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New Man for CIA

Only a few insiders have much basis for judging the work of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and they rarely talk. But there are a few hints along the way about the meaning of President Nixon's decision to name James R. Schlesinger CIA director and make the present director, Richard Helms, ambassador to Iran.

President Nixon has not been satisfied with the performance of the U.S. "intelligence community." In late 1969 he cut CIA personnel abroad by 10 to 12 per cent. He ordered a study of the CIA and intelligence generally by James Schlesinger, then a military and international specialist in the White House Office of Management and Budget, and by K. W. Smith, a National Security Council aide.

Their report came out in May, 1971. It recommended pulling intelligence together either by giving CIA Director Helms more authority over the five other U.S. agencies beside the CIA that gather intelligence, or by setting up a new cabinet-level Department of Intelligence.

In November, 1971, the White House ordered a reorganization of intelligence activities to give Helms more leadership over the rival intelligence agencies in the State and Defense Departments, the

Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Now the President pulls Helms out and puts in one of the authors of the report — Schlesinger.

One complaint that the President is said to have against the CIA under Helms is that the CIA often has been realistic about Vietnam. For example, the CIA didn't think bombing North Vietnam would be effective, or that it was effective after it started.

Ousting Helms for being right is wrong.

On the other hand, Senator J. William Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee has been hassling the CIA for its private wars in Laos and Cambodia, which either violate U.S. law or come close to it. Ousting Helms for making war against the will of Congress would be proper — but it is clear Helms was only carrying out Nixon's policy there.

James Schlesinger is an economist who spent 12 years in the RAND Corporation, an Air Force think tank, then three years as a Nixon appointee in the Bureau of the Budget and the White House Office of Management and Budget, then a year as Nixon's choice as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. His record in government is good, but he is a weapons man and a hardliner.

6 DEC 1972

Cambodian patriots score new gains

gains

By Richard E. Ward

Last of a series

How will a potential Vietnam ceasefire affect Cambodia?

Contrary to statements by the U.S.-sponsored Phnom Penh administration about peace talks with the "Khmer Rouge," the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, has denied that there have been any discussions between the resistance forces and the puppet regime.

Although the government of National Union has given its full support to the nine-point peace agreement for Vietnam, after it was announced by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Cambodian resistance is determined to fight until the U.S.-sponsored Lon Nol regime is overthrown. Recent Western press reports imply that this may well be within the capacity of the resistance forces within the foreseeable future.

The position of the National Union government in no way conflicts with the position of its Indochinese allies, which would be able to furnish greater assistance to the Cambodian resistance if there were a cease-fire in Vietnam and the U.S. persisted in prolonging the war in Cambodia.

In the short run, the U.S. could bolster the Phnom Penh regime for a time, but the days of its Cambodian clients appear to be numbered, despite the approximately \$350 million in military aid annually being sent to Phnom Penh, the clandestine presence of U.S. military advisors and continued heavy U.S. air attacks against the patriotic forces.

Rapid growth

Two-and-one-half years after the U.S.-promoted coup ousting Sihanouk in Phnom Penh, the resistance forces in Cambodia are growing more rapidly than ever, controlling 85 percent of the national territory, according to an Oct. 23 report by A.P. correspondent Holger Jensen who also wrote:

"Khmer Rouge (the name used by the Western press for the Cambodian resistance forces) strength has jumped from little more than 5000 in March to about 40,000 combat-honed troops. . . .

"U.S. officials . . . concede they 'drastically underestimated' the Khmer Rouge, which means Cambodian Reds.

"They grew more rapidly than anyone realized or reported; it's as simple as that," said one high-ranking American here. "They're not dependent on the North Vietnamese any more. The Khmer Rouge are actively engaged in combat against Cambodian government forces and they're making a maximum effort."

This assessment was corroborated by the Far Eastern Economic Review's Phnom Penh correspondent, Nayan Chandra, who wrote in the Nov. 18 issue: "Military . . . the situation has never been gloomier. Since the rout of the ambitious 'Chenla II' operation earlier this year

to open Highway 6 and lift the siege of Kompong Thom, the Cambodian army has not recovered its morale. 'Chenla II, has been as decisive for Cambodia,' estimates one diplomat, 'as Stalingrad was to the Germans.'

Not only was there heavy loss of men and material, but the credibility of Lon Nol as a strategist and leader suffered a grievous setback. Since then the army has launched a few half-hearted operations, with claims of initial victories followed by disastrous defeats.

"Taking full advantage of the political demoralization and popular malaise (toward the Lon Nol regime), pro-Sihanouk forces have considerably strengthened their position. One knowledgeable observer says looting by South Vietnam (Saigon) and Cambodian troops, plus American bombing, has given the Khmer Rouge an audience that did not exist a year ago."

While the American bombing continues to devastate the liberated zone, Saigon troops are no longer in a position to be sent in significant numbers to Cambodia, as the Nguyen Van Thieu regime needs every soldier available to him to meet the continuing offensive by the Liberation Armed Forces of the PRG.

In reply to questions posed by a correspondent, Sihanouk explained on Oct. 29 that the Cambodian resistance forces "sometimes have combined operations with our North Vietnamese and NLF friends along the Cambodian-Vietnamese common border, but our armed forces, alone, have responsibility for all military operations in the interior of Cambodia. We give the troops of our north Vietnamese and NLF friends the right to cross our national territory but these friendly Vietnamese troops do not possess any permanent base in the interior of the country. The question of their evacuation from Cambodia is not an issue and will never be an issue."

In answer to another question during the same interview Sihanouk noted that "the only route between Peking and the liberated zone of Cambodia is the Ho Chi Minh trail" on which travel would be much easier if there were cease-fires in Vietnam and Laos. Although the Cambodian leader was referring to the possibility of returning to his homeland, the military implications are quite clear and must be disconcerting to the Nixon administration which once called U.S.-supported operations in Cambodia the best example of the "Nixon doctrine" in action.

The realities of the Nixon doctrine in Cambodia are quite different than Washington originally envisaged when the CIA promoted the coup by Lon Nol and Sirak Matak, now bitter rivals, like most other "leaders" of Phnom Penh's pro-American camp. The regime now barely extends its authority outside of Phnom Penh and it is even subjected to military attacks within its

Virtually all traffic arteries from Phnom Penh have been cut on a more or less permanent basis. Route 5 going to the rice-rich Battambang province have been held by liberation forces since August, which cut off the capital city from its main source of rice. Since September there have been periodic "riots" over rice shortages in which troops of the Lon Nol army have participated.

Apparently a large segment of U.S. aid goes into the pockets of corrupt officials and military officers. Interviewing some soldiers early in November, Times correspondent Schanberg noted that they were lucky to be receiving their pay, for "corruption has permeated the Cambodian army ever since the U.S. began pumping . . . military aid into the country.

"Many commanders keep dead men on their unit payrolls and put the dead men's pay into their own pockets. Other commanders even keep the pay of their own troops, which leaves the troops penniless and demoralized and results in their looting and pillaging the nearest village for food and other wants."

Selling rope for their own noose

On the point of the regime's total corruption, all Western observers in Phnom Penh agree. Lon Nol's personal doctor who was appointed minister of commerce earlier this year had to quit after a scandal" involving sales of rice to the patriots.

Although most of Lon Nol's military forces are demoralized and unreliable and there is not the slightest prospect of broadening the base of the puppet regime, the U.S. has accelerated its arms shipments to Phnom Penh in recent weeks, which raises several questions, including the probable violation of congressional limitations on U.S. aid to Cambodia and the presence of U.S. advisors, also prohibited by congressional enactments. It is also conceivable that at least some of the military equipment, especially aircraft, is destined not for Lon Nol's forces but for America and other clandestine U.S. operations which are burgeoning throughout Indochina.

It is understandable that Sihanouk does not desire to negotiate with the traitors who serve the U.S. imperialists, as they represent nothing in the country, so the probability is continued conflict in Cambodia as long as the U.S. seeks to maintain its Phnom Penh retainers. The Vietnamese liberation forces have expressed full support for the refusal of the Royal Cambodian Government of National Union to negotiate with the puppet regime.

The Marasco Story

STATINTL

Two Bullets End Start Trouble

(Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were involved in one of the major controversies of the Vietnam War in 1969 when accused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recalling events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public.)

By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer

Vietnamese triple-agent

Thai Khar Chuyen was

"ordered" assassinated by the

Central Intelligence Agency in

June 1969 because he knew too

much about American relations

with Prince Norodom

Sihanouk who was admitting

that the Communists were

setting up base camps in Cam-

bodia, Capt. Robert F.

Marasco says.

This, plus the fact that the

CIA learned Chuyen was a

North Vietnamese agent,

resulted in an order to

Marasco and his men "to

eliminate him."

"He (Chuyen) was more

dangerous without a rifle than

100 men with rifles," Marasco

told The Daily Journal. "He

had the knowledge, intelli-

gence and capability of killing

many people.

"There was no difficult

decision to make. It was one

Vietnamese spy against

possibly thousands of

American GIs. There was no

point for discussion."

Chuyen knew Marasco's

units had photographic, com-

munications and other intelli-

mercurial chief of state.

Sihanouk was at that time balancing the east against the west attempting to maintain Cambodia's independence -- and to steer his country clear of the Vietnam War. He did not succeed, however.

Hanoi, at that time, became more demanding in its dealings with Sihanouk as the Communists built up large base camps and underground arsenals in border areas.

"Prince Sihanouk has always contended that there were no VC or North Vietnamese in Cambodia and that Cambodia was not used as a refuge or as a supply route," Marasco said. "In 1969 Sihanouk was starting to come around. He was saying, 'yeah, well, there may be a few.'

"We were about to send an American charge de affairs to Cambodia because relations were improving," Marasco said.

Had Chuyen talked about intelligence operations in Cambodia to the North-Vietnamese, "it might have affected relations with Prince Sihanouk.

"Chuyen also knew that Project Gamma was a unilateral operation and, did, in fact, inform South Vietnam about our highly classified operations," Marasco said.

Although the United States and South Vietnam were allies, the latter could not be trusted enough for involvement in Project Gamma, Marasco said.

"We wanted it to be successful," Marasco added. "It could not have been with all the politics and all the double agents we might have found as our bosses."

Marasco said Project Gamma had no bases in South Vietnam, some of which

were directed to Laos, some to the tri border area and others to Cambodia.

"If we had the South Vietnamese in there with us," Marasco explained, "Project Gamma would have become just another worthless unit like so many others."

It was in April 1969 when Chuyen's triple identity came to light. The entire story, Marasco said, was never told.

"I had a split camp," he explained. "Myself and two men were in one camp. I had a sergeant, Alvin L. Smith Jr., who was at another location, setting up a team of Vietnamese and Cambodians of his own."

Chuyen was Smith's principal agent. Ultimately, Marasco relieved Smith and assumed total responsibility for the second camp or "net."

Prior to the actual takeover, however, Marasco said he handled Smith's net only in a supervisory capacity.

After an emergency leave to Florida when Smith's mother died, the sergeant was assigned to Nha Trang Special Forces headquarters. One day he was going through some

Second of 5 articles

captured photographs from another, unrelated operation.

One of the pictures, Marasco said, showed a known Viet Cong general standing with his arm around Chuyen, in a friendly manner.

Marasco was called from the field and, after a meeting, it was decided to "run a check" on Chuyen.

"We found that he had not gone through the normal processing before his assignment," Marasco said.

"Supposedly, it was hard to come up with enough appointments with the guy who ran the lie detector. . . it was tough to do it, so there was always an excuse as to why it hadn't been done."

As it turned out, it was discovered that Chuyen had been trained in North Vietnam "in the equivalent of our CIA." He had arrived from Hanoi in 1954.

During the early 1950's Ho Chi Minh had allowed great numbers of people to migrate to the south. Some of those who settled in various hamlets were, in fact, North Vietnamese agents who could be called upon at any time to perform a service.

Thus, it is possible that Chuyen was an "inactive" agent until 1968 when Hanoi "Tapped him" for espionage duties.

"Chuyen came to us highly recommended by the South Vietnamese," Marasco said. "When I took over Smith's net, Chuyen had already been established as a principal agent.

"We brought him to Nha Trang and eventually to Saigon for questioning," Marasco said. "This was all based on the photograph we had found. We put him through three lie detector examinations which he flunked miserably."

It was early June of 1969 when Chuyen's guise was discovered. Between the time Chuyen was brought from Nha Trang to Saigon, Marasco had gone home to New Jersey on emergency furlough.

"When my leave was up," he said, "I would have had only four weeks to serve in

PYRRHIC PLOY

REMEMBER CAMBODIA?

E. W. PFEIFFER

Mr. Pfeiffer is professor of zoology at the University of Montana and a co-author of Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare in Indochina (Free Press/Macmillan). He visited Cambodia in 1969 and 1971 and was in Hanoi in 1970.

While on a visit to Hanoi in June 1970 my two companions and I met with Premier Pham Van Dong. During the conversation, I asked the Premier to evaluate Nixon's invasion of Cambodia which had occurred one month earlier. His answer was straightforward: "It makes things very favorable for the success of our revolution." By "our revolution" I supposed him to mean the revolution of the Indochinese people against foreign invaders.

How well does Premier Pham Van Dong's 1970 evaluation accord with the situation of Cambodia in late 1972? Recent dispatches from Indochina suggest that he knew what he was talking about. According to the A.P. (September 1), only one-third of Cambodia is still under "Khmer Republic" control. It has been revealed that the tanks used in the fall offensive against the An Loc area (only a short distance from Saigon) came from the Chup Rubber Plantation and nearby areas in Cambodia. These are the very areas that President Nixon characterized in April 1970 as "Communist sanctuaries" that must be cleaned out.

Two factors have been principally responsible for the failure of Nixon's Cambodian policies. First, the President was badly misinformed about past U.S.-Cambodian-Vietnamese relations and about the situation on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border prior to the March 1970 change in the Cambodian Government. For instance, in his speech of April 30, 1970, announcing the U.S. invasion of the Fishhook region of Cambodia, Mr. Nixon stated: "Tonight American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality." Mr. Nixon, standing in front of a map of Cambodia, put his finger on the little town of Mimot as he made this accusation. That puzzled me a great deal, for I had spent two days in and around Mimot about four months before the U.S. attack, and knew it to be controlled by French and Cambodian rubber interests. Many Europeans were working there, and some of them (e.g., a Belgian plant pathologist) were in complete sympathy with the American effort in South Vietnam. These Europeans were living with their wives and children in an environment of complete tranquillity. We asked many of them whether they had seen any sign of North Vietnamese or Vietcong activity and they all answered no.

My colleague A. H. Westing and I had visited the region to inspect the damage done by a clandestine defoliation raid carried out in April-May of 1969 over approximately 200,000 acres of eastern Cambodia. According to a letter

I received some months later from Sen. Frank Church, the raid was carried out by Air America, a CIA airline, for what purposes we still do not know. After the raid, the Sihanouk regime asked that American officials visit the region, with a view to making reparations for the damage. Although the U.S. Government to this day officially denies having carried out this operation, it did send a team of experts, including Charles Minarik of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories, U.S. Army, into the Mimot region shortly after the raids. This team's report describes how they were flown over the region, driven through it, and how they walked in it—just as Westing and I did some months later. It is inconceivable to me that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, who according to Nixon controlled the area, would have permitted an official U.S. Government team to wander through what Nixon called "the headquarters for the entire Communist military operations in South Vietnam." After the invasion began it was widely reported that no key control center could be found. Some arms caches were reportedly uncovered and, of course, a great deal of rice. The rice did not greatly surprise me, since at the time we were there, the main occupation, in addition to tapping rubber, was harvesting rice.

When speaking about the Cambodian "Communist sanctuaries," Mr. Nixon failed to mention that, on orders of Prince Sihanouk, troops of the Royal Cambodian Army had in fact swept these areas about three months before his invasion. The troops were led by Prince Sirik Matak, a loyal American protégé and one of those later involved in Sihanouk's overthrow. Sihanouk ordered Matak to search out and destroy all Communist-Vietnamese positions in Cambodia. Paul Bennett of the Cambodian desk of the State Department informed me in an interview, March 22, 1971: "A Cambodian Army operation began in January of 1970 in a northeastern province at approximately the time when Sihanouk left for France and when Prince Sirik Matak was Acting Prime Minister. They sent up a number of additional battalions, among the better troops in the Cambodian Army, and carried out a series of small sweeps generally in this area. They did have, as I recall, a number of contacts with small V.C. and North Vietnamese units. They found and destroyed a number of small supply dumps, a relatively small campsite, but there was no major contact with the main North Vietnamese forces." Where were the thousands of North Vietnamese troops that Nixon said had occupied the area for five years?

Besides being mistaken about the nature of the so-called Communist sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia, Mr. Nixon grossly misrepresented the facts when he stated that "American policy since 1954 has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of Cambodia. . . . North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality." The defoliation of vast sections of the rubber plantations, mentioned above, was one blatant violation of

KING AND COMRADE

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the ruler of Cambodia deposed in 1970, has not followed other ex-kings into idle and luxurious exile in the south of France. Instead he is leading an active political life in Peking, a Prince among the People, rallying his country behind the guerrillas who are fighting to overthrow the Right-wing regime at present controlling Cambodia. *Mo Teitelbaum* reports on the changed life and times of this descendant of God-kings who is now a fêted comrade of Chairman Mao

Early in the morning of May 19, 1970, a more than usually sombre Alexei Kosygin and Cambodia's jovial Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, were in a car heading for Moscow airport. Sihanouk, who had been on a brief visit to the Soviet Union, was about to leave on a similar trip to China. For Kosygin it must have been an intensely uneasy ride. News had already reached him of the coup d'état that had shaken Cambodia the day before - a coup designed specifically to depose Sihanouk and reverse his politics of neutrality. It was not until they actually reached the airport and the Russian leader was certain that the Prince would definitely board the plane for Peking that he shared his secret with Sihanouk. The Soviet Chairman must have been well aware that the Right-wing, military instigators of the coup, led by General Lon Nol, had let out the bath-water and he was determined not to be left holding the baby. Let's see how the Chinese comrades cope with this one, he must have thought.

The Chinese have shown a remarkable ability to embrace the glaring contradictions raised by the presence in their midst of the descendant of Cambodia's God-kings - the incomparable, irrepresible, unpredictable, laughing and volcanic prince who for nearly three decades ruled his country as an anxious but determinedly individualistic mother might guard her oil spring. The exile of Sihanouk is not

that of a Farouk, not the last desperate pleasure-seeking whirl of night-club life in Western capitals with no hope of return to the mother-country. Time and circumstances are on Sihanouk's side. He is still young. In spite of the long and sensational role he has played in political life, October 22 will be only his 50th birthday. Besides which, guided by his stubbornly optimistic nature, he has chosen not to resign himself, but to fight.

It looks as if the time is fast approaching when Sihanouk will be able to return to his country. He is convinced of it, and the Chinese tend to regard his stay with them as akin to that of de Gaulle in London during the war. The comparison fits in more ways than one. Sihanouk's relationship to Cambodia has always had much of the nationalistic, paternalistic passion which de Gaulle fostered for France - both of them finding it extremely difficult to separate their identity from that of the State.

Hardly a month goes by in Peking without some public tribute to the prince. Portraits of the veteran Marxist-Leninist hero, Mao Tse-tung, hang beside those of the descendant of the Lord of the Universe, Sihanouk. At official banquets, the rather austere Prime Minister of the People, Chou En-lai, is often to be found seated next to the cheerful, Cambodian comrade.

The former is now used to jet around the world now

confines himself to journeys between Peking, Hanoi and Pyoungyang. He does so, as always, with a smile. His sense of humour has not deserted him, nor has he abandoned his habitual frankness. The thoughts of Sihanouk, intensely personal and often outrageous, make a striking contrast with the thoughts of Chairman Mao. He is no Communist and the Chinese know this. He admits to a profound confusion over Marxist ideology, a tendency to lose himself in what he sees as the complex maze of differences between contending schools of thought. His own Socialism is compounded of a mixture of Buddhism, anti-Imperialism and a totally subjective, fierce love of Cambodia.

He has, nevertheless, chosen to act as the unifying symbol of the revolutionary guerrilla forces which are, at the moment, literally rocketing ahead in their bid to break the present regime in Phnom Penh. So Sihanouk's closest friends and allies now come not from international court circles but from the Marxist International.

The combination of royal determination and peasant resistance is wreaking havoc with the already enfeebled government in

continued

6 SEP 1972

Phoney vote now set for Cambodia

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

Brace yourself for another "free election" in an Asian country with special ties to the U.S.—Cambodia.

When general now Premier, Lon Nol overthrew Cambodia's neutralist government of prince Norodom Sihanouk in a military coup d'etat March 18, 1970, Sihanouk quickly branded the usurper as a "puppet's puppet."

Events quickly proved the term was exact. The Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime was demonstrably a sub-puppet of the Saigon puppet regime; propped up by Saigon mercenary troops and U.S. air power.

A slavish imitator in all things, Premier Lon Nol is now resorting to a one-man electoral farce—with Saigon-Washington blessing—similar to that perpetrated by dictator Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon last October. The object is to keep himself in power.

On Sept. 3, there will be "elections" in that fast shrinking one-fifth of the country the Lon Nol regime still controls to a new "National Assembly."

Since the U.S. prefers the facade of "democracy," three main parties are "competing." Even under a microscope it would be impossible to distinguish any difference in their programs. Each is headed by one of the main plotters of the anti-Sihanouk coup.

The "Social-Republican" party of Lon Nol is led by proxy by the dictator's younger brother, the fascist Col. Lon Non, who master-minded the attacks on the embassies of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam which preceded the coup and the massacre of Cambodians and Vietnamese that followed. The "Republican" party is headed by chief co-plotter and former Premier, Sirik Matak. The "Democratic" party is headed by In Tam, who as vice president of the National Assembly—which was surrounded by Lon Nol's tanks at the time—moved the motion deposing Sihanouk as head of state.

The only thing that distinguishes the parties is the deadly rivalry between the three leaders for power at the top. The electoral farce is a classic example of "when traitors fall out."

A fourth and most dangerous rival remains in the shadows for the three others to exhaust themselves while he prepares to eventually knife the winner and take over. This ambitious intriguer is Son Ngoc Thanh, former puppet Premier set up by the Japanese during their World War II occupation of Cambodia. He is Washington's "Man in Phnom Penh."

"Candidates d

Parallel to the case of the two announced opposition candidates in the Saigon's presidential "elections" last October, Sirik Matak pulled out of the contest Aug. 3, stating as his reason "the unconstitutional and anti-democratic nature of the decrees governing the elections adopted on July 15." He accused "the present government of using the administrative apparatus to put pressure on its employes to ensure that one single party, sponsored by it, gains the victory."

To complete the parallel with Thieu's one-man election, In Tam announced three days later his party would also boycott the "elections" held under a system in which Lon Nol's party would need to obtain only one eighth of the votes needed by the opposition parties to win.

In completely farcical presidential "elections" last June, In Tam soundly defeated Lon Nol in Phnom Penh, the only place where any control of voting and the counting of votes could be effected. The July electoral decrees were to guard against any such future "accidents."

Thus assured of a sweeping victory, Lon Nol and "free world democracy" will probably score another triumph this month.

Sirik Matak and In Tam are just as ferocious enemies of democracy as Lon Nol. If they had his power they would do exactly the same thing. They had both played a leading role in suppressing any shred of democracy following the coup. This did not prevent In Tam however, from usurping the name of the Democratic party which once had real influence among progressive intellectuals in Cambodia.

No Democratic party

In a statement July 16, prince Phourissara—one of the most distinguished Foreign Ministers in the pre-coup years who recently escaped to the Liberated Zone—vigorously denounced In Tam's pretense of heading the Democratic party. After exposing the traitorous and double-puppet role of Sirik Matak and In Tam, Phourissara and two other well-known personalities, in the name of the Democratic party of which they had been leading members stated:

"(1) The Democratic party has ceased to exist for several years following the unanimous decision of its members. At the present time there is no Democratic party.

"(2) The overwhelming majority of its members of good reputation and faithful to the democratic ideals of the party categorically repudiated the traitors Lon Nol, Sirik Matak and Son Ngoc Thanh following the March 18 coup. At the present time a great number of members of the former Democratic party play their part in working within the ranks of the Cambodian National United Front (NUFK) which is a broad organization of national unity with a political program in conformity with the idea of the whole nation and the whole of the Cambodian people.

"(3) The so-called 'Democratic party' of the In Tam, Douc Rasy clique and a few other intellectuals who have

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round**Hanoi Says It Prefers McGovern****Jack Anderson**

In their first comment on the U.S. presidential campaign, the North Vietnamese have informed us they expect President Nixon to win reelection, but they would prefer to deal with George McGovern.

From their Paris embassy, North Vietnamese spokesmen have sent us an exclusive message that they feel sure McGovern would pull U.S. troops out of Vietnam as he has promised. They also believe he would keep his word not to give more military backing to the Saigon regime.

They, therefore, not only would negotiate the POW issue with McGovern, but they would move fast, suggested one North Vietnamese diplomat, to return American prisoners.

But the North Vietnamese conceded, in the end, they probably will have to negotiate with a re-elected Richard Nixon. They couldn't afford, therefore, to place all their bets on McGovern, they said.

Hanoi's views on the election were delivered to us by an emissary who met with the North Vietnamese three times for a total of four and one-half hours. For diplomatic reasons, we agreed to withhold the names of the participants.

All the discussions were held in French, so we can only paraphrase what the North Vietnamese said. Their suspicion

of Mr. Nixon seemed almost paranoid, their trust in McGovern wary.

Nixon Paranoia

They recited Mr. Nixon's record back to his 1953-61 term as Vice President when he made saber-rattling speeches about Indochina. Nevertheless, they were ready to negotiate with Mr. Nixon in 1971, they said, for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces and the immediate return of U.S. prisoners.

But the rigged re-election of President Thieu on Oct. 1 and the escalated bombing of North Vietnam a few days later, they said exacerbated their old suspicions of Mr. Nixon.

Now they feared Mr. Nixon would listen to Thieu's appeals for renewed U.S. intervention in the Vietnam war. As evidence, they cited the buildup of U.S. forces in neighboring Thailand and the increase in air-naval units around Vietnam.

The Communist diplomats said they trusted McGovern, if he should be elected, not to re-intervene in the war. But one diplomat suggested that they would make rapid arrangements with McGovern to return American prisoners so he would have no excuse to re-intervene.

Bombing of Dikes

The North Vietnamese said they would make an account-

possible, at the same time a POW settlement is reached.

The 60 to 100 Americans held by the Communist forces in Laos, the North Vietnamese said, could be returned as part of a general U.S. agreement to withdraw from Indochina. They said the Americans held in Cambodia could also be returned as part of a general Indochina settlement.

A Cambodian Communist, who was present during the discussions, said the American prisoners in Cambodia are suspected CIA agents and special forces, not combat troops captured during the U.S. incursion of May, 1970.

The North Vietnamese were particularly emotional over the alleged American bombing of the dikes, which they pleaded could lead to two million deaths from drowning and starvation.

We have seen secret Pentagon documents, which substantiate the U.S. claim that the Red River dikes and dams are off limits to our bombers. The documents indicate, however, that some flood-control installations have been hit accidentally, because of the close proximity of military targets.

The North Vietnamese explained to our emissary that they had bolstered the hill-sides above the dams and dikes with trees, grass and underbrush. The torrential rains

last year eroded these natural barriers. Thus, U.S. bombs exploding near the dikes jar the weakened bulwarks and cause severe leaks.

Some roads also run directly on top of dikes, and U.S. attacks on the military traffic have blown holes in the dikes, they said. A combination of air raids, defoliation and artificial rain-making, they feared, could turn their flood-control system into a huge mudslide.

Footnote: Intelligence reports suggest that Moscow and Peking, unlike Hanoi, would prefer to deal with Richard Nixon than George McGovern. The reason, apparently, is that they feel more comfortable with the known Nixon than the unknown McGovern.

Appeal to Pope

Three priests imprisoned in Brazil's dread Sao Paulo penitentiary have smuggled out a letter to Pope Paul begging him to intervene against the torturing of political prisoners by Brazilian authorities.

The priests' letter, dated June 29, said they had fasted 21 days in protest against "atrocious tortures" that have killed more than 200 Brazilians. Although the priests claim they and hundreds of others are political prisoners, they have been thrown into common cells with rapists, murderers and other hardened criminals.

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Letters to the Editor

SIR: I refer to the letter of W. E. Colby, executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who rebutted the charges made by some American newspapermen that the CIA was involved in opium trafficking. I do not question Colby's good faith, neither do I say that the CIA, as an entity, traffics in opium; but, I am sorry to say that there is more to these charges than mere "gossip, conjecture and old history."

I also know what I am talking about because I was involved in security matters for the South Vietnamese government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. In effect, one day, the President told me to investigate into the activities of our chief of secret police, chief of our own "CIA" and chief of military security, and to report directly to him, because, as he put it: "I cannot ask my own chiefs of police, 'CIA,' and military security to investigate into themselves."

I found out the corruption of two chiefs, and the President took very drastic measures against them. I have kept the contact with my security agents ever since. They firmly confirm that a few CIA agents in Indochina are involved in opium trafficking. But above all, a line must be drawn between Indochina and the rest of the world, because, due to the fact of the counter-insurgency warfare, the operations of the American CIA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are extremely important when they are compared to operations of the same agency in other countries. In Indochina, the CIA is a real army with his own aerial fleet. A number of CIA operatives deal directly with Vietnamese, Lao, or Meo warlords or officials at the highest level, with whom they share the proceeds of the opium traffic. For good American citizens in the United States, it is very difficult to imagine the influence and power of these operatives in Indochina. Their power, in fact, is unlimited—they are the true rulers of Indochina; their desires are orders—no Vietnamese, Laotian or Cambodian official would dare resist their orders. Corruption growing from a de facto power affects some of these CIA operatives.

The traffic of opium involves a relatively large number of persons. Outside a few Americans, there are Vietnamese, Laotians and Meo who are involved. Since these persons have their clans, families and friends who live from this traffic, the total number of persons concerned become so great that it is impossible to keep secret the operations.

