

26 DEC 1972

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.

That Was Year That Was

As a general rule, nothing happens during the last week of the year. It is as if nature herself cooperated in the stillness of public affairs, so as not to get in the way of the holidays. Sometimes it doesn't work: indeed, there are nefarious spirits who take advantage of our preoccupation with the holidays. They used to say, in England a generation ago, that Neville Chamberlain took his weekends in the country, while Adolf Hitler took his countries in the weekend.

And of course the rules do not now apply in Cuba. There, puzzling over how to eliminate the Christmas slow-down in harvesting the winter sugar crop, Fidel Castro has figured it out: He is eliminating Christmas. From now on "Christmas" will be in mid-summer, after the summer harvest. Castro tends to go in for half-way measures. Why not declare that the month of August will henceforward be called December?

But mostly we can assume that the events of the year are behind us. What were the big ones?

Well there was Vietnam. In the spring the North Vietnamese launched a great offensive. There have not been as many tanks mobilized against a small country since Hitler marched into the Lowlands. We had, apparently, no intimation, of the offensive, even as ten years ago we had no intimation of the sudden appearance of the Berlin Wall, though one would have thought that such a stand-by accumulation of bricks and mortar would not have escaped the notice even of the CIA. A dozen years ago someone remarked that the weekend's attempted assassination of Sugarno had all the earmarks of a CIA operation: every one in the room was killed except Sukarno.

Having survived the surprise, President Nixon ordered the blockading of Haiphong Harbor, and it was quite popularly supposed that this measure would lead to a cancellation of the Moscow visit, the indefinite postponement of the SALT talks, the appearance in Indo-China of Chinese troops, and at least a little world war. Critics of Mr. Nixon were gravely

disappointed a) that international diplomacy continued on its chartered course; and b) that the North Vietnamese offensive was stopped. It would have been so very much easier if the North Vietnamese had won. If the North Vietnamese continue to fail in their aggressions against the south, they may very well wake up one day and find they have lost the support of American liberals.

On the domestic front it was of course a presidential election year. George McGovern was, really, the man of the year. It was a great surprise that he won the Democratic nomination, but no one anticipated that he would fight his way into the pages of American history as principal sponsor of the greatest upset in political history. Richard Nixon — Richard Nixon! — carrying every state of the Union except Massachusetts. Nobody could have accomplished that except George McGovern, and already the John Birch Society has figured it out. Nixon, who of course is the tool of the Communists, has tools of his own. It was he who contrived McGovern's nomination. Next time around, McGovern isn't going to play so easy to get for the Republicans. His price will be much higher. He is a proven performer, after all.

The colleges were quieter, and the atmosphere generally irenic. True, the reactionaries at Yale University did not permit General Westmoreland to speak, but they exhibited moderation, after all. They might have spirited him away and shipped him to North Vietnam, an overdue return for all those secret documents we have taken from them over the years. Yale is slowing down.

Oh yes, there was the 55th Annual Drought in the Soviet Union since the Bolshevik Revolution. It brought on great food shortages except in the little oases and pieces of Russia where people are permitted to grow their own vegetables. There the sun and rain were abundant. The Soviet Union will try the guilty parties, but not in time to prevent the 56th Annual Drought, which will take place next year. That's what the Marxists call dialectical certitude.

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Hans Brinker in Jakarta

By Richard L. Strout

I am reading "Hans Brinker, or The Silver Skates" to Stevie and Doug; the front page says, "For Edith Mayne from Papa, Christmas, 1907," and there is a note in my handwriting, "re-read for Betsy, Feb. 22, 1947." Now this same volume is in Jakarta, Indonesia.

I read it before the clouds settle for the day on our local volcano. It starts with Hans and Gretel fastening their skates "upon the bank of a frozen canal in Holland."

I look up; a lizard hangs on the wall. Sounds of twittering birds — a rooster, a sheep, a goat. The great banana leaves sway; a couple of eccentrically colored butterflies sip poinsettias, bougainvillea, roses, gardenias, and vivid blossoms I don't even know the names of.

Always the gurgle of water. You can see a couple of miles down into the deep valley. All the way down it is terraced into rice paddies: they begin above our red-tiled cottage and go on down and down, in a dozen or more moist steps, to the red-tiled cottage far below, set in a green jumble of coconut palms.

I must stop reading about the frozen dikes and go back and have another look at my gigantic snail. I left him a minute ago on the wall behind the cypress, boiling along at an inch an hour.

It is appropriate, in a way, to read Hans Brinker here. The Dutch held this country once. It was their Batavia. No Ice Age ever scoured its verdure, no Calvin ever plowed this voluptuous metaphysical soil. What names—Java, Sumatra, Bali, Borneo; the Celebes, the Moluccas. Joseph Conrad sailed these waters. The Dutch ruled and exploited the islands for three centuries. The relatives of Hans and Gretel may be buried up there above me as I read, where the burned mansion of the great tea plantation stood. In a cool, serene glade the tombstones tell of Dutch "geboren's," and of lifetimes spent far from Holland. The grand

stone stairway is left and recalls colonial splendor. A peasant hut stands there now on a tiled floor left from the building when the revolution tossed the Dutch out.

What comes next? I ponder this as I read Hans Brinker. There was the revolutionary ardor of 1945. Then the 20-year effort at democracy. President Sukarno held the masses in the trance of his spellbinding oratory. The CIA underwrote an abortive revolution against him. He was never a Communist himself, it appears, but under him the world's largest Communist Party developed. He put on a spectacular show, torchlight parades, emotional rallies, denunciation of all his neighbors. "The climate came closer and closer to madness," said a survivor of the regime, Adam Malik. The government was a triangle of antagonistic forces, the Army in one corner, the Communist PKI party in another, Sukarno in the third, operating through his old bureaucratic elite.

On the night of Sept. 30, 1965, six generals were dragged from bed and killed in an abortive coup. Some say it was a direct Communist putsch; others hint that it was instituted by a dissident group of younger officers in an essentially internal Army affair.

Then this gentle paradise had a blood bath of nobody knows how many lives. Thousands of persons, Communists and non-Communists alike, were massacred in reprisals. The country says one author, "in the literal sense, ran amok — a Malay word, incidentally, which originated in the islands to describe a nervous seizure which leads to murderous frenzy." Today the Army pretty much runs things.

... Well, well, Hans Brinker is a long way off and I must go and see my giant snail. The clouds have settled down punctually on our volcano, which last erupted in 1948. You can't see it through the clouds, but it is there all right, waiting.

Nkrumah: Pan-Africanist fighter

By William Worthly

Not long after being restored to power in 1958, as the North African crisis in Algeria deepened, French President Charles de Gaulle offered a so-called "choice" to France's West African colonies: a place within the French Union (a euphemism for French neo-colonialism) or a total, abrupt severance of all formal ties with the "mother" country.

After long and varying periods of plunder by French imperialism, all but one colony decided they couldn't make a clean break with their dependent status. It was obvious that de Gaulle had manipulated and counted on just that reaction. Some 14 years later, most of the countries that followed his script have yet to gain true national liberation.

The one colony that picked up de Gaulle's other option was Guinea. To the surprise and fury of Paris, President Sekou Toure led his financially bankrupt people out of the French embrace. For the colonial metropolis, his decision was as intolerable (as a precedent for others) as was Fidel Castro's opting out of the U.S. empire in Latin America.

Every conceivable measure was devised to make an example of the uppity upstart from Guinea. All programs of economic aid in every field were abruptly terminated. Teachers, doctors, technicians and other experts were summoned home to France, leaving behind a trail of economic sabotage and a colonized people with almost none of the educated cadres needed to keep a society afloat. Toure acceded to "power," only to find that his treasury had been literally rifled by the departing French "civilizers" and that the free and independent country was on the verge of collapse and imminent starvation.

Solidarity in practice

Into this dire gap stepped President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, with \$20 million to tide Guinea over the immediate crisis. For a country itself only a year or so out of the grip of classic British colonialism, \$20 million was a good-sized loan that probably put a strain on Ghana's own treasury.

But it saved the day for Sekou Toure, who remained eternally grateful. Not surprisingly, it was he who invited Nkrumah to come to live in exile in Guinea after the pro-Western 1966 army coup in Ghana deposed him. Toure bestowed on him the honorary title of "co-president."

character, sections of the Western press periodically invented "rifts" between the two close friends.

