
S - 353,314

SEP 17 1971

## State Department Says No Plans to Ease Coolness to Cuba

©1971, New York Times News Service  
Washington — The State Department told Congress that it had no plans to ease its long-standing policy of coolness toward Cuba.

Robert A. Hurwitch, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, opposed part of the Senate resolution, sponsored by Sen. J. W. Fulbright, D-Ark., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, calling for steps to restore "normal" U.S.-Cuban relations, both bilaterally and in the Organization of American States.

Hurwitch, who testified before the committee, cited Cuba's continuing close ties with the Soviet Union and its alleged continuing efforts to export revolution. He said at least 100 Cuban instructors at six camps in Cuba are training Latin Americans in both rural and, increasingly, urban terrorist techniques.

Fulbright criticized the

State Department for presenting to the world a "stone image" of inflexibility and lack of imagination. He also decried what he termed its attitude of "boring" righteousness.

Citing Hurwitch's allusion to 100 Cuban instructors in subversion techniques, Fulbright declared that the United States had "thousands" engaged in subversive activities around the world.

"The U.S. spends \$5 billion yearly on collecting intelligence and on subversion — covert, to say nothing of overt," Fulbright asserted. He said that the administration was spending \$400 million yearly on Central Intelligence Agency-directed military operations in Laos. He noted also that the CIA occasionally operated under aid cover.

"What Cuba is doing is peanuts compared to what this country is doing," Fulbright declared.

DAILY WORLD  
16 SEP 1971

# Saigon cops bared as authors of firebomb attack on McGovern

Daily World Combined Services

Saigon Police Chief Trang Si Tan admitted yesterday that the gang which attacked Sen. George McGovern's meeting with opposition leaders in a Saigon church Tuesday night was made up of members of the "Popular Forces," under the Saigon regime's control. Tan charged that McGovern "was not aware he was meeting with Vietcong agents and cadres."

McGovern (D-SD) declared, "All I can say is that I am flabbergasted that the police in Saigon should operate in this fashion." He called Tan's charge outrageous and later made a personal complaint when he met with Saigon puppet president Nguyen Van Thieu.

Frank Mankiewicz, McGovern's administrative assistant and former press officer for the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, called the Tan "Vietcong" statement "hogwash."

McGovern had on Tuesday night met in a Roman Catholic church in Saigon with several Buddhist, Catholic and student leaders known for their opposition to the Thieu regime. The church was attacked by a gang that hurled firebombs and rocks through the church windows, barely missing McGovern. The Saigon police said they could identify no one and had no clues.

The next day, police chief Tan, who is the boyfriend of Thieu's 13-year-old daughter, told the regular daily briefing for the Saigon press corps that the gang was composed of Popular Force members who were "indignant" when they were prevented from breaking up the alleged "Vietcong" meeting.

Tan said there were at present no plans to imprison McGovern for illegally meeting with the "Vietcong" and that he would probably be allowed to leave the

country.

Tan's statements, in the opinion of most observers, confirmed the earlier feeling that the Thieu regime itself had ordered the attack on McGovern, who has been outspoken in his criticisms of the Saigon puppets.

The Popular Forces, generally known as "Ruff-Puffs," operate in the South Vietnamese countryside in units of 30 to 35 men as a kind of home guard. In Saigon, their role is that of an auxiliary police, and they are under the operational control of Police Chief Tan.

## Laos revelation

Dirty politics in the Southeast Asia war also came out in Washington when the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday released previously secret testimony by the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, showing that the CIA "secret army" had been organized in 1962 and that its troops "have been the backbone of the military effort in Laos." His testimony raised disturbing questions.


Fighting in Laos between the Lao Patriotic Front (LPP) and the imperialists began as long ago as 1945; in 1954, the French colonialist forces withdrew and the U.S. moved in to replace them in a war which dragged on until 1962, when an international agreement made Laos a neutral country and established a coalition government in

which the LPP participated.

By 1963, a CIA-directed campaign of terrorism and assassination had destroyed the coalition government and civil war erupted again. The CIA used its "secret army" of Meo tribesmen and Thai mercenaries to try to hold the strategic Plain of Jars in northern Laos, and by 1964, the U.S. began a massive terrorist air bombardment of Laos which is still continuing.

Of Laos' population of some three million, 600,000 are believed penned up in CIA-run-concentration camps, referred to as "relocation centers."

If Ambassador Godley is correct on the point that the CIA set up the "secret army" as early as 1962, it is convincing proof that the U.S. deliberately sabotaged the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos and bears the entire responsibility for the war since then which has devastated Laos.



ST. LOUIS, MO.  
POST-DISPATCH.

E - 326,376  
S - 541,868

SEP 16 1971

*No Children, No Rice*

The official government policy is, as a inquirer would be told in Washington, to feed any and all refugees wherever Americans are involved in Indochina. As a matter of fact, the Agency for International Development can produce documents showing the U.S. drops 50 tons of rice daily from airplanes to tribal guerrillas and villages in the mountains of Laos.

What they say in Washington, however, is not what necessarily happens in the field--so Dr. Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale professor, found out on a trip to the Long Cheng area of Laos where the Central Intelligence Agency maintains a key military base. Dr. McCoy reports that he found the tribesmen in Long Pot village in a state of desperation for food. He says they have been denied rice for refusing to supply their remaining men to the U.S.-financed Hoo mercenary army. The break in delivery, says Dr. McCoy, came when the villagers refused to send their 14-year-old youths to the army after sending all their 15-year-olds. D. E. Ronk, reporting for the Washington Post from Vientiane, says a ranking government official claimed that AID was informed of the Long Pot situation weeks ago, that it ignored a request for deliveries and that the same method is being employed against other recalcitrant villages.

Washington would predictably deny this and we hope the professor is proved wrong. But, after the tiger cages and My Lai, after the CIA assassinations in Cambodia and the forced relocation of villages, nothing is inconceivable in this immoral and illegal war which President Nixon, in one of his more myopic moments, described as "our finest hour." Withholding food from villages who refuse to send their 14-year-old sons to fight seems tragically familiar in what has become one of the darkest episodes of our history.

STATINTL

SCOTTSDALE, ARIZ.,  
PROGRESS

SEP 16 1971  
E - 10,012

# CIA sets foreign policy

Who really runs the United States?

Certainly big business does not make ultimate decisions any more than does big labor.

The Supreme Court judges after the fact and has some influence.

Congress passes laws and appropriates money, but often it has no idea what is going on.

The President urges Congress to pass laws and the public to back him, and he signs bills into law.

In the area of foreign policy at least it would appear that real policy is made by the Central Intelligence Agency (oops, here goes another item on our dossier): ✓

At a secret hearing of the Senate Armed Forces Committee recently it was revealed that for nine years the CIA has been secretly training guerrilla troops in Laos. ✓

"The irregular forces in Laos today ... number about 30,000 men," according to U.S. Ambassador G. Murtrie Godley. They have been trained by CIA agents, who presumably tell them what to do and whom to fight.

Funny thing, we always thought Laos was an independent neutral country. And come to think of it, we thought the President made foreign policy with the advice and consent of Congress.

BALTIMORE SUN

15 SEP 1971

## 'Essential' in Laos


Testimony given in July before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and now made public, lifts a bit more the veil that has long obscured the extent and character of American military involvement in Laos. Among our activities there, we learn, is the sponsorship of a force of some 30,000 guerrillas, equipped, trained and paid by the Central Intelligence Agency.

They are described as indispensable to the carrying out of American policy. U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said at the hearings that "the absence of such support for the Lao government would undoubtedly lead to military and political collapse," and would free substantial North Vietnamese forces for use against South Vietnam. It was said further that the guerrillas were an essential part of the Nixon administration's policy of the "Vietnamization" of the war in Indochina.

Perhaps this was what Defense Secretary Laird had in mind when he told the committee that to halve the \$407 million budget for expenditures in Laos, as proposed by Senator Symington, would amount to an abandonment of the guerrilla effort.

We are reminded again that the war to Indochina, though indeed diminishing in terms of American ground troops in action, and American infantrymen killed, is still a war. We are also reminded again that American plans, so far as they can be discerned, foresee a continued war with continued American participation, whether by proxy or not; and that "Vietnamization" has many aspects not always mentioned by those who use it as a simple slogan, suggesting an easy conclusion to the American role in this tragic conflict.





### U.S. operation in Laos reported

Washington

Administration officials say the United States is supporting 30,000 Thai troops in special guerrilla units in Laos, which are equipped and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee hearings in July was made public Monday.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said that to halve this year's \$407 million budget for the U.S. expenditures in Laos would amount to abandoning the program.

# Cambodian Stability Shored By Low-Keyed U.S. Efforts

By HENRY S. BRADSHIER  
Star Staff Writer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia-- It was taking the loftiest, most detached possible view.

The American ambassador, Emory C. Swank, expressed regret the other day over the unsuccessful attempt by Communist terrorists to blow to bits himself, his chauffeur, his security guard and his car.

The reason for the regret: It gives Cambodia a bad name and makes the situation here look shakier than it really is now.

Swank's sophisticated reaction to the murder attempt was part of the American effort to create both the appearances and the substance of stability and security in Cambodia, despite the presence of some 60,000 Communist troops in the country.

The United States has accepted almost total responsibility for keeping Cambodia going under Communist military pressure.

## 'Every Assurance'

U. S. weapons, military training arranged by the United States in other countries, and tactical air support provided by U.S. or American-sponsored air forces have enabled Cambodia to resist North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, while American economic aid has kept the country running.

The foreign minister, Koun Wick, said after a recent visit to Washington that "we got every assurance that U. S. aid will continue for Cambodia.

The embassy staff was at one recent point supposed to

have been pegged at about 100. But the Department of Defense wanted to put more people here to supervise the delivery and utilization of military aid, which is scheduled to be worth \$200 million this fiscal year.

The Pentagon wanted 200 people here, Swank, and apparently the State Department, wants to keep the number of Americans down. They compromised on 50 "Military equipment delivery team" personnel, headed by Brig. Gen. Theodore C. Metaxis.

## Questions Raised

The MEDT people took over a job that had been done on a tougher schedule by the small office of Jonathan F. Ladd, the embassy counsellor for political-military affairs and Swank's right-hand man on all things military.

The combination of Ladd's Green Beret background and Swank's own record--he was the No. 2 man in the U.S. Embassy in Laos when the vast American clandestine operation there was growing in the mid-1960s--naturally raises questions about just what the United States is doing in Cambodia besides the public programs for arms and economic aid.

Nothing else, embassy officials insist.

There was a clandestine program of training about 1,500 Cambodian soldiers at a secret camp of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in southern Laos. The soldiers were supposed to operate as guerrillas in the Communist-controlled northeastern part of Cambodia.

But the program has now ended with recriminations and few guerrillas have been deployed.

Cambodia is trying to organize some sort of "pacification" program for areas in which Communist guerrillas are active. So far there is little more than touring propaganda teams to give the government message.

"Pacification" was a fertile field for CIA activities in South Vietnam. But, as one senior American commented, "Our results in pacifying Vietnam don't exactly qualify us as experts, even if we were to bring in people to help here. We're not going to, and it's up to the Cambodians to tackle that problem."

## Big Difference

With Americans in Cambodia barred by Washington from training or advising the army, the training that has made a big difference in the army's growing abilities was arranged with U.S. money to be conducted in South Vietnam and Thailand.

There has also been a very secret program for Indonesia to train some Cambodian soldiers in fighting guerrillas. Officials here insist the money for this has not come from U.S. aid to Cambodia.

There is, however, ample precedent for the United States to make indirect payments for such help. It cannot be established here whether the recently increased U.S. military aid program for Indonesia is financing the training for Cambodians.

STATINTL

14 SEP 1971

# CIA Assisting 30,000 Thais Fighting in Laos

Figure Far Above Unofficial Estimates;  
Troops Called Backbone of Anti-Red Battle

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency is equipping, training and advising about 30,000 Thai troops fighting as irregular forces in Laos, it was disclosed Monday.

The figure was given by G. McMurtrie Godley, U.S. ambassador in Vientiane, in secret testimony to a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 22.

A censored transcript of the hearing was made public Monday.

The 30,000 figure was far in excess of the previously published unofficial estimates of 4,500 to 5,000 U.S. trained Thai troops operating in LAOS.

Godley told the committee the CIA-financed guerrilla units "have been the backbone of the military effort in Laos" to repel the North Vietnamese forces.

"The irregular forces in Laos today . . . number about 30,000 men," he said. "These forces are organized into SCU (special guerrilla unit) battalions and these battalions now comprise about 330 to 360 men each."

## Vientiane Avoided

Godley said the guerrilla units operated everywhere in Laos except the area around the capital, Vientiane.

"The reason that no personnel have been recruited in the Vientiane area was that there were in the 1960s a series of coups," he said.

"Military personnel played a rather prominent role in these actions, and the United States did not

wish to become intimately involved in the internal political machinations or political military actions in that country."

Godley said the CIA began covertly assisting Lao irregular forces in 1962 and '63 when it became apparent the North Vietnamese were not going to respect the Geneva accords barring outside military interference in Laotian affairs.

The undersecretary of state for political affairs, U. Alexis Johnson, reiterated the Administration's contention to the committee that American financing of the Thais did not violate the congressional ban on U.S. payment to third country troops in Laos.

The United States considered such Thai forces as local forces because they had severed their connections with the Thai armed forces and were under the control of the Laotian government, he said.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), who helped push through the payment ban, described Johnson's logic in labeling the Thai troops as local as "reaching pretty far out."

"If there are Thai mercenaries in Laos, it is the opinion of our lawyers that that is against the law," he said.

## Nixon Doctrine

Godley said the CIA action in Laos was consistent with the Nixon Doctrine of reducing direct American military presence abroad while assisting local forces in other ways to battle outside aggression.

The ambassador said that CIA operations in Laos were under his control and that he knew of no other case where military operations abroad were under the direction of an ambassador with the Defense Department having no operational control.

The officials were supporting President Nixon's request for \$407 million for Laotian operations in the financial year which began July 1.

Johnson said "the absence of such support would undoubtedly lead to military and political collapse in Laos."

### NEW REPORT TELLS OF C.I.A.'S LAOS ROLE

WASHINGTON, Sept. 13 (UPI)—A transcript of secret Senate testimony described today the Central Intelligence Agency's role in secretly training and supporting 30,000 guerrilla troops in Laos since 1962.

The material was contained in published closed-door hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

G. McMurtrie Godley, United States Ambassador to Laos, told the committee that the guerrilla units financed by the Central Intelligence Agency, "have been the backbone of the military effort in Laos" to repel the North Vietnamese forces.

"The irregular forces in Laos today . . . number about 30,000 men," he said. "These forces are organized into S.G.U. [Spe-

cial Guerilla Unit] battalions and these battalions now comprise about 330 to 360 men each."

Last month a 23-page report was made public detailing the involvement of the C.I.A. in the Laotian war. That report was prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on foreign commitments by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, two former Foreign Service officers.

Mr. Godley said that the guerrilla units operated everywhere in Laos except in the area around the capital, Vientiane.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.  
INQUIRER

M - 463,503  
S - 867,810

SEP 14 1971

## Washington Dateline

# CIA-Trained Guerillas In Laos, Senators Told

A transcript of secret Senate testimony disclosed Monday that the Central Intelligence Agency has been secretly training and supporting 30,000 guerilla troops in Laos since 1962.

The figure was disclosed for the first time in published closed-door hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

G. Murtrie Godley, U. S. Ambassador to Laos, told the committee the CIA-financed guerilla units "have been the backbone of the military effort in Laos" to repel the North Vietnamese forces.

"The irregular forces in Laos today . . . number about 30,000 men," he said. "These forces are organized into SGU (special guerilla



G. Murtrie Godley

(unit) battalions and these battalions now comprise about 330 to 360 men each."

Godley said the CIA began covertly assisting Lao irregular forces in 1962 and 1963, when it became apparent the North Vietnamese were not going to respect the Geneva accords barring outside military interference in the Laotian affairs.

14 SEP 1971

**\$490 MILLION A YEAR AND 30,000 GUERRILLAS*****CIA's secret war in Laos is escalating***

(UPI) — The war in Laos has grown to a \$490 million-a-year operation that includes a 30,000-man secret guerrilla army run by the CIA.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird gave these figures to the Senate Armed Services Committee July 22. A heavily-censored record of his testimony was released yesterday.

Mr. Laird said the \$490 million does not cover U.S. bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail thru Laos into South Vietnam. The funds cover only operations in direct support of Laos, including CIA training and equipping of Lao and Thai irregulars, tactical air operations against North Vietnam, economic aid and military assistance to government forces.

**MILITARY ACTIVITIES**

G. McMurtrie Godley, the U.S. ambassador to Laos who supervises all military activities

and runs the CIA operations, said the 30,000 guerrillas and an undisclosed number of Thai irregulars are "the backbone of the military effort in Laos."

Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson said that never before has the United States conducted military operations under the direction of an ambassador with the State Department having no operational control.

The number of CIA men in the area remained classified, but Mr. Godley said he did not see how a similar number of regular U.S. military men could accomplish the same job with the same number of people.

"They have, for example, in Laos men who speak the language, who know the terrain like the palms of their hands and who do what I consider to be an outstanding job."

Mr. Godley said some of the CIA agents

were former military men "but in no case has there been any what we call sheep-dipping. There has been no instance of a man seconded by our military forces to serve with the CIA in Laos."

He said the guerrilla units operated everywhere in Laos except in the capital area.

"The reason that no personnel has been recruited in the Vientiane area was that there were in the 1960s a series of coups," he said. "Military personnel played a rather prominent role, and the United States did not wish to become intimately involved in internal political machinations."

Mr. Godley said the CIA began assisting Lao irregulars in 1962 and 1963, when it became apparent that the North Vietnamese were not going to respect the Geneva Accords barring outside military interference.

14 SEP 1971

# CIA Admits Training Irregulars in Laos

From News Dispatches

The Central Intelligence Agency is equipping, training and advising about 30,000 Lao troops fighting as irregular forces in Laos, it was confirmed yesterday.

The figure was given by G. McMurtre Godley, U.S. ambassador in Vientiane, in secret testimony to a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 22. A censored transcript of the hearing was made public yesterday.

Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson told the committee that American financing of additional Thai volunteer forces supplementing the Laos did not violate the congressional ban of U.S. payment to third country troops in Laos.

The United States considered such Thai troops as local because they had severed their connections with the Thai armed forces and were under the control of the Laotian government, he said. Other sources have said that the Thai volunteers number more than 4,000.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), who helped push through the payment ban, described Johnson's logic in labelling the Thai troops as local as "reaching pretty far out."

"If there are Thai mercenaries in Laos, it is the opinion of our lawyers that that is against the law," he said.

The ambassador said CIA operations in Laos were under his control and that he knew of no other case where military operations abroad were under the direction of an ambassador with the Defense Department having no operational control.

The officials were supporting President Nixon's request for \$407 million for Laotian operations in the financial year which began July 1.

STATINTL

10 SEP 1971

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

# Lie-Detector Sleuthing Hardly New

By Jack Anderson

The FBI's use of lie detectors to locate news leaks may be upsetting to the New York Times. But for us, it's strictly routine.

Long ago, we became resigned to this sort of intimidation. We've counted as many as 18 FBI agents at one time searching for our sources. They've used not only lie detectors but third-degree methods and grand jury subpoenas.

The latest investigation was touched off, the press reported, by a New York Times account on July 22 of the secret U.S. position at the strategic arms limitation talks.

Actually, Attorney General John Mitchell began investigating news leaks last spring. He ordered the FBI, specifically, to find out who was slipping us Pentagon secrets often intended for the "eyes only" of the top brass.

Military gumshoes grilled suspects behind the doors of room 3E993 at the Pentagon. FBI agents followed up, flashing their credentials and asking terse questions. Lie detectors were used; some suspects were tailed; their neighbors were questioned.

At least one suspect, a mild, bespectacled Pentagon aide named Gene Smith, was badgered, threatened, cursed and, finally, subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury in Norfolk, Va.

But unhappily, the vaunted FBI had fingered the wrong

man. Smith denied under oath that he had given us so much as the time of day.

U.S. Attorney Brian Gottings admitted to us afterward that a "federal agency" had suggested he go after Smith.

## Triple Threat

With the publication of the Pentagon papers, Mitchell broadened his investigation of news leaks. Then, in July, the gumshoes moved into the State Department after the appearance of three more sensitive stories:

1. The New York Times account by William Beecher giving details of the U.S. bargaining position on arms limitation;

2. Another New York Times report by Tad Szulc about arms shipments to Pakistan; and

3. A column by us quoting from a State Department message that had been hand-carried in a sealed envelope to U.S. AID Administrator John Hannah.

Were these news leaks prejudicial to the national interest," as State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey claimed? Or do government officials use the security stamp to cover up their mistakes and to manage the news for political purpose?

Let's take the message that was delivered to Hannah in a sealed envelope. This was a

hush-hush report from our Ambassador to Kenya, Robinson McIlvaine, on the high-jinks of the AID administrator in Kenya. It was classified, we believe, solely to spare the involved officials from embarrassment.

But admittedly, the Pentagon investigation was triggered by our publication of sensitive information. We reported, for example, that Gen. Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, had been asked to draw up top-secret contingency plans last October for a three-day, seven-day or ten-day aerial assault upon North Vietnam. We revealed no military details, except that the contingency plans included the bombing and mining of Haiphong harbor.

Here was evidence that President Nixon was preparing plans to expand the war at the same time that he was promising to curtail it.

## Official Discrepancy

We also revealed that MAC-SOG teams, composed of U.S. special forces and South Vietnamese rangers, continued to operate inside Cambodia and Laos at the same time our spokesmen were claiming no American troops were in those countries. We cited secret messages, which referred to the Cambodian raids by the code name "Salem House" and

to the Laos raids as "Prairie Fire."

Perhaps the story that caused the most embarrassment (and produced the most intensive investigation) was our disclosure that the United States had been intercepting South Vietnamese President Thieu's private communications. These were picked up and decoded by the National Security Agency, then passed on to the White House and other agencies. The intercepted messages were identified by the code name "Goyt."

This unpleasant revelation, no doubt was awkward for the United States. But we strongly believe that, in a democracy, the people have the right to know what their officials are doing. Since no military security was involved, we published the story.

For the same reason, we reported that Adm. Thomas Moorer, the Joint Chiefs' chairman, received a "Flash" message after the daring Son-tay raid informing him that the North Vietnamese prison-compound hadn't been occupied for three months.

The real reason for the news-leak investigations, in our opinion is to scare government employees into silence so they won't give out information that their bosses don't want the public to know.

Bell-McClure Syndicate



9 SEP 1971



### U.S.-Saigon invasion of Laos

United States and Saigon puppet troops have launched another large scale invasion of Laos while U.S. aircraft, including B-52 bombers, are now subjecting the liberated areas of Laos to new bombings. A spokesman of the foreign ministry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam said more than 30 battalions of CIA-trained and directed "special forces" and Thai mercenaries have been hurled against Lao defenders on the Plain of Jars, while other units have attacked the liberated districts of the Boloven Plateau and other areas of southern Laos. More than 20,000 Saigon puppet troops are participating in the invasion, having been airlifted by U.S. helicopters. The former U.S. military base of Khe Sanh has been reactivated and is serving as the headquarters of the invasion. U.S. artillerymen were said to be supporting the advance of the puppet troops.

A group of about 30 disabled Saigon puppet troops obtained about \$20 each from Saigon officials after demonstrating for several hours in front of the Veterans Ministry building, across the street from the residence of Deputy U.S. Ambassador Samuel D. Berger. During the demonstration, one veteran cut off his thumb and the others shook and rattled their artificial limbs to dramatize their plight.

6 SEP 1971

STATINTL

After Six Months

# U.S. Rice Supplies Resumed in Laos

By D.E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, Sept. 5.—The U.S. Agency for International Development has resumed supplying relief rice to a group of Laotian tribesmen after withholding the food for six months, AID officials said last week.

The resumption of supplies followed publication of a report by an American writer that AID was using the rice in an effort to force tribal villagers at Long Pot, 80 miles north of Vientiane, to cooperate with the U.S.-financed Meo army of Gen. Vang Pao.

Two AID officials, Charles Mann and Norman Barnes, said the rice supplies were resumed when it was determined that the Long Pot area was "secure." The fact that the area was secured a few days after the report by writer Alfred W. McCoy was published was "coincidental," Barnes said.

McCoy, who spent five days at Long Pot researching his second book on Laos, said U.S. and Meo authorities had stopped supplying rice to the village because the tribesmen refused to allow any more of their youths to be pressed into Vang Pao's forces or, alternatively, to move their village into the Cheng-Sam Thong military complex.

Publication of McCoy's allegation resulted in a query from AID headquarters in Washington to Mann, the agency's local director. Mann and Barnes reportedly went immediately to Long Pot and airplane drops of rice were resumed.

The first drop of grain contained 10 days worth of food for the seven villages in the Long Pot area, Barnes said. In addition, he said, a local medic and more than 350 pounds of medicines have been supplied.

Commenting on McCoy's claims about why the rice had been withheld for six months,

Barnes said their investigation did not cover the question.

However, he said Long Pot was declared "insecure" early this year and "U.S. AID does not drop rice into high-risk areas."

Barnes said Long Pot was listed as controlled by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese army forces since last February, when there was fighting in the area and 12 persons were killed.

McCoy, of New Haven, Conn., said however, that there has been no fighting in the Long Pot area since that time. He also said that a six-man detachment of Meo soldiers, equipped with a radio, has been in the area since the fighting.

Village leaders and the Meo troops themselves reportedly told McCoy they had been in constant radio communication with the base at Long Cheng and had frequently requested rice drops.

McCoy also said helicopters operated by Air America, a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency-backed airline in Laos, made periodic visits to Long Pot. One touched down there while he was in the village, McCoy said.

Village leaders told McCoy their relations with the Meo headquarters at Long Cheng fell off when the villagers refused to allow 14-year-old boys to be pressed into military service with the Meos. The 15-year-olds they had turned over to Gen. Vang Pao had been wiped out, they said.

"They simply decided they had lost too many killed already, that they could not afford more," McCoy said.

He added that following this refusal, the villagers were asked to move to the Cheng-Sam Thong complex. When they refused to leave their home of the last 30 years, he said, their rice supplies were cut off.

4 SEP 1971

## The Case Against Red China

In the following pages, HUMAN EVENTS presents a variety of Asian experts—including some Old China Hands—who provide what we believe to be compelling reasons against our current policy of vigorously courting Peking. These men and women detail the horrors of the genocidal regime on the mainland, they remind us of Peking's arduous efforts to subvert free governments around the world, and they underscore the point that the compromising of Taiwan is far too dear a moral and strategic price to pay for a temporary détente with the band of cutthroats that rule 750 million Chinese.

There may be, of course, some merit in trying to "improve" our relations with Peking for the purpose of playing it off against the Kremlin. But such diplomatic gamesmanship should hardly be pursued if it involves the shattering of old alliances and the undermining of loyal friends. Yet what is so ominous about the Administration's public posture is that it looks as if this is precisely the sort of policy it is following. The current rulers of the regime on the mainland are so steeped in blood and treachery, as the articles in this supplement make clear, that it takes a great act of will to believe that any good can come from offering up our friends to win Mao's friendship.

The Administration, however, has gone about its business in a way almost calculated to unnerve our friends.

The short notice given the Chinese Nationalists about the President's journey to Peking amounted to nothing more than a crude insult. Ambassador Shen was told about the visit, despite its enormous implications to Taiwan, just 20 minutes before President Nixon's dramatic TV announcement. The Administration conveniently arranged to have Vice President Agnew, whose reservations on the Red China "détente" policies are well known, out of the country when the Kissinger-Chou liaison occurred.

The most vocal senatorial critics of the Administration's China policy—Senators Peter Dominick (R.-Colo.), John Tower (R.-Tex.) and James Buckley (C.-R.-N.Y.)—have been provided with no information to relieve their

anxieties about how far the Administration is prepared to go in sacrificing Taiwan's interests. "If the President is not about to stick the dagger into Chiang," asked one observer, "then why won't he reassure anyone in this regard?"

So shattering has the President's announced "journey for peace" been, in fact, that not only has it caused consternation in Taiwan, but it has stirred extreme concern in such anti-Communist Asian countries as South Korea, Thailand, South Viet Nam and Japan. Even neutralist India has been close to alarm, with Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh having warned Parliament that he hoped that any "Sino-American détente will not be at the expense of other countries...."

Indeed, India's recent signing of a 20-year pact with the Soviets is said to be partly related to the President's softening policies toward Peking.

What is so extraordinary in all this adventurist diplomacy is that the President is openly relinquishing concession after concession to Mao, with no apparent yielding in return.

The President, for instance, has already lowered the trade barriers against Red China, called for its admission into the United Nations, insulted the Nationalist leaders, downgraded the importance of Taiwan and seriously harmed

our relations with many of our Asian allies.

We have also abandoned our spy flights over the mainland and, according to recent reports, have ordered a halt in the dispatching of special CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen into China on reconnaissance patrols from bases in northern Laos. Moreover, as officials of the International Security Affairs Department in the Pentagon have related, the Administration has turned down a proposal to shift American nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Taiwan in order not to take the bloom off our budding friendship with Mao.

Face-conscious Asians, furthermore, will undoubtedly be reassessing their allegiances as Richard Nixon, once Red China's mortal enemy, goes kowtowing to Peking. From Madagascar to Indo-

nesia, millions of overseas ethnic Chinese, dominant in trade and many of the professions in Southeast Asia, will be encouraged to shift their loyalties from Taiwan to the rising Red Star on the mainland. Taiwan and the mainland have competed for influence in the underdeveloped areas, and the U.S. move is bound to increase Red Chinese penetration.

The President's move has already shaken the pro-American governments of Japan and Australia, and may have dire consequences for pro-U.S. governments elsewhere. As columnist Kevin Phillips noted:

"Add it all up, and it is hard to avoid concluding that (1) the U.S. government has behaved badly towards its allies; (2) we are on the retreat in Asia; (3) the President's actions will injure pro-American parties in East Asia and Australia, tilting key internal structures leftward; and (4) the 'spirit of Peking to be' will greatly promote the international advance of Red China."

The statement issued by Secretary of State Rogers on U.S. policy toward Red China's admission to the United Nations only tends to confirm the thesis that we are about to betray Taiwan. In reversing a consistent policy of 22 years, Secretary Rogers said we would vote to let Red China into the United Nations.

The secretary also said that we would fight to keep Taiwan represented as well, but the secretary did not suggest, which he could have, if the Administration were seriously interested in preserving the Taiwan government, that we would only vote to admit Peking if Taiwan were not expelled.

As a result of our stance, rumors are still flying that we don't really intend to fight very hard to keep Taiwan in the world body—another concession, supposedly, to our new "friends" on the mainland. And that Taiwan could be tossed out—the incessant chant of Peking—hardly seems far-fetched at this time. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg has predicted as much. As he so aptly put it: "The floodgates are open and the battle is over."

While the U.S.—at least on the surface—is falling all over itself

continued

to appease Mao and Chou; one looks in desperation for crumbs of concessions by the Red Chinese. If the President has received any diplomatic gifts from the mainland, they are by no means apparent. Nor, do many experts believe, will he be able to go to Peking with much of a bargaining hand.

With division over the war at home, a stubborn determination to run as a "peace" candidate in 1972, and his yielding of our nuclear cards at SALT, the President will be able to exert very little pressure on Peking.

Even Oliver Edmund Clubb, an Old China Hand who was extremely sympathetic to the Communist Chinese during the 1940s, has wondered whether the President might not be at a diplomatic disadvantage at the summit.

"Because the meeting has been arranged at our initiative," Clubb said recently, "the President must bring home some tangible agreement. Failing that, he will suffer a major diplomatic setback. China, on the other hand, doesn't have to make many concessions because its political fortunes are already too clearly on the rise."

Since the President announced his trip on July 15, in fact, the Red Chinese have laid down a steady barrage of anti-American propaganda and assumed an even more inflexible diplomatic stance than they had previously. Joseph Kraft, a liberal columnist who favors the Nixon maneuver, has remarked that the notion that Peking was going to turn pliable on a broad range of issues was just a set of illusions. "As it happens," he noted, "the familiar sore spots have all been rubbed a little harder."

Indeed, they have. Just two days after the news that the President would travel to the mainland, Peking Radio blasted the "reactionary ruling circles" in America who "are actively carrying out the policies of aggression and war. . . ."

New York Times correspondent James Reston, who had a major interview with Premier Chou En-lai when he was recently in Peking, wrote that "you live in an atmosphere of vicious and persistent anti-American propaganda. . . ." While Chinese officials are pleased with Nixon's visit, "Peking media relentlessly characterize the American government as the 'arch criminal' of the world. The United States, they insist, has been 'beaten black and blue' in Viet Nam, but still goes on backing a 'fascist clique' there and is reviving 'Japanese militarism' and plotting new wars of aggression in Korea and the rest of Asia."

Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, President Nixon's prospective host, continues to beat the drums for an end to America's military presence in South Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, South Korea, Formosa, Thailand and Japan. He says that Peking will never drop its demand for the return of Taiwan, and he insists that Peking will continue to give aid to the Communist forces in Viet Nam "until the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces."

In his now-famous interview with Mr. Reston, who grandly sympathized with so many of Chou's major requests (such as the scuttling of Taiwan), Chou reiterated his "U.S.-must-go" theme, demanding, even, that the United States must withdraw from the Philippines!

Hardly a day goes by when Peking's top officials aren't making a new rash of humiliating demands upon the President.

Perhaps President Nixon may wave a magic wand when he voyages to Peking and produce a miracle that will justify his seemingly unjustifiable actions at the present time. Perhaps he has an excellent reason to visit the Red Chinese, who have killed anywhere from 34 to 64 million of their own people, according to Prof. Walker (see page 12).

But for the present our view of what's happening coincides with that of Bruno Shaw, a China expert who wrote a scathing denunciation of President Nixon's trip to the mainland in a recent edition of the *Wall Street Journal*. Said Shaw:

"Having lived in China from the beginning of the Chinese Communist movement, witnessed the murder of countless Chinese farmers in Hunan Province at the hands of Mao Tse-tung in the mid 1920s and had a first-hand personal acquaintance with the leadership and the program of the Chinese Communist crusade, I am firmly convinced that if President Nixon persists in the folly of a visit to Red China in pursuit of world peace, he will go down in history as:

- "In China, a barbarian chieftain who was permitted to enter the Middle Kingdom bringing tribute to Peking;
- "In the West, as the Neville Chamberlain of our time. And Taiwan will become the disposable Sudetenland of the East, no matter what fine words are uttered by the politicians who are presently in charge of our destiny."

We hope, of course, that we are wrong, that the President is fully aware of the enormity of Red China's treachery and the disastrous consequences that could

befall American foreign policy by betraying such allies as Taiwan. In case the President and his policy-makers need to be reminded, however, they could do worse than to read the articles contained in this supplement.


## AROUND THE WORLD

I. ANDRONOV

## PROVING GROUND

## FOR THE GUAM

## DOCTRINE



CAMBODIA is a comparatively recent victim of American imperialist aggression in Indo-China—U.S. forces invaded it only last year. The political prologue, it may be said, was the Guam doctrine—the new course in Asia proclaimed by President Nixon two years ago at the U.S. air force base in Guam. As put by Nixon himself, the point of this doctrine is that the United States must play a substantial role in Asia but would like the problem of war and the responsibility for it to be assumed in ever greater degree by the Asian countries themselves. In the opinion of many Asian public leaders and publications the veiled meaning of this is that Washington wants to "pit Asians against Asians," that is, to have its war in Asia fought by others in the selfish interests of the U.S. ruling element. The tempestuous events of the

last eighteen months in the once tranquil country of Cambodia offer a classic example of how this is worked in practice.

## YANKES IN PNOM PENH

Washington makes no secret now of its massive bomb strikes against vast areas of Cambodia, but all its other military operations against Cambodia's patriotic forces are painstakingly camouflaged by its official representatives in the Cambodian capital. This summer, for instance, quite a few groups of American servicemen were flown into Pnom Penh from Saigon, but in each case they were dressed as civilians. Thus "camouflaged," the visitors were then deposited in various parts of the country by U.S. Embassy helicopters. This operation, directed by the Pentagon and the CIA, is kept secret from American and world public opinion. What is more, it is conducted in defiance of the ban imposed by the U.S. Congress on American land operations in Cambodia. But in Pnom Penh itself, it is widely known that the Pentagon's "special forces" units—the notorious Green Berets—systematically make raids deep into the interior of guerilla areas. Very often they disguise themselves as insurgents. The Green Berets carry out sabotage and terrorist missions in the guerilla areas and pick targets for U.S. bombers.

American army planes can be seen daily in the Pnom Penh airport though their presence is partly concealed: the identification marks on some of the planes have been painted over. Last January guerillas blew up a few American planes in the airport and since then the building has remained half in ruins. The surviving part is roofless and its windows are gaping holes. The wind blows through it freely and the floor is strewn with rubble and plaster. But out on the airfield American military transports and sharp-nosed fighters again come and go.

The road from the airport to the capital is blocked off every three hundred metres by empty petrol barrels, so that no car can speed past. Near these roadblocks are stationed groups of soldiers equipped with American quick-firing rifles and field telephones, and wearing American green-tropical uniforms and helmets.

In the city there are coils of barbed wire everywhere. The barbed wire is strung on poles right on the sidewalks in front of all government buildings—whether a post office or a ministry. The more important the office, the more wire there is in front of it. First place is taken by the Defence Ministry: the street it stands on is covered with rows of it, and at its walls are piles of sandbags behind which soldiers stand ready to man machine-guns. There are also machine-gun nests at the gates of nearly all government offices. From time to time people calling at them are carefully searched at gun-point. At the press centre a representative of the military command cautions journalists that it is risky to take photographs in the streets—a nervous soldier may open fire without warning. A state of emergency has been declared in the capital, for guerilla units have surrounded it and by night approach its suburbs. No one may enter the city after sunset; all roads are blocked by government soldiers who huddle fearfully around the American M-113 armoured cars placed at their disposal.

Artillery batteries have been mounted even in the centre of the city, on the Mekong embankment, their guns trained on the opposite bank from which guerillas sometimes open up fire with mortars and mobile rocket launchers. From time to time they even blow up a munitions dump right in the city or shower hand grenades on picked targets, such as the Saigon mission. After one such attack the South Vietnam ambassador landed in hospital. A guerilla attack on the arsenal in June caused an explosion of such force that the flames rose 120 metres and the surrounding streets were showered with shell and mine fragments mixed with stone and rubble.

From a white four-storey building on the corner of one of the Pnom Penh boulevards and Avenue Mao Tse-tung, near the Mekong embankment, hangs the American flag. This is the American Embassy building and the Americans occupying it are jestingly called "the Yankees from Mao Street." Recently, though, the street was renamed—either at the request of the American diplomats or because of the change in the political climate of the Cambodian capital.

The American Embassy in Pnom

continued

By Jerome Dechtle

In Bangkok at 12 o'clock, if you believe Noel Coward, they foam at the mouth and run. This is not how GIs from Vietnam remember the place, though what they do remember about it may seem just as far-fetched. To GIs Bangkok is a favorite Rest & Recreation center because it rules as the home of the art of the Southeast Asian full-body massage.

The massage parlors of Bangkok, capital of Thailand, are as hushed as temples, with expensively decorated waiting-rooms, piped music, and elevators to serve what may be a four- or five-story building. The massage girls, scores of them in even a medium-size establishment, sit gossiping in small amphitheatres. Each girl wears a badge with a number. The customer, invisible behind a giant one-way mirror, examines the field at his leisure, makes his choice, and tells an attendant the number.

"A friend of mine who served in Ghana," says a Central Intelligence Agency man whose own service has been all in Southeast Asia, "once told me you're never the same man after the first servant calls you 'Bwana'. For me, it was the first time a little massage girl in Bangkok got down on her knees and started to unlace my shoes. Perfectly naturally. It sort of restructured my whole notion of the relationship between the sexes."

The Southeast Asian massage (except in Vietnam, where the art is in a rudimentary state) is a serious affair. To be accepted as an apprentice in the best parlors of Singapore, a girl must pay a deposit, returnable after a year, that can run as high as \$500. This is to insure the owner against the girl's running off and taking a job elsewhere as soon as her training is over. The apprentice starts by kneading mattresses to strengthen her fingers. Later she is set to toughening her hands by smacking walls with a modified karate chop performed with the fingers held loosely together, in the position of prayer—she will eventually use this technique to loosen up the large muscles of the legs and back. Once her hands are ready, she starts to learn the various holds, twists and wrenches of her new trade. Only after weeks of training will she be judged ready to work on a live specimen—usually one of the other girls.

The complete Bangkok massage treatment lasts about an hour, and starts with a thorough soaping of the customer. The masseuse then directs him to a raised table, like a doctor's examining table, and powders him all over with talcum. Now that he is dry and squeaky-clean, she goes to work on his joints in ways that would plainly result, with the exertion of several more foot-

pounds, in permanent maiming. She walks up and down barefoot on his back. In a hold too complicated to describe, she pops the vertebrae of his back in quick succession, like knuckles.

Next she positions the client on his hands and knees, his head lolling down, and suddenly wrenches his chin to one side as far as it will go, as if to twist his head off. This makes a sickening sound which means that the vertebrae of the neck, too, have been popped in chorus. Only the least imaginative customers ever get used to this one, just as only the most phlegmatic of men never wonders if the barber shaving around his windpipe might not be, after all, a homicidal maniac.

By now the customer is nicely gentled. He feels the gratitude of a baby towards the mother who has just washed and dried and patted and powdered him—and perhaps flung him around a little bit, just enough to make him pleasantly tired. The masseuse then leans over and whispers, "Want massage here?" Why she bothers to ask is not very clear—perhaps the occasional fundamentalist preacher refuses. In the normal course of events, the girl removes the towel covering the customer's midriff, positions a freshly-laundered napkin, and uncaps the Brylcreem. This is always the lubricant of choice for the final, intimate stage.

"As a rule, that's the whole of the standard treatment," says the CIA man, whose experience has become vast since the first massage girl unlaced his shoes. "A lot of places even leave the cubicle doors unlocked to discourage anything more happening. Some places, the girls get fired if they're caught sleeping with the customers. But there are exceptions.

"I ran across Naroudam the third time I went to a massage parlor. Pure luck. I just picked her out through the two-way mirror. Once she had finished with me in the usual way, she stretched out beside me and started breathing heavily, almost panting. I laughed and said she didn't have to bother, but just then she fished a breast out of that uniform they all wear, like a nurse's. Well, I mean, I'm a gentleman and I knew what to do. She was breathing harder and harder, but I still figured she was faking—until I noticed that damned if she wasn't playing with herself. Now that I took as a sign of sincerity. Naturally, I wasn't in any shape right then to apply the normal remedy, but I did manage to figure out a way to help. After it was all over for her, she said thanks very politely, and got back into her uniform. Going downstairs she was smiling at me, as if nothing had happened between us. No sign of any emotional connection. Didn't hold my hand, or

smile at me, or even look at me. In a funky way, if you see what I mean, that was the nicest part of the whole thing.

"Girls like Naroudam get famous in their way. Their badge numbers and names get passed around. The funny thing is, they seem to do it more or less for the love of the thing. They'll take a tip if you offer them one, sure, but they don't seem to expect it and they don't get upset if there isn't any. A lot of times, it seems to depend on how the gal likes a customer's looks. My own theory is that after you've spent all day kneading rolls of suet, anybody who's reasonably thin and properly built looks awful good to a massage girl."

An American technician stationed in Laos tells of the time his sister visited him in Vientiane. "She's got into this fem lib stuff," he explains. "Driving around town, every time I spotted some little Lao gal swinging a bucket of cement on a construction job I'd point her out. 'There she is, Mary,' I'd say. 'They've won the battle here. That's Miss Fem-Lib of 1970'. It drove her up the wall.

"The funny thing is, I would have taken that fem lib stuff seriously if I hadn't come to this part of the world. I was just a typical American boy. I didn't need the song to tell me those boots were made for walking and that's just what they'll do. I already knew that one of these days those boots are going to walk all over you. Then they sent me to Thailand four years ago, and then here. You might say it changed my life. Yes, you might.


"Frankly, I was never what you might call a big swordsman back home. The fact is, girls scared the piss out of me. Out here at first, I more or less went wild. But I was scared that it would all be over if I went back home. You know, though, I've heard the same thing from several guys, guys who always had plenty of girls back in the States. They said I wouldn't have anything to worry about, that once you've been in a place like this you get a lot less uptight about it or something, and the girls back home will recognize it. Not that I'm in any hurry to get back, but I hope they're right."

The American pauses a minute, remembering.

"Did you know there's a house in northern Thailand where the specialty is Chicken in a Basket? The girl gets in this huge basket with a hole in the bottom of it, and another girl hoists the basket up in the air with a rope and pulley arrangement. You position yourself on the bed underneath, and then the second girl lowers the basket just enough. You turn the basket around and around with your hands. Real slow."

Many marriages between American

31 AUG 1971



## Editorials

### CIA still at work

Few will doubt the reports that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had a hand in the overthrow of the Torres Government in Bolivia by a reactionary cabal closely linked to U.S. imperialist interests.

It was an operation in keeping with the role of this U.S. agency which maintains its own 30,000-strong army in Laos, its own airlines, has intrigued in South Vietnam since the 1950s, organized an invasion of Cuba and otherwise played the role of hangman of progress, national-liberation struggles and socialism.

Its role in the hunting down of Ernesto Che Guevara and his companions in the mountains of Bolivia is well-attested.

The very same 800-man unit trained by U.S. Special Forces (Green Berets) which murdered Guevara joined Col. Hugo Banzer in his military putsch to overthrow the Torres Government.

The spider sitting in this web of subversive conspiracy against the Torres Government was U.S. Air Force Major Robert J. Lundin, whose private, special-purpose radio connection to the U.S. Embassy in La Paz is reported to have been used by the putschists. U.S. companies in Bolivia are reported to have bankrolled the gang who promised to undo the reforms the Torres Government had undertaken with the support of students, workers and masses of the people.

This imperialist-inspired coup is a warning. There is not letup in the plotting against socialist Cuba.

The defeat of U.S. imperialism's efforts to block the advance of the people's national independence struggle in Chile has intensified the subversive activities of the CIA there.

A grave responsibility rests upon the U.S. workers of hand and brain, white, black and brown, on the masses of people, because it is the imperialism of our country which plots against the liberties of other peoples.

# Scholar Says U.S. Rice Used to Pressure Meos

STATINTL

By D.E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, Aug. 30 — An American scholar who recently visited the Long Cheng area, where the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency maintains a key military base, has said that U.S.-supplied relief rice is being used to enforce army authority over the Meo tribe villages there.

For six months, he said, the tribesmen around Long Pot, 80 miles north of Vientiane, have been denied rice for refusing to supply their remaining men to the U.S.-financed Meo army of Gen. Vang Pao, and they have been told that rice will be delivered when they again cooperate.

The break in rice delivery came when the villages refused to send their 14-year-old youths to the army after sending their 15-year-olds, Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale professor, said he was told by tribal leaders in Long Pot.

(In Washington, a spokesman for the Agency for International Development said of McCoy's allegation, "We have no basis to believe this is true.")

McCoy is co-editor of "Laos: War and Revolution," published last year, and is gathering information for another book on Southeast Asia.

He is a former national coordinator of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, a group formed in 1968 to oppose the war in Vietnam and to promote a basic reappraisal of U.S. government policy in Asia.

McCoy has just returned from a week-long visit to the mountainous area of Long Pot.

He said tribal leaders there blame American officials at the CIA's Long Cheng base as

much as Gen. Vang Pao for the cutoff of rice deliveries.

According to McCoy, tribal leaders said Americans from Long Cheng gave them two alternatives for resumption of the relief program: provide more soldiers to Vang Pao or move their villages within the perimeter of the Long Cheng — Sam Thong base complex southeast of Long Pot.

The leadership said they refused both alternatives and rice supplies were halted last February.

McCoy said he found a state of desperation for food in and around Long Pot.

In Vientiane, Charles Mann, local director for AID, told McCoy he knew nothing of the situation in the Long Pot area, but would have it investigated and would have rice dropped in immediately.

Mann denied that rice supplies are used to enforce Vang Pao's authority. "American policy is to feed any and all refugees," Mann told McCoy.

According to Mann, rice drops are decided upon by a committee composed of tribal group representatives, the Lao government, and the AID mission. "We have never refused a request from a Lao government official" for a rice drop, he told McCoy.

A ranking Laos government official in Vientiane says, however, that AID was informed of the Long Pot situation weeks ago, that they ignored a request for deliveries and that the same method is being employed against other recalcitrant villages in Laos.

According to U.S. government documents, the AID mission here drops 50 tons of rice daily from airplanes to tribal guerrillas and villages in the mountains.

For the past five years, virtually no rice has been grown

by the mountain people because of the war. They have become totally dependent upon American relief supplies.

Long Pot's leadership says their break with Long Cheng, and end to food provision, came when they were ordered to send all 14-year-old boys to the army.

"I know the 15-year-olds are gone," a chief told McCoy, "because I put them on the helicopters myself."

A move from Long Pot into the base at Long Cheng would make the village totally dependent upon Vang Pao and the Americans, the leaders said.

Such dependence would leave them no choice in following the orders of Vang Pao, whom they characterize as being considered by their followers the most hated man in the mountains "for sending the Meo to be killed."

McCoy says he is convinced of the truth in what he was told because of first hand observations and cross-checking stories.

"I would never have published these things if I had not been there, seen and heard," he said.



CANONSBURG, PA.  
NOTES

E - 5,345

AUG 30 1971

## The China Wind

The extent to which the United States has been monitoring activity in China in recent years is coming to light as secrets of the Vietnam war surface. President Nixon, it's reported, recently halted U-2 flights over China.

However, electronic equipped space craft continue to fly over China; thus intelligence agencies will continue to match military developments in the world's most populous nation. The President has called a halt to naval patrols close to the Chinese mainland involving Taiwan.

The Nixon Administration also recently announced a halt in the dispatch of Laotian reconnaissance teams into China, from Laos. These teams have been trained, financed and

directed by the Central Intelligence Agency; some of them have penetrated as far as 200 miles into China. No doubt widespread espionage activities have been carried on.

The incursion over the Chinese border were, obviously highly provocative. One can imagine the reaction in Washington if Mexico, for example, regularly engaged in sending such teams across the southwestern United States border.

Since the Korean War, China has avoided open confrontation with the U.S. and though no prophesy can be made, it's the hope of the free world that China and the U.S. can avoid war. Recent moves in both capitals strengthen that hope.

NEW ORLEANS, LA.  
TIMES-PICAYUNE

AUG 30 1971

M - 196,345  
S - 308,949

## Work of CIA Should Remain Secret

Twenty-four years ago the national legislature created the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency and now there is quite a show of feeling the result was too good from the standpoint of secrecy.

That Congress doesn't know what goes on within the CIA does more than pique curiosity, such as when it finds out about the United States' participation in a Laotian war. It makes many legislators downright put out.

Not that there hasn't been congressional prying before now, but the interest is accentuated. Of almost 200 bills introduced in Congress on the subject, as many as two survived long enough to come to a vote. None has passed.

The CIA oversight subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, it seems, is as hush-hush about the CIA as the CIA itself, which stirs still more consternation on the Hill.

Congress knew when it created the CIA in 1947 that it was setting up no goldfish-bowl agency, so despite criticism about the CIA and its clandestine work it is difficult not to agree with Sen. John C. Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and on its oversight committee, when he says:

"If we are going to have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA, we cannot run it as a quilting society or something like that."

It is easy to hop on the CIA, for the agency cannot answer its critics. That is the nature of its operations.

The charter of the CIA, the National Security Act of 1947, was the culmination of a national resolve that one Pearl Harbor was enough. President Truman said in that year in referring to the Pearl Harbor period, "the military did not know everything the State department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew. The Army and Navy, in fact, had only a very informal arrangement to keep each other informed as to their plans."

So the idea behind the CIA was to coordinate the intelligence elements of the government. Not a law unto itself, it is answerable to those it serves in government.

For the agency to make Congress privy to its secrets would be to have no secret at all, hence no usable foreign intelligence.

RACINE, WISC.  
 JOURNAL-TIMES  
 E - 38,807  
 BULLETIN  
 S - 38,729

AUG 29 1971

## *Congress in Dark on CIA*

We can't blame some Congressmen for wanting to know a little more about what the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is doing.

The agency is so secret that representatives who are supposed to know about CIA activities—members of four highly select intelligence oversight subcommittees—did not know how deeply the CIA is involved in Laos.

Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington, a member of the Senate Armed Services CIA oversight subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on U.S. commitments abroad, had to send two staff members to the jungles of Laos to find out what was going on.

The report that came out was censored, but it revealed that the CIA maintains an "irregular force" in Laos as the cutting edge of the Royal Laotian army. Augmented by Thai troops, the force has been as large as 38,000 and now is about 30,000. The report also disclosed that despite the fact that U.S. expenditures for the clandestine war in Laos escalated to \$350 million in fiscal 1971 (exclusive of bombing costs), with more to be spent this year, the military situation there is growing steadily worse.

More southern Laotian territory is under North Vietnamese control than before the American-supported South Vietnamese invasion of Laos.

If the censored report conveys such a discouraging picture, one can only


speculate on how bleak the uncensored version may have been.

Since the ultra-secret Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 as an executive privilege agency, nearly 200 bills have been introduced aimed at easing the tension between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA. Not one bill has passed and only two have been put to a vote. As a result, the CIA remains a mystery even to the body that voted it into existence.

More than a dozen bills have been proposed this spring and summer aimed at removing some of the legal blinders Congress put on itself on the CIA's activities.

The proposals include setting up a joint committee on CIA intelligence operations and information which would include members of key committees from both the Senate and the House, establishing a procedure for regular and thorough CIA intelligence briefings of the two Armed Services Committees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House foreign affairs Committee or limiting the CIA to information gathering rather than military or para-military operations in other countries.

One way or another Congress should be kept informed on the CIA intelligence activities. We can't expect the agency to tell the world all the details of its cloak and dagger work, but at least congressional leaders shouldn't be kept in the



## CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPENDING

Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an un-informed Congress and an uninformative CIA.

In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted.

The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this year's impetus.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his briefing on a staff report. (*Weekly Report* p. 1709, 1660, 1268)

He told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war."

As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Senate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing.

If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, then what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? (*Secrecy fact sheet, Weekly Report* p. 1785)

A Congressional Quarterly examination of the oversight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Congress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands of four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees—Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago.

### The CIA Answers to...

As established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was accountable to the President and the National Security

Council. In the original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination.

To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intelligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organization in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a select group of ranking members of Congress. (*Congress and the Nation* Vol. I, p. 306, 249)

### THE SENATE

In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straightforward. Nine men—on two committees—hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis.

Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.


"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations.

Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA budget, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations.

No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Woodruff said the material covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour."

Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

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## Gaps in Nixon-Mao publicity

By TOM FOLEY

Henry Kissinger's trip to Peking and the forthcoming visit of President Nixon to the People's Republic of China are now getting tremendous publicity in the U.S. news media. But many questions about this apparent U.S.-PRC rapprochement remain unanswered—at least, publicly—and the detailed speculation in the U.S. press deliberately seems to avoid these areas. They are the following:

1) Northern Burma and Laos: ever since the Chinese civil war, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been deeply involved in this region just south of the Chinese province with the romantic name of Yunnan, or "Cloudy South" province. In 1949, the defeated remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army crossed over into north Burma and Laos, seized control of these outlying areas, and began calling themselves the Yunnan Anti-Communist and National Salvation Army. Actually, they are the biggest opium dealers in Southeast Asia and they have been financed and armed since 1949 by the CIA.

In Laos, the CIA organized, trained and equipped the 50,000-man secret army led by Gen. Vang Pao, composed of his Meo tribesmen followers, who are the biggest opium smugglers in Southeast Asia. But everybody knows that the CIA created this Meo military force not only for use in Laos: in Yunnan, there are 4.5 million Meo tribesmen who form the most important national minority in south China and who have maintained their ties with their relatives across the Laos border.

2) Tibet and northern Nepal: in 1959, when revolt broke out among the Amdo and Khampa tribesmen of Tibet, it did not require great insight to see the CIA hand involved in it. The Khampas were armed with brand new U.S. equipment, including GI fatigue uniforms and thermoboots. Since both Tibetans and Chinese hate and fear the Khampas, the CIA made a serious political mistake in backing them, because everybody else allied against them. They did get the Dalai Lama, however, probably because he is of Amdo, not Tibetan origin, and was born in China. About 20,000 Khampas

and Amdos fled mainly into northern Nepal after the 1959 revolt and simply took over the country in conjunction with the CIA and U.S. military in Nepal. As far as anybody knows, most of them are still there.

3) Taiwan and CIA air bases: as everybody except the ordinary American citizen knows, Taiwan is headquarters for the CIA's vast air operations in Asia. The CIA base is at Tainan and is run by a front organization called Air Asia, which also has an office in downtown Taipei. Air Asia in turn is a subsidiary of Air America, the CIA line which provides all supply and transport runs for CIA operations in Laos, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia. Air America has its offices in Okinawa; it is a Delaware corporation with about 4,000 employees listed on its records as working in Asia.

The CIA base at Tainan, in southwest Taiwan, was the launching point for all CIA operations against the Chinese mainland, including parachute drops and reconnaissance flights. This is also well known to everybody except the American people.

But the curious fact is that the U.S. news media have not mentioned a word about any of these areas, and neither has the U.S. government. The Chinese side has been completely silent about them as well.

Any real normalization of U.S.-China relations demands that all these CIA operations be ended—and not only in China—and that the American people finally be told the truth about them in detail.

## Laos Secrets


According to a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the CIA has carved out its own military satrapy in Laos. A 23-page staff report released August 3 says that the agency maintains a force of 30,000 irregulars and recruits many of these soldiers from Thailand. These irregulars are "the main cutting edge" of the decrepit Royal Laotian Army - that is to say, the Vientiane regime has almost given up, and the rest of the army won't fight at all. "The Royal Lao Government continues to be almost totally dependent on the US, perhaps more dependent than any other government in the world." Washington in turn has become almost totally dependent on hired Asian professionals, some 4500 of whom were lifted out of Thai commands at annual salaries of \$7000.

This partial audit of the administration's Laos budget put our current expenses there at \$284.2 million and credited about \$70 million to the CIA. Mr. Symington, the subcommittee chairman, told a closed session of the Senate on June 7 that the cost overruns for the 1970 program came to \$72 million. "Before the fiscal year 1972 even begins," he warned, "plans are being made to spend more than twice the amount being requested of Congress by the executive branch." The government will be spending \$374 million, at least eight times the amount that Vientiane will spend to defend itself. But even this does not include the secret funds paid out for Thai troops and the Pentagon air war. All that would add \$400 million more.

The new report makes one wonder how Congress lost track of our multiple wars in Indochina. Part of the blame is Mr. Nixon's, whose major statement on Laos in March 1970 omitted mention of massive B-52 raids in northern Laos begun only a month before. A year later, when the cost overruns started to show up, the Senate dispatched its own team of investigators to Laos. They found that the Pentagon had intrigued against congressional restrictions attached to the 1970-71 Defense appropriations bill, which prohibited the Department of Defense from financing Thai soldiers for Laos duty. There was to be no money for mer-

cenaries, Congress thought it had said. But somehow in the undergrowth of Pentagon flow charts and budget pipelines, the administration found the necessary ways and means. First, it spent more money than ever through the CIA. Then, under CIA auspices, it spent the Pentagon money that had already been appropriated, technically avoiding the bans laid on the Defense Department. "By a process of osmosis," Mr. Fulbright complained in the Senate, "the CIA has become another Defense Department, and furthermore, a Defense Department that we cannot restrict."

During five weeks of negotiations with the Symington subcommittee, the administration did its best to sanitize the Laos study. Here is the first official public document even to mention the CIA in any connection with Laos, though the actual expenditures of the CIA were finally stricken from the record. It is clear from the report that the executive branch can use the CIA as an agency of last resort to make nonsense out of congressional oversight.



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ANDREW DAVIS  
DAILY WORLD

HAVE GUNS - WILL TRAVEL.

STATINTL

## Student congress applauds veteran

# Ex-Green Beret discloses U.S. guided China incursions

By Trudy Rubin  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Fort Collins, Colo.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency "equipped and directed" incursions by mercenaries into Chinese territory from northern Laos, according to a former Green Beret captain.

Lee Mond, now a student at Newark, N.J., State College and a delegate to the National Student Association Congress here, says "no Americans have crossed the Chinese border." However, the CIA recruited ethnic Laos and Chinese for the crossings. In addition, he maintains the CIA "directed reconnaissance missions and monitored operations along the Chinese border."

### Emotional speech

Mr. Mond repeated in an interview with the Monitor charges he first aired at a forum on war crimes sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War as part of the congress last Saturday.

The tall, black veteran of seven years, seven months service who left the Army in June, 1970, after being wounded three times—winner of the Silver Star and three Bronze Stars—struggled with his emotions as he told the cheering NSA delegates on Monday that he had "made up my mind after a year of deliberations to disclose this information because these things were part of an ongoing philosophy of . . . the executive branch of this country."

Mr. Mond said that about 3,000 Chinese were in northern Laos when he was in Thailand from June, 1969, to June, 1970, and that they then controlled the quarter of the country north of the royal capital Luang Prabang.

The majority were engineers, building a north-south road from China to Luang Prabang. He said "studies indicate" that they hoped to push down to Vientiane, the present provisional capital.

Chinese infantry units were in Laos to protect the road builders, he added, and anti-aircraft installations were built in Laos to protect them.

### Incursions described

The incursions were aimed at watching Chinese movements, according to Mond.

He said the incursions were made at Lai Chau in the northern tip of Laos and Muong Sing, also in northern Laos, and that the units moved about 50 to 75 kilometers north and northwest into a large open area touching on the town of Lant Sang in Yunam Province in the People's Republic of China.

Mr. Mond said his information was based on studies he had read while serving as a plans officer in Thailand on the U.S. Army general staff and in conversations with military personnel.

He also served with the 101st Airborne in Vietnam.

The former captain cited as one main reason for his disaffection with American policies the massive flood of drugs pouring out of Laos into Thailand and then into the hands of American troops.

### Opium smuggling

He charged that the CIA "actively encouraged the growing of poppies, the flower from which opium is made, by Montagnard tribesmen (on the opium rich Plain of Jars) whom the agency recruits as mercenaries."

He later qualified this statement by adding, "perhaps they (CIA) don't always need to encourage them (the Montagnards) to grow poppies because it is so lucrative." He added, "But I am sure they don't discourage them. If they cut off this source of income, they would have to support the tribesmen far beyond what they are paying them now."

Mr. Mond also charged that the opium is often flown illicitly to major populations in Laos by Air America, a private airline said to be controlled by the CIA. "Opium comes out of the Plain of Jars catch as catch can," he said in an interview with the Monitor, "but from Mounng Suoi, a major CIA base which has an airstrip, . . . I am aware that pilots would fly it down to Vientiane for their own profit."

### Planes carry drugs

He said he "knew" that Air America was flying opium from Vientiane to Udon Thant on the southern Lao border from where it would be transported to Bangkok and perhaps on to the United States. He said that the base at Udon had one of the biggest drug problems of any U.S. base.

Mr. Mond said he could not say whether

added "it is inconceivable that this much opium could be transported on American aircraft without their superiors knowing it."

Mr. Mond said he had never personally witnessed such shipments. However, he said, that while he was in Bangkok doing research for his study on Thailand "I talked with several young Air America pilots. They had been helicopter or fixed-wing pilots in Vietnam—and they told me that the drug trade from Vientiane to Bangkok was vast. They indicated that it was being flown in. I took it for granted that since they were relating this, they had firsthand knowledge."

While in Thailand Mr. Mond's unhappiness with the drug problem led him to write a letter in April, 1970, to the commander of U.S. Army Support Forces in Thailand in which he indicated that between 10 and 15 percent of the junior enlisted men on his base used hard drugs daily.

He also initiated a drug rehabilitation program on his base.



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POST AUG 25 1974

E - 252,198

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## THE POST'S OPINION

## Congress Needs CIA Information To Maintain Vital Safeguards

IN A WAY CONGRESS has only itself to blame if it often finds itself without all the intelligence information it needs when considering policy matters and threats to peace in various parts of the world.

The executive department, frustrated congressmen have been complaining with increasing frequency, has access to much more information than it is willing to share with the lawmakers.

Several hearings and at least one executive session of the Senate have been held recently to air charges that agencies dealing with defense and security have balked congressional efforts to find out about such things as our use of Thai mercenaries in the war in Laos and our bombing of Communist forces in northern Laos.

One key to the information gap may be the fact that when Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, setting up the Central Intelligence Agency, it

required CIA to report to the National Security Council and the President — but not to Congress.

As a result of that omission, Congress frequently has had trouble getting any information from CIA. In practice, it gets only such facts as the executive department is willing to let it have.

Consequently, congressmen, with perhaps one or two exceptions, don't even know how much money they are appropriating for the CIA, what that money is used for or just why it is so used.

The CIA appropriations are carefully concealed in various parts of the overall budget.

Objecting to this condition recently, Sen. William V. Roth Jr., R-Del., explained, "Proper disclosure (of what CIA is doing) to appropriate committees is a vital safeguard against government adoption of positions and policies of unknown and potentially dangerous implications."

"Congress cannot be expected to function effectively if it is not acquainted with information about a particular subject in essentially the same detail that is in fact in the possession of the Executive."

To cure the shortage of information available to Congress, Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., has introduced a simple bill which is supported by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, D-Mont., and others.

It would require the CIA, as a matter of law, to furnish individual congressmen, upon request and through the armed services and foreign relations committees, intelligence information and the CIA's appraisal of such information.

THE COMMITTEES would be responsible for seeing that such information was adequately protected from secrecy leaks.

It has been pointed out that the arrangement whereby the Atomic Energy Commission keeps a joint House-Senate committee fully informed regarding its activities has worked with complete satisfaction.

Congressional need for full access to all information available to the executive department through CIA has been adequately demonstrated by now, we believe. The present imbalance of knowledge, it should be enacted — the sooner the better.

# Laos its no longer 'secret war'

By Richard E. Ward

The official curtain of secrecy surrounding U.S. aggression in Laos was lifted slightly with the recent publication of a Senate subcommittee staff report, "Laos: April 1971."

The heavily censored report of the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Commitments of the Foreign Relations Committee presented a darkly pessimistic view of U.S. military efforts and indicated that the initiative was in the hands of the liberation forces. The staff report was written by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, who made an on-the-spot study of U.S. activities in Laos from April 22 to May 4.

"Most observers in Laos," they wrote, "say that from the military point of view the situation there is growing steadily worse and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy. There are apparently no plans for retaking and holding any of the two-thirds of the country no longer under government control but only a hope, not too firmly held in some quarters, that the one-third of Lao territory now under government control can continue to be held. Since Lam Son 719, more Lao territory has come under enemy control. . . ."

Lowenstein and Moose reveal that CIA-sponsored forces, formerly known as the Armees Clandestine, which now go by another French term, Bataillons Guerriers, have suffered particularly heavy casualties since 1968 and the Nixon administration has tried to make up for the losses by the introduction of Thai "volunteers"—actually mercenaries.

At a secret June 7 Senate session, when the report on Laos was discussed, Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) and other Senators charged that the use of Thai troops constituted a violation of a Congressional prohibition against U.S. financing of outside mercenary troops in Laos. An expurgated version of the June 7 session was published in the Congressional Record on Aug. 3, the same day the staff report was released.

## Thai troops

In releasing the report, which also appeared in the Aug. 3 Congressional Record, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), chairman of the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Commitments, noted that one of the aspects of the U.S. "secret war" in Laos is that the executive branch refuses to divulge to the public concerns details of arrangements for using Thai troops.

The report indicated, however, that the Thai troops are recruited in Thailand, trained and entirely financed by the CIA, apparently completely bypassing the authority of the Royal Laotian government in Vientiane. The U.S. claims that the Thais are commanded by Gen. Vang Pao, the head of principal CIA-mercenary army recruited in Laos, but there is evidence that he does not exercise command over the Thai troops.

Fulbright stated in the Senate that Thai-generals were secretly present in Laos to head their forces. This was verified in the Aug. 9 Washington Post by D. E. Ronk, who wrote that the Thai forces were regular units and not "irregulars," as they were referred to in the Senate report, which was based on the terminology used by the executive branch. On the basis of discussions with Thai soldiers, Ronk wrote from Vientiane as follows:

"Their units are formed in Thailand with Thai-commissioned and non-commissioned officers and are given special training for Laos. . . ."

"They arrive in Laos aboard CIA-supported Air America planes from Udorn airbase in northern Thailand. All orders from battalion level down are issued by Thais, the soldiers said. . . ."

## CIA "case officers"

"Vang Pao does not command the Thais, they said, but consults with Thai officers and the CIA 'case officers' who actually make the decisions.

"The Thai soldiers agree with press reports that there is at least one Thai general in Laos using the code name Nai Caw. This is the equivalent of John Doe. The Thai troops say he is a lieutenant general.

"Code names are frequently used by and for Thai troops in Laos. . . .Recent visitors to Pakse say that Thai soldiers are very much in evidence in hotels and bars. They do not wear Thai army markings on their uniforms. . . ."

The fact that the Thai commander is a lieutenant general, usually the rank of a divisional commander, is an indication of the substantial size of the Thai contingent which the U.S. is attempting to keep secret. Estimates from the press and senators refer to 4800-6000; with the numbers increasing, while Pathet Lao sources say that the Thai interventionary forces may total 10,000 or more.

The Senate report states that Laotian irregulars under the CIA had 6873 killed in action from 1968 through April 1971. The losses of Vang Pao's units in the same period were almost 3300 dead and more than 5400 wounded. The irregular units now totalling 30,000 have suffered catastrophic losses for their size. The figures do not include the lower but significant losses of the Vientiane royal army (also entirely U.S. financed) nor losses from sickness and desertions—the latter being extremely high. The report observes that the military manpower base in Laos "is now exhausted. . . . Thus additional military manpower can only come from outside Laos."

## Shifting strategy?

The only possible conclusion is that Washington is again shifting its strategy in Laos. First it attempted to build up the Vientiane army for use against the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao) and that effort failed. Now that Vang Pao's and other CIA-sponsored forces from Laos have been decimated, the U.S. apparently hopes to prolong the war with the use of Thai troops. It is noteworthy that the Thai commander outranks Vang Pao, whose Meo minority troops were considered until last year to be the backbone of the U.S. military effort in Laos. Because of losses, according to the Senate report, 40% of Vang Pao's troops are no longer from the Meo.

Further evidence of the difficulties confronting the U.S. results from a quasi-disintegration of the royal army. Lowenstein and Moose write that it has "become increasingly difficult in the past year or so to maintain an adequate level of manpower in the Royal Lao Army." Recruitment, they continue, "is said by some to resemble a press gang operation in which only those without political connection end up in the Army. We were told that 30% of all-new recruits desert."

Later in the report, the authors write: "Royal Lao Army units are all controlled by individual military region commanders who are frequently likened to warlords. We were told that Vientiane authorities are thus not at liberty to move them from one region to another as the overall military situation may require. Apparently each such move requires negotiation with regional authorities."

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COLUMBUS, OHIO  
DISPATCH

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AUG 22 1971

# Low-Profile Michigan Solon Selected to Investigate CIA

Dispatch Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — If the best qualification for a super-sleuth is to be inconspicuous, then the government's hush-hush intelligence network had better watch its secrets.

They'd better watch them—because if all the 535 members of Congress were assembled together, Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., might be the least noticeable. And Nedzi has just been named to explore the intelligence network's hidden operations.

NEDZI IS a small, plump man with scanty hair, although only in his mid-40s, of padding walk rather than purposeful stride, whose somewhat moonlike face is marked customarily by a somewhat bewildered expression.

He is, moreover, a dove. Members of the House establishment regard him as a rebel on the House hawk-like Armed Services Committee.

Thus it was that when Committee Chairman F. Edward Hebert, D-Ia., suddenly named the Michigan lawmaker, a veteran of less than 10 years in Congress and only the ninth-ranking member of the committee, as the House overseer of the intelligence establishment, there were gasps of amazement from all over.

TRADITIONALLY, the subcommittee that oversees Central Intelligence Agency operations is headed by the full committee chairman.

Presumably, that was the way it would be under Hebert, because the CIA traditionally



LUCIEN NEDZI had been a part of the defense establishment, its ways not to be questioned too deeply.

So Nedzi's selection was a shock—at least to those who did not know Hebert once was an investigation-minded New Orleans city editor who directed the first expose of the Huey Long empire.

AN EVEN GREATER surprise was when Hebert expanded the subcommittee's authority to include oversight of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the super-secret National Security Agency.

Nedzi's record on the Armed Services Committee has not been of the kind that had endeared him to the more senior, and generally more conservative, members of that panel—he had, as a matter of fact, been one of a quintet including Ohio's Charles W. Whalen Jr., R-Dayton, who had repeatedly infuriated Rivers, Hebert's predecessor

Nedzi has cosponsored an unsuccessful end-the-war

amendment, has opposed the BL bomber and the Safeguard missile system.

SO WHY DID Hebert jump Nedzi over several of his seniors? "Because he is an honest man, and will do an honest job," said Hebert.

Nedzi's explanation was that Hebert was interested in having "a review in this area . . . we understand each other. I know where he

stands and he knows where I stand. I have never deceived him and he has never reflected deception to me. He feels that we need to call a spade a spade and he feels I'll do just that."

Hebert may be right. Nedzi's fellow subcommittee members are four hawkish establishment men—Melvin Price of Illinois and O. C. Fisher of Texas, Democrats, and William G. Bray of Indiana and Alvin E. O'Rourke of Wisconsin, Republicans—all of whom rank Nedzi in seniority.

NEDZI COMES to his new job with little knowledge about the intelligence field. This could be a help in impartial inquiry, because in the past, only senior members of the Armed Services Committee knew and rarely let their juniors in on the secrets.

Nedzi had brief exposure to the intelligence field as a member of a subcommittee

looking into the Pueblo affairs. He had met CIA Director Richard Helms. But he has never had any direct contact with CIA. He does not know Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, nor Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the National Security Agency.

Thus, he comes to his newly assigned task with clean hands and an open mind. But he knows what he wants to find out.

HE WANTS TO know if individual rights are being protected—that is, have the intelligence agencies cut out their domestic intelligence activities. He will check to see if it is proper for CIA to manage secret operations such as those in Laos and other covert operations not related to intelligence gathering as such; if there is too much overlapping and too little coordination between intelligence operations and if enormous budgets for these operations channel information to proper authorities at the right time; if the whole system of security classification should be revised; and what is the real and definitive basis for arriving at decisions in national intelligence estimates.

There may be nothing wrong with the overall intelligence operation.

But if there is something wrong, those responsible had better not put in Nedzi's seeming vagueness any faith that he will not uncover their secret faults.

CHATTANOOGA, TENN.

TIMES

AUG 20 1971

M - 59,391

S - 69,238

## *Where Gaps Appear*

On Jan. 27, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright wrote Defense Secretary Melvin Laird a series of questions about military operations on Laos. On April 14, the department said the information was "too highly sensitive to release."

On June 7, the Senate held a closed session during which it was briefed on the Laos situation from a Foreign Relations Committee staff report. On Aug. 3, a censored version of the session's proceedings was published in the *Congressional Record*.

One of the things revealed was that the CIA was supervising and paying for training of Thai irregulars who "volunteer" for duty in Laos, transport them into Laos, and return them when their tour is up. But the State Department, in answer to a query, said that since the soldiers are volunteers and serve under command of the Royal Lao government,

they "are considered to be local forces in Laos."


Back of all this is a clause in the 1971 Defense Department Appropriation bill: "Nothing . . . hereunder shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia and Laos."

And who spoke of the "credibility gap" under President Johnson?

18 AUG 1971

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/09/10 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060016



# Editorials

## Peace talk, war deeds

"As the threat of war recedes," "as we move into a generation of peace," as "we...move forward to the new prosperity without war," to "prosperity with full employment in peacetime," we must decide to "hold fast to the strength that makes peace and freedom possible in this world," President Nixon said in his Sunday night broadcast.

Those words, sprinkled through the broadcast, were intended to convince the listener, almost in passing as it were, that the war has ended, that there is no U.S. war in Vietnam, no U.S.-organized, fed, and commanded war in Cambodia, no CIA-organized, fed, and directed war in Laos. ✓

The aim was to make the listener forget that Nixon is still sabotaging the peace talks in Paris, that he has refused to make any response to the 7-point peace program of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, though the proposals were presented six and one-half weeks before Nixon's broadcast.

The road of death for our GIs has been extended by six and one-half weeks by the President's sabotage of the talks; so, too, the road of death for men and women and children of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Freedom for the U.S. POWs, one of the bright prospects in the 7-point program, has been shoved off; they have had six and one-half weeks added to their term by the President's cruel rejection of peace.


If proof were needed for the urgency of speeding up the grass roots organization and mobilization for the October 13 peace moratorium action, the President provided it in his broadcast. When he says "peace," one can see the blood still running. Popular action for peace now is more urgent than ever.

# Secret U.S. Action Against Chinese Aired in Congress

By JAMES McCARTNEY  
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The story of clandestine U.S. military activities against mainland China has unfolded here before a joint House-Senate committee.

A former Chinese expert for the State Department testified that the United States, in 20 years, has played a key role in mounting "espionage, sabotage and guerrilla" activities against China.



BACKGROUND  
REPORT

The witness, Allen S. Whiting, now with the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, said "secrecy and censorship" have made it impossible for the public to know what was going on.

He blamed the secret activities for starting a whole series of wars in the Far East — and contributing heavily to the start of the Vietnam war.

Whiting's descriptions are believed to be the most detailed made public of secret activities against China mounted by the United States in cooperation with Formosa.

He blamed the U.S.-Taipei efforts for:

- Creating crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1954 and 1958.
- Adding to the flames of a revolt in Tibet in 1959.
- Heightening Chinese "alarm" of Indian advances on the Tibetan frontier in 1962, which led to a Chinese-Indian war in the fall of 1962.

HE SAID THESE CRISES "triggered Chinese Communist military reactions which, in turn, have been used to justify a vast expanse of U.S. military bases, alliances and military assistance programs throughout Asia, ostensibly to contain the threat of Chinese Communist aggression."

These expenditures, he said, have been made "largely in response to a nonthreat."

Whiting's testimony was praised by John Fairbank, who is director of Harvard University's East Asian Research Center and considered the nation's top Chinese expert.

"We should be outraged," Fairbank said, "about the way in which the military had their cap set under the argument of secrecy."

HE SAID WHITING'S testimony indicated the CIA is able "to conduct wars which in turn produced responses from the People's Republic (China) without the American public knowing about it."

It is not known whether the United States is continuing secret operations against China since President Nixon announced plans to visit the RE.

There have been reports that the Nixon Administration has ordered a halt to the dispatching of special, CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen into China on reconnaissance patrols.

But Whiting described much more elaborate activities.

HE SAID THE "SHADOWY involvement" of the United States grew rapidly after the Korean War and the Geneva Conference of 1954.

He identified a Formosan airline, Civil Air Transport (CAT), as being connected with the CIA.

CAT, he said, provided a "commercial cover" for CIA and other secret government activities.

These included "more than 2,000 overflights of mainland China and Tibet, according to Whiting.

"These included "more than 2,000 overflights of mainland China and Tibet, according to Whiting.

"These were not reconnaissance, but airdrops of supplies and possibly men for guerrilla warfare."

IN THE 1960S, according to Whiting, CAT "gave way" to a new "cover."

It has been called China Air Lines, which began operations in Laos and later moved to South Vietnam.

China Air Lines has carried out "clandestine intelligence operations" as well as "more dangerous missions," Whiting said.

He said Formosa has also provided the headquarters for Air Asia, a subsidiary of Air America, a CIA-operated airline in Southeast Asia.

HE DESCRIBED AIR ASIA as the "only facility in the Far East — excluding Japan — with modern jet fighter maintenance and overhaul contracts."

"Well over 6,000 combat aircraft were serviced there in the fiscal year 1969," he said.

China Air Lines, Air Asia and Air America, he said, work together to support U.S. attacks in Laos mounted from bases in Thailand. All, of course, are secret.

These activities, he said, help to explain China's road-building activities in northern Laos as well as its efforts to provide anti-aircraft facilities.

STATINTL

SANTA BARBARA, CAL.  
NEWS-PRESS

E - 38,949  
S - 40,976

AUG 18 1971

## Some Other Explosive Issues . . .

While the nation's attention is focused on the startling new economic moves initiated by the Nixon administration, other unsolved issues of deep concern to the American people continue to build up steam for future explosions.

One of these is the matter of how the Congress can regain adequate control over military activities by our governmental agencies overseas. Shortly before Congress recessed, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo), chairman of a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, drew from the Central Intelligence Agency a public admission that it is and has been sustaining a force of 30,000 irregulars in a secret war waged in Laos. It was indicated in the hearing that the CIA last year used about \$135,000,000 to train, pay and supervise the Laotian "volunteers" as well as a force of about 4,800 Thai recruits.

The senator alleged that the employment of Thai volunteers violates an anti-mercenary provision of the Defense Appropriations Act, and commented: "Not only are they breaking the law, but they intend to break it more." He said he plans to offer two amendments to the military buying authorization bill, coming up for a Senate vote in September, to limit U.S. spending in Laos, and to stop pay for Thai troops in Laos.

Many concerned Americans, private citizens as well as legislators, are deeply disturbed by the fact that an agency of the government (other than the Defense Department) can conduct secret war operations in a foreign land over a period of eight years or so, attempt to hide this fact from the American people and deny to Congress any financial or other control over its operations.

In recent days reports have come from India that American arms being withdrawn from Vietnam are now being supplied to the Pakistan government, in addition to the continuing shipment of arms from the United States that has been protested by India. Such supplies were embargoed by Washington, in response to protests that they would be used in suppression of the dissident Bengali people in East Pakistan, but the embargo has not yet taken effect.

The tragic bloodbath in East Pakistan may be viewed as an insurrection, a war of liberation, or a conflict between India and Pakistan. But the American people have a right to know why we are providing weapons that could be used for slaughter in East Pakistan and India. We should be active only in trying to encourage a peaceful settlement of the three-sided dispute, and in providing food and medical supplies to alleviate human suffering.

17 AUG 1971

## *Potomac Fever*

The CIA spent \$70 million to operate a clandestine army in Laos last year—and they still don't know who it is they're supposed to fight.

The Pentagon did a big study showing a relationship between some toothpastes and gum ailments. Was this their reaction to the charge that we're toothless tigers?

The government is only sore at that dentist who put phoney braces on draft-dodgers because they thought he was trying to pull a fast one.

President Nixon has asked that we spend \$6 million declassifying millions of World War II documents. Wouldn't you rather wait and see the John Wayne movie?

There's no danger that Lockheed will go bankrupt now. But we have to watch and make sure their management doesn't get gout.

Scientists have said the water in Washington is still safe to drink, in case anybody on Capitol Hill cared to try it sometime.



CAMDEN, N. J.

COURIER-POST

AUG 1 6 1971

E - 111,336

## *Not Too Much to Ask*

When the Central Intelligence Agency was established, in the late 1940s the explanation was that we needed a specially trained and equipped organization to gather information on political, economic, and military situations all over the world. We needed an organization that could give the President reports on these situations every day. The CIA was to be a well-camouflaged if not a secret agency -- so that it could go about its data-gathering assignment with a minimum of trouble.

The CIA has, indeed, gathered information and prepared the confidential evaluations for the presidents. Some of these evaluations, like those that forecast the problems in Vietnam, turned out to be good and prescient judgments, even if they were ignored. The CIA would look a lot better today if it had stayed with information gathering -- instead of getting into the business of designing and executing adventures like the Bay of Pigs.

It has been rumored for a long time and now is finally confirmed that the CIA has been running the "secret war" in Laos. This is the operation in which an irregular army of more than 30,000 Meo tribesmen, Thai volunteers, and men from the Royal Laotian forces has been waging nine years of relatively unavailing war for the Plain of Jars and the hamlets of the eastern half of the country. Our attempt to keep the operation secret has made our motives look too much like the motives of the Communists.

To the extent that the United States must carry on military programs in South Asia -- and elsewhere -- it would seem more reasonable and satisfactory to have them carried on openly and by the Department of Defense. We may not accomplish what we set out to do in every case. But at least we'll know what the United States is doing. That isn't too much to ask of the government.

**THE WAR IN INDOCHINA**

Ky: Bumped off the ballot

**No Ky and a Big Win?**

Among political cognoscenti in Saigon, Nguyen Van Thieu has earned the sobriquet of *le grand louvoyeur*—the grand maneuverer. And in his bid for re-election in next October's national election, South Vietnam's President has demonstrated some fancy—if questionable—political footwork. Last week, he pulled off a power play that apparently swept a major rival, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, right out of the electoral arena. But amid outraged cries of "foul" from his opponents, Thieu may yet find himself galloping all alone toward the goal line—and toward an empty victory.

Political passions in Saigon were churned to an angry froth last week when South Vietnam's Supreme Court rejected Ky's application to enter the Presidential contest on the ground that he had failed to secure the necessary number of valid endorsements for his candidacy. At the same time, the court duly certified Thieu and a third announced candidate, Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh. But barely hours after Ky was bounced off the ballot, Big Minh again reiterated his threat to withdraw should he conclude that the election was being rigged. Charging that many of his backers have been harassed and even arrested by the police, Minh told NEWSWEEK's Kevin Buckley: "All these pressures and sharp practices lead to the conclusion that the election is not honest right from the beginning. In view of this serious situation, we deem it necessary to reconsider our decision to run." At the weekend, however, Minh was still thinking things over.

The candidate shortage in South Vietnam was caused by a controversial election law that the Thieu government rammed through the National Assembly in June. The measure required Presiden-

tial candidates to be endorsed by at least 40 members of the National Assembly, or by 100 members of provincial councils. Ostensibly, the move was designed to limit the candidate list to a manageable number. But few Saigon insiders had the slightest doubt that the real target of the law was Nguyen Cao Ky. For Thieu had already cornered the market on endorsements, collecting 452 out of a possible 550 signatures in the local councils. In the National Assembly, Thieu also sewed up a majority, but left enough legislators uncommitted so that Big Minh could accumulate 44 Assembly endorsements and qualify for the election.

**Appeal:** Despite the obstacles confronting him, Ky beat the bushes for signatures and appeared at the Supreme Court claiming 102 endorsements from provincial councilors. But the court promptly tossed out 40 of Ky's endorsements because the signatories had previously signed for Thieu. To no avail, Ky contended that the disputed 40 signatures had been obtained by Thieu through threats and fraud and that the signers now wished to switch to him. The Vice President's last slim hope of making the ballot now rests on an appeal this month before the full Supreme Court (six of the nine justices were abroad on vacation last week). But according to one Western diplomat in Saigon, "he hasn't got a hope in hell."

In the heated aftermath of Ky's initial disqualification, rumors of a possible *coup d'état* began to swirl through Saigon. The Vice President himself did nothing to stop the talk. Attacking Thieu's heavy-handed political maneuvers, Ky said he was "alerting the brothers of the army to the dangers of a dishonest election." And when he was asked whether he would rule out the possibility that someone might try to overthrow the government, the Vice President replied: "I don't know." To be sure, there were no signs at all that such a move was being planned, and Thieu seemed to be more than strong enough to put down a coup in the unlikely event that one actually occurred. But what made the rumors politically significant was the fact that such talk has not been heard in South Vietnam for years.

**Prediction:** For Thieu, the rewards of excluding Ky from the race were apparently worth whatever risk he was running. Thieu does not merely want to win the election; he wants to win big. For in a nation where public opinion is little impressed by narrow victory margins, Thieu has chafed in his role as a minority President (he received just 34 per cent of the total vote cast in 1967). And with Ky apparently barred from the race last week, Thieu serenely predicted that he would get 55 per cent of the vote this time. That prospect, however, dismayed most of Thieu's American supporters. "Thieu hates Ky's guts, but that's no rea-

son to discredit the election," grumbled one Pentagon official. "It was in his best interests, and the interests of the Vietnamese people, to hold an open, democratic campaign in which two or three major candidates would fight it out. Frankly, I think Thieu is the best man for the job, but he should make a run for it fair and square."

**Course:** It was unlikely, however, that American sensibilities would have much influence on Thieu. Earlier in his term, the former army general leaned heavily on the advice of U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who may well have helped to shape the quiet, methodical process by which Thieu stripped his main rival, Nguyen Cao Ky, of most of his political power. But in recent months, Thieu has increasingly spurned the ambassador's advice, and the caution and restraint that Bunker instilled in his prize pupil have begun to wear off. By charting his own course in the pre-campaign maneuvering, Thieu has proved conclusively that he is no puppet of Bunker's. But the President may have gone too far in the process, letting himself in for the farce of an unopposed election. And considering the volatile political situation that he has created out of what looked like a winning position to begin with, Nguyen Van Thieu may yet wish that he had hung onto the apron strings a little longer.



Vang Pao: Paycheck from the CIA

**Open Secret**

Last week, the United States finally admitted what much of the world had known for years: that the Central Intelligence Agency has been supporting a Chinese anti-Communist army in Laos. A staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—and cleared by the CIA, as well as the State and Defense departments—revealed that the U.S. will pay \$322 million in the current fiscal year for a 30,000-man irregular army, including Miao tribesmen commanded by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao and 10,000 Thai "volunteers." Another report, published in *The Washington Post*, also maintained that the CIA has been sending Lao guerrillas across the Chinese border on reconnaissance missions, and that the Administration only recently halted these operations. Washington, however, declined to confirm or deny that report.

## LAOS

## The Twilight Zone

The total budget for the Kingdom of Laos this year is a paltry \$36.6 million. To fight a war there, the U.S. in fiscal 1971 spent \$284.2 million—or \$141 for every one of the approximately 2,000,000 men, women and children under government control. (The gross national product totals only \$66 per capita.)

These bizarre statistics are contained in a once secret staff report released last week by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after five weeks of haggling with the Administration over declassifying its salient points. The figures become even more bizarre when the cost of air operations—one of the figures still classified, but reliably estimated at \$1.4 billion—is included, bringing per capita expenditure up to an incredible \$900. The report was compiled after a visit to Laos last spring by Richard Moose and James Lowenstein, both former Foreign Service officers, who are the committee's staff experts on Southeast Asia. Their findings at least partially lifted what Committee Member Stuart Symington called "the veil of secrecy, which has long kept this 'secret war' in Laos officially hidden from the American people." The study also came to the discouraging conclusion that despite vast expenditures by the U.S., the military situation in Laos "is growing steadily worse, and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy."

**War by Proxy.** Though the 23-page document focuses on the clandestine nature of U.S. operations in Laos, the fact is that quite a few nations are involved in the same way. The reason for the secrecy is that none of the nations want to be accused of violating Laotian neutrality, which is guaranteed by the Geneva accords of 1962.

The North Vietnamese have always considered Laos vital in their struggle to unify Viet Nam. As early as 1953, an NVA division invaded Laos and slashed all the way to the Mekong. The Chinese have been working on an extensive road project in northern Laos since 1962, with a sizable military presence for protection. According to the Moose-Lowenstein report, that presence has increased from 6,000 two years ago to as many as 20,000 today, and carries with it a concentration of anti-aircraft and radar installations, which makes the area one of the most heavily defended in the world.

There is little doubt that the North Vietnamese were the first to violate the territorial integrity and neutrality of Laos. But for a variety of reasons, including domestic politics, the U.S. never responded openly to this situation. In-

stead, Communist clandestine operations in Laos were matched—and often surpassed—by the U.S. and its allies.

Not all of the secret adventures are mentioned in the Foreign Relations Committee's report. But they include: American bombing missions in northern and southern Laos from Thai air force bases in Thailand; probes by U.S. Special Forces teams from South Viet Nam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos; secret forays into China from northern Laos by specially trained CIA teams (now reportedly halted); the formation, funding and training by the CIA of an irregular army of up to 15,000 Meo tribesmen; large-scale operations throughout Laos by Air America, the CIA's unofficial flag line in Asia; and the recruitment, training and payment of at least 4,800 Thai volunteers to fight in Laos.

The result is a curious war by proxy whose protagonists are the North Vietnamese and the American-backed irregulars. The cost has been particularly heavy for the Meos. Says Edgar ("Pop") Buell, AID coordinator for northeastern Laos: "Back in 1960 we told the Meos they would only have to hold out for a year. They've held out for more than ten. They're tired and badly cut up, and still we're telling them to hold out. They think it's time for someone else to do the dying."

**Heavy Cost.** The main argument for this costly effort, as Symington pointed out last week, is that it "will buy more time for Vietnamization" by pinning down North Vietnamese troops in Laos. Without this effort, the North Vietnamese would have unrestricted use of Laotian supply lines to support their effort in South Viet Nam. "But what about Laos?" asked Symington. "The United States is using the people of Laos for its own purposes, at a startlingly heavy increased cost to our taxpayers in money, and to the Lao people in terms of destroyed hopes, destroyed territory, and destroyed lives."

# Senate 'Consultants' Sniff

By MILES BENSON

WASHINGTON -- (ANS) — In the paneled dignity of the Foreign Relations Committee hearing room, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose look like a pair of mild-mannered Senate aides in horn-rimmed glasses.

They are carried on the Senate staff rosters as "consultants."

But in the past two years these "consultants," congressional sources say, have been drugged in Phnom Penh, shadowed by geons in Athens and nearly spilled from a helicopter over Vietnam.

They have stolen secrets from the Central Intelligence Agency, unsettled the aplomb of numerous generals and ambassadors, the sources say, and uncovered a war Congress didn't know about.

THE HARD-DRIVING pair work for Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, who sends them out to the world's hot spots to dig out information the administration can't, or won't, give Congress.

They have written five detail-cramped reports on what is really going on in Greece, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos — the last so sensitive that the entire Senate went into a secret session last June 7 to discuss what Moose and Lowenstein reported.

That report disclosed for the first time the extent of U. S. war efforts in Laos, a war many congressmen said they had been unaware of.

UNTIL recently the two investigators worked in almost total anonymity, which they are now struggling to maintain. Their names, however, are appearing more frequently in news stories. Television news panel shows, sniffing international intrigue, are after them for appearances, which they refuse.

Lowenstein, 44, a short stocky tennis player, never travels without his racket. The son of a Long Branch, N.J., stockbroker, he attended Yale University and Harvard Law school, spent three years in the Navy and 10 years into the Foreign Service before joining the Foreign Relations Committee staff.

Moose, 39, from Little Rock, Ark., drives a battered red Volkswagen around Washington when

he isn't jetting around the world. He majored in history and political science at Columbia University and Hendrix College. Like Lowenstein, Moose put in 10 years in the Foreign Service and then was named to the staff of the National Security Council in 1966, working under Walt Rostow, President Johnson's adviser on national security affairs and an architect of the Vietnam war.

Moose spent two years with Rostow, left in mid-1968 to join the Institute for Defense Analyses, a private think-tank, and returned to the White House in 1969 as staff secretary to the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger, switching to Fulbright's staff a year later.

SENATE colleagues talk about Moose and Lowenstein with a mixture of envy and respect.

"They're good," said one, "because they're very sharp and they know from the inside how our missions operate overseas. They know the kinds of questions to ask, the people that they should see and where the bodies are likely to be buried. They have a trained nose for what smells fishy."

On a mission for Fulbright, they work as a team interviewing high and low U. S. officials on the scene, newsmen, officials of the nation they are visiting as well as unofficial sources.

They also have a lot of friends on embassy staffs from their own foreign service days who often provide them with inside information.

# Out U.S. Secrets

STATINTL

MILWAUKEE, WISC.  
JOURNAL AUG 15 1971

E - 359,036  
S - 537,875



'CIA Rent-A-War. May we help you?'

### *Letters From The People*

#### **China Does What We Can't**

Just yesterday we had to embark on a multi-billion dollar ABM system to save ourselves from the fearful Chinese dragon. Now we are becoming palsy-walsy. But China is going to demand that we get our whole warmaking machine out of Indochina. We can't decide whether we are sad or glad to realize that its voice is going to carry more weight than that of the American people, which has been crying out for just this consummation for a long time.

But we welcome anything that will effectively counteract the arrogance and unwisdom of the Pentagon and the CIA who seem hell-bent on usurping the powers of Congress and saddling the American taxpayer with the burden of endless war.

We search in vain for the reason. The governments we support in Indochina are oligarchies motivated by the narrowest possible self-interest. They are not pro-democracy or even anti-Communist. No principle is involved in what they do or plan to do. They would profess Communism or any other ism as blithely as they profess democracy, if it promised the means by which to perpetuate themselves. What have they done or would they ever do for America or the cause of democracy anywhere in the world? They reward us by striving to enrich themselves by making dope addicts out of your young men, who are sacrificing life and limb to "save" them from Communism.

So we find ourselves looking hopefully to our erstwhile enemy to do for us what we have been unable to do for ourselves through our elected Representatives in Congress. Not that Congress has not tried. It has outlawed the war in Laos, but the Pentagon and the CIA ignore the law and the Administration does everything possible to keep their clandestine war a secret. Ray R. Henley

TIMES AUG 15 1971

M - 154,532

S - 169,686

# Our Bloody Bombing

For the first time in the long history of U.S. secrecy on military adventures in Southeast Asia, the Central Intelligence Agency has publicly admitted its clandestine operations in Laos.

ONE HARDLY knows whether to hail the news as a step toward government honesty, or to condemn the magnitude of past deception.

A story by Fred Brantman on page one of this section fleshes out the bare bones of CIA admissions made to a Senate subcommittee early this month. Both the story and CIA disclosures show the plight of Laos is probably beyond the most horrible dreams of most Americans.

Though much information still is secret, we now know the CIA's secret war in Laos stretches all the way back to the 1952 breakdown of the Geneva Accords.

WE KNOW the CIA has spent some \$70-million to train, operate and pay an army of irregular forces called "volunteers" (possibly violating the anti-mercenary army provision in last year's Defense Appropriations Act), and we know that no one knows the full total of U.S. spending in Laos.

The Defense Department says \$234.2-million represents a "partial total of Laos costs in 1970." Senate Armed Forces Committee Chairman John Stennis admits the Defense Department can't account for how it spent \$2.5-billion in Southeast Asia.

And government sources say Laos costs have risen again, doubling since January. They are expected to reach \$374-million this year — three times larger than in 1967, 25 times higher than when military assistance began nine years ago.

DECEPTION IS deception no matter what it conceals. But in terms of wholesale destruction and death, the subterfuge practiced to hide the CIA ground war is inconsequential compared to the screening of the air war.

On that front we now know that the much-hailed Johnson Administration bomb halt of 1969 was a hoax, that the rain of bombs did not stop but only shifted to Laos, with greater destruction of villages than had ever taken place in North Vietnam.

We know that since President Nixon took office and ground troop withdrawals began, more than 2.7 million tons of bombs have been dropped on Indochina — more than during both Korea and World War II, six-million pounds a day, 4,000 a minute.

IN MAY the Washington Post wrote: "By the admission of American officials closely associated with the war there, Laos has been the most heavily bombed country in the history of aerial warfare."

Though the bombing destroys the very country it purports to defend, it has great advantage in American politics.

Fewer Americans are killed. The U.S. public is only vaguely aware of the destruction it is sponsoring and paying for because there can be no body counts from 30,000 feet. The killing of innocent people is harder to verify. When military officials are questioned, they simply deny it. Reporters can't get to the scene.

IT IS IMPORTANT that the American public understand the widened air war is not a temporary tactic. It is part of a fundamental change in policy, calculat-

ed to continue the war while claiming that fewer American casualties mean the war is winding down. Last week the Cambodian army announced a winter offensive with American air support.

The bombing has grown from sporadic tactical assistance a few years ago to become the primary thrust of the war. It now costs \$10-billion annually.

Americans cannot self-righteously condemn the World War II slaughter of German Jews and then walk at their government's bombing of innocent factions, Cambodians, Thais, North and South Vietnamese. We may not see the blood as readily as before troop withdrawals began, but it is there, it is greater, and it is on our hands.

DES MOINES, IOWA  
REGISTER

AUG 14 1970

M - 250,261  
S - 515,710

## Presidential Acts of War

Enemies and prospective enemies know when the United States invades them, or trains foreign guerrillas who invade, or sends spy planes or spy drone planes over their territory. Often Americans do not.


But what really gets to us is to learn this August that the United States stopped in July sending patrols of Central Intelligence Agency-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen on spy missions deep into mainland China; and to learn that the United States suspended U-2 spy flights over China about a year

ago, and unmanned drone spy flights over China some months ago.

All these are "acts of war" in international law. Presidents had no legal right to do them without permission of Congress, and no moral right to do them without the American people knowing about them and having a chance to roar, "Stop!"

But the public was not informed until long after they stopped, and then only by a leak from foreign diplomats in Washington.





# Will Mao Tse-tung

## Throw Nixon a Bone?

The President's move to open up relations with Peking looks curiuser and curiuser, and it is difficult to suppress the feeling that we are experiencing another Munich. One searches in vain for the slightest trace of evidence showing that the mainland has any intention of tossing the United States a bone, but if concessions from Peking are to be forthcoming, they are being securely hidden from public view. Meanwhile, all the evidence suggests that the Red Chinese are more irreconcilable than ever.

Since the President's announced trip on July 15, Red China has laid down a steady barrage of anti-American propaganda and assumed the most inflexible diplomatic posture. Even Joseph Kraft, who, of course, favors the Nixon maneuver, remarks that the notion that Peking was going to turn pliable on a broad range of issues was just a set of illusions. "As it happens," he goes on, "the familiar sore spots have all been rubbed a little harder."

Indeed, they have. Just two days after Nixon's dramatic statement that he would voyage to the mainland, Peking radio blasted the "reactionary ruling circles" in America who "are actively carrying out the policies of aggression and war...."

New York *Times* correspondent James Reston, recovering from an appendicitis operation in Peking, writes from the Chinese Communist capital that "you live in an atmosphere of vicious and persistent anti-American propaganda...." While Chinese officials are pleased with Nixon's visit, Peking media "relentlessly characterize the American government as the 'arch criminal' of the world. The United States, they insist, has been 'beaten black and blue' in Viet Nam, but still goes on backing a 'fascist clique' there and is reviving 'Japanese militarism' and plotting new wars of aggression in Korea and the rest of Asia."

Peking, moreover, continues to talk of an end to the American military presence in South Viet Nam, South Korea, Formosa, Thailand and Japan. To underscore the point, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, President Nixon's prospective host, says that in exchange for rapprochement, we must submit to the most humiliating and horrendous demands, including U.S. withdrawal "from all Indochina."

And now Peking has even turned its back on convoking a new Indochina conference to help settle the war in Viet Nam. As an article in *The People's Daily* put it, the United States is trying "to turn the tide and seek the way out" of Indochina through a conference, but "this can never be done."

Available evidence suggests that the Red Chinese are not only stepping up their propaganda warfare, but that they are heating up their guerrilla warfare operations in Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Laos. And the mainland is continuing to supply fresh military weapons for Hanoi as a result of a just-concluded agreement between Red China and North Viet Nam.

But where are the concessions? They are there, of course, but they are being unilaterally dispensed by the United States.

The President, for instance, has already lowered the trade barriers against Red China, called for the admission of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations, insulted the Nationalist leaders, downgraded the importance of Taiwan and seriously harmed our relations with nearly all our Asian allies.

We have also abandoned our spy flights over the mainland, and, according to reports last week, we have ordered a halt in the dispatching of special CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen

into China on reconnaissance patrols from bases in northern Laos.

Our policy reversal has particularly damaged relations with the pro-Western government of Premier Eisaku Sato. Before Nixon's dramatic announcement, Sato, who prided himself on having close relations with the United States, had refused to bow to pressure from 100 parliamentary members of his own party to make his own direct approach to Peking. He almost slavishly followed U.S. policy in this area.

Over the years, America has persistently pressured Tokyo into keeping its distance politically from the Chinese mainland, while giving maximum support to Taiwan. By abruptly switching policies without informing Sato, we have caused him to lose face and many are predicting the downfall of his government in the next elections.

But for the present our view of what's happening coincides with that of Bruno Shaw, a China expert who wrote a scathing denunciation of President Nixon's trip to the mainland in a recent edition of the *Wall Street Journal*. Said Shaw:

"Having lived in China from the beginning of the Chinese Communist movement, witnessed the murder of countless Chinese farmers in Human Province at the hands of Mao Tse-tung in the mid 1920s and had a first-hand personal acquaintance with the leadership and the program of the Chinese Communist crusade, I am firmly convinced that if President Nixon persists in the folly of a visit to Red China in pursuit of world peace, he will go down in history as:

○ "In China, a barbarian chieftain who was permitted to enter the Middle Kingdom bringing tribute to Peking;

○ "In the West, as the Neville Chamberlain of our time. And Taiwan will become the disposable Sudetenland of the East, no matter what fine words are uttered by the politicians who are presently in charge of our destiny."

Continued

The statement issued by Secretary of State Rogers last week on U.S. policy toward Red China's admission to the United Nations only tends to confirm the thesis that we are about to betray Taiwan. In reversing a consistent policy for 22 years, Secretary Rogers said we would vote to let Red China into the United Nations. The secretary also said that we would fight to keep Taiwan represented as well, but the secretary did not suggest, which he could have, if the Administration had Taiwan's true interests at heart, that we would only vote to admit Peking if Taiwan were not expelled.

As a result of offering no such assurances, rumors are flying through diplomatic circles that we don't really intend to fight very hard to keep Taiwan in the world body—another concession to our new "friends" on the mainland. And that Taiwan will be tossed out—as demanded by Peking—seems all too likely. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg predicted as much last week. As he so aptly put it, "The floodgates are open and the battle is over."

The furious pace at which we have been courting Peking has even astonished no less a personage than Oliver Edmund Clubb, an Old China Hand who was known in the 1940s and 1950s as extremely sympathetic toward the Red Chinese regime. Though Clubb is all for rapprochement, last week he wondered whether President Nixon might not be at a diplomatic disadvantage at the Sino-American summit.

"Because the meeting has been arranged at our initiative," said Clubb, who was once suspended from the State Department for his pro-Mao views, "the President must bring home some tangible agreement. Failing that, he will suffer a major diplomatic setback. China, on the other hand, doesn't have to make many concessions because its political fortunes are already so clearly on the rise." Indeed, the irony of ironies: Oliver Clubb warning Richard Nixon about falling into a Chinese Communist trap.

Perhaps President Nixon may wave a magic wand when he voyages to Peking and produce a miracle that will justify his seemingly unjustifiable actions at the present time. Perhaps he has an excellent reason to visit the Red Chinese, who have killed anywhere from 34 to 64 million of their own people, according to a recent document released by the Senate Internal Security subcommittee.

WEEKLY - CIRC.N-A

AUG 14 1971

THE GUARDIAN August 14 1971

American Intelligence faked a broadcast in Prince Sihanouk's voice in its latest attempt to regain influence in Cambodia: F. D. Allman reports from Phnom Penh on the dangerous rivalry between the CIA and the American State and Defence Departments.

# US infighting

While the armies of Phnom Penh and Saigon fight the forces of Hanoi for control of Cambodia, another war is being fought for the same territory by another set of allies against another infiltrator from the north. The other co-belligerents are the American Departments of State and Defence—like Cambodia and South Vietnam, hardly natural allies. The invader that has brought them together, to use President Nixon's phrase, is the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA, like the North Vietnamese, were supposed to have been deprived of their Cambodian enclaves last year, about the time of the US-South Vietnamese invasion, when the White House ordered that the post-invasion US role in Cambodia be as above-board as possible. Both criteria seemed to rule out the CIA, but both the North Vietnamese and the CIA keep trying to encroach on Cambodia from their secret outposts in southern Laos.

Whereas Hanoi's South Laotian base is known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the CIA's is called the "Annex." It is a white, multi-storied building in the Laotian Mekong river town of Pakse. The building looks like every other building in Pakse—except that it has no windows, is covered with antennae instead of tropical trees, and can be entered only by plugging the right combination on an electronic keyboard lock.

The CIA's latest Cambodian incursion recently was limited by an enterprising Phnom Penh-based American correspondent named Boris Baczynskyj, who discovered nothing less than a CIA plot to synthesise Prince Norodom Sihanouk's imitably squeaky voice, and broadcast it over the border into Cambodia. The venture was not only an attempt to seduce the Prince by putting emboldening words into his mouth, but also an effort to win away a few Cam-

bodian hearts and minds from the State and Defence departments.

Unfortunately for the CIA, Baczynskyj, a Khmer-speaking ex-Peace Corps Volunteer, noticed a considerable difference in the words of Sihanouk as beamed over Radio Peking, and the statements attributed to him by the Phnom Penh Government. After months of checking, he verified the existence of the clandestine Pakse Radio, and established the identity of its operators.

Baczynskyj's discovery, however, was more than a journalistic coup. It revealed the latest in a series of failed CIA attempts to maintain cover for its Cambodian operations, which are bitterly resented by the foreign service and military officers who predominate here. The agency, in fact, has been trying rather unsuccessfully to regain a piece of the Cambodian action ever since 1963, when Prince Sihanouk sent the US aid mission packing, which had served as the agency's main Cambodian cover.

The Green Beret scandal in Vietnam, for example, grew out of a CIA order to eliminate with extreme prejudice one of its Cambodian operatives. The agency also supported anti-Sihanouk insurgents, even when the State Department was trying for a Cambodian rapprochement in the late 1960s.

Several times burned, the State Department, when it resumed diplomatic relations with Cambodia in 1969, tried to make sure there would be no CIA agents in the embassy woodpile. Even now, ostensibly, there is no CIA component at all in the 169-man US mission in Phnom Penh.

Never daunted, the CIA has kept up its efforts to develop its own Cambodian infiltration routes. Early last year, while the US was trying to stay out of the Cam-

bodian political crisis, the Agency, unbeknown to the diplomats, relayed promises of support to the anti-Sihanouk faction. And as soon as the Cambodian war broke out, Agency-run teams of Laotian mercenaries began ranging down into Cambodia on "intelligence patrols," which the Pakse station hoped would be the landing parties for a whole CIA-run Clandestine Army in Cambodia.