I also do not question the good faith of CIA Director Richard Helms when he said that "as an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem . . ." However, as I said previously, a line must be drawn and a distinction must be made; for circumstances are not the same—there is not the vaguest resemblance between CIA operatives in Indochina and their colleagues operating in other countries.

In conclusion, CIA Director Helms and Colby, Miss Randal, and McCoy said the truth and did not contradict one another; they perhaps did not talk about the same country.

Tran Van Khiem,
 Attorney, Former Deputy,
 Vietnamese National Assembly.

Chevy Chase, Md.

18 JUL 1972

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Sees Defeat of Reds

Cambodian Premier Confident

BY DONALD KIRK
Far Eastern Correspondent
Chicago Tribune Press Service

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia—
In the demoralized atmosphere of this war-weary capital, one of the country's highest leaders still maintains a semblance of unabashed confidence in the face of the worst enemy threats.

He is Son Ngoc Thanh, a revolutionary figure from Cambodia's French colonial past and now prime minister under the ailing President Lon Nol.

"We are determined to push out the enemy," said Thanh, a peppery, slightly built man, gesturing excitedly as he talked in Cambodian thru an interpreter. "At the same time we will strengthen the regime we have built up."

Returned from Disgrace

If Thanh seems overly optimistic about Cambodia's chances of success, it is partly because he himself has returned from disgrace and exile since the overthrow of the Leftist chief of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, more than two years ago.

Appointed prime minister early this year, Thanh doubles as foreign minister and spends most of his days in his office in the Foreign Ministry overlooking a park beside the Mekong River.

"We are now establishing a true Khmer or Cambodian republic," said Thanh, who last served as prime minister at the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945, "Now there are no more quarrels. The people can decide whom they want to lead them."

Vote Fraud Charged

Thanh's faith in Cambodia's fledgling efforts toward democracy remains unshaken by a presidential election last month in which Lon Nol easily steamrolled over two opponents amid cries of military pressure and fraud.

Instead the prime minister cited the elections for a National Assembly planned for August or September as evidence of the country's democratic methods under its new constitution. Critics charge that Lon Nol will manipulate the assembly election just as he is accused of doing in the balloting for president—and that, in any case, the constitution grants little real power to the assembly.

For Thanh, however, almost any alternative seems preferable to the rule of Sihanouk, his most bitter foe since World War II. The rivalry between Thanh and Sihanouk dates to the Japanese decision to elevate Thanh to national leadership during the war while Si-

hanouk remained only a figurehead with little power.

French Dump Thanh

The French colonialists, returning after the war, promptly dumped Thanh, who then alternately fought and reconciled with Sihanouk. Finally, in the 1950s, Thanh organized a guerrilla force that fought against Sihanouk until fleeing to Thailand and South Viet Nam.

It was from Viet Nam, thru-out the decade before Sihanouk's downfall, that Thanh reorganized his guerrillas on bases near the frontier. The American Central Intelligence Agency provided the funds, while the U. S. Army's Special Forces trained the men.

"We had our troops along the border before Sihanouk was overthrown," said Thanh. "He knew he would fall. I had had contact in advance with Lon Nol and Lon Nol's younger brother, Col. Lon Non."

Almost immediately after Sihanouk's ouster, Thanh's forces crossed the frontier into Cambodia and began fighting the Vietnamese Communists. The speed with which Thanh's troops entered the war in Cambodia has convinced some observers that the CIA may have known in advance that Sihanouk would fall—and may

actually have instigated his ouster.

Thanh preferred not to discuss the CIA's role in the sudden turn of events in Phnom Penh. Instead, he noted the build-up of the Cambodian army over the last two years.

"At the beginning we had only 30,000 men in Cambodia and another 20,000 of my men," he said. "Now we have at least 170,000. We have a broad army now."

He admitted that the quality of his own forces, the best in the Cambodian army, may have declined since they were completely integrated with Cambodian units.

"We have so many men," he said, "but we lack the leaders. We have had some good officers, but they were not used to war and lacked the training."

As an example he pointed out the case of Maj. Gen. Sosthene Fernandez, a one-time crony of Sihanouk's and now the commander of a large region south of Phnom Penh.

"Fernandez, of course, was trained in France," said Thanh. "He has never fought in the jungle or the mountains. He had bad training."

America's new morality: 'What's worse, bombs or rain?'

FROM THE SAME people who gave the world the Gatling gun, the A-bomb and plastic shrapnel we now have, once again, a new, improved way of making war.

The U.S. Air Force and the CIA can now make it rain on your parade, whether that parade is a military convoy on the Ho Chi Minh Trail or a political demonstration in Saigon (or Louisville?).

We understand the Nixon administration's unwillingness to brag about the cloud-seeding operations that the United States has been conducting in Indochina. Any bragging, now—or even any admission that such operations have, indeed, taken place—would make it appear that Defense Secretary Laird lied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month when he was asked about Air Force rainmaking activities. The Secretary said, "We have not engaged in any over North Vietnam."

Now at least a dozen present and former military and civilian officials tell *The New York Times* that our planes have seeded clouds over North Vietnam at least as late as 1971—and over Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam as well.

In addition to damaging Secretary Laird's impeccable credibility, premature admissions to rainmaking might also lose Mr. Nixon the votes of those environmentalists, if any, who still take him seriously when he puts on his Smokey the Bear hat and proclaims himself hard to beat at admiring and protecting Mother Nature.

For it appears that Mr. Nixon, who rarely hesitates to rush in where angels and Democrats fear to tread, has outrained—as well as outbombed—the previous administration. State Department protests that our tinkering with Indochina's rainfall was taking environmental risks of unknown proportions apparently persuaded former Defense Secretary McNamara to call off cloud-seeding operations in 1967.

But, in the words of one pro-rainmaking official, "What's worse, dropping bombs or rain?"

Added ingredient possible

If we overlook the fact that Mr. Nixon and his generals (or perhaps, as seems to be common, the generals without Mr. Nixon's consent) are dropping both, it's a fascinating question.

The residents of our drought-stricken Southwest probably would reply that bombs are worse than rain. However, the citizens of Rapid City, S.D., or our eastern seaboard might not agree. And the tightly closed mouths at the Pentagon these days might

tempt the people of Rapid City to ask a few more questions about that cloud-seeding experiment that was conducted in the Black Hills on the day their city was flooded and scores of their friends and relatives were killed.

The anonymous official's question also prompts a second question: Is the destruction wrought by our bombing in Indochina as indiscriminate as that wrought by the forces of nature? If it is, then we've been lied to again about the pinpoint accuracy of our attacks on war-supporting industries and supplies in North Vietnam, in which our "smart" bombs always seem to demolish our targets but leave the civilians unharmed. If it isn't, then the rain could be far worse than the bombing—especially during the two monsoon seasons when, as an official explained, the cloud-seeding amounts to "just trying to add on to something that you already got." One thing the Indochinese peoples have got during those seasons is the strong danger that they'll be wiped out by floods. And it's a safe bet that the soldiers in that American Special Forces camp that received seven inches of rain in two hours, courtesy of a CIA blunder, didn't laugh.

In addition to sizable quantities, the Americans, never content to let nature go unimproved-upon, can now deliver two kinds of rain—either the plain, old-fashioned variety or a new, improved rain with an extra secret ingredient. This new rain, according to one source, has "an acidic quality to it and it would foul up mechanical equipment—like radars, trucks and tanks."

We're left to wonder whether it damages other mechanisms, such as humans and trees. But even if it doesn't, we hope the White House reserves the fancy rain for export only. If our government begins using rain to break up political demonstrations, as the CIA did in Saigon when the Diem regime was tottering, we hope the protestors will be spared the additional indignity of having to hitch-hike home.

Richard Jordan Gatling, the inventor of that primitive machine gun that we see used with such effectiveness against the Indians in Western movies from time to time, hoped that by developing such a terrible weapon he would make men more reluctant to resort to arms. If meteorological warfare fulfills its potential, Mr. Gatling's dream might yet come true. Our future disputes may be settled by a few wizards—heads of state, maybe—at control panels, instructing Mother Nature where to send her floods, winds, earthquakes and tidal waves.

There'll be no need of arms then, and "World War" will have a new meaning.

Vets return from Paris to spread peace message

By LENORE WEISS

NEW YORK, July 4 — Returning from a three-day meeting last week in Paris with veterans of the Southeast Asia liberation forces, 15 delegates of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), announced plans here to report their findings to their local areas.

This includes, said William del Rosario, a national coordinator of the VVAW, "speaking tours, articles, testimony to Congressmen and appearances on radio and TV."

The interview took place at VVAW headquarters on West 26 street.

They had to do their own publicity, the veterans said, because their trip had been ignored by the commercial press.

The veterans brought back photos documenting the effects of U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam.

In their three-day talks in Par-

is last week, they had met with veterans of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, the Army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Pathet Lao and the Cambodian United Front to find "a common basis for ending the war."

The talks had been organized by French peace groups and representatives of the War Crimes Commission, a citizens' group established several years ago by Bertrand Russell, the late British philosopher.

"We achieved more in three days than our government has achieved in three years, said John Boychuck, an active-duty GI who was due to return to Mt. Home Air Force Base in Idaho. "We didn't have to decide if we wanted round ashtrays, square ashtrays or who was going to sit where."

Precious minutes

Toby Hollander, of East St. Louis, Ill., an Annapolis graduate, said the PRG spokesman in Paris, Ly Van Sau, expressed the purpose of the meeting when he said, "If our efforts cause the war to end one minute earlier, this equals four tons of bombs."

Veterans learned in Paris of specifications by the U.S. military for 40,000 new "tiger cages," which are cells 8 by 10 feet on Con Son Island, for the prisoners of the Saigon regime.

Laotian and Cambodian representatives in Paris told the veterans, said Paul Richard, Seattle, that the war, contrary to U.S. State Department reports, is not limited to Vietnam. They cited the presence of U.S. advisers and helicopters along Routes 4 and 5, as well as a training camp in Cambodia conducted by the CIA. ✓


The Paris meeting, said Richards, demonstrated the solidarity of liberation forces in Southeast

STATINTL

RAMPARTS

July 1972

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The Story of My Overthrow and Resistance

[MOSCOW - PEKING]

YOU MUST NOT GO, SAMDECH SIHANOUK. It's Friday, the thirteenth." These words were spoken to me, half in jest, by one of my aides on the way to Orly Airport for the plane which was to take me from Paris to Moscow. It was the morning of March 13, 1970. Unlike many of my countrymen, I am not superstitious, so I laughed, and flew off to meet the Russian leaders. Five days later, while still in Moscow, I was deposed as Cambodia's Head of State so it was an unlucky day after all.

President Podgorny met my flight, but there were no elaborate welcoming ceremonies, because mine was a political and not a state visit. After greeting me he said there was a plane waiting to take me straight home to Phnom Penh.

"Take an overnight rest in Moscow, if you like," he said, "but fly on to Phnom Penh in the morning. We have confidence in you, Sihanouk. You are really the indispensable leader of your people. But you must go back and take charge of Cambodia's affairs. See that they don't fall into the hands of Lon Nol and Sirik Matak. You must ensure that Cambodia doesn't drift into an American takeover, prevent Lon Nol and Sirik Matak from creating difficulties for the South Vietnamese people who are waging a heroic struggle for the liberation of their country." I replied that I'd have to think things over very carefully.

There was much to think about. On March 8, there had been anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Svay Rieng Province—the reports reaching me showed that Lon Nol was behind them. On March 11, a mob—ostensibly of students and school children—attacked the embassy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (the NLF) and, a few hours later, that of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi). My reports showed it to be the work of the Army—specifically Lon Nol. The nucleus of the attackers was, in both cases, some fifty military men in civilian clothes, commanded by Lon Nol's younger brother, Colonel Lon Non. This was a far cry from the "spontaneous demonstrations" naively reported in the European press and on American television. Signs had been prepared in English, a language rarely used in public display in my country. Photographers and TV crews had been alerted. Everything pointed to a scenario drawn up well in advance.

As soon as I heard of the attacks on the embassies, I sent a cablegram to my mother, the Queen, condemning the violence as "acts of personalities attaching greater importance to their personal and clan interests than to the country's future and to the fate of the people." I warned of the possibility of a rightist coup and said that I would return for a confrontation with those responsible, but added that, if the people chose to follow them "along a path that will turn Cambodia into a second Laos, they will compel me to resign."

The answer to my message to the Queen came in the form of a cablegram and outrageous attacks

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continued

STATINTL

Lon Nol in Cambodia gets the exact 60.76 percent predicted vote

By TOM FOLEY

Puppet President Lon Nol of Cambodia easily won his regime's first presidential election Sunday, with a comfortable but discreet 60 percent of the vote. The actual number of voters was nowhere stated, only percentages were given, and this is not surprising.

Marshal Lon Nol's army cannot go anywhere outside capital city of Phnom Penh without being attacked by the patriotic forces of the Cambodian National United Front.

NUF units are able to operate within a few miles of the center of Phnom Penh without any hindrance. A conservative estimate would place NUF control of the country at around 80 percent. In fact, while the votes were being counted Monday, the NUF shelled the Defense Ministry building in downtown Phnom Penh, some of the shells landing only 50 yards from Lon Nol's residence.

Under these conditions it's

hard to see how Lon Nol could claim to have held elections at all. Last Oct. 20, when he abolished his own puppet National Assembly and announced he would rule by decree, stating he would no longer "play the game of democracy," he was being much more time to form. But this must have disturbed his U.S. advisers, who have an eye out for U.S. public opinion, so in March, Lon Nol simply declared himself the President of Cambodia and announced there would be a presidential election soon.

Interestingly enough, Lon Nol is supposed to have gotten 60.76 percent of the vote, a figure that was "predicted" down to the last decimal point by his regime's official newspaper, *Le Republicain*.

Son Ngoc Thanh — who was appointed Premier by Lon Nol this March — has a lurid past: he was born in South Vietnam, a member of the Khmer Krom or ethnic Cambodian minority of some two

million in the Mekong Delta. The Japanese appointed him their puppet Premier of Cambodia in World War II; after 1945, he was in exile in Thailand until he was picked up by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and sent back to South Vietnam.

The CIA had established what it called the Khmer Serei ("Free Cambodian") movement, made up entirely of Khmer Krom who were carrying out armed raids into Cambodia from South Vietnam. Son Ngoc Thanh was installed as the head of this "movement."

In the past, Lon Nol was always able to call in heavy U.S. air support plus invasions of his own country by thousands of Saigon puppet troops when things got really rough for him. Today, things are different. The patriotic offensive in South Vietnam made the Saigon regime pull all its troops out of Cambodia.

Lon Nol is thus left on his own.



Nkrumah: Pan-Africanist fighter

By William Worthy

Not long after being restored to power in 1958, as the North African crisis in Algeria deepened, French President Charles de Gaulle offered a so-called "choice" to France's West African colonies: a place within the French Union (a euphemism for French neo-colonialism) or a total, abrupt severance of all formal ties with the "mother" country.

After long and varying periods of plunder by French imperialism, all but one colony decided they couldn't make a clean break with their dependent status. It was obvious that de Gaulle had manipulated and counted on just that reaction. Some 14 years later, most of the countries that followed his script have, yet to gain true national liberation.

The one colony that picked up de Gaulle's other option was Guinea. To the surprise and fury of Paris, President Sekou Toure led his financially bankrupt people out of the French embrace. For the colonial metropolis, his decision was as intolerable (as a precedent for others) as was Fidel Castro's opting out of the U.S. empire in Latin America.

Every conceivable measure was devised to make an example of the uppity upstart from Guinea. All programs of economic aid in every field were abruptly terminated. Teachers, doctors, technicians and other experts were summoned home to France, leaving behind a trail of economic sabotage and a colonized people with almost none of the educated cadres needed to keep a society afloat. Toure acceded to "power," only to find that his treasury had been literally rifled by the departing French "civilizers" and that the free and independent country was on the verge of collapse and imminent starvation.

Solidarity in practice

Into this dire gap stepped President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, with \$20 million to tide Guinea over the immediate crisis. For a country itself only a year or so out of the grip of classic British colonialism, \$20 million was a good-sized loan that probably put a strain on Ghana's own treasury.

But it saved the day for Sekou Toure, who remained eternally grateful. Not surprisingly, it was he who invited Nkrumah to come to live in exile in Guinea after the pro-Western 1966 army coup in Ghana deposed him. Toure bestowed on him the honorary title of "co-president of Guinea."

character, sections of the Western press periodically invented "rifts" between the two close friends.

Numerous assassination attempts, usually traceable to outside intervention, dotted Nkrumah's years in power. In one instance, by unintentionally arriving a few minutes late for a dedication ceremony, he avoided being killed by a time-bomb planted in a bouquet of flowers that had been given to a small child to present to him. Knowing how eagerly the West sought his ouster because of his strong anti-colonialism, Nkrumah was naive to absent himself from home and thereby to make a coup that much easier to stage. From reports at the time, British intelligence seemed to have played the major outside role in the coup, with the CIA lending active support.

Those two closely meshed agencies may well have instigated the naive and futile Vietnam "peace mission" that Nkrumah allowed the British prime minister and other Commonwealth leaders to talk him into undertaking. As long ago as 1966, both Hanoi and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam had already made clear the basic terms on which the war could be settled and there was no role for the London-dominated British Commonwealth to play in reaching such a settlement.

Knowledge of neo-colonialism

By no means should it be implied that Kwame Nkrumah had no understanding of the devious workings of imperialism. That he knew much about his enemies is clear from his 1965 book "Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism," which he dedicated to "the freedom fighters of Africa, living and dead."

While Nkrumah was in power, his country was a home away from home for countless African exiles and liberation fighters. In the early 1960s, our own W.E.B. DuBois and his wife gave up their U.S. citizenship to move to Accra and to become highly honored citizens of Ghana. Nkrumah personally sponsored DuBois' last great scholarly undertaking (at age 90): the projected 10-year editorship of an encyclopedia of Africa. (Shortly after the 1966 coup, DuBois' widow, Shirley Graham, left Ghana.)

As Nkrumah surveyed the neo-colonial mess that much of Africa has become, he must have died with a broken heart. The West has skillfully re-established its de facto economic power (and political control) in Kenya, after having granted nominal

political independence to numerous colonies during the 1950s and 1960s. One of the best-publicized examples, of course, was in the former Belgian Congo (now Zaire). Both in retrospect and in analysis, it is clear that Brussels had not the slightest intention of giving up its control over that colony's priceless resources. The quick, greased downfall of Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba had been plotted long before the formal lowering of the Belgian flag in June 1960 at so-called independence ceremonies.

Former UN diplomat Conor Cruise O'Brien and others have thoroughly documented the record of Belgian-British-U.S. duplicity. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold allowed the world organization to be used in the re-enslavement of the Congo. By the autumn of 1960, when events were closing in on the trusting Lumumba—events that culminated in his foul and brutal murder in February 1961—Kwame Nkrumah, as president of Ghana, wrote to him with the classic warning: "The only colonialist or imperialist that I trust is a dead one." Believing that the UN would play a neutral role, Lumumba (to Nkrumah's dismay) had called in UN forces after a Belgian-instigated rebellion in his own army.

Had Nkrumah not died of cancer while under medical treatment in Bucharest, might he ultimately have regained power? No one can say for sure. But an official invitation to return home to Ghana after the recent overthrow of the repressive pro-Western regime amounted to a vindication of his efforts, if not of his complete administrative record, as father and first president of his country. After six years, the right wing generals of Ghana and their civilian supporters had shown they had no socio-political-economic program to meet the many problems of a new nation. The policy of reopening Ghana to unlimited western investment and exploitation had worsened the economy and the condition of the people. Discontent was massive. Corruption was everywhere. Universities were closed because the students were in active rebellion.

As with Indonesia after Sukarno's overthrow in 1965 by his army and the CIA, as with Cambodia after the military-CIA coup in 1970 that deposed Prince Sihanouk, as with all the former colonies that enjoyed a brief respite of self-respect before being re-colonized, Ghana lost a leader respected throughout Africa, whatever his shortcomings, as a true patriot. He failed to build

continued

world in revolution

CAMBODIA

A high-level source in the Phnom Penh regime has given the lie to President Nixon's statement in 1970 that Sihanouk's ouster "surprised no nation more than the U.S." According to Intercontinental Press, the recently named prime minister Son Ngoc Thanh revealed to Oxford University scholar

T.D. Allman in a series of interviews that CIA agents promised to do "everything possible" to aid anti-Sihanouk forces in a coup. Allman, who was in Asia last year on assignment for the Manchester Guardian, said Thanh told him the U.S. paid "millions of dollars" to train and equip his own private forces, the "Khmer Serei" ("Free" Cambodia) forces, which were recruited from Cambodian mercenaries living in South Vietnam. Shortly after the coup by Lon Nol, the Intercontinental Press report states, Thanh's group was air-lifted to Phnom Penh where it played a key role in holding the capital. . . . The Phnom Penh army is becoming more unpopular among youth in Cambodia. According to a Feb. 2 AFP report: "The Cambodian military authorities are having a lot of trouble in recruitment, many youths having crossed over to Thailand to dodge service in the Phnom Penh army". . . . "News from Cambodia," a feature in the Vietnam Courier, published in Hanoi, reported in March that Thai mercenary troops have pillaged homes, shrines and temples in Cambodia—all on the pretext of pursuing "Communist rebels". . . . "News from Cambodia" also reported that the deputy manager of the Sihanoukville branch of the National Bank crossed over to the liberated zone of the country Feb. 13.

VIETNAM

A celebration was held in Paris April 22 to mark the second anniversary of the summit conference of the Indochinese peoples. The first meeting was held in the spring of 1970, shortly after Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown from his position as head of Cambodia by a CIA-sponsored coup. The Paris meeting last month, organized by the Paris Committee of the National United Front of Cambodia; the Union of Lao Students in France; and the Union of Vietnamese in France, was attended by over 4000 people. The meeting unanimously adopted a resolution that acclaimed the victories of the Indochinese peoples and condemned the U.S. war escalation, especially the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. A banner across the meeting hall read: "Long live the fraternal militant solidarity of the Cambodian, Lao and Vietnamese peoples!"

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) is continuing its efforts to get the Saigon regime to release Mme. Ngo Ba Thanh from jail, where she has been held for the last six months due to her antiwar activities. When she collapsed on a stretcher in a courtroom March 22, due to an asthma attack, Thanh issued a statement saying: "We don't want the Americans to come here. I want all the Americans to go home and hand back our sovereignty and we want to talk with the other people from the other side, about our business, among the Vietnamese". . . . A letter from a Saigon puppet soldier, written as he was retreating from the demilitarized zone last month, was printed in the Washington Post April 6. The letter said in part: "We did not want to fight the Reds. What for? They have never harmed us. . . we should kill instead the corrupted leaders in Saigon and their dirty Saigon-American friends. (President Nixon's) withdrawal is interminable, hence we have no independence. His Vietnamization shall never work because he is fighting not only the Communists but also the whole Vietnamese population". . . . The Gaiphong Press Agency of the revolutionary forces reported from Hue April 18 that puppet general Hoang Xuan Lam, former commander of the I corps area, built an "execution pole" in the center of the city of Hue in order "to intimidate the people." Lam also ordered his agents, the report said, to murder those who propagandized in favor of the liberation forces.

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
STATES ITEM

E - 134,707

MAY 4 1972

Antiwar Demonstrators March

About 100 anti-war demonstrators marched from Beaugard Square to Lafayette Square today where they gathered under an oak tree and listened to speeches condemning President Nixon's recent "re-escalation" of the air war in Vietnam.

The procession bristled with signs that said things like "Smash Imperialism, Not Women and Children," or "Who Profits From This War?"

The marchers chanted slogans such as "Stop the War Now," and "Prices up, Wages Down, Why war?"

Willie Gunther, a Vietnam veteran, led the list of speakers recounting that when he

worker as cryptographer in Vietnam he discovered some "truths" about the war "that the people of the United States are not being told about the war."

He said the government "is telling a lie," when it says North Vietnam is invading South Vietnam. He said the North Vietnamese troops coming south are merely advisers and support troops to the Viet Cong.

Gunther said the President's attempt to suppress the Pentagon Papers indicates that Nixon does not want the American people to know the truth. "Because if the American people knew the truth, Nixon would have the same

problem with them as with his own troops."

He said that since he arrived in Vietnam hard drug use has escalated and that the Central Intelligence Agency, working with poppy growers in Cambodia who are friendly to the U.S., is running "junk" in Vietnam.

He said studies by the Army have shown that troops on hard dope don't resist the army and that one general has recommended that hard drugs be allowed into domestic and foreign posts to keep GI's from protesting the war.

State Rep.-elect Johnny Jackson told the group the continuing Vietnam war is symptomatic of the U.S. con-

tinuing to hold the wrong priorities, particularly in regards to the black and poor communities.

Steve Cohen, who said he is with a group called "Air War," spoke of the anti-personnel bombs he said are being used in Vietnam.

He said the U.S. has used a progression of more and more destructive anti-personnel bombs. He said that recently the Flechettes, which are tiny nails with fins on the back, which could be dispersed from a bomb, strike humans and cause gaping wounds, have been replaced by plastic pellets which Cohen said are "even more nefarious."

TARENTUM, PA.
VALLEY NEWS-DISPATCH

APR 20 1972
E - 39,021

Our opinions

The CIA meddles

AMERICANS seem to be the last to learn what the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and now they are learning about the CIA's role in Cambodia from a Cambodian who had a part in it.

Prime Minister Thanh told a British interviewer, before attaining his present post, that the United States paid millions after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. He said CIA agents assigned to him assured him of help if existing government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came under left-wing attack.

The government was overthrown in 1970 and that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by Sihanouk and that in turn led to a massive American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. So the Southeast Asia war engulfed

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APR 10 1972

Calls Nixon Policy 'Fraud'

Harrington Raps Vietnamization

By MARY TIERNEY

U.S. Rep. Michael J. Harrington, D-Beverly, yesterday attacked President Nixon's policy of Vietnamization as a "fraud." He made the remarks following a visit to South Vietnam last week.

As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, the North Shore congressman has been working for the past month to force the administration to increase the flow of public information about U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia.

Yesterday, at a Parker House press conference, Rep. Harrington said that "Vietnamization has been sold to the American people as a way of withdrawing our presence from the Indochinese war.

"In fact," he continued, "that policy, as it is now being pursued, requires a continued, massive American military presence in Southeast Asia for many years to come.

"It commits us to continue to spend billions of taxpayers' dollars for the support of the armies of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

"IT COMMITS US to spend many billions to pay for an air war as extensive as any this country has ever engaged in — even at the height of World War II.

"It commits us to continued direct involvement by the Central Intelligence Agency in the ground fighting in Laos and Cambodia and to continue to devastate four countries in a war which has long since lost any conceivable justification — militarily, politically or morally."



U. S. REP. HARRINGTON

Rep. Harrington said that since the U.S. has broken off peace talks, the South Vietnamese Army has been unable to hold its ground without full-scale American military support.

"Current American policy requires us to maintain our involvement in the Indochinese War for the foreseeable future.

And, as long as we remain committed to the maintenance of a pro-American regime in Saigon and as long as the pro-American forces are unable to sustain themselves in power, American men, money and

weapons will be deeply engaged in that war," he said.

Rep. Harrington said that American involvement is greater than the American people have been told and that it is time "to raise American consciousness to the magnitude of our involvement."

He said he was "particularly disturbed" about the secrecy that surrounds the military operation in Thailand where the U.S. is "spending \$5 million a day to maintain 25,000 Air Force men at five large air bases in a country club atmosphere."

He said he would do everything in his power to see that all censorship of news from Thailand would be lifted so that the American people would know where their money was going.

"When the full facts are known there will be public annoyance, anger and frustration in the inability to extricate," he said.

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APR 7 1972

More CIA Meddling

Americans seem to be the last to learn what the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and now they are learning about the CIA's role in Cambodia from a Cambodian who had a part in it.


Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh told a British interviewer, before attaining his present post, that the United States paid millions of dollars after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. He said CIA agents assigned to him ("they have three names a month," he added) assured him of help if the existing government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came under left-wing attack.

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CIA Role Bared in Sihanouk Ouster

Dispatch News Service, the source of the following article, was the first news agency to disclose details of the killings at My Lai, South Vietnam.

By RICHARD A. FINEBERG

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WASHINGTON.—The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a crucial role in encouraging the coup that toppled Prince Norodom Sihanouk and plunged Cambodia into the Indochina war, according to Cambodia's recently named prime minister, Son Ngoc Thanh.

Describing Sihanouk's overthrow in a series of interviews last year with Oxford University scholar T. D. Allman, Thanh said that CIA agents promised they would do "everything possible" to help if the Cambodian plotters successfully mounted a coup and then found themselves under attack by pro-Sihanouk and Communist forces.

Shortly after the March 1970 coup, Thanh's own forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, were dispatched by plane to Phnom Penh, where they played a vital role in defending the Cambodian capital for Gen. Lon Nol.

THE WHITE HOUSE maintains that the U.S. had no prior knowledge of the coup and that "no American military or civilian officers" were ever involved officially or unofficially with the plotters. Sihanouk's ouster "surprised no nation more than the United States," President Nixon said after the coup.

Sen. Mike Gravel (D., Alaska) said on Tuesday that White House denials of U.S. involvement in the 1970 coup are "incredible" and he called for full disclosure of the U.S.



PRINCE SIHANOUK
... toppled by CIA

role in Cambodia prior to the coup.

"It is incredible to take the position—as the White House has done—that the U.S. conducted continuous clandestine incursions into Cambodia, hired and trained members of a sect avowedly dedicated to Sihanouk's overthrow, and still did not know that a coup was being planned," Gravel said.

ALTHOUGH THE Sihanouk regime was faltering, Gravel said, "It is doubtful that the prince could have been overthrown without clandestine U.S. support for the coup."

According to Son Ngoc Thanh, CIA agents assigned to Thanh's staff were kept aware of developments concerning the coup including secret meetings between Thanh and aides of Gen. Lon Nol.

At that time, Lon Nol was Sihanouk's prime minister, while Thanh, who had been sentenced to death by Sihanouk, headed a rebel sect known as the Khmer Serei ("Free Cambodia") from a jungle post near the Vietnam-Cambodia border.