Numerous assassination attempts, usually traceable to outside intervention, dotted Nkrumah's years in power. In one instance, by unintentionally arriving a few minutes late for a dedication ceremony, he avoided being killed by a time-bomb planted in a bouquet of flowers that had been given to a small child to present to him. Knowing how eagerly the West sought his ouster because of his strong anti-colonialism, Nkrumah was naive to absent himself from home and thereby to make a coup that much easier to stage. From reports at the time, British intelligence seemed to have played the major outside role in the coup, with the CIA lending active support.

Those two closely meshed agencies may well have instigated the naive and futile Vietnam "peace mission" that Nkrumah allowed the British prime minister and other Commonwealth leaders to talk him into undertaking. As long ago as 1966, both Hanoi and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam had already made clear the basic terms on which the war could be settled and there was no role for the London-dominated British Commonwealth to play in reaching such a settlement.

Knowledge of neo-colonialism

By no means should it be implied that Kwame Nkrumah had no understanding of the devious workings of imperialism. That he knew much about his enemies is clear from his 1965 book "Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism," which he dedicated to "the freedom fighters of Africa, living and dead."

While Nkrumah was in power, his country was a home away from home for countless African exiles and liberation fighters. In the early 1960s, our own W.E.B. DuBois and his wife gave up their U.S. citizenship to move to Accra and to become highly honored citizens of Ghana. Nkrumah personally sponsored DuBois' last great scholarly undertaking (at age 90): the projected 10-year editorship of an encyclopedia of Africa. (Shortly after the 1966 coup, DuBois' widow, Shirley Graham, left Ghana.)

As Nkrumah surveyed the neo-colonial mess that much of Africa has become, he must have died with a broken heart. The West has skillfully re-established its de facto control over Africa, after having granted nominal

political independence to numerous colonies during the 1950s and 1960s. One of the best-publicized examples, of course, was in the former Belgian Congo (now Zaire). Both in retrospect and in analysis, it is clear that Brussels had not the slightest intention of giving up its control over that colony's priceless resources. The quick, greased downfall of Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba had been plotted long before the formal lowering of the Belgian flag in June 1960 at so-called independence ceremonies.

Former UN diplomat Conor Cruise O'Brien and others have thoroughly documented the record of Belgian-British-U.S. duplicity. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold allowed the world organization to be used in the re-enslavement of the Congo. By the autumn of 1960, when events were closing in on the trusting, Lumumba—events that culminated in his foul and brutal murder in February 1961—Kwame Nkrumah, as president of Ghana, wrote to him with the classic warning: "The only colonialist or imperialist that I trust is a dead one." Believing that the UN would play a neutral role, Lumumba (to Nkrumah's dismay) had called in UN forces after a Belgian-instigated rebellion in his own army.

Had Nkrumah not died of cancer while under medical treatment in Bucharest, might he ultimately have regained power? No one can say for sure. But an official invitation to return home to Ghana after the recent overthrow of the repressive pro-Western regime amounted to a vindication of his efforts, if not of his complete administrative record, as father and first president of his country. After six years, the right wing generals of Ghana and their civilian supporters had shown they had no socio-political-economic program to meet the many problems of a new nation. The policy of reopening Ghana to unlimited western investment and exploitation had worsened the economy and the condition of the people. Discontent was massive. Corruption was everywhere. Universities were closed because the students were in active rebellion.

As with Indonesia after Sukarno's overthrow in 1965 by his army and the CIA, as with Cambodia after the military-CIA coup in 1970 that deposed Prince Sihanouk, as with all the former colonies that enjoyed a brief respite of self-respect before being re-colonized, Ghana has a leader respected throughout Africa, whatever his shortcomings, as a true patriot. He failed to build

continued

A Short History of CIA Intervention in Sixteen Foreign Countries

In July, 1947, Congress passed one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the history of America in peacetime. The National Security Act of 1947 created The National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Air Force and, not least of all, the CIA. This act provided the Agency with five principal duties:

- 1. To advise the National Security Council on matters concerning intelligence.*
- 2. To make recommendations for the coordination of such intelligence matters.*
- 3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and disseminate it to other government departments.*
- 4. To perform "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."*
- 5. To perform "such other functions and duties as the NSC would direct."*

In 1949 Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act, allowing the agency to disregard laws that required disclosure of information concerning the organization, to expend funds without regard to laws and regulations governing expenditures with no other accounting than the Director's vouchers, and to make contracts and purchases without advertising.

With such unprecedented authority, with unlimited access to money, with liberty to act without regard to scrutiny or review by either civilian or governmental organizations, the CIA has become a self-contained state. One observer ranks the CIA as the fourth world power, after the U.S., Russia, and China.

Partly because of the CIA's special "secret" status and partly because of the laziness of the press, the total history of CIA intervention in foreign countries has never been reported. What you read instead are fragments—an attempted bribe in Mexico last July, an assassination in Africa last November.

What emerges here is an atlas of intrigue but not a grand design; on the contrary, the CIA's record is as erratic and contradictory as that of any bureaucracy in the Federal stable. But you do begin to comprehend the enormous size of the CIA and its ruthless behavior. The rules permit murder, defoliation and drug addiction for political ends. Look at the record:



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Taiwan's Many Little Secret 'Wars'

By Charles F. Ransom

Of The Register's Editorial Page Staff

THE NIXON Administration was offended by the cheering in the United Nations General Assembly at the assembly vote which led to the ousting of Taiwan (the Nationalist "Republic of China").

But for much of the world, Taiwan does not have the "good guy" image it has had in the United States, but is regarded as a usurper to the name of "China" and a troublemaker in east Asia. Taiwan announced regularly its intent to "liberate" the mainland by force, and used what force it could muster.

Besides this open goal, it took part in a series of secret wars, mostly with the help of the United States, some at its instigation.

The world laughed in 1953, when the neophyte Republican Administration in Washington "unleashed Chiang Kai-shek" -- that is, stopped preventing him from carrying on hostilities against the Chinese mainland. The U.S. restrained him during the Korean War; one Asian war at a time was more than enough.

Taiwan-Based CIA Airline

But it wasn't funny. Chiang was serious. The pin-prick raids from the offshore islands to the mainland; the heavy concentration of troops and guns on Quemoy, five miles from the mainland; the overflights of mainland China with Taiwan-operated U-2 spy planes furnished by the United States became public at the time or a bit later. But

they were not all the "unleashed" Chiang did.

Allen Whiting, one of America's outstanding China-watchers, pieced together the story for the New York Review of Books. Whiting watched China from the U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong 1966-68 and is now a political scientist at the University of Michigan's Center for Chinese Studies. He found evidence of Taiwan's secret wars in the Pentagon Papers, in new studies of China-India relations, in the memoirs of George Patterson, a British missionary-journalist, and elsewhere.

It was an airline based on Taiwan, financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which provided transport for U.S.-trained sabotage and guerrilla teams sent into North Vietnam in 1954, when Vietnam was legally at peace.

The same airline provided the transport for the CIA effort to overthrow the Indonesian government in 1953.

Warplanes and transports from Taiwan airdropped arms and supplies to Tibetan rebels in the period from 1951 through 1962, though the major fighting was quickly suppressed in 1951 and 1959. They used refueling bases in Thailand and flew over India and Burma without permission. India and China each thought the planes belonged to the other and complained. The Burmese shot one down, it landed in Thailand and was identified as a Chinese Nationalist bomber from Taiwan.

Taiwan had a secret part in the wars in Laos and South Vietnam, too. Still another CIA-financed airline was formed in 1960, and a third later in the 1960s, and carried on legal commercial passenger and freight business in Laos and Vietnam, and also clandestine military

operations. One job was ferrying guerrilla paratroops trained by the United States in Taiwan. North Vietnam caught some of them in 1963 and sentenced them, but the effort continued. Later Taiwan more or less openly sent several dozen psychological warfare men to South Vietnam.

Equipment Handouts

The United States paid for a lot of this clandestine activity, and also made it possible for Taiwan to maintain large and modern armed forces for a country of only 14 million people. With considerable pride, Taiwan stopped taking open U.S. "military aid" some years ago, but it has continued to get handouts in the form of "excess equipment" -- including planes, tanks, missiles and destroyers of not quite the latest model.

Whiting does not say so, but Taiwan enlarged its airport runways to take America's biggest planes, in the hope of replacing Okinawa as base for American strategic bombers and nuclear weapons.

There are only about 8,000 American servicemen on Taiwan now and routine U.S. naval patrols of the Taiwan Strait have stopped, and still more recently U.S. overflights of China have stopped. But the U.S.-Taiwan military alliance continues.