The American sibling rivalry, which might otherwise be as amusing as a nineteenth-century brouhaha between Whitehall and Simla over jurisdiction of some Indian Ocean atoll, already is producing some unedifying complications.

The CIA's Pakse operations—which for all their ingenuity so far have failed to keep the Communists from taking over most of South Laos—are flagrant violations of Laotian neutrality. And neither Laos's premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who is a northerner, nor the US Embassy in faraway Vientiane, seems able to curb the Pakse operation.

Here in Cambodia, where the US embassy has become the nexus of Cambodian political power, the American infighting has already produced some domestic political complications— notably affecting the much publicised rivalry between Premier-delegate Sisowath Sirik Matak and Marshal Lon Nol's young and ambitious brother, Lon Non. The embassy likes Sirik Matak, and hardly bothers to veil his distaste for Lon Non.

With Sirik Matak, who has shunned CIA contacts, emerging as the embassy's man, and Lon Non emerging as the CIA protégé, the American squabble seems to contain seeds potentially as disastrous as those that disrupted Laos a decade ago. At that time, the CIA so disliked the State Department's candidate for premier of Laos that it sent its own Laotian army marching north to drive him out of Vientiane.

Several times routed in its efforts to infiltrate Cambodia, the CIA, like Hanoi, may decide on a strategy of letting dissension spring up among its adversaries. The State Department wants to keep the Cambodian operation lean, clean, and honest. The Defence Department keeps pushing for a big in-country US military establishment.

"You might say we're caught in the middle," said one foreign service officer recently, empathising with the Cambodians who are similarly caught between North and South Vietnam.

STATINTL

## Mercenaries

The lushed-up war in Laos shows how the super-powers can raze a country without the public's being much aware of it. Military assistance, CIA funds, and random bombings have helped uproot over a third of that country's population, George McT. Kahin reports in this issue, and how many know or care? Senator Stuart Symington has been trying for many weeks to get this story publicized, but much of it remains hidden. At the very least, Symington believes, the Congress ought to stop financing mercenaries in Laos.

One year after the Fulbright amendment struck support for these mercenaries out of the Defense appropriations bill, or so Fulbright thought, the administration was still paying for Thai troops in Laos. Nothing has prevented Thai forces from expanding their military operations into the northern part of the country. It must have taken all the Pentagon's legal brainpower to short-circuit the Fulbright amendment. The DOD had to chisel money from CIA funds, which it claimed the appropriations bill did not really cover. According to Symington, it has even described the Thai forces as "volunteers" and included them with "local forces in Laos" eligible for special military aid. The administration claims the amendment never defined "local forces in Laos and Thailand." Those Asian countries are all so close, you know, and though the Thai nationals in Laos were recruited and trained in Thailand, aren't those Indochinese pretty much the same?

Symington now proposes to specifically prohibit US support for all Thai regulars or irregulars, conscripts or volunteers, who stray into other countries, though he would not forbid US help to Lao troops in Laos or Thai troops in Thailand. With more and more of the people of Laos becoming refugee nationals and paramilitary dependents, the administration would miss the support of Thai troops and its ubiquitous CIA slush fund. But as Mr. Kahin suggests, if we persist in this war by air and by proxy, we may soon find ourselves alone with another enemy - the homeless of Laos.

## Air Strike at Laos

## One-Third of a Nation Uprooted

by George McT. Kahin

## Vientiane

Since the staff report on refugees in Indochina was prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee just under a year ago, the number of Laotians uprooted from their homes has increased substantially. It is difficult to know how accurately this increase is reflected in the numbers classified as refugees by USAID's Vientiane Office of Refugee Affairs -- for its criterion for a refugee is essentially any displaced person to whom it provides support. But as of June 13 it reported a refugee total of 317,489 as against 253,241 for July of last year. These figures do not cover all of those displaced people under control of the Royal Laotian Government (nor, of course, do they extend to that two-thirds of the country controlled by the pro-Communist Pathet Lao). Currently the Vientiane government estimates that altogether 725,000 Laotians have been displaced by the warfare that has swept the country during the last decade -- a figure that USAID regards as roughly accurate. In terms of the 1962 Laotian census estimate of just over two million, this means that about one-third of the population has been uprooted.

Among the 14 provinces of Laos the extent of this dislocation varies considerably. A December 1970 US embassy breakdown headed "Population Displaced by Military Action Since 1962" indicated that in Sayaboury province (lying to the west of the Mekong) only four percent of the population had become refugees, while for Xieng Khouang, previously the third most populous province, the figure was 81 percent. (Xieng Khouang embraces the Plain of Jars and is reported to have the most extensive free-fire zones.)

A large portion of the USAID-supported refugees are classified as "para-military dependents." The number in this category has grown from 95,000 a year ago to 120,000 in April 1971, and roughly 150,000 in mid-June of this year. Although administered through USAID, the funds for this major component of the refugee population derive from the Department of Defense. This would seem appropriate given the fact that these are the families and other dependents of members of the CIA-organized and financed "Clandestine Army," led by the Meo general, Vang Pao. Meo tribesmen still constitute the largest single element of this 30,000 man army; and this helps explain why

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well over one-third of the USAID-supported refugee population in Laos is made up of Meo. Although in 1965 the Meo constituted approximately 70 percent of Vang Pao's army, heavy attrition because of casualties and some desertions has now reduced the proportion to about 40 percent. Currently the Khmu, who like the Meo are an upland dwelling people, are the second largest ethnic group within the Clandestine Army. Reports that it has been encadred by an increasing number of Thai soldiers are difficult to check out with any degree of reliability, but there is general agreement that at least two battalions of Thai troops have been playing a significant role in the defense of Vang Pao's headquarters at Long Chen.

It is not merely the seesaw fighting on the ground between the anti-Communist forces and the frequently North Vietnamese-supported Pathet Lao that has so severely altered the human geography of Laos. In addition, on wide areas of the country far removed from the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex American air power has had an enormous impact. Clearly there is a considerable relationship between American bombing and the growth in the number of displaced persons, but apparently American embassy personnel in Vientiane are under strict orders to deny this. Moreover, no hint of this major sociopolitical fact is to be found in USAID's recent report, *Facts on Foreign Aid to Laos*, a handsomely printed 200-page volume now widely dispensed to outsiders seeking information from the American Embassy. Its section captioned "Causes and Motives of Refugee Movements" eschews any reference to bombing as a factor in the creation of refugees, and the reader is informed only that: "The motives that prompt a people to choose between two kinds of rule are not always clear, but three conditions of life under the Pathet Lao appear to have prompted the choice of evacuation: the rice tax, portage, and the draft. The people grew more rice than they had ever grown before, but they had less for themselves. They paid it out in the form of taxes -- rice to help the state, trading rice, and rice from the heart. The Pathet Lao devised an elaborate labor system of convoys and work crews. They drafted all the young men for the army. The refugees from the Plain of Jars say that primarily for these reasons they chose to leave their homes."

It is undeniable that peasants dislike paying taxes. Unlike Vientiane's Royal Laotian Government, which is so heavily subsidized by the US that it has no need

STATINTL 1A

# Target Guides Reported

STATINTL

## Aiding Current Laos Drive

By H. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Aug. 13—Forward air guides are "doing a fine job" of assisting the current Royal Laotian government drive to recapture large areas of Laos lost to Communist forces during the dry seasons of 1970 and 1971, U.S. government spokesmen say.

Forward air guides are specially selected soldiers who control U.S. and Laotian bombers from the ground, guiding them in on targets. The existence of the guides was divulged last week by the Senate subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, headed by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.).

According to the committee's report, there are 182 such guides, 53 from the Royal Lao army and 129 from CIA-supported irregular forces in Laos, most of whom are Thai nationals and veterans of the Vietnam war, according to sources in Laos.

Sources say the guides are carefully selected on the basis of intelligence, experience and either ability to speak English or ability to learn it easily and well, then thoroughly trained. All are officers or senior non-commissioned officers.

Functioning like guerrillas, they infiltrate within sight of enemy troops or installations and direct either bombing or artillery fire onto the target, moving on after bombardment is completed.

According to the guides, their orders to propeller-driven T-28 bombers are relayed through forward air controllers flying overhead. Orders to U.S. Air Force jet pilots are usually given directly because of the speed of the bombing runs, hence the English language requirement.

Use of the forward air guides in guerrilla operations raises the questions here of further departure from the rules of engagement procedures established by the U.S. government to protect nonmilitary targets, procedures including prior clearance of targets by the U.S. ambassador in Vientiane.

Royalist T-28 bombers are already exempted from the rules as are U.S. bombing missions supporting infiltrating or exfiltrating troops, exemptions creating a "loophole" in the rules, according to the subcommittee report.

Doubt that the rules can remain even their limited success in protecting nonmilitary targets if guides are allowed to target bombers is expressed by many observers here, although the presence of a guide would appear to strengthen the system.

A measure of the successes being enjoyed by Royalist troops in their current offensive thrust in both northern and southern Laos is attributable to use of the guides working with air and artillery support, according to spokesmen. In northern Laos, irregular troops under command of Gen. Vang Pao at Long Cheng control most of the Plain of Jars, according to official spokesmen, while other sources say the irregulars have captured the entire plain, including Khang Khai and Phonsovanh in the northeast corner.

Intelligence reports through U.S. government spokesmen say that the high ground at the northeast corner of the plain is still held by a convention of Communist troops, however, blocking movement along routes leading toward Dienbienphu in North Vietnam.

Forward air guides are said

to have played an important role in Vang Pao's movement back onto the plain.

In southern Laos, Royal Laotian government troops continue a slow, careful thrust toward Paksong on the Bolovens plateau east of Pakse under cover of bombing and artillery, much of it controlled by the guides.

Paksong, informed sources say, is expected to be captured by Royalist troops within the next few days.

Thirty-five miles east of Savannakhet and 120 miles north of Pakse, a third thrust has stalled about the town of Moung Phalane after encountering stiff enemy resistance, according to the government sources. Air guides are believed to be operating with guerrilla troops beyond Moung Phalane, although the town itself has not been occupied.

Considerable complaint has been expressed in months both by Laotians and by U.S. mission sources working in northern Laos over indiscriminate bombing in particular by Lao planes—which, according to U.S. mission sources, get their bombing sorties over with quickly to earn extra pay. As the report says, pilots in at least two of Laos' five military regions receive a "bonus" based on the number of sorties flown. U.S. sources say Laotian pilots get \$1 per sortie and that the payment produces frequent "dumping" only minutes from their bases at Luang Prabang and Long Cheng during routine missions.

Part of the rising American investment in bombing ordnance is attributed by a knowledgeable source to the dumping, though the bulk of the rise is in cost alone. Dated bomb stocks now have been expended, thus requiring purchase of new ordnance at prevailing prices.

Although there may be more frequent success in actually bombing the enemy by using guides, observers here fear that their existence will bombing is more controlled in general targeting. Extensive use of non-Laotians is also

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

# U.S. Discussing a 'Mission Impossible'

By Jack Anderson

In the secret war against narcotics, the United States may send Mission Impossible operatives, possibly criminals, to destroy opium laboratories in foreign lands.

Or the United States may undercut the smugglers by flooding the market with harmless heroin substitutes or may simply entice them in bribing high foreign officials who protect the drug trade.

These desperate measures were taken up at a secret strategy conference called by the State Department last April in Bangkok. Foreign service officers, military representatives and narcotics agents slipped into Bangkok quietly from Hong Kong, Honolulu, Manila, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, Saigon and Vietnam.

They agreed that "extra-legal action" may be needed to combat the narcotics menace. A classified, 18-page summary of their discussions suggests:

"Flooding markets with harmless or aggravating heroin substitutes to destroy the trade's credibility with abusers; destruction of factories through use of criminal or at least non-official elements; payoffs of corrupt officials as an income substitute; and defoliation.

"Any extra-legal action is of course highly problematic," stresses the summary, "but the

urgency of the problem suggests that unusual steps should not be rejected out of hand. . . . Several of the preceding areas would depend on Washington support or could be better implemented with Washington involvement.

The conferees also agreed at Bangkok that Asian narcotics are reaching the U.S. through three "systems":

• "Okinawa System" — GPs and ex-GPs, "allied with a few local Okinawans," get heroin from Bangkok and transship it to the United States.

• "Thailand System" — "Retired U.S. servicemen" and "camp followers," who operate gambling rings and other rackets in Thailand, have now built up a thriving narcotics business. GPs on active duty help the gang smuggle "large quantities of heroin to the United States."

• "Philippines System" — Filipinos are recruited to "body-pack" nearly pure heroin from Hong Kong to the United States, sometimes by way of Europe.

Footnote: while the strategists in Bangkok were considering drastic means to curb the drug traffic, administration think-tank men in Washington came up with another unusual proposal. They have suggested using CIA agents now marking time because of the cutbacks in Southeast Asia, to circulate among the

Meos and other tribesmen they helped line up to fight the Communists. But the new CIA mission would be to persuade or pay the hill people to stop growing opium.

## ---Washington Whirl---

**House Hold-Off** — Last year, Congress enacted only half of the 14 basic appropriations bills by the November elections. The new House leaders started off this year determined to introduce more efficiency to the House. Louisiana's Hale Boggs, the new Democratic leader, broke all precedents by calling for sessions on Fridays. This upset the Tuesday-to-Thursday Club, which likes long weekends. After only two Friday sessions in June, Boggs gave up. House members, now taking a recess until Sept. 8, are talking about winding up their work in October. This time, they'll complete all the appropriations bills. But they aren't likely to pass much vital legislation.

**Nixon's Law Firm** — Rep. Morris K. Udall (D-Ariz.) paid a quiet visit to Wall Street this week to snoop under the plush rugs of the bonding firms. Bond underwriting has become the special preserve of a few attorneys and underwriters with an inside track. Udall is trying to find out how big their rake-off has been from the government and

whether the government has gotten its money's worth. He is particularly suspicious over the selection of President Nixon's former law firm to handle the legal formalities for the \$250 million postal bond issue. At the customary 1 per cent fee, the Nixon firm (now Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and Alexander) will wind up with a \$2.5 million windfall. Incidentally, bond work used to be the specialty of Attorney General John Mitchell, who was one of Nixon's partners in the firm.

**Conscience of Senate** — Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss), known as the Conscience of the Senate, presides over the Ethics Committee, which regulates Senate conduct. Yet it has been whispered that he made off with furnishings from the original Senate chamber, including a grand chandelier which once hung in the historic old room. We investigated and found the whispers highly exaggerated. All Stennis got were some bargain antiques. He paid \$35 for an old table with three legs and \$10 apiece for a couple of chairs. It cost him a few more dollars to get the table restored. Last month, he packed off his historic antiques to his home in Mississippi.

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# Asian Drug Trade Defies U.S. Crackdown

Saigon (AP)—Americans charged with the task of combating the heroin traffic in Vietnam find themselves with few real weapons for a fight that is only now beginning.

"We didn't give a damn about the drug business as long as only Asians were using the stuff," commented an American investigator in Saigon. "Now that American GI's are hitting heroin we just don't have enough hard facts to adequately crack down."

## 12,000 To 37,000 Users

In the first three months of this year United States military authorities apprehended 1,034 users, nearly the same number as they had taken in the whole of 1970. The estimate of GI drug-users ranges from 12,000 to as many as 37,000 of the quarter-million-man American force in Vietnam.

Americans in Thailand say that even though the death penalty for opium processing has been in effect for 10 years, drugs roll through that country in ton lots past border checkpoints and roadblocks, and ultimately to fishing trawlers that move the shipments on to Vietnam.

And in Laos, a major growing, collecting and processing area for the Vietnam trade, Americans are shaking their heads in perplexity over ways to bring about the crackdown demanded by the White House.

Senior Lao generals have been named as being incriminated in

the narcotics pipeline run by a Chinese ring that buys the raw opium in the hills and pays off all down the line, from the time the black gum is processed into heroin to its being sold in tiny plastic vials to GI's on the streets of Saigon.

The huge profits of the racket have kept the narcotics pipeline running for years. And the United States has even become involved in it temporarily for political reasons.

"Why, in the mid-60's when the war disrupted the traditional haulage routes, the CIA ordered Air America to assist the Loyal Miao tribesmen by flying their opium crops to Lao collecting points," commented one American involved in drug suppression in Vientiane. "That fact can be documented. The CIA have since got out of the business."

What the United States finds itself best able to do is first to warn GI's against drug usage, then to treat those addicted, and forcefully prevail upon the Vietnamese government to toughen the weak narcotics suppression laws.

President Thieu obliged this week with a bill instituting the death penalty for importers and peddlers belonging to organized rings.

American officials in Laos have helped draw up a bill that finally outlaws opium growing and smoking, and this is expected to be passed soon by the National Assembly.

"But then what we will end up with is rules, just rules," commented a U.S. official in Vientiane. "Now who is going to enforce them?"

American officials say that a concerted police effort in Laos could run to ground the Chinese operating the processing plants, and the dealers. But this would be a massive task involving retraining the police and breaking up a century-old way of life.

And in Bangkok, Americans say that the Thais just do not have the police resources to devote to a realistic drug-suppression effort.

Thailand is the major drug transshipment point to Vietnam, Hong Kong and Singapore, but Thai police must give priority to fighting Communist insurgents in the countryside.

Overlaying the whole suppression problem is the tolerance among Asians toward drugs, and the integral place the narcotics business occupies in the traditional patterns of smuggling in Southeast Asia.

"To effectively stamp out heroin, we would have to change the economic patterns of Asia. The governments of Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam are run by officials who are required to scoop out large doses of cash from the system to buy allegiance and pay political favors," said a U.S. official with long experience in Vietnam.

"At this stage of the game, with Americans getting out of Vietnam, we have less leverage than ever before. Maybe the only way to handle the problem is to pay officials the cash they would lose in cutting out the drug traffic, and I doubt the U.S. Congress would go along with that," he added.

STATINTL



Thais involvedU.S. takes gambles  
in Laos war policy

STATINTL

By George W. Ashworth  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The Nixon administration is taking heavy gambles in its handling of the war in Laos.

On the domestic scene, the administration is risking deepening troubles with Congress and supplying ammunition to critics as it directs the war in Laos with debatable regard for congressional dictates.

And, in Laos itself, the administration has decided to take unprecedented steps in prosecuting the war that may have devastating impact on the future of Southeast Asia.

At specific issue is the use of so-called "irregulars" from Thailand to fight with the Royal Lao Army and other irregular forces. The State Department, which just weeks ago refused to talk about the matter at all, either with the press or the Congress, now has sent representatives to Capitol Hill to tell more and is steadfastly maintaining that the Thai forces are volunteers.

Options reduced

Whether the forces are indeed volunteers or not is important because, through amendments, Congress has been steadily whittling away at presidential latitude in the war zone. Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D) of Arkansas got approval last year for an amendment forbidding the use of U.S. funds to pay for troops of other nations fighting in Laos. Loopholes might allow such activities if the payment of such troops were tied into the Vietnamization process.

However, the State Department has assured Congress that the fighting along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which might help Vietnamization, is not related to the fighting in the north of Laos, which involves the Thais.

Thus, the administration is arguing that the Thais are volunteer irregulars, not falling under congressional strictures. The problem is that nobody really believes this argument. It is well known in the White House, State Department, Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency that the Thai Government has agreed to provide the troops, and the U.S. is picking up the tab.

Assignment optional

To help clear the air, D. E. Ronk, who writes for the Washington Post, went to ask some Thai soldiers for the truth of the matter. The Thais told Mr. Ronk, he reports, that they are regular

army troops of Thailand, asked to accept special assignment in Laos, which they can refuse. They are in all-Thai battalions with Thai officers.

There is even a Thai general (a lieutenant general, according to other sources here in Washington) directing their activities. The Thai troops are supervised and trained in Thailand and paid for fully in Laos by the Central Intelligence Agency.

One source in Washington said, "They are regular Thai troops, and we are breaking the law. Congress may now try to limit funds. Even if they did, however, I doubt that would stop us."

Spending estimated

Sen. Stuart Symington (D) of Missouri has offered an amendment to the military-procurement bill that would limit direct and indirect military and economic assistance to Laos to \$200 million a year. This would not include funds spent to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other nearby areas. The administration clearly does not approve of the proposal, because, it is fairly clear, much more is now being spent. Senator Symington estimates military and economic aid and support spending for Laos and Cambodia together at more than \$1 billion annually. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report estimates the partial costs in Laos during the last fiscal year at \$284.2 million, including military and economic aid, plus CIA expenditures.

This infighting between elements of Congress and the administration doesn't appear likely to let up soon, what with the administration desire to play the war by its own, not congressional, rules, plus the advent of the political season, plus the continuation of antagonisms already at play. Adding to the difficulties for the administration is evidence that old-line stalwarts on the hill are becoming more and more unwilling to back the administration completely, lest they develop their own credibility problems.

The administration has come to the conclusion that the only way to safeguard Laos is to get the Thais involved in the rescue attempt. While this approach may help save the day militarily, it may have long-range political implications with the Thais now more deeply involved in the quest for any eventual settlement.

# Nixon's China stunt scored: EXPERTS WARN NATION 'DON'T RE-ARM JAPAN'

By TIM WHEELER

WASHINGTON, Aug. 11—Scholars today cited President Nixon's move to rearm Japan, his "two-China" policy, his resort to spy flights over China and his \$29 billion budget for war in Asia as proof of unwavering hatred of People's China.

In scathing testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, the scholars exploded as a myth the story of "Chinese aggression" used to justify decades of U.S. intervention in Asia.

They charged that this lie has been the mainstay of the Indochina War. As they buttressed their case with facts and figures, Senator William Proxmire, (D-Wisc), chairman of the hearings, exploded, "If China's real intent is to live peacefully within her borders, how can we justify the enormous military expenditures in Asia?"

#### Throwing money away

Proxmire added that China is "not even threatening military action against Quemoy and Matsu, let alone Taiwan or the Philippines. We are just throwing our money away."

The senator pointed out that the U.S. spends \$16 billion annually for "defense" in Asia, not counting the \$15 to \$20 billion annually for the Indochina War.

Professor Jerome Alan Cohen of the Harvard East Asian Studies Institute said the U.S. has flagrantly violated Chinese rights under international law and has illegally intervened in a Chinese civil war on the side of dictator Chiang Kai-Shek.

If Nixon "ping-pong" diplomacy is to signal a genuine change in U.S. policy, he said, the U.S. must "sever diplomatic relations" with Chiang Kai-Shek and recognize People's China as the only legitimate government of China.

He termed Nixon's China stunt "a diplomatic maneuver . . . or a don't do it again" move. "It is a sign of the U.S. government's difficulties in coping with our other international and internal problems."

12 AUG 1971

# Expert Calls Taiwan U.S.-China Spy Base

By JEROME CABILL

Washington, Aug. 11 (NEWS Bureau)—The United States and the Chinese Nationalists for 20 years launched espionage, sabotage and guerrilla forays against Communist China from Chiang Kai-shek's island bastion of Taiwan, a former State Department official told Congress today.

Allen S. Whiting, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, who served in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and in the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong from 1961 to 1968, said the covert operations included support of the ill-fated uprising in Tibet in 1959.

#### Increased After Korean War

Whiting said America's "shadowy involvement" in the clandestine operations grew steadily after the Korean war and the 1954 Geneva Conference. He said they triggered the Formosa Strait crises of 1954 and 1958 and helped set the stage for the Sino-India war in 1962 along the Tibetan frontier.

Testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate-House Joint Economic Committee, Whiting said the publication of the Pentagon papers provided partial documentation of the operations, particularly U. S. and Nationalist Chinese overflights of mainland China.

Quoting from a top-secret memorandum from Brig. Gen. Edward

Lansdale to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Whiting said a Nationalist Chinese airline called Civil Air Transport carried out "more than 200 overflights of mainland China and Tibet." In addition, the line provided aircraft for an abortive CIA effort to overthrow the Sukarno regime in Indonesia in 1958, and helped transport sabotage teams into North Vietnam as early as 1954, the witness said.

#### Airline Linked to CIA

In 1960, Whiting told the subcommittee, a new Taiwan-based airline, China Air Lines, came into being, and engaged in "clandestine intelligence operations" as well as commercial flights to Laos and Vietnam. He linked the airline to the CIA-backed Air America, which raided Northern Laos in the course of the CIA's "secret war in Laos."

At times, he said, the bombers strayed over the border, hitting mainland Chinese territory. This may explain "much of Peking's expanding military presence in road construction and antiaircraft activities in Northern Laos," he went on.

11 AUG 1971

# Asians Doubt That U.S. Can Halt Heroin Flow

By HENRY KAMM  
Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Aug. 10.—Formidable obstacles confront the United States in its efforts to halt the flow of heroin to its troops in Vietnam and to prevent Southeast Asian heroin from moving into the American market to fill the gap that may be left if the traffic from the Middle East is contained.

American officials, aware of the high priority President Nixon attaches to the program, display determined hopefulness that the flow can be significantly reduced, at least while American troops remain in south Vietnam.

Asian officials, on the other hand, are openly doubtful of the chances of even limited success over a short term. They express growing concern that a problem that they had considered primarily American may also be on the rise among their own people. They see the search for a solution—if indeed one can be found—as a process that will take years.

The Asians agree with American officials that with increased United States assistance they can intercept a greater share of the traffic in opium and its derivatives from the contiguous growing areas in the mountains of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northwestern Laos. But they believe that both supply and demand are so great and the profits so temptingly high that the supply and the demand will remain more or less in balance until one or the other can be controlled.

In a month of inquiry in Thailand and Laos it was possible to get a reasonably full picture of how the sap of the seeded pod of *Papaver somniferum*, the opium poppy, moves from the mountain tribesmen who cultivate and harvest it, is converted into heroin and reaches the consumer. Much vagueness was encountered, based both on secretiveness and on a lack of knowledge.

Among American officials, whose information-gathering capacity in Laos and Thailand is believed to surpass that of the national Governments by far, there was reluctance to discuss pertinent information that contrasts with the declared view of officials in Washington that exposure of the problem is in the national interest.

The principal factors behind Asian skepticism over the outlook for short-term success are these:

¶The main growing area—the Shan State in Burma—is in open rebellion against the Government in Rangoon, which exercises little control in the remote and inaccessible region.

¶The growing areas in Thailand and Laos are contested by rebel and bandit groups that make Government action extremely difficult.

¶The borders between the three countries run through densely jungled mountains and effective control is not exercised except at certain crossing points.

¶Opium is in most cases the growers' only cash crop and no substitutes with comparable return are available.

¶The trading networks are so firmly established and their links with Government and military officials who provide protection and tolerance so close that the Burmese Government is believed to be resigned to its inability to act and the Thai and Laotian Governments at a loss on how to carry out their new-found desire to act.

## Habit of Unpopular Minorities

The historical view of opium and its use among Southeast Asian officials has been that it provides profits for them from an admittedly bad habit that has been largely limited to unpopular minorities: the overseas Chinese, mainly coolies, and mountain tribesmen. Both groups sought refuge from poverty and hard labor and the absence of other medicines to make them forget pain and illness.

About three-fourths of the production is consumed in Southeast Asia, in the growing regions and in cities of heavy addiction such as Hong Kong and Bangkok. But now, by bringing an eager sector of the population into Southeast Asia in the form

of the American soldier in Vietnam, the trade picture is being distorted.

"Over the last year," a knowledgeable intelligence official in Washington said, "the production of heroin in Southeast Asia has risen out of sight."

White heroin, refined to a purity of about 93 per cent, is the most luxurious opium product and the only one with appeal to American consumers, at home and abroad. Asian opium or heroin users are content, at the most expensive, with cheaper purple heroin suitable only for smoking, not injection.

## More White Heroin Produced

Only since the discovery of the American market in Vietnam have Asian traders and processors begun to produce significant quantities of white heroin.

Since the estimated profit on a kilogram (2.2 pounds) of heroin between the grower of the required poppies and the user is put at more than \$200,000, people in the early stages in the complicated distribution network are increasingly finding their best interest in refining the opium to the most profitable state themselves.

The result has been a growth of refineries close to where the poppies bloom. The Central Intelligence Agency has identified seven installations capable of producing white heroin in the Burmese-Laotian border region where none had been known a year ago.

With the United States urging the cooperation of the opium-producing countries to suppress the trade, Asian officials believe that increasingly more refining will be done in the inaccessible border region to reduce the bulk and detectability of the product to be taken to market.

In the green mountains on whose slopes and valleys the poppies grow, the Government's writs, in so far as they run at all, run as far as do the roads—of which there are scarcely any.

## Except for Poppies, Self-Sufficient

The growers—be they Meo, Yao, Lisu, Labu, Akha, Kachin, Karen or any of the other mountain peoples—live in small villages largely apart from the lowland civilizations of the countries to which they belong. They eat the rice and vegetables they grow, make most of their own cloth and depend on the poppies they raise for most of life.

Their principal contact with the world, apart from the occasional patrols of Government or anti-Government soldiers, are Chinese traders, who sell them arms, ammunition, patent medicines, tools and other utensils. Early in the year the traders come to buy the opium that has just been harvested.

Many of the traders, according to the best available accounts, are small operators. After this stage in the chain of distribution there is little room for anything but potent organizations. The most potent are the groups that have their origin in remnants of Chinese Nationalist armies that sought refuge just across China's border with Burma after the Communist victory in 1949.

According to the C.I.A., the two groups, operating from base camps in Thailand, dominate more than 80 per cent of the traffic from the Shan State as a result of their control of a strip roughly 75 miles long in the extreme north of Thailand along the Burmese border.

The group that derives from the Chinese Nationalist Fifth Army, the larger of the two forces, is commanded by Tuan Shi-wen. He has about 1,800 men, informed Western sources say, only about a tenth of them trained soldiers and the rest hill tribesmen hired as smugglers.

## Links to Irregular Bands

The sources reported that General Tuan, from his headquarters at Mae Salong, commands 11 operating units in the Shan State that, in turn, command a number of friendly irregular bands in Burma with which the general has concluded alliances.

The second group, from the former Third Army, is commanded by Li Wen-Huan, who was reported to have about 1,400 men, also consisting largely of hired tribesmen. Their headquarters is at Tam Ngop, with seven operating units in Burma up to the Chinese border.

A third Chinese group, known as the First Independent Unit, received financial support from Taiwan through the Chinese Nationalist Embassy here longer than the others and, according to informed sources, may still be doing so. The sources said that the unit also received arms and ammunition smuggled from Ban Houei Sai, Laos, to its camp near Fang, in Thailand.

Commanded by Ma Ching-ko, the unit has a well-trained force of about 400. The sources said the unit ran intelligence

E - 634,371  
S - 701,743

AUG 11 1971

## Peril to Nixon Trip Seen

# Secrecy Is Charged In U.S. Aid to Taiwan

By RAY MOSELEY

Bulletin Washington Bureau

Washington — A former State Department official said today the Government is concealing the full extent of U.S. military and intelligence operations on Taiwan (Formosa) from Congress and the American public.

Such operations, directed against mainland China, must cease if President Nixon's forthcoming "journey for peace" to Peking is to succeed, said Allen S. Whiting, chief China specialist in the State Department from 1962 to 1966.

Whiting, now a professor at the University of Michigan, testified at a hearing on China policy conducted by the congressional Joint Economic Committee.

### Quotes From Documents

Quoting official documents and news reports, Whiting outlined a variety of alleged U.S. intelligence activities in support of Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan that have

come to light over the last 20 years, and said:


"In sum, there is a credible case that overt and covert U.S.-Chinese Nationalist activities have aroused Chinese Communist security concerns, resulting in heightened military deployments toward and across China's borders. This activity, in turn, has been used to justify increased American and allied military investment throughout Asia to guard against the so-called Chinese Communist aggressive threat."

Whiting said a complete assessment of U.S. involvement with the Nationalists has been seriously hampered by secrecy and censorship.

"Certainly Peking has known more of what has been going on than has Washington, or at least the legislative branch of our government," he said.

### May Block Settlement

Whiting said U.S. covert activities on Taiwan may block a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem by the Nationalists and Communists and lead to continued military



Allen S. Whiting

escalation on both sides.

"Only a convincing and credible reversal of our military-intelligence use of Taiwan can lay the basis for confidence necessary to make President Nixon's 'journey for peace' a successful reality," he said.

The Nixon Administration was reported recently to have ordered a halt to clandestine activities, including U.S. spy plane flights over China, to avoid upsetting plans for Mr. Nixon's trip.

In his testimony, Whiting cited these examples of covert activities allegedly supported by the U.S. against China:

### Airlines' Activities

— The Nationalist airline Civil Air Transport (CAT), identified in the recent Pentagon Papers as owned by the Central Intelligence Agency, operated from bases in Thailand in the 1950s to ferry supplies to guerillas in northern Burma, Laos, Tibet and China's Yunan Province.

— China Air Lines (CAL), another apparent CIA operation, provided planes and pilots to Vietnam and Laos and admitted involvement in "clandestine intelligence operations."

— A CIA line called Air Asia is headquartered in Taiwan, with the job of servicing jet fighter planes.

— U.S. Rangers have trained guerilla paratroopers in Taiwan, and some Nationalist forces have served secretly in South Vietnam.

— Nationalist China has received "a steady stream of cut-rate weapons out of the mammoth Vietnam stockpile" and some deliveries have been "unauthorized, uncontrolled and often unknown to the Congress."

STATINTL

## FROM HIMALAYAS TO GIs

# Tracing the Drug Trail to Vietnam

By PETER ARNETT  
and BERNARD GAVZER  
Associated Press

SAIGON—America's GI heroin users are at the Vietnam end of an intricately organized dope pipeline that begins in the poppy fields of the Himalayas and is tolerated, and sometimes aided, by government officials and soldiers of three nations on its journey to the streets of Saigon.

Alarmed by widespread use of drugs among American servicemen, the United States is putting on vast pressure to curb the traffic, but finds itself bucking a way of life that has endured for a century.

An Associated Press investigation of how drugs move through Southeast Asia produces these major findings:

o A Chinese "mafia" dominates the drug traffic. It operates a complex family-style network out of a dozen Asian cities, paying off all the way: to the military rebels whose caravans gather the opium gum grown by Meo farmers, to the Lao soldiers who guard the secluded heroin refineries along mountain streams, through customs checkpoints and roadblocks in Thailand; to fishing boat owners and truck drivers in Indochinese villages, and finally to some South Vietnamese generals who allow the traffic to continue right under their noses in Saigon.

o Though the opium trade in the Orient is a hundred years old, U.S. attention has centered on it in the past year only because of the spreading use of heroin among young soldiers in Vietnam. American officials in Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand say on the record the traffic is being suppressed, but many despair of making a serious dent in the business soon because it is one thing to know the system and quite another to break through the layers of protection and obtain names and evidence.

o The narcotics traffic is so deeply woven into the social, political, and economic fabric of Southeast Asia that it is a sort of cottage industry upon which many people depend for livelihoods. It is not generally conceived of here as wrong to deal in drugs.

o On mainly concerned with supplying smoking opium and a relatively poor grade of smoking heroin, the Southeast Asian narcotics traffic has evolved in the last year or so into a semisophisticated racket that some officials say is ready to expand and follow the GIs home to the United States if Mideast and European sources of heroin there dry up.

### 150,000 Doses a Week?

o The flow to GIs in Vietnam is appreciable by any standards. Col. Lee Doc Huong, head of narcotics investigation for South Vietnam said on the basis of seizure that it could readily be 50 kilograms a week, about 150,000 doses.

To measure the networks within Southeast Asia's drug traffic, we journeyed around the world, from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in Washington, to Interpol, the international police agency, in Paris, and to narcotics bureaus and study centers in Saigon, Bangkok, Hong Kong and Vientiane.

We traced the 100-year-old drug routes in the "Golden Triangle"—the key Southeast Asian cultivation center where Burma, Laos and Thailand meet in a checkerboard of misty mountains inhabited by bandit gangs.

### Supply Plentiful

We went where opium is grown, where it is processed and where it is used. We watched American GIs smoking heroin in Saigon while the peddlers and bar girls they purchased it from danced around them in constant attendance, always proffering more at \$5 a barrel—one third of a gram, pure.

While the war is fought in eastern Laos, the dope pipeline begins in peace on the green hillsides of Burmese, Lao and Thai villages. In these places the Meo families developed the opium crop. A typical family might have as much as two acres of opium in a year.

When the opium is harvested it stops being a family enterprise—a cottage industry of sorts. Chinese traders collect the production, paying the equivalent of from \$20 to \$40 per kilo, or 2.2 pounds. Prices for the drug rise astronomically along

the route; a kilo of heroin selling in Saigon for \$10,000 from an investment of only \$350 in the raw opium needed to produce it.

### Mules Employed

The trek from the remote villages goes through mountains and valleys, along hidden paths and ancient roadways, all leading to the 21 processing plants near the borders of Thailand and Laos.

Huge caravans of up to 300 pack mules are sometimes used. In the assembly of these mighty caravans, the major opium dealers become involved. They are the Chu Chow Chinese, the shrewd, successful businessmen who came from a small, harsh region—in their case the Fukien coast of China—and fanned out as families to all the neighboring nations of Asia.

Official assistance is required along the transportation route, and that is where the next payoffs are made: to customs officials, local military garrisons and police.

### Then the Payoffs

Major payoffs are made at the next stage of the traffic: the farmhouse-sized processing plants tucked discreetly along streams and on hillsides. Here the raw opium is refined into morphine blocks and low-grade purple heroin favored by Asian addicts, or the top grade J4 heroin used exclusively by the Americans. The payoffs at the processing plants are for protection by troops.

A senior Lao general, Ouane Rathikone, named in a special report to the U.S. Congress as being involved in the opium business, "protected" two heroin refineries at Ban Houei Sai with Lao troops loyal to him, according to informants in Vientiane. Rathikone has retired but faces no charges.

The next big payoffs come in moving the finished heroin product by truck through many roadblocks sprinkled on Thailand's highways to the coast, or by plane to Vientiane. American intelligence reports repeatedly have charged the Royal Lao Air Force with carrying opium and heroin from Ban Houei Sai, and from a new airstrip in the Shan states at Pong in Laos.

### Travelers Also Used

For the most part the drugs move by fishing trawler to Vietnam. From Vientiane the heroin

moves by plane through the southern Lao town of Pakse to Saigon and Nha Trang.

The U.S. Embassy in Saigon has incriminating dossiers on many South Vietnamese officials, and recently sent 78 of them to President Nguyen Van Thieu for action. American officials with access to these files said they were compiled by the CIA and include corruption charges against six senior officers in the military.

The charges are of a type that would mean certain court-martial for a general officer in the American army. As with so many other things in Vietnam, the Western model cannot automatically be substituted for the Asian reality. Patronage, political necessity, old alliances formed in war or commerce all play a role.

### Police Criticized

The chief of police, Gen. Tran Thanh Phong, has total police power. Yet, American investigators complain that when peddlers incriminate dealers there is no followup of American complaints to Phong.

Vietnamese Air Force planes, according to the best-informed Americans, fly to Pakse in southern Laos and return with dope.

"But how do you nail the Vietnamese Air Force?" one American investigator complained. "The retailers say they bought it from a pilot, and if we arrest him the Air Force bombs the police headquarters, and there is nothing we can do about it."

In Vietnam, the main effort by U.S. military authorities is to persuade GIs to avoid the drug, and to treat and rehabilitate those already hooked. Estimates of users range from 5 percent to 15 percent, the high figure representing some 37,500 soldiers.

U.S. officials also are pressuring the Vietnamese to crack down on peddlers to make it harder for GIs to get heroin.

Outside Vietnam, where American leverage is weaker, governments have been asked to crack down on the traffic, but American agents expect few results. The Laos National Assembly is soon expected to pass a bill outlawing opium growing and smoking, but both Thailand and Vietnam have had similar legislation for years, with little effect.

STATINTL

MILWAUKEE, WISC.  
JOURNAL

E - 359,036  
S - 537,875

AUG 10 1971

## Controls Over the CIA

✓ Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and has funded it ever since. The CIA has little obligation to tell its parent what it's up to. It has been involved in clandestine activities over the world, sometimes in opposition to the nation's stated foreign policy. It has involved us with unsavory leadership of some nations and in plots that the State Department was never consulted about. It has even misled presidents.

The CIA does report what it thinks advisable — which isn't much — to certain select congressional bodies. But it has no requirement to do more than a perfunctory job of it.

There are now several proposals in the Senate to correct this situation. Sen. Cooper (R-Ky.) would require the CIA to make regular and special reports to select congressional committees, much as the sensitive Atomic Energy Commission does. Sen. Case (R-N. J.) wants to force the CIA to get congressional permission to use funds for aiding foreign troops in Laos and other places. ✓ Sen. McGovern (D-S. D.) wants the CIA's budget to appear as a line item in the general budget instead of being hidden, as it is now, in the budgets of other agencies.

These seem simple and logical controls over a government agency. It is basic to a democratic system that there be such controls.

OLATHE, KAN.  
NEWS

M - 4,857

AUG 10 1971

IN OUR OPINION:

# Criminal folly in Laos

Both the costly futility of our Asian misadventure and the dangers of secret power politics by U.S. Presidents are illustrated by the latest reports to the Senate on Laos.


It now appears that the CIA has been operating an army of mercenaries in Laos and that we have been spending around \$350 million a year in an effort to bolster the Laotian government. Despite these efforts, the number of North Vietnamese and Chinese troops in Laos is on the increase.

We first went into Laos under President Kennedy on the theory that an anti-Communist government would prevent the "domino" nations of Southeast Asia (see map) from falling before the Reds. This was part of our Vietnam campaign.

But, until now, the American public was not told how deeply we were involved in Laos or the cost.

It was clear from the beginning that we could not make a viable nation out of Laos. A State Department publication issued back in 1963 had this to say of the country:

"The sizable minorities and their ethnic, cultural and regional diversities have tended to keep Laos from becoming a national entity or the people from having a national loyalty. The rugged mountainous terrain or jungle growth of much of the country tends also to keep the population fragmented in small, self-contained communities bound together only tenuously by very poor communications and transportation systems.



"A gulf between the central government in Vientiane and the people in the countryside has always existed, and those who have governed Laos have never established effective authority or won the allegiance of all the various people who make up the Lao nation...Although independent Lao kingdoms existed in the 8th and 14th centuries, the Lao people have been dominated by their more powerful neighbors during most of their history."

It was to make a democracy out of this mess, so we said, that we sent our men and our dollars into Laos. It was criminal folly. No wonder those responsible wanted to keep their actions secret!



BOSTON, MASS.  
HERALD TRAVELER

M - 194,557

S - 260,961

AUG 9 1971

George Minot

## Secret Forces

## Fight in Laos

Here are some more questions and answers:

Q—Is it true, as I was told in Washington last week, that the United States still has an army of 30,000 men now fighting in most of Laos? Why hasn't there been anything in the newspapers about this?

A—This is a matter of considerable dispute in Washington and elsewhere. There have been a score of newspaper stories in recent years about the Central Intelligence Agency maintaining an "irregular" force that was fighting in most of Laos. These troops consist of Laotian army "volunteers," recruited and paid for by the CIA, and their activities constitute a secret war that the United States has been conducting in Laos ever since the breakdown of the 1952 Geneva accords, which were supposed to, but didn't, establish the neutrality of Laos. This was made public last week in a hitherto top secret report made public after clearance by the CIA as well as the State and Defense departments.

Q—Despite reassurances from Washington, isn't it true that the new U.S. policy toward Red China means that the non-Communist government on what used to be the island of Formosa is nearing its end?

A—That may be going a little too far, but it seems obvious that this country doesn't expect the Taiwan government of Chiang Kai-shek to amount to a great deal after his death. It might be more correct to say that the future of that government is not bright.

# CIA Establishes Precedent with Laos War Disclosures

BY FRANK STARR  
[Washington Bureau Chief]  
[Chicago Tribune Press Services]

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 — A significant precedent in government secrecy was established last week when the Central Intelligence Agency, with White House approval, conceded for the first time its hitherto top secret role as the clandestine director of the United States war effort in Laos.

Administration sources say the rather startling public confirmation of what had long been charged or assumed constituted a deliberate decision to concede such a fact in favor of protecting other secrets less generally assumed.

But the sources attribute the decision largely to the pressure created by accurate and competent investigation by two former foreign service officers now working for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the strength their material lent to the legislators in their confrontation with the Executive Branch.

## How Times Change

"Times have changed," said one administration source who recalled how President Kennedy had protected from public exposure the CIA role in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion by taking the blame for it himself.

Two years ago the administration was not mentioning American involvement in Laos, another source noted, while now as much as 90 per cent of the U. S. role there is a matter of public record.

Most of it became public last week after five weeks of negotiations between the two investigators and representatives of the Defense and State Departments and the CIA who were faced with what is readily admitted to be an extensive, detailed and accurate account of

## News Analysis

the U. S. role in Laos and the possibility of an extended and bitter debate over its secrecy if much of it weren't disclosed.

### Object of Bargaining

The object of the bargaining was what would or would not be censored in a 23-page staff report entitled "Laos: April 1971" written by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose as a result of 12 days spent in Laos at the end of April and the beginning of May.

"They are competent investigators and they knew the right questions to ask because they know where the bodies are buried," one well-placed source said.

Lowenstein was a foreign service officer in the State Department from 1956 to 1965, as was Moose from 1957 to 1966. Moose additionally worked as a special assistant of former Presidential adviser Walt Rostow, then in the Defense Department's Institute of Defense analysis, and finally during the first year of the Nixon administration as a staff secretary on the National Security Council under Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger.

### Had Full Authority

On the other hand, as Lowenstein readily admits, much of the top secret information was given them in the first place with the full authority of

the Executive Branch in the persons of embassy sources in Laos who, when asked for the secret data, gave it.

To that degree and to the degree that the final decision to release as much as was released, including the CIA's involvement, were approved by President Nixon, the disclosures do represent the effect of Nixon's announced policy of making more information available to the public.

But there is a strong belief on both the Executive and Legislative sides of the argument that the administration was faced with the possibility of a strong challenge to the conduct of a secret war in Laos as opposed to a nonsecret one, and possibly over the larger issue of secrecy itself in the wake of the Pentagon papers.

In any case, the CIA, State, and Defense Department representatives finally conceded the CIA role in Laos, the extent of the CIA-backed army of Laotian irregulars, the extent of the air war, and the extent of U. S. expenditures on the total effort in Laos.

There were many facts, Lowenstein said, which both sides agreed were and should remain secret for obvious reasons, and the first of the five weeks was spent narrowing down to four or five the areas on which Lowenstein and Moose held out for publication. The administration representatives then needed to start the process

of gaining approval of higher authority.

Much finally was censored; particularly on the subject of U. S. support of Thai irregulars fighting with CIA support and training among the force of 30,000 Laotian irregulars.

But among the information not censored were the reasons for secrecy given the two investigators during their 12-day visit to Indochina.

"The principal arguments we heard for the need to continue to maintain secrecy were these: first, that Gen. Vang Pao [commander of the irregular forces] does not want to allow the press to visit because his military security would be compromised; second, that if reporters were permitted to visit Long Tieng [the irregulars' principal base], they would concentrate on the role of the U. S. overlooking Vang Pao's contribution; third, that the CIA is a clandestine organization not used to operating in the open and that its operations in other parts of the world might be compromised if the techniques and individuals involved in Laos were to become known; fourth, that were U. S. activities publicized, American would be accused of violating the Geneva Agreements of 1962 and it would thus be more difficult to reestablish the Geneva Agreements as a framework for a future settlement in Laos; and fifth, that the details of the Thai presence would become known which would [deleted]."

DETROIT, MICH.  
NEWS

Approved For Release 200

E - 592,616  
S - 827,086

AUG 8 1971

# CIA losing its veil of secrecy

By GEORGE KUNTERA  
News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—Since it opened in the late 1950's, the headquarters of the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in nearby Virginia has been screened from public view by a border of woodland.

That screen is soon to be lost. The land is to be developed by the National Park Service for camping, hiking and picnicking. And even as CIA headquarters itself becomes more visible, an effort is beginning in Congress to open a window on the CIA activities within the building.

These developments on Capitol Hill point up the effort:

• The troubled reaction of some Senate members to the disclosure last week that the CIA and the United States were more deeply involved in a clandestine military action in Laos than was heretofore publicly known or believed.

• The appointment of an anti-war Michigan congressman, Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Detroit Democrat, the chairmanship of a special House subcommittee on intelligence, and his hope of staging open hearings on the CIA.

• Action in Congress, already halfway through the legislative process, to put a halt to secret CIA financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which beam news behind the Iron Curtain.

NO MEMBER OF CONGRESS asks that the operations of the intelligence agency headed by Richard Helms be an open book. But some members are miffed about the unwillingness of the executive branch to share more information with Congress and the CIA is part of the irritant.

Helms himself recognizes this situation. In dealing with it, he went so far last April as to make a public speech, his first as CIA director, outlining his views.

He firmly denied that his agency was a law unto itself or an invisible government "engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls."

The CIA is directly responsible to the National Security Council. But the agency long has contended that it is responsive to Congress as well because of its briefing to an informal group composed of some members of the Armed Services and Appropriations committees.

In his public speech here to members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Director Helms argued that this informal congressional group is "told more about our activities and our operations than is known to most of the personnel in our highly compartmented agency."

He added, "But how, in the end, we are to be supervised is for Congress itself to decide."

However, some members of Congress do not feel, despite the informed briefings, that procedures exist that make the CIA at least partially accountable to Congress.

NEDZI SAID THE OTHER DAY, "My feeling is that the old subcommittee (the informal group) served more as a vehicle for the Chief Executive, to enable him to say he had consulted and advised Congress. But I'm not aware that there has been any congressional oversight of the CIA . . . I think it important that the window be opened a bit."

He said later, "Everybody appreciates that elements of restraint are involved. The difficulty is in drawing that line between the national security and public disclosure."

The effort to focus more attention on the CIA is part of a trend in recent years toward more public disclosure by the Congress.

This trend has seen public reporting of congressmen's net worth and income, liberalized rules in House and Senate, the adoption of recorded teller votes in the House, reform of campaign spending and reporting of that spending, and a move toward more open hearings of congressional committees.

Publication of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report on Laos last week indicated that CIA-supervised troops numbering more than 30,000 were actually bearing the brunt of the combat against the enemy in Laos.

IT BECAME KNOWN last week that the report had led Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Montana Democrat, to call an extraordinary secret session of the Senate June 7.

A transcript of that session was placed in the Congressional Record last Wednesday and it showed that the Nixon administration was accused of withholding information and misleading Congress about growing American involvement in the Laotian war.

Senator Stuart Symington, Missouri Democrat, told the Senate that U.S. military assistance to Laos had trebled since 1937 and was now 25 times as great as when it began in 1963.

"We have been appropriating money for this war in the blind," he said.


As for Nedzi, he said the Laotian disclosures suggest "there may be a need for legislation in this area, to restrain the CIA from becoming involved in this kind of thing."

"I can understand how it happened," he said, "but I can't justify in my own mind how it happened without Congress being aware of it."

As for Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts to Eastern Europe, and Radio Liberty, which broadcasts to Russia, the Senate has approved legislation providing \$35 million in fiscal 1972 for "open funding" of the stations, thereby eliminating, if the bill passes the House, funding by the CIA.

"The Senate has clearly shown," said Senator Clifford P. Case, New Jersey Republican and the bill's sponsor, that it will no longer abdicate its responsibilities in allowing the executive branch to pay out \$35 million a year (to the stations) without congressional authorization.

For 20 years the payments were made by the CIA.



REP. LUCIEN NEDZI

HUNTSVILLE, ALA.

TIMES

AUG 9 1971

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## Why must an 'information' agency run these wars?

When the Central Intelligence Agency was established, in the late 1940's, the explanation was that we needed a specially trained and equipped organization to gather information on political, economic, and military situations all over the world. We needed an organization that could give the President reports on these situations every day. The CIA was to be a well-camouflaged if not a secret agency—so that it could go about its data-gathering assignment with a minimum of trouble.

The CIA has, indeed, gathered information and prepared the confidential evaluations for the presidents. Some of these evaluations, like those that forecast the problems in Vietnam, turned out to be good and prescient judgments, even if they were ignored. The CIA would look a lot better today if it had stayed with information gathering—instead of getting into the business of designing and executing adventures like the Bay of Pigs.

It has been rumored for a long time and now is finally confirmed that the CIA has been running the "secret war" in Laos. This is the operation in which an irregular army of more than 30,000 Meo tribesmen, Thai volunteers, and men from the Royal Laotian forces has been waging nine years of relatively unavailing war for the Plain of Jars and the hamlets of the eastern half of the country. Our attempt to keep the operation secret has made our motives look too much like the motives of the Communists.

To the extent that the United States must carry on military programs in South Asia—and elsewhere—it would seem more reasonable and satisfactory to have them carried on openly and by the Department of Defense. We may not accomplish what we set out to do in every case. But at least we'll know what the United States is doing. That isn't too much to ask of the government.

AUG 9 1971

## The CIA's Army in Laos

# Light on a 'Secret War'

By Michael T. Malloy  
FROM WASHINGTON, D.C.

The "secret war" that the United States has long waged in Laos became a little less secret last week.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee published a report compiled by two of its investigators after a visit to the Southeast Asian country. Their most striking conclusion was that an unofficial Laotian army raised by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had taken over most of the fighting from the larger, but less competent, regular Laotian army.

The report was heavily censored by the CIA and the State and Defense Departments, and much of its contents had been published elsewhere in bits and pieces. But it was still the clearest official picture that has been drawn publicly about the Laotian conflict and the American military involvement there.

### Budget Breakdown

The CIA censors, in five weeks of negotiation with the committee, permitted the report to indirectly reveal for the first time some of the costs of the intelligence agency's operations in Laos. The report did this by breaking down a \$284,200,000 partial estimate of U.S. expenditures in Laos in the last fiscal year into \$162,200,000 for military assistance, \$52,000,000 for economic aid, and the unspecified balance — which comes to \$70,000,000 — for CIA operations.

These CIA expenses did not include the cost of hiring troops in Thailand to strengthen the intelligence agency's forces in Laos. Thailand has refused to acknowledge that any Thais are fighting in Laos. The size of the Thai force was censored from the committee report, but some senators estimate that 4,800 Thais serve in Laos. The report said they were recruited and trained in Thailand, and paid less than if they served in the regular Thai army.

About 30,000 Laotians serve in the irregular forces, which are "trained, equipped, supported, advised, and, to a great extent, organized by the CIA," the report said. It described the irregulars

fighting units, the *bataillons guerriers*, as "the cutting edge" of the allied forces in four of the five military regions into which Laos is divided.

### Meo Tribesmen

The CIA-sponsored forces are about half as large as the Royal Lao Army. But the report said that since 1963 the irregulars have suffered more than twice as many casualties and killed almost three times as many of the enemy as have the regular troops. The statistics indicate that the irregulars have played a much greater combat role than has been known previously. Earlier accounts of operations by CIA-supported forces have dealt with only the 10,000 or so warriors of Gen. Vang Pao, whose Meo tribesmen are based in the mountainous military region around the Plain of Jars.

The committee report said Thai troops had been added to the allied forces because Laos' own manpower supplies had been "exhausted" by years of warfare. It said Vang Pao's tribal units were so eroded that 40 per cent of his manpower was now drawn from outside the Meo tribe. About 66,000 men were enrolled in the various allied forces in Laos.