According to Thanh, beginning in 1965 the U.S. paid "millions of dollars" to train, arm and support his forces, most of whom were recruited from the Cambodian minority living in South Vietnam's Delta region.

Thanh told Allman, who was

on assignment for the (Manchester) Guardian, that in 1969 a U.S. agent assigned to Thanh's staff gave assurances that the U.S. would support a two-pronged invasion of Cambodia by Thanh's partisans.

THE PLEDGE, Thanh said, came from a CIA operative identified only as Fred. "They have three names a month," said Thanh referring to his American collaborators. "We never knew their real names."

The plan, Thanh said, was "to penetrate the country" from the South Vietnam and Thai borders. "Our hope was that the Cambodian army would rally to us. We would negotiate with Sihanouk, to avoid bloodshed. He could either leave the country or agree to become a constitutional monarch."

Large-scale Khmer Serei defections to the Cambodian government were reported in 1969 and may have been part of Thanh's invasion plan to overthrow Sihanouk. According to reliable sources, the repatriated Khmer Serei units were serving in the royal army under Lon Nol and spearheaded political demonstrations in Phnom Penh just before the coup.

Thanh's invasion plan was shelved — "overtaken by events," as Thanh put it — early in 1970 when Lon Nol's aides sought Thanh's support in the event of a coup.

THANH TOLD Allman that Lon Nol's officers asked him "If the Vietcong attack Phnom Penh the way they attacked Saigon in 1968, could Lon Nol expect the help of Son Ngoc Thanh's forces in defending the capital?"

After checking with his "American friends," Thanh committed his U.S.-trained and financed forces to the Lon

Nol coup. The CIA, he said, promised that the U.S. would do "everything possible" to help.

The 63-year-old Thanh was named prime minister by the ailing Lon Nol on March 21. A devout Buddhist and an early Cambodian nationalist leader, Thanh was prime minister for a brief period in 1945 when he staged a coup prior to the Japanese surrender. He was quickly arrested by British occupying forces, however, and exiled to France.

Thanh returned to Cambodia in 1951 and joined the militant Issarek (Independence) movement. At that time he allied with the Communist Vietminh to oppose Sihanouk, whose strategy of cooperation with the French to achieve independence was too moderate for the militant nationalist.

From that time until the March 1970 coup, Thanh engaged in anti-Sihanouk guerrilla efforts from rural Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam.

In July 1970, Thanh returned to Phnom Penh to become an adviser to Lon Nol. By that time, Cambodian leftists had become allied with Sihanouk and Vietnam Communist forces to fight Lon Nol, the combined U.S.-Saigon forces had swept into Cambodia, and the war that had raged on its borders for two decades finally engulfed Cam-

STATINTL

April 1972

Nixon's Peace Offer

THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE at stake in the Indochina war has always been a relatively simple one; is the United States (or the French before it) to have a predominant voice in determining the political and social structure of Indochina, or will this question be settled by the Indochinese peoples themselves, relatively free from outside intervention? It has been fairly clear from the outset that, if external force were withdrawn, Vietnam would ultimately be unified under communist leadership, since the Viet Minh and its successors had "captured" the nationalist movement, as U.S. government analysts express it. In Laos, the Pathet Lao have been unmatched in their ability to construct a popular nationalist political movement, in this case, too, with revolutionary social content. U.S. intervention from the late 1950s has drawn North Vietnam increasingly into Laotian affairs, much as in South Vietnam and more recently Cambodia, where the March 1970 coup, very likely with a CIA hand, and the US-ARVN invasion that followed, shattered a fragile though conceivably stable neutralism and increased the probability that Cambodia too will be brought ultimately into a communist-led federation of some sort if outside force is withdrawn.

For reasons that need not detain us here, the United States has never been willing to tolerate the "loss" of Indochina, and remains unwilling today. The conditions of U.S. intervention have changed over the years, but not the essential goals. Furthermore, the basic problem facing the Western invaders has also changed little during the past quarter century. Several years ago, an American military spokesman formulated the problem clearly: the U.S. has enormous military force but little political power and must defeat an adversary with enormous political power but only modest military force. To this problem the U.S. must find the "proper response"—in Vietnam and elsewhere in the third world as well. (Jean Lacouture, *Vietnam: Between Two Truces*, 1966).

This problem dictates American strategy. The basic strategy has been, necessarily, to demolish the social and

political structures in which the indigenous resistance is rooted, what is called "nation-building" by some of the more contemptible hypocrites spawned in the course of this endeavor, for example, Robert Komer, chief Presidential advisor on "pacification" in the Johnson Administration. Five years ago, he held out the hope that "erosion of southern VC strength" may be feasible because, though none of the American programs are very efficient, "we are grinding the enemy down by sheer weight and mass" (*Pentagon Papers*, Beacon, volume IV). After the Tet offensive of 1968, it became clear that the American public would not long tolerate the costs of a continuing military occupation in South Vietnam, coupled with a costly air war against the North. Consequently, the direct U.S. troop commitment was leveled off and then gradually lowered through "Vietnamization"—a policy suggested by Pentagon systems analysts in 1967—while a sharply expanded technological war reached its peak in the early months of the Nixon Administration.

Nixon and Kissinger are gambling that the massive destruction and forced population concentration in the South, with its devastating impact on the rural society, may create conditions under which the U.S.-imposed regime can survive. To use Robert Komer's terms, "thanks to massive U.S. military intervention at horrendous cost," a "favorable military environment" has been created "in which the largely political competition for control and support of the key rural population could begin again" in this "revolutionary, largely political conflict" (*J. of International Affairs*, 1971, no. 1). He fails to add that control of the "key rural population" may be facilitated by the fact that at least half the population, 85 percent rural in 1960, now lives in urban ghettos (J-C Pomonti, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 1972), part of the "horrendous cost" of "massive U.S. military intervention." Much the same is true in Laos and Cambodia. Nixon and Kissinger appear to be moving towards an effective partition of Indochina: the heavily settled areas of Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia will, it is hoped, be separated from the resistance, controlled by an elaborate

military and police apparatus, and gradually absorbed within the U.S.-Japan Pacific system. The vast areas ceded to the resistance will be subjected to intensive bombardment which will continue to make an organized social life virtually impossible. Parts of Laos may be effectively incorporated within Thailand, as George Ball suggested years ago. It may be that the willingness of the Administration to concede the presence of Thai mercenaries in Laos (in conflict with explicit legislation designed to prevent this) reflects the need to prepare the public for this outcome.

As the very knowledgeable Australian analyst Peter King observes; such "successes" as have been achieved in this program are "no mystery": "It requires more than ordinary courage for civilians to maintain their political allegiances openly in the face of a semi-genocidal counter-insurgent strategy" (*Pacific Affairs*, Fall 1971), the prerequisite for Komer-style "nation-building." It is this counter-insurgent strategy and its results that lead General Westmoreland to believe: "I think particularly significant is that the enemy does not have the strong infrastructure and the guerrilla forces in large numbers, well equipped and highly motivated, that he had in 1968" (Peter Osnos, *Washington Post-Boston Globe*, Feb. 1, 1972). However, as King and many others recognize, "the durability of that success may be doubted."

Given the insistence of the U.S. public on scaling down the direct American involvement, it has been obvious for several years that it would become necessary for the U.S. to engage in some sort of political manipulations within the areas of South Vietnam that remain under U.S. control, or to "get ready for political competition in South Vietnam," as Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington put it in a paper before the May 1969 meeting of the Council on Vietnamese Studies of SEADAG. This collection of scholars, who claim to be concerned with support for research on Vietnam, struggled manfully with the problem of how to ensure control at the national level for "our side," given that the NLF remains "the most powerful purely political national organization," "the

STATINTL

Erratic Politics, War, Corruption Erode Support for Lon Nol Regime

STATINTL

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

PHNOM PENH, March 30—The broad popular support for the Lon Nol government that made it possible to marshal the will of passive Cambodians to resist a fierce and disciplined enemy is now, perhaps irretrievably, a thing of the past.

It is not only that Phnom Penh's university and high school students have been on strike for three weeks or that a political split has developed among senior Buddhist monks. It is that the malaise seems to have spread everywhere.

What is vocal discontent when expressed by student leaders is merely apathy coming from simple farmers and soldiers, but it amounts to degrees of the same thing: an unhappy recognition that this regime is in most respects no different from the one it replaced two years ago, only now there is war.

Sophisticated Cambodians from all walks of life, who a year ago spoke hopefully about progress being made on the drafting of the new republican constitution and about the high-spirited bravery of the Khmer army, now see only corruption and military weakness.

"The corruption is worse than under Sihanouk," said an English-speaking Cambodian, cheerful by nature, who fled the countryside in June 1970, three months after the prince was overthrown. "Then the officials had motorbikes, now the army officers have cars and villas."

"The soldiers don't pay attention," he went on. "They sit in their barracks and play cards. The Communists must laugh."

The latest round of political maneuvering by Lon Nol—which produced government by decree and scuttled, at least temporarily, the almost-completed constitution—plus the worst rocket attack ever made against

the capital, have not in themselves made matters dramatically worse.

But the disorder and fear deepened the disillusionment that first became evident after a series of battlefield reverses in November and December. Then it was the army that was discredited; this time it is the politicians.

Making the rounds of diplomats and various Cambodians one hears as never before that the government is unpopular.

"It is staggering and probably no damn good," a cabinet minister told an American friend the other day, but he agreed to rejoin the cabinet because he thought it was his responsibility.

Lon Nol, an unpredictable, invalidated mystic, retains a special status, a kind of benign father image difficult for outsiders to understand. This puts him largely above public criticism, which falls heavily on those around him, although he is criticized privately.

The biggest loser has been Sisowath Sirik Matak, who for months was the day-to-day head of government, admired far above all others by the U.S. embassy, but disliked by many Cambodians, especially the students.

He has been forced out altogether, a major concession by Lon Nol who counted on Matak as his closest aide. The U.S. Embassy hopes that some way can be found to bring Matak back, perhaps as an unofficial adviser.

For the moment that looks unlikely. Banners still hang on the walls of Phnom Penh University's law school proclaiming that "Sirik Matak is the source of all that is bad."

The charges against Matak, an aloof aristocrat, are vague. To the students, however, he apparently represents the old order that they thought ended when Si-

hanouk was toppled. He has become a focus of their disenchantment.

Contributions to the uneasiness is the fact that the government, as it now stands, has legal basis. Lon Nol is a self-declared president: a dictator, in effect. Not that the niceties matter a great deal here, but too much symbolic importance has been given to the trappings of the Republic for them not to be missed.

Apparently sensing that, Lon Nol has appointed a committee headed by the rector of Phnom Penh University to have another go at the constitution he has rejected. (His chief objection was that it would give too much authority to the legislature and not enough to the executive.)

The committee is to report in two weeks or so. Then—in a matter of months, Lon Nol has said—there will be a referendum and election, probably for a new National Assembly. Whether it will go as smoothly as that is considered doubtful.

In a radio speech last night, Lon Nol drew a fine distinction between freedom in a democracy and anarchy. "I ask you to understand the difference," he said, in explaining why he seized complete power.

"Our constitution is soon to be finished," he said. "Afterward we will have a referendum as we all wish and we will have a good system."

In the meantime, after a number of public figures turned down the post, Lon Nol has retained as his principal deputy, Son Ngoc Thanh, a 64-year-old former prime minister who once led a CIA-supported movement against Prince Sihanouk.

It is not at all clear why Thanh, who has supporters among the students and monks and some in the army, took the job, although

one current theory is that he plans slowly to gather power to himself and challenge Lon Nol.

The rest of the government consists of a half-dozen holdovers from the last cabinet, a new defense minister who is apparently well thought of, a few non-political functionaries and as minister of commerce—said to be a particularly lucrative post—Lon Nol's personal physician.

The selection of the new government has not ended the student strike, which is desultory in the late-March heat but completely effective. Nor has it stopped the dispute between two of Cambodia's most important monks over the right to criticize the government.

One of the monks, Khiev Chum, has a long record of opposing the monarchy. Like the students, he speaks out for some undefined principles of freedom that were supposedly embodied in the coup against Sihanouk. The monk has been warned by his superior to desist or be punished.

There is no evidence that a significant number of the students of Khiev Chum and his followers are leftists or that their outspoken opposition could trigger large demonstrations. But their activities are symptomatic of the sapping of the public spirit.

Last weekend, the government called on the people of Phnom Penh to prepare for future attacks by digging trenches and arming themselves with "knives, swords and spears."

The message ended with a paraphrase of what Winston Churchill told the British in World War II: "There are only drops of tears and blood that can be promised to you."

The people of the capital, whose shining patriotism once so impressed and touched foreign visitors, were not stirred enough to dig a single trench.

HARTFORD, CONN.

TIMES
MAR 29 1972

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Is Son Ngoc Thanh our next albatross?

STATINTL

Most Americans pay little attention to changes of government in small and volatile nations like Cambodia. Political leaders come and go, and it is difficult to remember their names.

The name of Son Ngoc Thanh is worth remembering.

He would appear to be, at the moment, the real power in Cambodia. He has been for more than two generations a leader of the nationalist movement in Cambodia.

But he has also been, for the last twenty years or more, in nearly constant opposition to the now-exiled Prince Sihanouk, and his opposition has in recent years been heavily financed by the American Central Intelligence Agency.

In a very real sense, the CIA's man is now in power in Phnom Penh. His arch-enemy — and still the most popular, beloved, and nearly-deified Cambodian, Norodom Sihanouk — is in exile in Peking.

That is hardly a recipe for stability.

SUPPORT FOR Son Ngoc Thanh is not unreasonable. He began his career as a crusading anti-colonial editor (in Cambodia's first newspaper in the Cambodian language) in 1937. He worked with the Japanese in the latter stages of World War II to drive the French out. His pressures probably made Sihanouk, then a very young (and French-sponsored) king, hasten Cambodia's independence.

Sihanouk's hostility toward Son can be seen as personal jealousy of

a politician nearly as popular at times, as Sihanouk himself.

Son was exiled; recalled briefly; exiled again. He has since the early 1950s organized several nationalist, anti-Sihanouk guerrilla organizations, backed variously by Saigon and Bangkok (both historic antagonists of Cambodia) and the CIA.

He comes to power in Phnom Penh now by a curious route.

Lon Nol, the general who drove Sihanouk into exile, this month abrogated all semblance of democratic process in Cambodia: He cancelled the nearly-completed drafting of a new constitution, declared himself president, ousted the titular "chief of state" and assumed that role as well; and surrounded himself by a "cabinet" of Army men loyal to him, with only one token member of the democratic opposition.

From a man who has suffered a crippling stroke, who apparently cannot walk without support, and who has never in several previous stints as head of government been considered anything but a figurehead, it was a remarkable show of decisiveness — remarkable enough to make one wonder who was behind it.

He then named Son Ngoc Thanh as premier and prime minister.

AMERICAN POLICY in Indochina has, on previous occasions, singled out nationalist leaders whom we could trust, and helped to install them in power, Ngo Dinh Diem was only the first of many such men in Vietnam.

It is, at best, a risky business. Today's American-sponsored national hero can be tomorrow's albatross.

CLOUDED FUTURE

Cambodia's Premier: Life of Mystery

BY GEORGE McARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

PHNOM PENH—Cambodia's newly named prime minister, Son Ngoc Thanh, is one of Asia's most mysterious schemers and appears to be an unlikely prospect as a successful politician.

He has offended conventional nationalism by accepting the money and support, at various times, of the Japanese, the Americans, the South Vietnamese, the Thais and probably others.

For 30 years he has been virtually a nonperson in his own country, ignored by Prince Norodom Sihanouk's controlled press and, furthermore, under a death sentence. Except for a brief one-year return during that period, he saw Cambodia only from clandestine hideouts and jungle camps.

When the current regime of President Lon Nol finally did permit his return last year, he was smuggled into town and his presence was denied for weeks.

Painfully Diminished

Although Cambodia has been painfully diminished by the absence of effective government, it is questionable how much support Thanh will get from Lon Nol. Many of the men Thanh must work with are on record during the Sihanouk regime with the most vitriolic attacks against him. Some of them spent time trying to track him down.

Though the war is obviously going badly, many of the elite fear Thanh.

Though he is now prime minister, Thanh's government is remembered for one thing: "I am a Thanhiste but

please do not tell anyone," one army officer told a Western correspondent.

A stocky little man with graying, crew cut hair, Thanh shows few outward signs of a cloak-and-dagger life stretching back to his childhood. He laughs easily, makes awkward puns in French and urges visitors to quit smoking.

"I gave them up 20 years ago," he said, "I was in the Maquis and it was too hard to get the British cigarettes I liked. They cost too much, too."

Age in Dispute

He claims to be 64—some sources add as much as four years—but he looks younger. He wears plain khaki trousers and shirt and peers intently from behind simple, gold-rimmed spectacles.

He shrugs off with a smile questions of his relationship with ranking Cambodian officials who were vilifying him only a short time ago.

"At least the blood is no longer flowing between us," he said. "We must work for the country."

Preparing to take up where he left off 30 years ago, Thanh has no regrets about the past, particularly his collaboration with the Japanese during World War II.

He recounted the tangled politics of France, Japan, the Vichy regime and the different outlooks of those days and added:

"History is written by the activities of men. A farmer must farm and a fisherman must fish. I am a politician and had to do what I did."

"Historically, perhaps, one might now wish to have acted differently but I have no regrets."

He claims, with some justification, the Cambodian people do not reproach him for his old Japanese ties nor for his later and barely hidden ties with the American Central Intelligence Agency.

"They have always known that I was Cambodian," he said, smiling.

That, in fact, is Thanh's immediate problem: a government clouded only partly by his

and efforts by Sihanouk to rewrite history.

Sihanouk once cut short the tour of an American diplomat, who inadvertently referred to Thanh as "Cambodia's first nationalist."

Was an Agitator

As a schoolboy, Thanh was influenced by the works of Sun Yat-sen and Mahatma Gandhi. He was an agitator but not a radical in those days, living and cooking in a garret in Paris while studying law.

He marched and distributed pamphlets and came back to Cambodia to a minor civil service job and then on to a rundown print shop and a one-sheet newspaper.

It was World War II that activated the group of supporters Thanh had gathered about him. When France fell, Thanh saw his chance with Japan's Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. When he was about to be arrested for organizing a protest march, he sought asylum in the Japanese Embassy in Phnom Penh.

Shipped to Tokyo

He was shipped off to Tokyo to learn Japanese and train with the Japanese army. Some sources say he was commissioned a captain by the emperor but Thanh says he was never an army member.

"I lived with the officers and many were my friends and some still are," said Thanh. "But I was never an officer in the Japanese army."

At any rate, when the Vichy regime in France collapsed late during the war, Thanh was flown back to Phnom Penh and installed in a new cabinet, first as foreign minister and then as prime minister.

At that time his nominal boss was Sihanouk, then the teen-aged monarch. One of the men nominally working for Thanh was Lon Nol, director of the Cambodian police under the Japanese.

Thanh's government is remembered for one thing: it proclaimed Cambodia's independence, admittedly with Japanese backing. But the word independence had been effectively spoken for the first time and by Thanh, not by Sihanouk.

Though Thanh was jailed by the French on their return, and later given a 20-year prison sentence, the political force he still controlled remained dominant in Cambodia. Twice his supporters won National Assembly elections sponsored by the French and Sihanouk.

To counter domestic pressure, Sihanouk arranged for Thanh's return from house arrest in France in 1951 and a crowd of 5,000 turned out to greet him. Within the year Thanh was in the jungles fighting.

Gave Performance

He was occasionally reported in Bangkok, Saigon and Taipei, seemingly more and more on the edge of things as Sihanouk gave a virtuoso performance in Phnom Penh.

When the war in Vietnam grew hotter, the Americans—most notably the CIA and the Special Forces—became aware of Thanh's assets.

He was born in the Mekong Delta of ethnic Cambodian parents and his organization, known as the Khmer Serai, was strong there. (As was his family, which remained in the Delta. A younger brother, Son Thai Nguyen, is now a member of South Vietnam's National Senate.)

Thanh recruited ethnic Cambodians for the Green Beret camps that dotted the border. The Special Forces worked closely with him, though officials have always denied it.

Thanh saw it as a way to arm his followers. The Green Berets saw it as a source of good troops. Both were right but Thanh won in the long run.

The CIA dropped Thanh some years back after he was implicated in a plot to assassinate Sihanouk. But

STATINTL

continued

23 MAR 1972

STATINTL

Lon Nol Gets Full Control in Cambodia

By FOX BUTTERFIELD

Special to The New York Times

PNOMPENH Cambodia

March 22—President Lon Nol has emerged from Cambodia's latest political crisis with virtually unchallenged power, diplomats here agree, having removed the last legal opposition to him and, in the process, the last semblance of democracy.

There had been some doubt in Pnompenh that he would be able to form an effective government after he abruptly dismissed the constituent assembly, canceled the constitution it was preparing and proclaimed himself president 12 days ago. But his official announcement last night that he had formed a 17-man Cabinet, including only one member known as an opponent, dispelled the lingering hopes of some who thought the President might be forced to back down.

The army, which is believed to be completely loyal to President Lon Nol and the basic source of his power, has two important representatives in the new Government, the Minister of Defense, Maj. Gen. Sak Suthsakhan, and the Minister of Interior, Maj. Gen. Thapana Nginn. Two other members of the Cabinet are temporary wartime officers.

With the removal of the constituent assembly, which had been the national assembly until Lon Nol, then marshal, changed its role by decree last October, only Pnompenh's students remain as a possible dissident voice.

But in a country that has known only monarchy and French colonial rule, and in which the people have been

raised in a tradition of reverence for a god-king, there has been little real protest over President Lon Nol's assumption of power.

"We do not look at things as categorically as you do in the West," said one former opposition member of the national assembly today. "We may not like what Lon Nol does, but he is our leader and most of the people believe in him." "Besides," he explained with a deep sigh, "Cambodia is at war and we cannot afford the luxury of too much politics."

Musical Chairs

Most of the changes in the Cabinet appear to have been part of Cambodia's annual game of musical chairs in which members of the small political elite shuffle the important Government posts among themselves.

The new premier, Son Ngoc Thanh, a longtime guerrilla leader in the fight to oust Prince Sihanouk, represents a sharp change from the former Premier, Lieut. Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak. The latter, a member of the royal family and a close associate of President Lon Nol, was widely regarded as Cambodia's most energetic and able administrator.

In one of the inexplicable actions that has made foreign diplomats here fond of saying Cambodia's politics sound like a story from Alice in Wonderland, thousands of students at Pnompenh University and the city's high school have been demonstrating for two weeks for the ouster of General Sirik Matak.

The students have accused him of corruption and of being undemocratic for denying them freedom of speech. They have

continued their protests against him and boycotted all classes even after he announced his withdrawal from political life last week and after President Lon Nol failed to reappoint him.

American officials here, who had developed great respect for General Sirik Matak, say that his loss to the Government will be a serious one.

One Opposition Minister

The only member of the new Government who has been associated with the opposition is the new Minister of Justice, Yem Sambaur, a former president of the national assembly. His presence in the Cabinet is regarded as token representation for the opposition bloc that had formed in the assembly before it was dismissed.

Mr. Thanh, who was first made Premier by the Japanese during their occupation of Cambodia during World War II has a reputation as an ardent nationalist and an eccentric. The guerrilla forces he led, which were reportedly financed by the American Central Intelligence Agency, fought Prince Sihanouk's army for many years during the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties, and many Cambodian generals are hostile to him as a result.

Despite Mr. Thanh's reputed close relations with Americans over the years, he is not believed to be as highly regarded as General Sirik Matak by the American Embassy. But the students have said they favor Mr. Thanh's appointment.

Many longtime observers of Cambodian politics say that there will probably be another political crisis within a few months and that the Cabinet is likely to change again.

Lon Nol Aide Accepts Post

PHNOM PENH (UPI) — Elder statesman Son Ngoc Thanh, senior adviser to president Lon Nol, said yesterday that he had agreed to accept the post of prime minister, ending Cambodia's governmental crisis.

Son Ngoc Thanh served as prime minister during the Japanese occupation in World War II. He is known to have kept in close contact with U.S. officials in recent years, and was repeatedly accused by deposed chief of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk of being an agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Thanh's announcement came as the regime was celebrating the second anniversary of the overthrow of Sihanouk, who has set up a government-in-exile in Peking.

Cambodia has been without a government for four days, during which five other candidates for prime minister reportedly have turned down offers of the post.

Thanh told reporters he had "imposed no conditions, but only wanted to serve his country."

He said his job would be that of "coordinator" of the council of ministers, all of whom would be chosen and headed by Lon Nol.

He also said there would be an executive council and a security council in the new government, but added that "as yet no decision has been made on filling the post of vice president."

Thanh's acceptance was reportedly welcomed by Phnom Penh's protesting students, whose main target was former Prime Minister-Delegate Sisowath Sirik Matak. He is apparently now completely out of top positions in the government after acting as Lon Nol's right-hand man in the first two years of the war.

14 MAR 1972

Week of Solidarity with Indochina opens

Daily World Foreign Department
from combined news sources

The World Council of Peace has called on more than 100 of its national peace committees to implement the program for a worldwide Week of Solidarity with the Indochina Peoples.

The Week of Solidarity being held this week is to include demonstrations, meetings, rallies and campaigns protesting the continuation of the U.S. aggression against Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and demanding the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces.

Meanwhile a massive drive to annihilate the Khmer Rouge, or Cambodian patriotic forces, entered its fourth day, with more than 50,000 Saigon puppet troops supported by U.S. aerial and artillery forces conducting a "search and destroy" operation in Cambodia.

Puppet regime near collapse

The puppet Saigon troops were ordered into Cambodia as a political crisis threatened to topple the puppet government in that country headed by Prime Minister delegate Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak, a compradore capitalist and arch conspirator against the Cambodian people.

The governmental crisis came to a head Friday when the invalid Lon Nol, crippled by a stroke, took over from Cheng Heng as chief of state and dissolved the National Assembly.

Lon Nol, who had seized power with the aid of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency while former head-of-state Prince Norodom Sihanouk was out of the country, today proclaimed himself president, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and prime minister.

Last week the Cambodian Student Association precipitated the crisis when it voted "absolutely no confidence" in Sirik Matak. Lon Nol claimed that he had acted "according to the wishes of Buddhist monks and all compatriots."

Khmer Rouge attacked

The seriousness of the Cambodian situation was evident in the size of the puppet Saigon force sent to buttress the Cambodian puppets. U.S. jets and helicopters were reported to be backing the Saigon forces. U.S. B-52 bombers pounded areas believed to be occupied by the Khmer Rouge.

U.S. and Saigon military spokesmen apparently got their lines crossed in reported details of the operations. One dispatch from Saigon claimed the invasion of Cambodia had been launched to head off an attack by "North Vietnamese" troops. This is the standard jargon used by the U.S. and puppet regimes, which purport to see "North Vietnamese" as the only fighters in the three Indochina countries.

A second dispatch from Saigon admitted, however, that the invasion was ordered to prevent a "guerrilla attack on Saigon," which apparently referred to the Khmer Rouge forces. This dispatch said a force of about 25 U.S. helicopters was flying a "search and destroy" mission at tree-top level in advance of the Saigon puppet forces.

Neither dispatch admitted, however, the real motive for the new invasion of Cambodia—the need to protect the Cambodian puppets from the Cambodian people.

C I A DOPE CALYPSO

by Allen Ginsberg (for Peter Dale Scott)

IN NINETEEN HUNDRED FORTY SIX
CHINA WAS WON BY MAO TSE-TUNG
CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S ARMY RAN AWAY
AND THEY'RE WAITING THERE IN THAILAND TODAY

SUPPORTED BY THE C I A
PUSHING JUNK DOWN THAILAND WAY

FIRST THEY STOLE FROM THE MEO TRIBES
UP IN THE HILLS THEY STARTED TAKING BRIBES
THEN THEY SENT THEIR SOLDIERS UP TO SHAN
COLLECTING OPIUM TO SELL TO THE MAN

PUSHING JUNK IN BANGKOK TODAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A

BROUGHT THEIR JAM ON MULE TRAINS DOWN
TO CHIENG MAI THAT'S A RAILROAD TOWN
SOLD IT NEXT TO POLICE CHIEF BRAIN
HE TOOK IT TO TOWN IN THE CHOOCHOO TRAIN

TRAFFICKING DOPE TO BANGKOK ALL DAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A

THE POLICEMAN'S NAME WAS MR. PHAO
HE PEDDLED DOPE GRAND SCALE AND HOW
CHIEF OF BORDER CUSTOMS PAID
BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE'S U.S. AID

THE WHOLE OPERATION NEWSPAPERS SAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A

HE GOT SO SLOPPY & PEDDLED SO LOOSE
HE BUSTED HIMSELF & COOKED HIS GOOSE
TOOK THE REWARD FOR AN OPIUM LOAD
SEIZING HIS OWN HAUL WHICH SAME HE RESOLD

BIG TIME PUSHER A DECADE TURNED GREY
WORKING FOR THE C I A

THE WHOLE OPERATION FELL INTO CHAOS
TIL THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAME INTO LAOS
I'LL TELL YOU NO LIE I'LL SPREAD NO RUMOR
OUR BIG PUSHER THERE WAS SOUVANNA PHOUMA

THREE STRONG PRINCES IN A POWER PLAY
BUT PHOUMA WAS THE MAN FOR THE C I A

TOUBY LYFONG HAD WORKED FOR THE FRENCH
BIG FAT MAN LIKED WINE AND WENCH
PRINCE OF THE MEOS GREW BLACK MUD
OPIUM FLOWED THROUGH THE LAND LIKE A FLOOD

COMMUNISTS CAME AND CHASED THE FRENCH AWAY
SO TOUBY TOOK A JOB WITH THE C I A

AND HIS BEST FRIEND GENERAL VANG PHAO
RAN OUR MEO ARMY LIKE A SACRED COW
HELICOPTER SMUGGLERS FILLED LONG TIENG'S BARS
IN XIENG QUANG PROVINCE ON THE PLAIN OF JARS

IT STARTED IN SECRET THEY WERE FIGHTING
YESTERDAY
CLANDESTINE SECRET ARMY OF THE C I A

ALL THROUGH THE 'SIXTIES THE DOPE FLEW FREE
THRU TAN SON NHUT SAIGON TO MARSHALL KY
AIR AMERICA FOLLOWING THROUGH
TRANSPORTING CONFITURE FOR PRESIDENT THIEU

ALL THESE DEALERS WERE DECADES AND TODAY
THE INDOCHINESE MOB OF THE C I A

-- January 5, 1972

MONTGOMERY, ALA.