In words this alliance is defensive. But Taiwan's record must look pretty aggressive to mainland China, Burma, India, and other countries which learned about it long before it became public knowledge in the United States.

What Nixon Must Do to Make Friends in Peking

Allen S. Whiting

tier in 1962, culminating in the Sino-Indian war that fell.

These crises produced Chinese Communist military reactions which, in turn, have been used to justify a vast network of US military bases, alliances, and military assistance programs throughout Asia, ostensibly to contain the threat of Chinese Communist aggression.

Such developments bear scrutiny by the American people and, thanks to the "Pentagon Papers," partial documentation can now prove what journalists could previously only allege. In the past, secrecy has served primarily to conceal the facts from Americans; the details have long been known in Peking. If, however, Americans are to understand Peking's demand that we "withdraw all US bases and military personnel from Taiwan," the facts about the concrete provocations that underlie this demand must be known. Only if we cease all hostile operations involving the Chinese Nationalists, whether from Taiwan and the offshore islands or elsewhere in Asia, can there be real hope that President Nixon's plan to visit Peking will result in a successful "journey of peace."

Clandestine Chinese Nationalist Air Activity: Taiwan to Tibet, 1954-61

The Chinese Nationalists have, with the knowledge and support of the United States, carried out clandestine air, sea, and land operations against mainland China and neighboring areas for twenty years. From 1950 to 1953, hostilities between Chinese Communist and United Nations forces in Korea may have justified our support for these activities. However, our shadowy involvement with Mao's civil war enemy steadily grew after the Korean War and the Geneva Conference of 1954.

The "Pentagon Papers" are highly revealing about the air operations in particular. According to a top secret memorandum from Brigadier General Edward Lansdale to General Maxwell Taylor, President Kennedy's chief military adviser, a Chinese Nationalist commercial airline, Civil Air Transport (CAT), ostensibly "engaged in scheduled and non-scheduled air operations throughout the Far East," was, actually

"a CIA proprietary." CAT furnished Lansdale wrote in 1961,

... air logistical support under commercial cover to most CIA and other US Government agencies' requirements ... by providing trained and experienced personnel, procurement of supplies and equipment through overt commercial channels, and the maintenance of a fairly large inventory of transport and other type aircraft under both China and US registry.

CAT's activities extended far beyond the confines of China. As early as 1954, for instance, Lansdale, then a colonel, organized paramilitary teams in Saigon for sabotage and guerrilla warfare in North Vietnam. He reported that "CAT provided SMM [Saigon Military Mission] with the means for secret air travel between the North and Saigon."³ Lansdale also claimed that in 1958 CAT furnished "complete logistical and tactical support for the Indonesian operation," an abortive CIA effort to overthrow Sukarno through an army rebellion in Sumatra.⁴ But most pertinent for our purposes is the revelation that by 1961 CAT had carried out "more than 200 overflights of mainland China and Tibet."⁵

Lansdale's memo forces us to reconsider the revolt against China that took place in Tibet in 1959, a revolt that had an important effect on subsequent Sino-American as well as Sino-Indian relations. At the time, Peking charged that outside help for the rebels came from Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalists openly acknowledged these charges.⁶ No independent verification was available, however, except through the somewhat exotic writings of a British missionary-journalist, George Patterson.⁷ Patterson's claim of divine guidance and his passionate advocacy of Tibetan resistance—he favored the militant, lesser-known Khambas of East Tibet against the more passive center of the Dalai Lama at Lhasa—aroused disbelief when he wrote his dramatic accounts. He got little attention, too, when he claimed that in 1955 he had acted as interpreter for an American official who offered clandestine help to

Summit meetings in the past between an American President and a communist leader have never resolved any existing problems, but they have created some basis of communication and understanding which have helped to prevent conflict. So too the meeting between President Nixon and Chou En-lai is unlikely to bring peace to Indochina or, at one stroke, dispose of Taiwan's future. However, if it is to lead to better relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, it must go far beyond the "exchanges of view" of Geneva, 1955, and Glassboro, 1967. It must mark concrete concessions by both sides on the most fundamental clash of interests, US relations with Chiang Kai-shek and the status of Taiwan.

Walter P. McCaughy, the present US Ambassador to the Republic of China, testified in 1969 that "any US military presence or military-related activity on Taiwan is viewed by the Chinese Communists with especial hostility, since Peking considers such activity on Taiwan as interference in its internal affairs."¹ This statement conceals a double-truth. First, we *did* interfere in China's internal affairs when, in June, 1950, we interposed the US Seventh Fleet between the two sides of a civil war. And we have been intervening ever since, having supplied \$2.5 billion in military assistance to one side, the Nationalists, while making a treaty commitment to defend them from attack by the other side, the Communists.

But even more direct and threatening an interference in China's internal affairs, at least as perceived by Peking, has been what Ambassador McCaughy elliptically referred to as our "military-related activity." In conjunction with the Chinese Nationalists we have sponsored and supported a wide range of espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla activities on the mainland. Those activities created crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1954 and 1958 and, as we shall see, furthered a revolt in Tibet in 1959. Covert operations from Taiwan heightened Chinese alarm over Indian advances on the Tibetan fron-

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World Gets Rights To German Spymaster's Memoirs

World Publishing Company has acquired world rights, including all book and serial rights and excluding only German-language rights, to the memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen, German chief of Wehrmacht intelligence on the Eastern Front during World War II and then head of the clandestine Buro Gehlen which operated in West Germany, secretly financed by the Central Intelligence Agency from the war's end until 1956 (*PW Currents*, September 20). World plans publication in May of 1972. From 1956 until his retirement in May, 1968, General Gehlen was chief of the official West German Intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst. He was one of the most influential, feared, brilliant, mysterious and successful figures in the history of espionage.

The publication of General Gehlen's memoirs will release a vast amount of information previously unavailable about World War II and the cold war period that followed it. The publishers believe, on the basis of their current knowledge of the manuscript's contents, that the whole historiography of World War II will have to be substantially revised after its publication. Gehlen's revelation that Reichsleiter Martin Bormann was a Soviet spy during World War II, a disclosure which has aroused intense interest in the world press, is only an example of the extraordinary nature of the material the book will offer.

World's purchase of the rights to General Gehlen's memoirs culminates several years of interest and pursuit by James O. Wade, editor-in-chief of the adult department of World Publishing and formerly senior editor of the Macmillan Company, where he commissioned a still unpublished biography of the general. Last month, Mr. Wade learned that previous arrangements for publication of the memoirs, understood to have been final, had been cancelled. Mr. Wade immediately reported this news to Peter V. Ritner, vice-president and director of World's general publishing division. Mr. Ritner, publisher of "Inside the Third Reich" (*Macmillan*) by Gehlen's wartime colleague, Albert Speer, went to Germany to look into the situation personally. He spent a day in Mainz in the company of George Bailey—an old friend, ABC correspondent and former American intelligence officer—reviewing parts of the manuscript and assuring himself that it was both authentic and sensational.

From Volker Hansen, head of Hase und Kohler Verlag, the German pub-

lisher acting as general agent for the property, Mr. Ritner obtained a two-week option. Approaches were made to other publishers and media, with the result that by September 7, an offer well in excess of \$400,000 had been made to the German publisher.

In West Germany, Conrad Ahlers, a government spokesman in Bonn, told newsmen that any disclosure of confidential information in the memoirs would violate West German law. As a result, a great deal of material falling into this category has had to be deleted from the Hase und Kohler Verlag text and from all other forms of publication in the German language, including serialization in the newspaper *Die Welt*, which, having paid a record equivalent of \$250,000 for serialization rights, published the first installment of the memoirs on September 10.

West German law cannot, however, control what is published in other languages outside of the country. General Gehlen has consequently insisted on many additions to the English-language version over what can be published in Germany and has further insisted, as a point of his contract with World, that all translations into other languages be made from the full and definitive text that will comprise World's English-language version.

While General Gehlen's knowledge and authority may go unquestioned, recent articles that picked up the Bormann story have suggested that he may have mixed motives in releasing his book for publication, even though they have failed to suggest any substantial motive that might distort his telling of the myriad facts uniquely at his disposal. It has been known for some time, for example, that Gehlen's organization operated illegally in West Germany after the war, with secret financing from the American Government through the CIA, and it has been surmised that Washington kept the arrangement secret out of embarrassment over the need to employ the 4000 men with whom Gehlen staffed his *Büro*, most of whom were former Nazis who worked under the SS or Gestapo, but who were nonetheless the only men qualified to conduct espionage and security operations in this area of the cold war. Hitherto, the matter has been taken lightly by the press, possibly because sufficient evidence was publicly unavailable. General Gehlen's memoirs now provide that evidence.