Enemy forces in Laos were estimated at 39,000 members of the Communist Pathet Lao and 100,000 North Vietnamese. The report said that between 14,000 and 22,000 Chinese Communists were engaged in building and guarding a road in northwestern Laos, away from the main combat areas. According to the report, the Communists now control 60 per cent of Laos, though most of the population lives in regions still in allied hands.

The committee's investigators found "considerable confusion" in Laos over the number of Americans there, but were given figures ranging from 1,143 to 1,231. They were also told that 232 Americans had been listed as missing in Laos. The Pathet Lao says it has captured some Americans, but will not provide a list unless the United States stops bombing Pathet Lao-held territory.

The report said the Americans operated with differing degrees of secrecy. The 127 U.S. Army attaches in Laos openly wore their uniforms and insignia of rank when visiting the countryside. Air Force personnel wore civilian clothes, called each other "mister," and pretended they worked for the foreign-aid mission. CIA operatives were officially assigned to cover jobs in other U.S. agencies. The report said they advised and supervised the irregulars, but did not the CIA flew 55 men into perilous Meo

territory every day and back to the security of the Laotian capital of Vientiane each night.

### CIA Force Shrinks

The Senate investigators found that most Americans in Laos were pessimistic about the military situation. They said the North Vietnamese had increased their strength and occupied additional territory since the South Vietnamese effort to invade the country and cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in March. Because of the increased fighting, the CIA's *bataillons guerriers* have shrunk from a peak strength in 1969 of almost 40,000 to the present 30,000.

The report painted a pathetic picture of the regular Lao army. It said recruits reportedly were conscripted by "press gang" methods and that 30 per cent of them deserted. Troops frequently were cheated of their food rations and the \$5-a-month wages they are supposed to get. Military payrolls were so heavily padded that one 300-man paper unit reportedly was able to muster only 25 soldiers.

The Laotian government was found to be almost entirely dependent on U.S. handouts. The national income of the roughly 2,000,000 people living in government-controlled territory was estimated at about \$132,000,000 a year. American aid is scheduled to reach \$374,000,000 this fiscal year, nearly three times as much as the Laotian economy.

The most optimistic Americans that the investigators met in Laos hoped that the Laotian government could hold the territory it now has until a settlement is reached in Vietnam. Laos is an important battlefield now because it is crossed by the Ho Chi Minh Trail and because the conflict there ties up North Vietnamese troops who might otherwise be fighting in South Vietnam. U.S. and Laotian officials believe an end to the Vietnam War might make it possible for the Pathet Lao and the American-backed government to resolve their differences on the basis of the 1962 Geneva agreement, which theoretically neutralized the country. The United States has kept its involvement there as secret as possible because, like the North Vietnamese military operations, it violates that agreement.



# CIA-Backed Thais in Laos Say They Are Regular Army

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, Aug. 8 — Thai soldiers serving with the CIA-supported irregular forces in Laos say they are regular army troops of Thailand, asked to accept special assignment in all Thai battalions.

Their assertion contradicts a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report made public last week. The report, prepared by Committee staff members James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose referred to Thai troops in Laos as "irregulars."

Heavily censored in most of its references to Thais serving in Laos, the report said the Thai fighting men "are recruited for service in Laos from outside the regular Thai army."

Speaking to a reporter, several Thai soldiers said they were asked to accept an assignment in Laos after the advantages of such service were explained. They have the option of refusing, they said.

According to the Lowenstein-Moose report, "the CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

Their units are formed in Thailand with Thai commissioned and non-commissioned officers and are given special training for Laos.

They arrive in Laos aboard CIA-supported Air America planes from Udorn airbase in Northern Thailand. All orders, from the battalion level down, are issued by Thais, the soldiers said. Only at the very top, with Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo commander of Laos Military Region Two, and the CIA's Arnee Clandestine, is there interference with the Thai chain of command, they said.

Vang Pao does not command the Thais, they said, but consults with Thai officers and the CIA "case officers" who

The Thai soldiers agree with press reports that there is at least one Thai general in Laos, using the code name Nai Caw. This is the equivalent of John Doe. The Thai troops say he is a lieutenant general.

Code names are frequently used by and for Thai troops in Laos. Reliable sources in Thailand say that until recently all wounded Thais treated in the U.S. hospital at Udorn Airbase were listed as John Doe One, Two, Three, etc. to hide their national origins.

At present the troops say, there are 10 or 12 Thai battalions in Laos, or about 4,000 men. Two Thai battalions are at Pakse, in southern Laos, and "about ten" in northern Laos, with headquarters at Long Cheng, the soldiers said.

Reliable sources in Bangkok say, moreover, that another Thai artillery battery has either just entered Laos or shortly will, accompanied by an American major. The U.S. officer is to advise them on the operation of unfamiliar equipment, believed to be aiming devices.

Official U.S. sources deny knowledge of such a unit, that an American officer has been given such an assignment, and that a new American officer has arrived or is expected, even on temporary duty.

The Bangkok sources say the officer will be traveling on a civilian passport and in civilian clothing.

A Thai soldier now stationed in Pakse outlined the sequence of events in his assignment to Laos. Returning to Thailand from duty in South Vietnam, he said, he was sent for advance training in Thailand following a 30-day leave. He was told the training was for assignment to Cambodia, he said.

Following the training, he was told his assignment was changed to Laos, but that he could refuse to go and remain in Thailand.

After the pros and cons were explained he decided to accept and became a volunteer.

"special battalion," he was sent to Udorn, then to Long

Cheng. At Long Cheng, the unit was engaged in defense of that headquarters. The Thais fought in one "heavy" battle in a sector call "Sky-line" by U.S. personnel.

Shortly before the fall of the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos to North Vietnamese forces last May the Thai battalion was flown to Ubon Air Base in Thailand then to Pakse, where they were airlifted to the vicinity of Ba Houei Sai, on the Bolovens Plateau.

As a result of the Hanoi offensive, they withdrew to Pakse. The soldiers said they are not deeply involved in the current counter offensive to recapture the Bolovens, though some of them are used as forward air guides, relaying bombing targets from ground to air.

Recent visitors to Pakse say the Thai soldiers are very much in evidence in hotels and bars. They do not wear Thai army markings on their uniforms and the soldiers say they carry no identification, on orders from their officers.

STATINTL

9 AUG 1971

MILTON VIORST

## Erosion of Nixon's War Powers

It's been getting harder lately for the Central Intelligence Agency to perpetuate the myth that the United States is not engaged in a war in Laos. So the other day, it came clean -- or almost clean.

The CIA reluctantly authorized the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to publish a report which detailed years of American involvement, but omitted just enough fact to leave some doubt over whether its activities actually violated American law.

Press dispatches already had made clear that American personnel were engaged in fighting in Laos. The press also had established that the CIA was financing Thai mercenaries in Laos. Both actions are contrary to congressional prohibitions. But though everyone knew of them, the CIA never admitted them. Finally, warned that the Foreign Relations Committee planned to tell all, the CIA had a choice: Either keep lying and look absurd, or make a bargain.

So for five weeks, the agency and the committee negotiated. The CIA wanted to expunge facts; the committee wanted its report cleared for security. In the end, the agency won a few skirmishes, but the committee carried the battle.

By giving the report an official security clearance, the CIA confessed publicly that it has for years been waging a war it had told no one about.

The war in Laos, in fact, makes Vietnam look as veiled as a newborn babe. For Vietnam, Congress was, at least, given an annual opportunity to inquire into military appropriations. But Laos expenditures were always hidden within the secret CIA budget.

Last spring, after it became apparent what the CIA was up to, Rep. Herman Badillo of New York proposed an amendment to the armed services appropriations bill to bar any funds for secret Laotian operations.

In the ensuing debate, Rep. Jerome Waldie of California and Chairman Edward Hebert of the House Armed Services Committee engaged in the following colloquy.

Waldie: "While recently in Indochina, I visited Laos and several questions occurred to me . . . Mr. Chairman, I would ask if there are funds in this bill for the Central Intelligence Agency."

Hebert: "There are funds in the bill for intelligence work for all agencies."

Waldie: "Can the gentleman tell me in what portion of the bill those funds are contained?"

Hebert: "No, I cannot tell the gentleman that."

Waldie: "Is it available so that a member of this House of Representatives may go to the committee and examine the classified documents involving the amount of money available for the Central Intelligence Agency in this bill?"

Hebert: "No, sir, it is not. The chairman takes full responsibility of not discussing the matter further."

In cutting off the debate, Hebert was saying that, under White House direction, the CIA had authority to conduct the war anywhere, and that neither Congress nor the American people had a right either to be informed about it or to exercise control over it.

Certainly, many Americans would have disagreed with that, and with Hebert's aphorism that, "secrecy is one of the prices we must pay for survival." The Badillo amendment, however, didn't have a chance. It lost by a vote of 172 to 46.

But strangely, while rumors

of the impending CIA revelations circulated on Capitol Hill last month, Hebert had an apparent change of heart. Although he is a staunch Pentagon supporter, Hebert's views are far from the mindless jingoism of his predecessor, the late Mendel Rivers of South Carolina.

On July 28, Hebert established a new subcommittee to investigate the CIA. He named as its chairman no patsy for the Pentagon, but Lucien Nedzi, an aggressive anti-war liberal from Michigan.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Capitol, Sen. Stuart Symington, chairman of the subcommittee which authorized the CIA report, announced publicly that he was dissatisfied with the amount of information the agency still concealed. He hinted he would try to prove that the CIA knowingly violated federal law, particularly in financing the Thai mercenary force.

These signs indicate that, even if Congress does not withdraw the CIA's mandate for adventurism, it may be preparing to exercise greater control.

Clearly, however, the episode represents a further step in the continuing erosion of the President's war powers. The secret war in Laos was an abuse of those powers. Congress is now reasserting the constitutional principle that such powers are too important to be left to the President alone.

STATINTL

8 AUG 1971

INDOCHINA

POW Hope Raised--Briefly

For the relatives of U.S. prisoners of war, no news is bad news.

Last week, there was a dramatic report involving the possible release of 187 Americans being held by Hanoi, but it was uncertain whether the story was good news, or even any news at all.

A Swedish newspaper, the respected Dagens Nyheter, reported that the U.S. command in Saigon had arranged for the airlift this Thursday of 187 prisoners from Vientiane, Laos, to New York via Bangkok and Rome.

The story, which was team-written, quoted "confidential sources" saying that the prisoners would be released in Hanoi and then flown "probably with Russian planes" to Vientiane, where they would be put aboard a Scandinavian Airlines System jet.

Later, an SAS spokesman questioned about the report said that such an operation was being planned but added that "there has yet not been any contract signed and therefore no fixed time for the transport."

Everyone Denies It

But soon after the story appeared, it was being denied by almost everyone involved—including SAS.

Knut Hagrup, the airline's president, said the SAS public relations man who had confirmed the newspaper report lacked the background to handle "this sensitive thing in the middle of the night and no one regrets this incorrect statement more than he does."

Hagrup admitted that a "private person" had contacted the SAS representative in Frankfurt, West Germany, about such an operation. But he said the request was not taken "too seriously."

Speaking for the White House, Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler said that "the United States government has not been informed of any such plan nor have we participated in negotiating such a plan . . ."

Xuan Thuy, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator at the Paris peace talks, also discounted the story, accusing the Swedish newspaper of possessing "an excessive imagination."

Later, an unidentified West German businessman appeared on U.S. television and said he had talked to SAS officials about the availability of a plane and its cost.

The man, whose back was turned to the camera, said, "I was not acting for any American organization, neither private nor military, involved." But he

declined to say who he was speaking for.

In Stockholm, Dagens Nyheter refused to back down, hinting that disclosure of the operation might have caused its cancellation.

"It is not unlikely that SAS, bowing to external pressure, has found it suitable to downgrade the importance of the flight," said Boerje Dahlqvist, the general news editor. "Our information has been very accurate."

Through all the confusion, one fact was brutally clear. The relatives of the estimated 500 American POWs had had their hopes raised, then flattened.

And the issue seemed as deadlocked as ever: Hanoi insisting upon a U.S. withdrawal deadline in exchange for the release of the POWs, Washington refusing to set a deadline.

While the stories from Stockholm were receiving most of the publicity, a report published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee disclosed new information on the secret involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos.

The 23-page report said that the CIA has spent about \$70 million to operate an army of irregular forces numbering more than 30,000 in Laos during fiscal 1971—a larger involvement than was previously supposed.

Pentagon War Study

Meanwhile, the man who has admitted the leaking of the most controversial government report in recent years was ordered removed to California to face charges of illegal possession of secret government documents.

Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, who said he turned over the Pentagon study of the Vietnam war to the New York Times, was indicted under the Espionage Act of 1917. The warrant was issued in Los Angeles because the federal government contends Ellsberg had access to the secret documents as an employe of the Rand Corp., of Santa Monica.

On the congressional battlefield, the Senate put off until Sept. 13 consideration of a law extending the draft for two years.

The major point of contention between the House of Representatives and the Senate is an amendment to the bill dealing with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam.

The old draft law has expired, but the Selective Service System drew lots Thursday to establish the order of call for the next draft. The first call is for 19 this year. Dec. 4 came first on the list, while Nov. 1 was 366th.

STATINTL



8 AUG 1971

## In Laotian Town, Sweetness of Opium and Peace

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

BAN HOEI SAI, Laos.

The sweetness of opium and peace hangs over this Mekong River town. Ban Houei Sai is reputed to serve as a major transshipping point for illicit opium from the nearby hills in Laos, Thailand and Burma, and the war has not touched it with death, destruction or an invasion of foreigners.

The liveliest action is the rush of the rain-swollen Mekong. At this time of year its high and muddy waters speed toward Cambodia and the delta in South Vietnam, swirling along a disorderly flotilla picked up in Thailand, on the opposite bank, in Burma, just upstream, and in China, where the river rises.

But Fort Carnot, which the French built more than three decades ago to ward off the Thais, dozes over town and river and over the 6,000-odd serene people.

With its covering of lichen and tropical decay, the fort looks more romantic, perhaps, but no more menacing than when it failed to deter the Thais from briefly seizing and thoroughly looting the town just before a kind of peace came to Indochina in 1945.

"Honneur — Discipline," it says, still legibly, over the portal. A bent but burnished bugle rests in a breach in the wall through which no weapon has been aimed. When the bugle calls in midafternoon, a garrison of smiling soldiers in ap-

proximate uniforms straggles out, some carrying their babies and followed by their wives.

In the quadrangle stands the only weapon to be seen—an old American mortar, a ramrod blocking the barrel and a plastic cloth securely covering it.

No ammunition for it is in sight, but under the eaves of the low buildings that form the quadrangle are stacked American rockets in cases, some of them rotting. A pair of torn canvas boots stand alone near the flagpole, and at the main gate lies the carcass of an American-made military truck.

While the opium traffic appears to be largely in the hands of the military and is treated by them as top secret, illicit re-export of imported goods is the main source of income for those who live above subsistence level and is far more open.

An unscheduled flight of Royal Air Lao, a commercial airline, landed from Vientiane with a cargo of cigarettes. Their duty-free entry into Thailand will be facilitated by the enlightened policies of the customs and immigration authorities on both sides of the Mekong. They are there but hard to find.

Traffic across the river is entirely free, with no bribes or documents required. Motorized boats cross in a steady flow from dawn until dark.

Laotians go to buy food in Thailand because the remoteness of Ban Houei Sai and the

war make the town hard to supply from Vientiane. Thais come here to buy imported consumer goods and to do day labor because northeastern Thailand is a poor region.

Few foreigners live here, unlike the rest of Government-held Laos, where they abound. Only four American civilian advisers are here, some Filipino physicians run a hospital and Italian priests a Roman Catholic mission. Other Americans are based at Nam Yu, north of here, where the Central Intelligence Agency runs a secret base from which intelligence patrols operate in the Communist north—sometimes, it is said, crossing into China. Even Laotian Army majors and colonels require special clearance to go there.

The war is not far from here but seems to respect well-established lines and remains quiescent. Experienced observers attribute this to the absence of North Vietnamese troops in significant numbers and to the general unwillingness of Laotians to make war against Laotians.

An 11 P.M. curfew is the rule, but it presents no hardship in a town whose only place of entertainment is a movie house that opens some evenings.

What gives life to the street scene of this one-street town are the comings and goings of hill tribesmen who come down to trade their meager products and sometimes such belongings as silver necklaces and bronze drums for necessities.

# Secrecy On Laos Being Lifted

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.  
A Washington Correspondent  
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Aug. 7

MANY AMERICANS do not know where Laos is, much less that the United States is spending close to \$560,000,000 annually in support of the clandestine war there. Like a dentist digging at a wisdom tooth, Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, has been trying to bring the facts to light.

The cat was pretty well out of the bag this week—not fully, but the head and shoulders at least—with the publication of two documents in which the Executive Branch allowed mention of the Central Intelligence Agency's heavy involvement in Laos.

One of the documents was a 23-page report prepared for Symington's foreign relations subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad. It was prepared by two staff members, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose. A "sanitized" version of it was made public Tuesday.

The other document was the expurgated, declassified transcript of the Senate's closed session of June 7, a session that had been requested by Symington to discuss Laos and make the then top-secret Lowenstein-Moose report available to other Senators. It was published Wednesday in the Congressional record.

Lowenstein and Moose visited Laos from April 21 to May 4, in the aftermath of last spring's drive into Laos by United States-supported South Vietnamese troops. The two presented their report, classified top secret, to Symington's panel May 21.

BEFORE THE REPORT was made public this week, it was reviewed in detail with representatives of departments of State and Defense and the CIA. This procedure took five weeks. Many deletions were made for security reasons, but the CIA permitted itself to be mentioned. The CIA's role—long reported—now is official.

Late in 1969 Symington's subcommittee held hearings on Laos as part of a comprehensive inquiry on American commitments abroad. A heavily censored report of the hearings was made public in April 1970. One can scrutinize its 608 pages without finding mention of the CIA.

In contrast, the Lowenstein-Moose report released this week puts the CIA firmly in the picture, as in the sentence: "The United States continues to train, arm, and feed the Lao army and air force and to train, advise, pay, support and, to a great extent, organize the irregular military forces under the direction of the CIA."

IN ASSESSING the new report on Laos, it is necessary to differentiate between what it contained that was news to the Senate and Congress generally and what it contained that was news to the American public. Members of Congress are often privy to information that is classified and not available to the citizenry.

As Symington acted in a statement Tuesday, there were several areas in which the subcommittee and its staff report squeezed information from the Executive Branch that previously had been kept secret.

(1) Since early 1970, the United States has been conducting B-52 raids in northern Laos on a regular basis. This was disclosed to Congress May 3 while the staff men were in Laos. President Richard M. Nixon admitted in March 1970 that the United States was flying tactical missions in northern Laos.

It is easy to relate American air activity against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos to the war in Vietnam, because the trail is an enemy supply route to South Vietnam. In the case of the war in northern Laos, the relationship to Vietnam is less obvious.

(2) The American-supported irregular forces in Laos, about 30,000 Laotian troops and about 4000 Thais, are deployed generally throughout the country's military regions, except around the capital, Vientiane. It had been thought that the irregular forces were concentrated in Military Region II under Gen. Vang Pao.

(3) United States operations in Laos are costing much more than had been supposed. Symington said the only official expenditure publicly announced previously for Laos for fiscal 1971, just ended, was about \$50,000,000 in economic assistance. He said the actual outlay for 1971, exclusive of bombing costs, was about \$250,000,000.

In addition the report by Lowenstein and Moose indicated an over-all intensity of American involvement in Laos that undoubtedly came as a surprise to many in Congress and to citizens at large, even the sophisticated.

The figures that were made public do not include specific outlays by the CIA. Those figures were deleted. It could be deduced, however, that the CIA spent \$100,000,000 to \$120,000,000 in 1971 for support of the irregulars, including the recruits from Thailand.

IN ADDITION to training, paying and otherwise supporting the CIA's irregulars, the United States trains, arms and feeds the Royal Laotian Army and Air Force. It was made clear that the government of Laos had about exhausted its manpower from internal sources—hence, the troops from Thailand.

The irregular forces in Laos are doing most of the fighting against enemy Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese units. From 1968 through last April, 5920 irregulars were killed in action and 3664 royal army troops.

A private in the royal army receives the equivalent of \$5 a month, in addition to allowances for dependents. Lowenstein and Moose were told that the Laotian government was having difficulty finding soldiers. About 30 per cent of new recruits reportedly desert.

The population of Laos, an impoverished agricultural country west of Vietnam and south of China, is only 2,800,000. Nearly two thirds of Laos is not under government control. The military situation has steadily worsened.

The income of the approximately 2,000,000 Laos under government control averages \$68 a year, based on the country's gross national product. A partial total of United States outlays for Laos in 1971, it was said, would amount to \$141 for each Laotian.

A BONE of contention between Mr. Nixon's Administration and some members of Congress is whether the United States Government, in its support for the Thai irregulars, violated a law enacted by Congress last year. The Government says it has not.

At the behest of Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, an amendment was put into the defense authorization bill barring the use of funds "to support Vietnamese or other free-world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia or Laos."

If defense funds were spent to support the troops from Thailand in Laos, the contravention of Congress's will would be fairly obvious. What about CIA funds? The State Department has taken the position that the Thai irregulars sent into Laos by the United States are "local forces in Laos."

TOLEDO, OHIO

BLADE

AUG

8 1977

E - 176,688

S - 200,492

## The CIA's Secret Army

We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we cannot and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts—the agreed facts—and the whole known range of facts relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the estimative function—the projection of likely developments from the facts—but not to advocacy, or recommendations for one course of action or another.

—CIA Director Richard Helms

WITH that definition of the basic role of the Central Intelligence Agency, few would quarrel. For the sake of national survival, our Government, as well as most of those around the world, must rely on efficient, secretive intelligence-gathering networks for the collection and interpretation of the raw data upon which vital decisions are made.

The CIA is first and foremost an intelligence agency. It is presumably a successful one since Congress has continued it since 1947, and its programs and budgets are reviewed periodically by congressional representatives. The major criticism that has been raised against this agency is that events of the past have shown it far too willing to engage in clandestine operations that would appear to extend well beyond the realm of espionage and intelligence accumulation.

The story now emerging from a Senate subcommittee staff report, for instance, in which the CIA acknowledges that it is maintaining a 30,000-man armed force that is fighting all over Laos only raises anew questions over where the agency's intelligence functions stop and it becomes an extension of the Defense Department. A 30,000-man force that includes Thai mercenaries recruited and paid by the CIA is no mere platoon; it is, in reality, a small army that is receiving support and presumably direction from the CIA while carrying out military operations 10,000 miles from our shores.

There are adverse ramifications when such disclosures finally come to light. First, they further erode confidence in the Government which had long denied knowledge of any secret war in Laos in which we were a major par-

ticipant. Secondly, they cast a shadowy reflection upon the CIA itself by creating the impression that its primary role is not intelligence but insurrection. Lastly, it is this kind of furtive activity that always carries a high risk that what begins as a secret, guerrilla-type war will explode into a larger conflict of far greater implication.

When the CIA was set up, the overall purpose was to form an office that would not replace existing elements of the Government's intelligence community but coordinate the work of all of them. One can only wonder if Congress really had in mind creating an agency that under the guise of intelligence-gathering would one day be maintaining an army of 30,000 in distant Laos, in addition to whatever else it is up to.

ST. Approved For Release 2001/09/10 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600160  
 GLOBE--DEMOCRAT

MORNING -- 292,789  
 WEEKEND -- 306,889

AUG 7 1971

from the GLOBE'S Bureaus

Edward W. O'Brien

## Symington scores on Laos

WASHINGTON — Senator Stuart Symington has achieved a monumental feat in gathering and publishing information about the secret war being waged in far-away Laos by the United States.

As the past two decades have demonstrated, it is no longer necessary for Congress to declare war before shots can be fired. But Congress still must appropriate the money to fight a war and presumably would know the basic facts before furnishing the funds.

Symington is a senior member of the Senate bodies most directly involved — the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Appropriations committees, and, holy of holies, the Central Intelligence Agency subcommittee.

Nonetheless, as he has said repeatedly in recent weeks, the true scope of the American military effort in Laos and many of the critically important details were withheld from him as well as the rest of the Senate.

"I HAVE BEEN hoodwinked," Symington told his colleagues after learning the truth belatedly.

"Let's face it. We have been appropriating money for this war in the blind."

Because of his concern about American commitments abroad, Symington visited Laos many times over the years.

"Every time, upon my return, I thought to myself, 'I finally have the picture,'" he says.

"But later I found that was not the case."

THIS SPRING, as chairman of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, Symington sent two staff investigators to Laos. Their findings, classified as top secret, prompted Symington to

arrange a rare closed session of the Senate June 7.

The staffers' report and the transcript of the Senate session, with many deletions by administration censors, were finally released a few days ago, giving the American public for the first time a fairly complete account of how their resources are being used in Laos.

For Symington, who probably knows more about the subject than any other congressman, there were two principal surprises.

THE UNITED STATES this year is spending at least \$284 million on the Laos campaign — or five times the figure previously suggested by the administration. The real figure, Symington said, is doubtless much higher than the \$284 million.

The dollars are significant as a measure of military activity.

Second, the U.S. Air Force since February, 1970, has been regularly using Big B-52 bombers for attacks on Communist ground troops in Northern Laos, not far from the Communist China border.

That part of Laos contains thousands of Chinese antiaircraft crewmen and civilian construction workers.

AS SYMINGTON SAID, The United States is risking a confrontation with China, and "if we lost some B-52s up there, either from antiaircraft or fighter attacks, this could well be a different ball game."

The administration explains that by resisting Communist forces in Laos, military pressure is lessened on American troops in South Vietnam. Further, the administration hopes that somehow little independent Laos can be kept from falling to full Communist control.

The administration may be right, though many don't think so.

But Symington's point is that the issue of fighting a ravaging war in Laos is so serious it should be debated and decided not in a few quiet offices in the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon but in a public forum.



MR. O'BRIEN

AUG 1971

# Air America's Role in Laos Becoming More Clandestine

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, Aug. 6—The role of Air America, a private contractor providing special air transport services to the U.S. government in Southeast Asia, is reverting to a more specific clandestine nature in Laotian operations.

"The company is strictly a paramilitary operation again," following its loss of a "rice drop" contract in competitive bidding recently, says one source close to the company. "It is moving back to its original role."

Air America lost the supply contract to Continental Air Services, another contractor in Southeast Asia, but will continue transport services to the Royal Laotian Army, Vang Pao's CIA-supported clandestine army and other, more secret U.S. government operations in Laos.

Until recently, Continental and Air America shared the service as logistics links to U.S.-supported forces scattered in the mountains north and east of the Mekong basin, dropping them food, arms and ammunition from Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Longcheng or Thailand's Udon Airbase.

Foodstuff dropping has come to be called "rice drops" because the double-bagged, half-filled sacks of rice, free-falling to outposts, makes up the bulk of the supplies. U.S. government sources say 50 tons are dropped daily.

Air America's helicopters, short takeoff and landing planes and heavy cargo

planes will continue to provide such services, but, according to the sources, company operations will be less open to the public than before because of the nature of the cargo and its destinations. Most strategic cargo moved to the mountains of Laos is moved by Air America.

Most air mobile military operations conducted in Laos, particularly in the northern sector, rely on Air America and its veteran pilots—most of whom, though civilians, have combat experience.

In recent weeks troops and material both for Gen. Vang Pao's current Plain of Jars offensive, 100 miles north of Vientiane, and for the Bolovens Plateau offensive east of Pakse in southern Laos, were ferried by Air America. The operations could not continue without the company's planes and helicopters.

The airline was created as a paramilitary air force following World War II being built around former combat pilots, the most flamboyant of them from Gen. Claire Chennault's Flying Tigers which operated in Asia.

Some of the original Flying Tigers remain with the company, as do former Army Air Corps pilots from the European theater.

The majority today, however, are U.S. Air Force veterans of the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Originally a highly secret service, Air America became famous during the earlier days of the Vietnam war and gradually became a fea-

ture of U.S. government operations in volatile areas, the bulk of its work being cargo and passenger transport. Clandestine operations continued, including piloting T-28 bombers in Laos and search and rescue missions, according to the Pentagon Papers.

Continental Air Services entered cargo hauling for the government in competitive bidding, along with smaller companies, allowing and forcing Air America to revert to its earlier paramilitary role.

Local sources note a recent management and government program to reassert security consciousness among the airlines employees under threat of revoking their security clearances and hence their clearance to fly for the company. According to the sources, recent breaches of security have led to a general shakeup.

Air America is also revert-

ing to use of Asian co-pilots on its less sensitive missions and on smaller planes. Former Nationalist Chinese co-pilots still with the company are being retired, and replacements taken from a small training program for Lao and Thai pilots conducted by the company for the U.S. government.

Use of such co-pilots is said to be a financial saving for the company and also creates a pool of pilots for local aviation. Most of the new co-pilots will be "volunteers" of Thai origin passing as Laotian, according to sources.

Sources say, however, that the larger cargo planes will retain American co-pilots because of the greater skill needed to fly them and the secrecy of many of the missions, particularly troop and war material movements.

"Asians have a low security consciousness quotient," says an American government official.

August 6, 1971

### LIMITATION ON CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES

Mr. TADMADGE, Mr. President, on Thursday, August 5, the Senate took what I believe to be an important step toward restoring the credibility of the American people in their elected Representatives. We have heard much in recent months about this loss of credibility. One of the primary complaints has been that America's elected officials are no longer readily accessible to Americans. This charge has been based on the idea that the skyrocketing cost of election campaigns has created a situation wherein the only way a candidate can raise enough money to run for office is by obligating himself to a dangerous degree to wealthy vested interest groups.

In limiting campaign expenditures and promulgating disclosure requirements, the Senate has gone a long way toward alleviating this problem. I endorse, therefore, the passage of this legislation with only one minor reservation.

Much has been said recently concerning the growing threat of Government interference in the private economic sector. The various outlets of the media who sell advertising time to candidates are obviously competitors in the economic arena. In enacting this legislation, we have been forced to compromise their interest somewhat to advance the interests of the general public.

But there is one area of this legislation in which I believe the Senate went too far in that direction. I refer to the so-called "lowest unit rate" requirement. Simply stated, this portion of the bill requires broadcasting stations to charge, "the lowest unit charge of the station of the same class and amount of time for the same period." This requirement would be in force for the 45 days preceding a primary and the 60 days before a general election.

This means that a candidate for office, by congressional decree, would be entitled to the best possible rate available on the advertising market.

The power to use the congressional licensing power to fix prices is one which should be exercised very carefully. In my judgment, it is appropriate only to combat inflation or to deal with some other serious national emergency. Clearly, there is no such situation present here. The immediate beneficiaries of this legislation are the candidates themselves.

Senator CARL CURTIS introduced an amendment to delete this provision, and I supported that amendment. The opponents of the amendment say that we are not fixing prices since the lowest unit rate is set by the individual station. This seems to me to be nothing more than playing with words. If we are not fixing prices, we are certainly regulating them, and we are doing so in our own self interest.

The opponents of the amendment also argue that the ultimate beneficiary of this provision is the general public. I would like to examine this for a moment in light of my own situation. According to the Bureau of the Census, in 1972 there will be some 2,111,000 Georgians of voting age. Using the formula contained in the legislation, I would be allowed to

spend some \$187,000 for advertising in the broadcast media in a 1972 Senatorial election campaign. In 1968, when there was no such lowest unit requirement, Vice President HUMPHREYS spent some \$6 million for broadcast advertising. I would thus be allowed to spend approximately 3 percent of what the Vice President spent. The Bureau of the Census also informs me that in 1972, there will be some 139.5 million Americans of voting age in 1972. In other words, I will be able to spend 3 percent of what the Vice President spent while attempting to reach only 2 percent as many voters as he did.

This demonstrates clearly that under the present provisions of the bill, the access of a candidate to the broadcast media would be more than adequate whether or not there is any requirement that the candidate be extended the lowest unit rate.

Therefore, while I was delighted to see the passage of this legislation, I was indeed distressed that the Senate saw fit to interfere in the private economic sector in an area in which I strongly feel that such interference was unnecessary.

### VIETNAM EXPENDITURES

Mr. GRAVEL, Mr. President, it becomes increasingly apparent that there will be no more quick dividends from the winding down of Vietnam expenditures—if indeed there ever were any. If the present administration has its way, the price of maintaining our defenses is bound to balloon, for it has never adequately addressed itself to the issues of where the real interests of the United States lie and how the military requirements of true national defense differ from the demands imposed by continuing our present policy of garrisoning troops worldwide.

While the President makes much ado over his new policy of self-help for the countries of Asia, and while he speaks of shifting contingency planning from a posture of preparedness for 2½ to 1½ wars, he nonetheless avoids the hard decisions we must eventually face in reducing the scale of our worldwide commitments. Instead he continues to request troop strengths in excess of 2.5 million and to deploy them at farflung bases around the world despite the nominal retrenchment to a 1½ war strategy.

Nothing in the Nixon doctrine gives me any confidence that this administration has learned the real lessons of the war in Vietnam. It has learned only one kind of lesson: Do it differently next time. Do it by stealth; do it through the corruption of foreign officials. Wage war by air, but not on the ground. Do it by sending American troops, but in civilian clothes. Do it with the CIA—as in Laos—not with army regulars.

But the solution to worldwide military intervention is not disguising it, but stopping it. And the only way to stop it is to reconceive our whole scheme of worldwide objectives such that we do not invite involvement in war through the very means by which we purport to provide for the national defense. This means that we must reduce our troop commitments abroad and cease to play the

world's policeman, realizing that certain events in the world—distressing though they may be—are of neutral significance to the well-being of the United States. The only other alternative is to come to be regarded as the world's most notorious outlaw.

What we require for the United States is a whole new concept of Foreign Policy which steers a prudent course of international risk-avoidance, instead of the courting of and preparation for improbable risks. It must bolster at every occasion our respect for, and reliance upon, International Law and Cooperation as peaceful means of settlement, rather than insisting on an American solution that leans heavily on the decisive and lonely use of force.

It is time to admit frankly that we cannot afford, and do not choose any longer to sustain, the role that a succession of presidents have chosen—or claim to have had thrust upon them. Tens of thousands of American dead, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese dead, and more than \$100 billion spent on destruction and devastation have taught us that much.

The dramatic reversal called for cannot, moreover, be bought with belated, piecemeal efficiencies. Such hopeless and half-hearted efforts will only see the so-called "peace dividends" counted on by the American people gobbled up by cost escalation of particular weapons systems, general inflation, and climbing service-pay scales. The only place to go for large savings is the conventional force structure.

First, we should realize that strategic forces—nuclear missiles, submarines, bombers, anti-missile systems, and air defense—though extremely expensive in absolute terms, are only a quarter of our total defense budget. For fiscal year 1972, for example, our total bill for strategic items, including the associated research and development, intelligence, and general overhead, will be about \$20 billion out of \$76 billion. Percentages are even lower in the manpower area. Strategic force strength for fiscal year 1972 is estimated to be only 139,000 men, or less than 10 percent of the total force level.

Even a fairly wide range of feasible options—ranging from a low posture, stressing a single, sea based retaliatory system, to a program of modernization of all three redundant systems—ICBM, SAC, and polaris—plus ABM and Air Defense—would run only about \$6 billion to \$8 billion in either direction from the \$20 billion already budgeted for strategic defense.

On the other hand, general purpose forces—what we keep in our force structure to cope with threats to allies, to sea lanes, to our various interests in foreign countries, to our supposed interest in preventing political change in client states—are \$56 billion. This breaks down to about \$22 billion for NATO, about \$19 billion for Asia besides Vietnam, about \$9 billion for continuing Vietnam expenditures, and about \$6 billion for the central strategic reserve and the rest of the world—the so-called "½ war" or "minor contingency."

Reducing our general purpose and support forces not only makes good

BOSTON, MASS.  
HERALD TRAVELER

M - 194,557  
S - 260,961

AUG 6 1971

## *The Symington Papers*

Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on foreign commitments, has gained release of a report generally construed as a formal U.S. acknowledgment of participation in the "secret" war in Laos.

The report was prepared, it should be noted, by two former foreign service officers recruited by the subcommittee, and merely declassified by the State and Defense Departments as well as by the Central Intelligence Agency.

What the Symington papers "confirm" is what has been general but unspecified knowledge about U.S.-sponsored operations in land-locked Laos since the immediate disintegration of the Treaty on Laos in 1962. To stave off the imminent takeover of Laos by Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces, the United States has been supplying Laotian troops with annual military and economic assistance; moreover, it has sent Special Forces advisory personnel and CIA operatives into that besieged "neutral" kingdom since 1962.

The neutrality and inviolability of Laos have been a myth ever since. The only reason the precise

amounts of military assistance given to Laos have hitherto remained classified is that both the United States and North Vietnam, as signatories of the 1962 treaty, have found it diplomatically advisable to sustain at least the semblance of the myth.

But old pretenses are being dropped. Hanoi now speaks directly for the Pathet Lao and the CIA has allowed its role as recruiter and trainer of irregular forces to be divulged by others. The Symington papers, by subtracting other estimates of U.S. spending to protect Laos from utter subjugation, conclude that the CIA spent \$70 million in fiscal 1970 to train, equip and advise Laotian irregulars—mostly Meo tribesmen.

If one reads only the Symington papers, it might seem the United States is fomenting a "secret" war just for the villainy of it; nowhere does it underscore the fact that the United States has no combat troops in Laos or that the estimated 30,000 irregulars recruited by the CIA are really no match for the 60,000 to 70,000 North Vietnamese regulars on Laotian soil, whose aggressive occupation of another country's territory has been about as secret as the Ho Chi Minh trail.

*Our opinions**The mysterious CIA*

✓ THE need to make the CIA answerable to Congress is underscored by disclosures that the agency has been promoting and financing a secret war in Laos and has been training Cambodian troops in Laos in order to circumvent a 1970 amendment cutting off funds for U.S. ground troops or advisers in Cambodia.

Although the training of regular Cambodian troops in Laos has reportedly been discontinued, a covert program using American advisers to train Cambodian guerrillas is still going on. The continuing secret war in Laos, in which mercenary forces are advised, clothed, armed, paid and sometimes led by CIA operatives, is in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of a 1939 amendment prohibiting the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops into Laos.

In view of the Congress constitutionally conferred powers to tax, to make appropriations, to raise and support armies and to declare war, it is strange that the House has declined to approve a resolution by Republican Paul N. McCloskey of California requiring the Administration to tell Congress what the military and the CIA are up to in Laos.

This is abdication of legislative responsibility based on the false rationalization that the information

sought "is of a highly sensitive nature" and its revelation "would not be compatible with the public interest." Why hasn't the House learned a lesson from the deception revealed by publicity on the secret Pentagon history of the war?

It is to be hoped that senators will exhibit more wisdom than House members when the time comes to act on several proposals introduced in the Senate. One by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, would require the CIA to make regular and special reports to responsible Senate and House committees. Another by Sen. George S. McGovern, would require CIA expenditures and appropriations to appear as a single line item in the budget rather than being camouflaged in other agency budgets.

Finally, Sen. Clifford P. Case would limit the CIA's use of funds and military equipment for fielding foreign troops in Laos or elsewhere without specific approval by Congress.

These measures represent a fully justified effort to prevent an organization that is supposed to be an information-gathering agency from initiating dubious policies and conducting far-reaching operations abroad without the knowledge or consent of elected lawmakers.



6 AUG 1971

STATINTL

# CIA's murderous role outrages the Filipinos

By WILLIAM J. POMEROY

LONDON

Publication of the Pentagon Papers that has blasted a gaping hole in the credibility of a string of American administrations has set off a secondary explosion in the Philippines, where the role of the puppet Magsaysay administration in aiding the American aggression in Vietnam has been exposed.

One of the main reports in the Papers is that by Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, in which he discusses in detail the actions taken by the CIA from before the Geneva Agreement of 1954 onward to promote suppressive counter-guerrilla warfare in Vietnam and Laos and to build up Ngo Dinh Diem as the American instrument to frustrate the Agreement. Lansdale was well-known before that in the Philippines, since he was the CIA agent who masterminded many aspects of the anti-Huk suppression campaign in the country and who groomed Ramon Magsaysay for the presidency and ran his election campaign.

In a number of the actions detailed by Lansdale in his report Filipinos who were part of the Magsaysay apparatus and with whom Lansdale had worked in the Philippines played a leading part. Magsaysay himself as honorary president, backed the setting up of an outfit initially called the Freedom Company, "a non-profit Philippine corporation," which had the assignment of recruiting Filipinos who had participated in the anti-Huk suppression for similar service in Vietnam and Laos.

After Freedom Company was organized in November 1954, it was apparently felt that its name did not sufficiently disguise its operations, so it was changed to Eastern Construction Company. (The CIA has created a maze of such "corporations" around the world, through which its espionage and subversive activities are carried on.)

As the Lansdale report states, "The head of Eastern Construction is Frisco 'Johnny' San Juan, former National Commander, Philippines Veterans Legion, and for-

mer close staff assistant to President Magsaysay (serving as Presidential Complaints and Action Commissioner directly under the President)" San Juan went on to a political career and is now a congressman from Rizal province.

Lansdale praised the almost untapped potential of Eastern Construction for unconventional warfare "which was its original mission." He wrote that "this cadre can be expanded into a wide range of counter-Communist activities, having sufficient stature in the Philippines to be able to draw on a very large segment of its trained, experienced and well-motivated manpower pool." After a few years, "It now furnishes about 500 trained, experienced Filipino technicians to the Governments of Vietnam and Laos, under the auspices of MAAG (MAP) and USOM (ICA) activities."

MAAG are the initials for Military Assistance Advisory Group, and MAP for Military Assistance Program in Vietnam; USOM stands for United States Operation Mission, and ICA for International Cooperation Administration.

The Freedom-Eastern Construction outfit was also assigned the task of running a training camp for anti-Communist Vietnamese para-military units in a hidden valley on the Clark Air Base reservation in the Philippines.

In addition the Magsaysay government agreed to operate a psychological warfare counter-guerrilla school called the Security Training Center, located at Fort McKinley on the rim of Manila. This, as the Pentagon Papers mentions, was secretly sponsored and financed by the CIA. This trained "anti-subversion" personnel for all of Southeast Asia.

Another Filipino-linked scheme

was the so-called Operation Brotherhood, which came about following a visit in 1954 to see Lansdale in Saigon by Oscar Arellano, a Filipino close to Magsaysay who was then vice president for Asia of the International Junior Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees). Arellano came away from this visit to advocate the setting up of Operation Brotherhood, which was played up in the Philippines at the time as a semi-religious altruistic medical mission.

However, as Lansdale explains it, it was "capable of considerable expansion in socio-economic medical operations to support counter-guerrilla actions," and he says that "Washington responded warmly to the idea." According to Lansdale, the Saigon Military Mission that he then headed would "monitor the operation quietly in the background" and that "it has a measure of CIA control."

Oscar Arellano, following the publication of the Pentagon Papers issued a defensive statement claiming that "OB has always been a presidential program since the administration of President Magsaysay. OB's mission is the propagation of the conviction that all men are brothers, created by a Supreme Divinity to whom He gave His image and likeness and imbued with His spirit."

A third Filipino operation was headed by Col. Napoleon Valeriano, who was given the job of training a Presidential Guard Battalion for Ngo Dinh Diem, after having done the same for Magsaysay. Valeriano was selected, says Lansdale, for his "fine record against the Communist Huks." In the Philippines, Valeriano had commanded the most brutal and notorious of all anti-Huk units, called the "Skull Unit."

6 AUG 1971

# POW release rumor called fabrication

Daily World Combined Services

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam's Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, yesterday branded as "a pure fabrication" a widely-circulated report that a Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) plane had been chartered by U.S. military authorities to fly U.S. war prisoners out of Vientiane, Laos.

Xuan Thuy, chief DRV delegate to the Paris peace talks, also dismissed the rumor as the product of "a too-fertile imagination."

The story first appeared in the Stockholm newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, which said the POW "airlift" would begin in a week, with "Russian planes" flying the American prisoners from Hanoi to Vientiane, where they would be transferred to the SAS charter flight from there to New York.

Both the U.S. and Swedish government flatly denied the story.

SAS at first said it had been contacted by an unidentified "U.S. military authority" in West Germany about such a charter, but later denied its own story and said its contact had nothing to do with the American military—although they weren't certain exactly whom he did represent.

A CIA funnel

Stockholm has been the scene of many of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's "planted" stories and rumors in the past. These are designed as part of its psychological warfare to distract attention from events like the Paris talks.

"Early this morning," Xuan Thuy told newsmen in Paris on yesterday, "I was surprised by a bit of information concerning the release of American pilots in Hanoi.

"All I can say is that the person or newspaper—or agency—responsible for this information has a too-fertile imagination.

"Let's be realistic. The main point is that the Nixon administration must respond quickly to the seven point plan of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and at this conference. The question of military prisoners was dealt with in Point One of the PRG plan.

"If Mr. Nixon refuses to fix a precise date for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, if he

continues to back the Thieu regime in Saigon, the war certainly will continue and the list of war prisoners—far from becoming shorter—will get longer."

In Saigon a political thunderstorm appeared to be brewing as the Saigon puppet Supreme Court ruled Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky off the ballot for Saigon's presidential elections Oct. 3. Gen. Duong Van "Big" Minh, who did get on the ballot to oppose incumbent President Nguyen Van Thieu, declared:

"The above tricks and pressure indicate that the next elections are being rigged even while they are yet in the preliminary stage. In the face of this serious situation, we deem it necessary to reconsider our intention to run for the presidency."

If Minh does pull out of the race, it will be a political disaster for the Nixon administration, which is backing Thieu 200 percent but which needs a token opposition to make the elections look fair.

Thieu and the U.S. are in a particularly bad way since the withdrawal from the presidential race on Wednesday of Dr. Tran Tam, a mild-mannered Roman Catholic theologian. Tam, at a news conference in Saigon, said he and his running mate, Huynh Van Nhiem, would "adopt an attitude of noncooperation" in the forthcoming elections, and would "continue to serve the people of South Vietnam by other means."

Although Tam evidently had collected enough signatures from provincial councillors (at least 100 are necessary, and all have been appointed by Thieu to their jobs), he indicated indirectly that there was a great possibility the Supreme Court would invalidate his petitions too.

The Supreme Court in Saigon yesterday said Ky's qualifying

petitions were illegal because some 39 of the signatures he had obtained were already down for Thieu. The Saigon elections law, drawn up by Thieu and rammed through a packed National Assembly, prohibits switching support once a signature has been obtained.

In the 1967 elections, the Thieu-Ky ticket got in by stationing its national police in the polling booths to "help" voters; the runner-up peace candidate, Truong Dinh Dzu, despite this got too any votes and was arrested and sent to Saigon's equivalent of Devil's Island—the notorious Con Son island-prison now being expanded with U.S. funds.

DES MOINES, IOWA  
REGISTER

M - 250,261  
S - 515,710

AUG 6 1971

## Secret War Exposed

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has pried additional details about the secret war in Laos from a reluctant Administration, which finally permitted publication of a censored version of a committee staff report by investigators James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose.

It turns out that the secret army organized and trained by the United States Central Intelligence Agency has largely taken over the fighting from the Royal Laotian Army, not just in the Plain of Jars but in all but one of the five military regions of Laos.

For years the Administration has been repeating, "The United States has no ground combat forces in Laos." During the joint U.S.-South Vietnamese armed incursion into Laos early this year, President Nixon added, "We are not going to use ground forces in Laos. We are not going to use advisers in Laos with the South Vietnamese forces."

These statements were true in the sense that the CIA force, though trained and financed and advised by Americans, did not consist of Americans. The secret soldiers were alleged to be part of the Laotian armed forces, not the American or South Vietnamese.

In President Nixon's statement Mar. 6, 1970 on the scope of U.S. involvement in Laos he admitted "a military assistance program reaching back over six years and air operations dating over four years" and also "some other military support activities which had been initiated by two previous Administrations." He said he thought disclosure of more about those "other activities" would not be in the national interest.

They leaked out in dribbles anyway, and now with the publication of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report, still more has become public.

Do they violate the law?

Congress attempted in 1969 and 1970 to put limits on U.S. combat activity in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia, without crippling the air attacks on the Ho Chi

The Church-Cooper-Mansfield amendment to the defense appropriations act for fiscal year 1970 said no funds could be used to finance "the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand." Fiscal year 1970 is long over, but the Administration is reluctant to go against this provision openly, and it has kept U.S. Army ground forces out of combat in those countries.

The Cooper-Church amendment to the supplemental foreign aid authorization bill for fiscal year 1971 which ended June 30, prohibited use of U.S. ground combat troops or advisers in Cambodia. U.S. advisers have trained Cambodians, but the training was done in South Vietnam, so this was not a violation.

\* \* \*

But President Nixon, like Presidents Johnson and Kennedy before him, has usurped the constitutional power of Congress to "raise and support armies," and declare war.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee leaders believe that use of Thai soldiers in Laos violates the Fulbright amendment banning U.S. support of mercenaries in Laos, but the Administration now counters that these are ethnic Thais recruited and trained in Laos.

This seems unlikely. It could be a cover story cooked up to protect Thailand, which hates publicity about its military ties with the United States. It may have to get along with North Vietnam soon instead of fighting it.

But aren't these "ethnic Thais" still mercenaries, even if the story is true? And aren't the soldiers in the secret army of Meo tribesmen and other Laotians trained and paid by the American CIA also mercenaries?

Gradually, the secret war in Laos is becoming known to Americans, and it doesn't look good.

It isn't even working militarily. Hostile forces control more of Laos than ever. The Royal Laotian army never would fight, and the secret CIA-trained

6 Aug 1971

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# The CIA foiled again

American Intelligence faked a broadcast in Prince Sihanouk's voice in its latest attempt to regain influence in Cambodia: T. D. ALLMAN reports from Phnom Penh on the dangerous rivalry between the CIA and the American State and Defence Departments.

WHILE the armies of Phnom Penh and Saigon fight the forces of Hanoi for control of Cambodia, another war is being fought for the same territory by another set of allies against another infiltrator from the north. The other co-belligerents are the American Departments of State and Defence — like Cambodia and South Vietnam, hardly natural allies. The invader that has brought them together, to use President Nixon's phrase, is the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA, like the North Vietnamese, were supposed to have been deprived of their Cambodian enclaves last year, about the time of the US-South Vietnamese invasion, when the White House ordered that the post-invasion US rôle in Cambodia be as above-board as possible. Both criteria seemed to rule out the CIA, but both the North Vietnamese and the CIA keep trying to encroach on Cambodia from their secret outposts in southern Laos.

Whereas Hanoi's South Laotian base is known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the CIA's is called the "Annex." It is a white, multistoreyed building in the Laotian Mekong river town of Pakse. The building looks like every other building in Pakse — except that it has no windows, is covered with antennae instead of tropical vines, and can be entered only by playing the right combination on an electronic keyboard lock.

The CIA's latest Cambodian incursion recently was limited by an enterprising, Phnom Penh-based American correspondent named Boris Baczynskyj, who discovered nothing less than a CIA plot to synthesise Prince Norodom Sihanouk's inimitably squeaky voice, and broadcast it over the border into Cambodia. The venture was not only an attempt to discredit the Prince by putting embarrassing words into his mouth, but also a effort to win

a few Cambodian hearts and minds from the State and Defence departments.

Unfortunately for the CIA, Baczynskyj, a Khmer-speaking ex-Peace Corps Volunteer, noticed a considerable difference in the words of Sihanouk as beamed over Radio Peking, and the statements attributed to him by the Phnom Penh Government. After months of checking, he verified the existence of the clandestine Pakse Radio, and established the identity of its operators.

## Unsuccessful

Baczynskyj's discovery, however, was more than a journalistic coup. It revealed the latest in a series of failed CIA attempts to maintain cover for its Cambodian operations, which are bitterly resented by the foreign service and military officers who predominate here. The agency, in fact, has been trying rather unsuccessfully to regain a piece of the Cambodian action ever since 1963, when Prince Sihanouk sent the US aid mission packing, which had served as the agency's main Cambodian cover.

The Green Beret scandal in Vietnam, for example, grew out of a CIA order to eliminate with extreme prejudice one of its Cambodian operatives. The agency also supported anti-Sihanouk insurgents, even when the State Department was trying for a Cambodian rapprochement in the late 1960s.

Several times burned, the State Department, when it resumed diplomatic relations with Cambodia in 1969, tried to make sure there would be no CIA agents in the embassy woodpile. Even now, ostensibly, there is no CIA component at all in the 100-man US mission in Phnom Penh.

Never daunted, the CIA has kept up its efforts to develop its own Cambodian infiltration routes. Early last

ing to stay out of the Cambodian political crisis, the Agency, unbeknown to the diplomats, relayed promises of support to the anti-Sihanouk faction. And as soon as the Cambodian war broke out, Agency-run teams of Laotian mercenaries began ranging down into Cambodia on "intelligence patrols," which the Pakse station hoped would be the landing parties for a whole CIA-run Clandestine Army in Cambodia.

The American sibling rivalry, which might otherwise be as amusing as a nineteenth-century broohaha between Whitehall and Simla over jurisdiction of some Indian Ocean atoll, already is producing some unedifying complications.

## Complications

The CIA's Pakse operations — which for all their ingenuity so far have failed to keep the Communists from taking over most of South Laos — are flagrant violations of Laotian neutrality. And neither Laos's premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who is a northerner, nor the US Embassy in faraway Vientiane, seem able to curb the Pakse operation.

Here in Cambodia, where the US embassy has become the nexus of Cambodian political power, the American infighting has already produced some domestic political complications — notably affecting the much publicised rivalry between Premier-delegate Sisowath Sirik Matak and Marshal Lon Nol's young and ambitious brother, Lon Non. The embassy likes Sirik Matak, and hardly bothers to veil its distaste for Lon Non.

With Sirik Matak, who has shunned CIA contacts, emerging as the embassy's man, and Lon Non emerging as the CIA protégé, the American squabble seems to contain seeds potentially as disastrous as those that disrupted Laos a decade ago. At that time, the CIA so disliked the State Department's candidate for premier of Laos that it sent its own Laotian army marching north to drive him out of Vientiane.

Several times routed in its efforts to infiltrate Cambodia, the CIA, like Hanoi, may decide on a strategy of letting dissension spring up among its adversaries. The State

Department wants to keep the Cambodian operation lean, clean, and honest. The Defence Department keeps pushing for a big in-country US military establishment.

"You might say we're caught in the middle," said one foreign service officer recently, empathising with the Cambodians who are similarly caught between North and South Vietnam.

STATINTL

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH  
TRIBUNE

AUG 6 1971  
M - 108,270  
S - 188,699

## Those Non-Secret Wars

The recent disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency spent well over \$100 million last year as part of a growing U.S. effort to halt North Vietnamese advances in Laos was part of a hitherto secret report on what is probably the most publicized of this nation's non-secret "secret" involvements.

The correctness of U.S. involvement aside, for the moment, the continuing involvement of the CIA in these foreign adventures will continue to be an embarrassment for this government in general and the CIA in particular. There is something bordering on the inane for the U.S. to continually involve a supposedly highly confidential, information gathering and evaluating agency in what are simply military efforts to preserve governments whose continued existence has been held to be to the U.S.' best interests.