ADVERTISER

FEB 21 1972

M - 61,769

S - 80,831

A Light Checkrein On The CIA

THE CENTRAL Intelligence Agency gets a large chunk of its funds through hidden channels.

A favorite method is for another agency's budget to be kited by a certain amount, then that amount is declared surplus and transferred to the CIA.

In this manner, only a handful of people know what has occurred, most of them in the Executive branch. There is an oversight committee of the Senate made up of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, plus four members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Sen. John Stennis of Miss. presides over the group, which is supposed to monitor all CIA activities. Last year the oversight committee didn't meet a single time.

The Foreign Relations Committee members on the oversight panel are angry. They contend CIA activities around the world have a decisive effect on the conduct of U.S. diplomatic policy.

They have taken action to bypass Stennis and to gain some measure of control over CIA funds, personnel and activities by writing new curbs into the foreign aid authorization bill.

The bill, signed by President Nixon the other day, requires for the first time a reduction in military personnel working for the CIA in activities similar to the assistance and advisory groups now operating in Cambodia and Laos.

It includes the CIA in the \$341,000,000 ceiling on aid to Cambodia and requires CIA arms transfers to be counted against the military aid appropriation. The CIA is reported to have warehouses filled with arms at various points in Southeast Asia for distribution to anti-communist guerrillas.

The CIA will be forbidden to pay foreign troops — such as the 4,800 "volunteers" in Laos — more than their counterparts in the U.S. armed forces. The bill specifically places the CIA under existing restrictions on giving arms to forces in Asia.

It will require quarterly reports to Congress on Cambodia and annual reports on foreign aid. CIA assistance will be included in the totals, although it will probably not be pinpointed.

These regulations will increase congressional supervision over shadow wars, but the language is not so tight as to prevent some circumvention, if the CIA is supported by the White House.

The National Security Council, the President's consultative committee to which the CIA reports, has the final decision on the agency's activities.

However, the new controls should require the CIA to think twice before committing the U.S. to clandestine wars, as it has done all too often in the last several years.

CHARLOTTE, N.C.
OBSERVER

M - 174,906

S - 204,225

FEB 17 1972

The Congress And CIA Controls

The Central Intelligence Agency, a sort of world power unto itself these many years, is going to have to join the Union at last.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee put its foot down recently and slapped some new controls on the CIA when it prepared the foreign aid authorization bill. President Nixon signed the bill last week.

The controls mean the CIA will be limited in the number of military personnel it can use for its projects; in how much it can pay foreign troops; and in

the amount of arms it can distribute in other countries.

One objective of the Foreign Relations Committee was to curb CIA activity in Cambodia, where the committee feared the agency might generate another war, as it helped to do in Laos. Thus, aid to Cambodia is limited and the CIA must make quarterly reports on that country to Congress.

The new limitations are not air-tight. More are probably needed. But the Congress has at last put a firm hand on the reins for the first time since the CIA was created in 1947.

YORK, PA.

RECORD

FEB 17 1972

M - 33,894

Curbs on the CIA

Through the efforts of a handful of U.S. senators, controls have at long last been placed on the operations, cost and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. These curbs are contained in the Foreign aid authorization bill signed last week by President Nixon.

Credited with providing the controls are Senators Clifford Case of New Jersey, Frank Church of Idaho and Stuart Symington of Missouri. All are members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Together with Sen. William Fulbright, committee chairman, they have protested increasingly that Congress has too little knowledge of the CIA's activities, particularly in Southeast Asia.

According to the New York Times, Senator Case urged last summer a tightening of restrictions over the Defense Department's use of its funds overseas and over its power to transfer "surplus" military material to other U.S. agencies. Senator Case, the Times said, insisted that the CIA be included lest U.S. involvement in Cambodia develop surreptitiously, as he said it had in Laos.

Such restrictions, the senator said,

"would prevent the circumvention of congressional intent in funding of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through the CIA rather than through more open government agencies."

A number of senators, particularly those serving on the Foreign Relations Committee, have complained over the years regarding the lack of congressional knowledge and control over military action abroad. The disastrous "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba soon after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in 1961 was one of the major operations planned secretly by the Central Intelligence Agency. Since then the agency has been blamed or received credit for masterminding various coups and revolts in various parts of the world.

The CIA, by the nature of its intelligence work, must indeed have privacy. But when it comes to involving the nation in military operations abroad, and otherwise affecting foreign policy, the CIA should be responsible to Congress as well as the President for its actions. The curbs that were placed on the agency last week are a start in that direction.

12 FEB 1972

Communists Force Halt of Work at Angkor

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

PHNOM PENH, Feb. 11—For the first time since the ancient city of Angkor was occupied by Communist forces in June, 1970, conservationists have been forced to give up the never-ending struggle to preserve the temple ruins.

French archeologist Bernard Groslier, the only Westerner who had been permitted to cross enemy lines and supervise the work of 1100 Cambodian laborers and technicians, quietly left for Paris in late January.

He left after receiving a warning that the Communists had accused him of being a CIA agent and were planning to seize him that morning as he rode to the Angkor Wat ruins on his bicycle. Five of his team leaders actually were abducted, and it is unknown where they are.

Government sources here said Groslier told them he would seek the help of negotiators at the Paris peace talks in reopening the temples and in finding his assistants.

Since the first incident, other Cambodian workers—estimates vary from 20 to more than 100—have been seized. Many others have fled with their families.

The shift in the Communists' attitude towards the restoration project clearly increases the danger that the historic ruins may be damaged by natural causes. Experts in Phnom Penh say that the most immediate threat is the rainy season, now three months off.

Eventually, according to the experts, weak scaffoldings could tumble from around the nearly 1,000-year-old walls and bat guano, among other things, could turn the stone to dust if allowed to grow thick with time.

But the end of the restoration work has important political and military implications as well, raising the possibility that the North Vietnamese and their Cambodian allies may be planning to put the ruins to some new use.

Diplomats also suggested that the Communists may have acted because they decided that some of the Cambo-

dians working and living among the ruins were providing intelligence to the government on enemy movements and supply routes.

As many as 10,000 Cambodians flocked to the temples in the past 20 months because there was so little likelihood of fighting there. Market places sprouted amid the old pillars and peace prevailed.

Since the restoration was suspended, the Cambodian government has stepped up military operations in the vicinity of the temples. The possibility that there might be an effort to retake the area with force is not ruled out.

On Thursday, the government announced it had examined the 1954 Hague Convention on protection of historic monuments in wartime and decided that it was not barred from taking military action if it decides such steps are absolutely necessary.

Arguing against such a move is the very strong emotional attachment Cambodians profess to feel for the ruins. "We value those temples as much as our lives," a government spokesman said last spring in denying a report that Cambodian soldiers fired an artillery round damaging Angkor Wat.

"We do not even send in patrols in this area" the spokesman, Col. Am Rong said, "because we are afraid the other side would take the opportunity to destroy our temples."

In the meantime, an estimated four brigades of Cam-

bodian soldiers are reported to have fanned out south, east, and west of the temples from the nearby town of Siem Riep.

Military sources here stressed that the troops are moving slowly and very cautiously.

The temples are occupied by the 204th North Vietnamese Regiment, made up of North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Some Cambodian Communists are also present, but relations between the Cambodians and Vietnamese have not been good, sources in Phnom Penh say.

Just how tangled the relations are was illustrated by one Cambodian official who said that on the night of Jan. 20 the Vietcong organized a demonstration among the villagers against the presence of Cambodian Communists and then, when it was over, accused the villagers of making trouble.

It was early the next morning that the Vietcong went through the temples with a loud speaker denouncing Groslier and his "coolies" as American spies and saying that the villagers would support Cambodian forces when they invaded the grounds.

The Communists also attacked the conservationists on

the ground that some of their money was supplied by the government of Marshal Lon Nol.

The workers left in such a hurry that they left behind some \$2 million worth of equipment at the sites and in a warehouse at one temple.

Coincidental to the end of the conservation work, there has been a new spate of reports that the temples are being looted by Communist troops and artwork smuggled to Hong Kong and Bangkok.

The government dispatched experts, including the director of the national museum, to both places. They reported finding statues and other artifacts valued from \$10,000 to \$2 million missing.

Western experts, while not disputing that some smuggling is evidently going on, pointed out that the statues turned up outside Cambodia even before the war.

The Cambodians have expressed their concern about the end of the restoration work and the looting in numerous cables to the United Nations calling on the world body to declare the temple area a neutral zone.

Unquote

Regular listeners to the Agence Khmer d'Information, take note. This is the rebel radio station in Cambodia that emits a stream of propaganda calculated to damp the ardour of General Lon Nol's soldiers. Lots of people quote *The Economist*, but you can trust the AKI to quote it in its own way. On December 10th, for instance, the AKI broadcast this passage supposedly culled from our pages :

The Cambodian puppet army has lost a great battle. This is undeniable. Puppet General Lon Nol's situation is worsening. . . . Thus, the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh traitors cannot hide their defeat. . . .

The only article in *The Economist* on that subject, and at about that time, had been published nearly a fortnight earlier and had expressed a cautious optimism about the Cambodians' chances of holding their own. And *The Economist*, sorely afflicted by British reticence, is not in the habit of dubbing politicians puppets and traitors. But then it pays to take anything you hear on the radio in that part of the world with a pinch of salt. The Central Intelligence Agency is said to be practising "disinformation" on the sound waves on a considerable scale, using an actor who can mimic Prince Sihanouk perfectly. And just to complete the confusion, the English initials used by our friends of the Agence Khmer are CIA.

Cambodians Compete To Succeed Lon Nol

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

PHNOM PENH, Dec. 18—

While enemy forces make damaging advances in the countryside, an important contest for leadership is currently taking place among Cambodia's senior political and military leaders, according to diplomatic sources here.

Deals are being struck and allegiances shifted that could when completed produce a dramatic overhaul, even the equivalent of a coup d'etat, or perhaps nothing more than a reshuffling of some of the old personalities.

The departure of Marshal Lon Nol, the ailing head of government whose primacy is being increasingly criticized by those beneath him, would certainly be the most significant change. It is believed a strong possibility.

The marshal tried to retire last spring, but was then persuaded to stay on. Now there are signs he doesn't want to go. This week he promoted to general eight officers in an apparent effort to consolidate his position.

Logical Successor

The logical successor to Lon Nol would be Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak, his powerful number two (officially prime minister-delegate) and the man favored by the U.S. embassy as the most pragmatic and Western-oriented of Cambodia's top echelon.

Others prominently mentioned are In Tam, a former deputy prime minister dismissed by Lon Nol in October after a series of differences, and Son Ngoc Thanh, who was a prime minister 30 years ago and then went into exile. He is now an adviser to the government.

While none of these on the surface seems to be a

break with the past, there are indications that each is promising to deal at long last with the problems of corruption and inefficiency that are crippling the country.

Thanh, who led a CIA supported movement against Prince Sihanouk for many years, has support among many younger military officers and is courting major Buddhist monks. In Tam has proved himself an able administrator, and talks much about organizing the countryside.

Details of the leadership struggle are difficult to follow day to day for even the most astute foreign observers who only know that it is going on because Cambodian friends and contacts privately tell them so.

Morale Low

From these and other conversations they sense also that public and official morale has fallen sharply in recent weeks—lower, it is said, than at any time since war spread to the country in March, 1970.

While the decline may merely be a passing phenomenon, brought on by a series of military defeats, it is still serious in a country whose major asset in a war over which it has virtually no control has been an ardent and enthusiastic patriotism.

Many of the young intellectuals and professionals who flocked to the government after the toppling of Prince Sihanouk are now said to be quietly bowing out as they lose faith in the ability of the regime to carry on.

As for the beleaguered Cambodian army, some analysts believe that if its fortunes continue to sink under the pressure of a determined Communist offensive, a government might emerge that is prepared to negotiate with the Communists to prevent an outright defeat.

Tacit Agreement

For the first time since the fighting began in Cambodia such a prospect is being seriously discussed, at least in certain small circles and always in whispers. If it came to pass, more likely than not the agreement would be a tacit one, never made public, to stop fighting.

One diplomat who is especially sensitive to the current maneuverings believes the Cambodians, under such an arrangement, would effectively cede control over that part of the country east

of the Mekong River where North Vietnamese are battling South Vietnamese.

This would leave a neutralized Cambodia consisting essentially of the major towns and the rice-rich Western provinces, with the Communists retaining control over the sparsely populated northeast where they have held sway since the early days of the war.

Critical events in Cambodia never seem to have the urgency they might elsewhere, but in the jockeying now going on there is an apparent awareness that while the malaise in Phnom Penh deepens the Communists are making headway.

Depressing Picture

Military successes are one aspect of the enemy advance. But in the depressing picture painted this week by both Cambodians and foreigners there was also talk of limited Communist political progress in organizing the population and recruiting cadres.

The principal handicap of the Sihanoukists now in Peking exile and their North Vietnamese mentors has been the Cambodians' abiding nationalism demonstrated in the raising of a 180,000 man volunteer force in a matter of months.

The nationalism remains, but as the fighting drags on and tens of thousands of people become refugees

(largely to avoid U.S., South Vietnamese and Cambodian government strikes) the Communists solicit support by pledging peace, agricultural aid, an end to corruption and lower prices.

In their favor are tight organization and rigid discipline which eliminate the depredations so often committed by South Vietnamese soldiers and Cambodian government troops. The North Vietnamese army and Vietcong are ordered to pay for their food rather than steal it and keep out of the villages as much as possible.

While there were no more than a few thousand Cambodian Communists—Khmer Rouge—20 months ago; the prevailing estimates now range from 15,000 to 20,000, fully one-third of the Communist forces.

Loyal Recruits

Most of these recruits are nominally at least, loyal to Sihanouk's National United Front of Cambodia.

For the most part they play a military role subordinate to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong but that too is said by intelligence gained from defectors to be slowly changing with some Cambodians now being given commands.

The U.S. embassy is acutely aware of the present situation and is sending word back to Washington in what surely must be the gloomiest cables since the very early days of the Lon Nol government.

OIL CITY, PA.

DERRICK DEC 8 1971

M - 14,890

Wind-Down

In the last five years we have heard various reasons for our violent presence in Vietnam. We had commitments; we wanted self-determination for the South Viets.

And our GIs were told that they were fighting in Southeast Asia to keep war from the beaches of California.

So we have not felt this war's outrageous immensities. Unless one of ours was a casualty. And we sit satisfied that our President is "winding down the war." Some say he is merely substituting brown bodies for white.

But how much longer will we keep converting their "green earth" into brown dust?

In one of those wind-down years, April 1969, one "clandestine raid" (so described by Paul R. Ehrlich and John P. Holdren in Saturday Review) by Air America, an airline of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency defoliated 173,000 acres in eastern Cambodia. It damaged about one-third of Cambodia's rubber crop and damage to local food production was severe.

Presumably the defoliation of 173,000 Cambodian acres prevents this same from happening to 104,000 Crawford, 24,300 Venango, 28,600 Warren, and 2,800 Forest county crop-producing acres.

By late 1969, more than five million acres of Indo China had been treated with defoliants applied at an average of 13 times the dose recommended by the USDA for the domestic use.

Those millions represent more acres than all Pennsylvania farms used for crop production in 1967, according to the Pennsylvania Statistical Abstract of 1969.

For Southeast Asians it's often fatal to be downwind from the "wind down."

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 536,108
S - 709,123

DEC 5 1971
*Desire for peace
still being flouted*

Many of us seem to believe President Nixon's protestations that the Vietnam war is being wound down. We see casualty figures of five to eight a week and we tend to think it is all over. All of which shows how callous and arrogant we have become, as a people.

A recent New York Times story told of a military hospital in South Vietnam with 1,800 beds that currently cares for 4,500 wounded soldiers -- two to a bed, hundreds on the floor. The carnage obviously is far from over.

Unfortunately, because the dead have yellow instead of white or black skins, far too many Americans think the war is over. Out of sight, it seems, out of mind. If the newspapers have buried the war on Page 34 the readers don't think it exists. Yet Mr. Nixon continues to rain 350,000 bombs on Indochina a year -- almost half the bombs dropped by the U.S. Air Force in all of World War II. And by all the evidence, the American air force intends to stay on in Vietnam indefinitely.

Thieu recently said there would be a residual force of 50,000 U.S. troops plus two combat divisions by the end of 1972. That's about 110,000 troops. Defense Sec. Melvin R. Laird and President Nixon have both made it clear that despite all the talk of withdrawal a large residual force will continue to occupy Vietnam.

I know that the President has said he will keep his word about ending the war. Do you remember what he said in April, 1970, when he invaded Cambodia? That all troops would be out within 30 days and that there would be no air action in Cambodia in support of the Cambodian army? What of the pledge not to conduct military campaigns in Laos or to pay for mercenary foreign armies? We are currently up to our ears in a CIA war in that little country.

We have a long way to go before America turns around and the American government begins to respond to the wishes of its people to stop the war and shed our militarism.

Many of us are tired from years of shouting, demonstrating, writing letters, picketing. But isn't it clear that when we relax our pressures, the Nixon administration and the Pentagon continue to flout the undisputed desire of the people for peace?

Shirley Lens,
Chicago area chairman,
Women for Peace

KISSINGER'S APPARAT

by John P. Leacacos

A top Washington's complex foreign affairs bureaucracy sits the National Security Council, a 24-year-old body given new status in 1969, when President Nixon moved to make it a kind of command and control center for his foreign policy. The new Nixon NSC system, run from the White House by Henry A. Kissinger, has now existed for nearly three years, producing 138 numbered study memoranda, reaching 127 formal decisions, and employing a permanent staff of about 120 personnel (more than double the pre-Nixon figure). Though the substance of its operations are necessarily secret, interviews with officials permit tentative evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Kissinger NSC. There is broad agreement on the following seven points:

--The NSC has served President Nixon more or less as he desired, that is, in the ordered style of formal answers to detailed questionnaires. The volume of this paperwork has at times been staggering, but it has sharpened focus on the search for policy choices.

--The answers and alternatives for action, "coming up through the NSC" have produced few panaceas, but have contributed greater coherence of outlook in foreign affairs management. NSC recommendations are more pragmatic than academic, reflecting Kissinger's view: "We don't make foreign policy by logical syllogism."

--Explicit insistence on the "limited" nature of U.S. power and the need for greater restraint and cautious deliberation about its exercise have been reinforced at the highest level by Nixon's habit of withdrawing to make final decisions in solitude and of frequently deciding on no-action rather than accepting advice to initiate new action.

--By being close to the President and keeping his fingers on all aspects of the NSC process personally, Kissinger without question is the prime mover in the NSC system. The question arises whether the NSC would function as effectively without Kissinger, and whether it can bequeath a heritage of accomplishment to be absorbed by the permanent machinery of government.

--Secretary of State William P. Rogers

operates within the NSC system and also utilizes it as a forum to establish whatever policy position is preferred by his State Department; but he side-steps the NSC on occasion to carry his demurrer, dissent or alternate position to the President privately.

--Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird is less personally involved in the NSC process, having apparent indifference to what he believes is unnecessary NSC paperwork, which he leaves to his deputy, David Packard. Laird's main day-to-day operational preoccupation is with the exit of U.S. forces from Vietnam. His International Security Affairs Bureau in the Pentagon performs poorly by Washington bureaucratic standards.

--The influence on foreign policy of the military, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are usually represented in the NSC process, is at the lowest point in several years. This has been attributed to the anticlimactic winding-down atmosphere of the Vietnam war, and to the fact that the Chiefs' once die-hard views and abstract argumentation on strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union have been successfully emulsified into the Nixon-Kissinger basic principles for SALT negotiations with Russia. Kissinger has commented: "In my experience with the military, they are more likely to accept decisions they do not like than any other group."

From time to time, gears have clashed within the system. The State Department has complained bitterly of the "Procrustean bed" fashioned by the Kissinger staff. Meeting excessive White House demands, bureaucrats allege, robs State and Defense of manpower hours needed for day-to-day operations. After his first year, Kissinger conceded: "Making foreign policy is easy; what is difficult is its coordination and implementation."

White House NSC staffers, on the other hand, exuberant at their top-dog status, express a degree of condescension for the work of the traditional departments. In 1969 Kissinger staffers rated State-chaired studies and recommendations only "50 to 70 percent acceptable" and based on mediocre reporting which failed to sift wheat from chaff in the political cables constantly arriving from 117 U.S. embassies overseas. The Kissinger staff say that they have to hammer out the real choices on the hard issues, since a cynical and sometimes bored bureaucracy offers up too many "straw options." State's planners, for their part, criticize the NSC staff for overdoing

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News



Future of Nixon doctrine clouded

By George W. Ashworth
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

With Senate passage of drastically chopped foreign-aid legislation, the future prospects for the Nixon doctrine remain very much in doubt.

Beyond that, it is clear now that there is a widening willingness on Capitol Hill to try to exercise steadily more control over U.S. handling of overseas involvement.

In the past several days, the Senate has approved \$2.65 billion in economic and military aid. While still a substantial sum, the figure is about \$267 million less than in the bill defeated by the Senate two weeks ago and about \$800 million less than the administration wanted.

Close vote studied

It remains to be worked out just how the reduced funds are to be allocated, but it is clear now that the administration faces the very real prospect of seeing some of its most cherished programs drastically curtailed unless agreement can be worked out in conference.

Seen here as highly significant was the narrow passage of an amendment raising military aid from \$1.2 billion to \$1.5 billion. That was still less by about a half billion dollars than the administration desired originally. And the closeness of the vote, even in the light of the reduction, did not appear here to portend well for the future of military aid at present levels.

It is quite likely that in future years the administration may find itself very hard-pressed to do nearly as well in gaining approval for heavy military assistance spending as was done this year.

As finally passed by the Senate, the military-assistance program was reduced from the \$705 million approved by the House to \$452 million; supporting assistance, from the \$800 million approved by the House to \$568 million, plus \$85 million for Israel; and military credit sales from \$510 approved by the House to \$400 million.

In one crucial test, the administration won once again approval to spend \$341 for military and economic assistance to Cambodia. But Senate doves saw as highly significant the fact that the Senate had approved a specific limitation of both American personnel and money for a country. Limitation agreed to for Laos only covered money.

As approved, there were other potentially significant aspects to the legislation.

◦ An amendment proposed by Sen. Clifford P. Case (R) of New Jersey to prohibit the use of mercenaries in Thailand, Laos, and North Vietnam was approved. This theoretically would bar, according to the wording of the amendment, the present payment of Thai irregular forces for use in Laos. The administration will undoubtedly try to have the amendment killed in conference and may not abide by it even if approved.

◦ Another amendment removes service-funded military assistance for Thailand from the defense budget and puts it under foreign aid and, thus, surveillance by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, rather than Armed Services Committee. If the amendment survives conference, service spending for Laos and South Vietnam may be shifted to the domain of the foreign service committees. This could place the Nixon doctrine under very close scrutiny and criticism each year, more so than in the armed services committees, with their myriad other military concerns.

◦ Another amendment, also by Senator Case, would strengthen the present Cooper-Church prohibition on advisers in Cambodia by including the CIA in the prohibition.

Total pullout sought

The Senate also approved an amendment offered by Sen. Mike Mansfield (D) of Montana calling for a total pullout from Vietnam within six months of final approval of the foreign-aid legislation. Sources in the administration and on Capitol Hill are generally agreed that this limitation will fail to win final approval. The most likely limitation will be the one approved with the military procurement authorization on calling for an expeditious departure with the release of prisoners being the controlling factor.

There is little doubt that the administration will come out of the present arguments somewhat more limited in a number of areas. And it is clear that no matter what final decisions on money for economic and military aid come out of conference, the strictures will be much tighter than the administration would wish.

Some 'ifs' involved

It is probably true that the future of military assistance and security-related economic assistance will hinge largely, sources believe, upon what happens between now and the next budget-consideration time in the war in Vietnam. If between now and then the American pullout is completed or almost completed without a great disaster, many on Capitol Hill who have been giving the administration a hard time this year will be less belligerent as the level of frustration falls.

Essentially, it is crucial to the Nixon doctrine that many of the present uncertainties over the level of aid disappear and be replaced by fairly widespread domestic and foreign understanding of precisely where America can be expected to stand and what it can be expected to do.

Report U.S. Spy Units Active in Cambo

By JOSEPH FRIED

Staff Correspondent of THE NEWS

Saigon, Nov. 16—The United States is sending American military intelligence teams secretly into Cambodia despite a declaration by Washington that only American equipment: delivery teams are operating in Cambodia, sources disclosed tonight.

The sources said that the U. S. intelligence teams, which are assigned to the American military command in Saigon, are engaged in unannounced missions in Cambodia in cooperation with the Cambodian army. Their activities include securing and evaluating intelligence information acquired by the Cambodians.

The teams are reassigned to the missions from Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital. U. S. officials have insisted that there are no American military personnel operating on the ground in Cambodia except for the U. S. military equipment delivery teams.

On the battlefronts of Indochina, a U. S. air force F-4 Phantom jet attacked an antiaircraft artillery site about 75 miles inside North Vietnam.

The jet bombed the North Vietnamese gun emplacement after it was fired at during a mission over Laos. It was the 76th air strike against North Vietnam's defenses this year. Headquarters said the jet damaged one of the antiaircraft guns.

Two GIs were killed when their patrol walked into a mine field set up earlier by another U. S. Army unit, a military spokesman said.

Transfer Another Base

The accident was the fourth in a 48-hour period in which seven Americans were killed and nine were injured. The command spokesman said that there were no other American casualties during that period.

The command announced the

turnover of another U. S. Air Force base, at P'ou Cat, 270 miles northeast of Saigon, to the South Vietnamese. But military sources said that the U. S. Air Force personnel would not be included in withdrawals of American troops from Vietnam for at least the next several months.

The closeout of the base for U. S. Air Force Phantom jets also included deactivation of the base's 12th Tactical Fighter Wing headquarters, the command said.

The 150 men of the unit will be the last air force personnel to be included in the current program of withdrawal of American servicemen from the war zone.

that while attending school they should spend their time behind the books rather than behind the throttle. To send these pilots to school costs a considerable sum of money and they should devote their full time and attention to that schooling.

Mr. TALCOTT. I commend the chairman and the ranking member and the full committee for trying to save some money. I think that we can save considerable amounts of money which are used in developing flying schools and in creating flying facilities and in the maintenance of aircraft and facilities if they are not necessary to maintaining flying proficiency.

I simply wanted to be assured that rated personnel who become students would be permitted, like other personnel, to fly, to keep up their proficiency, if they desired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. YATES).

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned with the provisions of section 713 (c) which appear on page 34 of the bill. When the House reads the bill for amendment I shall offer an amendment to change the section by limiting the power it gives to the President to 60 days at the end of which time he would be required to come to the Congress to obtain its approval for the additional troops that he has called up. The reason for my amendment is that this section gives the President a blank check. To give him the right to call to active duty as many troops as he thinks necessary even though that number exceeds the mandatory troop levels that have been established by the military committees of the House and the Senate and by the funding of the Committees on Appropriations of the House and the Senate. What awesome power to give to the Chief Executive and without check.

Some years ago when President Truman seized the steel companies, the Supreme Court decided that he had exceeded his powers as Chief Executive having acted without congressional authority. In his decision Justice Jackson said:

We may say that power to legislate for emergency belongs in the hands of Congress but only Congress can prevent its power from slipping through its fingers.

In section 713 (c) of this bill, it is proposed that Congress should relinquish its power, should let it slip through its fingers by giving complete authority to the President to call up as many men into the Armed Forces as he thinks necessary. Even the gravest emergency should not provide the Chief Executive with such power without congressional approval. The Constitution gives the Congress the responsibility and the authority to raise armies and to provide the funds to pay for them. It is a joint responsibility. Congress must be consulted.

Even the best of Presidents should not have such power, for all Presidents are mortal with human failings. If he is a good President, he will not want such power. If he is a bad President, he certainly ought not to have it.

If there is any lesson to be learned from

Vietnam it is that the Executive should not be permitted to act without congressional supervision.

Unfortunately, too often the Congress has deferred in its judgment to that of the executive branch. Unfortunately, too, these days the executive branch has come to assume that in matters of foreign policy—especially foreign policy which may lead to wars the Congress is under the duty to accept the judgment of the executive branch.

Too frequently the executive branch has failed to follow the sage advice of the late Senator Vandenberg that the Congress should be informed and consulted before the takeoff and not merely at the end of the crash landing of an ill-fated venture.

And, that is the purpose of my amendment: To bring the Congress into the picture before we are so overcommitted by the President that it almost impossible to extricate ourselves. In this day and age when wars can break out anywhere on the face of the globe when it may be decided that American Armed Forces should be dispatched to an area of conflict in order to influence the decision, the the Congress must be consulted. In a time when wars need not be declared—indeed today that formality is rarely observed, in a time when wars can be undertaken solely by Presidential decision, it is of critical importance that there be congressional review and that such review occur within a reasonable period.

In the absence of a declaration of war, the only oversight Congress has of a Presidential action initiating American armed intervention is through its power over the pursestrings. Section 713 (c) proposes to waive that power and to give the President the absolute right for the duration of a fiscal year at least to do as he wishes with our Armed Forces expanded to any size he sees is necessary without having to come back to Congress for funds to assist such action.

I believe the authority requested is excessive, arbitrary and unreasonable.

I shall offer my amendment at the appropriate time.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. BADILLO).

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

(Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, from all appearances, President Nixon has convinced most Americans that he is ending our involvement in Vietnam and he is now mesmerizing them with the illusion of action to end our economic chaos. The defense appropriations bill before us today offers a prime opportunity to set the record straight on both counts.