The book also shows how the American government knew the Bay of Pigs

invasion would fail; how Gehlen, a close personal friend of General Moshe Dayan, helped build the Israeli intelligence organization Sheroot Yediot (SHAI); how the CIA was restrained from interfering with the anti-Communist coup in Indonesia that ended in the slaughter of 600,000 Indonesian "Communists"; why former West German intelligence chief Otto John may have "defected" to the East; how Bonn had five days advance warning of Israel's "surprise" attack on the Arabs in the Six Day War of June, 1967, three weeks advance notice of the building of the Berlin Wall, and six weeks advance notice of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The German publisher, Volker Hansen, is the son of a World War II officer who was a close associate of Gehlen's in the Wehrmacht. (Gehlen's uncle ran a publishing house in Germany before the war, and Gehlen's father ran its Breslau branch). Gehlen and Hansen's father were both in communication with Canaris, Stauffenberg and the other officers who were planning to assassinate Hitler, and Gehlen warned Stauffenberg that the plot would fail. (What really happened during the plot of July 20 is also covered in the memoirs.)

After the war, Hansen's father spent 11 years in a Russian prison camp. When he returned to Germany he picked up the threads of his life, and one of the old friends he looked up was Gehlen. Hansen senior and Hansen junior spent years convincing Gehlen to write the story of his career.

General Gehlen has also expressed his intention to make himself available for promotional appearances and interviews in the United States upon the book's publication. World plans publication in May of 1972.

Little Black Lies

Spy Groups Increase Use of False Material To Put Enemy on Spot

How Prague Tripped Up U.S. On a Latin Opinion Poll; Planting 'Data' in a Lake Laxative in the Salt Shakers

By EVERETT G. MARTIN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Until last June, relations between U.S. Ambassador Anthony Marshall and President Philibert Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic were going swimmingly. Then without warning, Mr. Marshall was called to the foreign ministry and told to leave the republic, which occupies the island of Madagascar. Even today the former ambassador isn't certain what happened. His only clue is that Malagasy newspapers reported that the government had received a secret document allegedly signed by him that implicated him in a supposed coup planned against President Tsiranana.

In the Middle East last August, Radio Baghdad breathlessly broadcast the text of a document it said "proves the U.S. role in planning and instigating the liquidation of the Palestine resistance in Jordan." In this case the document was a letter from a Jordanian official thanking the American ambassador on behalf of King Hussein for intelligence information on Palestine guerrilla activities.

Washington stoutly maintains that in both cases Americans are the victims of a hoax. Officials say Ambassador Marshall neither wrote nor signed such a document. King Hussein's thank-you note was never written—at least, not by a Jordanian official—and its implications are false, the Americans say. Of course, U.S. officials could be expected to deny everything, but chances are in these cases they are right; the documents have all the earmarks of not-too-subtle examples of the art of "black propaganda" at work.

Sticks, Stones—and Words

Black propaganda has nothing to do with race. It is the business of going to elaborate ends to spread half-true, misleading or downright false information to get your enemy in trouble. In the past decade it has come into increasing use as a tool of espionage establishments.

No one is sure who is behind the Malagasy document, which President Tsiranana has never let any outsiders see. Some observers speculate that it could be the Russians, interested in causing Americans trouble with a country in the Indian Ocean, where the Soviet fleet is actively steaming. Or it could be the French, wanting to weaken growing American economic influence in the island. Or it could be the Americans. Yet a third possibility is that President Tsiranana cooked up the document to get rid of a political rival and that Ambassador Mar-

The Jordanian letter more clearly seems to be a Communist invention to stir up trouble in the Middle East, Washington experts on Russia say. These authorities contend that the Russians are the most active in black propaganda because they take to it naturally. "There was a conspiracy syndrome in Russia long before the Soviet system came in," one authority says. An early classic case was the Protocol of the Elders of Zion, a document concocted by the Czar's intelligence service 70 years ago that was used by Hitler and is still used by anti-Semites as evidence of the dangers of Zionism. The Dirty-Trick Department

The first modern Soviet ventures were usually the brainchild of a spy with a bent for practical jokes. But in 1959 the Kremlin put such operations on a formal basis by establishing within its espionage branch the KGB, a special Department of Disinformation. It quickly picked up the nickname in Moscow of Department D and in Washington of Department of Dirty Tricks. Five years later the Russians expanded their efforts by ordering that espionage establishments in their Eastern European satellites set up similar departments.

No one will say how active the Central Intelligence Agency is in black propaganda; but in the opinion of Communist spy organizations, the CIA conducts few, if any, such operations. "It was our opinion that the Americans had more effective means than this sort of trickery—things such as economic-aid programs—that were more influential than any black-propaganda operation," says Major Ladislav Bittman, a 40-year-old Czechoslovak spy who defected after the Russians invaded his country in 1968.

However, the Pentagon Papers disclosed several American "black-psychological-warfare" operations conducted against Hanoi in 1954 by a group headed by then Col. Edward G. Lansdale, an Air Force counterinsurgency expert. The output included forged Vietnam leaflets designed to frighten the population about what the Communists planned. The group's crowing achievement was an almanac produced by paid astrologers and distributed throughout North Vietnam. Its predictions: disaster for North Vietnamese leaders and stable government for South Vietnam.

Busy Tricksters

Major Bittman, a veteran of 14 years in Czechoslovak espionage, was the first deputy director of Prague's Department D. The Czechoslovaks, he claims, are the busiest dirty tricksters in the Soviet bloc, including Moscow's own KGB. "I estimate that in 1965 there were 300 to 400 operations by the whole bloc, and we were responsible for 110 of them," he says. "We had 20 full-time planners in our department, but every intelligence officer was expected to submit ideas. Since bureaucracies always grow larger, the number of operations must be even greater now."

After he had been in dirty tricks for two years, Major Bittman became disgusted with what he was doing, and he is now in the U.S. writing a book exposing the whole business. "The only accomplishment (of black propaganda) is to impede any progress toward international understanding," he maintains. "The final irony in his own experience was watching the KGB and Prague intelligence agents practice the same tricks on their own people in preparation for the Soviet invasion. They sent threatening letters to followers of

liberal leader Alexander Dubcek and spread stories that American Green Berets were flooding into the country. As evidence they produced a fake arms cache of U.S. weapons. "It had to be put together in such a hurry that the weapons were preposterously out-of-date," he recalls.

The main targets of Soviet-bloc Department D activities, according to Major Bittman, are the U.S., NATO and West Germany, in that order. "We always tried to sell the idea that the U.S. State Department was planning to overthrow the local government. There didn't have to be any immediate gain for us in mind other than branding the U.S. as public enemy No. 1."

But, he emphasizes, black propagandists cannot successfully make up a campaign out of whole cloth. "We fish in troubled waters. We capitalize on an existing anti-American feeling or a mistake the Americans have made." Thus, the Communists don't try anti-U.S. operations in a pro-American country such as Britain, and they don't send anonymous forgeries to U.S. newspapers because the papers aren't easily taken in by such things.

The easiest targets are African, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, where the press more readily accepts anonymous documents and the leaders are often eager to believe the worst about the U.S. The Czechoslovaks had a heyday in Latin America after the U.S. made the mistake of staging Operation Camelot in 1961. This was a U.S.-style opinion poll measuring the attitudes of Chileans toward their government, but for the Latins it was impermanent meddling. The Czechoslovak Department D seized the opportunity to cause the Americans further embarrassment by continuing the polling. Department D mailed out questionnaires asking even more prying questions to a list of the touchiest people in Latin America with directions to mail the answers to the nearest American embassy.

Major Bittman says the forgeries often are clumsy because the Communist bureaucrats require that all documents be prepared in the mother tongue and then translated into English. "These translations are filled with wooden phrases that an expert can spot easily," the major says. An example is a forged set of Peace Corps instructions that surfaced in Iran designed to show U.S. contempt for the Moslem religion. The rhetoric was heroic: "The historic winds of might and success have filled the sails of America and placed our nation in the leadership of mankind's advance toward the future."

Merry Christmas From the Communists

To get raw material for their forgeries, the Communists place high priority on obtaining blank stationery from U.S. missions and on collecting signatures of American officials. "One technique," he explains, "is for Communist diplomats to send early Christmas cards to American officials. Out of embarrassment, the Americans will often quickly send cards in response, and their signatures go into our files. I would advise diplomats to send cards with printed signatures."