There was a time, and in the not too distant past, when such preservation jobs were accompanied by cries of "send the Marines." It might not be a bad idea to

fall back on. It was considerably more honest because at least it let the world know the U.S. wanted to "do business" with the current regime. Now the practice of "sending the CIA" places Uncle Sam in the role of the thief in the night. Previously there was at least some miniscule validity to the implication that Uncle Sam was a knight in shining armor.

The Marines might not have a corner on the role, but it is a good starting place. Also the Army's Special Forces, originally organized to provide the manpower for active military assistant roles, might be realigned to their original task, instead of being a CIA-usurped action arm.

But whatever branch of the armed forces gets the job, having the military do the job of supervising U.S. support of friendly, but under attack, governments would be better than the ludicrous spectacle of CIA agents, posing as agricultural experts, flitting through the jungle undergrowth supervising indigenous soldiers as they off-load from a U.S.-supplied helicopter. There is something considerably more honest in having a soldier or marine in uniform do the job, than having a placid agronomist suddenly transformed into a sharpshooting expert on helicopter warfare.

What is even more to the advantage of the U.S. is not facing the contingency of having its "secret wars" continually exposed by antagonists either at home or aboard to the further embarrassment of America.

AUG 1971

## CIA Patrols Into China Said Halted

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Nixon administration has ordered a halt to the dispatching of special CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen into China on reconnaissance patrols from bases in northern Laos, according to well informed diplomatic sources.

These patrols—which sometimes range 200 miles inside China's Yunnan Province on road-watching, telephone-tapping missions—have been going on for a number of years, and their existence was known to the Peking regime.

Nevertheless, in a recent action designed to avoid any possible incident which could sour U.S. relations with Peking before President Nixon's forthcoming trip to the Chinese mainland, the forays have been halted, according to official sources here.

Some sources also suggest that the intelligence value of these operations may also have decreased somewhat.

Although no Americans go on these patrols, the Laotian hill tribesmen who carry them out are recruited, trained and equipped by the CIA, and the staging area for the patrols is a CIA outpost in northern Laos.

The Laotians are native to the border region, and the intelligence-gathering operation took advantage of the normal movements back and forth of these hill people.

While the White House, CIA and the U.S. embassy in Vientiane have never commented on or confirmed these activities—which reportedly date back to the Johnson administration—the patrols have been mentioned in numerous press reports by U.S. correspondents in Laos.

In late 1970 and early this year, articles by Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service International described the reconnaissance operations in considerable detail.

As recently as June 27, Arnold Abrams of The Philadelphia Bulletin reported that the raids were still being carried out despite the onset of Ping Pong Diplomacy.

The order to stop these patrols, according to informed sources, came very recently. Presidential aide Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking was made July 9 to 11.

In another move relating to the forthcoming Nixon visit, a press report last week, citing administrative sources, said the United States had suspended flights over Communist China by high-flying SR-71 spy planes and unmanned reconnaissance drones. This concession was also depicted as a move designed to avoid any incident which could interfere with the President's journey.

However, well placed defense and intelligence officials, asked about the reported suspension, said privately that to the best of their knowledge there had never been any SR-71 flights over the Chinese mainland.

Officials say there was a suspension of the unmanned drone flights some months ago, partly for diplomatic reasons and partly because of technical problems and the vulnerability of these drones to Communist gunners. At least two of the drones were shot down since late in 1969, one over the mainland and one over Hainan Island.

There have been flights of the older-vintage U-2 spy plane over mainland China carried out by the Nationalist Chinese, but officials hint that these flights, too, have not been scheduled for about a year.

The United States for some time has relied on satellites for photographic coverage of goings-on inside China. The SR-71s based in Asia, sources say, are used primarily for flights over North Korea.

STATINTL

6 AUG 1971

## DOVISH NEDZI'S NEW JOB

## Overseer to Lift CIA's Lid

By ORR KELLY  
Star Staff Writer.

Shortly after Congress returns from its August recess, five congressmen will turn off the George Washington Memorial Parkway at an unmarked exit, swing back across the parkway on than overpass and suddenly emerge into a spacious, tree-dotted parking lot surrounding a gleaming white building.

Only after they have parked and entered the building will they see their first solid evidence — inlaid into the floor in a giant seal — that this is the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Heading the little group of congressmen will be Rep. Lucien Norbert Nedzi, a 46-year-old Democrat who has represented the eastern portion of Detroit since 1962, and who has just been named — to the surprise of many — as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on central intelligence.

Nedzi's record has not been the kind that would, on the surface, endear him to the more senior — and generally more conservative — members of the committee. He co-sponsored an end-the-war amendment in the House, has opposed the B1 bomber and the Safeguard missile defense system, and is one of a tiny group of rebels on the 41-man committee known as the Fearless Five.

Why did Rep. F. Edward Hebert, a Democrat from Louisiana, choose Nedzi for one of the most important subcommittee assignments — a post traditionally held by the chairman himself?

## Nedzi Explains Choice

"The chairman was generally interested in having a review of this area," Nedzi explained in an interview. "My experience with him has been excellent — we understand each other. I know where he stands, and he knows where I stand. I have never deceived him and he has never reflected deception to me.

"He feels that we need to call a spade a spade and he feels I'll do just that."

Nedzi comes to his new assignment — which will cover all intelligence agencies, not just the CIA — with few preconceptions and, in fact, very little knowledge of the field.

"The senior members were on the Central Intelligence subcommittee and we were not privy to their deliberations. We had absolutely no information on the budgets of the agencies or what they were up to. Periodically, we got intelligence reports," Nedzi said.

The five-man subcommittee was, in the past, made up of the chairmen of the full committee and the two senior members from each party. The senior members serving with Nedzi will be Reps. Melvin Price, D-Ill., O. C. Fisher, D-Tex., William G. Bray, R-Ind., and Alvin E. O'Konski, R-Wis.

Nedzi had some brief exposure to the intelligence field when he served on a special subcommittee looking into the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo by the North Koreans.

## Has Met Helms

He has met Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, on several occasions when Helms has appeared before the committee and he thinks highly of him. But Nedzi has never visited the CIA, has never called on the CIA for a special intelligence briefing, and does not know Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the super-secret National Security Agency.

The only time a top intelligence official has appeared in an open hearing in the last decade, was on June 2, 1961 when Helms, then No. 2 man in the CIA, testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee. Normally, Helms and other CIA officials not only testify in closed hearings but their names and the name of their agency are deleted before a transcript on the hearing is made public.

## Sets Priorities

Despite his lack of experience in the area, Nedzi has a pretty good idea of the areas he would like to explore and he listed them this way:

1— Is there too much overlapping of functions among the CIA and the State and Defense Department intelligence operations?

2— Are the budgets the proper size — and does all the information paid for at great expense get to the man who needs it when he needs it?

3— Are individual rights being protected? Nedzi is aware that military intelligence people have been told to cut out their domestic intelligence activities, but he wants to make sure the new rules are being obeyed.

4— Is it proper for the CIA to manage operations such as those in Laos?

"There is a question of whether we should be involved in such operations and the further questions of whether this agency is the proper one to do it," Nedzi said.

5— Should the whole system of security classification be revised?

"That this is a difficult area, I realize," Nedzi said, "and I'm not sure we're going to be able to come up with a Solomon-like decision."

6— How are the national intelligence estimates arrived at? What really is the basis for arriving at decisions?

Since his selection for the new job announced earlier this week, Nedzi said, his phone has been constantly busy with callers volunteering information about U.S. intelligence operations.

"We will give them an appropriate audience," he said. "We are hearing from people with all sorts of axes to grind. We'll screen them all for substance, but no one is peremptorily dismissed."

STATINTL



August 5, 1971

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE

H 8963

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio? There was no objection.

#### TIME TO STOP CIA SECRET WARS

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Speaker, the Nixon administration has now acknowledged, through a Senate subcommittee staff report, that the Central Intelligence Agency is financing and directing a 30,000-man army in Laos. This confirms news reports which have come from Laos in recent months and confronts Congress and the American people with some very basic questions involving our foreign and military policy, the war powers of the President, and the role of the Congress in determining where and under what circumstances this Nation will become involved in military combat operations abroad.

If our tragic and costly involvement in Vietnam has taught us one lesson it must be that Congress can no longer abdicate to the executive branch the power to commit this Nation to war, either overt or covert.

Earlier this year, I introduced legislation aimed at closing a glaring loophole in the National Security Act—a loophole which permits the CIA to organize, finance, and direct military combat operations if that is related to its intelligence mission. I feel strongly that the CIA should confine itself to the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence and I urge my colleagues to support my bill, H.R. 8371 when it is circulated for cosponsors after the August recess.

I would urge my colleagues also to examine carefully the debate in the House on June 17 of this year when I offered an amendment to the military procurement bill to prohibit use of the funds that bill authorized for CIA-run military or paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia. During that debate, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services asserted in response to a question:

The activity of the CIA in all sections of the world, in Laos, the Middle East and everywhere is the gathering of intelligence for the protection and security of the United States.

Only the most generous interpretation could construe the organization, financing, and direction of a 30,000-man army to be intelligence-gathering. The CIA is running a full-scale war in Laos and its army has become the main fighting force there. Unless the Congress specifically prohibits this kind of activity, the power of any President to commit U.S. men, material, and funds to war will remain virtually unbridled.

I have nothing but respect for the achievements of the CIA in the intelligence field, and certainly its reputation in this area was greatly enhanced by the disclosures in the Pentagon papers. For its own sake and the sake of our Nation, the CIA must be kept out of a combat role. Talk of preventing future Vietnams is idle rhetoric unless we are willing to take that step.

#### THE CONTAGIOUS ANIMAL DISEASE BILL

(Mr. MELCHER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minutes, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MELCHER. Mr. Speaker, the Subcommittee of the House Agriculture Committee handling livestock legislation reported out a bill yesterday dealing with the threat of highly contagious diseases carried by animals, some of which may also infect man, giving the Secretary of Agriculture specific authority to work out cooperative programs of control and eradication when these diseases pose a threat to livestock, animals or people here in the United States. There are a number of diseases which are not present in this country which are invasion threats to us.

Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis, a disease primarily of horses but also infectious to humans, spread out of Venezuela to Central America and reached Mexico 3 years ago. While equine owners, American veterinarians and public health officials were cognizant of the threat it posed for our country, no effective cooperative program was initiated successfully in Mexico, and we now have the disease in this country.

The Department of Agriculture testified last week before the committee that they wanted new legislation authorizing the Secretary to take broader action to prevent the spread of these types of diseases into our country. The Department should have asked for this 3 years ago before VEE made its way over a thousand miles north through Mexico to this country. If a prod is needed to move the Department into action more quickly in controlling contagious diseases that threaten us, then this bill should serve that purpose. It must be passed promptly.

Passage of the bill would authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to work out cooperative agreements with foreign countries in the Western hemisphere if in his judgment the health of animals or people in the United States are threatened.

African swine fever, now rampant in Cuba, has reached the Western Hemisphere for the first time. There is no vaccine, no treatment, and the only control is to kill all the swine that are infected, exposed, or anywhere within miles of known cases. It is highly contagious, and its presence in Cuba poses a real threat to the pig producers of this country. Department of Agriculture officials fear hoof and mouth disease, which affects all cloven hoofed animals, domestic and wild, is also present in Cuba.

Again, this disease is only controlled by killing all of the animals either infected or exposed. Only 90 miles away from our shore, the invasion of either of these diseases from Cuba would have devastating effects on the animals that are affected by it. The livestock industry and ultimately consumers would pay dearly for meat products if either of these diseases spread in our country. It would require the immediate killing and burial of the diseased or exposed animals to halt the outbreak.

There is a great need for us to be

and eradication are being followed in Cuba for African swine fever and also for hoof and mouth disease if it is also present, as U.S. Department officials fear.

Despite the lack of diplomatic relations with Cuba, our own best interests require that we leave no stone unturned to be sure that Cuba's efforts to eliminate these diseases succeed and her needs for assistance are met. Canadian officials are working through the Pan American Health Organization to assist Cuba, but their threat to Canada is not nearly as great as the threat to us, only 90 miles away. Either of the diseases can easily be highjacked into this country, brought in by refugees or carried in by boats which still travel between our country and theirs. American relationship with Cubans is not so strained but what our athletes and theirs cannot compete in Cali, Columbia. Certainly we can also establish direct communication between our Department of Agriculture scientists and theirs to make sure that neither of these diseases escape from Cuba and that both are eradicated on their shores.

The threats posed by these highly contagious diseases—VEE infecting equine, African swine fever infecting hogs, and hoof and mouth disease, infecting all cloven hoofed animals including deer, antelope, elk, and moose, are not to be shrugged off lightly. Control and eradication of the diseases may cost millions of dollars but to ignore them and let them spread throughout our country would stagger us with billions of dollars loss besides the threat to human health that VEE poses.

#### GUIDEPOSTS TO DEMOCRACY

(Mr. WHITTEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Speaker, as a Mississippian I take great pride in the fine young people of our State, and it is with warmth of feeling that I share with you and our colleagues the award-winning speech of Miss Lydia Ruth Hodges of Dorsey, Miss. Miss Hodges, a senior in high school, presented this speech in the American Legion Oratorical Contest. She was the winner of the initial contest in Fulton, Miss., and then the winner in the district contest, the area contest, and the Mississippi State contest; and was runner-up in the regional competition.

I commend her to you for her fine spirit of patriotism and responsibility, as so clearly expressed in her fine speech, "Guideposts to Democracy," which is herewith presented in full:

#### GUIDEPOSTS TO DEMOCRACY

Freedom, liberty, justice, patriotism, heritage—are these just sentimental words from History? No! These are direct and vibrant challenges to all of us, the "Now Generation." We, as American citizens, have the potential to benefit all mankind, but the only way to change this potential into progress is to maintain the rights and privileges that have made and kept us free.

How do we accomplish this seemingly impossible task in today's complex world? Our forefathers who built this country have laid clearly-marked guideposts to show us the way. These guideposts are stated in the Pre-



AUG 1971

# Symington hits secret Laos war

STATINTL

WASHINGTON, August 4—The Nixon Administration is breaking the law by conducting a "secret war" in Laos and intends to continue doing so, Sen. Stuart Symington said today.

The devastating extent of the "secret war" was revealed more than a year ago by the Daily World in a series of articles by co-editor John Pittman, sent by the paper to Laos to gather the information at first-hand.

In a series of reports beginning on June 2, 1970, Pittman revealed the havoc wreaked by B-52 raids, the U.S. use of Thai troops, the role of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in the aggression against Laos, and other details now confirmed by developments.

The Missouri Democrat made

his charge today in an interview on a NBC-TV's Today Show.

He said that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is spending many millions of dollars to train and equip Thai troops to carry on the war in Laos despite legislation which specifically bans the use of Federal funds for that purpose. Asked if he was saying the Administration is breaking the law, Symington replied, "Yes, I am." He added, "Not only are they breaking the law, but they intend to break it more."

The subcommittee Symington heads of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released Monday a heavily censored report outlining the CIA role in the secret war in Laos.

Symington also criticized B-52

raids on Laos, "very close to the border of the People's Republic of China," as a "very dangerous business."

The report released Monday showed that a "partial total" of U.S. spending in Laos for fiscal 1970 was more than \$234 million. For the current fiscal year, it is expected to rise to \$374 million. The cost of the heavy B-52 bombing raids is not included. These raids averaged 340 sorties a day this April.

The CIA now admits that it maintain a 30,000-man so-called "irregular" force in Laos, composed of Thais, whose upkeep and pay come to \$7,000 each a year, three times as much as President Nixon proposes people on relief in the U.S. should get.

# U.S. at MIDWAY LINK

By CONRAD KOMOROWSKI

## Laos disclosures

After bitter struggles, a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has finally extracted from the Central Intelligence Agency an admission that it maintains a secret army in Laos. Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo) complained, however, that the Nixon Administration is still withholding "certain truths concerning the nature, composition and command arrangements of the Thai forces in Laos."

Among the facts revealed is that the CIA maintains a 50,000 man irregular force in Laos and has been conducting this secret war since at least 1962, in violation of the Geneva Accords of that year on the neutrality of Laos.

In fiscal 1970, a "partial total" of U.S. expenditures in Laos came to over \$284 million. It is expected to increase to \$374 million for the current fiscal year. These sums do not include the cost of the heavy bombing of Laos. The report claims that the bombing raids have declined to a daily average of 340 sorties in April of this year, compared with 440 in the first part of 1969.

"Free zones" have been established, as in South Vietnam, where anything that moves becomes a target.

Despite this cruel, systematic destruction, two thirds of Laos is controlled by the Laotian patriots. The CIA report admits:

"Most observers in Laos say that from the military point of view, the situation there is growing worse, and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy" (New York Times, August 3).

STATINTL



MIAMI, FLA.  
HERALD

M - 380,828

S - 479,025

AUG 5 1971

## Telling All About CIA

A DELIGHTFUL excerpt from this week's Congressional Record occurs in the censored version of the Senate's secret session of June 7 about operations of the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos.

At one point, the transcript of the debate quotes an exchange between Sen. Alan Cranston (D., Calif.) and Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.):

"Mr. Cranston. Deleted.

"Mr. Symington. Deleted."

We'll never know how many printed pages were saved by the blue pencil.

## The CIA in Laos

THE SENATE HAS WRUNG from the Central Intelligence Agency a public admission that this cloak-and-dagger agency is sustaining a force of 30,000 irregulars in the secret war waged in Laos for so long. While the full extent of the role of the CIA is still unrevealed, such specific information that has now been put on the record is appalling.

Even the Senate itself cannot tell how many millions the CIA is spending, because much of the money is hidden in budgets of other agencies. It is indicated, however, the CIA used about \$135 million last year to train, pay and supervise the Laotian "volunteers," as well as a force of perhaps 4800 Thai recruits.

Senator Symington, who forced the disclosure as chairman of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, believes the employment of Thai soldiers violates an antimercenary provision of the Defense Appropriations Act. "Not only are they breaking the law, but they intend to break it more," said the Senator.

IN 1962, THE TIMES OF LONDON first reported the CIA was dabbling in internal Laotian affairs, and since then there have been bits and dabs of information putting the CIA in an increasingly disenchanting role. The CIA admitted last year it had 1040 men there, but this seems meager for training and supervising an active fighting force of upwards of 30,000 men.

Senator Symington is intent on finding out whether the United States can organize, finance and help fight a war without officially acknowledging to Congress or the people. At the very least, he has already made a case for reining in the CIA. Its fumbling in the U-2 episode, its blundering in the Bay of Pigs, and now its activities in Laos, clearly state that the CIA should be confined to gathering and evaluating intelligence, and that it should be withdrawn from the field of military operations.

STATINTL

5 AUG 1971

# Hill Session Assails U.S. Over Laos

The Nixon administration was accused during an extraordinary secret Senate session last June 7 of withholding information and misleading Congress about growing U.S. military involvement in the Laotian war.

The meeting was held at the request of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) to brief the Senate on a then-top secret staff report on Laos. The report was made public Monday and the transcript of the secret session was placed in the Congressional Record yesterday.

In clearing the transcript for release, the administration indirectly acknowledged the presence of Central Intelligence Agency advisers in Laos, despite the prohibition against U.S. advisory personnel in Laos and Cambodia written into the 1970 Cooper-Church amendment.

## Rise in U.S. Aid

Symington told the Senate, on the basis of the report, that American military assistance to the Royal Laotian government has trebled since 1967 and is 25 times as large as it was when it began in 1963.

"We have been appropriating money for this war in the blind," said Symington.

During the June 7 session Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis acknowledged that the De-

fense Department had not been able to account fully for how it spent its \$2.5 billion in military spending authority for Southeast Asia during the last fiscal year. Said Stennis:

"The Department of Defense told us frankly, 'We are just not certain exactly how much money was spent through these funds in the various countries,' although they made an effort to keep up with it. With bombers flying everywhere and soldiers coming and going, and (deleted) and everything going on, I can see the difficulty. I was not patient with it at first, but I came to understand it better."

## Spending Limits Sought

Symington and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee have been trying to impose spending limits on the Pentagon for the war in Laos. The Missouri Democrat has proposed a \$200 million ceiling on assistance to Laos, exclusive of the costs of bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Some informed Senate sources estimate the annual costs of bombing the Trail at more than half a billion dollars.

The secret Senate exchange also revealed that Defense Secretary Melvin Laird refused on grounds of military sensitivity to respond to a Foreign Relations Committee query on U.S. military activities in Laos.

Symington said that all but one of the questions Laird declined to answer were answered by U.S. civilian and military officials stationed in Laos and Thailand during a two-week field trip by two committee staff members.

WASHINGTON POST

5 AUG 1971

# Radio Hoax Suspected in Laos

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP)—A radio station that claims to speak for exiled Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk but which actually undercuts the former chief of state is part of a psychological war being waged against the Communists in Cambodia.

On several occasions, according to Khmer-speakers who have monitored the transmitter's broadcasts, a man pretending to be Sihanouk has given a nearly perfect imitation of the prince's high-pitched speechmaking.

Well-informed sources suspect that the station is lo-

cated in southern Laos inside a secret paramilitary camp run by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The radio station calls itself the voice of Sihanouk's United National Front of Kampuchea, or FUNK. It devotes much of its three-hour-long broadcasts daily to violent attacks on Marshal Lon Nol, Cambodia's prime minister, and members of his cabinet.

But when the speakers are not engaged in antigovernment tongue-lashing they mouth slogans and statements aimed at portraying Sihanouk as a puppet prince

manipulated by foreign Communists.

Thus, the station's programs wind up with the statement that the voice of FUNK is "commanded by Prince Norodom Sihanouk and governed by the thoughts of Chairman Mao Tse-tung." Sihanouk has been in Peking since his ouster from power 16 months ago.

On one occasion, the listeners report, the phony Sihanouk went on the air to urge Cambodian girls living in Hanoi controlled regions to sleep with North Viet-

namese and Vietcong soldiers.

Another statement broadcast by the bogus prince accepted responsibility for damage inflicted upon the temple of Angkor Wat in fighting earlier this year. The North Vietnamese soldiers who caused the damage, the statement said, were mere youngsters who did not know how deeply the Khmers venerate the ruined temples and were unaware of their priceless historic value.

## Laos: New Report, Old Story

The new Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report on Laos reveals that Washington's involvement in the formerly secret war there is far deeper, and Vientiane's contribution to its own security is far shallower, than practically anybody outside Laos had believed. The Royal Army is pathetic, lucky to muster 25 men in a battalion of 300, the report indicates, so the Central Intelligence Agency now runs an army of 30,000 Lao irregulars (1971 cost: \$70 million) who do battle against the Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces fighting in the north. So many Lao soldiers have died, draft-dodged, deserted or enlisted in the Pathet Lao, however, that the CIA found it necessary to import some 4,000 Thai "volunteers" (\$35 million) to help out.

The American effort in Laos cost \$284 million in fiscal 1971, excluding funds for Thais in Laos and for the immensely expensive bombing campaigns against the Ho Chi Minh trail in the south and the fighting grounds around the Plain of Jars in the north. In fiscal 1972 the figure is expected to reach \$374 million. Economic aid is almost half again as large as the total Lao budget. In a country where per capita GNP is estimated at \$66, American spending amounts to \$141 per capita; services rendered include, if you will, the hiring of 24 Filipinos to teach Lao soldiers English. The Lao government, the report says, "continues to be almost totally dependent on the U.S., perhaps more dependent on us than any other government in the world."

And meanwhile, North Vietnamese men and materiel flow down the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam, Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces push into the third of the country not yet under their control, and the tiny country suffers the ravages of an immense war. The precise extent to which the situation there is deteriorating is described in the conclusion of the staff report, published elsewhere on this page today.

Well, what's new? The details are juicy but the thrust of the report is consistent with Mr. Nixon's major statement on Laos of March 6, 1970. He said then that the American purposes in Laos were to save American and allied lives in South Vietnam, by bombing; and to support the "independence and neutrality of Laos as set forth in the 1962 Geneva agreements," by aiding the Laotian government

"when requested." Specifying certain forms of that aid, the President said the U.S. also was conducting "some other activities." Well, now we know "other activities" included items like 14,000 sorties a month, in January, 1970, and unnumbered B-52 raids, still going on, and up.

Through declassifying the previous secret information in the Senate report, however, the President has in fact respected in good measure his earlier pledge "to give the American people the fullest possible information on our involvement (in Laos), consistent with national security." We cannot recall that any other administration ever disclosed so much about secret and continuing operations of the CIA. Unofficial reports had indicated the existence of a CIA role in Laos but there had been no official confirmation or description of it.

Mr. Nixon has not, of course, told all. In particular, he has not conceded that, as Mr. Fulbright and others suspect, funds for CIA support of Thai "volunteers" in Laos came from a defense money bill which had attached to it a Fulbright amendment banning precisely such subterfuges. If so, this is an outrage, but a predictable outrage. It would be unrealistic to think that an administration bent on prosecuting a secret war could not surmount an obstacle like the Fulbright amendment. "Let's face it," Mr. Symington said, in a secret session of the Senate which took place June 7 and whose proceedings were published yesterday, "We have been appropriating money for this war in the blind." Exactly so.

Since it is already widely recognized that the American effort in Laos is linked to the larger effort in South Vietnam and could not survive it, we doubt that anyone will be so shocked and outraged as to demand an end to American activities in Laos now. But the essential point should not be lost. By operating in secrecy and, more than that, by building an organization intended to operate in secrecy, the United States government provided itself the resources to take steps which — if it had been required to take and explain them in public — it might not have taken at all. When a democracy undertakes a policy built on secrecy, it risks falling into such a swamp that — and this is the ultimate irony — it is finally no longer embarrassed by disclosure. On the contrary, it winds up using it to plead for public understanding and support.

8 AUG 1971

# Senate Armed Services Panel Cuts \$1.2 Billion From Pentagon Budget

The Senate Armed Services Committee cut \$1.2 billion from the Pentagon's fiscal 1972 budget request yesterday and voted to limit construction work on the Safeguard missile defense system this year to two sites rather than the three the administration requested.

In announcing the unanimous committee action, Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) stressed that work on the country's major strategic weapons systems would be unaffected by the reductions. These systems include the Navy's Polaris/Poseidon missile-firing submarine fleet, the proposed successor to Poseidon, called ULMS, and the Air Force's proposed new B-1 bomber.

The \$21 billion measure approved by Stennis' committee is \$900 million less than that approved by the House Armed Services Committee.

The Senate version is expected to go to the floor for debate after the congressional recess. After floor action, differences in the two bills will have to be worked out in a House-Senate conference committee.

Despite the cuts, Stennis predicted yesterday that the bill would face "a very rugged trip" through the Senate.

Floor fights are anticipated over money ticketed for further development of the B-1 bomber and of the Army's trouble-plagued MBT-70 tank. Also, further attempts to restrict secret U.S. support of guerilla operations in Laos with Laotian and Thai irregular forces are expected.

The committee's single biggest cut and the major action differing from both the administration request and the House-passed version involves the Safeguard antiballistic missile system.

In reducing the administration's original \$1.27 billion request for Safeguard by \$161.4 million this fiscal year, the Senate committee voted 11 to 5 to limit the remaining funds to deployment only at the two bases where construction is already well under way—Grand Forks, N.D., and Malmstrom AFB, Mont. The administration had requested permission to start construction on a third site this year at Whiteman AFB, Mo., and to "take steps toward deployment of a fourth site" at either Warren AFB, Wyo., or around Washington.

The committee action completely eliminates any defense ring around the nation's capital and restricts work at Warren and Whiteman to site preparation activities with no deployment authorized.

Stennis said that as a matter of policy, the committee fully supports Safeguard "as necessary to assist in the protection" of U.S. Minuteman ICBM bases. He said the cutbacks and restrictions were made basically because work at the first two sites had fallen one year behind schedule due to construction delays and bad weather. Those sites were originally set for completion in 1973.

The committee action, if it is sustained, could complicate the official U.S. position at the strategic arms limitation talks where the stated U.S. negotiating position involves allowing Safeguard missiles around three Minuteman bases to balance the Soviet ABM net around Moscow. American officials have indicated privately that a compromise on the number of sites would be reached.

Other changes in the Pentagon request made by the committee include:

- A cut of \$75.8 million in the \$472 million requested for the C-5A supertransport plane. The committee called this a financing adjustment involv-

ing funds which could be cut this year without affecting deliveries.

- \$62.8 million was added to the Army's request for \$27.5 million to complete development of the new Main Battle Tank and build six models for testing. Both the House and Senate committees, however, refused to allow any money for mass-producing the controversial new vehicle.

- A \$155.7 million cut out of almost \$374 million the Navy wanted to pay off claims due to cost overruns in its shipbuilding programs. The committee said the Navy didn't need all that money this year.

The committee's biggest single area of cuts came in the Pentagon's research and development budget, where \$321 million was eliminated, including a portion of the total Safeguard request. Stennis noted, however, that even with these reductions, \$7.6 billion for military R & D still was left in the new budget and this was \$600 million more than was appropriated last year.

Stennis' committee, as did its House counterpart, voted to keep \$801 million in the budget for the Navy's swing-wing F-14A fighter but insisted that the Navy get no fewer than 48 planes for their money this year.

Stennis also said that an amendment proposed by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) aimed at prohibiting CIA support for Thai troops fighting in Laos was voted down, 11 to 3. Other attempts are expected to revive this measure when it comes to the Senate floor.



## Light On Laos

It is high time that the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department decided to take the lid off our so-called secret military involvement in Laos. The need for secrecy — in a vain effort to preserve the fiction of that nation's neutrality as guaranteed by the 1962 Geneva agreements — has long passed. And the reluctance of the executive agencies to make information available has long been an irritant to congressional critics of the Indochina war.

There is, in fact, little in the report released by the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on foreign commitments that was not known previously, both to the Congress and the public. It has long been established that the major military operations in Laos were under the direction of the CIA and that the 30,000-man irregular force has provided the main cutting edge for military operations there. The Royal Lao regular army for years has confined its activities largely to the role of providing passive defense.

What is new — and somewhat touchy — is official admission of the presence of considerable numbers of Thai "volunteers" in Laos, also apparently recruited and paid by the CIA. Although the fact

had been widely reported, the admission could have diplomatic repercussions in Bangkok and Vientiane. And Congress is likely to question whether the American involvement is not in violation of a provision against hiring military personnel contained in last year's Defense Appropriations Act.

In the main, however, the report merely re-emphasises what has always been the case: That Laos, like Cambodia, has been an integral part of the Indochinese battlefield from the beginning. The North Vietnamese — who now occupy nearly two-thirds of the country — need Laos to maintain their military operations in South Vietnam. And the Royal government, sorely lacking in manpower reserves after more than a decade of fighting, needs all the help it can get.

Denying that help — as some senators seem disposed to do — would simply increase Communist military pressure on Cambodia and South Vietnam and quite probably bring about a full-scale intervention by Thailand. Ultimately, Laos must be a part of an overall settlement of the Indochina conflict. But until that happens, the tough, inconclusive, unorthodox war is likely to continue.

trait Gallery maintain the regular hours of 10 a.m.-5:30 p.m. daily.

National Zoo buildings are open from 9 a.m.-6 p.m. daily.

Anacostia Neighborhood Museum hours are from 10 a.m.-6 p.m. weekdays; 1-6 p.m. weekends.

Dial-A-Museum—737-9311 for daily announcements on new exhibits and special events.

Dial-A-Phenomenon—737-8855 for weekly announcements on stars, planets and worldwide occurrences of short-lived natural phenomena.

#### FOREIGN STUDY TOURS

The Smithsonian has organized several special tours concerned with archaeology, the arts, museums, private collections, and natural history, for members of the National and Local Associates. All 1971 tours are full. For further details on the 1972 tours, listed below, please write to Miss Kennedy, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560.

Mexico and Guatemala: Jan. 3-22. Dr. R. H. Howland will accompany the group through the historic sites of Yucatan, Oaxaca, Mexico City, Tikal, Antigua, etc.

St. Croix and Puerto Rico: Feb. 1-14. Enjoying the sun, studying early Danish and Spanish architectural heritages, and visiting historic preservation projects.

Australia and New Zealand: Late March-April. This unusual tour will go out via Fiji and return via Tahiti, and will include visits to Canberra, the Australian Outback, and Christchurch with its areas of historic interest.

No-Tour Tour: Dulles-Paris-Dulles. May 29-June 19. Air France Excursion. Members make their own arrangements for travel in Europe.

Greece and Yugoslavia: June 15-July 8. The classical tour of Greek archaeological sites plus Yugoslavia's Adriatic Coast and inland sites. There is a possibility of including Romanian churches and other locations as well.

No-Tour Tour: New York-Frankfurt-New York. July 3-24. Qantas Excursion. Members make their own arrangements for travel in Europe.

King Arthur's England: July 12-Aug. 2. This archaeological, architectural and literary adventure will be directed by Mrs. Francis Pickens Miller, author of *Realms of Arthur*.

The Pilgrimage Road: Sept. 11-Oct. 9, traversing Burgundy, southwestern France and northern Spain, the route of the medieval pilgrims to Santiago da Compostela. Emphasis on architectural history, food, and viticulture.

No-Tour Tour: Dulles-London-Dulles. Sept. 11-Oct. 2. BOAC Excursion. Members make their own arrangements for travel in the British Isles.

Pakistan and Afghanistan: Oct. 10-Nov. 15. Overnight stops en route in London and Paris; motoring through the provinces of Pakistan; Dr. R. H. Howland and John J. Slocum will lead the tour and will be joined by local scholars at the sites.

#### CONTINUING EXHIBITIONS

Anacostia Neighborhood Museum  
(2405 King Avenue, S.E.)

*Science: Man's Greatest Adventure.* Black scientists are honored with this exhibit, which covers achievements from the earliest times to the present and projects future roles. Through Nov. 7.

*Arts and Industries Building*  
(900 Jefferson Drive, S.W., Air and Space Museum)

*Space and Artists.* Realistic illustration, impressionistic and abstract paintings and sculpture inspired by the space program.

*Freer Gallery of Art*

(12th and Jefferson Drive, S.W.)

*Chinese Album Leaves and Lacquer Ware.* Twenty-four painted album leaves dating

from the Sung through the Ch'ing dynasty, and five examples of Chinese lacquer ware that represent the change in style from 1280 A.D. through the late 15th century. Through September.

*Japanese Screen Paintings.* Bird and flower screens from the Freer collection ranging in date from the late 15th century to the 18th century. Through Sept.

*Museum of History and Technology*  
(14th and Constitution Ave., N.W.)

*Slovenes in America: An Instance of Cultural Impact.* The sustained cultural identity of emigrants from the Eastern European region of Slovenia and their descendants depicted by examples of Slovenian life in America. Through August 31.

*The Campbell Museum Collection.* Antique silver and porcelain soup tureens, bowls and ladles from around the world dating as far back as 1735. Second floor, through Labor Day.

*Do It the Hard Way: Rube Goldberg and Modern Times.* Featuring cartoons, writings, sculptures and cartoon "inventions." On display through Labor Day.

*Museum of Natural History*

(10th and Constitution Ave., N.W.)

*Society of Animal Artists.* 23 paintings and sculptures of wildlife from around the world. Through Labor Day.

*Insect Zoo.* Live insects including a bee hive, termites, cockroaches, mosquitoes and dragonfly nymphs. Also included are tarantulas and spiders spinning webs. Through Labor Day—10 a.m.-4 p.m.

*National Collection of Fine Arts*

(8th and G Streets, N.W.)

*American Master Prints from the Smithsonian Collections.* A survey of three centuries of graphic art in the United States. Through September 12.

*Romare Bearden: Prevalence of Ritual.* Fifty-six works by contemporary black artist Bearden, including an 18-foot collage-mural entitled "The Block," which mirrors life on a Harlem street. Through September 26.

*Photographic Competition.* Entries of D.C. youth aged 10-18 in a competition sponsored by the Black Women's League of Washington and the NCFEA. Through August 31.

*Hidden Aspects of the National Collection of Fine Arts.* Objects representing the entire range of collections held by the NCFEA, particularly objects not previously exhibited. Through October.

*National Portrait Gallery*

(8th and F Streets, N.W.)

*Mary McLeod Bethune.* The late Mrs. Bethune, noted black educator and adviser to U.S. Presidents from Coolidge through Truman, is honored by this commemorative exhibition. Through August 31.

*"A Glimmer of Their Own Beauty": Black Sounds of the Twenties.* Educational exhibit focusing on the jazz of Louis Armstrong, the blues of Bessie Smith and "Ma" Rainey, and the poetry of Langston Hughes and Claude McKay as an expression of black life in the period of the Harlem Renaissance. Through October 15.

#### RADIO SMITHSONIAN

Radio Smithsonian is broadcast every Sunday night on WGMS-AM (570) and FM (103.5) from 9-9:30 p.m. The program schedule for July:

1st—*Sing for Your Votes.* A short history of political campaign songs from 1800-1968, with Herbert Collins, curator of Political History, National Museum of History and Technology.

8th—*A Zoo for Insects,* with Dr. Ronald Goor, National Museum of Natural History; *How Do You Serve Your Soup?* A look at soup tureens through history with William Parker of the Campbell Museum in Camden, New Jersey.

15th—*Folk Concert.* West Virginian Franklin George and some of his friends

play tunes on the dulcimer, the fiddle and the banjo at the Smithsonian.

22nd—*Prints as Art.* A conversation with Jacob Kalmén, artist, author, and consultant to the National Collection of Fine Arts; *The Prevalence of Ritual.* An interview with artist Romare Bearden on black life as reflected in his work.

29th—*Concert.* Catharina Mcints, James Caldwell, violists da gamba and James Weaver, harpsichordist, playing works of Saint-Colombe and Marais.

In the Washington area, the program is also heard on WAMU-FM (88.5) Tuesdays at 1:30 p.m.; WETA-FM (90.9), Mondays at 9:30 p.m.; and in New York City on WNYC-AM Sundays at 10 p.m., and FM Mondays at 9 p.m.

#### APOLLO 11 CAPSULE—NEW DISPLAY SHOWS LUNAR VEHICLES, SUPPORT SYSTEMS

The National Air and Space Museum has placed on exhibit in the Arts and Industries Building one of the key artifacts of the historic Apollo 11 mission—the command module Columbia.

It was the mother ship Columbia that stayed aloft in orbit when the descent to the moon's surface was made for the first time in the lunar module (LM). Later the Columbia brought the Apollo crew safely back to earth. Columbia was designed with a compact blunt shape to withstand the fiery temperatures generated when it re-entered the earth's atmosphere at 24,000 miles an hour. Char marks on the craft's surface can still be seen.

The Columbia's lunar module companion ship, Eagle, was not designed to return to earth, but the NASM currently has on view an identical LM recently presented to it by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The two-story high (23 feet) two-stage craft, built by Grumman Aerospace, is in the rotunda of the Arts and Industries Building, a few feet away from the Columbia.

Around the Columbia and the LM are exhibit cases containing other unique artifacts associated with the historic Apollo 11 flight. Many of them are on public display for the first time, including the space suit worn by Apollo 11 astronauts, Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr.; lunar sample collection tools employed on the mission or in training, including scoops, tongs, core sample tubes, and a box that held the lunar rocks; and a selection of guidance and navigation equipment—computer, star charts, etc.

Also on view is a display of health and hygienic materials used on the voyage—a medical kit, human waste disposal systems, shaving gear and toothbrushes; and a selection of the freeze dried and canned foods and drinks that were part of the Apollo life support system. Replicas of the American flag planted on the moon during the Apollo 11 mission and the plaques left on the moon by the Apollo 11, 12 and 14 crews are on display, as well as a photographic exhibit that allows the viewer to see close-up stereo photos of the moon's surface.

#### THE SECRETRY OF CIA OVERSIGHT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON  
OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 3, 1971

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, under the leave to extend my remarks, in the Record, I include the following:

Mr. Speaker, recent reports of a CIA training program for Cambodian soldiers in Laos should serve to focus public attention on the weakness of legis-

## The CIA in Laos

The United States government has been struggling with the war in Laos through four presidential administrations. The American involvement began there during the Eisenhower administration; it was at a near-crisis stage when President Eisenhower passed it on to President Kennedy and in subsequent years it was merged into the United States larger involvement in South Vietnam. For reasons going back to the Geneva Accords, much of the United States participation in Laos has been secret—or at least semi-secret—but largely through the persistence of Senator Symington the record of clandestine financing of military operations by the CIA has been pieced together. Now a staff report by a Senate subcommittee has been issued after being subjected to censorship by the State and Defense departments and the CIA.

During the 1972 fiscal year the cost of United States military and economic aid to Laos, plus the special operations financed by the CIA, is put at \$374 million. Reporters concluded from the figures in the report, and the omissions, that the CIA spent more than \$100 million last year in Laos, using irregular Lao forces and a contingent of mercenaries from Thailand. The irregular forces were reported to be made up of some 30,000 indigenous troops, including a large contingent of Meo tribesmen, and Thai mercenaries. The report found that in the conduct of the war "the

Royal Lao government continues to be almost totally dependent on the United States, perhaps more dependent on us than any other government in the world."

"Most observers in Laos say that from the military point of view the situation there is growing steadily worse, and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy," the report said further. And: "No one we met in Laos, American or Lao, seems to have a prescription for the future other than to continue to do what is being done now."

It is hoped that if and when the war in South Vietnam is ended—that is, ended by a peace settlement and not merely ended so far as United States combat forces are concerned—the war in Laos also can be ended. The record in Laos and the present course of events add greatly to the reason for a settlement in Vietnam.

AUG 1971

# CIA's Laos Troops Aid Confirmed

BY FRANK STARR  
Washington Bureau Chief

(Chicago, Tribune Press Service)

WASHINGTON, Aug. 3--The State Department today confirmed that the Central Intelligence Agency is training and supporting an army of 30,000 irregular Laotian soldiers in Laos.

It also confirmed that most of \$55.8 million was spent in fiscal 1971 in support of Thai soldiers recruited and flown into Laos by the CIA to fight the pro-Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese.

The confirmation came from a Department spokesman, of facts and assessments contained in a report released yesterday by Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) on American involvement in Laos.

Called Forthright Record

McCloskey said that together with President Nixon's statement on Laos in March, 1970, which first revealed the extent of United States involvement there, a "forthright record" of the American effort had come out. One State Department source said about 90 per cent of the information on American involvement had come out when "two years ago we weren't talking about it."

Yesterday's report also represented the first time the United States had publicly and deliberately confirmed CIA direction of the U. S. war effort in Laos. While McCloskey indicated the decision had been deliberate by pointing out that the CIA had taken part in censoring the previously top secret report, he did not disclose the reason for the decision.

The report in its original top secret version was the subject of a secret session of the Senate June 7 after which it was charged that the U. S. was spending "hundreds of millions of dollars" in Laos and support-

Altho the number of Thai soldiers, officially called volunteers, and the amount spent on them were deleted from the report, both were in effect confirmed by State Department officials.

Cost Told by Rogers

In a press conference June 15, Secretary of State William P. Rogers said the U. S. spent \$359 million in Laos during fiscal 1971 exclusive of bombing costs. The Senate subcommittee report released by Symington put that figure at \$284.2 million. Asked if the remaining \$65.8 million were spent on the Thai forces in Laos, McCloskey replied, "That deduction would be substantially correct."

He also deleted, the costs of CIA support of the Laotians could also be deducted from the Senate staff report which said the \$284.2 million "was composed of an estimated \$162.2 million in military assistance, \$52 million in the [Agency for International Development] program, and \$ [deleted] million spent by CIA exclusive of the Thai irregular costs." Arithmetic suggests the deleted figure is \$70 million.

McCloskey was questioned closely on the staff report today and confirmed many of the figures and assertions contained in it, taking issue with none of them. Asked if the general characterization the report made of a worsening military situation in Laos and almost total Laotian dependence on the U. S. was correct, he implied that it was.

CLEVELAND, OHIO  
PLAIN DEALER

M - 409,414  
S - 545,032

AUG 4 1971

## True -- and Shocking -- Laos Story

It's official. The news so far about United States involvement in Laos is bad. It is bad enough that what remains to be disclosed cannot cause much more shock to the American people.

United States involvement in Laos, and military involvement in particular, has been an open secret for years, but until now it has been impossible to gauge its true depth.

As recently as Feb. 11, at the time of the Laos incursion by South Vietnamese troops, the Nixon administration continued a tradition of misleading the American people in the matter of American participation in Laotian affairs. It repeated a statement made by the President a year earlier: "The total number of Americans directly employed by the U.S. government in Laos is 616. Another 424 Americans are employed on contract to the government or to government contractors. Of these, 1,040 Americans, the total number, military and civilian, engaged in a military advisory or military training capacity numbers 320. Logistics personnel number 323."

What a good many of those small numbers of Americans have been mixed up in amounts to plenty. That is confirmed, finally, in the staff report this week from the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on foreign commitments. These disclosures should cause further concern over how deeply the United States is entangled in an Indochina mess:

- The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) maintains a 30,000-man force of irregulars now fighting in Laos. Not only

that, the CIA recruits and pays for "volunteers" from Thailand added to the irregular force and the Royal Laotian Army.

- The big-money cost of involvement increases. In the fiscal year ended last month it was \$284.2 million, most of it for military aid. In the current fiscal year it is expected to total \$374 million. And those figures do not include the cost of American bombing operations against the Ho Chi Minh supply line and in support of Laotian forces fighting Communist aggression.

- Despite the massive American assistance to Laos, the outlook there is poor. Communist forces are building a road in northern Laos that in effect shifts Red China's border southward. The report says: "Most observers in Laos say that from the military point of view the situation there is growing steadily worse and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy."

The report does not tell the whole story of American involvement in Laos. Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., the Armed Services subcommittee chairman, complains that the Nixon administration still refuses to make public facts concerning the nature, composition and command arrangements of the CIA-sponsored Thai forces in Laos.

But as Symington says, the curtain of secrecy has been partially lifted.

What is disclosed so far makes more valid the fears of harmful consequences from military activities carried out in a clandestine manner. More of the Laos story needs to be told.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.  
BULLETIN

E - 634,371  
S - 701,743

AUG 4 1971

## CIA Spies, Opium Mix In Obscure Laos Town

By ARNOLD ABRAMS  
*Special to The Bulletin*

Ban Houei Sai, Laos — It is not on any travel agent's list, and has no tourist facilities, yet some of the most interesting things in Southeast Asia are happening in this nondescript Laotian town.

Ban Houei Sai, is rugged mountain country about 225 miles northwest of Vientiane, is a key center for the region's opium traffic, as well as a major base area for CIA-directed intelligence operations in northern Laos.

The two operations are not exclusive. Two ostensibly private charter airlines — Air America and Continental Air Services — reportedly have been carrying both opium and intelligence agents passing through town.

The airlines, chartered exclusively by the U.S. Government and known unofficially as the "CIA Airlines," still fly intelligence operatives.

They presumably have cracked down on opium transport, however, because of Washington's current campaign against narcotics traffic.

The opium comes from the Burma-Laos-Thailand border area, known as the "golden triangle" because its annual output of about 700 tons of raw opium constitutes about half of the world's total supply.

The produce is carried here by former Nationalist Chinese soldiers who have been opium-running in the tri-border area for the past two decades.

The longtime director of opium flow in this area has been Gen Ouan Rathikoun, former commander-in-chief of the Laotian army.

Quan retired from the army recently after being named as a key drug operative by Rep. Robert Stoeffe (D-Conn), who conducted a wide-ranging study of narcotics traffic in Asia.

The Laotian commander reportedly has been shipping opium from Ban Houei Sai to Vientiane via Air America and Continental Air Services — in effect, having American taxpayers foot the bill for his illicit activity.

The opium is either processed in the Laotian capital or distributed for processing in Saigon, Bangkok or Hong Kong.

American-directed intelligence activities here are designed to assess capabilities and forecast future moves of hostile forces in Laos.

Those forces include Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops, as well as an estimated 14,000 Communist Chinese personnel building roads in northern areas.

Peking's aims in this strange country have long

been a mystery to American analysts. Recent intelligence reports suggest that the Chinese construction projects are designed to bolster China's border defense and facilitate the sending of supplies to Hanoi.

It has been suspected, however, that the roads also are designed to aid Communist-led insurgents in Thailand and Burma.

The spy teams gathering such information consist of specially trained Americans (former servicemen now employed by the CIA), Lao commandos and hilltribe troops.

Operating from bases around Ban Houei Sai, they are equipped with the latest snooping devices, including portable radar and starscopes that allow high visibility at night.

Seven such teams reportedly are operating out of this area. They combine long-range patrolling with periods of observation in which they map enemy supply traffic and troop movements.

The work is dangerous; although U.S. officials in Vientiane refuse to discuss such matters, there have been reliable reports of ambushed patrols and overrun bases.

Some teams, operating from an outpost north of Ban Houei Sai, also engage in patrols that penetrate as far as several hundred miles into south-

ern China's Yunnan Province.

Although CIA-directed, these teams do not have American members; they are composed of hill tribesmen whose ethnic stock is prevalent in south China.

Several teams have been captured in Chinese territory during recent years, but U.S. officials in Laos discount the possibility of these forays damaging the developing relations between Washington and Peking.

ST. LOUIS, MO.  
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376  
S - 541,868

AUG 4 1971

### *Laotian War Cost*

The well-publicized lesson that the road of escalation in Vietnam led to disaster has apparently still not penetrated the Administration's thinking on the secret war in Laos. Despite the fact that U.S. expenditures for the clandestine war in Laos escalated to \$350,000,000 in fiscal 1971 (exclusive of bombing costs), with more to be spent this year, the military situation there is growing steadily worse. More southern Laotian territory is under North Vietnamese control than before the American-supported South Vietnamese invasion of Laos.

These conclusions and figures on American aid to Laos are contained in a highly censored report released by Senator Stuart Symington's Foreign Relations Subcommittee. Compiled by two committee staff assistants who visited Laos in the spring, the report was declassified only after the State and Defense departments and the CIA had deleted material.

If the censored report conveys such a discouraging picture, one wonders how bleak the uncensored version may have been. With the U.S. now spending for secret operations in Laos nearly ten times as much as the total budget of the Laotian government, Senator Symington could well ask whether the American people think a policy is wise which exacts such a price in dollars for the U.S. and in lives and territory for the people of Laos.

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 SAN DIEGO, CALIF. TRIBUNE

E - 121,726

AUG

4 1971

## Peking bolsters troops, guns along Laos highway project

EVENING TRIBUNE News Report

WASHINGTON — Communist China, under the watchful eyes of U.S. reconnaissance, has quietly built up its military presence in neighboring Laos to a force of between 14,000 and 20,000 men.

A report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee disclosed Monday that the Chinese have installed 395 radar-guided anti-aircraft guns along a road they are building deep into the interior of northern Laos.

The significance of the Chinese movement is not known but American officials regard it as virtual extension of China's southern borders into a neighboring state, the report said.

The report was the first detailed analysis presented of the Chinese presence in the war-torn Indochina state and it also provided the first officially sanctioned account of Central Intelligence Agency activities in directing Laotian commando troops against North Vietnamese in the area.

While U.S. pilots have strict orders not to fly sorties into the Chinese-held area, the report said Laotian government planes have already engaged in minor clashes with the Chinese anti-aircraft units on at least two occasions.

Two committee consultants, James G. Lowenstein and Richard Moose, prepared the 23-page document after a two-week trip to Laos last Spring. A heavily censored version was made public yesterday after the CIA, the State Department and the Defense Department deleted sensitive material.

But despite the heavy classification, the CIA for the first time was willing to acknowledge publicly its role in the war.

The report shows that in fiscal 1971, U.S. military aid

to Laos was \$162.2 million, economic aid was \$52 million and the total including CIA backing for Laotian troops was \$284.2 million, indicating that part of the CIA operation cost \$70 million.

Secy. of State William P. Rogers has put the total non-bombing cost to the United States at \$350 million and committee sources said most of the \$65.8 million additional was for CIA support of Thai troops in Laos.

In fiscal 1972 which began July 1, military assistance is due to go up by \$90 million to \$232.2 million, the report said.

Despite heavy casualties, North Vietnamese troop strength rose from about 40,000 in March 1966 to 200,000 in April 1971, while native Pathet Lao Communist forces

dropped from 51,645 to about 39,000, the report said.

North Vietnamese troops have taken the brunt of action, the report said. "Sparing the Pathet Lao for the future when they will vie for political control in Laos with non-Communist Lao forces whose numbers will have been greatly reduced by war losses ..."

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., who halted the report's release, plans a Laos-related amendment to the military procurement authorization bill.

His measure would restrict U.S. spending in Laos, including all aid and bombing in northern Laos unrelated to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to \$200 million — about one-fifth of the present level.



## A Good Investment CIA Gets 'A' on Tests

By Holmes Alexander

WASHINGTON — Among the many things one can find in the Pentagon Papers is a high degree of competence on the part of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in at least three fields. While President Kennedy's reputation suffers from the revelations, the CIA comes through with flying colors — the skull and bones variety.

Back in 1963, the Kennedy Administration decided to bring down the loyal-to-the-USA Ngo Dinh Diem regime because it was known to be corrupt and not to have popular support in South Vietnam. Kennedy naturally turned to the CIA as his executioner.

The CIA did not stage a coup, but it did the next best thing. It kept track of the Vietnamese generals who were conspiring against Diem. The CIA agent on the spot was a certain Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, an old acquaintance of several of the Saigon generals, and he was in close touch with Washington. President Kennedy wanted "plausibility of denial" about U.S. involvement in the upcoming coup. The CIA performed its delicately deceitful role with ruthless precision.

With instructions from JFK, the CIA provided the anti-Diem conspirators with information on the faction that would succeed him.

On October 5, 1963, when President Kennedy wanted to dispatch instructions "with closest security" to the Saigon embassy, he sent them via CIA channels. President Kennedy furthermore ordered that all cloak-and-dagger reports be sent back to him on the same CIA circuit. The coup came off as planned, and the Diem government was replaced by a military junta. (The Diem brothers lost their lives only because they did not accept Ambassador Lodge's invitation of sanctuary at his embassy.)

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While overall instructions from the White House were sometimes ambiguous, according to the published documents, the CIA speaks did their dirty work very well.

As the Vietnamese War was stepped up by the Johnson administration, the CIA took a hard look at the bombing campaign in a report of March 16, 1966, and found that:

"Although the movement of men and supplies in North Vietnam has been hampered and made somewhat more costly (by our bombing), the Communists have been able to increase the flow of supplies and manpower to South Vietnam." The CIA saw the bombing as a failure before others higher up in the administration realized this.

The Pentagon Papers were

certainly not leaked in order to make the CIA look good, but these documents do have that effect. In the James Bond world of kill and conspire (an unnatural and un-American way of life) and in the world of military studies, the agency gets A on most of the tests.

The Pentagon Papers show that the CIA recruited a number of secret armies in Southeast Asia, including an army of Meo tribesmen in Laos. This army was to assist the Royal Laotian Army against the Communists. The secret force has had its ups and downs on the battlefield. Recently, it again was able to capture the strategic Plain of Jars with the help of the U.S. Air Force.

Pravda, in an editorial of 18 July, inadvertently gave the CIA a plug by mentioning the success of the Meo army in Laos. At this writing, the Communists are on the run and are talking peace for a change in Laos. It looks as though the rag-tag army of primitive tribesmen is living up to expectations.