First of all, the President is not getting us out of Vietnam. It is apparent that he has every intention of maintaining a permanent military presence in Southeast Asia and of merely substituting increased air warfare for the decline in ground combat. It is also apparent that the withdrawal of our uniformed combat forces is being more than matched by the escalation of covert activities, particularly in Laos and Cam-

bodia, under the aegis of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Actually, Mr. Nixon no longer has to rely on a massive U.S. military force in Vietnam. He obviously feels the American people will tolerate any level of air combat, regardless of how much of Indochina is laid waste in the process. And with the failure of Congress to effectively prevent the President from conducting a secret war through the CIA and through paid mercenaries, his freedom to continue our tragic involvement in South-east Asia remains unchecked.

The fraud of his Vietnam policy is more than matched, however, by the fraud of his economic policy, as evidenced by the bill before us now. The economic dislocations under which so many millions of Americans are suffering are the direct result of our involvement in Southeast Asia and the continued dominance of defense spending is our first national priority. The defense appropriations bill on which we will soon vote perpetuates a distortion which not only has been a prime cause of inflation, but which also has seriously retarded our ability to meet urgent domestic problems.

More than a billion and a half dollars of this \$71 billion bill is earmarked for one item—procurement of ammunition for all Army weapons except missiles. The committee would have us spend half a billion dollars more on this item than spent last year and this increase represents fully a third of the total increase in the bill over last year's defense money bill. If the war in Vietnam is ending and our troops are coming home, why are we spending so much more on ammunition for the Army?

Let me read you the paragraph from page 84 of the committee report. It says as follows:

This appropriation finances the procurement of ammunition for all Army weapons except missiles. It also provides industrial facilities needed for production of ammunition end items and components, the modernization of Army ammunition plants, and the layaway of Government-owned plants and equipment at the time ammunition production is completed and where it has been established that the facilities will be required in the event of mobilization.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let us analyze that paragraph to see why we need another one-half billion dollars more for ammunition for the Army. What happened to the wage-price freeze? Why does it cost that much more money to manufacture these items? Do we need it for the industrial production—for the production of ammunition? Do we mean that after all these years we no longer have industrial facilities with which to produce this ammunition? Do we need it for the modernization of Army ammunition plants? What is meant by this?

They say that "We want it for the layaway of Government-owned plants and equipment at the time ammunition production is completed, and where it has been established that the facilities will be required in the event of mobilization."

Are we preparing to mobilize for some unknown war, and that is why we have to spend half a billion dollars more this year than last year?

U.S. Aid Revived As 2 Bills

Senate Panel Cuts Amount By \$1.2 Billion

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously yesterday to revive foreign aid, but only after splitting it into two separate economic and military assistance bills and slashing more than \$1.2 billion from President Nixon's \$3.6 billion request for this year.

The two bills, totalling \$2.329 billion in authorizations, are intended as an "interim" substitute for the \$2.9 billion measure rejected by the Senate Friday by a 41 to 27 vote.

White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler told reporters immediately after the committee action, "We are not satisfied with that level. It is not sufficient to meet the essential elements of the President's policy." He added, "You may quote the President" that the \$2.329 billion figure "is insufficient."

Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) told reporters that he believed the committee had reported out the best bills it could, given the deep disagreements within it over the aid program.

But he said he would offer floor amendments to raise the total, although not all the way to \$2.9 billion again, because that would simply risk another rejection of the program by the Senate. He said he believed he could count on enough vote switches to pass

the two measures if their total added up to somewhere between \$2.329 billion and \$2.9 billion.

The two bills reported out yesterday:

- A \$1.144 billion economic and humanitarian aid authorization. This includes \$250 million for development loans, \$175 million for technical assistance; \$225 million for the Alliance for Progress, \$250 million for Pakistan refugee relief and \$139 million for the United Nations.

- A \$1.185 billion military aid authorization, which includes \$350 million for military aid grants, \$435 million for war-related economic supporting assistance (of which \$85 million is earmarked for Israel) and \$400 million for foreign military credit sales (with \$300 million in arms credit authority earmarked for Israel). The biggest cuts were in this area.

An unusual feature of committee voting was the use by Scott of a proxy from Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.), who has been absent from the Senate for two years because of illness and has never appeared on the floor during that period. Mundt's proxy was decisive in an 8-to-7 committee vote to package humanitarian and economic aid together, instead of leaving them separate and having a total of three bills.

The military bill contains a \$341 million ceiling on aid to Cambodia, which the administration has now said it will accept, after threatening a veto of the earlier aid measure over an identical provision. Although it is only seeking \$341 million in funds for Cambodia aid, it had opposed a ceiling in case it wanted to switch more for emergency reasons.

State Department spokesman Charles Bray said yesterday, in the first such assurance yet given by the administration, that Cambodia aid programs "have come close to their peak and will be declining." The \$341 million ceiling was designed to head off a suspected increase.

Other important provisions approved by the committee yesterday would limit CIA operations in Cambodia; require annual authorization for

basic State Department expenses; bar use of U.S. funds for outside mercenaries to fight in North Vietnam, Thailand or Laos (thus wiping out a CIA program of financing Thai "volunteers" in Northern Laos). Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's end-the-war-in-six-months amendment also is in the bill.

Despite committee approval, the aid program still faces serious obstacles. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) and some other former aid supporters who voted against the bill on the floor last Friday still have serious reservations about the use of military assistance as a tool to "bribe" potential allies and still fear that aid to Cambodia may lead to deeper U.S. involvement and a long-term financial drain.

Traditional foes of high foreign spending may not be fully assuaged by the committee's big slashes.

In the House, which has already passed a \$3.4 billion authorization bill, the whole issue will have to come to the floor again. Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.) said yesterday it will be hard to get both bills through the House separately, since economic aid has always piggybacked to passage on the shoulders of military aid.

Even if the authorizations pass both chambers the program could face new cuts in the appropriations committees. Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Allan J. Ellender (D-La.) said yesterday he couldn't envision his committee voting out more than \$2 billion to \$2.2 billion in actual appropriations.

Before taking final action yesterday, the committee defeated, 10 to 6, a proposal by Sens. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.), Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) and John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to approve a flat \$2.4 billion in a single bill, and include language barring any funds in the bill from being used for Cambodia and Laos except for the purpose of assisting in withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina.

Javits told reporters before the meeting that he would

seek a \$2.9 billion authorization, but Case said the three shaved the figure to \$2.4 billion when it became clear that the higher figure had no chance.

Fulbright and the bulk of Committee Democrats opposed the Javits-Case-Cooper proposal because they favored a three-bill approach — seeking to have each of the separate portions of the program fly on its own — and a lower total figure, \$2.655 billion.

The committee first voted 9 to 7 for a three-bill system, then voted 8 to 7 to join economic and humanitarian aid. It went down each separate item in the two final bills, and Republicans won enough increases to push the final two-bill total to \$2.329 billion. Scott said he favored a single package for fear military or economic aid portions might be defeated if sent to the floor alone, in a three-bill system.

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, in a statement yesterday, blasted defeat of the earlier bill, saying (in a reference to Fulbright) that he hoped it didn't indicate a desire to return to "Fortress Arkansas."

He declined to link the bill's defeat to any possible slowdown of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, but in emphasizing the need for military aid to U.S. allies, said the U.S. Navy would have to pull out of the Mediterranean without the support of Greece and Turkey.

continued

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Australia Is Said to Plan to Aid In Training Cambodian Troops

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2.—Australia has agreed to provide instructors and facilities in South Vietnam for the training of several battalions of Cambodian troops, informed sources said today.

William McMahon, the Australian Prime Minister, who is visiting Washington, was reported to have discussed the arrangement today with President Nixon. The two leaders met for nearly two hours at the White House.

About 125 Australian instructors will reportedly train the Cambodian troops at Muidat, a jungle warfare training center near Saigon, as part of an allied effort to enlarge and equip the Cambodian Army.

The Australian instructors will remain behind after the departure of the 8,000 Australian troops currently serving in South Vietnam. Mr. McMahon announced in August that all Australian combat units would be home by Christmas.

The Cambodian armed forces now number approximately 180,000, according to American sources, compared with the 38-

000-man force that was in existence in March, 1970, at the time of the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Chief of State. The goal for 1972 is 220,000 men.

A total of 60 battalions of Cambodians have been trained so far by the South Vietnamese in South Vietnam and have been equipped by the United States. Five other battalions have undergone training in Thailand and three others were given instruction by Central Intelligence Agency units in southern Laos last spring.

Charles W. Bray 3d, the State Department spokesman, confirmed today that the United States was discussing the possibility of assistance for the Cambodians, including the training of Cambodian troops. He said that no final decisions had been reached.

Mr. Bray said the discussions had preceded and were in no way related to the rejection of the foreign aid authorization bill by the Senate last week. Australia is expected to cover the expenses of the training program herself.

1 NOV 1971

EDITORIALS

Remember Cambodia?

Unless you are an assiduous Nixon-watcher, you probably don't. Nor do many Americans remember the promises of early victory that President Nixon made at the time of his "incursion" a year and a half ago. But there are those who do remember—in particular, Sen. Mike Mansfield. Supplying a preamble of his own, he inserted in the *Congressional Record* (October 13, pp. S16251-16256) a series of three articles on Cambodia, written by T. D. Allman for the *Manchester Guardian*, which show up Mr. Nixon as a peerless master of bamboozlement, and a majority of the American people as political dupes. Not that they are incapable of understanding but that they are so wrapped up in their personal concerns that it is easy to victimize them.

In his introduction, Mansfield points out that, before the invasion and the overthrow of Sihanouk, not one cent of American aid was going to Cambodia. Now we are well started on our first billion of military and economic support, without the slightest indication of when we shall be able to get the Lon Nol regime off our backs. Without our support, that so-called government would fall apart within a few weeks.

While Sihanouk was clinging to power, his country was at peace. It was a peace as precarious as Sihanouk's tenure, but the people lived without fear of looting, rape, destruction of their homes and sudden death. Small areas on the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border were controlled by the North Vietnamese or Vietcong, who by all the available evidence behaved in a civilized manner. Now the Cambodians are at the mercy of the South Vietnamese who, supported by American artillery and air power, renew their forays, and are feared and hated by the Cambodians, whom they regard as hereditary enemies and legitimate victims. And, to cap the irony, enemy "sanctuaries" now comprise the greater part of Cambodia.

Allman shows that this ruinous reversal was engineered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which continues to make the Cambodian people its pawns in the unremitting quest for victory in Indochina. In 1963 the CIA was supporting anti-Sihanouk insurgents and Sihanouk sent the whole American mission packing, thus depriving the CIA of its cover. In 1969 diplomatic relations were resumed, with the understanding that the CIA would not return. But, although the State Department tried to adhere to this agreement, the CIA transmitted promises of support to the anti-Sihanouk elements and, when hostilities broke out, sent teams of Laotian mercenaries into Cambodia, along with Cambodians trained in South Vietnam. Together, these supplemented the open American invasion, which lasted one month, and in which 350 Americans died and hundreds of others were wounded.

All of this was done to save Cambodia for the "Free World," Sihanouk having made it clear that he would not stooge for Washington's definition of that term. Now Lon Nol has declared that he will no longer "play the game of democracy and freedom," since that interferes with winning the war we are paying him to fight. The idiocy of our Asian policy is again graphically displayed.

American aid to the Lon Nol faction in Cambodia is largely clandestine. Visible expenditures, such as the U.S. appropriation of \$235 million in fiscal 1971 and the \$310 million requested by the Administration for 1972, are estimated by Allman to amount to less than half the total. The cost of U.S. bombing in Cambodia and of U.S. tactical support, the cost of training thousands of Cambodian troops abroad, are not included. Allman estimates that, while the United States is ostensibly withdrawing from the region, the cost to the American taxpayer alone will amount during the next eleven months to about \$1 billion—and with no end in sight.

The Cambodianization of the war is a fraud. Without active American military support, the Lon Nol and Thieu military effort would collapse. Within the past few weeks American TV has carried pictures of American 8-inch cannon firing at Communist positions, and American patrols going into action to protect Cambodian (or South Vietnamese) positions along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. Every week, thousands of tons of explosives are dropped on suspected enemy centers. On October 18, U.S. Air Force jets, flying in support of South Vietnamese troops near the Cambodian border, killed eighteen ARVN soldiers and wounded others. This was a mishap, but when the USAF is more successful, the media tell tall stories of scores of Communist dead, while the South Vietnamese suffer only light casualties.

There is also a well-founded suspicion that American advisers are working with the Cambodian forces, and that their role will increase. *Newsweek* (October 18) quotes an American diplomat in Phnom Penh: "The pressure to increase the military presence here is very strong. There are simply too many officers losing their jobs in Saigon. These men are worried about their careers, and you don't become a general by sitting behind a desk in Washington." What with the promotion-hunger of the military, the machinations of the CIA, and the habitual deceptions of the Administration, the American people are once more being led by the nose deeper into Southeast Asia.

STATINTL

November 1971

HEROIN

Peter Arnett has been covering South East Asia and the Vietnam War for more than a decade. His reporting has won such varied accolades as The Pulitzer (1966) and Sigma Delta Chi (1968) prizes, expulsion from Indonesia (1962), and the government closing of his weekly paper based in Vientiane, Laos (1960).

An Associated Press reporter since 1960, Arnett recently wrote a series of articles with Bernard Gavzer about the heroin traffic in South East Asia and the ways that heroin gets to US troops in Vietnam. UR interviewed him shortly after his return to New York, and asked him about the nature of the drug traffic there.

An American G lights up a cigarette in Saigon. He poured grains of white heroin powder into the menthol cigarette, from which he had first removed some of the tobacco.

STATINTL

Wide World Photos

Everyone is against the use of heroin or at least they say they are. But beyond the basic idea that people take heroin because their life is a bummer, there are only a lot of charges and counter-charges about who is letting/helping/pushing/or profiting from the heroin trade.

We think that the heroin trade is a typical issue of our time. For example, how is it that heroin can be transported thousands of miles over all sorts of obstacles to poison millions, while we cannot possibly figure out how to get food to starving people?

We hope to do a series of articles and or interviews about heroin presenting a variety of views and evidence. We have started with South East Asia because it is the largest source of opium in the world, and also because the heroin usage by American soldiers in Vietnam has led to increased information on this issue becoming available, such as the confidential government documents that we partially reprint here.

We do not imagine that we can cover this by ourselves and we hope that anyone who has information, documents, or knowledge will help us with this

UR: Has the CIA been part of the drug traffic in South East Asia?

Arnett: The CIA has indeed been involved, as has the US Government, for years in the drug business, but it's essentially for political reasons — as a political necessity.

Now, why is it a political necessity? At the beginning of the '60's, South East Asia was seen as greatly threatened by Communist China. There was great fear that revolutionary war by people's armies would sweep across South East Asia, to Vietnam, Thailand, Formosa and all the rest. So the American officials out there — the CIA, the American Military, and the Embassy people — figured that any approach would be acceptable if it was in order to resist that great a threat. Eventually, of course, it led to a commitment of half a million American troops in Vietnam. But even before Vietnam, any act to prevent the Communists from taking over the area was considered acceptable, and this included the drug business. Here's an example of how it worked.

In Laos you have this tribe, the Meo. They came down from central China about one hundred years ago. They are nomadic and they are squatters. They move in family groups and live above the 5000 ft. level in the mountains.

They farm crops, including opium, and they have a fairly well-developed culture based on silver ornaments and home-made weapons. The CIA and the American Government considered them important because they were the buffer between China and the rest of South East Asia. So it was in the interest of the American Government to win their allegiance. They were just another arm of the American war effort.


However, in the early '60's the Communists started pressing into Laos. Up to that time these people had been growing opium and other little crops, but opium was their only cash crop. The average family could make \$40 or \$50 a year from it, and that would be enough to buy some silver ornaments and to pay for the pigs for the harvest celebrations.

As the Communists started coming through they started to cut the old trails that these people had been using to unload their opium. The Meo were stranded in the mountains and the CIA figured that the least they could do was to help them in harvesting and distributing their crop. So, on the numerous American airfields you had a liaison

6: THE PACIFIC

The First World War ignored it. The Second World War started elsewhere and only ended up here. But the Third World War has several times looked like both starting and ending in this vast no-man's land between the super-powers. The gaping emptiness of the Pacific is deceptive, for, as the pictures below demonstrate, every country in it and around it is raked by the crossfire of the great contenders for world leadership, who snipe from the two sides of the ocean. The Indo-Chinese, Korean and Vietnam wars have been the most tragic results of the confrontation, but there are others - many others. In the sixth instalment of our *Planet Earth* survey of the world, the Pacific is examined by Richard West.

Japan



Japan will outgrow the United States economically by 2000 A.D., according to Herman Kahn, the modish 'futurologist'. World-famous for cameras and transistor equipment, the Japanese economy owes its success to still greater achievements in heavy industry, especially steel, shipbuilding and, more recently, automobiles. With 10 per cent. of her young men at university, Japan is educationally ahead of Britain and the United States, and draws on an army of technologists.

The four giant cartels or *zaibatus* that dominate Japanese industry have been criticised for crushing initiative and competition. And although Japan pays lip service to free trade and private enterprise, she has entrenched herself behind

tariff walls, and has blocked foreign ownership of her industry. The Americans own a controlling share of only one industry - Coca-Cola. The Japanese regard capitalism, especially the company they work for, with the same fanatical love that they once offered the Emperor and the army. The bigger the company, the more love and respect it commands, so that sometimes the host at a business dinner will seat the guests at table according to the distributed capital of their firms. About half the marriages in Japan are arranged by the bridegroom's boss, who sometimes takes precedence over the parents at the wedding.

In relation to the whole of Asia (excluding the eastern USSR), Japan occupies 1.4 per cent. of the land and has 5 per cent. of the population. Yet the Japanese produce 75 per cent. of Asia's steel output and 95 per cent. of its motor vehicles. Japan has two-thirds of all Asia's telephones, one-third of its radio sets - and 89 per cent. of all the continent's TV sets.

The price of economic growth has been the desecration of a graceful, cultured country. Hills have been flattened and seas filled in to make room for petro-chemical plants, overspill towns, motorways and express railway lines. "All the smoke coming up from the works sends our spirits soaring to the mountain tops," sing the workers at the Yawata Steel company. The rest of the population choke from smog which

has made Tokyo and Osaka airports the most dangerous in the East.

In the uninterrupted urban complex that stretches from Tokyo to Osaka, the human beings exist in noisy, nerve-wracked squalor. Crowded into insanitary homes or the dormitories run by their company, the Japanese seek escape through alcohol, television or *ero-uctions*, the sex films specialising in torture and disembowelment.

Yet although Japan suffers from some of the horrors of capitalistic development, it is extremely little Americanised. Through all the years of American occupation, few Japanese mastered English or wanted to copy the culture of their conquerors.

The traditional Japanese shyness, often a form of suppressed aggression, makes it hard for them to get on with the extrovert and easy-going

Americans. Japanese men, and perhaps some Japanese women, do not envy the sexual equality of America. While Japanese wives stay at home in the evening, Japanese men go from the office to bars, night clubs or, if they are rich enough, geisha houses to flirt with one of the million professional female hostesses. Rush-hour going home starts three hours after the offices close.

The party of business, the Liberal Democrats, have never been seriously challenged during their 21 years of power. Having lost their old reverence for the Emperor, the Japanese are not inclined to seek a political strong man. The Liberal Democrat premier, Eisaku Sato, does not aspire to be more than a chairman of a committee. There is much rivalry within the Government, often involving a conflict of business interests, but the opposition Socialists have never looked menacing. As long as the economy grows and there is no real unemployment, a proportion of the working class will be satisfied with the Government. The ferocious para-military student revolutionaries, who used to run through the streets in chanting, snaking processions, have been quietened down somewhat by the still more ferocious riot police.

There have been recent signs of a right-wing revival of the military and aristocratic tradition. These sentiments have contributed to the electoral success of the Komeito Sokagakkai, a kind of Buddhist Moral Rearmament. Puritanical in its social attitudes, it also plays on the greed of its followers, encouraging them to believe that regular prayer will bring them business, or even improve their averages at baseball. In contrast to Komeito Sokagakkai, which was pacifist in conception, a military, neo-fascist movement has recently sprung into prominence with the sensational suicide, by disembowelment, of the novelist Mishima. His death, which has inspired a morbid cult in a country already prone to sadistic fantasy, may come to be seen as a passing sensation. But this reminder of recent bloody history has influenced current arguments on Japan's defence role today.

The Japanese armed forces are some quarter of a million strong and three times that number of volunteers respond to recruiting posters like that on page 77. There is a grow-

STATINTL

CIA RECRUITMENT FOR INDOCHINA OPERATIONS

[Article by V. Vinogradov: "Stake on Expanding Aggression"; Moscow, Sovetskij patriot, Russian, 27 October 1971, p 4]

In looking through the latest newspapers, an unemployed engineer from Oakland named Holden came across an advertisement printed in one of them in bold type. The management of the Air America aviation company was advertising jobs for various types of specialists. Perhaps this time Holden would be lucky and finally manage to find work?

In the personnel office Holden was received by a smoothly combed and carefully pressed middle-aged gentleman. After familiarizing himself with the engineer's biography and particulars and having been convinced that he was not a "Red," the gentleman got down to business without further ado. "We are offering you work for the Central Intelligence Agency, with your field of activity being Laos," he said. Seeing that the engineer was beginning to fidget nervously in his seat, the CIA recruiter continued, "You will be able to earn some real money: a thousand dollars a month. Just think, Holden. Think it over well. The game is worth the candle." He added with a grin, "And if something untoward happens and you buy the farm, we guarantee a free coffin to transport your mortal remains to the USA. So your family won't be the worse off..."

Holden rejected the CIA offer.

This story has as its basis genuine facts as related by Republican Congressman P. McClosky to journalists in Washington, from a letter he had received from engineer Holden.

The US Central Intelligence Agency plays a leading role in the "secret war" of American imperialism in Laos and other countries of Indochina. In the most active manner it furthers Washington's strategy of further expansion of aggression. In an interview with a correspondent of UPI, a former highly placed CIA employee, V. Marchetti, lifted the veil over the miserable activity of American intelligence. According to his words, secret, semimilitary CIA operations represent a great danger. CIA agents cast into a particular

THE CAMBODIA DILEMMA

Senators Seek U.S. Policy Limits . . .

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

The leading members of the Senate's foreign policy establishment are convinced that the United States is walking into another Asian bottomless pit in Cambodia. This week they will begin the most far-reaching effort yet to control U.S. policy there before it develops.

Sweeping anti-war amendments and fund cut-off proposals are part of the effort. But for the first time those who oppose further military commitments in Southeast Asia have come up with a series of specific, carefully-worded restrictions on U.S. activities which, if passed, would do much to return congressional partnership to the conduct of foreign policy.

"We are getting out of South Vietnam," says Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana, "but it looks like we are getting into Cambodia.

"It appears to me that the old pattern is perhaps being repeated; that the handwriting is on the wall for another Vietnam, despite all disclaimers to the contrary.

During a 1969 visit to Cambodia, Mansfield found only two Americans at the embassy in Phnom Penh. When Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown in 1970, there were 11 Americans there. Now, Mansfield says, "There are upwards of 150 and the trend is up."

Many of Mansfield's Senate colleagues do not believe the United States would make a massive commitment of American air and ground force to Cambodia, as it did in Vietnam.

But to many of them, Cambodia looks like a trap that could drain financial and political resources from the United States for years, preventing the kind of decisive disengagement from Indochina that Senate doves believe to be a necessity.

The Cambodia question has been simmering beneath the surface in the Senate for more than a year, since the Nixon administration began a rapid increase of aid to the Lon Nol government after the U.S. invasion of Communist sanctuaries in the spring of 1970.

Many members of the Foreign Relations Committee have watched with increasing discomfort as U.S. military and economic aid has multiplied.

Last week a prominent dove leaked to The New York Times a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird which spelled out a proposed five-year program of pacification, "psychological operations" and "unconventional warfare" for Cambodia, and listed the ways to fund such a program by diverting appropriations from other areas, masking military aid as economic assistance and declaring large amounts of military equipment "excess" so that it could be diverted to Cambodia.

The memorandum called for doubling U.S. expenditures by 1977 to a level of \$500 million a

Capitol Hill sources admit that the memorandum was never agreed to by Laird, and that both the State Department and Henry Kissinger's National Security Council Staff apparently opposed the plan.

But its disclosure accelerated an effort within the Foreign Relations Committee to set stringent limits on future aid to Cambodia.

Aid Bill Provision

Senators Stuart Symington, D-Mo., and Clifford Case, R-N.J., added a provision to the foreign aid bill last week that would limit money to Cambodia in fiscal 1972 to an absolute ceiling of \$250 million for all military and economic assistance.

The expenditures would have to be accounted for in such great detail that State Department officials complained privately the procedure might be both unmanageable and dangerous to national security.

A second part of the Symington-Case amendment would limit to 200 the number of American personnel who can operate in Cambodia, and would allow for funds to pay only 50 third-country nationals employed in Cambodia by the U.S. Government.

The bill states explicitly that no more than \$250 million from any government source can be spent "to carry out directly or indirectly any economic or military assistance, or any operation project, or program of any kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers, in to for or on behalf of Cambodia . . ."

A subsection states that in computing the \$250 million limitation, the value of any goods provided must be listed at "fair market value and in no case less than one-third of acquisition cost."

State Department officials first learned of the Cambodia limitations from the newspapers, and the administration appears to have been caught off guard.

Department officials said yesterday they did not know whether the administration would make a major effort on the floor of the Senate to remove the limitations from the bill, although they acknowledge that an intense effort could be expected in a House-Senate conference committee.

Administration objections are many. The ceiling would represent a 40 percent cut in planned aid to Cambodia. The strict accounting called for could be interpreted, one official noted, to include the state Department's internal budget for Washington officials assigned to Cambodian affairs and even the cost of airplane rides to Cambodia by sightseeing members of Congress.

More significant, the cost breakdown was interpreted as requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to report its expenditures -- both for military and intelligence operations -- to the Congress as a whole, instead of just to special CIA-oversight committees in the Senate and House.

Worst Moment

From the administration's point of view, Senate doves have chosen the worst possible moment to attempt remote-control cost accounting of the Indochina War.

As more and more U.S. troops depart from Vietnam, the five North Vietnamese and Viet Cong divisions in Cambodia become an increasing threat which needs to be countered with more, not less, U.S. aid to the growing Cambodian army.

Senate opponents do not deny the strategic importance of the Cambodian border areas or the pressure that could be exerted there by the North Vietnamese.

But they believe the administration should closely consult Congress every step of the way in order to resist the temptation to pour massive resources into Cambodia as a way of diverting the attention of the enemy and U.S. critics from Vietnam.

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376

S - 541,868

OCT 22 1971

Fed Up With Games

Like the peripatetic Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's latest ruler, Lon Nol, believes in being blunt. "Should we vainly play the game of democracy and freedom which will lead us to complete defeat or should we curtail anarchic freedom in order to achieve victory?" he asked his people on Wednesday.

He did not wait for an answer. "The government has made its decision," he decreed, meaning he and his cohorts will rule by ordinance rather than by constitutional law. To combat those who believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat he created a dictatorship of generals and other assorted favorites. And when the Buddhists protested silently, Lon Nol charged, "There is a fifth column at work."

The United States, of course, has great plans for Cambodia. President Nixon is asking a \$75,000,000 increase in aid for fiscal 1972 to a total of \$341,000,000 for that country. The Pen-

tagon would like to increase this to one-half billion dollars by 1977 so that Lon Nol can draft roughly one-half the country's adult male population into the army and paramilitary units. Although there is a congressional ban on U.S. ground troops and advisers in Cambodia, the CIA and the Pentagon, with apparent approval from the White House, consider the situation critical enough to violate the spirit of this ban. The embassy staff alone may be of battalion proportions, if certain plans are carried out. And as Senator Eagleton warns in a speech reprinted on this page, a commitment to Cambodia could lead the nation to the same tragic results as the supposed "commitment" to South Vietnam. Surely Congress has been forewarned against that.

All this is, of course, done to give the Cambodians "a chance," as President Nixon likes to say. A chance for tyranny?

STATINTL

MADISON, WISC.
TIMES

E - 46,029

OCT 21 1971

We're Fighting On Wrong Side

THE R E C E N T D E V E L O P -
A M E N T S in Cambodia where our
strongman puppet, Lon Nol, has
suspended the National Assem-
bly, abolished rule by constitu-
tional law and set up a dictator-
ship, makes us wonder if the
United States is fighting on the
right side there.


Prime Minister Lon Nol, who
c o u l d n ' t pay his laundry bill
without funds from the Central
Intelligence A g e n c y, and the
American taxpayers, is another
pip-squeak dictator forced on an
unwilling country by the
militarists who m a k e foreign

policy for the United States.

"S h o u l d we vainly play the
game of democracy and free-
dom which will lead us to com-
plete defeat or should we curtail
anarchic freedom in order to
achieve victory?" said Lon Nol
in a broadcast following a silent
protest by Buddhists.

Hitler couldn't have put it bet-
ter, nor Stalin.

Can a Communist menace be
more terrible than this? We are
bombing the wrong targets. We
should bomb the hell out of Lon
Nol's palace if we want to pre-
serve freedom for Cambodia.



ATLANTA, GA.
JOURNAL
E - 257,863
JOURNAL--CONSTITUTION
S - 536,497
OCT 20 1971

STATINTL

CIA Out of Control

The Editors: I have not liked the high command organization in regard to the administration of things in South Vietnam. I have not liked the way in which the Central Intelligence Agency has handled the facts of life. For one thing, the Nixon administration could have moved troops faster from Vietnam than it has accomplished and it has been bombing too much. Better dealings with the National Liberation Front could have taken place at Paris.

The great historians have not favored military offensives in Vietnam. Many escapades in South Vietnam have been run without the knowledge of the American people and the CIA can start small wars without any control by Congress. What the CIA is able

to do is to conceal the motives of a conflict.

Intellectuals believe that the CIA helped put Ngo Dinh Diem out of office. We know that the Kennedy administration did not continue to support the Diem regime so the Diem line could not go on.