During Major Bittman's involvement in these, one of the most successful Czechoslovak efforts was Operation

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SEP 16 1971

'The Intelligence Game'

CIA Draws Praise And Blame From Writers

STATINTL

By LEW SCARR
Copley News Service

Perhaps no area of our government having a direct bearing on our attitude in the cold war has been more controversial, yet less understood than our intelligence network.

It is partly that we don't know what the Central Intelligence Agency does, but if it does what we think it does, it goes against our sense of fair play and that is bad.

The popular notion is that the CIA is a law unto itself. It is believed that it freely interferes in the internal affairs of sovereign nations, and that it overthrows anti-American governments, even democratically elected ones, to install anti-Communist governments.

Some writers have capitalized on these beliefs, shadowed them with a cloak and fastened them with a dagger and written books to support them. Fortunately, most were crudely written and rudely received.

Still, many congressmen and some journalists continue to ask, why have an intelligence community at all? Mostly the questioners are those to whom "intelligence" connotes spies, saboteurs and political activists.

Those living in the intelligence community consider the question absurd. But it deserves an answer.

Any president of a large corporation, and, indeed, any chief of state, must have "intelligence" if he is to fulfill his responsibilities.

He may get it from newspapers, from briefings by his subordinates or from reports from consultants. Wherever, he must have intelligence. If he does not, he will not survive long.

Before World War II, the armed services had relied heavily upon civilian specialists in wars and, when the fighting was over, they sent the specialists home and forgot all about the need for intelligence.

Gen. George C. Marshall once described the Army's foreign intelligence as "little more than what a military attache could learn at a dinner, more or less, over the coffee cups."

Five months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Harry Howe Ransom reports in "The Intelligence Establishment" President Roosevelt summoned Col. (late Maj. Gen.) William J. Donovan to draft a plan for a new intelligence service designed for the requirements of a global war and patterned in the main after the British.

Donovan was a successful lawyer who had won the Medal of Honor in World War I.

"He was an imaginative, aggressive man," Ransom writes, "who had traveled abroad extensively. So far as intelligence work went, he was an amateur, but in the American tradition of public service he seemed qualified to assemble what was to become the forerunner of CIA."

During World War II the closest approach to a central intelligence system was the widely publicized Office of Strategic Services — the almost legendary OSS.

It is difficult to assess the worth of OSS because its official history still remains classified. Still, it must be given credit, despite traditional detractors, for invaluable contributions to allied victory, especially in Burma and in defeating the axis in North Africa and in aiding the French resistance

But it wasn't until 1947 that Congress created the CIA. It was fashioned after OSS and it was born during the year that cold war was declared.

Actually, Congress in setting up CIA delegated it a single function, intelligence, and nothing more. That it does much more is without question, but just what and where it does it is hard to say.

There is a theory among intelligence agents, the good ones, that there should "almost always" be no failures. It is better, so the theory goes, to leave a problem unsolved than to risk failure or discovery.

Still, there have been failures: the Bay of Pigs, the U2 incident.

Taking into account CIA's policy toward supercaution, it would seem reasonable to assume that for every failure there must have been, oh, ten or more successes.

The failures have been pinned on the CIA while the successes almost never are. Not definitely.

Some have suspected the CIA of having brought on the downfall of Nkrumah in Ghana and Sukarno in Indonesia, of having installed the military junta in Greece and of having thrown Sihanouk out of Cambodia.

But these redits, if they are, do nothing more than support the notions of observers who see the CIA as a molder of temporary geography and a shaper of tentative history.

It is the same attitude which Miles Copeland III, who once worked for the State Department and the CIA, writes of in his "The Game of Nations:"

"In the intelligence game, competitors seek to gain the greatest possible advantage short of going to war."

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Expert Calls Taiwan U.S.-China Spy Base

By JEROME CABILL

Washington, Aug. 11 (NEWS Bureau)—The United States and the Chinese Nationalists for 20 years launched espionage, sabotage and guerrilla forays against Communist China from Chiang Kai-shek's island bastion of Taiwan, a former State Department official told Congress today.

Allen S. Whiting, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, who served in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and in the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong from 1961 to 1968, said the covert operations included support of the ill-fated uprising in Tibet in 1959.

Increased After Korean War

Whiting said America's "shadowy involvement" in the clandestine operations grew steadily after the Korean war and the 1954 Geneva Conference. He said they triggered the Formosa Strait crises of 1954 and 1958 and helped set the stage for the Sino-India war in 1962 along the Tibetan frontier.

Testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate-House Joint Economic Committee, Whiting said the publication of the Pentagon papers provided partial documentation of the operations, particularly U. S. and Nationalist Chinese overflights of mainland China.

Quoting from a top-secret memorandum from Brig. Gen. Edward

Lansdale to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Whiting said a Nationalist Chinese airline called Civil Air Transport carried out "more than 200 overflights of mainland China and Tibet." In addition, the line provided aircraft for an abortive CIA effort to overthrow the Sukarno regime in Indonesia in 1958, and helped transport sabotage teams into North Vietnam as early as 1954, the witness said.

Airline Linked to CIA

In 1960, Whiting told the subcommittee, a new Taiwan-based airline, China Air Lines, came into being, and engaged in "clandestine intelligence operations" as well as commercial flights to Laos and Vietnam. He linked the airline to the CIA-backed Air America, which raided Northern Laos in the course of the CIA's "secret war in Laos."

At times, he said, the bombers strayed over the border, hitting mainland Chinese territory. This may explain "much of Peking's expanding military presence in road construction and antiaircraft activities in Northern Laos," he went on.

OCT 1970

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State Oil Company Is Indonesia's Fat Kitty

By Lee Lescaze

Washington Post Foreign Service

DJAKARTA—"The oil company is Indonesia's CIA budget," one observer remarked. "If the government needs money quickly and quietly, that's the only place to get it."

Pertamina, Indonesia's state oil company, is the nation's most visible sign of modernization and economic success. Critics charge that it is also a leader in corruption of the seemingly eradicated traditions of this country.

When students took to the streets this summer urging President Suharto to move against corrupt elements, they singled out the oil company and its sophisticated director, Lt. Gen. Ibnu Sutowo.

The presidential commission appointed to investigate corruption recommended many changes in the handling of Pertamina funds, which presently are not turned over to the government's finance ministry but dispensed as the company sees fit. In response to the criticism, a draft bill is being prepared which would make Pertamina somewhat accountable to the central government, but it is still a question whether the bill will become law.

Gen. Sutowo says bluntly that he hopes no controls will be imposed. Asked if he disagrees with Indonesia's economists and others who believe that Pertamina should be integrated with the rest of the economy instead of remaining a state within a state, Sutowo replies: "Aren't all large oil companies states within states?" He compares his operations to the role of British and American oil companies in the Middle East.

"The way we run things looks like the best way to get results," Sutowo said in an interview. He points out that his company, which he began in 1958, is the only one of Indonesia's three state oil concerns still existing.

Elegantly Awesome

SUTOWO RUNS his empire from an office in what used to be the Shell headquarters before Shell decided in 1965 not to gamble on Indonesia's volatile politics any longer and sold out.

His army uniform is elegantly tailored. He wears his hair slightly long

at the sides and sports a Piaget wristwatch that could not be matched in Djakarta's rather poorly supplied stores. His staff treats him with a respect that seems to border on fear.

The general's critics are all Indonesian. He is well liked by the foreign oilmen who have joined the boom here in the last four years and most foreign diplomats believe that he is irreplaceable in this manager-poor nation.

"Indonesia could use 20 Sutowos. They'd be fools to kick out the only one they've got," one foreigner put it.

Even his critics concede that Sutowo has made a remarkable record at Pertamina. The company runs its own oil fields and has also developed the production-sharing contracts which cover oil exploration by foreign companies in about 40 areas. Indonesia has management control under all these contracts and will get 65 per cent of the crude after the company has recovered its costs.

Pertamina is so highly visible in Indonesia because oil plays such a large part in the economic picture. Oil is the largest export; 900,000 barrels are produced daily, making Indonesia the 11th largest world producer.

Indonesian oil is extremely low in sulphur, which makes it particularly desirable in the pollution-conscious developed nations. Japan buys about half of Indonesia's oil, with the United States and Australia each taking about one-fifth.