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If we accept it as a grisly necessity of world politics, the Central Intelligence Agency, despite its failures, is a good investment and is worth its funding of about \$500-million a year. How do we know? If CIA were not doing a good job, Pravda wouldn't bother to denounce it so hysterically.

STATINTL

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TIMES

E - 43,427

AUG 4 1977

## OUR GUERRILLA ARMY

# CIA's Role in Laotian Conflict Larger

By LAURENCE STERN

The Washington Post

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency spent about \$70 million to operate an army or irregular forces numbering more than 30,000 men in Laos during fiscal 1971, a senate foreign relations committee staff report has disclosed.

The report portrayed a far broader picture of clandestine American involvement in the Lao Guerrilla armies, now known as the BGS (after the French bataillons guerriers) than has yet surfaced publicly in Washington.

The 23-page document, prepared by committee staff members James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, was released Monday by Stuart Symington, D., Mo., chairman of the subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad.

There has been a widespread conception, as a result of Symington subcommittee hearings and newspaper articles two years ago, that the principal CIA-trained guerilla force in Laos was concentrated in the Plain of Jars under the leadership of Meo Gen. Vang Pao.

### Irregulars Carry Load

But the new report, based on interviews with American military and diplomatic officials in Laos, asserts that BG "Irregular" forces are operating in all but one of the five military regions of Laos. Only 38 per cent of the irregulars are under Vang Pao's command in the second military region, which encompasses the Plain of Jars.

The BG irregulars, says the

senate report, are playing a far more important role in the Laotian war than the royal Lao Army. They have taken heavier casualties and accounted for higher enemy kills than the regular Lao Army forces.

In the 1968 to early 1971 period, for example, the BGS reportedly suffered 8,020 killed and accounted for 22,726 enemy deaths, according to official figures. The Royal Lao Army in the same period lost 3,664 and reported an enemy kill of 8,522.

"The most effective military force in Laos is not the Royal Lao Army, but the force known previously as the Armee Clandestine . . . and now as the BGS. . . the BG units are part of the irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the CIA," the report asserts.

### Report "Sanitized"

It took five weeks of negotiation with the administration to release the sanitized version of the report. The document is shot through with the word "deleted," which signifies omissions of facts and numbers insisted upon by executive agencies.

But for the first time the CIA permitted itself to be referred to by name in a published document of the subcommittee during its three-year review of U.S. military commitments. Although specific CIA expenditures were stricken from the report, they could be simply computed by subtracting published figures listed for the defense department and aid from the over-

## Than Earlier Admitted

all totals given in the subcommittee report.

In a statement announcing release of the Laos report, Symington said he found it "an encouraging sign that the executive branch has finally agreed that much of what the United States government has been doing in Laos may now be made public."

He protested, however, the administration's continued refusal to declassify much of the information bearing on U.S. support of Thai military forces in Laos.

### Lists Sorties Over Laos

Members of the foreign relations committee have taken the position that the Thai units which have been acknowledged by the administration to be fighting in Laos are in violation of the Fulbright amendment to the

1971 defense authorization and procurement bills, which prohibits American financing of third country forces in Cambodia and Laos.

The staff report also listed — for the first time with tacit official acknowledgement — the number of U.S. Air Force sorties over Laos. Monthly sorties by the seventh Air Force in January, 1970, reached a high point of 14,000. The breakdown of air missions between Northern Laos and the southern panhandle was deleted by administration officials, however. The number of American raids declined to 8,289 in April, 1971, the report said.

BALTIMORE SUN  
3 AUG 1971

# CIA Said To Spend \$100 Million In Laos War

By GENE OTSIII

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington--The CIA spent more than \$100 million last year on a secret war in Laos, using irregular Lao forces bolstered by a large contingent of Thai mercenaries.

This was one of the conclusions to be drawn from a staff report released yesterday by a Senate subcommittee on United States agreements and commitments abroad.

The top secret report was heavily censored by the Pentagon, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, but what remained was the most detailed account so far of U.S. operations in Laos, where, according to some senators, the U.S. is spending more than \$1 billion a year.

## Brunt Of Fighting

By not following previous policy of deleting all references to the CIA, the administration for the first time acknowledged the agency's direct support and supervision of the guerrilla warfare being waged by Lao irregular forces, which, according to the report, are carrying the brunt of the fighting against the Communists.

The report was prepared by two members of the subcommittee staff, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, after a 12-day tour of Laos last spring. Its contents were reported to the Senate last month in a secret session, and Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), the subcommittee chairman, made public a "sanitized" version yesterday.

## U.S. Spent \$284.2 Million

Excluding the amount spent on U.S. air operations in Laos and the cost of the Thai mercenaries, the report said, the U.S. spent \$284.2 million in that country in fiscal 1971.

Of this amount, \$162.2 million was in military assistance and \$52 million in economic aid. This leaves \$70 million unaccounted for, since the

was deleted. However, subcommittee sources made it clear that there was no other program to which the money could have gone.

The sources noted, moreover, that William P. Rogers, the Secretary of State, has stated publicly that the total U.S. expenditure in Laos for fiscal 1971--excluding the cost of the bombing--was \$350 million. This would place the cost of the Thai mercenaries at about \$65 million for the year.

## \$374 Million For 1972

Some of this \$36 million is accounted for by an increase in the military aid program, but considerably less than half, according to subcommittee sources.

The budget for fiscal 1972, according to the report, totals \$374 million for military assistance, economic aid and the CIA. Again, the amount allotted for the Thai forces or U.S. air operations is not included in this figure.

The report said that U.S. air operations in Laos were declining because some squadrons are being transferred out of Southeast Asia and also because more aircraft are being used in Cambodia.

## B-52 Raids Increased

In 1969, the report said, the U.S. was flying about 400 sorties a day. In April of this year, the level was down to about 340 sorties a day. Because of the deletions, the report did not give the breakdown between missions flown over northern Laos and the Ho Chi Minh trail.

The report noted, however, that the U.S. had increased the level of B-52 raids over northern Laos since last year, although the comparative figures were censored. B-52 bombers are used for high-altitude saturation bombing.

As for the ground war, the report said "friendly forces" totaled about 96,000 men, but that the regular forces are used almost exclusively for "static de-

fense." The irregulars, sponsored by the CIA, do most of the day-to-day patrolling, ambushing and attacking, the report said.

## About 4,800 Thais

The irregular forces are composed of 30,000 indigenous troops--including a large contingent of Meo tribesmen--and Thai mercenaries. The number of Thai forces was deleted, but senators have said they numbered about 4,800.

The report said the CIA supervises and pays for the training of Thai recruits in Thailand and then transports them to Laos by Air America, another CIA-financed operation.

Once in Laos, the Thais join the Lao irregular forces, which, according to the report, are "trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the CIA."

## More Chinese

The report also stated that the number of Chinese forces in northwestern Laos has been increased from 6,000 to 8,000--an estimate given two years ago--to somewhere between 14,000 to 20,000.

Chinese forces are in northwestern Laos ostensibly to build a road, but the report said they have recently installed 300 new radar-directed, anti-aircraft weapons along the route.

The Chinese also have built 12 small-arms firing ranges, normally associated with the stationing of ground troops, as well as 66 basketball courts, the report said.

While the area occupied by the Chinese is off limits to U.S. bombers, the report said, the Royal Laotian Air Force has bombed the area at least twice.

STATINTL

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## OPENINGS OF HEARINGS ON DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I am very much pleased that the distinguished chairman of the Government Operations Committee, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) has called for opening hearings on Thursday, August 5, on the bill creating a new Department of Natural Resources, S. 1431. As principal Senate sponsor of this proposed legislation on behalf of the administration, I am delighted that the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) is taking time, at Chairman McCLELLAN's request, from his work as chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to preside over these hearings in the full Government Operations Committee, of which he is also a member.

Senator Jackson brings a wealth of experience in natural resource issues and programs, a dedication to conservation and environmental protection, and very great ability to this subject. He will be able to apply his first hand experience in all of the substantive aspects of natural resource programs and policies to create an ideal new structural framework for existing natural resource programs. The result, I am confident, will be a very sound bill.

The creation of such a new Department could make major improvements by coordinating planning of resource development projects. An article published in the Wall Street Journal of July 19, entitled "Waterway Wrangle," demonstrated again the waste and confusion resulting from the conflicting aims of the Agriculture Department's Soil Conservation Service, Interior Department agencies, and conservation groups. The issue is not whether stream channelization is good or bad in principle; the issue is more clearly one of better defining our objectives, planning without duplication and waste for measured land reclamation where necessary, and for maintaining natural habitats where desirable and where channelization is not clearly necessary.

The public has every reason to be frustrated with continued poor Government performance and every right to demand change.

I fully subscribe to the President's comments in discussing his top-priority programs with media executives in Rochester, New York, on June 18:

I simply would summarize the attitude of most people toward government in this way: most people are fed up with it. They are fed up with it at all levels. They are fed up with it because they think it costs too much, they think it doesn't work, and also they think they don't have anything to say about it.

Government reorganization, combined with revenue sharing, answers that fundamental concern of the American people. It will reduce the cost of government by making it more efficient. It will make it work better.

Thus I am pleased that Senator McCLELLAN has called for hearings on the proposed Department of Natural Resources. The witnesses now planned will be the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss), who has over a period of years led in proposing new structures for natural re-

sources programs; Secretaries Morton and Hardin; the Under Secretary of Commerce, Mr. James Lynn; Atomic Energy Commissioners Larson and Lancy; the Under Secretary of the Army, Mr. Beal; the Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers, General Clarke; and the Associate director of the Office of Management and Budget, Mr. Weber.

## ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

### U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN LAOS—PROCEEDINGS IN CLOSED SESSION

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in today's Record the expurgated transcript of the proceedings of the closed session of the Senate on June 7, 1971, and that subsequently it be published at the appropriate place in the permanent Record of June 7, 1971.

There being no objection, the transcript was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

### U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN LAOS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senate will indulge the Chair for a moment, the precedents and rules provide that any action taken now in the Senate is confidential, and that means that it is secret. It can be divulged only by special affirmative action by the Members of the Senate, or by a majority vote of the Senate.

Under section 2 of Rule XXXVI, when acting on confidential or executive business, unless the same shall be considered in open executive session, the Senate Chamber shall be cleared of all persons except the secretary, the chief clerk, the principal legislative clerk, the executive clerk, the minute and Journal clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, the assistant doorkeeper, and such other officers as the presiding officer shall think necessary.

Under recent practices, the word "assistant doorkeeper" as used in the rule, has been expanded to include the majority and minority secretaries.

Under previous practices, the Chair under his authority to retain "other officers as the presiding officer shall think necessary" retains the Parliamentarian and the Assistant Parliamentarian to aid him.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I also want to make it absolutely clear that the loudspeakers are shut off completely, in the cloakrooms and elsewhere. I would hope that the Sergeant at Arms would see that that is done.

### UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. President, I send to the desk two unanimous-consent requests, the first having to do with Senate staff employees. I want to make it very plain that those who are on the list, if the Senate agrees that they should be present, must have the clearance that the ones previously allowed on the floor had.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the first agreement.

The Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) makes the following unanimous-consent request:

That during the closed session the following Senate staff employees be permitted the privileges of the floor to perform their official duties: The Official Reporters; the Secretary of the Senate, Francis Valco; the Parliamentarian, Floyd Riddick; Journal clerk, Bernard Somers; chief clerk, Darrell St. Claire; legislative clerk, James Johnson; the secretary for the majority, J. S. Kimmitt; the assistant secretary for the majority Teddy Foe; the secretary for the minority, Mark Trice; the assistant secretary for the minority, William Brownrigg; majority policy committee staff members Charles D. Ferris and Daniel E. Leach; the following officials for the minority: William Hildenbrand, Cecil Holland, and Oliver Dempierre; and the following Senate officials: Robert Dunphy, the Sergeant at Arms; William Wannall, the Deputy Sergeant at Arms; and Nicholas Lacovara, the Assistant Sergeant at Arms.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Montana wish to include the Assistant Parliamentarian?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Only the Parliamentarian now.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

### PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my assistant, who specializes in matters relating to this specific question of troops in Laos and the American employment of mercenaries in Laos, be added to the list. His name is John Marks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to adding this name to the list?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that two staff members be allowed the privilege of the floor during my presentation. Their names are James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to these persons staying on the floor during the closed session?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I wonder if the chairman of the committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), has his people included?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Senator from Mississippi will be taken care of.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have received no request from the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.

However, in view of the fact that this may well encompass part of his responsibility, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) may be allowed to have the following staff members on the floor if he so desires: T. Edward Braswell and R. James Woolsey.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, may I say to the able majority leader that I told the staff of the Armed Services Committee

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GLOBE

AUG 3 1971

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# Huge China air defense found on Laos border

By Darius S. Jhabvala  
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON— Communist China has substantially increased its air defense capabilities along a road they have been building in northern Laos, making that region "one of the most heavily defended in

In the past two years Red China not only increased its forces along the road by more than 100 percent but also has deployed 395 radar-directed, anti-aircraft weapons which are effective up to 68,000 feet. The weapons are manned by crews totaling anywhere from 3000 to 7000 trained personnel.

Also along the road, which begins at the Laotian border with the Chinese province of Yunnan and runs up to Munong Huon, are eight small-arms firing ranges of the kind normally associated with garrisons of ground troops. There also are headquarters buildings and 66 basketball courts.

These details were revealed in a staff report on Laos prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by two investigators, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, who visited the strife-worn country from April 22 to May 4.

The document has been heavily censored by officials of the State and Defense departments and the Central Intelligence Agency for reasons of national security.

Thus, most of what has now been declassified and issued has been in the public domain since the committee began its investigation of the US involvements in Laos.

Nevertheless, a spokesman for the committee explained that, despite the deletions, the report "will help the American public decide whether it is either the United States to continue to do what it has been wise or desirable for the doing in Laos at an ever-increasing cost to this nation in dollars and to the Lao people in lives and territory."

The report states that "most observers" in Laos hold the opinion that "from the military point of view the situation there is growing steadily worse and the initiative clearly seems to be in the hands of the enemy.

"There are apparently no plans for retaking and holding any of the two-thirds of the country no longer under government control but only a hope, not too firmly held in some quarters, that the one-third of Lao territory now under government control can continue to be held," it points out.

The war, the investigators claim, "is run in most respects by the US Embassy in Vientiane," and the undertaking "seems to consume a considerable portion of the time of senior officers."

They also reveal that the United States "continues to train, arm and feed the Lao army and air force and to train, advise, pay and support and, to a great extent, organize the key regular

by Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), and Sen. Stuyvesant Smilington (D-Mo.), have claimed that some 4800 Thai mercenaries are now operating in Laos. The mercenaries are part of the Battalions Guerriers which, according to one estimate, "have become the cutting edge of the Lao military forces."

No details were made public about the strength of the BG and where and how they operate. However, the report claims that the CIA supervises and pays for their training and provides their salary, allowances and operational costs.

According to the report the partial total of estimated US expenditures in Laos in fiscal 1971 was \$284.2 million, including an estimated \$162.2 million in military assistance and \$52 million in aid programs.

While the figure for what the CIA spends has not been revealed it can be deduced that at least \$70 million was spent, exclu-

sive of the Thai irregular costs.

The last amount is almost twice the amount of the Laotian government's entire budget for the current year.

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Members of the Foreign Relations Committee nota-

3 AUG 1971

STATINTL

# Charge CIA Pours 2B Into Losing Laos War

By DAVID BREASTED

Washington, Aug. 2 (NEWS Bureau)—U.S. taxpayers will shell out an estimated \$2 billion this year for the secret—and losing—war the Central Intelligence Agency is conducting in Laos, Senate investigators charged today.

The \$2 billion cost does not include huge military outlays for widespread B-52 bomber raids in Laos or for complete CIA support of several thousand "irregular" troops from Thailand fighting Communists in Laos, investigators for a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee said.

## Small Group at Helm

Subcommittee Chairman Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said that the war in Laos is being directed by "a small group of government officials who operate behind closed doors on the basis of information available only to them, officials who thereupon are free to control what the public shall know of their decisions."

In a heavily censored 23-page report, the subcommittee said that the regime of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma effectively controls only about 40% of Laos, and that even this territory "shrinks steadily."

## Chinese Have Taken Over

The report further warned that Fed Chinese construction of a road from the Laotian border deep into northwestern Laos has already effectively moved the Chinese border substantially southward.

A clandestine army trained and paid for by the CIA is in fact the only real army defending Laos against North Vietnamese regular troops and Pathet Lao guerrillas, the report said. It said one regular Lao army unit, supposedly of 300 men, at one point actually mustered only 25.

The CIA's private army reportedly operates semi-independently in four of the five major regions of Laos.

## Free Run for Reds

But, subcommittee investigators wrote, U.S. officials told them in Laos, "Perhaps the only real protection the Lao have is whatever limits the North Vietnamese wish to place on themselves."

The report said some U.S. officials believe that the North Vietnamese have no desire for the headaches of running Laos, but plan eventually for a partitioned Laos with the eastern portion governed by the Pathet Lao and the west in the hands of a neutral Lao regime.

Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese intend to continue use of eastern Laos along the South Vietnamese and Cambodian borders for a major military supply route.

## More Trucks Than Exist

U.S. Air Force claims of kills against North Vietnamese trucks "are not taken seriously by most U.S. officials, even Air Force officers," the report said. One reason for skepticism is, "The total figure for the last year greatly exceeds the number of trucks believed by the (U.S.) Embassy to be in all of North Vietnam," the report added.

The administration, through Secretary of State William P. Rogers, has officially acknowledged the spending of only \$350 million for the current fiscal year in Laos.

## C.I.A. Says It Maintains Force of 30,000 in Laos

By JOHN W. FINNEY  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 2—The Nixon Administration acknowledged today, through a Senate subcommittee staff report, that the Central Intelligence Agency was maintaining a 30,000-man "irregular" force now fighting throughout most of Laos.

Many news articles in recent years have described C.I.A. sponsorship of an irregular army in Laos. However, the subcommittee report represented the first time that the agency publicly and officially confirmed its military activities in Laos. The report indicated that the use of the irregular units in Laos was more widespread than had been indicated in the news accounts.

The force has become "the main cutting edge" of the Royal Laotian Army, according to the report, and has been supplemented by Thai "volunteers" recruited and paid by the C.I.A.

The agency's involvement in a secret war in Laos was finally confirmed officially in a staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on foreign commitments by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, two former Foreign Service officers who made an inspection trip to Laos in April. A version of their report, once classified top secret, was made public today after clearance by the C.I.A. as well as the State and Defense Departments.

Publication of the detailed 23-page report marks the formal acknowledgement of the secret war that the United States has been conducting in Laos ever since the breakdown of the 1962 Geneva accords, which were supposed to re-establish the neutrality of that country.

In making public the report, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, the subcommittee chairman, said: "It is an encouraging sign that the executive branch has finally agreed that much of the United States Government has been doing in Laos may now be made public. The veil of secrecy which has

long kept this secret war in Laos officially hidden from the American people has been partially lifted."

Senator Symington complained, however, that the executive branch was still refusing to make public "certain truths concerning the nature, composition and command arrangements of the Thai forces in Laos." The information the Administration has refused to make public, he said, bears on the question whether the recruitment of the Thai forces violates a provision against hiring soldiers that was written into the Defense Appropriations Act last year.

One fact kept secret by the executive branch is the presence in Laos—referred to in the past by Senator J. W. Fulbright—of a series of Thai generals who use the Thai equivalent of John Doe as their names. The senator did not give the Thai equivalent. In contending that the provision against hiring troops is not being violated, the State Department has argued that the Thai volunteers came under the command of the Royal Laotian Army.

Out of the report came the first detailed description of the rapidly rising cost of the American military involvement in a war in which, the report observed, "the Royal Lao Government continues to be almost totally dependent on the United States, perhaps more dependent on us than any other government in the world."

### U.S. Spent \$284.2-Million

In the fiscal year 1970, which ended on July 1, a "partial total" of United States expenditures in Laos came to \$284.2-million, of which \$162.2-million was for military aid, \$52-million for economic aid and \$70-million was spent by the C.I.A. exclusive of the amount spent on the Thai forces.

This was the first time that the C.I.A. has permitted disclosure of its spending in Laos, and even then the figure came out indirectly through subtraction from over-all estimates included in the report.

In the current fiscal year, the report said, the estimated cost of military assistance has "risen rapidly," doubling since January, mostly because of increased ammunition being furnished the Royal Laotian and irregular forces. The cost of military and

economic aid plus the C.I.A. programs is now expected to come to \$374-million in the current fiscal year. At that level, the report observed, the cost will be more than three times as large as it was in fiscal 1967 and 25 times as large as when United States assistance began nine years ago.

Not included in these estimates were the costs of United States bombing operations in northern Laos in support of the Royal Laotian forces and in southern Laos against the Ho Chi Minh supply line used by North Vietnam.

The report said that American air operations in Laos had declined over the last two years, with United States planes aver-

aging 340 sorties a day this April, compared with a daily rate of 440 in the first part of 1969. At the same time, B-25 bombing in northern Laos has increased since it was begun in February, 1970, with what amounts to "free fire zones" being established for the bombers. These zones have been cleared of the civilian population and any activity in them can be considered to be supporting the enemy.

The report also said that in recent months the Chinese Communists have increased their air defenses along the road they are building in northern Laos, making the "area one of the most heavily defended in the world." The Chinese, the report said, have moved in "a heavy new increment" of radar-directed anti-aircraft guns, raising the total to 395, including for the first time 85-mm. and 100-mm. guns that are effective up to 68,000 feet.

The area around the Chinese-built road is "off limits" to American planes, but the report noted that on at least two occasions the road had been attacked by unmarked Royal Laos air force T-28's furnished by the United States.

The Chinese build-up of anti-aircraft defenses began after an attack by two Laotian planes in January, 1970.

In the last two years, the report said, the size of the Chinese forces along the road has increased from 6,000 to between 14,000 and 20,000. Since November, 1970, the Chinese, in addition to "upgrading earlier road construction," have constructed eight small-arms firing ranges of a kind normally associated with garrisons of ground troops as well as a large basketball courts.

The Chinese road stretches from the Chinese border to Muang Sai in north-central Laos, with branches extending toward Dienbienphu in North Vietnam and toward the Thai border. The purpose of the road remains unclear, but the report observes that in terms of "areas of influence," the "practical effect of the Chinese road is that the Chinese border has already been shifted southward to encompass a substantial portion of northern Laos."

To subcommittee members, probably the most significant disclosure of the report was confirmation that their irregular units in Laos are "trained, equipped, supported, advised and to a great extent organized by the C.I.A."

The "B.G. units," as they are known. (For the French term "battalions guerriers"), "have become the cutting edge of the military," the report said, "leaving the Royal Lao Army as a force primarily devoted to a static defense."

These units began as a force of Meo tribesmen under Gen. Vang Pao operating around the Plain des Jarres, but now, the report said, they are operating in all sections of Laos except a small military region around Vientiane, the administrative capital.

Except for a 1,500-man cadre from the Royal Lao Army, all members of these units, according to the report, are "volunteers," with their rations and pay supplied indirectly by the C.I.A. and guaranteed evacuation of wounded by air America helicopters.

At one point in 1968-69, the size of the irregular forces totaled 38,000 men, according to the report, but it is now down to about 30,000 men, largely because of desertions, heavy casualties and "financial restraints incurred by budgetary limitations."

With the military manpower base in Laos "exhausted," the report said, the agency turned to Thai "volunteers" to supplement the irregular forces.

The precise number of Thai "volunteers" in Laos was deleted from the report, but Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey and Senator Fulbright have used a figure of about 4,600.

The report—made public, in its declassified form, with gaps representing security delisions—said:

"Most of the irregulars have been recruited, we were told, by 'mercenaries' outside the Thai army, although (deleted)."

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AUG 3 1971

**China Doubles Troops on Border****Military Setback in Laos Grows Steadily Worse**

By RAY MOSELEY

*Bulletin Washington Bureau*

Washington — Despite the American-backed invasion of Laos earlier this year, enemy forces still hold the initiative and the military situation is growing steadily worse, according to a report issued yesterday by a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee.

The heavily censored version of the 23-page report — written by staff members James O. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, former Foreign Service officers who visited Laos in April — also contained these statements:

The enemy holds more Laos territory than it did before the invasion by South Vietnamese troops and now controls two-thirds of the country.

The invasion and heavy air attacks on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos have not prevented the enemy from continuing to move enough supplies through Laos to support its military operations in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Central Intelligence Agency is maintaining a 30,000-man "irregular" force now fighting throughout Laos.

**China Doubles Troops**

And Communist China, which has been building a road across northern Laos for some time, has doubled the number of troops involved in that operation and built up air defense along the road. The practical effect of the road has been to extend Communist China's border south to encompass "a substantial portion of northern Laos."

Some material was deleted

at the request of the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency, resulting in such passages as:

"We were told that the embassy wanted to (deleted) the (deleted) with (deleted) because the (deleted) were more mobile and thus "could do things the others could not do."

**Lifts Veil of Secrecy**

Despite the deletions, Subcommittee Chairman Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said the report will do much to lift the veil from the "secret war" in Laos for the benefit of the American public.

Laos was proclaimed a neutral nation by the 1962 Geneva conference that ended the first Indochina war. But fighting has gone on there continuously, with North Vietnam never acknowledging its violations of the agreement and the U.S. reluctant to say much about its own role.

Much of the deleted matter in the report referred to Thai "irregular" forces recruited by the U.S. to fight in Laos. The existence of these forces was acknowledged officially

only a few months ago but the U.S. has never given the number of these troops or their costs.

**Under 4,000 Troops**

However, officials said last week the number was fewer than 4,000. Symington said the Government refused to declassify facts about the Thai troops because of objections from Thailand and Laos.

"But since the taxpayers of this country are paying the bills, why should the recipient foreign governments have the rights to dictate what our citizens can and cannot be told about the way in which public funds are being spent?" he said in a statement.

The report said the Thais were only part of the irregular units in Laos "trained, equipped, supported, advised and to a great extent organized by the CIA."

These irregular units started out as a force of Meo tribesmen under Gen. Vang Pao, known as the "clandestine army" and operating around the strategic Plain of Jars. Now, the report said,

they operate in all sections of Laos, except around Vientiane, the administrative capital, and number about 30,000 men.

The report makes clear the extent to which Laos is an economic dependency of the U.S. The Lao Government budget this year totals \$36.6 million, it says, but U.S. aid programs total \$350 million.

The U.S. has built just under half the Laos road network, 76 percent of elementary classrooms, 109 percent of the teacher training schools and 22 percent of the secondary schools.

On the Chinese road operation, the report said the number of Chinese troops involved has increased from between 6,000 and 8,000 two years ago to between 14,000 and 20,000 today.



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AUG 3 1971

# Laos Reported Dependent On U.S.

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.

A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Aug. 3—The rolay government in Laos is almost totally dependent on the United States, and the dependence is increasing as the military situation there worsens, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was told in a report made public today.

Exclusive of bombing costs, the United States spent about \$350,000,000 on its operations in Laos in fiscal 1971, it was said. That was nearly 10 times the total budget of the Laotian government.

The report indicated that the Central Intelligence Agency was maintaining an irregular military force in Laos of about 30,000 men, at a 1971 cost of about \$70,000,000. The cost figure does not include support of irregular troops from Thailand.

The report, originally classified top secret, was prepared by the staff of the Senate foreign relations subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad. The subcommittee chairman is Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri.

Symington requested a closed session of the full Senate, held June 7, to discuss the then-classified report. The version made public today was declassified after five weeks of consultation with the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.

The Administration of President Richard M. Nixon made numerous security deletions from the published report but allowed mention of the heavy CIA involvement in the clandestine, American-supported war in Laos.

Symington said a declassified version of the closed Senate session on the Laos report was to appear in the Congressional Record tomorrow.

The report mentions a trip to Laos made April 22-May 4 by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose of the Symington subcommittee staff. The American-supported incursion into Laos by South Vietnamese troops began Feb. 8 and ended April 9.

Lowenstein and Moose were told in Laos, they said, that "from the military point of view, the situation there is growing steadily worse and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy."

Since the South Vietnamese operation into Laos last spring, called Lam Son 719, it was reported, additional territory in Laos has come under enemy control. North Vietnam

has about three more regiments in southern Laos than it had before the operation.

The report said the war in Laos was run in most respects by the United States Embassy at Vientiane, the capital of Laos. It said American officials at the embassy spent an hour and a half a day at an operations meeting, during which they are briefed on the war by Army and air attaches and the CIA station chief.

"The United States continues to train, arm and feed the Lao army and air force and to train, advise, pay, support, and, to a great extent, organize the irregular military forces under the direction of the CIA," Lowenstein and Moose said.

Combat elements of the irregular forces are now about as large as those of the Royal Lao Army, it was said. Cost of the irregulars has been increasing every year, the report noted, and the irregulars "have become the cutting edge of the military, leaving the Royal Lao Army as a force primarily devoted to static defense."

Moose and Lowenstein were not permitted to say how many irregular volunteers from Thailand were in Laos at the time of their visit. They were told the Thai volunteers were recruited for service in Laos from outside the regular Thai army. The costs of the Thai troops are channeled through the CIA, it was said.

The report said two Laotian air force planes in January 1970 bombed the road being built in Northern Laos by Communist China. Subsequently, it was reported, there has been a heavy build-up of Chinese anti-aircraft along the road. The area is off limits to United States aircraft.

Symington has sought for some time to bring into public view the facts about American involvement in Laos, an elongated country of about 3,000,000 persons west of Vietnam, south of China, and north of Cambodia. The Ho Chi Minh Trail into Vietnam runs through Laos.

It is encouraging, Symington said in a statement today, that the American Government has agreed now that much of what it has been doing in Laos may be made public. He said he regretted that some details and facts still were being withheld.

"Let us hope that . . . the staff report on Laos will help the American public decide," he said, "whether it is either wise or desirable for the United States to continue to do what we have been doing in Laos, at ever-increasing cost to this nation in dollars, and to the Lao people in lives and territory."

TROOPS POUR IN

# Laos bristles with Chinese

(UPI) — Red China has quietly built up its military presence in neighboring Laos to a force of 14,000 to 20,000 men.

A report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee disclosed yesterday that the Chinese have installed 395 radar-guided anti-aircraft guns along a road they are building deep into the interior of northern Laos. Some of the guns can hit planes 68,000 feet high.

The significance of the buildup is not known but American officials regard it as virtual extension of China's southern borders into a neighboring state, the report said.

The report not only detailed China's role in Laos, but was the first officially sanctioned account of day-to-day CIA activities in directing Thai and Royal Laotian commando forces against the communists.

Also, it was the first time the CIA was willing to acknowledge its role. The heavily-censored report had been classified secret.

Two committee consultants, James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, prepared the 23-page document after a two-week trip to Laos last spring.

They said the overall situation in Laos was

growing steadily worse and that U.S. aid was the only thing preventing a complete route by North Vietnamese and communist Pathet Lao forces in the country.

CIA expenditures for the past fiscal year, not counting its support for an estimated 4,800 Thai irregulars, was put at \$67 million. The report said: "The CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits) and operational costs in Laos."

An exact breakdown of the war's cost was not given, but some senators have said it runs more than \$1 billion a year plus the cost of U.S. bombing runs over the Ho Chi Minh trail leading into South Vietnam.

The road the Chinese started in the early 1960s now stretches 45 miles across the northern tip of Laos within 20 miles of Thai.

It is virtually a Chinese garrison with all the earmarks of permanence, according to the report.

Altho the road is off-limits for American bombers, Royal Laotian planes flying too close to it have been fired at.

3 AUG 1971

# Deeper CIA Role in Laos Revealed

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency spent about \$70 million to operate an army of irregular forces numbering more than 30,000 men in Laos during Fiscal 1971, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report disclosed yesterday.

The report portrayed a far broader picture of clandestine American involvement in the Lao guerrilla armies, now known as the BGs (after the French bataillons guerriers), than had previously surfaced publicly in Washington.

The 23-page document, prepared by Committee staff members James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, was released yesterday by Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), chairman of the subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad.

There has been a widespread conception, as a result of Symington subcommittee hearings and newspaper articles two years ago, that the principal CIA-trained guerrilla force in Laos was concentrated in the Plain of Jars under the leadership of Meo Gen. Vang Pao.

But the new report, based on interviews with American military and diplomatic officials in Laos, asserts that BG "irregular" forces are operating in all but one of the five military regions of Laos. Only 38 per cent of the irregulars are under Vang Pao's command in the second military region, which encompasses the Plain of Jars.

The BG irregulars, says the Senate report, are playing a far more important role in the Laotian war than the Royal Lao Army. They have taken heavier casualties and accounted for higher enemy kills than the regular Lao army forces.

In the 1968 to early 1971 period, for example, the BGs reportedly suffered 8,020 killed, and accounted for 22,726 enemy deaths, according to official figures. The Royal Lao Army in the same period lost 3,664 and reported an enemy kill of 8,522.

"The most effective military force in Laos is not the Royal Lao Army, but the force known previously as the Armee Clandestine . . . and now as the BGs . . . The BG units are part of the irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the CIA," the report asserts.

"The BG units have become the cutting edge of the Lao military forces, as one U.S. official puts it."

The irregular units, says the staff report, "do most of the day-to-day patrolling, ambushing and attacking throughout the country." They are "closely" supervised and fed and paid by the CIA. Unlike the Royal Lao Army, the Senate document says, the BGs are guaranteed evacuation by Air America helicopters (a CIA-organized airline) and medical care—in some cases provided in a U.S. field hospital at the Royal Thai Air Force base in Udorn, Thailand.

It took five weeks of negotiation with the Nixon administration to release the sanitized version of the report. The document is shot through with the word "deleted," which signifies omissions of facts and numbers insisted upon by executive agencies.

But the first time the CIA permitted itself to be referred to by name in a published document of the Subcommittee during its three-year review of U.S. military commitments. Although specific CIA expenditures were stricken from the report, they could be simply computed by subtracting published figures listed for the Defense Department and AID from the overall totals given in the subcommittee report.

In a statement announcing release of the Laos report, Symington said he found it "an encouraging sign that the Executive Branch has finally agreed that much of what the United States government has been doing in Laos may now be made public.

has long kept this secret war in Laos officially hidden from

the American people has been partially lifted," he added. He protested, however, the administration's continued refusal to declassify much of the information bearing on U.S. support of Thai military forces in Laos.

Members of the Foreign Relations Committee have taken the position that the Thai units which have been acknowledged by the administration to be fighting in Laos are in violation of the Fulbright Amendment to the 1971 defense authorization and procurement bills. It prohibits American financing of third country forces in Cambodia and Laos and was designed to prevent further escalation of the U.S. role in the Indochinese war.

Most references to Thai troops in Laos were sanitized from the staff report. Foreign Relations Committee sources, however, indicated that the United States may have spent as much as \$35 million to finance a Thai "irregular" military presence in Laos.

The administration has refused to disclose how much it is spending for how many Thai troops in the Laotian war. Symington and other Foreign Relations Committee members, however, have cited publicly a figure of 4,800 Thai irregulars in Laos. This would indicate an approximate spending level of roughly \$7000 per Thai per year. A State Department spokesman said last week that there are fewer than 4,000 Thai "volunteers" in Laos.

"The Thai Irregular program developed during the past year and was designed by the CIA specifically along the lines of the irregular program in Laos," the report said. "The CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

In objecting to the administration's secrecy policy on the Thai irregulars, Symington said, "The stated reason for this Executive Branch refusal to declassify these facts is so as to avoid making public

what the governments of Thailand and Laos do not wish to make public. But since the taxpayers of this country are paying the bills, why should the recipient foreign governments have the right to dictate what our citizens can and cannot be told about the way in which public funds are being spent?"

Thai forces were introduced into Laos in significant numbers early last year when North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces swept across the Plain of Jars and nearby captured the strategic CIA command posts of Long Cheng and Sam Thong.

"At the time of our visit to Long Cheng on April 23," said the Lowenstein-Moose report, "there were (deleted) Thai there, at the nearby base of Sam Thong, and at Hill 1663 near Sam Thong. (There was also a small Thai team of (deleted) men at Nam Yu in Military Region 1.)"

"We were told that the details of the funding were not known in Vientiane, as all of this bookkeeping is done in Washington," the staff report said. The administration contends that the Thai forces are volunteers, recruited in their homelands.

The staff report takes a grim view of the military prospects ahead for the Royal Laotian government of Premier Souvanna Phouma. It notes that since the Laotian "incursions" by South Vietnamese forces last spring, "more Lao territory has come under enemy control, and there are about three regiments more of North Vietnamese forces in southern Laos than there were before the Lam Son operation."

Despite the reported claims of destruction of North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao supply trucks — 12,363 damaged and destroyed in 1970 — the report says "these figures are not taken seriously by most U.S. officials, even Air Force officers . . ."

The report also listed—for the first time with tacit official acknowledgement—the number of U.S. Air Force sor-

STAINTL

# Cost of War in Laos Placed at \$130 Million

By GEORGE SAURMAN  
Star Staff Writer

A previously classified Senate report released today indicates the United States secretly spent about \$130 million in the last fiscal year on "irregular" troops under CIA control in the Laos war.

The money, according to the staff report of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, supported 30,000 Lao irregulars operating in four of the five military regions of Laos, plus Thai irregulars operating mainly in the strategic Plain of Jars in North Laos.

The exact number of the Thai forces is deleted from the report by administration censors. But Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, after reading the uncensored report, on June 8 put the number of Thais at 4,600.

## Long Negotiations

The version made public today follows five weeks of intensive negotiations between the authors of the report, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, and three representatives of the executive branch—one each from the State Department, Defense Department, and Central Intelligence Agency.

It is the first time that CIA activities in Laos have been confirmed and given some detail publicly.

The report states that the Lao irregulars—called BG units after their French name, bataillons guerriers—are part of the irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and, to a great extent, organized by the CIA.

These forces, the report continues, have become the "cutting edge" of the Lao military forces, far more active and efficient than the 60,000-man Royal Lao Army.

## Encouraging Sign

Sen. Stuart Symington, chairman of the security subcommittee which sent Lowenstein and Moose to Laos for 12 days, April 22 to May 4, said it was "an encouraging sign that the executive branch has finally agreed that much of what the United

States government has been doing in Laos may now be made public."

But he hit the continued unwillingness of the administration "to acknowledge certain truths"—mainly the composition and command arrangements for the Thai troops in Laos.

On June 7, Symington presented the whole uncensored report to an executive session of the Senate. A "sanitized" version of the debate behind closed doors is to appear in the Congressional Record tomorrow.

## Most Exact Figures

For the public record, the 23-page report today manages to give the most exact figures to date on the cost of the secret operation, but overall totals still are obtained only by putting together bits and pieces of what the administration has allowed through censorship.

For instance, a key passage lists a total of \$234.2 million as the total U.S. expenditure in Laos in the fiscal year ending June 30—exclusive of bombing costs. That \$234.2 million, the report says, is made up of "an estimated \$162.2 million in military assistance, \$52 million in the AID program (economic) and \$(deleted) spent by CIA exclusive of the Thai irregular costs."

By school-boy mathematics—uncontested by administration representatives—that makes the CIA budget for irregulars \$70 million.

## Rogers' Estimate

In addition, Secretary of State William P. Rogers said June 15 that the total U.S. expenditures in Laos in fiscal 1971—exclusive of bombing—was \$350 million, not \$281.2 million.

That makes an additional \$65.8 million spent.

Committee sources say part of that \$65.8 million went for additional and unexpected expenditures after the staff was in

Laos. But the vast bulk was to pay for the Thai irregulars—a figure deleted from the report.

## \$130 Million Total

Therefore, a conclusion, produced from the report, sources close to the Senate committee and public statements by Rogers, is that the U.S. spent about \$130 million on the activities of the irregulars in Laos—Lao and Thai irregulars.

Also for the first time, the report produces official figures to document the steeply rising costs of the Laos war since 1963. For the fiscal year 1972 which began July 1, the overt military assistance program alone is to cost \$252.1 million.

## Chinese Double

The report also finds that Chinese participation in Laos, along the road from the Chinese border into north central Laos, has more than doubled in two years. Up from 6,000 men, the Chinese force is now estimated by U.S. intelligence at between 14,000 and 20,000 men.

Since November 1970, the report says, the Chinese, besides improving previous road construction, have installed eight small-arms firing ranges usually associated with ground garrisons, plus anti-aircraft guns, raising the total to 395.

The report says that, despite the huge expenditures of American money and Lao and Thai manpower, "most observers in Laos say that from the military point of view the situation there is growing steadily worse and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy."

WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

# The Theory and Fallacies of Counterinsurgency

## MORAL ANBIAD

*From the beginning, the core of the tragedy in Southeast Asia has been the inability of Western political leaders, and particularly American political leaders, to grasp the nature of insurgency in areas formerly under colonial rule, or the limitations of counterinsurgency to quell it. Accordingly, The Nation is devoting almost this entire issue to Egbal Ahmed's essay on the subject. In somewhat different form it will be a chapter in his forthcoming Reaction and Revolution in the Third World (Pantheon). Mr. Ahmad is a Fellow of the Adlai Stevenson Institute in Chicago.*

To write on counterinsurgency one must first explain what the so-called "insurgencies" really are. In the United States that may be difficult because for the most part the social scientists who write on revolutionary warfare have been proponents of counterinsurgency. As a result, the biases of incumbents are built into the structure, images and language of contemporary Western, especially American, literature on the subject. We have come to accept ideologically contrived concepts and words as objective descriptions.

One could take innumerable examples—terrorism, subversion, pacification, urbanization, protective reaction, defensive interdiction, etc.—and expose the realities behind these words and phrases. The term counterinsurgency is itself an excellent example. Like all coinages in this area, it is value-laden and misleading. In fact, counterinsurgency is not at all directed against insurgency, which Webster defines as "a revolt against a government, not reaching the proportions of an organized revolution; and not recognized as belligerency." The truth is, the Congress and the country would be in uproar if the government were to claim that U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities could conceivably be available to its clients for putting down "revolts not reaching the proportions of an organized revolution." The truth is the opposite: counterinsurgency is a multifaceted assault against organized revolutions. The euphemism is not used by accident, nor from ignorance. It serves to conceal the reality of a foreign policy dedicated to combating revolutions abroad; it helps to relegate revolutionaries to the status of outlaws. The reduction of a revolution to mere insurgency is also an implicit denial of its legitimacy. In this article, counterinsurgency and counterrevolution are used interchangeably.

Analytically, counterinsurgency may be discussed in terms of two primary models—the conventional-establishment and the liberal-reformist; and two ancillary models—the punitive-militarist and the technological-atrivative. I term these latter ancillary because they develop after the fact—from actual involvement in counterrevolution, and from interplay between the conventional and liberal institutions and individuals so involved. The models, though identifiable in terms of the intensity and

scope of their application at given times, and in terms of the agencies and individuals favoring them, are operationally integrated in the field. I outline them here:

Although monolithic in its goal of suppressing revolutions; the theory and practice of counterinsurgency reflects the pluralism of the Western societies to which most of its practitioners and all of its theoreticians belong. A pluralistic, bargaining political culture induces an institutionalized compulsion to compromise. Within a defined boundary, there can be something for everyone. Hence, the actual strategy and tactics of counterinsurgency reflect compromise, no one blueprint being applied in its original, unadulterated form. This give-and-take contributes to a most fateful phenomenon of counterrevolutionary involvement: groups and individuals continue to feel that their particular prescriptions were never administered in full dosage and at the right intervals. They show a tendency toward self-justification, a craving to continue with and improve their formulas for success. Severe critics of specific "blunders" and "miscalculations," they still persist in seeing "light at the end of the tunnel." I shall return to this in discussing the Doctrine of Permanent Counterinsurgency.

### Set Battles; 'Liberal' Doctrine

We might view the conventional-establishment approach as constituting the common denominator of the assumptions and objectives shared by all incumbents; viz., an *a priori* hostility toward revolution, the view that its origins are conspiratorial, a managerial attitude toward it as a problem, and a technocratic-military approach to its solution. In strategy and tactics, this approach prefers conventional ground and air operations, requiring large deployments of troops, search-and-destroy missions (also called "mop-up operations"), the tactics of "encirclement" and "attrition"—which involve, on the one hand, large military fortifications (bases, enclaves) connected by "mobile" battalions (in Vietnam, helicopter-borne troops and air cavalry); and, on the other hand, massive displacement of civilian population and the creation of free-fire zones. The conventionalists also evince deep longings for set battles, and would multiply the occasions by forcing, surprising or luring the guerrillas into conventional showdowns. The results of these pressures are bombings (e.g., North Vietnam) or invasion of enemy "sanctuaries" across the frontiers of conflict (e.g., Cambodia) and the tactic of offering an occasional bait in the hope of luring the enemy to a concentrated attack (e.g., Dienbienphu, Khe Sanh).

If the conventional-establishment attitudes constitute the lowest common denominator of counterrevolution, the liberal-reformists are the chief exponents of its doctrine, and the most sophisticated programmers of its practice. They provide the core of the policies specifically associated

STATINTL

# The Nation

## Congress: For the President— Some Ties That Bind

*I slept sounder than ever I remember to have done in my life . . . when I awakened. . . . I attempted to rise, but was not able to stir: for, as I happened to lie on my back, I found my arms and legs were strongly fastened on each side to the ground.*  
—From a Voyage to Lilliput in "Gulliver's Travels"

WASHINGTON — With a maze of legislative strings, the Congress last week dramatically accelerated efforts to ensnare a latter-day Gulliver named Richard Nixon. Those leading the attack, however, had an even larger target in mind: the ever-increasing power of the institution of the Presidency itself.

Thus, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee threatened to cut off funds for the military aid program unless the Executive Branch produced a Pentagon document. Committee rooms rang with complaints of excessive secrecy by the Executive Branch and proposals to force the Administration to supply Congress with information. And a bill to limit the warmaking powers of the Presidency began moving with unexpected speed and support through the legislative machinery.

Through all the noise and activity, which seemed to be ignored but was certainly not unheard by the Gulliver in the White House, ran a deep constitutional power struggle between the Presidency and the Congress. Ever since the Nixon Administration took office, and even before, in the closing days of the Johnson Administration, a Senate frustrated at not being included in foreign policy decisions and at being excluded from policy information had been in an assertive mood, seeking

to re-establish itself and Congress as a whole as a branch of the Government co-equal with the Presidency.

The most direct challenge last week — and one that could produce a stormy confrontation — came from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which discovered a little-noticed provision in the 1961 Foreign Aid Act. Basically the provision states that a foreign aid program will be cut off if, within 35 days, the Executive Branch has not supplied a foreign aid document requested by a Congressional committee — or, alternatively, if the President has not invoked Executive privilege to keep the document from Congress.

By a unanimous vote the committee decided to invoke the provision to require the Defense Department to turn over a five-year military assistance plan which it has refused to supply to the committee. In perhaps the clearest test of the Executive Branch's right to withhold information since the Eisenhower Administration tussled with Senator Joseph McCarthy, the Pentagon was thus faced with a choice of turning over the document or facing a suspension of its billion dollar military aid program to more than 40 nations.

The President could invoke Executive privilege, but that would set a precedent and undercut all the lesser reasons that the Executive Branch has been using for withholding information from Congress—that it would not be in the national interest to release such information or that the data were merely "internal working documents."

A Senate Judiciary subcommittee, meanwhile, began hearings on legislation, offered by Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that would compel Government officials to appear before Congressional committees and testify unless the President invoked Executive privilege. "When the Government operates in secrecy, its citizens are not informed and their ignorance breeds oppression," said Senator Fulbright, of North Carolina, the subcommittee chairman, at the outset of the hearings, and

that pretty well summed up the frustration in the Senate over Executive Branch secrecy.

In a less punitive manner, Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky came forward with a proposal that Congressional committees, like the Executive Branch, should be furnished with information by the Central Intelligence Agency, again on the premise that if Congress is to help set foreign policy then it must be informed. Senators Clifford P. Case of New Jersey and Stuart Symington of Missouri, meanwhile, were pressing amendments that would prevent the President from using undisclosed C.I.A. funds to fight a secret war in Laos.

On the theory that the Senate should give advice as well as consent, Senator Vance Hartke advanced with a double-barreled resolution. One part would call for Senate confirmation of the new United States representative to the Vietnam peace talks in Paris. The other would offer the advice of the Senate that in the negotiations the United States should agree to total troop withdrawal in nine months if agreement was reached on timely release of American prisoners of war.

The latter part was a variation on the Senate-approved troop withdrawal amendment of Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, that was still tying up legislation extending the draft. On Friday, House and Senate conferees reached agreement on a compromise that would considerably weaken the force of the Mansfield amendment but would retain the concept that the President should withdraw all troops by a "date certain" subject to the release of American P.O.W.'s.

All these various legislative strings, even if they should be tied down, would not fundamentally change the balance of power. At most they might make the Congress better informed in giving advice and thus more able to serve as a counterbalance to the Presidency. Undoubtedly the most important string, therefore, was one that Senators, Republicans and Democrats have been pressing for some time: the President's warmaking powers.

fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Professor Alexander M. Bickel of Yale Law School said: "In matters of war and peace, a succession of Presidents — well intentioned and patriotic, to be sure — have indeed come close to canceling the effectiveness of Congress. The result is a dangerous contradiction of the principles of democratic government, which I believe ought to be set right."

They were welcome, well-heeded words to members of the Foreign Relations Committee as they set about last week to consider legislation defining and restricting the war powers of the Presidency. What is expected to emerge is an amalgam of proposals offered by such unlikely partners in a challenge to

the Presidency as conservative Senator John Stennis of Mississippi and liberal Jacob K. Javits of New York. Basically their proposal is that the President could undertake emergency military actions, such as repelling an attack on United States forces, but could not continue military hostilities for more than a month without obtaining Congressional consent.

Even Senator Hugh Scott, who as Republican leader has stood as the Administration's spokesman against Congressional intrusions on Presidential prerogatives, joined in the drive for war powers legislation. "The time has come," he said, "when Congress will not be denied the right to participate, in accordance with the Constitution, in the whole enormous business of how wars are begun." Earlier in the month, Representative Gerald R. Ford, who as House Republican leader has been a conservative champion of the Administration, had endorsed war powers legislation. When the Republican leaders start talking that way it was proof that Congressional resentment and frustration over the secrecy and powers assumed by the White House were running deep.

Even the long passive House Foreign Affairs Committee was getting into the act. It included in the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill amendments that would restrict military and economic aid to Greece until constitutional democracy is restored in that

In testimony last week be-

CHICAGO, ILL.  
SUN-TIMES

M - 536,108  
S - 709,123  
JUL 31 1971

# Adlai backs policy of not beating Nixon to Peking

By Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.) said Friday that the State Department has advised China against admitting any senators or congressmen prior to President Nixon's visit. He felt "sure" Peking would comply.

Stevenson indicated support for the State Department policy and said he had passed the word to Peking that he did not think it would be "appropriate" for him to visit China until after Mr. Nixon's trip.

The senator applied for a visa a few hours before the President made his surprise July 15 announcement that he plans to go to China before next May.

To talk to CIA

Stevenson called a press conference to make a formal announcement of his plans to take a 25-day trip to Asia and the Soviet Union starting Wednesday.

His Asian stops will be Hong Kong, Thailand, South Vietnam and Japan.

Stevenson said he intends to concentrate on political and economic, rather than military, problems. However, he said he will discuss the war in Laos with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency at the CIA headquarters at Udorn in northern Thailand.

In Saigon, he said he hopes to see President Nguyen Van Thieu, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and Gen. Duong Van (Big) Ming, who, with Ky, is threatening to challenge Thieu

in next October's presidential election.

'A special interest'

Stevenson said he has "special interest" in the political scene in South Vietnam since he fears, after an investment of 50,000 American lives and \$200 billion, the U.S. involvement will end in what is "perceived to be a crooked election (with) a U.S.-dictated outcome."

Stevenson said he intends to enter the Soviet Union from the east, stopping in Siberia at Khabarovsk and Irkutsk before going on to Moscow and Leningrad. He expressed the hope of arranging a meeting with Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin and other high Soviet officials.

He is scheduled to return directly from Russia to Chicago on Aug. 29. He will be accompanied by Thomas Wagner, his administrative assistant, and John Lewis, director of the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University.

2  
ASHVILLE, N.C.

CITIZEN

M - 47,151

CITIZEN-TIMES

S - 67,768

JUL 30 1971

STATINTL

## Is U.S. Maintaining A CIA Army In Asia?

Do you know that the United States has a secret army gnawing away in Asia?

That it may not be disbanded when the troops are brought home from Vietnam?

A Southeast Asian expert told a congressional committee this week that the Central Intelligence Agency has built clandestine armies numbering 100,000 in Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia.

Fred Branfman, a former member of the International Volunteer Services, called it "the CIA's foreign legion" and said it includes native tribesmen, Thais, Nationalist Chinese, and other Asians.

Their job is to harass the population and troops in Communist-controlled areas of Indochina, except North Vietnam. Presumably, Branfman said, they would continue their fighting with American supplies and money after American forces are withdrawn.

The troops are paid by the CIA, which itself operates on a "secret" budget.

It was the first direct word of what the agency is doing in Asia. Earlier it had been disclosed that Thai troops, paid by the CIA, were operating in Laos, but not so extensively.

The report places the Indochina operation in a new light. Is accommodation with Hanoi possible so long as this force, secretly organized, remains active under the CIA aegis?

Branfman said the CIA exercises functional control of military operations in Laos and other Southeast

Asian countries outside of Vietnam. In Laos, he added, it is conducting "a campaign of terrorism" in Communist-held areas.

There was no immediate indication whether Congress will explore the matter further. The CIA seems to be one of the federal "untouchables."

But if Branfman's story is true—and there is no reason to doubt it—somebody better pin it down. The CIA may have acquired more power than it can safely administer.



STATINTL

# U.S. Involvement in Laos

## Losing Secrecy Curtain

STATINTL

By DONALD M. ROYBERG  
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON — Day by day and leak by leak, the secret war in Laos is becoming more and more difficult to hide.

Successive administrations, Democratic and Republican, have refused to discuss the extent of U.S. involvement in Laos — a small, landlocked and officially neutral country whose borders touch China, North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma.

The question is not whether the United States provides military and economic aid to the neutralist government of Laos, but whether Americans are actually engaged in fighting between forces supporting that government and Communist insurgents.

THE OFFICIAL response, as enunciated by President Nixon when asked during a Sept. 26, 1969, news conference about American involvement in the war, is: "There are no American combat forces in Laos."

Pressed by a Senate subcommittee on the same question, William H. Sullivan, a deputy assistant secretary of state and a former U.S. ambassador to Laos, replied the next month:

"Are there any people with military training in civilian clothes? There are people who have had military train-

ing and people who have had paramilitary training who are in civilian clothes. My definition of troops are people who are members of the armed forces of the United States of America. I assume that is what the senator had in mind."

A year later, an Associated Press dispatch from Saigon quoted a military source as saying casualties for U.S. Special Forces troops in Laos were 1 or 2 killed and 3 to 10 wounded each month.

Asked about the figures, a U.S. command spokesman in Saigon said, "There are no U.S. combat troops in Laos."