I have read reports that contend that the CIA had Prince Norodom Sihanouk removed from office in Cambodia. I think that Prince Sihanouk had a splendid plan for the people of Cambodia. I like his plan better than I like the plan of Richard M. Nixon for military offensives.

I found that John F. Kennedy did well in planning things in Laos.

CHARLES W. SHEPHERD

Atlanta

And the article reports that the Defense Department is going ahead with plans to expand MEDT—the Military Equipment Delivery Team—forces to 500 by the end of next year.

According to Newsweek—

There are signs that the military men already in Cambodia are getting more directly involved in the fighting there. American helicopters have reportedly begun transporting Cambodian troops into battle areas and supplying them with ammunition. And at Pochentong Airport in Phnom Penh, U.S. forces recently opened a radio center (officially called a "navigation aid") to coordinate air support for Cambodian troops.

But planned escalation is not confined to personnel increases alone. Although this year's aid program for Cambodia calls for \$211 million in military aid, \$110 million in economic assistance and \$20 million in agricultural commodities for a total of \$341 million—a net increase of \$59 million over last year—the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently want another \$52 million for military aid.

According to a story in the New York Times October 13, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have designed a costly program of "pacification" and other "unconventional warfare" for Cambodia, as well as ways to get more money to implement it than Congress is willing to authorize.

According to the Times, the Joint Chiefs have devised a battle plan to outflank the intent of Congress. According to this report the Chiefs offered four different ways of generating—on the sly—the additional \$52 million they want:

The first way would be simply to transfer \$52 million from the economic aid program to military spending, which can be done later in the fiscal year simply by the Administration's notifying Congress. The second way would be to use the economic aid fund for the purchase of all "common use" items such as trucks and jeeps, which have military as well as civilian value, thus freeing other military funds.

A third way would be to increase procurement for the United States Army by \$52 million and give the material to the Cambodians, for "repayment" later. The fourth way would be to make some exceptions in Defense Department supply regulations, declaring additional equipment to be "excess" and delivering it to the Cambodians.

Mr. President, if these reports are true, and past experience suggests that they probably are, it appears that the United States role in Cambodia is escalating significantly as more American dollars and more American personnel are becoming more involved in the war there.

The pattern is all too familiar to repeat: A tentative commitment becomes firm; a temporary presence becomes permanent; a limited role expands, and the executive branch of Government circumvents or ignores the advice and intent of Congress, if not the actual provision of laws.

And the unanticipated results, as we have found in Vietnam, can be disastrous.

Mr. President, the Senate will soon be making important decisions regarding the amount, scope, and type of aid to Cambodia when the Foreign Assistance Act comes to the floor.

The Foreign Relations Committee has taken an important step toward limiting

the scope of our growing involvement there by voting to impose a \$250 million ceiling on military and economic aid and to limit the number of U.S. civilian and military personnel to 200.

Since I came to the Senate in 1969, Congress has been attempting to restore the constitutional balance in the war-making power. Many Senators have recognized that executive branch ability to make war unilaterally is a very real danger to democracy. As Senator JOHN STENNIS stated the other day before the Foreign Relations Committee while testifying on bills dealing with congressional war powers:

The President is faced with difficult day-to-day decisions in the Executive Branch in the field of foreign policy and the temptation is great to rely upon the threat of military force against a particularly troublesome or recalcitrant opponent.

But he went on to point out:

But the Constitution has placed the responsibility for deciding whether or not that force is to be used in the hands of the Legislative Branch. Thus it is not only our right but our Constitutional duty to insist that the President obtain the sanction of the Congress, the peoples' representatives, before he actually involves the nation in war.

Mr. President, it is clear that Executive decisions have shaped the course of the Indochina war and that an indifferent Congress provided little or no restraint on Executive actions. I recognize that some politicians will continue to prefer inaction or deference to the Executive in the exercise of a policy that could result in war, for scapegoats are often popular in politics and the assumption of responsibility often is not.

I feverently hope that such failure to accept responsibility is a thing of the past.

If the reports on Cambodia are true, as I believe they are, it should be clear that current and planned executive branch actions could take us into another ill-advised military adventure.

Congress has the ability to set wise limits on such dangerous Executive policy. The Foreign Relations Committee has given us a vehicle, in the Symington-Case amendment, for setting a proper limit in Cambodia.

Mr. President, I am pleased at this time to yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE).

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized for 7 minutes.

THE NEED FOR ABSOLUTE CEILINGS ON U.S. SPENDING AND PERSONNEL IN CAMBODIA

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding to me. I commend him for the remarks he has made and for the activities he has engaged in on this matter on several occasions in the past. He has been most helpful to the Senate and to the Nation in regard to the problems we are facing here. I am happy that his remarks preceded mine on this subject. Mr. President, the time has come for the United States as a Nation to decide what to do about Cambodia.

Recent press reports indicate what the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel must be done if we are to bring about a military solution in Cambodia. The Joint Chiefs' plan calls for a doubling of military expenditures and almost a five fold increase in the size of the Cambodian army.

Those are very disturbing proposals.

In no event, however, should the fundamental question of whether the United States becomes even more deeply involved in yet another Southeast Asian country be decided within the executive branch under a veil of secrecy.

I thought we had painfully learned this lesson from our Vietnam experience, but the reports on the Joint Chiefs of Staff plans for Cambodia would seem to indicate the strong possibility that we may be about to repeat past mistakes.

My own view is that the overwhelming majority of Congress and the American people do not wish to repeat the Vietnam example.

We on the Foreign Relations Committee have on several occasions asked the Secretary of Defense for the 5 year plans for military assistance programs. We have always been refused access to these documents.

It is indeed unfortunate that we have to rely on leaks of secret papers to receive the plans for Cambodia. But considering the vast scope of the Joint Chiefs' proposals for that country, I can understand why the Pentagon has been reluctant to expose its thinking. The aid levels and force levels described in the New York Times and the Washington Post are so large that it is difficult to believe they could stand up to either congressional or public scrutiny.

If the proposals of the Joint Chiefs were put into effect, Cambodia would be turned into an armed camp absolutely dependent on us for its existence. And this would not just be for a year or two; but for the indefinite future. The Joint Chiefs project an expansion of the current 170,000 man Cambodian armed forces, 863,000 by 1977. In a country of less than 7 million people, we would then be supporting a military establishment which would be the proportional equivalent of more than 25 million Americans under arms.

It is of course the right of the Cambodians to decide how large their army will be; but it becomes very much our concern when the American taxpayer is asked to pay the bill. And there is no question that the United States would be paying virtually all the costs. The war has left the Cambodians themselves nearly without resources. As long as the fighting continues, they will be deprived of their three principal sources of foreign exchange: rice, rubber, and tourism. Moreover, as we found out in Vietnam, our other allies will do little if anything to share the costs.

The Joint Chiefs further propose that we get involved at all levels of Cambodian society with pacification programs, psychological warfare programs, and even unconventional warfare programs directed by the CIA. Again, as we learned in Vietnam, these kinds of American supported programs all lead to deeper and deeper entanglement.

CHARLOTTE, N.C.
NEWS

OCT 19 1971
E - 65,014

Commitment To Cambodia

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield promises to inquire again this week into U.S. involvement in Cambodia. The action is timely, coming as it does just before Congress is to vote on a massive foreign aid package which includes \$250 million in U.S. assistance to the Cambodian government. Though concerned about the size of the appropriation, Mr. Mansfield finds more unsettling the authorization in the bill for 150 Americans, 50 civilian and 100 military, to be stationed permanently in Cambodia.

It would be reckless to over-emphasize the parallels between American aid to Cambodia today and American aid to South Vietnam 10 years ago. Yet to allay any doubts that the administration does not intend to become mired in another Asian war, the American public deserves some straightforward explanations.

Since the ouster of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk and the installation of Lon Nol as head of state (reportedly with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency), American financial aid has risen from about \$9 million annually to the now-requested \$250 million. Why?

Why too are 100 U. S. military personnel needed permanently in Cambodia? Two years ago there were only six; presently there are 50. Reports — unconfirmed by the American military — indicate that a major undertaking of U. S. officials in Cambodia is the recruiting, coordinating and paying of mercenaries to wage "unconventional warfare" and protect South Vietnam's western flank.

To be sure, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee cut the administration's



MANSFIELD

Cambodian request substantially, even to a point that an under secretary of state said would jeopardize the Cambodians' chances to "consolidate their independence." That argument may have merit, though one wonders about the independence of a country whose Prime Minister, Lon Nol, moved just Saturday to strip the National Assembly of its law making powers.

The Foreign Relations Committee's vote (7 to 6) to put a ceiling on aid to Cambodia (efforts to reduce aid further failed) should not end the matter however. A sizable commitment can be made under that ceiling. Senator Mansfield will be doing a great service if he continues to press for both an authoritative definition of the real limits of that commitment if, in fact, any is really necessary.

Cambodia, Another Vietnam?

Having in effect assumed responsibility last year for the defense of Cambodia, as a result of a presidentially-ordered invasion which flouted the constitutional powers of Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are reported now to have prepared elaborate plans that would turn that once peaceful country into virtually a garrison state.

As reported by Max Frankel of *The New York Times* in a dispatch published in the *Post-Dispatch*, the military planners at the Pentagon visualize a doubling of American expenditures for Cambodia to about \$500,000,000 a year by 1977. As submitted to Congress, Cambodian aid proposed for fiscal 1972 has already increased by \$75,000,000 over fiscal 1971, to a total of \$341,000,000.

Sensing a repetition of the Vietnam pattern, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on learning of the Joint Chiefs' plans, voted to impose a \$250,000,000 ceiling on Cambodian aid. But one of the most disquieting aspects of the Cambodian planning is the cavalier manner in which the military men have proposed to achieve their program by various alternative procedures, each obviously designed for use in the event that Congress should impose some limit on Cambodian aid.

These alternative schemes, symptomatic of the arrogance of power, include such devious methods as increasing procurement funds for the American army and then giving the materiel thus purchased to the Cambodians for "repayment later"; declaring American equipment to be "excess" and delivering it to the Cambodians.

For their part, the Cambodians would be expected to expand their army from the current 180,000 to 300,000 by 1977 and "paramilitary"

units (armed civilians) to 500,000 by the same year. These forces, constituting half of the country's adult male population, would be involved in activities euphemistically labeled by the Pentagon as "unconventional warfare," "pacification," and "psychological operations"—all of which means actually that the country is expected to be engaged in consuming total war for the unpredictable future.

With operations financed in part by the CIA and supervised from the American embassy, the American role is already being prepared for by steady expansion of the team of U.S. military men inside Cambodia in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of an existing congressional ban on American ground troops or advisers in that country.

The blueprint for Cambodian defense, offered as a means of protecting the withdrawal of American troops, is in fact a design for continuing an American-financed proxy war with all of the attendant risks and costs of growing U.S. involvement. Cambodia could be transformed for years into the same kind of bloody battleground as Vietnam, its people subject without their consent to bombing and burning and to cruel mass evacuation, its social fabric rent by guerrilla warfare.

With its provisions for profligate use of taxpayers' money in an unpromising military venture, the Cambodian plan appears almost as a rewrite of the Vietnam scenario done by an author who has seen nothing and heard nothing about the tragedy in that country brought about by misguided American military intervention which produced no benefit for U.S. security but inflicted terrible suffering on the people of Vietnam.

STATINTL

BUFFALO, N.Y.

NEWS

OCT 15 1971

E - 281,982

Putting Lid on Cambodia Aid

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has acted forthrightly in voting to put a lid on the steadily escalating American military role in Cambodia. The committee seeks to impose a ceiling of \$250 million on military and economic aid in the current fiscal year and would also limit to 200 the number of U. S. personnel in Cambodia.

The administration, in contrast, sought \$341 million, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly favor increasing military aid to \$500 million by 1977. With costs rising into the stratosphere like this, it is hard to believe that our aid to Cambodia just a year and a half ago was zero.

Sen. Case (R., N. J.) rightly declared that "we should go no further in increasing our commitment to Cambodia—at least not without a firm decision by Congress and the American people that an expanded war in Cambodia is the course our country should follow."

The administration has entered a familiar objection to the senators' action — that it would endanger American troops as they are withdrawn from Vietnam. Obviously, this same argument could be used to justify any level of support for Cambodia — including the sending of troops. We did send troops in last year's "incursion," but that was supposed to be a one-shot surgical operation, and President Nixon assured the nation that in any future border operations by the South Vietnamese there would be "no U. S. air or logistics support."

Now, U. S. planes fly combat-support missions not only for South Vietnamese but for Cambodian troops, and the plans reportedly projected by the Joint Chiefs include an American-directed pacification effort in Cambodia involving the Central Intelligence Agency and a new embassy command structure.

It is true that the war throughout all of Indo-China is interrelated, and that all these moves are directed against the same enemy, but it would be folly to

escalate the war in Cambodia as we are de-escalating the war in Vietnam. If the U. S. fighting role in Vietnam is not ended before next year's election, the American public is going to want to know why: hence why plan on an increasing American involvement lasting till 1977?

Such a plan would, as Sen. Case said, "turn that country into an armed camp, altogether dependent on United States dollars, arms and food for its continued existence." We would, in short, be Americanizing another war, a tragic prelude perhaps to another nightmare involvement that would be solved by "Cambodianization" 10 years from now.

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incidents, the investigations were begun as the result of an accident or a complaint outside the responsible chain of command, not because the screening programme worked.

"What can you do?" Pentagon spokesmen say. "Drugs infect the society. They're bound to get into the military." Sadly true. And they are bound to get into units trained to fire nuclear weapons. Terrifyingly true.

ILLNESS OF MARVELLA BAYH, WIFE OF SENATOR BAYH, OF INDIANA

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the deep sympathy of the whole Senate goes out to our distinguished Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) on the illness of his wife. Special sympathy goes out to Marvella herself, whom we all know as one of the most lovable of the ladies of the Senate.

Our hearts grieve for all in the Bayh family over this unfortunate situation.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, President Nixon has announced that he will be going to visit Moscow in May for a meeting with the leaders of the Soviet Union.

This step, while independent of the journey to Peking, is another bold decision so typical of a President who has not hesitated to act in controversial matters and to act strongly and move the Nation and the world, so far as within him lies, in the direction of at least a generation of peace.

We do not know what will come out of these two fateful meetings, but we do know that it is far better to continue negotiations and to avoid confrontation, and particularly to negotiate with the other great superpower and with the only potential superpower in the coming two decades.

With regard to the visit to Moscow, it is our turn to return the state visit paid us by Chairman Khrushchev. The invitation comes from the Soviet Union. It is difficult to predict what can happen. Not everything we expect will result.

However, the actions of Soviet leaders lately in visiting so many parts of the world, in their obvious attempts to lessen certain tensions, as exhibited by the Seabed treaty, the bacteriological warfare treaty, and the treaty to take steps against accidental nuclear explosions, all indicate that the Soviet Union is desirous of cooling the temperature of the world—I think even in the Middle East, where we do not approve of what they are doing by any means in furnishing arms to some of the nations there, but at least there has been no shooting for 15 months. That in itself is progress of a sort. We hope for eventual peace in that area.

The SALT talks are moving. Progress has been noted there.

Thus, I commend wholeheartedly the President of the United States, and I know that that sentiment is shared by the bipartisan leadership in both Houses of Congress.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I join the distinguished Republican leader in what he has just said about the President's proposed journey to Peking, which

is to be followed sometime thereafter by a journey to Moscow.

It should be stated for the Record that there was bipartisan and unanimous approval at the White House yesterday when the President briefed us on some of the details of his latest acceptance, the invitation to go to Moscow.

As the distinguished Republican leader has pointed out, the last time a high Soviet dignitary visited us was when Chairman Khrushchev came to this country. Thus, in the course of events, the way protocol works, if there were to be a high level conference of this kind, it would be held in Moscow this time.

It should also be stated, and on a bipartisan basis, that President Nixon has made tremendous strides, I think, in the field of foreign policy. Not only have we two agreements on the SALT talks, but two more are in the offing, although they may take longer. Not only do we have a degree of stability—at least in view of what existed in the Middle East until the Nixon-Rogers formula, which I approve completely—but we also have the signing of the Berlin accords by the representatives of the four powers, in which the President played a very important personal part. Those accords are now being considered by the two Germans. If agreement can be reached, it will be stamped finally as an agreement by the plenipotentiaries of the four powers. Then it is hoped it will be possible for Willy Brandt, the Chancellor of Germany, to continue the Ostpolitik policy by the signing of an agreement with Poland and the Soviet Union, this to be followed by an all-European conference, to be attended by the United States and Canada.

These are actions in the right direction. They are moves of great importance.

While I wish we could accelerate our withdrawal from all of South Vietnam, one has to give due recognition to the fact that the policy, while not speedy enough in my judgment, is nevertheless moving in the right direction.

Perhaps when the President addresses the Nation next month, he will have news which will accelerate the withdrawal. However, that is for the President to decide.

I join the distinguished Republican leader by saying what I can in view of the shifts of policies which are occurring throughout the world and the travels which are now underway and will be underway shortly. I hope that out of this new mixture accruing in this new age will come new policies which will satisfy the needs of the times. I look for changes in old policies which have outlived their usefulness and should be consigned to the distant past.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for his usual and expected patriotic response and bipartisan-ship which illuminates our foreign policy.

PERIOD FOR THE TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there will now be a period of 30 minutes for the transaction

of routine morning business with the Senator being limited to 3 minutes.

Is there any morning business?

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE C-5A SCANDAL

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the grounding by the Air Force of the entire fleet of C-5A's, the Air Force cargo plane, should outrage every American taxpayer. The Air Force should require the Lockheed Corp. to recall immediately all C-5A aircraft and should itself stop the pernicious practice of accepting delivery of deficient planes.

The C-5A, with its cracked wings, its engines and wheels that fall off, its missing parts, landing gears that do not work, and numerous other deficiencies, is one of the greatest "rip-offs" of the public treasury in defense contract history. This is a plane that cost \$2 billion more than it was supposed to cost.

What is worse, Mr. President, is that under the present contract, the public must pay the cost of correcting every one of Lockheed's bonthead fumbles.

Unless the Air Force acts now to force the contractor to make the necessary corrections at its own expense or without increasing the cost of this program, I intend to do everything in my power to place a ceiling on this endless outpouring of billions of taxpayers' dollars for such pitiful waste.

I do not know what else we can do. We have tried everything else. The situation involving this plane gets worse and worse. It is a nightmare. However, I do think that the Senate should consider very, thoughtfully and carefully, when the appropriation bill involving this matter comes before the Senate, putting a ceiling on the amount that can be spent for that program.

CAMBODIA: THE HANDWRITING ON THE WALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a year and a half has elapsed since the military overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and the subsequent U.S. incursion into Cambodia. At the time, these events were hailed as quickening the end of the war in Vietnam. A year and a half later, the war still goes on and this obscure episode of the long tragedy of Indochina is all but forgotten.

It is not forgotten, however, by the families of more than 350 Americans who died in the Cambodian invasion. Nor is it forgotten by the hundreds of other Americans who were wounded in that brief campaign. Nor is it forgotten, I should

11 OCT 1971

THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER STAFF OFFICER CRITICIZES CIA ACTIVITIES

Is the CIA starting to spy on Americans at home—turning talents and money against students, blacks, others? That is one of several key questions raised in a wide ranging criticism. A direct response starts on page 81.

THE ATTACK

The following was written by Edward K. DeLong of United Press International, based on an interview with a Central Intelligence Agency official who has resigned. The dispatch was distributed by UPI for publication on October 3.

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it—that is, dissident student groups and civil-rights organizations—Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U. S. intelligence community.

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA—and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations)—and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who—if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like—are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, [Va.], a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'the enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history.

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of—an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization—the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

With many of his lifelong views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen career. One of the last things he did at the CIA was to explain to Director Richard Helms why he was leaving.



Mr. Marchetti

STATINT

11 OCT 1971

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THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.

THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad: for what it has allegedly done as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big


This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

-(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U. S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a




Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is worldwide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-



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*CIA School
Closed Over
Drug Arrest*

Agency (CIA) closed a secret school for training Cambodian army guerrillas in Laos when police arrested a high ranking Cambodian officer at the school on heroin smuggling charges, military sources said.

The officer was a top aide of Lt. Col. Lon Non, brother of Prime Minister Lon Nol, the sources said.

Since his arrest in June, the aide has been released and, dressed in civilian clothes, has resumed duties in Phnom Penh at Lon Non's super secret special coordination committee.

WASHINGTON STAR

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8 OCT 1971

CIA Closes School After Drug Arrest

PHNOM PENH (UPI) — The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency closed a secret school for training Cambodian army guerrillas in Laos when police arrested a high-ranking Cambodian officer at the school on heroin-smuggling charges, military sources said.

The officer was a top aide of Lt. Col. Lon Non, brother of Prime Minister Lon Nol, the sources said.

Since his arrest in June, the aide has been released and, dressed in civilian clothes, has resumed duties in Phnom Penh at Lon Non's super-secret Special Coordination Committee.

The Cambodian army, in the meantime, has established a new guerrilla training center in southern Laos, and the CIA is once again considering providing American instructors and equipment, the officers said.

The Lon Nol aide was arrested in Pakse, Laos, by local police when he attempted to board a Phnom Penh-bound Air America plane with 22 pounds of heroin in a soapflake box, the sources said.

The heroin would be worth almost \$12,000 on the Vietnam market.

American officials were informed, and concluded after investigation that the heroin was bound for U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

The secret CIA camp, at Nakorn Sin in southern Laos, subsequently ordered out all Cambodian officers and trainees from Lon Non's 15th Infantry Brigade, the officers reported.

MANCHESTER, ENGLAND
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CIA and Cambodia

Perhaps T. D. Allman ought to be congratulated for the remarkable feat of writing an article about the fall of Sihanouk without a single reference to American policy in Vietnam, or the CIA. ✓

I've heard of Hamlet without the Prince, but this is ridiculous!

B. J. Burden.

Raintree,
Essex.

WAR OF WORDS

The House in the Alley: CIA 'Ears' in Asia

BY JACK FOISIE
Times Staff Writer

BANGKOK—In a strange house in an alley off Soi 39 (39th St.) here, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency produces documents that quite often end up in the hands of fishmongers as wrapping paper.

The house, with faded green walls, red-tiled roof and surrounded by a corrugated tin fence of forbidding height, is conspicuous by its shabbiness in an otherwise reasonably manicured neighborhood.

It is also conspicuous by the abnormal number of antennas it sprouts.

It is the regional office of an American government agency blandly identified as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, or FBIS.

Under its roof, approximately 20 American-employed foreign nationals monitor the outpouring of enemy and friendly news and propaganda broadcasts originating in eight Southeast Asia nations.

Supervised by a handful of Americans, the spew of words is recorded and translated into English. The process turns the clutter of 14 languages and dialects gathered from the air waves into a digestible product to be read by FBIS clients.

Detecting Political Trends

The clients are mostly Americans—Asian political specialists and military men assigned to intelligence duties. They read the FBIS reports to detect trends, alterations in political positions, and the rise and fall of leaders in Asian countries.

For the monitors, working around the clock in three shifts, listening to the diatribes or oily persuasion broadcasts can be deadeningly dull. Much of the propaganda is repetitious in theme, and is meant to be.

But there can also be moments of exhilaration for even the most jaded monitor. Recently, a "Prince Sihanouk" broadcast came on the air, but the FBIS specialist realized immediately that the voice was fake.

The deposed Cambodian monarch, now living in Peking, has been a standout performer in propaganda work for the Chinese Communists. Had he died? Had the Chinese cut him off the air?

Intercepted Own Broadcast

It was later learned—much to the embarrassment of FBIS Americans—that the bogus Sihanouk voice had really come from an American-financed Cambodian government station.

With such goings-on, it seems surprising that the daily FBIS summary of "significant" broadcasts is not a secret document. But it is one of the few products of the CIA, of which FBIS is a part, that is not stamped secret.

"We are the straight-forward outfit in the agency," an FBIS employe explained.

While other CIA sections monitor certain types of coded-enemy—and sometimes friendly—radio traffic, FBIS eavesdrops on programs that peasants are hearing over a communal radio, and soldiers in barracks or in bivouac are listening to on transistorized sets. That explains why the monitoring is not considered a classified project.

Not that the bulky stapled sheaf of blue-ink summaries is available to just anyone. But copies of the daily

report can be begged, borrowed or purloined. In Vientiane, the Lao capital where both sides in the Indochina war have diplomats, FBIS is "must" reading in every embassy. Eventually the discarded FBIS copies end up in the market place, where peddlers use them to wrap fish.

The FBIS distillation of Southeast Asia's war of words is probably most eagerly read by military briefers, who must put pins on maps and inform their generals of daily combat action. While enemy radio broadcasts describing "great victories" are read with a jaundiced eye, their exaggerations are sometimes no greater, one officer admitted, than what the "friendly" governments of Laos, Cambodia and Thailand are reporting about the same actions.

"By having both versions, we're in a position to judge what really happened," he explained.

First Reports

In times of turmoil, weakly powered clandestine stations often give the first reports as to whether a government has fallen, or a secessionist movement is still viable. The East Pakistan "Bengla Desh" movement was more active on radio than in battle the first few months.

The FBIS station on Okinawa, which devotes its main effort to monitoring the radios on the Chinese mainland, has the added responsibility of "cruising." Patient operators "twirl the dial" on all possible wave bands and frequencies to detect new radio stations, be they but a gasoline-powered "one-lung" transmitter set in the jungle.

Diplomatic feelers are sometimes first voiced, or replied to, on clandestine radios. For a year, the allied-backed Lao premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and his half-brother Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the Communist Pathet Lao, have been making peace proposals. Souphanouvong, often as not, has been voicing his ploys through a pair of Lum-and-Abner "uncles," Hak and Sat, who hold a 30-minute conversation over clandestine Radio Pathet Lao every Sunday morning.

Folksy Chat

A folksy chat, or a slightly risque sing-song exchange, is standard entertainment in Laos. To assure an audience, the Pathet Lao make most of their propaganda points to the people in these forms.

Uncle Hak and Uncle Sat discussed Souvanna Phouma's latest peace offer in a broadcast recently. Recorded and translated by FBIS, the Mut-and-Jeff dialog included this portion:

Hak: Prince Souvanna Phouma's letter to Prince Souphanouvong this time is not different from the previous ones. That is, it avoids coming to grips with the main question.

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'The Intelligence Game'

CIA Draws Praise And Blame From Writers

By LEW SCARR
Copley News Service

Perhaps no area of our government having a direct bearing on our attitude in the cold war has been more controversial, yet less understood than our intelligence network.

It is partly that we don't know what the Central Intelligence Agency does, but if it does what we think it does, it goes against our sense of fair play and that is bad.

The popular notion is that the CIA is a law unto itself. It is believed that it freely interferes in the internal affairs of sovereign nations, and that it overthrows anti-American governments, even democratically elected ones, to install anti-Communist governments.

Some writers have capitalized on these beliefs, shadowed them with a cloak and fastened them with a dagger and written books to support them. Fortunately, most were crudely written and rudely received.

Still, many congressmen and some journalists continue to ask, why have an intelligence community at all? Mostly the questioners are those to whom "intelligence" connotes spies, saboteurs and political activists.

Those living in the intelligence community consider the question absurd. But it deserves an answer.

Any president of a large corporation, and, indeed, any chief of state, must have "intelligence" if he is to fulfill his responsibilities.

He may get it from newspapers, from briefings by his subordinates or from reports from consultants. Wherever, he must have intelligence, in both senses of the word, or he will not survive long.

Before World War II, the armed services had relied heavily upon civilian specialists in wars and, when the fighting was over, they sent the specialists home and forgot all about the need for intelligence.

Gen. George C. Marshall once described the Army's foreign intelligence as "little more than what a military attache could learn at a dinner, more or less, over the coffee cups."

Five months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Harry Howe Ransom reports in "The Intelligence Establishment" President Roosevelt summoned Col. (late Maj. Gen.) William J. Donovan to draft a plan for a new intelligence service designed for the requirements of a global war and patterned in the main after the British.

Donovan was a successful lawyer who had won the Medal of Honor in World War I.

"He was an imaginative, aggressive man," Ransom writes, "who had traveled abroad extensively. So far as intelligence work went, he was an amateur, but in the American tradition of public service he seemed qualified to assemble what was to become the forerunner of CIA."

During World War II the closest approach to a central intelligence system was the widely publicized Office of Strategic Services — the almost legendary OSS.

It is difficult to assess the worth of OSS because its official history still remains classified. Still, it must be given credit, despite traditional detractors, for invaluable contributions to allied victory, especially in Burma and in defeating the axis in North Africa and in aiding the French resistance

But it wasn't until 1947 that Congress created the CIA. It was fashioned after OSS and it was born during the year that cold war was declared.

Actually, Congress in setting up CIA delegated it a single function, intelligence, and nothing more. That it does much more is without question, but just what and where it does it is hard to say.

There is a theory among intelligence agents, the good ones, that there should "almost always" be no failures. It is better, so the theory goes, to leave a problem unsolved than to risk failure or discovery.

Still, there have been failures: the Bay of Pigs, the U2 incident.

Taking into account CIA's policy toward supercaution, it would seem reasonable to assume that for every failure there must have been, oh, ten or more successes.

The failures have been pinned on the CIA while the successes almost never are. Not definitely.

Some have suspected the CIA of having brought on the downfall of Nkrumah in Ghana and Sukarno in Indonesia, of having installed the military junta in Greece and of having thrown Sihanouk out of Cambodia.

But these credits, if they are, do nothing more than support the notions of observers who see the CIA as a molder of temporary geography and a shaper of tentative history.

It is the same attitude which Miles Copeland III, who once worked for the State Department and the CIA, writes of in his "The Game of Nations:"

"In the intelligence game, competitors seek to gain the greatest possible advantage short of going to war."

STATINTL

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Cambodian Stability Shored By Low-Keyed U.S. Efforts

STATINTL

By HENRY S. BRADSHIER
Star Staff Writer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia—It was taking the loftiest, most detached possible view.

The American ambassador, Emory C. Swank, expressed regret the other day over the unsuccessful attempt by Communist terrorists to blow to bits himself, his chauffeur, his security guard and his car.