It is Pertamina's visibility as the strongest element on the economic scene that helps attract criticism. With a budget over more than \$1 billion, Pertamina employs 27,000 people and runs its own schools and hospitals for employes.

In a country where the average annual wage is less than \$100 and where civil servants and military officers have to supplement inadequate salaries by corrupt practices or taking second jobs, Pertamina pays its employes well and trains them well. About a fifth of the company's managers are on leave at any one time attending business courses here or abroad. The company takes care of its own far better than the government is able to.

The company also takes care of the armed forces government. According to well-informed sources, Pertamina began to support the army financially when President Sukarno was strangling the armed forces and the rest of his country through inept fiscal management.

Sutowo's primary loyalty was to the army, and he made sure as the years went by that his brother officers had cash available. His help has not been forgotten, nor has it been discontinued.

Ready Cash

WHILE THE rest of the government chokes on paperwork, Pertamina can provide funds quickly. It is reported that the oil company paid for the hastily arranged Djakarta conference on Cambodia last spring.

In addition, Sutowo has provided the money for mopping up military Communists when the local commanders couldn't obtain funds to transport their troops. The headquarters for Indonesia's five-year plan is a new building which is officially described as Sutowo's gift to President Suharto.

It is rumored that the government party is drawing on oil money to support its campaign offices for the general election scheduled for next July. Political opponents are naturally unhappy, and they point to these alleged gifts to the government as well as to Sutowo's personal style of life.

The general, who began his career as a doctor for the Stanvac Oil Co., lives in a large house, owns several cars and makes it no secret that he is rich. When his daughter was married last year, thousands of guests were flown in, closed circuit television was installed for the event and the display dazzled Djakarta.

"What have I stolen? When? Where and how much?" Sutowo said he would ask anyone who accused him of corruption. Then he added, "What is the complaint? My management is getting results? If I am corrupt and can get results like this, then Indonesia needs more corruption."

RECEIVED
1 October 70

The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre

"Indonesia is the best thing that's happened to Uncle Sam since World War II." —A World Bank official

INDONESIA, WHICH in the past fired the imagination of fortune-hunters and adventurers as the fabled East Indies, was long regarded as "the richest colonial prize in the world." Harking back to such times, Richard Nixon described Indonesia in 1967 as "the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area." Not too many years earlier, however, the prize had been thought all but lost to the fiery nationalist, Peking-oriented Sukarno and the three million-strong Indonesia Communist Party waiting in the wings. Then in October 1965 an unsuccessful coup and a swift move by Indonesia's generals immobilized the leader and precipitated the largest massacre in modern history, in which from 500,000 to a million unarmed communists and their peasant sympathizers were killed. When the bloodletting was over, the immense nationalist spirit of a decade had vanished, and the Indies' vast natural treasures were opened by the new regime to U.S. oil companies and corporations.

To cut the ribbon on the Indonesian side was an extraordinary team of economic ministers known to insiders as "the Berkeley Mafia." Sporting PhDs from the University of California and acting as a closely-knit clique in the councils of power, these men shaped the post-nationalist policies of the new regime. Behind their rise to eminence and power lay a saga of international intellectual intrigue, of philanthropoids and university projects, of student Generals and political Deans, and a sophisticated imperial design beyond Cecil Rhodes's wildest dreams.

Part I

[A DEAN IS BORN]

FOLLOWING JAPAN'S DEFEAT in World War II, wars of national liberation raged in China and Vietnam. Meanwhile, far away in Washington offices and New York living rooms, Indonesian independence was being sensibly arranged. By 1949 the Americans had persuaded the Dutch that if they took action before the Indonesian revolution went the way of China, they could learn to live with nationalism and like it. And sure enough, in that year the Indonesians accepted an independence agreement, drafted with the help of friendly American diplomats. It maintained the severely war-weakened Dutch economic presence, while swinging wide the Open Door to U.S. cultural and economic influences as well.

Among those who handled the diplomatic matters in

those years were two young Indonesian aristocrats: Soedjatmoko,* called "Koko" by his American friends, and an economist and diplomat named Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. Both were members of the upper-class, nominally socialist PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia), one of the smaller and more Western-oriented of Indonesia's myriad political parties.

In New York the two were lionized by a group closely linked to the notorious Vietnam lobby which shortly thereafter launched Ngo Dinh Diem on his meteoric career in U.S.-Vietnamese politics. The group, which included Norman Thomas, was composed of members of the Committee for Independence of Vietnam and the India League. It occupied something of a vanguard position among socialist anti-communists. "We were concerned that the United States not be caught flatfooted in the post-war necessity to create non-communist governments in Asia," explains League member, Park Avenue attorney and legal counsel for Indonesia in the U.S., Robert Delson.

Delson squired Sumitro and "Koko" around town, introducing them to his friends in the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and to top anti-communist labor leaders. They also circulated in Establishment circles, particularly among members of the foundation-funded Council on Foreign Relations, the most influential elite policy-formulating group in the United States.

DISTRESSED BY Indonesia's peppery nationalist leader Sukarno and the strong left wing of the Independence forces, the Americans found that, as with Diem in Vietnam, the rather bland nationalism of "Koko" and Sumitro offered a most palatable alternative. In Council on Foreign Relations parlance, they were interested in "modernizing" Indonesia, not revolutionizing it. At the Ford-funded School of Advanced International Studies in Washington in early 1949, Sumitro explained that his kind of socialism included "free access" to Indonesian resources and "sufficient" incentives for foreign corporate investment.

When independence came later that year, Sumitro returned to Djakarta to become Minister of Trade and Industry in the coalition government and then, in two later cabinets, Minister of Finance. As Minister through the early '50s, Sumitro defended an economic "stability" that favored Dutch investments. Carefully eschewing radicalism, he appointed as advisor the German Hjalmar Schacht, economic architect of the Third Reich.

Soviets Keep Options On Indochina Open

By Anthony Astrachan
 Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, April 27 — The Soviets are having trouble deciding what to do in Indochina, Western analysts here said today.

They also suggested that any major U.S. military aid to Cambodia would shut off some options still open to the Soviets and force them into a more obdurate position.

The analysts, however, found significance in a Soviet reluctance to go all the way with Hanoi. Each new Soviet pronouncement seems to reveal Soviet footsteps hesitating at the water's edge before plunging in at Hanoi's urging, they commented.

In Pravda today, Lev Dyomin labeled Indonesia an accomplice of the Pentagon and the CIA for its suggestion of an Asian conference on Cambodia. Such a conference could not prevent civil war and foreign intervention, he said, because "the civil war in Cambodia is already under way and direct U.S. interference in that country's affairs is evident."

Dyomin said that Indonesia is already shipping arms to Cambodia and called attention to American ties with most of the Asian nations Indonesia was consulting, through the ANZUS and SEATO pacts and bilateral agreements.

In Izvestia, Vasily Tarasov echoed Soviet distaste for the proposed participants in the conference and said, "It is only the Cambodian people that have the right to decide their future. Cambodia must remain a neutral state as laid

down by the 1954 Geneva agreements, and no conference can be vested with the right of deciding her destiny. Those who hatch such plans contribute to Cambodia's involvement in the war, and add grist to the mill of the American aggressors."

Both commentaries omitted any mention of the presence of North Vietnamese or Vietcong troops in Cambodia.

But the Soviets could not go so far as Hanoi in setting up a team of "good guys" from all four countries in Indochina, the Western analysts suggested, because the Kremlin still has not made the final decision to back Prince Norodom Sihanouk against the Lon Nol regime that ousted him as head of state last month.

Dyomin in Pravda therefore referred to the "Phnom Penh authorities" and "Sihanouk's supporters" in the same sentence as though they were indeed equals. This was the more striking because a Tass statement Friday treated the massacres of Vietnamese in Cambodia in such a way as to make "recognition" of the Lon Nol regime more difficult.

The analysts believe that the Kremlin wants to preserve its options in case the Sihanouk forces lose on the battlefield. In a somewhat similar case, the Soviets maintained correct relations with the Indonesian generals who put down the abortive left-wing coup in 1965, even while the generals' followers were slaughtering 500,000 Indonesian Communists.

The Soviets may also have doubts about backing Sihanouk because he has remained

in Peking since leaving Moscow just after the Cambodian coup.

In their desire to maintain strong influence on Hanoi without encouraging an escalation of the war in Southeast Asia that would imperil Soviet domestic programs, the Kremlin leaders have tried to have it both ways.