Slowly, over a long series of hearings, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has disclosed some of the U.S. involvement in Laos. Other information has come from such sources as the Pentagon papers, present and former government officials, and field dispatches.

### AMONG THE disclosures:

○ There are 4,800 Thai troops led by a Thai general and supported entirely by U.S. funds fighting in Laos despite an act of Congress prohibiting support of mercenaries in Laos.

○ Cambodian troops, trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, have been fighting in Laos. Forty Cambodians were killed and an undisclosed number wounded in recent heavy fighting for the Bolovens Plateau.

○ Current budget figures show the United States spending \$90 million for military and \$52 million for economic aid to Laos. The correct figure, congressional sources claim, is nearly \$500 million, most of which is channeled through the CIA.

○ Congressional sources estimate \$2 billion is being spent each year bombing that part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, principal Communist supply route from North to South Vietnam, that runs through Laos.

○ Since 1964, the United States also has conducted bombing raids in support of the Royal Laotian Army. While the number of sorties is classified, Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) has said "a handful" in 1964 increased a hundredfold in 1965, then nearly doubled again in 1966.

○ As of Jan. 27, 1971, according to the State Depart-

ment, there were 1,031 Americans in Laos, including 395 employes of the Agency for International Development, 244 with the military attaché's office, and 300 employed by Air America and Continental Air Services International, two air lines supported by the CIA.

○ Since 1961, the CIA has had an undisclosed number of agents working principally with Meo tribesmen in northern Laos and more recently with the Thai force.

When John F. Kennedy became president in 1961, Laos was the United States' most pressing problem in Southeast Asia.

In President Dwight D. Eisenhower's view "the fall of Laos to communism could mean the subsequent fall — like a tumbling row of dominoes — of its still-free neighbors, Cambodia, and South Vietnam and, in all probability, Thailand and Burma. Such a chain of events would open the way to Communist seizure of all of Southeast Asia."

EISENHOWER supported the pro-Western government of Premier Boun Oum. With Boun Oum's army taking a beating from the pro-Communist Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies, American advisers were sent into Laos to try to shore up the faltering Laotian Army.

Kennedy sought instead to defuse the situation through formation of a Laotian coalition government led by neutralist Souvanna Phouma.

# U.S. Financed Thais In Laos; Cambodian Unit Also Fought

## Laird Refuted

By GENE OISH

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington--The State Department has acknowledged that Thai "volunteers" fighting in Laos are being financed through the U.S. Military Assistance Program, contrary to assurances by Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, that the program was not used for that purpose.

The manner in which the Thai forces are financed was disclosed in a letter dated July 15 from the State Department to Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.), who charged the administration yesterday with "glaring inconsistency" in its accounts to Congress.

Mr. Case noted that he specifically asked Mr. Laird, when the secretary appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations committee June 14, whether the Military Assistance Program in Laos was used to finance regular or irregular Thai troops in that country.

According to transcripts of the hearing, Mr. Laird replied: "The Military Assistance Program will not fund that program . . . No, the Military Assistance Program is not used for that purpose and will not be used for that purpose."

In a letter to Senator Case, David M. Abshire, assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, said that "Thai volunteers" are operating in irregular guerrilla units under the command of the Laotian armed forces.

### "Semantically In Accord"

"Support for these irregulars is supplied under the Lao military aid program, which, as you know, is funded through the Department of Defense budget as 'Military Assistance, Service-Funded' (MASF)," the letter said, adding, "under current appropriations legislation, such funds can be used to support local forces in Laos."

Senator Case said that Secretary Laird's statement might be "semantically in accord" with the State Department letter, since technically the Military Assistance Program (now called International Security Assistance) is a different program from one called "Military Assistance Service-Funded."

The former is funded through the Foreign Assistance Act, while the latter is included in the Defense Department budget.

Senator Case's office also noted, however, that according to the original and unofficial transcripts of the hearing, Secretary Laird said flatly that "there is no program in our department which finances such a program" of Thai forces in Laos.

This remark was changed by the Defense Department, in the usual screening process, so that the official transcripts read: "There is no such program in our department's request for International Security Assistance."

The State Department letter represents another advance in effort led by Senator Case to obtain more information about the use of "Thai mercenaries" in Laos, who, Mr. Case still maintains, are being supported through the CIA.

The administration, in accordance with long standing policy, never has acknowledged CIA involvement. In June a State Department spokesman acknowledged the presence of "Thai volunteers" in Laos, but did not reveal how they were financed.

### "The U.S. . . . Is Paying"

In his statement yesterday, Mr. Case noted that he said in a speech last May he had learned from "government sources" there are 4,000 to 6,000 Thai troops in Laos and "the U.S. government, through CIA, is paying for them."

"I stand by that statement," he said yesterday, "and I am glad we now have a better idea of where the money is coming from."

Senator Case also repeated his charge that U.S. support for Thai troops in Laos violated the amendment attached to the Military Appropriations Act last year forbidding the use of Defense Department funds to support "Vietnamese or other free-world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia and Laos."

## CIA Deal

Phnom Penh, Cambodia (AP)—More than 40 Cambodian soldiers are said to have died fighting in Laos as the result of a bizarre deal involving the United States Central Intelligence Agency, Cambodia's premier, Lon Nol, and Prince Boun Oum, one time right-wing premier of Laos.

The Cambodian soldiers were part of a contingent sent to a secret camp to be trained by the CIA, reliable sources say. Instead of returning to Cambodia they were thrown into the recent battle for the Bolvens Plateau and engaged in some of the heaviest fighting.

Besides the 40 or more killed an unspecified number were wounded, the sources say. These losses, together with disagreements and wrangling on both sides, have ended the CIA training program for Cambodians, at least temporarily.

Despite official silence, the following story has been pieced together:

The Cambodians taken in hand by the CIA were originally trained to serve as members of spy teams to infiltrate into Cambodian provinces that are held by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces.

Use of Laos for training presumably enabled CIA operatives to circumvent the Cooper-Church amendment banning U.S. military advisers, training teams or combat soldiers from Cambodian soil.

### Used By Rebels

In addition, the CIA had an isolated ready-made training center at Kakorn Sim camp, about 25 miles north of Pakse. This was used as a jumping-off

point for raids into Cambodia by Khmer Serei rebels during the reign of the former head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk

Any deal involving southern Laos is impossible without the approval of Prince Boun Oum, whose word is law in government-held portions of the panhandle. The former Laotian premier is known to have flown to Phnom Penh last year when the training program was being established.

# CIA-Trained Cambodia Troops Killed in Laos

Secret Program Reportedly Suspended  
After Wrangling, 40 Deaths in Battle

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP)—More than 40 Cambodian soldiers have died fighting in Laos after being trained there by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in a secret camp, reliable sources say.


The Cambodians were thrown into the recent battle for the Bolovens Plateau and engaged in some of the heaviest fighting.

Besides the 40 or more killed, an unspecified number were wounded, the sources say. These losses, together with disagreements and wrangling on both sides, have ended the CIA training program for Cambodians, at least temporarily.

Official circles here are reluctant to discuss Cambodia's involvement in Laos. Such use of Cambodian troops challenges the much-violated 1962 Geneva agreements on neutrality for Laos. And hard-pressed Cambodia is not anxious to give an impression of having spare soldiers.

Despite official silence, the following story has been pieced together:

The Cambodians were originally trained by the CIA to serve as members of spy teams to infiltrate Cambodian provinces held by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces.



CIA CAMP — Map locates Nakorn Sin, identified as CIA camp for training Cambodians.  
Times map

Use of Laos for training presumably enabled CIA operatives to circumvent the Cooper-Church amendment banning U.S. military advisers, training teams or combat soldiers on Cambodian soil.

In addition, the CIA had a ready-made training center at Nakorn Sin camp, about 25 miles north of Pakse. The camp is almost entirely isolated with access by air. North Vietnamese units have tried to hit the camp with mortars but missed.

After the Bolovens battle, the Cambodians complained that they had been given the hardest fighting to do because they were thought to be better soldiers than the Lao. This action soured the Cambodians on the CIA program, informants say.

Disillusionment was not one-sided, however. The U.S. training team was reported to have been angered by lack of co-operation from the Cambodian co-ordinating officer, Lt. Col. [Name obscured].

NEW YORK, N.Y.  
POST

EVENING - 623,245  
WEEKEND - 354,797

JUL 29 1971

## The War That Isn't

Add another to the list of those who are tired of being lied to.

Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.) is shocked by "a glaring inconsistency" between fact and fiction in regard to Laos. In fiction, as dosed out last month to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Defense Secretary Laird, we aren't bankrolling Thai irregulars in Laos. In fact, we are—and indeed some 4000 to 6000 such troops, according to a letter Sen. Case has received from the State Dept. The money goes through the CIA, which is perhaps why it is learned about from the State Dept.

It is, says Sen. Case, the right of the public and of Congress to get the whole story of the secret war in Laos:

"After all, the U. S. taxpayer is financing activities in Laos to the tune of at least \$350 million annually, not to mention the estimated \$2 billion cost for the air war over that country. The North Vietnamese and their allies certainly know we are fighting them in Laos, so why can't the American people who are paying for it have the same information? . . .

"I would welcome an Administration White Paper which gives all the details on Laos: What it costs? Who is fighting? What agreements have been made with foreign governments; and of course most importantly, when will it all end?"

Amen.

# Case Assails U.S. Financing Of Thais in Laos

By Murrey Marder  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) charged yesterday that there is "glaring inconsistency" in the Nixon administration's explanations of U.S. financing of Thai troops in Laos.

Case said he believes that the administration is violating legislation which "forbids the use of Department of Defense money for funding foreign mercenaries in Laos."

The State and Defense departments disagreed. They said the 1970 legislation cited by Case would bar the transfer by Thailand of U.S.-supplied military assistance to another country. But in the case of Laos, the departments claimed, the legislation permitted the use of Defense Department funds for "Thai volunteers who are operating in irregular guerrilla units in Laos under the command of the Royal Lao Armed Forces."

Case recalled yesterday that he stated on May 20 that he had learned "from Government sources that there are four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. Government — through the CIA—is paying for them."

"I stand by that statement," Case said yesterday, and "I am glad we now have a better idea of where the money is coming from."

Case claimed that new information supplied to him "directly contradicts testimony given by Secretary of Defense [Melvin R.] Laird on June 14 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee."

State and Defense countered yesterday that there is "no inconsistency."

This was the latest in a series of disputes during the Indochina war in which congressmen expressed the belief that one avenue of funds had been blocked off, only to find that funds had been drawn from another category. In this case, the distinction drawn by the administration

was between the use of the regular overseas Military Assistance Program (MAP) and funds drawn from the Defense Department budget, called "Military Assistance, Service Funded" (MASF).

Case produced a letter yesterday from David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, dated July 15. It said:

"Support for these [Thai] irregulars is supplied under

the Lao military aid program which, as you know, is funded through the Department of Defense budget at 'Military Assistance, Service Funded' (MASF)."

Case contended that this statement conflicts with Laird's responses to his questions on June 14. He asked Laird then if the "Military Assistance Program" would be used "for regular or irregular Thai troops in Laos," or if that financing "comes from somewhere else." Laird replied, "That is correct. The Military Assistance Program will not fund that program." Laird later repeated the disclaimer.

Senate sources yesterday said that in another exchange, Case asked: "Would the funding for Thai troops in Laos fall under the international security program." Laird responded: "There is no program in our department which finances such a program." But in the transcript as amended by the Defense Department, these sources said, Laird's answer was changed to state: "There is no such program in our Department's request for international security assistance."

When asked for explanation of that change, a Defense Department spokesman yesterday said that the subject of Laird's public testimony was "the international security assistance program."

Laird's comments, "at that point in the lengthy hearings," the spokesman continued, "were in the context of MAP not MASF." It is "normal practice, the spokesman continued, for the Committee and the Department each to make their own corrections in "the unofficial draft transcript . . . for accuracy and clarity." Congress "is, of course, fully aware of the MASF program," said the spokesman, and Laird's remarks were "reviewed" to assure that they were "understood" in the proper context.

A State Department spokesman said that Congress, in 1966, set up the MASF program for use of Defense Department funds for Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.

Case said yesterday that "the fundamental issue remains of the public's and the Congress' right to know what is happening in the 'secret war' in Laos."

STATINTL

# U.S. Defends Funding of Thais in Laos

By GEORGE SHERMAN  
Star Staff Writer

The Nixon administration has denied charges by Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., that it has violated Congressional restrictions by financing Thai irregulars fighting in Laos.

State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray III said yesterday that these volunteers from Thailand, operating on their own under Laos command, do not fall under the amendment of Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., to the Defense Appropriation Act last year.

According to that amendment, Bray said, the U.S. government is prohibited from using any of the \$2.5 billion for Vietnam to support other "free world forces" aiding the local governments of Laos and Cambodia.

"We have taken the position in the executive branch," said Bray of the Fulbright amendment, "that these free world forces would be formally organized units provided by other governments and under the command of nationals of those governments."

## "Not Regular Forces"

Such is not the case for the Thai volunteers in Laos, Bray said. "They are not from the regular forces of Thailand, and they are under Lao command in Laos." Case had earlier estimated their number at between 4,000 and 6,000, but state department officials said that number is "slightly high."

Both Fulbright and Case insist that the amendment is intended to prevent the use of mercenaries.

Bray also denied Case's charge on the floor of the Senate yesterday that the funds to support these Thai volunteers come out of the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency. He stood behind a letter sent by the department to Case July 15—and released yesterday—that support goes through the Lao military program funded by the Defense Department.

But other officials admitted that the actual mechanics of transmitting the funds to the Thais, most of whom are fighting in North Laos around the Plain of Jars, may be worked out by the CIA—who advise the local Lao forces there.

Case's statement yesterday accused the administration of a "glaring inconsistency" in its position on "funding Thai troops

in Laos." He noted the contradiction between what the July 15 letter from the state department said and a statement by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird June 14, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Case quoted Laird as saying, in answer to a direct question by Case, that the senator was "correct" about funds for the volunteers coming from "somewhere else" — "The military assistance program will not fund that program," Laird said.

Yet the July 15 letter to Case stated that "support for these irregulars is supplied under the Lao military aid program which, as you know, is funding through the Department of Defense budget as 'Military Assistance, Service-Funded (MASF)'"

Bray said he could not explain the "confusion" over what Laird had told the Foreign Relations Committee. Both he and Case noted, however, that Laird's words were technically correct, since the name, "military assistance program" as such has been eliminated from Laos — as well as Thailand and South Vietnam.

In 1966 Congress bowed to the request of the Johnson administration and included military aid to those three countries in the regular Defense Department budget. So the "military assistance program" formerly controlled by the State Department in Laos has become the defense department's "Military Assistance, Service-Funded" program. Laird did not emphasize this point to the Foreign Relations Committee in assuring Case that no funding would go through the extinct "Military Assistance Program."

Case yesterday also asked that the administration provide a White Paper on all the details of Laos. He said the taxpayer has a right to know what is being done with the \$350 million a year the administration has admitted spending there. Bray said no such White Paper is being prepared. But administration officials said that much of the information may soon emerge in several transcripts of a Senate cleared for publication by the administration.

# Cambodian Losses

## Spike CIA Deal

By ROBBIN MANNOCK  
Associated Press Writer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — More than 40 Cambodian soldiers have died fighting in Laos as the result of a bizarre three-cornered deal involving the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Cambodia's premier Lon Nol and Prince Boun Oum, onetime right-wing premier of Laos.

The Cambodian soldiers were part of a contingent sent to a secret camp to be trained by the CIA, reliable sources say. Instead of returning to Cambodia they were thrown into the recent battle for the Bolovens Plateau and engaged in some of the heaviest fighting.

### At Least 40 Killed

Besides the 40 or more killed an unspecified number were wounded, the sources say. These losses, together with disagreements and wrangling on both sides, have ended the CIA training program for Cambodians, at least temporarily.

Official circles here are reluctant to discuss Cambodia's involvement in Laos. Such use of Cambodian troops challenges the much-violated 1962 Geneva agreements on neutrality for Laos. And hard pressed Cambodia is not anxious to give an impression of having spare soldiers.

### Details of Story

Despite official silence, the following story has been pieced together:

The Cambodians taken in hand by the CIA were originally trained to serve as members of spy teams to infiltrate into Cambodian provinces that are held by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces.

Use of Laos for training presumably enabled CIA operatives to circumvent the Cooper-Church amendment banning U.S. military advisers, training teams or combat soldiers from Cambodian soil.

In addition, the CIA had a

ready-made training center at Nakorn Sin camp, about 25 miles north of Pakse. This was used as a jumping-off point for raids into Cambodia by Khmer Serei rebels during the reign of the former head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Any deal involving southern Laos is impossible without the approval of Prince Boun Oum. The former Laotian premier is known to have flown to Phnom Penh last year when the training program was being established. Most of the dickering with Boun Oum was conducted by Cambodia's Premier Lon Nol.

Lao soldiers are also trained at Nakorn Sin, but 350 trained alongside the last batch of 450 Cambodians included some teen-agers whose reliability was questionable. A number of 12-year-olds are serving in the Lao ranks.

After the Bolovens battle the Cambodians complained that they had been given the hardest fighting to do because they were thought to be better soldiers than the Lao. This action soured the Cambodians on the CIA program, informants say.

The U.S. training team was also reported to have been angered by lack of cooperation from the Cambodian coordinating officer, Lt. Col. You Kim Heng.

The Americans were further annoyed that Cambodian trainees did not receive the monthly \$13 allowance earmarked for them. Soon after incurring American displeasure, Heng was arrested on a charge of smuggling opium. He is reliably reported to be awaiting trial.

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Approved For Release 2001/09/10 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600160001-1

Taking away nothing from the very remarkable men who founded these United States, we would like to point out that, along with the disappointments, a lot of improvements have been made since those Good Old Days.

Take 1789, the year George Washington became our first President:

The long, divisive war (opposed from the beginning by fully a third of the populace) had been miraculously won seven and a half years before.

Inflation and post-war depression had strained the public purse, temper and credibility.

After two years of debate, North Carolina and Rhode Island had yet to ratify the new Constitution and join the Union. More than thirty-five percent of all delegates at state ratifying conventions had, in fact, voted against the Constitution.

Even when ratified, what did the Constitution provide?

No guarantee of personal liberties, certainly. Our precious Bill of Rights would not be adopted until 1791—as a grudging compromise to the Nation's first protest movement, the Anti-Federalists, who feared unbridled government power.

No provision for religious freedom. In New Hampshire, Connecticut and Massachusetts separation of church and state was not to be achieved until well after 1809.

No solution to the agonizing slavery issue. It would take, seven decades later, history's bloodiest war and the loss of one out of five American men of military age to erase slavery from the land.

Nor was the right to vote guaranteed even to white males.

Every state had economic, religious or other restrictions on voting. In Rhode Island more than half of all adult white males would be disenfranchised until as late as 1843.

Women, of course, would not vote until 1920 and blacks in some parts of the country would be unable to exercise that right until a century after it was established in 1870.

Universal education, labor reforms, health laws—all were yet to rise out of nineteenth century humanitarian movements.

What the Constitution did provide was a beginning—a hard-won chance to build a Nation which, more than a century and a half later, laborer-philosopher Eric Hoffer would describe as "the only new thing in history."

The Revolution goes on. Sometimes peacefully, sometimes painfully.

And there is reason for confidence.

Ours is the first great nation, in the midst of unprecedented power and prosperity, to re-evaluate its own goals, question its own rightness and work from within to correct its injustices.

May we, as Marylanders, prove as equal to the task of doing the proper thing (if not always the most popular thing) as those first practical dreamers of the American Revolution.

Let's work together . . . Meeting the Baltimore Challenge.

### THE SOKOLS

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, on July 17, I had the honor of addressing the 25th National Set on the Slovak Catholic Sokol. At the convention, I was especially impressed by the sense of brotherhood of the Sokols and by their pride in both their ancestry and America. Since many of us are not familiar with the origin of Sokol organizations or of the particular character the organizations give to cities like Bethlehem, Pa., I ask unanimous consent that an article entitled "Bethlehem, Pa., Is Widely Known as a Sokol

City," published in the July 14 issue of the Falcon be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### BETHLEHEM, PA., IS WIDELY KNOWN AS A SOKOL CITY

Bethlehem, Pa., is truly called a Sokol City for the reason that it has two Sokol Halls and the members of both organizations live in peace, harmony and true brotherly Sokol love and spirit, as advocated by the Sokol founders.

Bethlehem, Pa., Slovak pioneers settled in this "Christmas City" 91 years ago. On June 29, 1971, we recalled the 80th anniversary of the ordination of their late great leader, Father Francis C. Vlossak, whose Centennial birthday we observed in 1964. Father Vlossak was a pioneer priest of Philadelphia archdiocese, out of which was created the Allentown diocese. He assisted the well known Msgr. William Heinen of Mauch Chunk, known as the "apostle of the Slovaks" in the Lehigh Valley on account of establishing some 14 Slovak parishes.

Now what is the Sokol? It means Falcon and the Slavonic nations adopted the name to honor their heroes, who are called Sokols. The Sokol movement dates back to the boyhood of St. Methodius, who with his brother St. Cyril converted the Slovaks and the Slavs in the ninth century. It is related that St. Methodius as a boy was attached to a bird Falcon and practiced falconry, which was a popular sport among the European aristocracy.

The Slavonic poets and bards wrote about their heroes, whom they called Sokols.

But the movement was organized on February 16, 1862 in Prague, present Czechoslovakia by Dr. Miroslav Tyrš and his father-in-law Jindrich or Frederick Fugner for the purpose of Physical Fitness and training of members in virtues of life, also in perseverance to overcome the hardships of tyrannical governments, under which the Slavonic nations were forced to serve their oppressors.

The Sokols were known especially for their artistic banners, which were blessed by priests and beautiful ceremonies. These banners were preserved and used in World War I, when the Czechoslovak Legions were organized in Russia by General Milan R. Stefanik, noted Slovak astronomer and scientist. General Stefanik was a Slovak and became a general in a French army within three years from an ordinary private. He served on General John J. Pershing's Allied Military Staff and visited the United States on several occasions. The first time in 1906 on his way to the Tahiti Island and the second time in 1917, when he was organizing Czechoslovak Legions with a Military Camp in Stamford, Conn.

General Stefanik wanted the Sokol (Falcon) to be the emblem of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and the highest decoration. Instead a lion was chosen.

A famous historian, Dr. Frantisek Rieger, exalted the Sokols over a century ago during one of their celebrations by naming them the Christian Knights of that period, who must always be ready to defend their faith.

The American Sokol took root after the Civil war in St. Louis, Mo., in 1865 and thus, in 1965 its Centennial was observed. It would have been started earlier but its leaders were occupied with the Civil War, aiding President Abraham Lincoln. For instance, on February 4, 1861, Colonel Geza Mihalotzy, born of Slovak parentage, petitioned President Lincoln for a permission to use his name for "Lincoln Riflemen of Slavonic Origin." The great emancipator "cheerfully granted the request."

However, after the Civil War, Sokol organizations began to flourish besides St. Louis, also in Chicago, New York, Iowa, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and other states.

It is noteworthy that during the Bicentennial of the city of St. Louis, former President Lyndon B. Johnson chose Stan Musial, noted baseball player, for his advisor on Physical Fitness for Musial, a son of a Polish father and a Slovak mother, born in Donora, Pa., received his first Physical Fitness training in the Polish Sokols, or Falcons.

The Bethlehem Slovaks were also sports minded. The best proof is that way back in 1904 the young Bethlehem Slovaks organized the St. Anthony's Baseball Team. This team won 24 out of 26 games during that season under the captaincy of Charles Gostony, as reported way back in 1921 by John J. Bartos, one of the four living Sokol founders of Assembly 78 and our oldest Supreme Officer who were honored on December 5, 1970. During the same year the young Slovaks formed a football team. In 1908 they formed an Athletic Association of St. Anthony Juniors. In 1909 they formed the Athletic "Thomas" Club and a year later Assembly 78, was founded which was awarded many champion trophies by the Slovak Catholic Sokol organization.

The Bethlehem Sokols mindful of their duty for God and Nation, when World War I broke out, volunteered for the service in defense of their country. The records show that on June 9, 1917, first nine Slovak volunteered for the service of Uncle Sam. There were 93 Bethlehem Slovaks in the U.S. Army and 16 in U.S. Navy during World War I. George Silvay and John Nemcik paid the supreme sacrifice. The World War II gave a record number of young men and women to the service of their country and also during the Korean conflict and the present War in Vietnam.

And the Sokol organizations trained these men to be brave soldiers and loyal to their great country—the beloved U.S.A. Zdar Boh!

Your Editor,

JOHN C. SCHANKA.

#### DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROVIDING "SUPPORT" TO THAI TROOPS IN LAOS

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, it is more in sorrow than in anger that I report a glaring inconsistency in the administration position on the funding of Thai troops in Laos.

On July 15 I received an unclassified letter from the State Department which says that support for Thai "irregular" troops in Laos is being supplied under our military aid program for Laos.

This admission directly contradicts testimony given by Secretary of Defense Laird on June 14 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I believe it also violates the Fulbright amendment which forbids the use of Department of Defense money for funding foreign mercenaries in Laos.

During the June 14 hearing I asked Secretary Laird:

The military assistance program won't take care of the moneys being spent for regular or irregular Thai troops in Laos; that comes from somewhere else.

He replied:

That is correct. The military assistance program will not fund that program.

I continued:

In other words, you are not going to use military assistance or military credit sales in the future for mercenaries or other third-country military forces. This is not done now and you do not propose to do it in the future out of military assistance programs?



CHARLOTTE, N.C.  
OBSERVER

JUL 28 1970

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S - 204,225

CHARGES MADE

## CIA Built Own Asian Armies, Hearing Told

By SAUL FRIEDMAN  
Observer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—The Central Intelligence Agency has built clandestine armies numbering 100,000 in Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia, an expert on Southeast Asia told a congressional panel Tuesday.

"It's the CIA's foreign legion," said Fred Branfman, a former member of the International Volunteer Services and a free-lance reporter in Laos.

The armies, controlled and paid for by the CIA, Branfman said, include native tribesmen, Thais, Nationalist Chinese and other Asians. Their job is to harass the population and troops in Communist-controlled areas of Indochina, except North Vietnam. Presumably they would continue their fighting with American supplies and money after American forces are withdrawn, he said.

Branfman's charges were

the closest thing to hard news, at the opening of a three-day seminar on the Pentagon Papers, sponsored by 17 members of Congress. The generally repetitive discussion showed that the leak of the Pentagon Papers themselves is a difficult act to follow.

Branfman, talking about the CIA's role in Southeast Asia, said it "exercises functional control of military operations in Laos" and other Southeast Asian countries outside of Vietnam. In Laos it is conducting a campaign of "terrorism" in Communist-held areas.

Ngo Vinh Long, a South Vietnamese now studying at Harvard, said the Pentagon Papers disclose that American war planners had no understanding of the Vietnamese people, their aspirations, problems and nationalism.

"For them the Vietnamese didn't exist except as Communists or anti-Communists," he said.

# Author Says Very Few Read Pentagon Papers

'Time and Effort Spent Was 'Ludicrous,'  
Professor Tells Capital Panel Discussion

BY THOMAS J. FOLEY

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — An author of The Pentagon Papers said Tuesday it was "ludicrous" to have spent so much time and effort studying U.S.-Vietnam policy decisions when so few of the policy-makers ever read the 47-volume document.

Dr. Melvin Gurtov, formerly employed by the Rand Corp. and now a professor at UC Riverside, made the remark at the opening session of a three-day panel discussion, sponsored by 17 congressmen, on the significance of the still-classified papers.

Gurtov said that, as far as he knew, former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, who ordered the study, was not one of the very few who looked at any of the 7,000-page study, which covered 23 years of U.S. relations with Vietnam. Nor does he believe McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, ever read it, Gurtov said.

The Southeast Asia expert, who said he studied the 1945-1954 period, said he already was against U.S. participation in the war when he came to Washington in 1967 to help write the document.

"The Pentagon Paper experience just reinforced my position on the war," Gurtov said.

## People an Issue

Anthony J. Russo, a former Rand employe now appealing a contempt of court citation for refusing to answer grand jury questions about the document's release, said one of the most important issues not treated in the Pentagon papers was the Vietnam war's effect on the people themselves.

Russo said that by his own "very conservative estimates," the United States had been responsible for the death of from 500,000 to 1 million persons in Vietnam.

Three of the four Vietnamese on the panel urged Congress to set a date for withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the country.

They were Tran Van Dinh, deputy ambassador to the United States during the administration of President Ngo Dinh Diem; David Truong, son of the candidate who ran against President Nguyen Van Thieu in the 1967 election in South Vietnam; and Ngo Vinh Long, a Vietnamese scholar.

## Saigon Collapse Seen

The fourth, Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi, urged U.S. withdrawal. He also conceded that the Saigon government would collapse when the United States left.

Much of the discussion centered on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly in Laos.

Fred Branfman, a correspondent for Dispatch News Service who was ordered out of Laos for reporting on Laotian refugees from bombings, said the CIA pays 100,000 Asians now fighting in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Prof. Noam Chomsky, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has written several books on Vietnam, answered the formal question posed by Rep. John Dow (D-N.Y.), chairman of the congressional group:

"What's wrong with the system itself but blamed (the absolute failure to make it work.)"

Chomsky said he saw nothing wrong with the system itself but blamed "the absolute failure to make it work."

Branfman disagreed, declaring that the problem was with the system. He said that proliferating technology since the end of World War II has concentrated too much power in the Executive branch of government.

STATINTL

# CIA Has Secret Army Of 100,000, Panel Told

STATINTL

By SAUL FRIEDMAN  
Herald Washington Bureau


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BRANFMAN'S charges were the closest thing to hard news at the opening of a three-day seminar on the Pentagon papers, sponsored by 17 members of Congress. The generally repetitive discussion showed that the leak of the Pentagon papers themselves is a difficult act to follow.

Rep. John Dow (D., N.Y.), chairman of the three-day event, said that Daniel Ellsberg would join the group today. Ellsberg, one of the authors of the 47-volume study, has acknowledged passing portions of the docu-



Rep. Dow  
... heads panel

ment to the press, for which he has been indicted by a federal grand jury.

Only one author of the Pentagon papers, Melvin Gurtov of Santa Monica, appeared at the conference Tuesday. But he added little to what is already known.

GURTOV, WHO last month was forced to resign as a researcher at the Rand Corp. because of his anti-war sentiment and his association with Ellsberg, told the panel that almost no one in government had read the Pentagon papers, including the man who commissioned them, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, until they were published in the press.

He noted, in response to a question, that the Pentagon study shows the intelligence analysts of the CIA, but not the field operatives, "in a good light."

The CIA analysts, he said,

questioned basic assumptions, like the theory that if Vietnam fell to the Communists the rest of Southeast Asia would fall like dominoes. They also criticized the effectiveness of American bombing, Gurtov said.

"But when their reports, like others, challenged basic assumptions," Gurtov said, "they were ignored."

Branfman, talking about the CIA's role in Southeast Asia, said it "exercises functional control of military operations in Laos" and other Southeast Asian countries outside of Vietnam. In Laos it is conducting a campaign of "terrorism" in Communist held areas.

NGO VINH Long, a South Vietnamese now studying at Harvard, said the Pentagon papers disclose that American war planners had no understanding of the Vietnamese people, their aspirations, problems, and nationalism.

"For them the Vietnamese didn't exist except as Communists or anti-Communists," he said.

And he suggested that administrative overtures to mainland China in hopes it would help impose a settlement of the war on North Vietnam indicates that the United States still does not understand that any settlement "must come with the Vietnamese people," by which he meant the Communists and the Saigon regime.

Tran Van Dinh, former South Vietnamese ambassa-

dor to the United States, traced American involvement in his country from May 1854, when Marines landed there to free an imprisoned French missionary.

"I DON'T plead for Americans to understand the Vietnamese," he said. "Americans should understand America first. In 1945, when we thought we won our independence by defeating the Japanese, we believed in this country and that it would help us. Ho Chi Minh had faith in America. But we didn't understand about your Indian wars, and the suppression of the revolts in the Philippines.

"In the past years we have been trying to find out what America is all about, and so far we don't know."

Others at the conference included Anthony Russo, a former Rand employe now facing contempt charges for refusing to testify about the leak of the Pentagon papers; Noam Chomsky, a linguist whose books on American policies helped convert Ellsberg, and David Truong, whose father ran second in the South Vietnamese presidential elections in 1967 and subsequently was imprisoned.

# At Thai-Burmese Border, Opium Eases

STATINTL

## Way for Petty Smugglers

By HENRY KAHN  
Special to The New York Times

TACHILEK, Burma, July 23—The border officer strolled at the happy click-clack as two wooden balls, dangling on the ends of a string he held, knocked against each other.

Meanwhile, the unofficial border traffic and smuggling continued to flow steadily across the bridge on the Maesai River between this town and Maesai in Thailand. Burmese and Thai officers guard the border with a tolerant eye and a gentle hand. The customs and border officials in this area of impenetrable jungle but porous borders shrug off the petty smuggling across the bridge without doubt because they know the truth around them: proceed one of the world's largest smuggling operations, and they know they are powerless against it. So why not let the little smugglers go?

### Tribesmen Grow the Poppy

On the mountainsides all around—in Burma, Thailand and Laos—primitive hill people of many tribes grow the poppies that produce about one half the world's illegal opium. Less primitive people buy it, process it and start it on its way toward the consumer.

The Central Intelligence Agency study that provided this estimate also concluded that Tachilek was probably the most important transshipment point in the area.

Tachilek is also, the C.I.A. reported, the center for 14 of the 21 known opium refineries in the tri-border area.

Knowledgeable sources in the provincial capital of Chiangrai and in Maesai said that in the last 18 months significant quantities of 96-per-cent-pure, white No. 4 heroin had become available to local addicts used to smoking the less potent purple heroin.

The observation lends credence to reports that the mounting demand for No. 4—regarded in Asia as a luxury for the Western market only—among American soldiers in Vietnam had prompted opium traders to do the refining closer to the market.

### A Few Low Shacks

But the Thais said the only generally known aspect of the illicit trade, beside the fact that it goes on, was a few low shacks in Tachilek, just below the Burmese Army barracks. There Thai-



The New York Times July 23, 1971

and Burmese addicts meet to smoke their pipes.

This is a fair international exchange, they said, because many people from Burma cross daily to visit the Maesai brothel. There are no opium dens in Maesai, the Thais said hopefully, and no brothels in Tachilek.

Those with yellow or brown faces cross the border bridge with a nonchalance that is particularly surprising because Burma stringently limits access to foreigners, even tourists. But a pale outsider appearing unexpectedly on this side of the river was allowed no further than the control post. There officers apologetically drew the line and let only a Thai companion pass without asking for his papers.

He returned with two tightly furled umbrellas in the elegant style favored by British guards officers, acquired on the market place for 42 Thai baht (\$2.10) each.

### Goods Are Japanese

The Burmese customs man, offering no objection, assessing the smuggled goods with an expert customs man's eye

as Japanese merchandise smuggled into Burma from Laos, across a border that is officially closed.

Burmese border officials are fully aware of the opium traffic—in fact, one said, "some Thais come to smoke it right here in front of us"—but they said the opium crossed the border upstream and downstream from here. Except for now, at the height of the monsoon rains, the river is shallow enough to be forded on foot in many places.

The Burmese regime exercises even less control than the Thai and Laotian governments over these mountains, covered in the richest and deepest greens. Their populations consist of remote hill tribes and mutually antagonistic bands of rebels of various persuasions, bandits and opium smugglers.

The small Burmese military garrison and handful of officials control little more than the town. They are linked to Rangoon and the rest of Burma only by air, and duty here is not desirable for men from Rangoon or Mandalay.

"You can take the road," one said, "but sometimes they cross it, and if you're there you've had it."

"They" are the Shan State rebels, who are fighting in the jungle and sometimes in the towns to separate this vast state and its ethnic group from the Union of Burma.

But no one interferes with the comings and goings across the bridge. No one is fished, and the last opium seizure occurred many months ago. "I think it was August," an official said.

Hill tribesmen, in homespun black shirts and lion-cloths, carry charcoal across for sale in Thailand, where the people are poor but less poor than in Burma. They return with meager food supplies, mainly vegetables.

Burmese cross into Thailand to buy shoes and textiles and other small consumer items unavailable in Burma. Most pay in baht acquired through the illegal sales of Burmese rubies, sapphires and other gems.

The Burmese kyat is a currency worthless outside Burma and is not acceptable in Thailand.

Thais and Chinese merchants from Maesai, and villages nearby come to Tachilek to buy for resale small quantities of Western luxuries smuggled from Laos. Cigarettes and whisky are the main item in the illicit duty-free shops.

A carton of Lucky Strikes sells here for 70 baht (\$3.50) after having been transported from the East Coast by ship to Bangkok, by truck to Vientiane, by plane to Ban Houei Sai near the Laotian-Burmese border, smuggled across by boat and carried here by mule over about 100 miles of mountain jungle.

# With Vientiane Students and Intellectuals

"MY views on the current situation? Is it rather hard to say. I don't like to speak about politics in the sense the Vientiane administration understands it. Of course, I have my own point of view. By the way, dear Thoong Phan, do you know what happened to Mr Ph's niece? I'll tell you her whole story. He is a well-known and highly esteemed Lao intellectual. At that time, Phoumi Nosavan was the strongman in Laos and Police General Siho, a protégé of the CIA, was his right hand. One day Siho came and saw the Phs.

"I'm told you have a niece," he said, "a slip of a girl about 16 or 17 who is now at Vientiane High School. Her parents are dead and you are her guardians. So I ask you for her hand."

"But... you have already two legitimate wives! My niece hasn't come of age."

"Well, you've been warned," Siho said with an equivocal smile. "If you don't give her to me, I'll 'borrow' her by force?"

"That very evening, the girl did not come home as usual. The Phs were well aware of what had happened to their ward. But how could they help it! So they resigned themselves to their misfortune."

"Two weeks later, a police car stopped in front of their house. A young girl stepped out and staggered in, livid and exhausted. They recognized their niece."

"She handed them a paper, then burst into sobs. The letter contained but this line: 'I am returning to you what I borrowed. And probably with a small profit!'"

"Since that day, Mr Ph's attitude towards the Americans and all Vientiane 'strongmen' has changed completely. It was a personal drama for him, but he let everybody know it..."

"But my dear I has nothing to do with my

question on the political situation in Vientiane?"

"My dear Thoong Phan, I don't know whether there is any link between the two things. I only know that once, I was told by some people from the US Embassy: 'You're an intellectual and a high official. But a mere technocrat! You should have a try at politics... First, try to get elected to the National Assembly, this will make you a vice-minister or even a minister... What do you say to it, you'll be given a leg up by the US Embassy.'"

"The Yankee drew out a cheque-book: 'You're certainly aware of a few deputies' intention to set up a group of nationalist intellectuals. Join them. This 200-dollar cheque will defray the expenses you may incur because of your new acquaintances. Of course, other will follow suit...'"

"He looked at me smiling and-poising his fountain-pen. But the fellow was grossly mistaken about me. I immediately brought him to his senses."

"'Excuse me', I told him. 'You're going a bit too far. I don't like politics and am not inclined to meddle with it.'"

"The Yankee was astonished. His face fell."

"'What? You are not willing?' He shoved his book into his briefcase and added, 'I say, don't you want nationalism, eh? Which doctrine are you for? Neutrality...or...?'"

"On the doorstep, he turned round: 'Give it another thought, will you... you'll reply me later.'"

"But there was no 'later.' When they failed to 'marry' me the CIA men simply borrowed my director's job..."

"The niece of Mr Ph," Mr L. went on with a smile, "was unfortunately 'borrowed' for two weeks by a Vientiane strongman. As which was 'borrowed' by

the CIA agents! I am realizing more and more that it was for me a blessing in disguise after all..."

Planes were roaring past in the sky.

"No! The Lao territory and people are not things to be 'borrowed' and trodden down with impunity by the Yankees!" he said in anger.

"GOOD morning, Dr Khamlit, good morning Mr Director."

"Good morning, Thoong Phan! Such forms of address make me look old! Besides, I've not yet defended my Ph. D. thesis. Call me simply Khamlit. By the way, forget about my directorship. I've just resigned."

"What? I thought your high position made it possible for you to have connections with big shots and fly always higher..."

"Enough of your scoffing! I am but a wax-winged crow. And I'm plunging into the precipice for having come too near the sun..."

"Truly, I don't get you..."

"You know, I gave up my study and came back to the country in high spirits. The 1962 Geneva

Agreements had just been concluded, Laos became a neutral nation, and Vientiane, the capital of an independent country! At least I thought so. I intended to put my youth at the service of my Fatherland. So I came back home and accepted the position of director... Well, let's pass over it. What have I seen during all these years?"

"I've witnessed the daily merry-go-round of officials of the US Embassy in my boss's office. They've dictated him the answers to most varied problems. The budget, expenditures, incomes, etc., all is seen in detail by USAID advisors. Only a blank is left for the signature of the 'Lao royal

BBC... news bulletins. Should military campaigns be scheduled against the Pathet Lao in the dry season or rainy one, there are US advisors to work them out for you. Generals Kouprasit, Udon Sananikone and Oua Rattikoun are busy with gambling dens, drug traffic, and erecting buildings for the Americans. In the long run, I've become clear about all this. There is a limit to my patience. One day, as the US Airforce actions were being stepped up, I asked my boss: 'Well, boss, Washington, Saigon and Bangkok are treating our country as a preserve of theirs, aren't they? Here they are pouring bombs at random and stationing troops everywhere without notice.'

"'Beg your pardon?' he stared at me with a look of dismay. Until then he had been thinking of me as a 'director' who carried out his instructions to the letter without grumbling. Never had he expected a rebellion of my conscience. He gave a start as if a sudden thought occurred to him."

"'That's enough! I've got it,' he exclaimed. 'No more of your innuendoes. When I became a statesman, you were but a snivelling. What a rotten lot, all these students! All Reds, or fellow-travellers!'"

"I could no longer control myself."

"I am neither red nor pink, Sir," I said. "I only know that Laos is an independent country, Lao affairs should be settled between Lao. You're perfectly aware that in Vientiane the Americans can come through the front or back doors into all minis-

continued

tries. Where is our sovereignty, our legislation

are now Excellencies in the government. It is your charge.

You want to call down your wrath. Never mind, you can do it

"My boss was mad with rage! 'Stop your cackle! It is fortunate that you have not donned your lawyer's gown! To hell with all your laws! If you want to keep your position as a director, you have to abide by only one law: do what you are told to. You're a civil servant and nor a politician, do you understand?"

some paper or ink, it won't be turned down; but no money, please!"

quite well while in the government. I'm doing it myself and so are many others!"

"I only understood it too well. So I handed in my resignation."

Boun Leut gave a broad smile.

"Thank you for your advice, Mr Deputy. Your secret curses are not at all getting in their hair. Every day, they seize you by the wrist to make you sign heaps of statements. Willy nilly you're one of their 'boys,' a yesman of theirs..."

"GOOD morning, Boun Leut! What are you doing bare backed on a Sunday? You're mimeographing something, I suppose. May I see... Is it a leaflet for the Vientiane government?"

"We are now working on issue No. 10," he said. "Plenty of anti-US stuff! Moreover, there won't be any end of anti-US topics!"

"Shut up, Boun Leut! I don't want to discuss politics with you. I've come to see you. Here, take these 5,000 kips as a contribution to our magazine."

"I'm not good enough for that, you know! The USIS is looking after it! I am simply preparing for my Ph.D. in political economy!"

He paused and all of a sudden asked me: "Can you guess who is supplying us with most informative, most searing anti-US subjects?" and burst into laughter: "You never can, my dear! It is our very old schoolmates now vice-ministers... or even our University seniors now ministers. Officially, they are chinning in with the Americans, but do not spare them in private. Do you know how they call the US ambassador? Instead of 'our boss' many of them say 'our boot'. But the latter does not care a fig! He refers to all the big brasses in the Lao administration and army as 'our boys'."

"I don't want your money. You know that our paper refuses to take any subsidies wherever they may come from! If you offer paper, ink and stencils... I won't say no!"

He put on his shirt laughing and shook my hand, put his papers in order then handed me a 30-page copy. On the first page I read under the word Appeal the following mention: "A group of young intellectuals for neutrality, independence and peace."

He cast a glance at his shabby lodgings on the same floor and called my attention to it:

"Yes, but... If I give money, I just help an old friend and I can easily clear myself from accusations. Presents in kind are a bit compromising. So you're asking for an impossible thing."

"A newspaper? or a magazine, weekly or monthly?" I asked.

"Not long ago, one of our ex-fellow-students, deputy N., paid a visit to me. When he saw me, he burst out into curses: 'Damned with this shaky staircase like my seat in the National Assembly! Look here, Boun Leut... (he pointed downstairs), you've bought yourself a Honda, haven't you? By Buddha, our monk is rolling in money! Tell us your secret, maybe you have accepted a job from the Americans?'"

"As you please... Tell me now the latest ones in Vientiane!"

"Call it as you please. But just take a look at this article dealing with the plight of our functionaries battling with the soaring cost of living or this one on young employees yearning for the building of a neutral, independent and peaceful Laos or on US war activities in Laos, as well as other columns. Call it a magazine if you like. A review without regular dates of issue. Now weekly, now monthly, depending on our means and articles, on the supply of paper, ink, time to stencil and roneo the copies."

"You're raving my boy, sorry, Mr Deputy, the ex-student of political economy in France has simply become a Honda agent in Vientiane. This new motorcycle has been put at my disposal on my trips. The returns just help me rub on along and I am a bachelor... I spend my day time canvassing houses and my evenings preparing this magazine."

"Certainly. Unbelievable, disgusting stories which make your gorge rise. Take your pen...!"

"Who is the manager and chief editor?"

"Serves you well! How many times did I offer to get you a job in a ministry? You'll start as a department head and rise higher afterwards as assistant director or even director. You'll ride in a car and get married!"

"You know that except for a few black sheep, most Lao intellectuals, students and functionaries in Vientiane as well as in other towns are harbouring a bitter hatred for the Americans," Boun Leut continued. "They hold in contempt the rightist ultras, demand the application of the 1962 Geneva Agreements and the respect of Laos' neutrality and independence. We are doing our jobs most enthusiastically!"

"There is no manager! You know how we are about it... A group of ex-students gets together, one brings along some paper, another a typewriter or a mimeograph. My places become a 'printing house'. We share between ourselves all the editing, typewriting, printing work. Everyone's leisure time is devoted to it. Printed copies will circulate from hand to hand or be sent to intellectuals and old schoolmates, many of whom

I picked up a copy of the Appeal, while gazing at the Roneo: "You are fighting in difficult conditions. How is it that you're always smiling?"

Boun Leut's voice grew warmer: "I have many friends, former students like me, who are more deeply involved in the struggle than I... Let them know that Boun Leut, though he is living in Vientiane, is not too unworthy of them. Do you see, Thoong Phan..., our Fatherland is so attractive, so lovable. No, the Lao people do not reconcile themselves to being ground down by US boots."

Thoong Phan (Lao journalist)

29 JUL 1971

STATINTL

# U.S. Pledging Aid, Pushes Laos To Enact 1st Anti-Drug Law

BY MICHAEL PARKS  
Sun Staff Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—Under strong American pressure, Laos is about to enact its first drug-control law, and the United States has promised to provide advisers and money to help the Lao police enforce it.

The proposed law, which is awaiting final action by a reluctant National Assembly, for the first time would limit the cultivation and use of opium, once the basic source of income for the hill tribes of northern Laos. Marijuana Excluded

It also would completely outlaw the sale, processing and transportation of opium, heroin and related drugs. Marijuana, which is as plentiful and as easily obtained as tobacco here, is not included under the law since the Lao use it for cooking.

Although police are compiling lists of the dozens of opium dens to be closed and hundreds of drug addicts to be arrested, the law is intended principally to check the heavy flow of raw opium through the "Golden Triangle" where Burma, Laos and Thailand meet.

"Laos is probably the busiest single drug corridor in Asia now," said an American official.

"What opium is still grown here does not cause much of a problem, and the Lao users are not a big concern either.

"Major Thorengbana"

"But Laos is a major thoroughfare in world drug traffic, and the amount of opium refined down to a morphine base and heroin is also very large. Laos funnels drugs to Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Hong Kong."

A European intelligence agent, who investigated drug traffic here for his government estimated that virtually every civil-

ian airline flight out of Vientiane carries contraband drugs and that a fourth to a third of the thousands of military flights, aside from bombing runs, carry drugs.

"It is going to take a lot more than a fairly mild law to stop this drug traffic, especially when it is the Army that is a principal mover," the agent said.

CIA Licensed

Two U.S. congressional investigators charged last spring that until recently the American Central Intelligence Agency had allowed its planes to be used by Lao officials transporting opium, morphine and heroin.

They accused the Lao Army commander, who is retiring, of being the top figure in the complex drug-running-and-refining operation. The processed heroin, carefully guarded through its journey by Lao soldiers, eventually was smuggled into South Vietnam for sale to American soldiers.

American officials in Laos have put up with the drug traffic over the years, the congressional report suggested, to win support in the fight against the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao and preserve political peace in the embattled kingdom.

American officials, now worried about enforcing the law once it is enacted, say they have won firm commitment of support from the premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, the King and other high-ranking Laotians, who are mindful of their country's virtually total dependence on U.S. aid.

To help enforce the law, American officials here have requested that Washington assign a drug coordinator to the embassy. "He should be here within a matter of days, we hope," a

senior embassy official said.

"Once he arrives, we expect he will be setting up a program to help the Lao national police enforce the law. The Lao have asked for advisers and we have promised to supply them. But details of the program are still to be worked out."

Tighter Controls

The initial effort, according to American officials, will be to tighten customs inspections of cargoes on domestic and international air flights and to establish controls over military flights.

American officials also hope to end the use of the northern Laotian town of Ban Houei Sai as a major opium transshipment point. It has been a center for refining raw opium to a morphine base and, recently, the site of a major laboratory turning morphine into heroin.

The proposed law would permit persons over 40 years of age to continue growing opium if they get a government license. But much of the land used in opium cultivation is under control of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese—who burn the opium crops out of moral strictness—and the growers, mostly Miao tribesmen, have been moved as refugees to lowlands, where the opium poppy does not grow well.

"We have no illusions that as soon as we get a law the flow of drugs is going to dry up," said a senior U.S. diplomat, "but with no law there is nothing that can be legally done."

In addition to advisers, the United States is prepared to provide financial aid, technical assistance (such as laboratory analysis) and help in establishing a rehabilitation program for Laos's own opium smokers and other drug users.

W. PALM BEACH, FLA.  
TIMES JUL 24 1972  
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POST-TIMES  
S - 69,302

## Legislation Needed

New legislative safeguards offer the only hope for putting reins on the secret wars and intrigues foisted on U.S. citizens under the guise of "national defense" and "public interest."

Pending in the Senate are three bills to put strings on the super-secret funds and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Kentucky Republican Sen. John Sherman Cooper proposed a bill which would require the CIA to make available to Congress the "same intelligence conclusions, facts and analyses that are now available to the executive branch."

Another Republican, Sen. Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, authored a bill limiting commitment of troops, funds and military equipment to Laos and other areas. Sen. Case said he sees the need "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

The third bill, introduced by Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.), would require an accounting of CIA funds and prohibit concealment of the spy agency funds in appropriations for other agencies.

Future of the three Senate bills can only be guessed. But in the House, five resolutions on similar issues went down the drain in rapid-fire order. One was authored by Rep. Paul N. McCloskey (R-Calif.) who argued that the Congress has a right to be told "the entire truth" about Laotian operations. In contrast, the Foreign Affairs Committee argued that telling the truth about Laos "would not be compatible with the public interest" and the resolution was defeated on the floor of the House along with three similar resolutions.

Admittedly, some phases of government operation directly related to national defense appropriately belong in highly restricted classifications. The Laotian situation, however, and concealment of accurate figures on CIA funding illustrate the deliberately deceptive techniques frustrating efforts to learn the extent of U.S. entanglements in Indochina.

It is a cliché — and a none-too-accurate one — to observe that survival of a democracy depends on an informed electorate. Certainly, survival demands an informed Congress. The pending Senate bills — and perhaps more — are clearly called for and merit wide support.

STATINTL



# U.S. mum on peace as war intensifies

Daily World Cambodian Services

A massive step-up in U.S. military operations in Indochina appeared to be underway as the Paris peace talks went into their 122nd session on Thursday with still no U.S. reply to the Vietnamese patriots' seven-point peace plan of July 1.

In Saigon, the U.S. command announced on Thursday that the American military was drawing up new, tough regulations restricting newsmen's coverage of the war, because of what the U.S. command claimed was "premature disclosure" of a new U.S.-Saigon puppet invasion of Cambodia. The invasion began three days ago, when the U.S. airlifted at least 5,000 Saigon puppet troops into the area just east of Snuol, near the South Vietnamese border.

## New bombing raids

In Laos, the Kaosan Pathet Lao News Agency reported heavy and continuous bombing raids on northern Laos by U.S. B-52 jet bombers, on densely-populated districts north of the Plain of Jars.

The KPLNA also said that in the past two weeks, since the beginning of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's attack on the Plain of Jars, American aircraft have sprayed poisonous chemicals over the entire area north and east of the strategically-located plains. "Many civilians fell victim to this barbaric action, large numbers of cattle have died and crops and orchards have been devastated," the news agency said.

The U.S. command admitted in Saigon on Thursday that B-52's were carrying out heavy raids just south of the Demilitarized Zone in South Vietnam, covering South Vietnam's two northernmost provinces. These B-52 bombardments have been increasing in intensity for the past week.

In Paris, neither of the two Vietnamese patriotic delegations made reference to President Richard Nixon's proposed trip to China in Thursday's session of the peace talks.

Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revo-

lutionary Government of South Vietnam, said on Thursday: "While refusing to reply to our July 1 proposals, the Nixon administration is intensifying the war, stepping up its operations not only in Vietnam, but also in Laos and Cambodia."

## Set the date

Both Mrs. Binh and Democratic Republic of Vietnam chief delegate Xuan Thuy insisted that the U.S. must set a fixed date for withdrawal of all its forces from South Vietnam and cease supporting Saigon puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu, in order to arrive at a just peace settlement in Vietnam.

In the DRV capital of Hanoi on Thursday, Le Duan, First Secretary of the Vietnam Workers' Party, spoke to a military cadres conference and praised the aid of all the socialist countries to the DRV.

Le Duan said: "The Nixon administration is doing its utmost to fool public opinion, while continuing its war gamble in Indochina. But the 'Nixon Doctrine' and the 'Vietnamization' plan are suffering a complete fiasco."

The DRV Foreign Ministry, on

the 17th anniversary of the signing of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina (July 20), issued a statement emphasizing that "the world front of peoples supporting Vietnam against the American aggressors is strengthening and widening from day to day. Notwithstanding their numerous and crafty diplomatic stratagems, the American imperialists have landed in greater isolation than ever before."

## Seven-point program pressed

"The only honorable way out of the Vietnam war for the U.S.," the DRV Foreign Ministry said, "is to give a serious reply to the seven points put forward by the PRG, which meet with enthusiastic support all over the world and in the U.S."