The reason for the regret: It gives Cambodia a bad name and makes the situation here look shakier than it really is now.

Swank's sophisticated reaction to the murder attempt was part of the American effort to create both the appearances and the substance of stability and security in Cambodia, despite the presence of some 60,000 Communist troops in the country.

The United States has accepted almost total responsibility for keeping Cambodia going under Communist military pressure.

'Every Assurance'

U. S. weapons, military training arranged by the United States in other countries, and tactical air support provided by U.S. or American-sponsored air forces have enabled Cambodia to resist North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, while American economic aid has kept the country running.

The foreign minister, Koun Wick, said after a recent visit to Washington that "we got every assurance that U. S. aid will continue for Cambodia.

The embassy staff was at one recent point supposed to

have been pegged at about 100. But the Department of Defense wanted to put more people here to supervise the delivery and utilization of military aid, which is scheduled to be worth \$200 million this fiscal year.

The Pentagon wanted 200 people here. Swank, and apparently the State Department, wants to keep the number of Americans down. They compromised on 50 "Military equipment delivery team" personnel, headed by Brig. Gen. Theodore C. Metaxis.

Questions Raised

The MEDT people took over a job that had been done on a tougher schedule by the small office of Jonathan F. Ladd, the embassy counsellor for political-military affairs and Swank's right-hand man on all things military.

The combination of Ladd's Green Beret background and Swank's own record—he was the No. 2 man in the U.S. Embassy in Laos when the vast American clandestine operation there was growing in the mid-1960s—naturally raises questions about just what the United States is doing in Cambodia besides the public programs for arms and economic aid.

Nothing else, embassy officials insist.

There was a clandestine program of training about 1,500 Cambodian soldiers at a secret camp of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in southern Laos. The soldiers were supposed to operate as guerrillas in the Communist-controlled northeastern part of Cambodia.

But the program has now ended with recriminations and few guerrillas have been deployed.

Cambodia is trying to organize some sort of "pacification" program for areas in which Communist guerrillas are active. So far there is little more than touring propaganda teams to give the government message.

"Pacification" was a fertile field for CIA activities in South Vietnam. But, as one senior American commented, "Our results in pacifying Vietnam don't exactly qualify us as experts, even if we were to bring in people to help here. We're not going to, and it's up to the Cambodians to tackle that problem."

Big Difference

With Americans in Cambodia barred by Washington from training or advising the army, the training that has made a big difference in the army's growing abilities was arranged with U.S. money to be conducted in South Vietnam and Thailand.

There has also been a very secret program for Indonesia to train some Cambodian soldiers in fighting guerrillas. Officials here insist the money for this has not come from U.S. aid to Cambodia.

There is, however, ample precedent for the United States to make indirect payments for such help. It cannot be established here whether the recently increased U.S. military aid program for Indonesia is financing the training for Cambodians.


AROUND THE WORLD

I. ANDRONOV

PROVING GROUND

FOR THE GUAM

DOCTRINE



CAMBODIA is a comparatively recent victim of American imperialist aggression in Indo-China—U.S. forces invaded it only last year. The political prologue, it may be said, was the Guam doctrine—the new course in Asia proclaimed by President Nixon two years ago at the U.S. air force base in Guam. As put by Nixon himself, the point of this doctrine is that the United States must play a substantial role in Asia but would like the problem of war and the responsibility for it to be assumed in ever greater degree by the Asian countries themselves. In the opinion of many Asian public leaders and publications the veiled meaning of this is that Washington wants to “pit Asians against Asians,” that is, to have its war in Asia fought by others in the selfish interests of the U.S. ruling element. The tempestuous events of the

last eighteen months in the once tranquil country of Cambodia offer a classic example of how this is worked in practice.

YANKEES IN PNOM PENH

Washington makes no secret now of its massive bomb strikes against vast areas of Cambodia, but all its other military operations against Cambodia's patriotic forces are painstakingly camouflaged by its official representatives in the Cambodian capital. This summer, for instance, quite a few groups of American servicemen were flown into Pnom Penh from Saigon, but in each case they were dressed as civilians. Thus “camouflaged,” the visitors were then deposited in various parts of the country by U.S. Embassy helicopters. This operation, directed by the Pentagon and the CIA, is kept secret from American and world public opinion. What is more, it is conducted in defiance of the ban imposed by the U.S. Congress on American land operations in Cambodia. But in Pnom Penh itself, it is widely known that the Pentagon's “special forces” units—the notorious Green Berets—systematically make raids deep into the interior of guerilla areas. Very often they disguise themselves as insurgents. The Green Berets carry out sabotage and terrorist missions in the guerilla areas and pick targets for U.S. bombers.

American army planes can be seen daily in the Pnom Penh airport though their presence is partly concealed; the identification marks on some of the planes have been painted over. Last January guerillas blew up a few American planes in the airport and since then the building has remained half in ruins. The surviving part is roofless and its windows are gaping holes. The wind blows through it freely and the floor is strewn with rubble and plaster. But out on the airfield American military transports and sharp-nosed fighters again come and go.

The road from the airport to the capital is blocked off every three hundred metres by empty petrol barrels, so that no car can speed past. Near these roadblocks are stationed groups of soldiers equipped with American quick-firing rifles and field telephones, and wearing American green tropical uniforms and helmets.

In the city there are coils of barbed wire everywhere. The barbed wire is strung on poles right on the sidewalks in front of all government buildings—whether a post office or a ministry. The more important the office, the more wire there is in front of it. First place is taken by the Defence Ministry: the street it stands on is covered with rows of it, and at its walls are piles of sandbags behind which soldiers stand, ready to man machine-guns. There are also machine-gun nests at the gates of nearly all government offices. From time to time people calling at them are carefully searched at gun-point. At the press centre a representative of the military command cautions journalists that it is risky to take photographs in the streets—a nervous soldier may open fire without warning. A state of emergency has been declared in the capital, for guerilla units have surrounded it and by night approach its suburbs. No one may enter the city after sunset; all roads are blocked by government soldiers who huddle fearfully around the American M-113 armoured cars placed at their disposal.

Artillery batteries have been mounted even in the centre of the city, on the Mekong embankment, their guns trained on the opposite bank from which guerillas sometimes open up fire with mortars and mobile rocket launchers. From time to time they even blow up a munitions dump right in the city or shower hand grenades on picked targets, such as the Saigon mission. After one such attack the South Vietnam ambassador landed in hospital. A guerilla attack on the arsenal in June caused an explosion of such force that the flames rose 120 metres and the surrounding streets were showered with shell and mine fragments mixed with stone and rubble.

From a white four-storey building on the corner of one of the Pnom Penh boulevards and Avenue Mao Tse-tung, near the Mekong embankment, hangs the American flag. This is the American Embassy building and the Americans occupying it are jestingly called “the Yankees from Mao Street.” Recently, though, the street was renamed—either at the request of the American diplomats or because of the change in the political climate of the Cambodian capital.

The American Embassy in Pnom

continued

AUG 14 1971

THE GUARDIAN August 14 1971

American Intelligence faked a broadcast in Prince Sihanouk's voice in its latest attempt to regain influence in Cambodia: T. D. Allman reports from Phnom Penh on the dangerous rivalry between the CIA and the American State and Defence Departments.

US infighting

While the armies of Phnom Penh and Saigon fight the forces of Hanoi for control of Cambodia, another war is being fought for the same territory by another set of allies against another infiltrator from the north. The other co-belligerents are the American Departments of State and Defence—like Cambodia and South Vietnam, hardly natural allies. The invader that has brought them together, to use President Nixon's phrase, is the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA, like the North Vietnamese, were supposed to have been deprived of their Cambodian enclaves last year, about the time of the US-South Vietnamese invasion, when the White House ordered that the post-invasion US role in Cambodia be as above-board as possible. Both criteria seemed to rule out the CIA, but both the North Vietnamese and the CIA keep trying to encroach on Cambodia from their secret outposts in southern Laos.

Whereas Hanoi's South Laotian base is known as the Ho Chi Minh

Trail, the CIA's is called the "Annex." It is a white, multi-storied building in the Laotian Mekong river town of Pakse. The building looks like every other building in Pakse—except that it has no windows, is covered with antennae instead of tropical trees, and can be entered only by playing the right combination on an electronic keyboard lock.

The CIA's latest Cambodian excursion recently was limited by an enterprising, Phnom Penh-based American correspondent named Boris Baczynskyj, who discovered nothing less than a CIA plot to synthesise Prince Norodom Sihanouk's inimitably squeaky voice, and broadcast it over the border into Cambodia. The venture was not only an attempt to discredit the Prince by putting words into his mouth, but also an effort to win away a few Cam-

bodian hearts and minds from the State and Defence departments. Unfortunately for the CIA, Baczynskyj, a Khmer-speaking ex-Peace Corps Volunteer, noticed a considerable difference in the words of Sihanouk as beamed over Radio Peking, and the statements attributed to him by the Phnom Penh Government. After months of checking, he verified the existence of the clandestine Pakse Radio, and established the identity of its operators.

Baczynskyj's discovery, however, was more than a journalistic coup. It revealed the latest in a series of failed CIA attempts to maintain cover for its Cambodian operations, which are bitterly resented by the foreign service and military officers who predominate here. The agency, in fact, has been trying rather unsuccessfully to regain a piece of the Cambodian action ever since 1963, when Prince Sihanouk sent the US aid mission packing, which had served as the agency's main Cambodian cover.

The Green Beret scandal in Vietnam, for example, grew out of a CIA order to eliminate with extreme prejudice one of its Cambodian operatives. The agency also supported anti-Sihanouk insurgents, even when the State Department was trying for a Cambodian rapprochement in the late 1960s.

Several times burned, the State Department, when it resumed diplomatic relations with Cambodia in 1969, tried to make sure there would be no CIA agents in the embassy woodpile. Even now, ostensibly, there is no CIA component at all in the 109-man US mission in Phnom Penh.

Never daunted, the CIA has kept up its efforts to develop its own Cambodian infiltration routes, trying to stay out of the Cam-

bodian political crisis, the Agency, unbeknown to the diplomats, relayed promises of support to the anti-Sihanouk faction. And as soon as the Cambodian war broke out, Agency-run teams of Laotian mercenaries began ranging down into Cambodia on "intelligence patrols," which the Pakse station hoped would be the landing parties for a whole CIA-run Clandestine Army in Cambodia.

The American sibling rivalry, which might otherwise be as amusing as a nineteenth-century brouhaha between Whitehall and Simla over jurisdiction of some Indian Ocean gull, already is producing some unedifying complications.

The CIA's Pakse operations—which for all their ingenuity so far have failed to keep the Communists from taking over most of South Laos—are flagrant violations of Laotian neutrality. And neither Laos's premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who is a northerner, nor the US Embassy in faraway Vientiane, seems able to curb the Pakse operation.

Here in Cambodia, where the US embassy has become the nexus of Cambodian political power, the American infighting has already produced some domestic political complications— notably affecting the much publicised rivalry between Premier-delegate Sisowath Sirik Matak and Marshal Lon Nol's young and ambitious brother, Lon Non. The embassy likes Sirik Matak, and hardly bothers to veil its distaste for Lon Non.

With Sirik Matak, who has shunned CIA contacts, emerging as the embassy's man, and Lon Non emerging as the CIA protégé, the American squabble seems to contain seeds potentially as disastrous as those that disrupted Laos a decade ago. At that time, the CIA so disliked the State Department's candidate for premier of Laos that it sent its own Laotian army marching north to drive him out of Vientiane.

Several times routed in its efforts to infiltrate Cambodia, the CIA, like Hanoi, may decide on a strategy of letting dissension spring up among its adversaries. The State Department wants to keep the Cambodian operation lean, clean, and honest. The Defence Department keeps pushing for a big in-country US military establishment.

"You might say we're caught in the middle," said one foreign service officer recently, empathising with the Cambodians who are similarly caught between North and South Vietnam.

STATINTL

CONFIDENTIAL

THE ASIA LETTER

AN AUTHORITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

STATINTL

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STATINTL

10 August 1971

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (III): MODUS OPERANDI (Part 1). Every Friday, at precisely 8:30 A.M., a clean-cut young American assigned to the Combined Studies Group in Saigon leaves the American Embassy and drives to a rendezvous house on Saigon's Tran Hung Dao Street.

There, he picks up a briefcase and a Vietnamese accomplice and begins a drive to Tay Ninh, located northwest of Saigon near the Cambodian border.

Inside the briefcase are bundles of Vietnamese piasters, U.S. dollars and Cambodian riels.

The man carrying the briefcase is a C.I.A. "bag man". The money is the payoff for local agents and tipsters who keep tabs on Communist activities and movements in the important area of eastern Cambodia, southern Laos and the western border of Vietnam.

He is one of a dozen or more C.I.A. "bag men" who make regular trips to various parts of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to pay for the services of agents and informants.

The "bag man" never sees what a businessman would call the "end user"--- the men who get the money. He merely turns it over to the C.I.A.'s "control man" in the area. Sometimes he picks up data to take back to the higher-up agents where he works. But more often than not he returns empty-handed.

The "bag man" duty usually goes to junior C.I.A. men in the Indo-China area. It is a colorless, unstimulating assignment that usually leads to frustration and sometimes to resignations.

One day last February, a Chinese cargo junk from Canton sailed down the Pearl River, through the river estuary and tied up alongside Hong Kong's Western waterfront.

It was one of many that made the same trip the same day to the western waterfront of Hong Kong Island and to the waterfront along Macao's ancient Rua das Lorches.

The river junks, which ply between Hong Kong, Macao and Canton daily, carry very ordinary cargo ranging from vegetables to joss sticks.

But the cargo of cabbages carried by that junk last February was no ordinary cargo. Stuffed inside one of the innocent-looking Chinese cabbages was a report giving up-to-date information on China's missile program.

It came from a C.I.A. informant inside China and went through a half dozen intermediaries in Hong Kong before it ended up in the hands of a high-ranking agent, who forwarded it on to Langley, Virginia, for study and analysis.

The C.I.A. frequently receives reports and messages from its agents and informants in China by this method. And it often sends in messages or instructions through the same channels.

The best example of just how effective these channels are came during China's Cultural Revolution (1966-69), which threw the country into turmoil. In addition to a flood of Red Guard documents giving a very accurate picture of the turmoil, the C.I.A. also received hundreds---perhaps thousands---of very valuable documents pilfered during some of the Red Guard rampages against government and military officials and sold.

6 Aug 1971

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400200001-

The CIA foiled again

American Intelligence faked a broadcast in Prince Sihanouk's voice in its latest attempt to regain influence in Cambodia: T. D. ALLMAN reports from Phnom Penh on the dangerous rivalry between the CIA and the American State and Defence Departments.

WHILE the armies of a few Cambodian hearts and minds from the State and Defence departments. Phnom Penh and Saigon fight the forces of Hanoi for control of Cambodia, another war is being fought for the same territory by another set of allies against another infiltrator from the north. The other co-belligerents are the American Departments of State and Defence — like Cambodia and South Vietnam, hardly natural allies. The invader that has brought them together, to use President Nixon's phrase, is the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA, like the North Vietnamese, were supposed to have been deprived of their Cambodian enclaves last year, about the time of the US-South Vietnamese invasion, when the White House ordered that the post-invasion US rôle in Cambodia be as above-board as possible. Both criteria seemed to rule out the CIA, but both the North Vietnamese and the CIA keep trying to encroach on Cambodia from their secret outposts in southern Laos.

Whereas Hanoi's South Laotian base is known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the CIA's is called the "Annex." It is a white, multi-storied building in the Laotian Mekong river town of Pakse. The building looks like every other building in Pakse — except that it has no windows, is covered with antennae instead of tropical vines, and can be entered only by playing the right combination on an electronic keyboard lock.

The CIA's latest Cambodian incursion recently was limited by an enterprising, Phnom Penh-based American correspondent named Boris Baczynskyj, who discovered nothing less than a CIA plot to synthesise Prince Norodom Sihanouk's inimitably squeaky voice, and broadcast it over the border into Cambodia. The venture was not only an attempt to discredit the Prince by putting embarrassing words into his mouth, but also a

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Complications

The CIA's Pakse operations — which for all their ingenuity so far have failed to keep the Communists from taking over most of South Laos — are flagrant violations of Laotian neutrality. And neither Laos's premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who is a northerner, nor the US Embassy in faraway Vientiane, seem able to curb the Pakse operation.

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Unsuccessful

Baczynskyj's discovery, however, was more than a journalistic coup. It revealed the latest in a series of failed CIA attempts to maintain cover for its Cambodian operations, which are bitterly resented by the foreign service and military officers who predominate here. The agency, in fact, has been trying rather unsuccessfully to regain a piece of the Cambodian action ever since 1963, when Prince Sihanouk sent the US aid mission packing, which had served as the agency's main Cambodian cover.

The Green Beret scandal in Vietnam, for example, grew out of a CIA order to eliminate with extreme prejudice one of its Cambodian operatives. The agency also supported anti-Sihanouk insurgents, even when the State Department was trying for a Cambodian rapprochement in the late 1960s.

Several times burned, the State Department, when it resumed diplomatic relations with Cambodia in 1969, tried to make sure there would be no CIA agents in the embassy woodpile. Even now, ostensibly, there is no CIA component at all in the 100-man US mission in Phnom Penh.

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Department wants to keep the Cambodian operation lean, clean, and honest. The Defence Department keeps pushing for a big in-country US military establishment.

"You might say we're caught in the middle," said one foreign service officer recently, empathising with the Cambodians who are similarly caught between North and South Vietnam.

STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST

5 AUG 1971

STATINTL

Radio Hoax Suspected in Laos

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP)—A radio station that claims to speak for exiled Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk but which actually undercuts the former chief of state is part of a psychological war being waged against the Communists in Cambodia.

On several occasions, according to Khmer-speakers who have monitored the transmitter's broadcasts, a man pretending to be Sihanouk has given a nearly perfect imitation of the prince's high-pitched speechmaking.

Well-informed sources suspect that the station is lo-

cated in southern Laos inside a secret paramilitary camp run by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The radio station calls itself the voice of Sihanouk's United National Front of Kampuchea, or FUNK. It devotes much of its three-hour-long broadcasts daily to violent attacks on Marshal Lon Nol, Cambodia's prime minister, and members of his cabinet.

But when the speakers are not engaged in antigovernment tongue-lashing they mouth slogans and statements aimed at portraying Sihanouk as a puppet prince

manipulated by foreign Communists.

Thus, the station's programs wind up with the statement that the voice of FUNK is "commanded by Prince Norodom Sihanouk and governed by the thoughts of Chairman Mao Tse-tung." Sihanouk has been in Peking since his ouster from power 16 months ago.

On one occasion, the listeners report, the phony Sihanouk went on the air to urge Cambodian girls living in Hanoi controlled regions to sleep with North Viet-

namese and Vietcong soldiers.

Another statement broadcast by the bogus prince accepted responsibility for damage inflicted upon the temple of Angkor Wat in fighting earlier this year. The North Vietnamese soldiers who caused the damage, the statement said, were mere youngsters who did not know how deeply the Khmers venerate the ruined temples and were unaware of their priceless historic value.

U.S. Financed Thais In Laos; Cambodian Unit Also Fought

Laird Refuted

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington--The State Department has acknowledged that Thai "volunteers" fighting in Laos are being financed through the U.S. Military Assistance Program, contrary to assurances by Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, that the program was not used for that purpose.

The manner in which the Thai forces are financed was disclosed in a letter dated July 15 from the State Department to Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.), who charged the administration yesterday with "glaring inconsistency" in its accounts to Congress.

Mr. Case noted that he specifically asked Mr. Laird, when the secretary appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations committee June 14, whether the Military Assistance Program in Laos was used to finance regular or irregular Thai troops in that country.

"According to transcripts of the hearing, Mr. Laird replied: 'The Military Assistance Program will not fund that program . . . No, the Military Assistance Program is not used for that purpose and will not be used for that purpose.'"

In a letter to Senator Case, David M. Abshire, assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, said that "Thai volunteers" are operating in irregular guerrilla units under the command of the Laotian armed forces.

"Semantically In Accord"

"Support for these irregulars is supplied under the Lao military aid program, which, as you know, is funded through the Department of Defense budget as 'Military Assistance, Service-Funded' (MASF)," the letter said, adding, "under current appropriations legislation, such funds can be used to support local forces in Laos."

Senator Case said that Secretary Laird's statement might be "semantically in accord" with the State Department letter, since technically the Military Assistance Program (now called International Security Assistance) is a different program from one called "Military Assistance Service-Funded."

The former is funded through the Foreign Assistance Act, while the latter is included in the Defense Department budget.

Senator Case's office also noted, however, that according to the original and unofficial transcripts of the hearing, Secretary Laird said flatly that "there is no program in our department which finances such a program" of Thai forces in Laos.

This remark was changed by the Defense Department, in the usual screening process, so that the official transcripts read: "There is no such program in our department's request for International Security Assistance."

The State Department letter represents another advance in effort led by Senator Case to obtain more information about the use of "Thai mercenaries" in Laos, who, Mr. Case still maintains, are being supported through the CIA.

The administration, in accordance with long standing policy, never has acknowledged CIA involvement. In June a State Department spokesman acknowledged the presence of "Thai volunteers" in Laos, but did not reveal how they were financed.

"The U.S. . . Is Paying"

In his statement yesterday, Mr. Case noted that he said in a speech last May he had learned from "government sources" there are 4,000 to 6,000 Thai troops in Laos and "the U.S. government, through CIA, is paying for them."

"I stand by that statement," he said yesterday, "and I am glad we now have a better idea of where the money is coming from."

Senator Case also repeated his charge that U.S. support for Thai troops in Laos violated the amendment attached to the Military Appropriations Act last year forbidding the use of Defense Department funds to support "Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia and Laos."

CIA Deal

Phnom Penh, Cambodia (AP)--More than 40 Cambodian soldiers are said to have died fighting in Laos as the result of a bizarre deal involving the United States Central Intelligence Agency, Cambodia's premier, Lon Nol, and Prince Boun Oum, one time right-wing premier of Laos.

The Cambodian soldiers were part of a contingent sent to a secret camp to be trained by the CIA, reliable sources say. Instead of returning to Cambodia they were thrown into the recent battle for the Bolvens Plateau and engaged in some of the heaviest fighting.

Besides the 40 or more killed an unspecified number were wounded, the sources say. These losses, together with disagreements and wrangling on both sides, have ended the CIA training program for Cambodians, at least temporarily.

Despite official silence, the following story has been pieced together:

The Cambodians taken in hand by the CIA were originally trained to serve as members of spy teams to infiltrate into Cambodian provinces that are held by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces.

Use of Laos for training presumably enabled CIA operatives to circumvent the Cooper-Church amendment banning U.S. military advisers, training teams or combat soldiers from Cambodian soil.

Used By Rebels

In addition, the CIA had an isolated ready-made training center at Kakorn-Sin camp, about 25 miles north of Pakse. This was used as a jumping-off

point for raids into Cambodia by Khmer Serei rebels during the reign of the former head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Any deal involving southern Laos is impossible without the approval of Prince Boun Oum, whose word is law in government-held portions of the panhandle. The former Laotian premier is known to have flown to Phnom Penh last year when the training program was being established.

CIA-Trained Cambodia Troops Killed in Laos

Secret Program Reportedly Suspended
After Wrangling, 40 Deaths in Battle

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP)—More than 40 Cambodian soldiers have died fighting in Laos after being trained there by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in a secret camp, reliable sources say.


The Cambodians were thrown into the recent battle for the Bolovens Plateau and engaged in some of the heaviest fighting.

Besides the 40 or more killed, an unspecified number were wounded, the sources say. These losses, together with disagreements and wrangling on both sides, have ended the CIA training program for Cambodians, at least temporarily.

Official circles here are reluctant to discuss Cambodia's involvement in Laos. Such use of Cambodian troops challenges the much-violated 1962 Geneva agreements on neutrality for Laos. And hard-pressed Cambodia is not anxious to give an impression of having spare soldiers.

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The Cambodians were originally trained by the CIA to serve as members of spy teams to infiltrate Cambodian provinces held by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces.



CIA CAMP — Map locates Nakorn Sin, identified as CIA camp for training Cambodians.
Times map

Use of Laos for training presumably enabled CIA operatives to circumvent the Cooper-Church amendment banning U.S. military advisers, training teams or combat soldiers on Cambodian soil.

In addition, the CIA had a ready-made training center at Nakorn Sin camp, about 25 miles north of Pakse. The camp is almost entirely isolated with access by air. North Vietnamese units have tried to hit the camp with mortars but missed.

After the Bolovens battle, the Cambodians complained that they had been given the hardest fighting to do because they were thought to be better soldiers than the Lao. This action soured the Cambodians on the CIA program, informants say.

Disillusionment was not one-sided, however. The U.S. training team was reported to have been angered by lack of co-operation. The co-ordinating officer, Lt. Col. You Kim Heng,

STATINTL

Cambodian Losses

Spike CIA Deal

By ROBBIN MANNOCK
Associated Press Writer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia -- More than 40 Cambodian soldiers have died fighting in Laos as the result of a bizarre three-cornered deal involving the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Cambodia's premier Lon Nol and Prince Boun Oum, onetime right-wing premier of Laos.

The Cambodian soldiers were part of a contingent sent to a secret camp to be trained by the CIA, reliable sources say. Instead of returning to Cambodia they were thrown into the recent battle for the Bolovens Plateau and engaged in some of the heaviest fighting.

At Least 40 Killed

Besides the 40 or more killed and an unspecified number were wounded, the sources say. These losses, together with disagreements and wrangling on both sides, have ended the CIA training program for Cambodians, at least temporarily.

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ready-made training center at Nakorn Sin camp, about 25 miles north of Pakse. This was used as a jumping-off point for raids into Cambodia by Khmer Serei rebels during the reign of the former head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Any deal involving southern Laos is impossible without the approval of Prince Boun Oum. The former Laotian premier is known to have flown to Phnom Penh last year when the training program was being established. Most of the dickering with Boun Oum was conducted by Cambodia's Premier Lon Nol.

Lao soldiers are also trained at Nakorn Sin, but 350 trained alongside the last batch of 450 Cambodians included some teen-agers whose reliability was questionable. A number of 12-year-olds are serving in the Lao ranks.

After the Bolovens battle the Cambodians complained that they had been given the hardest fighting to do because they were thought to be better soldiers than the Lao. This action soured the Cambodians on the CIA program, informants say.

The U.S. training team was also reported to have been angered by lack of cooperation from the Cambodian coordinating officer, Lt. Col. You Kim Heng.

The Americans were further annoyed that Cambodian trainees did not receive the monthly \$13 allowance earmarked for them. Soon after incurring American displeasure, Heng was arrested on a charge of smuggling opium. He is reliably reported to be awaiting trial.

28 JUL 1971

Plans for People's Army In Cambodia Captured

PHNOM PENH — (UPI) — Cambodian government forces have captured what is believed to be a blueprint of the Communist Khmer Rouge for establishing a "People's Army" in Cambodia drawing heavily on the theory of Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung.

"The Khmer (Cambodian) people urges the formation of an army with members in every village, district and province, large or small," the document says.

"Their aim is to fight the imperialists who are grasping Cambodian territory and who use Cambodia as a base to subdue the whole Indochinese people."

THE 12-PAGE hand-written document bears no official stamp. Reliable sources said it was captured by Cambodian government forces during an operation in Kompang Thorn Province, 100 miles north of Phnom Penh and was believed to have been issued by the Khmer Rouge headquarters there.

It contains ideas for propaganda agents, a short treatise on relations with civilians and practical hints for guerrillas.

"When close to enemy positions, scouts must crawl because their hands feel better than their feet if there is an obstacle," reads one handy jungle fighting hint.

"If the enemy fires flares, scouts and troops should close one eye. When the flares are out, the eye they closed can still see things," says another.

THE AUTHORITIES who issued the document refer to themselves as Funk, the liberation forces ordered set up by former Cambo-

dian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk, now in exile in Peking.

The Chinese influence on the Funk (from the French initials for National United Front of Cambodia) is most evident in the document's discussion of the Mao simile of fish and water.

"We must consider the people as the water and the Funk as the fish" the play says. "If we do not want the fish to die or to be dried up we must have water. It means we must know how to behave to build up popularity among the people."

Funk soldiers are encouraged to do jobs for villagers who give them shelter. And if villagers chase out the Communist troops, "do not ill treat them but come back later to explain our cause."

THE PEOPLE MUST also be disciplined, the document cautions. "The motto which the people must always remember and follow is 'know nothing, hear nothing and see nothing,' " it warns.

The Funk's view of past events in Cambodia is similar to the accepted Indochinese Communist point of view:

"For 16 years, the Cambodians were united firmly behind Sihanouk, who made the country prosperous and happy.

"On March 18, 1970, a coup d'etat was launched according to U. S. plan. All progress enjoyed previously by the Khmer people has gradually faded away and killing of each other has begun instead.

"HOPELESS NIXON instructed his valets to set up a coup d'etat under the sponsorship of the CIA. This was to save his face from shameful defeats in Vietnam and Laos."

CIA Has Secret Army Of 100,000, Panel Told

By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency has built clandestine armies numbering 100,000 in Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia, an expert on Southeast Asia told a congressional panel Tuesday.

"It's the CIA's foreign legion," said Fred Branfman, a former member of the International Volunteer Services and a free-lance reporter in Laos.

The armies, controlled and paid for by the CIA, Branfman said, include native tribesmen, Thais, Nationalist Chinese and other Asians. Their job is to harass the population and troops in Communist-controlled areas of Indochina, except North Vietnam. Presumably they would continue their fighting with American supplies and money after American forces are withdrawn, he said.

BRANFMAN'S charges were the closest thing to hard news at the opening of a three-day seminar on the Pentagon papers, sponsored by 17 members of Congress. The generally repetitive discussion showed that the leak of the Pentagon papers themselves is a difficult act to follow.

Rep. John Dow (D., N.Y.), chairman of the three-day event, said that Daniel Ellsberg would join the group today. Ellsberg, one of the authors of the 47-volume study, has acknowledged passing portions of the docu-



Rep. Dow
... heads panel

ment to the press, for which he has been indicted by a federal grand jury.