Moscow has responded to Hanoi's pressures for a hard line against an Asian or a Geneva conference on Indochina. Yet this reduces its chance of gaining new leverage from its dormant role as co-chairman of the Geneva conferences. This chance probably inspired Soviet hints April 16 of interest in a renewal of the Geneva conference. These hints were withdrawn two days later.

The response to Hanoi's pressures also undermines the philosophical basis of Moscow's ill-defined projects for Asian collective security.

The Kremlin has not, however, publicly backed Hanoi's hopes for a joint campaign by North Vietnam, the Vietcong, the Pathet Lao and whatever Cambodian forces are behind Sihanouk.

The problem of timing may explain the Soviet failure thus far to express backing for a four-country campaign in Indochina. But the western analysts here said that the Soviets were probably holding back deliberately to preserve their options on Sihanouk, their independent contact with the Pathet Lao, and their hopes of keeping the war and attendant expenses from escalating.

If the United States comes in with massive military aid to Cambodia, the analysts said the Soviets will probably feel they have no choice but to go all the way with Hanoi and with Peking, which is thought to be already on Hanoi's side.

Soviet military aid will probably then be extended to the Sihanouk forces, great-power prestige will clog more channels that could conceivably lead to fruitful peace talks, and an end to the Indochina war will seem less attainable than ever.

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APR 4 1970

Sihanouk's overthrow a truly nationalist act

By JOHN P. ROCHE

For some reason or other, dictatorships always seem stable until they are overthrown. This came to mind in connection with the adventures of Norodom Sihanouk, formerly of Cambodia, now shuttling between Moscow and Peking. At the outset of the Cambodian caper, there were many who suspected that Sihanouk himself had written the entire script. He has played games like this before. But even if the prince did write the first act, it is now clear that the second act got out of control and the militant anti-Vietnamese forces, centered in the army, took over the performance.

What is interesting is how little support Sihanouk had in the crunch. I suppose the American anti-war movement will find some way to describe events in Cambodia as a "civil war." However, the battle line is obviously between Khmers and North Vietnamese, that is, between the Cambodians and 50-60,000 armed visitors from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The new government in Pnom Penh has, of course, been designated "right wing," with the implication that it is awaiting a chance to turn the country over to the CIA and the Chase Manhattan Bank. But it is, in fact, classically nationalist.

Hanoi immediately weighed in by alleging that the CIA was already in charge. Since this is the first break we have had in Southeast Asia since the Indonesian turn-around in 1965, one that presents Hanoi with real trouble, the Communists obviously need a scapegoat. Since it is well known throughout the "progressive world" that the Vietnamese Communists are the champions of the nationalist, anti-imperialist spirit, a Khmer revolt against their aggression simply can't happen

It has to be a counter-revolutionary plot sponsored by United States intelligence and directed by "running dogs of American imperialism."

I have gone into this in some detail because I predict that within the month two or three



John P.
Roche

articles will appear in American journals attempting to protect Hanoi's revolutionary virginity. Precisely the same thing happened in 1965-66 with respect to Indonesia.

For several years journalists and scholars had gone into virtual ecstasies about the brilliance of the Communist party of Indonesia (the P.K.I.). The gist of the message was that PKI alone had "won the hearts and minds of the peasants." Then came October, 1965, and the bloody failure of "GESTAPU," as the Indonesians termed the attempted Communist coup. The peasantry, dominated

by nationalists, went berserk and killed hundreds of thousands of Communists.

Since, according to left-wing scriptures, Communism in Asia is the vehicle for nationalism, not its enemy, the eccentric behavior of the peasants had to be explained away. Needless to say, this was accomplished. The PKI became the victims of a right-wing military plot, with the CIA, of course, hovering in the background. The late Bertrand Russell was wheeled into the fray to announce "the responsibility of the United States for this counter-revolutionary bloodbath." Later, unfortunately for those concerned, disputes between the PKI refugees, split between the allegiance to Moscow and Peking, blew this thesis out of the water.

Now the Khmers have engaged in the same kind of "counter-revolutionary" behavior. In the process, of course, they have undermined the whole basis of the anti-war argument that the United States has been fighting against progressive nationalism in Indochina. It is clear that our enemy is Communist imperialism, that is, Ho Chi Minh's ambition to create a totalitarian successor-state in the whole of former French Indochina.

CHARLOTTE, N.C.
NEWS

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MAR 19 1970

Sihanouk Ouster CIA Plot—French

By MILT FREUDENHEIM
Chicago Daily News Service

PARIS — The ouster of neutralist Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk was arranged by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), according to some French military officials.

They see it as a move to strengthen the position of Thailand in case Laos falls to Communist North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces.

The takeover by Cambodian Premier Gen. Lon Nol and Sihanouk's rightist relative, Prince Sisowath Sidik Matak, is compared here with the 1965 ouster from power of Indonesian president Sukarno, which the French also credit to the CIA.

However Sihanouk's long and spectacular history of resigning, and threatening to resign pro-

duces caution. Some experts think he may yet stage another dramatic comeback.

According to French analysts, who are always quick to see a CIA role whether it exists or not, other American motives in Cambodia include:

—Hoping for permission to bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia for Viet Cong and Laos in order to cut North Vietnamese supply lines to their forces in South Vietnam.

—Denial of sanctuary in Cambodia for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces raiding across the border into South Vietnam.

—Removal of an erratic and frequently pro-Peking neutralist leader, Sihanouk, blamed by the Pentagon for prolonging the Vietnam war by tolerating Hanoi penetration of Cambodia.

War could end - - or spread

Cambodia coup:

break for us?

By James McCartney
Chicago Daily News Service

The right-wing military coup in Cambodia—if it is successful—has the potential of changing the ground rules of the Vietnam War.

It could be the biggest break that President Nixon has gotten in trying to end the war.

Or it could lead to a North Vietnamese attempt to take over Cambodia by force, and thus cause a new and different kind of crisis in Vietnam.

U.S. officials do not pretend to know what precisely is happening in Cambodia — or who may wind up in charge. It's too early for that.

But they are certain that the events of the last few days in Cambodia will affect all of Southeast Asia. And they are seeking to weigh alternatives.

Cambodia is important because it has sought, essentially, to remain neutral in struggle for Southeast Asia.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the chief of state who has been ousted, has walked a narrow path — often leaning one way, then the other.

DAILY NEWS Washington Bureau chief Peter Lisagor reports that suspicion that the coup deposing him might be another ruse faded quickly as Southeast Asian experts studied the scant reports monitored on Phnom Penh Radio.

THE JUDGMENT in Washington is that Gen. Lon Nol as premier and his accomplices have entrenched themselves in power, and that the neutralist Sihanouk has been permanently bounced.

This prospect raised apprehensions, described as a "fear of the unknown" by one source, that the rightist anti-Communist successors of Sihanouk might get in over their heads in their defiance of the North Vietnamese.

"If they did that and holed for help, we might have a dilemma on our hands," said one U.S. official.

SIHANOUK has permitted the North Vietnamese to use his country as a sanctuary in mounting attacks on southern South Vietnam. If that ground rule were to be removed, the Communists would be severely crippled.

That would aid President Nixon in de-escalating the war.

Approximately 40,000 main-force North Vietnamese troops are believed to be based in Cambodia, poised to threaten the capital city of Saigon and the rich Mekong Delta to the south.

DAILY NEWS correspondent Milt Freudenheim reports that Paris observers were quick to stress the dangers of a shift to the right in Cambodia. If the weak Cambodian army fails to control the Communist Vietnamese forces, United States forces could be sucked in, as happened in Vietnam and Laos, they warned.

Cambodia also has provided the supply route for Communist forces in southern South Vietnam.

U.S. and South Vietnamese forces have not been able to touch the supply routes — or attack Communist bases — without violating Cambodia's ostensible neutrality.

U.S. MILITARY officials say flatly that the United States could win a "quick military victory" in Vietnam if ground troops were permitted to invade the Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos.

And officials have not been reluctant to discuss the possibility that South Vietnamese

troops might try to do the job. No less an official than Defense Sec. Melvin R. Laird has openly discussed this possibility.

That's where the importance of a successful right-wing coup comes into the picture.

If right-wing generals were to gain control in Cambodia and invite the United States to clean out North Vietnamese forces, the temptation to take them up on the offer would be great.

This course of action, no doubt, would cause a political uproar in the United States.

BUT LESS drastic possibilities also are being discussed in official circles here. For example, a right-wing regime in Cambodia might make it possible to freeze supply routes to the Communist forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Supplies for Communist armies in the Mekong Delta have been permitted to flow freely through Cambodian ports.