"The more stubbornly the American imperialists resort to perfidious maneuvers, the more serious their defeats are going to be, and undoubtedly utter defeat is in store for them. Our people firmly resolved to honor their pledge they made when bidding farewell to President Ho Chi Minh: to carry high Ho Chi Minh's victorious banner, to final victory," the DRV statement emphasized.

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As We See It

# Buckley 'Fake' Papers

## An Indefensible Deceit

IN ALL earnestness and for what he seems to consider an exemplary cause, columnist William Buckley has told an outrageous and, to us, indefensible lie.

Because of his own deviousness, however, we are not quite sure of the extent of his deliberate fraud upon his readers, or how many lies are involved. In either case the logic of his self-defense escapes us.

Buckley, who is the editor of National Review magazine, published in the magazine's last issue "highly classified documents" which were purported to be more secret papers on the Vietnam war. The weight of the "documents" was heavily from the viewpoints of the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Wednesday evening, after having his hand called by numerous sources, Buckley announced the whole thing was an enormous hoax, and said that the articles and documents had been dreamed up "ex nihilo, (from nothing) in the offices of National Review."

*The purpose, Buckley said, was to show that the Pentagon and the CIA were not the fools some of the Pentagon papers reports have indicated.*

At this point is where we have trouble following Buckley's logic. If the papers were a fraud, then obviously they would prove nothing about the CIA and the Pentagon.

But the evidence is that the National Review "documents" were not all fraud.

Some of them were clearly picked up from the genuine Pentagon papers and documents, almost word for word.

Thus, such a hoax was totally pointless, at least in defending the CIA. It was remarkable to this newspaper, in reading those Pentagon papers given to us as well as those printed by the New York Times, how often the CIA's predictions and analyses turned out to be right on target.

Its role in the war was certainly secret and not in keeping with what Americans had been told. The CIA conducted the covert war in North Vietnam before the United States put combat troops in South Vietnam in 1965. It masterminded the war in Laos and ran its own air force. But when it came to telling Presidents Kennedy and Johnson what was actually happening and what was likely to happen if the United States followed a certain course, the CIA emerged as the only agency with little or no egg on its face.

What Buckley has done, then, and for what purpose, almost defies analysis. He lied when he first said the "documents" were genuine, because some of them are absolute fakes, and he lied when he said they were created "ex nihilo" in his magazine's offices, since some of them weren't.

In either case he has failed to serve any worthy purpose, and in the process has damaged his credibility and that of his magazine. His views must be taken with a grain of salt or, as Buckley would say, *cum grano salis*.

*Laos*

## The rains came

The seasonal rhythm of the war in northern Laos is reminiscent of those animated barometers where one little man pops out on sunny days and another on rainy days. The dry season is traditionally the time for a communist offensive in Laos, and it is during the monsoon (when supplies from North Vietnam are interrupted and the communist forces pull back towards the northern fringes of the Plain of Jars) that General Vang Pao's Meo army inches its way back across lost ground.

Reports at the end of last week suggest that his "secret army," organized and equipped by the Central Intelligence Agency, has regained control of the plain after a two weeks' offensive.

Six Meo battalions pushed eastward from their base area around Long Cheng, while Air America planes carried a commando strike-force to Xieng Khoang in the centre of the plain. They met with very little resistance, although Pathet Lao radio reported some skirmishing over the southern part of the plain. There are reports that the Meos have discovered some important arms caches, but the Laotian prime minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, merely said that the offensive was "an American affair."

The recapture of 30 square miles of upland plain that has come to look rather like a battered sports trophy can hardly alter the military balance in Laos, and it may have strained the diminishing resources of the Meo army that forms the only effective local resistance to the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. The 300,000 Meo tribesmen, who share a hereditary distrust of the Vietnamese, have been badly buffeted by the Indochina war. They have become a nation of refugees, moved back and forth down jungle trails or in Air America planes as the communists advance or retreat. Over the past year, the "secret army" has suffered from an acute shortage of manpower, and Vang Pao has been forced to recruit young boys.

The campaign of systematic terrorism launched by the communists against the Meo civil population earlier this year has also shaken morale. Some of Vang Pao's troops, separated from their families for more than a year and worried by stories of intimidation and forced conscription by the North Vietnamese, have deserted and made the long walk east. The health of Vang Pao himself is another cause for concern. The current offensive is being headed by a team of junior officers and American advisers while the general convalesces from a serious illness whose nature has not been disclosed. He would be hard to replace.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

23 JUL 1971

STATINTL

## Radio Booms Red Herring

Saigon, July 22 (Special)—  
Meo tribesmen, aided by the  
Central Intelligence Agency,  
have set up a radio station  
masquerading as a Red station  
to sow dissension among Com-  
munist forces fighting in Laos,  
it was disclosed today.

The station, beamed to the  
Plain of Jars, began broadcast-  
ing at the same time that gov-  
ernment Meo forces moved into  
the plain early this month.

An indication that the tactic  
is succeeding came in a broad-  
cast over the Red station which  
exposed and protested the ruse.

—Joseph Fried

Hard Decisions Avoided*GIs and Heroin:  
The Facts of Life*

By Flora Lewis

JOHN W. PARKER, director of strategic intelligence in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, knows a good deal about Southeast Asia's contribution to the dope problem. And while he is a soft-spoken Southerner, sometimes so quiet one has to strain to hear him, he is the most straightforward man I have yet found on the subject in the administration.

He starts with an explanation. Remember, he says, that until 1970 we were concentrating on the drug problem here in the United States. Not too much attention was paid by the bureau to the source of supplies. And the Army, the CIA, the State Department, the people out there where the heroin comes from weren't concerned about drugs. They were concentrating on other problems.

Further, while there has been opium in Southeast Asia since the British introduced it in the early 19th century, until 1970 the heroin refineries in the area were all in Thailand and Hong Kong, Parker says. It didn't seem to affect the United States.

In fact, the dominant government attitude was that this was a fact of life in Asia which Americans shouldn't try to upset, especially since by the beginning of the decade so many Americans were so deeply engaged in trying to control other facts of Southeast Asia's life, namely the Vietnamese war and all its offshoots.

Now, according to Parker, practically all the heroin refineries have been resituated along the Mekong River, in Burma, Thailand and Laos, and "almost all have been identified."

If so, why hasn't the United States, which completely subsidizes and virtually runs Laos and has poured billions into Thailand, whose "volunteer soldiers" it employs in Vietnam and Laos, made sure the heroin factories were destroyed?

The obvious urgent question didn't annoy Parker. On the contrary, his stolid face slowly eased into a Cheshire cat grin. At first he didn't say anything. I suggested that the reason wasn't hard to guess and wasn't really secret.

"I know," he said. "I'm struggling not to say it."

IT IS AT once a simple and excruciatingly tough answer. As he finally pointed out, it is a matter of political decision in Washington. There is a choice to make. It would be easy to blow up the refineries, defoliate most of the poppy fields, push the governments involved into cracking down on their own high-level military and civilian profiteers and blocking the supply of heroin to GIs in Vietnam and, increasingly, to the United States.

But it would be a severe embarrassment to allies in Southeast Asia. It would hinder the prosecution of the war in Indochina, perhaps so seriously that basic U.S. policy would have to be changed.

There have been some changes in the past year, but they have followed a pattern of seeking compromise with the drug-producing countries, not confrontation.

The CIA has changed its rules in an effort to stop the use of its private airline, Air America, for the transport of drugs in Laos. Although only two months ago CIA Director Richard Helms adamantly denied there had ever been any agency involvement in the traffic, he is now said to have told a secret congressional hearing that there was involvement but it has been stopped in the past year.

The U.S. Embassy in Laos has pressed the government there to put through a strict law on drugs which may be passed this month. There was none before.

The U.S. Embassy in Saigon got the Vietnamese government to remove some of the corrupt customs officials, and similar efforts are being made in Thailand. With Congress vociferously taking up the issue, the White House is cracking the whip on all the assorted American officials who thought drug traffic was not their concern, who thought their job was only fighting the war, gathering intelligence, maintaining foreign relations.

c-9

THE QUESTION is whether these relatively gentle pressures will convince governments largely dependent on the United States that they must fight heroin. Years of argument got nowhere in Turkey, but a threat to cut off foreign aid finally did.

Now the Turks have promised to wipe out opium production after the 1972 crop, which means that in three or four years that source of supply will dry up. Parker is convinced now that the Turks can and will enforce the ban. But ask him how much difference it will make in the amount of heroin supplied to Americans.

"If nothing else is done," he says flatly, "no difference." And the "something else" can only be done in Washington, a decision to be just as tough in Southeast Asia as the Nixon administration was in Turkey.

Meanwhile, the inch-high vials of 98 to 99 per cent pure heroin distributed in South Vietnam have begun to turn up in the United States. The bureau foresees an almost uncontrollable flood as veterans return, find themselves without jobs and realize how much money can be made by having buddies or friends send them supplies from the Far East.

Addicts can be treated, but there isn't much likelihood that there won't be far more new ones than cures each day unless the flow of heroin is cut at the source. At the Bureau of Narcotics, experts are convinced that is possible, except perhaps for a going to happen. The hard political decision hasn't been taken.

STATINTL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Information Agency

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1. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS IN PARA ONE REFTEL:
  - A. TWO SURVEY REPORTS WERE PREPARED, REPORT ON ATTITUDES OF VIENTIANE PLAINS REFUGEES AND REPORT ON BAN SON REFUGEES. BOTH WERE DRAFTED BY VIENTIANE BPAO FRANK ALBERT. USIS WAS NOT INVOLVED IN SUMMARY REPORT PREPARED FOR RELEASE TO KENNEDY SUBCOMMITTEE.

DAILY WORLD  
22 JUL 1971

## Demands bar to paid Thai troops in Laos

WASHINGTON, July 21 (UPI) — Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo), today proposed legislation designed to “once and for all put an end to our paying for Thai mercenaries in Laos.”

The State Department on June 7 conceded to Symington that several thousand “volunteers” from Thailand, paid by the United States, were engaged in the war in northern Laos.

Symington, a member of both the Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Relations Committee, said the Nixon Administration had found a loophole in legislation adopted by Congress last year intended to prevent U.S. support for Thai operations in Laos.

The legislation adopted last year banned the use of “appropriations available to the Department of Defense” to support Thai forces in Laos.

Symington said the administration got around this stricture by using funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency.

“Last year many of us thought that Congress, by means of amendments to the defense authorization and appropriations bills, had made it unlawful for the United States government to pay Thai troops to fight in Laos and Cambodia,” Symington told the Senate.

“Today there are Thai troops in Laos and they are being paid by the United States government.”

22 JUL 1971

STATINTL

## A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:

## Kennedy's Private War

Ralph L. Stavins

The article that follows is part of *The Planning of the Vietnam War*, a study by members of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, including Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and Ralph Stavins.\* In their introduction to the study, the authors write:

"In early 1970, Marcus Raskin conceived the idea of a study that would explain how the Vietnam disaster happened by analyzing the planning of the war. A group of investigators directed by Ralph Stavins concentrated on finding out who did the actual planning that led to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam, to introduce over a half-million troops into South Vietnam, to defoliate and destroy vast areas of Indochina, and to create millions of refugees in the area.

"Ralph Stavins, assisted by Canta Pian, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin, and Brian Eden, conducted more than 300 interviews in the course of this study. Among those interviewed were many Presidential advisers to Kennedy and Johnson, generals and admirals, middle level bureaucrats who occupied strategic positions in the national security bureaucracy, and officials, military and civilian, who carried out the policy in the field in Vietnam.

"A number of informants backed up their oral statements with documents in their possession, including informal minutes of meetings, as well as portions of the official documentary record now known as the 'Pentagon Papers.' Our information is drawn not only from the Department of Defense, but also from the White House, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency."

The study is being published in two volumes. The first, which includes the article below, will be published early in August. The second will appear in May, 1972.

\*The study is the responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, or fellows.

I  
At the end of March, 1961, the CIA circulated a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in South Vietnam. This paper advised Kennedy that Diem was a tyrant who was confronted with two sources of discontent, the non-Communist loyal opposition and the Viet Cong. The two problems were closely connected. Of the spreading Viet Cong network the CIA noted:

Local recruits and sympathetic or intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the countryside. For example, more than one-half of the entire rural region south and southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately backed by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Saigon and has recently begun to move closer in the city.

The people were not opposing these recent advances by the Viet Cong; if anything, they seemed to be supporting them. The failure to rally the people against the Viet Cong was laid to Diem's dictatorial rule:

There has been an increasing disposition within official circles and the army to question Diem's ability to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the Communists because of his reliance on virtual one-man rule, his tolerance of corruption extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to relax a rigid system of public controls.

The CIA referred to the attempted coup against Diem that had been led by

General Thi in November, 1960, and concluded that another coup was likely. In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong, they predicted that the next attempt to overthrow Diem would originate with the army and the non-Communist opposition.

The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and subversive operations including united front efforts are directed toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup attempt which occurs over the next year or so will originate among non-Communist elements, perhaps a combination of disgruntled civilian officials and oppositionists and army elements, broader than those involved in the November attempt.

In view of the broadly based opposition to Diem's regime and his virtual reliance on one-man rule, it was unlikely that he would initiate any reform measures that would sap the strength of the revolutionaries. Whether reform was conceived as widening the political base of the regime, which Diem would not agree to, or whether it was to consist of an intensified counter-insurgency program, something the people would not support, it had become painfully clear to Washington that reform was not the path to victory. But victory was the goal, and Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw up the victory plans. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:

- a) Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.
- b) Recommend a series of actions (military, political, and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which will prevent Communist domination of the country.



# USIA Accused Of Aiding Thieu

By Tim O'Brien  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Two members of a House subcommittee accused the U.S. Information Agency yesterday of aiding incumbents in Vietnam elections by supplying political poll results only to the South Vietnamese government, excluding challengers and potential challengers from access to the information.

Rep. William S. Moorhead, (D-Pa.), chairman of a Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, said \$133 million has been spent on information services in South Vietnam, of which the United States has supplied 90 per cent.

"In my own personal view," he said, "what it boils down to is that we have helped the Saigon regime build a massive propaganda machine."

John E. Reinhardt, assistant USIA director for East Asia, admitted that the agency's poll results are classified for official use only, for one year. He said that although the polls could be of limited value to incumbent candidates, they are not taken for partisan political purposes.

Reinhardt also said the USIA has issued orders that its facilities and personnel may not be used to influence the outcome of forthcoming Vietnam elections. The polling itself, he said, was stopped in February.

Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) said giving poll results to government officials and withhold them from challengers is "a political boon to the government in power."

Moorhead termed the expenditure of U.S. funds for polling "a waste and possible misapplication of money."

The subcommittee also heard testimony from two former AID officials in Vietnam who resigned because of alleged misuse of AID polls. Theodore Jacquency, who now heads a new group that seeks "fair elections" in South Vietnam, said he resigned "because I felt that U.S. policy in Vietnam supported President

CORDS, a pacification and development program administered by AID in South Vietnam. He said results of the poll—which quizzed Vietnamese on such subjects as government leadership and candidate preferences—“were for the eyes of Thieu supporters only.”

In addition to the polls, Jacquency said, the U.S.I.A. and Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office lent vast “political propaganda services” to the Saigon government, “at a time when that government is denying freedom of the press to many Vietnamese nationalists.”

Jacquency charged that “despite declarations of U.S. impartiality, U.S. resources have been diverted to assist President Thieu’s campaign.”

He recommended a full congressional investigation of U.S. involvement in South Vietnam elections along with an inquiry into the Thieu regime’s policy with respect to the right of others to “disseminate their views freely.”

Meanwhile, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) introduced legislation to “once and for all put an end” to what he said was U.S. financing of mercenary forces from Thailand fighting in Laos.

On June 7 the State Department admitted that the United States was supporting Thai forces in Laos but described them as volunteers.

Symington’s amendment would ban the use of American funds to support any member of a local military force in Laos who is not a citizen or national of Laos. He claimed the Nixon administration has found a loophole in legislation adopted by Congress last year which was designed to prevent U.S. backing for Thai operations in Laos.

The legislation barred the use of Defense Department funds, but Symington charged that the administration avoided this stricture by using money available to the CIA.

The Senate Rules Committee approved a special \$100,000 al-  
Jacquency singled out an attitude survey conducted by war.

States pursuant to article V of the Constitution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLER). Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 1318

At the request of Mr. FANNIN, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROOK) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1318, a bill to deny tax exemption under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

S. 1442 THROUGH S. 1445

At the request of Mr. MOSS, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYNE) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1442, a bill to provide that the first \$3,000 received as civil service retirement annuity shall be excluded from gross income; S. 1443, to eliminate the survivorship reduction during periods of nonmarriage of retired employees and Members, and for other purposes; S. 1444, a bill to increase the contribution by the Federal Government to the costs of employees' health benefits insurance; and S. 1445, a bill to provide increases in certain annuities payable under chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, and for other purposes.

S. 1659

At the request of Mr. FANNIN, the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1659, a bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act.

S. 2223

At the request of Mr. TALMAGE, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) were added as cosponsors of S. 2223, a bill to amend the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

S. 2258

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN, the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE) and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) were added as cosponsors of S. 2258, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Acceleration Act.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 62

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN, the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 62, authorizing the display of the flags of each of the 50 States at the base of the Washington Monument.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 99

At the request of Mr. CASE, the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 99, a joint resolution proposing establishment of a National Collegiate Press Day.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 114

At the request of Mr. CURTIS, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 114, a stable purchasing power resolution of 1971.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 35—SUBMISSION OF AN ORIGINAL CONCURRENT RESOLUTION FAVORING THE SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

(Ordered to be placed on the calendar.)

Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following original concurrent resolution:

S. CON. RES. 35

Resolved by the Senate (The House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress favors the suspension of deportation in the case of each alien hereinafter named, in which case the Attorney General has suspended deportation pursuant to the provisions of section 245(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (66 Stat. 204; 8 U.S.C. 1251):

A-9337873, Chan, Chauen.  
A-17929342, Chin, Lean.  
A-6616735, Funk, Thomas Fredrik.  
A-13282197, Moy, Huey Nel.  
A-10465009, Torres de Bejerano, Socorro.  
A-11586573, Yee, Soen Hing.  
A-6392988, Terrazas-Barrio, Efran.  
A-4916705, Ioanides, Gabriel Constantinos.  
A-1893768, Herrera-Marquez, Aurelio.  
A-18198886, Lum, Wah Gum.  
A-3212791, Candanora-Laza, Rogelio.  
A-6495744, Cartier, Paul August.  
A-12027284, Liu, Jai Chih.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS—1972

AMENDMENT NO. 284

(Ordered to be printed and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.)

CLOSING LOOPHOLES: AN AMENDMENT TO END U.S. FINANCING OF FOREIGN MERCENARIES IN LAOS

Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, last year many of us thought that the Congress, by means of amendments to the Defense authorization and appropriations bills, had made it unlawful for the U.S. Government to pay Thai troops to fight in Laos or Cambodia. Today there are Thai troops in Laos and they are being paid by the U.S. Government. The State Department has finally admitted that we are paying the Thais, but the Thai Government still asserts there are no Thai troops in Laos.

In our discussions with the executive branch, we have encountered two lines of legal argumentation being used to justify the U.S. role in this bizarre affair. First, it is argued that the legislative history of last year's amendments indicates that the amendments' sponsor, whose avowed purpose in proposing the amendments in the first place was to prohibit payment for Thai troops in Laos or Cambodia, had, by inference, condoned the very practice he was seeking to prohibit. Second, it is argued, that, even if this had been the sponsor's intent, the legislation enacted contained loopholes which permits the executive branch to do lawfully what the sponsor had sought to prohibit. Either way, they say it is legal for the United States to hire Thais to fight a war in Laos which the Lao are no longer able to sustain with their own manpower.

For those who find this situation diffi-

cult to comprehend, a brief review of the facts will be helpful before I propose a legislative solution to this problem.

Following the U.S. incursions into Cambodia in May 1970, it was recognized that language of the defense authorization and appropriations legislation providing \$2.5 billion for "support for Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces" could possibly be interpreted as permitting U.S. financing of Thai troops in Cambodia and Laos. Indeed, in August 1970, the State Department acknowledged that a "tentative agreement" had been reached between the United States and Thai Governments regarding the sending of Thai troops to Cambodia.

It was generally understood at the time that the provision of any troops to Cambodia by Thailand would be contingent upon the furnishing of financial support by the United States.

It was in the light of these facts that an amendment was added to both the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts which provided that nothing in the authorization to support "Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnam forces" could be construed "as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

This amendment was originally proposed by the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee who declared that his intention was to prevent our paying for South Vietnamese or Thai forces to expand their military activities in Cambodia and Laos so that we would become involved in large-scale operations in close support of the Government of Cambodia or the Government of Laos.

Nevertheless, despite this amendment, a Department of State spokesman admitted on June 7 that there were Thai forces in Laos and also that the United States was supporting them, although he described them as "volunteers."

This spokesman did not say that these Thai forces are operating principally in the war in northern Laos, a war that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan has said has "nothing to do with military operations in South Vietnam or Cambodia."

The amendment included in the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for fiscal year 1971 never defined "local forces in Laos and Thailand" and the prohibitions written into the Appropriation Act applied, of course, only to "appropriations available to the Department of Defense during the current fiscal year." Thus, it might be argued that Central Intelligence Agency funds were not covered by the amendment.

In addition, it has been argued by the executive branch that the Thai forces in Laos are "local forces in Laos," even though they are Thai nationals who were recruited and trained in Thailand, are transported by us from Thailand to Laos; then they are sent back to Thailand

ST. LOUIS, MO.  
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376  
S - 541,868

JUL 21 1971

STATINTL

## Would Halt Aid To Thais In Laos

By RICHARD DUDMAN

Chief Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, July 21 — Senator Stuart Symington (Dem., Missouri), proposed today a new restriction intended to close loopholes that allow the United States to finance foreign mercenary troops in Laos. Symington said that his amendment to the military procurement bill would "once and for all put an end to our paying for Thai mercenaries in Laos, and thereby remove any technical loophole which might be used to continue to circumvent the intent behind the amendment to last year's authorization and appropriation acts."

Symington, whose subcommittee on overseas commitments brought out the fact that Central Intelligence Agency funds were used to pay for Thai troops in Laos, reminded the Senate that many members thought that Congress had banned the practice last year.

An amendment last year said that the support of "Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnam forces" could not be construed as authorizing "the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos."

Despite that amendment, the Department of State acknowledged June 7 that there were Thai forces in Laos and that the United States was supporting them. The department described them as Volunteers.

Symington said that because the legislation referred to Department of Defense appropriations, it might be argued that CIA funds were not covered by the 1970 amendment.

He said the Executive Branch contended that the Thai forces in Laos were "Local forces in Laos," even though the men were Thai nationals recruited

and trained in Thailand, transported from Thailand to Laos, and then sent back to Thailand after their tours of duty and given special benefits by the Thai government.

Certain testimony given to the Senate in a closed session June 7 "seriously undermines the credibility of the claim that these Thai are local forces in Laos," Symington said. But he pointed out that the Executive Branch continued to insist that these facts was classified.

Symington's new amendment would change the wording to permit U.S. funds to be used for "local forces of Laos in Laos and local forces of Thailand in Thailand" instead of "local forces in Laos and Thailand."

It would provide also that no U.S. funds be used to support any member of a local force in Laos who is not a citizen or national of Laos.

Symington expressed confidence that the tightened language would prevent U.S. support for Thai soldiers—regulars or irregulars, conscripts or volunteers—in Laos.

The move was part of Symington's continuing effort to expose and curtail the secret war that the United States has been waging in Laos since 1964.

21 JUL 1971

# Thais Said to Erect Base Complex in Laos

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, July 20—Elements of a Thai army regiment have reportedly moved across the frontier and established permanent bases in western Laos.

The bases were set up in a large area of Sayaboury Province which borders Thailand, according to reports reaching here from Xieng Lom, 160 miles northwest of Vientiane.

The reports say Thai units entered Laos from Nan Province of Thailand during an antiguerrilla sweep in recent weeks and constructed satellite camps to the complex of CIA-maintained bases extending eastward from Xieng Lom in a 40-mile shallow arc to Hong Sa.

U.S. sources say the move is being coordinated by the Central Intelligence agency, probably for area security.

Other U.S. sources reporting from Sayaboury Province say the Thai units are showing indications of permanently occupying a strip of Laos nearly 100 miles deep and 20 miles wide. They are also said to be turning southward toward Sayaboury City, the province capital, establishing outposts.

A recently improved all-weather highway from Nan City in Thailand to the Lao border, where it becomes an improved trail, is said to be the supply link with the Thai units.

Western military sources last week confirmed that there have been border incursions by Thais in recent weeks, but ascribed them to the ill-defined demarcations.

A heavy security curtain is maintained over northern Sayaboury Province. Air transport, which is necessary for entry, is routinely denied to those without security clearances, including newsmen.

Nan and Uttaradit provinces of Thailand, which border Sayaboury, are also off limits to journalists by orders from Bangkok.

Informed sources in Vientiane have confirmed that an operation had taken place in the Xieng Lom area in recent

days but denied knowledge of any Thai participation in Laos. They said, however, that a concurrent and "possibly coordinated" sweep had occurred on the Thai side of the border.

U.S. mission sources said the clearing operation had been completed about 10 days ago. Until Monday, however, knowledge of such an operation was denied by all U.S. embassy offices normally releasing such information.

The Xieng Lom—Moung Ngeun-Hong Sa complex, with its satellite camps, are reliably reported to have outstripped the Aeo base at Long Cheng near the Plain of Jars in importance to the U.S. war effort in Laos. They are said to be less important, however, than a base near Ban Houei Sai, 210 miles northwest of Vientiane and 50 miles northwest of Xieng Lom.

A unit of Thais training hill tribesmen in Laos is regularly reported to be stationed in Xieng Lom and operating along the complex of positions.

A subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has prepared a report that puts the number of Thai troops in Laos at 4,000.

In an action possibly related to the Thai incursion from the west, pro-government irregulars have reportedly launched an offensive thrust westward from Luang Prabang across the Mekong. There is no official confirmation of the thrust.

Other reports tending to confirm Thai operations in Sayaboury Province were printed in the Bangkok Post last week and attributed to "informed government sources."

The Post said that Thai intelligence had located the headquarters of a Pathet Lao battalion less than 5 miles from the Thai border, with another battalion moving from Sayaboury Province to join it. The Pathet Lao, according to

pick up food from Thai territory.

An alert has been ordered in Uttaradit Province, according to the Post, and "the 2d Cavalry Regiment has been assigned to double the number patrolling the border area as a precaution against possible invasion by the Pathet Lao."

"Meanwhile," the Post reported, "an intelligence mission has been sent to collect more reports on Pathet Lao movements, the source said." U.S. analysts in Vientiane suggest the Post story may be a "planted cover" for operations 100 miles north of those reported and say they have received no reports on Pathet Lao presence in northern Sayaboury Province for months.

Western military sources only last week said they had no reports of enemy movements in northern Sayaboury and no knowledge of anything more than isolated, ineffective pockets of Pathet Lao.

It is noteworthy, however, that northern Sayaboury lies just across the Mekong from where military analysts believe Chinese engineers will eventually stop building their road through northwestern Laos.

U.S. intelligence sources say construction was halted 20 miles short of the Mekong a year ago but it continues to produce official comments of alarm in the Thai capital.

It is also noteworthy that Sayaboury Province was annexed by Thailand during World War II, then returned to Laos and the French as part of the war settlement. The Bangkok government is generally believed to still covet the strip of Laos west of the Mekong.

STATINTL

JUL 21 1978

E - 30,102

S - 59,244

## Make the CIA Accountable

FOR SOME TIME the need has existed to make the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency more accountable to the Congress than has been the case over recent years.

No one argues that the United States does not require some type of intelligence gathering organization. That fact was recognized from the earliest days of our Republic. President Polk, for example, had a showdown with Congress in 1846 about accounting for the funds he used "to employ individuals for the purposes of obtaining information." In the Civil War, the North hired the Pinkerton Agency to expand its intelligence services.

But the CIA today seems to have gone far beyond its original purpose as outlined when it was created in 1947 as a result of the experience of Pearl Harbor. President Truman explained:

"... if there had been something like coordination of information in the government, it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack ... In those days, the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew. The Army and Navy, in fact, had only a very informal arrangement to keep each other informed as to their plans."

There is a feeling now that the CIA is an invisible government -- a law unto itself, engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls. There probably is no isolated part of the world today where CIA agents aren't poking around in another nation's business.

Some of the CIA's activities appear to approach the ridiculous stage at times, such as an illustration recently cited in an address by the agency's own director, Richard Helms. He told how it was vital to the United States to know how deep is the water alongside the docks in Djibouti. Why? Well, Mr. Helms said that if France should one day grant independence to French Somaliland -- now formally the Territory of the Afars and Issas -- the area would almost certainly be a source of contention between Ethiopia, which looks to the United States for support, and Somalia, which is highly dependent

on the Soviet Union. What ships could be used to land a UN peace-keeping force -- or unload relief shipment, according to Mr. Helms, suddenly would become important to the United States. The illustration cited here would lead one to believe the CIA goes looking for trouble.

Of more immediate concern is what the CIA is doing in Laos and Cambodia today. There have been disclosures about how the agency has been promoting and financing a secret war in Laos and training Cambodian troops in Laos in order to circumvent a 1970 congressional amendment cutting off funds for U.S. ground troops or advisers in Cambodia. Unfortunately, the House of Representatives declined recently to approve a resolution requiring the Administration to tell Congress what the military and the CIA are doing in Laos.

There are several proposals now before the Senate, all related to the future operations of the CIA, which we believe deserve the support of that body. Senator John Sherman Cooper has proposed that the CIA be required to make regular and special reports to responsible Senate and House committees; Senator George McGovern would require CIA expenditures and appropriations to appear as a single line item in the budget rather than being hidden in other agency budgets. And Senator Clifford Case would limit the CIA's use of funds and military equipment for fielding foreign troops in Laos or elsewhere without specific approval by Congress.

## How the CIA can help

While there is much that can be criticized in the secrets revealed in the Pentagon papers, one agency that comes out of them with a record for calling its shots correctly is the Central Intelligence Agency. As Crocker Snow Jr. pointed out in last Sunday's Globe, it suggests that the last few Presidents should have listened more to the CIA than to the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the White House advisers.

For it appears that if they had, there would have been no doubts about President Diem's regime in Saigon; the domino theory would not have been trotted out to justify the war, and the war would not have been escalated.

Why were not the CIA reports given greater credence? The answer may come only with less secrecy in Washington. But perhaps part of the answer lay in the disastrous 1961 invasion the agency ran at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba (for which President Kennedy, nonetheless, took all the blame).

And perhaps another part lies in a deliberate downplaying of the CIA's role. It had been an operational as well as an intelligence agency

when John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State and his brother Allen was CIA director. But after the Bay of Pigs, Robert Kennedy urged a tight control of operations and, according to what CIA director Richard Helms told the editors last April, the CIA was urged to present options rather than hard recommendations.

It is not publicly known what role if any the CIA played in the futile invasion of Cambodia and the abortive raid on an empty North Vietnamese prison camp. Enough is known about its role in Laos to make it subject to severe criticism, however.

All of this makes more attractive the proposal of Sen. John Sherman Cooper that the CIA share its intelligence estimates with Congress, which passes on its secret budget without knowing, for the most part, where the money goes. This would help Congress reach a judgment on important policy questions.

At a time when Congress is rightly reasserting its responsibility, that would be most helpful. It would be infinitely preferable to having to vote on the basis of limited information designed to support administrative policies.

STATINTL

WORCESTER, MASS.  
TELEGRAM

JUL 19 1970

M - 62,339  
S - 108,367

STATINTL

## Probing the CIA

✓ Congress, which is in an anti-Vietnam, anti-Administration mood, is directing its attention to the Central Intelligence Agency. A number of bills being debated would flush some of the CIA spooks out into the daylight and give Congress more of a say in the agency's operations.

It is a sensitive subject, to say the least. The CIA says it must be cloaked to be effective. But some of its critics think its curtain of secrecy gives it the power to act as an invisible government, accountable to no one.

✓ The various proposals offered attack the problem from different angles. Rep. Herman Badillo wants an amendment which would confine the CIA to gathering and analyzing intelligence. Sen. George McGovern wants all CIA appropriations and expenditures to appear in the budget as a single line item. (CIA expenses are now concealed). Sen. Clifford Case has introduced legislation to prohibit the CIA from financing a second country's operation in a third country (as the CIA is doing now with the Thais in Laos). Senator Sen. John Cooper, who is a former ambassador and friendly to the CIA, nevertheless wants its "conclusions, facts and analyses" distributed in full to the relevant committees in Congress as well as to the executive branch. This would require an amendment to the National Security Act.

It is plain that some of these proposals are aimed at the executive

branch, which Congress has become very suspicious of. Many congressmen have the feeling that they have been hoodwinked by various presidents (the Tonkin Gulf Resolution affair, for example), and they are convinced that the powers and secrecy of the CIA permit the executive branch to do things in foreign affairs that would otherwise be impossible under the Constitution.

Congress' attitude is understandable. After all, the Constitution regards the legislative as perhaps the most important branch of the government, yet Congress does not even know what is going on in foreign affairs, half the time, and is powerless to do anything when it does learn the facts. The war in Laos, for example, has been run by the CIA without congressional approval or even debate.

Yet, how effective can an intelligence agency be if its activities are exposed to congressional scrutiny? How long would its secrets remain secret if they were pored over by congressional committees?

The questions raised by these proposals in Congress are fundamental in their implications. On the one hand, the United States must have effective ways to gather intelligence — and it also must on occasion be able to operate clandestinely.

On the other, it cannot tolerate an agency that functions under too tight a secrecy curtain with almost unlimited funds and powers. That way lies other Bays of Pigs.

BOSTON, MASS.  
GLOBE

Approved For Release 2001/09/10 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

STATINTL

H - 237,967  
S - 566,377

JUL 18 1970

# McCloskey hits Nixon on secrecy in N.H. talk

By Jeff McLaughlin  
Globe Staff

HANOVER, N.H. — In what he called his "first campaign speech," Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) here yesterday said he was challenging President Nixon for the Republican presidential nomination in New Hampshire's first-in-the-nation primary "not just because of his war policy," but because the Nixon Administration's policy of withholding vital information from Congress and from the American people threatened "to undermine the very precious cornerstone of democracy."

"The Executive branch of Government now chooses not to disclose to those of us who may differ with government policy any facts or information which might support our position," McCloskey said. "And the difficulty with this is, that if dissent cannot be argued in America against government policy, or if dissent cannot be ably argued for lack of information, then we no longer have democracy."

McCloskey said the Nixon Administration had deliberately concealed, even from Congress, the facts surrounding the bombing of villages in northern Laos, the facts surrounding Central Intelligence Agency support of a secret army in Laos, and men's employing Thai mercenaries to fight in Southeast Asia.

McCloskey said that as a congressman he had "a duty to try to pass good laws, and under the Constitution, to provide as to whether we decide to fund wars or not . . . but the

government of the United States does not wish to divulge facts to those of us who are responsible for making the laws."

McCloskey said that although he "would not have run against the president but for the war," there are "a number of other issues" over which he has "major differences" with his party's top leadership. "If the president stopped the bombing tomorrow and reduced our negotiation demands in Paris to the release of American prisoners of war, as the Mansfield amendment suggests, I'd certainly want to reconsider my candidacy," McCloskey said.

"But the overriding issue for me is the people's current lack of faith in their government and in the Republican party. There are 25 million potential new voters in the country and they don't believe their government about the war, but there are also problems in such areas as law enforcement, race relations and the environment."

McCloskey said the Nixon Administration tried in 1970 to "emasculate" the 1965 Voting Rights Act as part of a Southern strategy, "and there is no black man in America today who feels any confidence in the Republican party because of that single action."

McCloskey said only about 10 percent of the young, newly franchised voters now were likely to register as Republicans, "and if youth doesn't come in, the Republican party dies," he said.

After dining with 60 potential supporters in a knotty-pine paneled dining room here at the Hanover Inn, McCloskey drove 45 miles to the Orange Coun-

ty, Vt., town of Randolph, which will hold the only Presidential preference in the nation next March 7, the same day as the New Hampshire primary.

McCloskey made his campaign stance clear to Randolph voters during his seven hour visit to the town of 4000:

"Truth in government is the major issue," he told Red Dalton, a supermarket meat manager, "I want the government to be more honest. The government has to stop treating the American people as if we were the enemy."

Later, before a drenching thunderstorm curtailed his planned walking tour, McCloskey said: "The American system of government isn't failing us, we're failing the system. The Constitution established a government of checks and balances, and now the executive branch has taken over powers the makers of the Constitution never intended it to have. That take-over must be challenged or America will grow very, very weak."

McCloskey said the New Hampshire and Randolph preference primaries would enable "the ballot box to establish the American people's views on Constitutional government." He said he was hopeful, but not confident about unseating President Nixon, "but the effort has to be made if you believe as deeply as I do in the greatness of America's potential."

Approved For Release 2001/09/10 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600160001-1



DAYTON, OHIO  
NEWS

JUL 18 1971  
E - 161,249  
S - 215,360

## *Plain of Jars*

What with the Laotian Plain of Jars recovered by the U.S. Central Intelligence agency's army of Meo tribesmen, the contest has shifted again in the Indochina war. Though not to anyone's particular favor. The tug-of-war across the plain is, well, peripheral to the eventual decision on the peninsula.

If you have a knack for ancient history, you will remember that about this time last year, the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao, which is the local Communist organization there, swept across the plain, dislodging the CIA and the Meos. There was much fussy distress about that. American war thinkers thought about it and proclaimed several shades of doom.

There was much serious talk about what, if anything, the United States should do to regain the area for its ally, the CIA. The royal Laotian capital, Vientiane, went into one of its occasional flaps, although the difference between the somnolent Vientiane and the agitated one is remarkable only to old hands there and is marked mostly by the frequency of news conferences (but not by the amount of news thus produced).

The Royal Laotian navy readied itself, putting ashore the chickens that were being raised on its river fleet. A number of U.S. senators set their faces to "grim," and said the Communist tide might sweep on to lap the shores of the Pacific and shake the foundations of America. Others wanted to know how much the United States was spending.

Now, with the reoccupation of the plain by loyalists, all that has been reversed.

HARTFORD, CON Approved For Release 2001/09/10 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0006  
TIMES

JUL 18 1971

E & S - 135,812

Jack  
Bell



## President outranks Congress overseas

WASHINGTON — The confrontation between Congress and the President on foreign policy might be viewed more seriously as a crisis between branches of government if the lawmakers were equipped to share in the making of international decisions.

Constitutional questions aside for the moment, the national legislature cannot possibly compete with the chief executive in this field. It lacks the organization, the information and the technical ability to take the initiative it is groping to assert in the highly complex business of dealing with other nations.

THE IMPASSE between the House and Senate over the draft bill's provision to admonish President Nixon to withdraw all U.S. troops from Vietnam in nine months, if American prisoners are freed, is illustrative of one phase of this futility. It is clearly symptomatic of the very great difficulty of reaching any meeting of the minds among a majority of 535 individuals.

That only scratches the surface of the matter. Who in Congress, for example, can furnish an answer to the simple question of whether it would be physically possible to pull out all of these troops in that period?

Congress must depend on the Pentagon to supply the answer, and defense officials are being evasive on the question.

Therein lies one glaring weakness in the antiquated congressional system. Congress had no effective machinery to analyze executive department proposals.

Even the most active of its committees must depend on the executive department for the facts on any given situation.

Congress has no built-in ability to assess those "facts" once it receives them. It can only haggle about them, air its suspicions of their accuracy and in the end legislate by hunches.

PUBLICATION of the Pentagon papers has raised the decibels of the far-from-new cries of the legislators for more active participation in and supervision of foreign affairs decisions. The papers demonstrated that the lawmakers had practically no intimate knowledge of, let alone influence on, the course of events that led us into the Vietnam War.

It can be said there is equally widespread ignorance on Capitol Hill of how Nixon intends to get us out. And the legislators desperately want to have information that the executive denies them on the grounds that to pour it into the congressional sieve would endanger national security.

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.), one of the most thoughtful of the end-the-war-now members, has proposed a bill to "provide the legislative as well as the executive branch the best intelligence information on foreign policy and national security matters available to the government."

His measure would require the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to furnish germane committees with analyses of the intelligence it gathers.

Even if such a system were installed, Congress would have no technical means of assessing the analyses. And one can imagine the 57 varieties of interpretations that would be laid on them by individual members.

Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) has proposed that the Senate and House set up a joint committee to survey the whole security complex and to make recommendations for action.

But at least three standing committees of each House then would demand to be cut in on the act. The resulting chaos is imaginable.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) may rail at the "secret war" he says the CIA is conducting in Laos. Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.) may demand advance notice before the executive shifts appropriated funds from one country to another, as was done in Cambodia.

But Sen. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) went to the heart of the matter when he said in his assessment of the Communist peace proposals at Paris, "The final decision remains with the President. No matter what Congress does, it is likely to remain there."

*Mr. Bell, a veteran White House AP correspondent, is now a news analyst with The Times' Gannett Bureau.*

ANDERSON, S.C.  
INDEPENDENT

STATINTL

M - 52,097  
S - 51,872

JUL 17 1977

## Secrecy About Laos: A Strange Rationale Keeping Facts Hidden

Sen. Stuart Symington has introduced an amendment to place a \$200 million ceiling on U.S. military assistance to Laos, and the Pentagon, predictably, is opposed.

Without, at the moment, going into the matter of what it is that the U.S. is doing in Laos and what prospects there are for success, we are intrigued, as is the senator from Missouri, over the Defense Department's rationale for its position.

In a statement which Symington has read into the record, the Pentagon declares that the Missourian's amendment "would intrude into matters properly within the constitutional authority of the President, as commander-in-chief, to direct military operations in Southeast Asia."

Now the one thing that can be said for this argument is that it is consistent with the administration's theory that the President has the "inherent power" to do whatever he wants, whatever the Constitution may say to the contrary -- tap your telephone lines without a court order (the Fourth Amendment), pre-censor the press (the First Amendment), pick up citizens and throw them in "preventive detention" when they assemble to petition the government for a redress of grievances (First, Fifth, Sixth, Fourteenth Amendments) and so on.

In this instance, the relevant constitutional provision is Article 1, Section 8, which gives to Congress the power "to declare war," "to raise and

support armies," and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."

The Symington amendment might, true enough, inconvenience the President, but that is not the same as intruding upon his authority, and it seems to us that Congress has every right and responsibility to exercise its own authority, especially on matters like Laos, where something is going on but neither Congress nor the American people quite know what.

But it would also seem that if Congress is going to make these determinations it ought to find out what is going on, and in this connection the action the other day of the House of Representatives is curious indeed.

A "resolution of inquiry," sponsored by Republican Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. of California, was introduced to obtain documents and other information relative to U.S. military and Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos from 1964 to the present.

Other resolutions were offered to get information on our bombing operations in that unhappy country, but the House, taking the position that such information was "too sensitive" for it to know, voted the resolutions down.


Americans who have a right to know may also be intrigued by the House's rationale, but certainly cannot appreciate it any more than they do the Pentagon's.

# The Wonderland of Opium

OPIMUM growing and heroin marketing are not new to Asia or the world. Nor are efforts to control them. Yet last month US President Richard Nixon was prompted to declare a national emergency in his country, bluntly stating: "If we cannot destroy the drug menace in America, then it will surely in time destroy us." America, he admitted, has the highest number of heroin addicts of any nation in the world, although no opium is grown there and no heroin processed. "This deadly poison," Nixon said, "is a foreign import".

Such words must ring ironically in those Asian capitals which are targets of a new international effort to stem drug marketing. And Peking, forced just over a century ago to open its borders to foreign trade after attempting to prevent Westerners from destroying its people with the "foreign mud", now sees the wheel come full circle.

Recently a UN mission accompanied by US observers investigated outlets in northern Thailand — following charges by Taipei that China devoted 6 million acres annually to the production of 10,000 tons of opium for export. It declared China innocent of any involvement in the production or export of opium, heroin or any other narcotics. Marshall Green, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, did not mention China



at a July 12 press conference on the drug problem. He pointed instead to the "golden triangle" — the border areas between Burma, Thailand and Laos.

Experts estimate that in this area 1,000 metric tons of raw papaver somniferum — the "opium poppy" — are harvested every year, 80% of it in Burma, the remainder in Laos and Thailand. Far above the legal limit authorised by the UN, the crop realises 30 tons of heroin in world markets. The route to such markets was directly through Rangoon in the years immediately following world war II, then through Bangkok until 1957, and finally by way of Vientiane, Pnom Penh and Saigon.

The Indochina War, despite creating problems of distribution, has not slowed the flow of drugs. Social workers in South Vietnam now report many of the nation's large street urchin population are hooked on the cheapest form of opium by-product — a dark watery substance which is heated and then injected into the veins. As Green noted, heroin traffickers need to seek new customers as American troops leave Vietnam. "The youth of Asia are a prime target," he concluded "and this disturbing possibility is beginning to come home to Asian leaders". Perhaps they, like their American counterparts, now realise that if they do not destroy the drug menace, it will surely in time destroy them.

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## Fortunes of War

By T. D. Allman, Bangkok

HEROIN addiction among American soldiers in Vietnam has finally prompted White House orders for US missions in Southeast Asia to crack down on drug traffic. But these new efforts to curb the clandestine trade in drugs are not America's first incursion into the murky area of Southeast Asia's most secret and profitable business enterprise. Though the exact details have been well-guarded secrets, several US clandestine agencies and a number of allied Asian military leaders have been involved in the traffic for years. Until the tragedy of opium and heroin addiction began to strike US soldiers, the reason for American involvement in the trade was ruthlessly simple. Opium is a major basis of the power wielded by several of the area's most influential pro-American leaders, and US influence with them has depended partly on American ability to influence the flow of opium within the region.

The remote northern mountains of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Burma are among the world's prime opium growing areas. Traditionally, the local warlord, governor or military commander has controlled the drug trade for his own profit. In their efforts to dominate these regions, American personnel have become involved in a sordid business that goes back to the opium wars of the last century.

The degree and nature of official involvement in the drug trade takes different forms in different countries. When asked by a congressional committee if Asian government officials

were involved US Attorney General John Mitchell replied "the fact of the matter is there has been involvement of government officials in some of these countries. Mitchell refused to name publicly any of the suspected figures, but Congressman Robert Steele, a former CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) officer who has personally investigated Southeast Asian drug trade, said a fortnight ago the US had "hard intelligence" that Major General Ngo Dzu, commander of a vital military zone



Vientiane marijuana market: Traffic is hardest to control in Laos, because of involvement at the top.

in northern South Vietnam was "one of the chief traffickers in heroin in Southeast Asia". Although Dzu promptly denied the charge, both Saigon's defence ministry and the US state department announced they would investigate immediately. But when similar accusations were made against Vice Presi-

15 JUL 1971

STATINTL

## Capitol Punishment

*He's the Man Without a Secret*

By Art Buchwald

After being away from Washington for 17 days I found the town completely changed. Everywhere I went, people were trading secret Pentagon papers to each other.

The first place I stopped was the National Press Club bar. It was jammed with correspondents holding up Xeroxed copies in their hands.

"I'll give you two Henry Cabot Lodge memos for one McNamara position paper," someone yelled.

"I've got a Walt Rostow pre-Toukin Gulf evaluation I'll trade for a Tet offensive report."

"How about a Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency plan for the invasion of Manchuria?"

I drank in embarrassed silence. Finally a New York Times man next to me said, "You don't have any Dean Rusk memos to Maxwell Taylor to complete my collection?"

I replied, "I don't have any papers at all."

"I thought you were a newspaperman," he said.

"I am, but I was out of the country when Daniel Ellsberg was handing out the documents."

He turned away from me with suspicion.

I tapped him on the shoulder. "You wouldn't let me see one, would you?" I asked.

"I should say not," he said indignantly. "These are classified documents."

I saw a friend of mine from The Washington Post.

"Murray," I said, "I don't know how to put this to you, but I was wondering if I could borrow a stolen Pentagon paper until I get paid on Thursday."

Murray said, "I'd like to help you, but I need every one I've got. I know the guy from the Boston Globe has some extra McGeorge Bundy cables. Why don't you ask him?"

I went down the bar to the Boston Globe man. "Healy," I said, "I'm plumb out of Pentagon papers. Could you spare a couple until I can make contact with a traitor from the Rand Corporation?"

"You know I'd do anything for you," Healy said, "but according to Attorney General John Mitchell, these papers could compromise the government. I would be betraying a trust if I gave them to somebody from the press."

"Healy," I said. "I don't like to beg, but I'm the only guy in town that doesn't have a single stolen document. How can I hold up my head in this profession if I don't have a Pentagon paper to my name?"

Healy replied, "Look, we're dealing with top secret stuff here. I know you wouldn't do anything with the papers, and Murray knows you wouldn't do anything to compromise the country. But does J. Edgar Hoover know it?"

A man from the Los Angeles Times said, "Does anyone want to trade the CIA's estimate of Madame Nhu for the plans of a military coup in Laos?"

"I'll do it," the bartender said, bringing out some papers from behind the bar.

"You have papers too?" I asked in surprise.

"Sure," he said. "All my tips for the past month have been in stolen Pentagon papers."

"You wouldn't sell any, would you?"

"Not on your life. These papers were given to me on the condition I would never show them to strangers."

I left the bar trying not to hear the taunts of the drinkers.

A Chicago Sun-Times man said, loudly enough for me to hear, "We ought to keep an eye on who comes into this place or our papers will be leaked all over town."

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# Meos Are Blending Into Laos

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIETIANE—Kham Hung at 15 is a Meo civilian and says he's lucky not being a soldier because soldiering is dying, a link he understands thoroughly, talks of knowingly, and the reason he'll probably never go back to the mountains.

Besides, "I'm forgetting how to speak Meo. I'm forgetting how to be Meo," he says in Vietnamese.

Kham Hung's father, a "captain" in the CIA's "Meo Army," was killed in action over two years ago. Then his mother died a month later of "lowland sickness," as he describes it. He and two younger sisters were brought to Vientiane by a Laotian "captain," a friend of their father's and placed with his relatives.

"I'm becoming a Lao when I forget to speak Meo. I don't have Meo friends here to talk to, only Lao friends. Maybe in two more years I will speak no Meo language, only Lao and Vietnamese."

Kham Hung is one among a growing Meo population in the lowland capital, a presence grown to "at least a thousand, probably two and may easily be more already," according to an American teacher with close ties to the tiny group of Meo secondary students here.

"You can't really count them," he says, "because most hide their Meo identity quickly to try blending into the Lao community. The Laos know because they hear the accent, but my ear isn't that sensitive and most can pass physically as ethnic Lao."

Kham Hung is young and his status is different enough so that he finds it unnecessary to hide his identity, but he talks with pride, then with discomfort, about "forgetting how to be Meo." But, like other Meo students here, he doesn't want to go back to the mountains.

"In the mountains," he explains, "Meo boys become soldiers at 15," adding simply, "I don't want to be a soldier."

Soldiering has been a way of life for Meo men for at least three decades. Two years ago the army was drafting 15-year-olds for lack of older soldiers; today they are drafting 12-year-olds to maintain the 10,000-man army and the average age of the soldier is reported to be 15.

"It's better to live here and learn to be a Laotian," he says, grinning.

There have been shocks since he arrived on the lowlands. "My uncle," a Lao captain, "is dead in the war, too," he says. But his youthful transitions have been easy. He calls his adoptive parents mother and father and speaks of them with respect and affection.

For older Meo the changes in place, custom, weather, language and dress are more wrenching than the culture shock among Americans going into alien, unmodernized societies. Meo withdrawal into depression, from which some never recover, is frequent, according to the American teacher.

For most, however, accommodation comes rather easily, retaining what is possible of mountain ways, hiding some, quickly forgetting most.

Newly arrived Meo are obvious on the streets. They cling to mountain dress, basic black cotton for men and women, with women wearing day-glo colored sashes, bandanas, scarves, belts and tiny aprons about waist and neck, combinations of colors that identify their clans.

They also wear heavy silver jewelry, though that is now sold as souvenirs in Vientiane's gold and silver shops.

Silver is the base of wealth among the Meo. Beaten silver bands adorn the men's bird guns and silver rings inlaid with enamels identify clans.

There are only two obvious centers of Meo wealth in Vientiane, the villa of Gen. Vang Pao and the huge hangar of Touby Ly Pong, often called "King of Meo." Vang Pao is a hereditary clan chief and

former minister of social welfare educated in France.

Meo arriving in Vientiane, like aliens elsewhere, go first among their own kind, living as small, scattered clusters in the unoccupied buildings of government villas or small ghettos in the city.

Broom-making provides their main income. Families of two to six, or more, wander the business districts with backpacks of brooms.

Broom-making and peddling is not lucrative, Meo say, and is passed on to later arrivals when better work is gained.

Cottage handicrafts for the souvenir market are rapidly developing, stimulated by the ease of selling silver and embroidered cloth decorations for new arrivals.

Although Westerners working with Meo say they learn quickly, there is little they know that is useful on the lowlands.

Divisions between the Meo and lowland Lao run deep. Affection like that between Kham Hung's father and his "uncle" is almost unique among adults.

The ethnic Lao, the major minority among minorities, consider the mountain peoples inferior, or savages and slaves.

In turn, the Meo consider the lowlanders inferior, indolent, soft and unwelcome when they come to the mountains. War has widened the differences, according to Meo, Lao and knowledgeable Westerners.

Resentment wells up among the Lao against advantages believed accruing to the tribespeople from their unique relationship with the United States, one following from a similar relationship with colonial France.

To most Lao, "the Meo" have become synonymous with one-third of Laos' Meo clans aligned with Vang Pao. "The Meo" are a mercenary people, according to the Lao.

Yet there are perhaps 5 million Meo scattered through south China, North Vietnam, Burma, Laos and Thailand with Laos having three to four hundred thousand of them and only one-third of those accepting Vang Pao as primary war lord.

And important to the traditional Lao elite is the belief that promises were made by Americans for a Meo nation, at least partially independent of Vientiane, to "buy" the Meo. That such nationhood is virtually impossible as a result of the war's decimation doesn't change the suspicions.

There is also suspicion that the tribe is simply receiving a disproportionate amount of assistance, evidenced by truckloads of rice running endlessly through the city for air delivery to the mountains.

The elite in particular remember the "stockpiling" of food, arms and ammunition, and medical supplies that occurred when Touby Ly Pong was minister of social welfare, which the Meo used following the 1962 cease-fire and played a large part in bringing North Vietnamese intervention in their frontier areas.

Stories of the brutality and thievery of Vang Pao's Meo troops when they occupied the Plain of Jars were carried down from the plain last year by Lao refugees. The stories remain current.

Below the 3,000-foot level of their mountains nature exacts a toll of the Meo. Malaria, endemic to Laos' mountains below 3,000 feet, kills and cripples mountaineers. Heat is strength-sapping and, coupled with exhaustion and disease, is itself a killer. Starvation alone has killed possibly tens of thousands.

War has taken most of the military age men, plus women and children, and continues still with only whispers of Meo capitulation.

In the city and towns the Meo are different, a tiny minority among an overwhelming Lao majority. Lowlanders don't want them.

As Kham Hung says, "It is better to be a Lao, so I am becoming a Lao."