The United States also might be invited to bomb Communist

sanctuaries in Cambodia. Bombing has not been permitted in Cambodia.

THE OTHER side of the coin presents a different picture.

There is widespread speculation in Saigon and Paris that the United States — probably through the Central Intelligence Agency — has played a role in the Cambodian coup.

Freudenheim reports that French military officials see it as a move to strengthen the position of Thailand in case Laos falls to North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces.

The take-over in Cambodia by Gen. Lon Nol and Sihanouk's righthist relative, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, is compared in Paris with the ouster of Indonesian President Sukarno, which the French also credit to the CIA.

The Communists have the military power to respond. They are already in a strong position in Laos, north of Cambodia. They probably could take over all of Cambodia if they wished in a counter attack.

AT THE PARIS Vietnam talks Thursday, Freudenheim reports, North Vietnam accused the United States of trying to spread the Vietnam War into Cambodia and Laos. But Hanoi carefully avoided recognition that Sihanouk has been ousted.

"It is perfectly clear that the Nixon administration, in order to save itself from defeat in Vietnam, not only is escalating the war in Laos but also is trying to extend the war to the whole IndoChinese Peninsula, placing a grave threat to peace in Southeast Asia," Hanoi delegate Nguyen Minh Vy declared.

"The United States must assume full responsibility for the consequences," Vy said as he went into the session.

U.S. Ambassador Philip C. Habib told reporters as he entered the session, "I have no intention of having any comment on Cambodia."

South Vietnamese delegate Pham Dang Lam replied that long-standing North Vietnamese denials that its troops are in Laos and Cambodia have been disproved by recent statements of the neutralist governments of both countries.

COMPTON, CAL.
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from...
**Cliff
 Smith**

Lest We Forget

The originator of CDC, the volunteer political arm of the Democratic party, was the very noisy junior senator from California, Alan Cranston. This is and was the organization which worked against "loyalty oaths," tried to increase the "free list," and tried to attack nearly everything American which the majority of us hold dear. Cranston organized this left-wing organization and assisted materially in the formation of its principles or lack of them. There is nothing new to lead us to believe he has shifted stance from the far, far, far left.

Now he tries anything to get in the news. His newest vehicle is to attack anything the administration does. Laos is the vehicle he is using.

The deaths in Laos of a captain and six civilians is his major cry now. Why doesn't he attack Los Angeles and the Orange County traffic fatalities—eight in Orange County in one accident last week, and six in Los Angeles County Monday in one accident. Sixty thousand highway fatalities reported last year. No, he has to nitpick at the President.

The President did not start this war and has been doing everything possible to stop it. This war was started by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. It could have been won in two to three weeks but Kennedy and Johnson both lacked intestinal fortitude to use measures to win—did not want to offend Russia and China. The CIA is in every country in Asia and has done an outstanding job. CIA operatives kicked Sukarno and his Chinese war lords out of Indonesia and placed Suharto in power. Suharto is a very good friend of the United States.

Many of the Americans in Laos are in United Nations organizations. Many

more in agricultural jobs. This has been the way of life in nearly all Asian countries for a long time. President Nixon did not put them there, and Congress authorized them all. The Peace Corps is in nearly every country all over the world.

Senator Cranston is looking for anything to discredit the Nixon administration. It is suggested that he look for things to help get our troops out of Vietnam instead of looking for small things to harass the President.

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STATINTL

DENIS WARNER . . .

Traces Nixon Doctrine to '65 Indonesian

WHEN the dust of the Vietnam war has finally been laid, the events that occurred in Indonesia on Sept. 30, 1965, are likely to be remembered, as they should be, as of momentous importance.

This was the day that the tide of history changed in Southeast Asia. Because of it, Sukarno lost power; the Peking-Jakarta axis, with its ominous threat to all of Southeast Asia, collapsed; and the Indonesian Communist Party was all but destroyed.



DENIS
WARNER

It was on this day, also, that Marshall Green, then the U.S. ambassador in Jakarta and now assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, had the revelation that led to the Nixon Doctrine and the new low-posture American policy in Asia and far beyond.

Here, Green saw, was an underdeveloped Southeast Asia nation, grievously threatened by the possibility of a Communist takeover, suddenly liquidating its problem without the assistance of a single American dollar or a single American soldier. If the Indonesians could do it by themselves when all the odds seemed stacked in the Communists' favor, others could do it, too.

Green had not opposed the American intervention in Vietnam, but he also saw with crystal clarity the targets that such things as the plate glass windows of U.S. Information Service libraries presented for Communist demonstrators. Even the Peace Corps could become a target for dissension. Green was not against helping other nations, but he wanted to help to be multilateral.

Viewed as Army Coup

When Nixon visited Indonesia, Green briefed him. Nixon was greatly impressed, and thus, well before the American elections, the foundations were laid for what is now the Nixon Doctrine.

Yet the events in Indonesia that led to so many dramatic changes remain murky. Some observers saw the Sept. 30

affair as an army coup, not as a Communist plot, and, despite evidence to the contrary, this version still has credence in some academic circles.

The degree of Sukarno's involvement has never been properly explained. If he was truly involved in the murder of the generals, why was he not put on trial? To what extent, if any, was Peking involved? Or the Indonesian Communist Party? Or even the CIA?

Arnold Brackman, American author, teacher and journalist, has followed events in Indonesia since 1945 with infinite attention to detail. He was a close friend of many of the early postwar generation of Indonesian leaders, and so has sources available to few others. He now has taken a long, penetrating look at

Denis Warner, an Australian journalist, has been covering events in Southeast Asia for 25 years.

what happened on Sept. 30 and thereafter, and the result is a book (*The Communist Collapse in Indonesia* — W. W. Norton, New York) that should be required reading for all concerned with Indonesia and Southeast Asia.

Stroke by stroke he documents the Communist role in the conspiracy that led first to the abortive coup and finally to the bloody liquidation of hundreds of thousands of Communists.

Sukarno Lacked Guts

This is contemporary history at its best. Here is former Foreign Minister Subandrio at a banquet in Peking promising to drive the imperialists into the sea and, being cheered at the end of each sentence by his Chinese hosts.

Brackman is a meticulous researcher and his pieces all fit into place. He traces Sukarno's belief that he had to remove the generals, who suffered from

Coup

"anti-Communist phobia," and his idea that they could be confronted with trumped-up charges of treason, put on trial as "CIA agents," and exiled.

This was a convenient point of departure for the Indonesian Communist Party. Sukarno was ailing; his doctors and D. N. Aidit, the party chairman, felt that his chances of recovery were slim. Aidit was under no illusions about the hostility of many of the army leaders and their intention, if Sukarno died, of cracking down on the Communists.

Thus, on Aug. 28, 1965, the Politburo unanimously agreed that a pre-emptive strike against the general staff, and the council of generals, was warranted and justified. Sukarno did not want the generals killed, merely out of the way, but he showed no sign of regret at their deaths. If the Suharto regime wanted to put Sukarno on trial for complicity it does not lack for evidence but, wisely, it has not made him a martyr.

As for the Indonesian Communist Party, and the passive way in which it folded, it was a victim of its own propaganda. It really believed that it was a powerful mass party. But it did not have the highly indoctrinated mass following that Aidit's bold play for power demanded. It was too big for its own boots, and it continued to rely too much on Sukarno, who, for all his bombast, just did not have the guts to fight in a situation that he had helped contrive.

JULY 27, 1965

STATINTL

ANTARA REPORT ON U.S. TROOPS IN PHILIPPINES

Djakarta ANTARA in English 1324 GMT 27 July 1965--B

(Text) Manado, 27 July--The United States is concentrating its special trained troops on Sarangani island in the southern Philippines. The island concerned is located nearest the Indonesian archipelago. The U.S. troops stationed there are reportedly well trained for acts of aggression on short notice.

The United States this year is planning to station its troops on Mindanao island. This is in line with U.S. plans for the establishment of a strong military base in the southern Philippines.

Meanwhile, reliable sources said that the United States has assigned one company of its special troops on Sarangani island. Indonesians living in border areas with the Philippines have frequently detected American warships approaching Indonesian waters.

Other sources said that Indonesian authorities had recently confiscated a bundle of CIA (the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) documents reportedly containing calculated plans for CIA penetration into Indonesia via the Sangir-Talaud islands.

Local authorities, following the seizure of the CIA documents, have stepped up security measures and patrols.