Only one author of the Pentagon papers, Melvin Gurtov of Santa Monica, appeared at the conference Tuesday. But he added little to what is already known.

GURTOV, WHO last month was forced to resign as a researcher at the Rand Corp. because of his anti-war sentiment and his association with Ellsberg, told the panel that almost no one in government had read the Pentagon papers, including the man who commissioned them, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, until they were published in the press.

He noted, in response to a question, that the Pentagon study shows the intelligence analysts of the CIA, but not the field operatives, "in a good light."

The CIA analysts, he said,

questioned basic assumptions, like the theory that if Vietnam fell to the Communists the rest of Southeast Asia would fall like dominoes. They also criticized the effectiveness of American bombing, Gurtov said.

"But when their reports, like others, challenged basic assumptions," Gurtov said, "they were ignored."

Branfman, talking about the CIA's role in Southeast Asia, said it "exercises functional control of military operations in Laos" and other Southeast Asian countries outside of Vietnam. In Laos it is conducting a campaign of "terrorism" in Communist held areas.

NGO VINH Long, a South Vietnamese now studying at Harvard, said the Pentagon papers disclose that American war planners had no understanding of the Vietnamese people, their aspirations, problems, and nationalism.

"For them the Vietnamese didn't exist except as Communists or anti-Communists," he said.

And he suggested that administrative overtures to mainland China in hopes it would help impose a settlement of the war on North Vietnam indicates that the United States still does not understand that any settlement "must come with the Vietnamese people," by which he meant the Communists and the Saigon regime.

Tran Van Dinh, former South Vietnamese ambassa-

dor to the United States, traced American involvement in his country from May 1854, when Marines landed there to free an imprisoned French missionary.

"I DON'T plead for Americans to understand the Vietnamese," he said. "Americans should understand America first. In 1945, when we thought we won our independence by defeating the Japanese, we believed in this country and that it would help us. Ho Chi Minh had faith in America. But we didn't understand about your Indian wars, and the suppression of the revolts in the Philippines.

"In the past years we have been trying to find out what America is all about, and so far we don't know."

Others at the conference included Anthony Russo, a former Rand employe now facing contempt charges for refusing to testify about the leak of the Pentagon papers; Noam Chomsky, a linguist whose books on American policies helped convert Ellsberg, and David Truong, whose father ran second in the South Vietnamese presidential elections in 1967 and subsequently was imprisoned.

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Make the CIA Accountable

FOR SOME TIME the need has existed to make the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency more accountable to the Congress than has been the case over recent years.

No one argues that the United States does not require some type of intelligence gathering organization. That fact was recognized from the earliest days of our Republic. President Polk, for example, had a showdown with Congress in 1846 about accounting for the funds he used "to employ individuals for the purposes of obtaining information." In the Civil War, the North hired the Pinkerton Agency to expand its intelligence services.

But the CIA today seems to have gone far beyond its original purpose as outlined when it was created in 1947 as a result of the experience of Pearl Harbor. President Truman explained:

"... if there had been something like coordination of information in the government, it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack ... In those days, the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew. The Army and Navy, in fact, had only a very informal arrangement to keep each other informed as to their plans."

There is a feeling now that the CIA is an invisible government -- a law unto itself, engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls. There probably is no isolated part of the world today where CIA agents aren't poking around in another nation's business.

Some of the CIA's activities appear to approach the ridiculous stage at times, such as an illustration recently cited in an address by the agency's own director, Richard Helms. He told how it was vital to the United States to know how deep is the water alongside the docks in Djibouti. Why? Well, Mr. Helms said that if France should one day grant independence to French Somaliland -- now formally the Territory of the Afars and Issas -- the area would almost certainly be a source of contention between Ethiopia, which looks to the United States for support, and Somalia, which is highly dependent


on the Soviet Union. What ships could be used to land a UN peace-keeping force -- or unload relief shipment, according to Mr. Helms, suddenly would become important to the United States. The illustration cited here would lead one to believe the CIA goes looking for trouble.

Of more immediate concern is what the CIA is doing in Laos and Cambodia today. There have been disclosures about how the agency has been promoting and financing a secret war in Laos and training Cambodian troops in Laos in order to circumvent a 1970 congressional amendment cutting off funds for U.S. ground troops or advisers in Cambodia. Unfortunately, the House of Representatives declined recently to approve a resolution requiring the Administration to tell Congress what the military and the CIA are doing in Laos.

There are several proposals now before the Senate, all related to the future operations of the CIA, which we believe deserve the support of that body. Senator John Sherman Cooper has proposed that the CIA be required to make regular and special reports to responsible Senate and House committees; Senator George McGovern would require CIA expenditures and appropriations to appear as a single line item in the budget rather than being hidden in other agency budgets. And Senator Clifford Case would limit the CIA's use of funds and military equipment for fielding foreign troops in Laos or elsewhere without specific approval by Congress.

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8 JUL 1971



C.I.A. Aides Reported Leading Commando Raids in North Laos

The Washington Star

VIENTIANE, Laos, July 7—A secret operation involving commando raiders, some led by employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, is reported under way against the Communist-held Plaine des Jarres in northern Laos.

According to well-informed sources, United States aircraft have been landing on the plain, and one C-123 transport was stranded with its American crew there for a night.

The informants said the commandos had penetrated as far as an airstrip in the east central part of the plain called Lima 22.

United States and Laotian officials here have refused to comment on the reported operation.


[In Washington, State Department officials said they were checking the situation and had no immediate comment.]

One American source said privately that the Meo leader, Gen. Vang Pao, whose C.I.A.-backed forces are based at Long Tieng, southwest of the plain, was "strengthening and improving his defensive position."

Some military sources suggested that the reported operation was being conducted by the Meo base of Bouam Long, north of the plain.

Informants said two Thai battalions and six Meo battalions were involved. The Pathet Lao radio said the operation was being conducted by three regiments of General Vang Pao's forces.

In 1969, a joint United States-Laotian operation took the plain from Communist



The New York Times July 8, 1971

troops briefly but this led to a large North Vietnamese counterstroke, which drove the Meos back and almost resulted in the fall of Long Tieng.

Cambodian Plan Said to End

PNOMPENH, Cambodia, July 7 (UPI)—The United States has abandoned its secret program of training regular Cambodian troops on Laos, United States sources said today, but is continuing to train Cambodian guerrillas.

The sources said that the program, financed by the Central Intelligence Agency, ended last month when a 500-man Cambodian army battalion wound up a three-month training course in the Laotian panhandle.

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Typhoon Wanes; B-52 Raids Resume

From News Dispatches

SAIGON, July 8 (Thursday) —American B-52 bombers resumed bombing near the Demilitarized Zone in South Vietnam last night and this morning after having been kept away from the area for one day by rough weather from Typhoon Harriet, military sources said.

But U.S. battle communiques showed the lull in enemy attacks against American ground forces continuing. There have been no Communist ground attacks on GIs anywhere in Vietnam since just after midnight Monday, when a rocket barrage killed five American soldiers and wounded more than 30 at the Danang air base.

Military sources said the north Vietnamese army kept a trickle of supplies moving down the trail system in Laos. But fewer than 200 truck movements were detected Tuesday night compared with well over 2,000 at the height of the dry season.

Meanwhile, military sources said battlefield action in South Vietnam dropped to one of the lowest levels in the war last week.

News agencies reported these other developments:

- In Phnom Penh, American sources said the United States had ended its secret program of training regular Cambodian troops in Laos, but are continuing to train Cambodian guerrillas.

- U.S. officials declined to say how many Cambodian troops were trained by the CIA, but other sources put the number at "several thousand."

- Capt. Ernest L. Medina, accused of murdering 102 South Vietnamese civilians in the 1969 My lai massacre, flew into the U.S. airbase at Bien-Hoa near Saigon with his army lawyer, Capt. Mark J. Kadish.

Maj. William Eckhardt, the Army prosecutor at Medina's court-martial set for July 26, wanted to question two South Vietnamese army sergeants in connection with the case and asked Medina and his attorney to accompany him to South Vietnam.

- In Paris, France indicated today it played some kind of behind-the-scenes role in bringing about the latest Vietcong peace initiative on Vietnam.

At the weekly cabinet meeting Foreign Minister Maurice Schuman noted that the peace formula presented by the Vietcong contained new elements favorable to a solution of the war.

Senator Would Bar CIA From Combat

Case Seeks To Prevent Secret Wars Fought By Agency Behind Congress's Back

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, June 19—Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) announced today that he intends to introduce legislation to prevent the CIA from secretly engaging in military operations.

The legislation will be drafted as amendments to the foreign aid authorization bill, which is expected to reach the Senate floor next month. The series of amendments would:

1. Extend congressional restrictions on the use of Defense Department funds overseas to all government agencies, including the CIA.

Specific Authorization

2. Prohibit any U.S. government agency from financing military operations abroad without specific congressional authorization.

3. Extend the existing limitations on the use by the Defense Department of surplus arms to all government agencies.

Mr. Case said he did not believe his proposal would completely cut off the executive branch's ability to wage secret wars, but said he was approaching the matter "piecemeal" because he did not believe Congress was ready to pass more comprehensive legislation.

The reluctance of Congress to assert its full authority was demonstrated, he said, by the defeat in both houses earlier this week of legislation to impose a deadline for total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina.

Foreign Mercenaries

The House, in fact, also rejected by a 172-to-46 vote an amendment similar to what Senator Case is proposing. The defeated amendment would have prevented the CIA from using Defense Department funds for conducting "paramilitary" operations or hiring foreign mercenaries to fight in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.

Representative F. Edward Hebert (D., La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, opposed the amendment, saying its enactment would be "very dangerous to the security of our country."

Mr. Hebert, as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is one of a handful of congressmen who have access to information pertaining to the CIA.

While all CIA operations are officially secret, there have been numerous newspaper reports as well as statements by congressmen and senators on the agency's operations in Southeast Asia.

The most publicized activity of the CIA has been its operations in Laos, where the agency reportedly has equipped and trained a secret army of Meo tribesmen and now is supporting Thai mercenaries to fight there.

Without disclosing his sources, Mr. Case also suggested that the CIA is financing Cambodian troops in Laos as well as Thai troops in Cambodia.

He said he has also received reports that the CIA has relatively unrestricted use of surplus arms in its covert military operations.

Only Following Orders

"I do not direct criticism against the CIA," Mr. Case said, "for it has only been following orders issued by several Presidents. I simply question whether a secret intelligence organization should be assigned a war-making role abroad. Certainly this was not the intent of Congress when it originally voted to establish the CIA."

The rationale behind secret military and paramilitary operations is that the United States should have some means of militarily protecting its interests abroad, short of engaging in open warfare.

Mr. Case said that while he agreed that secret operations might in certain instances be useful he felt they were incompatible with "an open system of government."

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Election 'Arrangement' in Vietnam Was Disclosed a Decade Ago

While the classic battle for Americans to know what their government is doing was being waged—the government v. The New York Times—the Justice Department sought to stop the Washington Post from printing its reports on what went on in Vietnam during the Eisenhower years.

The Post pieces are echoes. Read, for example, Edgar Snow's "The Other Side of the River," published 10 years ago. Snow's chapter seven, "War and Peace in Vietnam," recounts the break-up of the Geneva conference, State Secretary John Foster Dulles' rush off to Saigon to arrange for the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, and subsequent "postponement of the elections."

A part of the cease-fire terms, ending the French rule in Vietnam, was an exchange of residents under supervision and free elections. The charge was made at the time, probably with a good deal of truth, that the north sent thousands of people southward to stack the elections. At any rate, Snow wrote: "It shortly became apparent that the electoral arrangements were to be sabotaged, however, by a de facto United States military alliance with Ngo Dinh Diem, an ex-royalist violently opposed to unification with the D.R.V. (Democratic Republic of Vietnam). . . ."

"Using SEATO as a facade (but without any authorization from other members to do so) Mr. Dulles' envoys urged military assistance on both Cambodia and Laos. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia quickly halted the infiltration and reasserted his complete neutrality, after he discovered the inten-

tions of Central Intelligence Agency operatives functioning under the direction of John Foster Dulles' brother Allen. (So did Burma.) . . ."

Again, Snow writes: "After United States intervention in South Vietnam and repudiation of the election agreement in 1956, the international commission (Poland, Canada, India) dissolved itself in disgust."

Pentagon papers seem to confirm Snow's decade-old views, for which he was roundly criticized at the time. Eisenhower was candid enough to concede that the North would have won the election at that time. Rationale was that we were battling spreading communism.

Time has shown that far too many political-diplomatic decisions in the embryonic days of the war were not what the public assumed them to be, based on official policy statements. That's what the furor is about now, though it's puzzling to understand the Nixon administration's edgy concern about the disclosures from official sources. Our hope is that this dose of unvarnished truth will do some good.

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the opening of the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam in the first half of 1965. Except where excerpting is indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Letter From Rostow Favoring Commitment of Troops by U.S.

Personal letter from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dispositions and Political Signals."

Following on our conversation of last night I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we wish to send.

The signal consists of three parts:

a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 accords;

b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage;

c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if they are so minded.

Four points follow.

1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a US ground force commitment of some kind:

a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sit during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.

b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; and, therefore the possibility of radically extending their position on the ground at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out.

c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two moves ahead; namely, they might be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected US retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack.

2. The first critical military action against North Vietnam should be designed merely to install the principle that they will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to re-attack in the north for continued violations for the 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words, we would signal a shift from the prin-

spense. This means that the initial use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as possible. It is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for tat.

3. But our force dispositions to accompany an initial retaliatory move against the north should send three further signals lucidly:

a. that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up direct and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required;

b. that we are prepared to face down any form of escalation North Vietnam might mount on the ground; and

c. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the form of increased aircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sitting off China distinguished from the force in the South China Sea.

4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions without raising seriously the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to land immediately in the Red River Delta, in China; or seek any other objective than the re-installation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

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1. We
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appreciation of the view in Hanoi and
Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem.
I agree almost completely with SNIE
10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the criti-
cal passages:

"While they will seek to exploit and encourage the deteriorating situation in Saigon, they probably will avoid actions that would in their view unduly increase the chances of a major US response against North Vietnam (DRV) or Communist China. We are almost certain that both Hanoi and Peiping are anxious not to become involved in the kind of war in which the great weight of superior US weaponry could be brought against them. Even if Hanoi and Peiping estimated that the US would not use nuclear weapons against them, they could not be sure of this. . . .

"In the face of new US pressures against the DRV, further actions by Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a considerable extent on their estimate of US intentions, i.e., whether the US was actually determined to increase its pressures as necessary. Their estimates on this point are probably uncertain, but we believe that fear of provoking severe measures by the US would lead them to temper their responses with a good deal of caution. . . .

"If despite Communist efforts, the US attacks continued, Hanoi's leaders would have to ask themselves whether it was not better to suspend their support of Viet Cong military action rather than suffer the destruction of their major military facilities and the industrial sector of their economy. In the belief that the war has become most irreversibly in their favor in South Vietnam, they might

Continues

17 JUN 1971

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's history of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 1964, to February, 1965, the period in which the bombing of North Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Rusk Cable to Embassy in Laos On Search and Rescue Flights

Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the United States Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug. 26, 1964. A copy of this message was sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing Americans, Thais and Lao. You are also hereby granted as requested discretionary authority to use AA pilots in T-28's for SAR operations when you consider this indispensable rpt indispensable to success of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever situation permits.

At same time, we believe time has come to review scope and control arrangements for T-28 operations extending into future. Such a review is especially indicated view fact that these operations more or less automatically impose demands for use of US personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increased AA capability clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not

be desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize T-28 operations are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna's position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of operations and-or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible extension T-28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septel.)

On central problem our understanding is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Command Center with [word illegible] in effective control, but that this not true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm control.

Request your evaluation and recommendations as to future scope T-28 operations and your comments as to whether our impressions present control structure correct and whether steps could be taken to tighten this.

and that such preconditionference. Queitorial gains vided they c practice bro equilibrium no longer n Lao withdra tion to 14-n fact though curred to So is also touc to Butler (Souvanna a PDJ withdr evitably ins gains, and arrangemen present fa division. I were to be best be don it might be used by Souvanna as bargaining counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that he attend conference as head of Laotian Government. Remaining condition would be cease-fire. While under present conditions cease-fire might not be of net advantage to Souvanna—we are thinking primarily of T-28 operations—Pathet Lao would no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could press for effective ICC policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of importance in upcoming period.

3. Above is written with thought in mind that Polish proposals [one word illegible] effectively collapsed and that pressures continue for Geneva [word illegible] conference and will no doubt be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRV naval attacks. Conference on Laos might be useful safety valve for these generalized pressures while at same time providing some deterrent to escalation of hostilities on that part of the "front." We would insist that conference be limited to Laos and believe that it could in fact be so limited, if necessary by our withdrawing from the conference room if any other subject brought up, as we did in 1961-62. Side discussions on other topics could not be avoided but we see no great difficulty with this; venue for informal corridor discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicoms could be valuable at this juncture.

4. In considering this course of action, key initial question is of course whether Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdrawal precondition and whether, if he did, he could maintain himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about

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Rusk Query to Vientiane Embassy On Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire

Cablegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the United States Embassy in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, with a request for comment, to the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Moscow, Phnompenh and Hong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the mission at the United Nations.

1. As pointed out in your 219, our objective in Laos is to stabilize the situation again, if possible within framework of the 1962 Geneva settlement. Essential to stabilization would be establishment of military equilibrium. Moreover, we have some concern

that recent RLG successes and reported low PL morale may lead to some escalation from Communist side, which we do not now wish to have to deal with.

2. Until now, Souvanna's and our position would require Pathet Lao withdrawal from areas seized in PDJ since May 15

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIET STUDY

Following are the texts of key documents from the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam situation from December, 1963, through the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964, and its aftermath. Except where indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, typographical errors corrected.

McNamara Report to Johnson On the Situation in Saigon in '63

Memorandum, "Vietnam Situation," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.

In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.

(and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.

As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate forces to recapture the remaining government-controlled areas and work out from there.

1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.

2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving little or no direction because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A specific example of the present situation is that General [name illegible] is spending little or no time commanding III Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs full-time direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has, of course, been stressed to him both by Dean Rusk and myself

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In recent months, General Harkins still hopes these areas may be made reasonably secure by the latter half of next year.

In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on the government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for cross-border operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would not be politically acceptable or even militarily effective. A more realistic approach would be immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and this we are preparing on an urgent basis.

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12 JUN 1971

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Americans Are Barred From Spy Raids in Laos

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 11 — The Nixon Administration has decided that Americans will no longer be permitted to enter southern Laos as leaders of teams keeping watch on enemy movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail network.

Before the South Vietnamese drive into Laos in February and March, Americans had been assigned to such missions. But they were then barred for fear an embarrassing incident might arise that would appear to contradict President Nixon's pledge that no American military men would be involved in ground combat in that Laotian campaign.

Well-placed Nixon Administration sources said that plans to resume the use of Americans on trail-watching teams after the South Vietnamese drive ended had been vetoed by officials at the White House and the Pentagon. The informants said that the decision had been made partly because of growing Congressional criticism of American military activity in Laos and partly because all military missions are being turned over to the South Vietnamese as the United States disengages from the war.

Officials conceded that the enemy's infiltration activities has gone down recently as small teams made up of South Vietnamese and of Montagnard tribesmen have taken over the trail-watching missions. But they said there were other means of collecting information, among them aerial reconnaissance and special sensors planted along the trail.

American participation in the missions had come under a secret military unit known officially as the Studies and Observation Group. Established in 1964 as a joint venture of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army, it has been

involved not only in watching trails but also in attempts at rescuing prisoners and other highly sensitive missions in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam.

After a closed-door briefing of the Senate earlier this week, Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, declared, "Our activities in Laos have been carried out largely in secret, without Congressional sanction and outside the normal appropriations process."

Air Strikes a Factor

The main focus of Congressional concern has been American support of Thais and Laotian tribesmen who, led by Americans working for the Central Intelligence Agency, have been conducting both combat and surveillance missions against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in Laos. Extensive American air strikes throughout Laos have also been cited as a source of concern.

When the Studies and Observation Group was established, it was intended primarily for missions in and around North Vietnam.

Some of its teams are known to have slipped into North Vietnamese waters in fast boats to kidnap fishermen, who were brought to South Vietnam for interrogation on conditions in the North and then released. Other teams made up of refugees from North Vietnam were occasionally sent back by helicopter on spy or sabotage missions.

All such operations required advanced approval in Washington, the informants said.

In 1966, the unit was also authorized to watch trails and to spot targets for American bombers. The informants said that these tasks were undertaken by the Army alone, without C.I.A. participation. In late 1966 or early 1967, similar activity reportedly was extended to include Cambodia, again

without the participation of C.I.A.

Although the size of the trail-watching teams varied, a typical unit consisted of nine men—three Americans and six Vietnamese or Montagnard tribesmen. At the height of this activity, there were as many as 30 teams assigned to the Laos mission, but usually no more than two or three would be operating at any one time. The missions were said to have lasted from several hours to several days.

Information was sent by radio to a special aircraft flying along the border for relay to Air Force units and intelligence centers in South Vietnam.

According to the informants, the teams operated no more than about 20 to 30 miles inside Laos. Any watching of trails beyond that point, it was said, was assigned to special guerrilla units organized in Laos by the C.I.A.

Pentagon and other sources said that with the start of the South Vietnamese thrust into Laos, the leaders of the Studies and Observation Group were told that the Administration did not want to risk the embarrassment that would result from the capture of soldiers on an intelligence mission in Laos, even though, strictly speaking, they would not have been involved in combat.

'Still Has Some Missions'

After the South Vietnamese pulled out of Laos, the group, which has headquarters in Saigon, circulated a memorandum saying that it planned to resume its trail-watching activities. When the memorandum reached Washington, the group was told that the watching of trails would be carried out exclusively by the South Vietnamese.

"While the group's teams are under specific orders not to get involved in fighting," one officer said, "their job is to move in and out undetected. There are times when they have been discovered and have had to exchange fire with the enemy as helicopters came in to take them out."

The Studies and observation Group, it was reported, is not being disbanded at this point. "It still has some missions," an official said.

He added that the group could still be called upon to stage rescue attempts while American prisoners remain in Southeast Asia. He refused to discuss any other missions.

STATINTL

3 MAY 1971

Battles rage nearer Cambodian capital

Daily World Combined Services

Battles erupted yesterday all around the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. A Lon Nol government spokesman said fighting was raging at Ancheng pagoda, 10 miles northeast of Phnom Penh.

At Kompong Chamlang, 15 miles northeast of the city, two battalions of CIA mercenaries, the "Khmer Krom," or ethnic Cambodians from South Vietnam, were reported surrounded by National United Front patriotic forces and under mortar and rocket bombardment. Just before their communications with Phnom Penh cut off, the Khmer Krom reported survivors were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting and trying to fall back.

U.S. military spokesmen said yesterday that when the NUF took Snuol from Saigon forces, huge stocks of ammunition and equipment were lost.

They said U.S. air strikes on Snuol, about 50 miles northwest of Saigon and just inside Cambodia, destroyed about 60 vehicles and eight artillery pieces but did not say how much equipment was left intact.

Lon Nol army reinforcements in the Ancheng pagoda area were said to be "moving very slowly because of heavy fire." The Lon Nol regime's spokesman, Lt.-Col. Am Rong, said he thought NUF

forces were taking up positions all around Phnom Penh because monsoon rains due soon will make U.S. air support difficult. He added that already many Lon Nol army positions can only be supplied by parachute drop.

The NUF forces surrounding Phnom Penh, he said, included at least one rocket battalion, which means the city is threatened with rocket bombardment.

In Paris yesterday, the peace talks delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared that President Nixon's press conference statement Tuesday night "further proves that he is distorting the truth, talking of a sham peace but making real war; speaking of respect for the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination but ceaselessly trampling underfoot this right."

The prisoners issue, the DRV said, was a Nixon pretext "for not ending the war of aggression in South Vietnam and for not fixing a deadline for the total repatriation of U.S. forces."

In reality, the fraudulent nature of the "prisoners" issue

brought up by the Nixon Administration becomes clear when the 1949 Geneva Convention on War Prisoners is studied. Article III, Paragraph 118, clearly states that POW repatriation "shall take place without delay after the cessation of active hostilities."

The official International Red Cross commentary on the 1949 POW Convention says that this means prisoners will be released "after the cease-fire," since often a great length of time elapses between a cease-fire and the signing of a peace treaty. There is no provision in international law for the release of POWs before a cease-fire or the actual end of hostilities, except for: 1) severely wounded POWs or those seriously ill; 2) POWs who are paroled and who are legally bound not to engage in military activities for the duration of the conflict by Article 117 of the Convention.

The "prisoners" issue would therefore seem to exist only because Nixon has not brought hostilities to an end by agreeing to a definite withdrawal date or cease-fire.

Survivor tells how Lon Nol regime slew 2,000 in Cambodia

General Lon Nol and a pro-U.S. clique seized power in Cambodia by a coup on March 18, 1970. The Lon Nol regime attacked Cambodia's minority of Vietnamese, who were largely peaceful fishermen and plantation workers and 90 percent Roman Catholic. Later reports indicated that Lon Nol was deliberately trying to stir up anti-Vietnamese chauvinism in an attempt to stay in power. It was also revealed that Lon Nol carried out his coup with the military help of "Khmer Krom," ethnic Cambodians from South Vietnam, who had been trained and organized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and who were infiltrated into Cambodia.

The following report shows what Lon Nol and his CIA backers did to implement their policy less than a month after they seized power.

— Daily World Foreign Department

NEW YORK, June 1 (UPI) — Cambodian soldiers rounded up some 3,000 Vietnamese and killed them by shooting them in the back on an isolated sand dune near the Mekong River in Cambodia on April 12, 1970, according to a correspondent for Look Magazine. Denis Warner, who based in Asia for Look, said he was informed of the slaughter by Licu Van Tam a 69-year-old Vietnamese fisherman, who was one of 23 survivors. He said Van Tam told him that all of the victims were men and boys from the Roman Catholic community in Phnom Penh.

Van Tam said he escaped with only a bullet crease in his skull by feigning death with two dead compatriots lying on top of him.

A knock on the door

Van Tam told Warner the incident began "when I heard a knock on the door, I went outside. Immediately, the soldiers grabbed me and took me away. First they told me to lie on the ground with the other men that they had taken."

"Then," Warner said Van Tam told him, "they told us to stand up with our hands over our heads. Anyone who didn't, the soldiers said, would be shot."

The Vietnamese were herded aboard two Cambodian landing

craft and taken to Con Trung, about 30 miles south of the Cambodian capital.

At about 9 a.m., the hostages were tied with their hands behind their backs and marched "along the sand dunes where the soldiers were waiting with rifles, Warner reported.

"At the sound of a whistle," the survivor related to Warner, "the soldiers shot them down."

Shot in the back

According to Warner, Van Tam said the Vietnamese were shot in the back. He said the 3,000 executions took a very long time, since the Cambodians had only 20 rifles.

Van Tam told Warner he and about 27 others survived.

"I fell with two dead men on me," Van Tam told Warner. "I lay there, not moving. I did not dare move."

Warner said Van Tam told him he left when he heard the firing stop and the boats leave. Van Tam said he was captured with the other survivors on the outskirts of Phnom Penh and placed in a concentration camp before being deported to Vietnam.

At the time of the reported massacre, hundreds of Vietnamese nationals were found dead floating down the Mekong River into Vietnam from Cambodia.

Behind Phnom Penh's musical

By Charles Meyer
Pacific News Service

Lon Nol's recent abdication of power in Phnom Penh has once again brought into the spotlight the man whom the CIA has long sought to impose upon Cambodia. Only three months after the coup of March 1970 which overthrew Prince Norodom Sihanouk, most politicians in the Cambodian capital were predicting a short term for Premier Lon Nol, and naming as his probable successor Son Ngoc Thanh.

Son was born Dec. 7, 1908 in Ky Ja, South Vietnam, of a Cambodian father and a Vietnamese mother. After attending a French high school, he moved to Phnom Penh in 1937; a functionary in the government there. The same year he started a nationalist group which published the first native language journal, Nagaravatta (Land of the Pagodas).

In 1941, French Indochina, still technically ruled by the Vichy government, granted the use of military facilities to the Japanese, in exchange for maintaining French sovereignty over Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Son immediately became an active collaborator with the Japanese Black Dragon Society, which aimed at overthrowing the French. On the verge of arrest by French authorities in the summer of 1942, Son fled to Tokyo.

With defeat imminent, the Japanese abolished the colonial administration in March 1945 and imprisoned all French citizens in Cambodia. A month later Son appeared in Phnom Penh as a Japanese captain and became minister in charge of relations with the Japanese command. On Aug. 10 a palace revolt inspired by Son and supported by the Kempetai (Japanese police) forced Sihanouk, then king, to confer upon Son the office of prime minister.

Following the collapse of Japanese power, Sihanouk on Oct. 8 secretly delegated a cabinet minister to go to Saigon for the avowed purpose of discussing "certain questions" with the French command. A week later French Gen. Leclerc arrived in Phnom Penh and arrested Son. He was put in the Saigon jail and then sentenced to forced labor for collaborating with the Japanese. Soon, he was sent to France and put under house arrest.

After several royal interventions, Son was pardoned in October 1951. He returned to Phnom Penh on the agreement that he would abstain from all political activities. He refused the ministerial portfolio Sihanouk offered to him, but within a

few weeks—encouraged by several prominent Americans—he revealed clear political intentions. Early in 1952 he began publishing Khmer Krauk (Cambodians Awake!), violating his repatriation agreement with the French. By March he fled the city to rejoin an underground resistance band in northwest Siemreap province. He had, there, only a few hundred men and a radio transmitter. His broadcasts called upon the population to rise up and overthrow colonial rule under the French.

Joins with the CIA

In November 1953, Sihanouk's efforts at influencing the French paid off and Cambodia was granted formal independence. Son tried to gain some control in the new regime at Phnom Penh. Unsuccessful, he returned to the armed band in the northwest, where defections during his absence had weakened the ranks severely. His political constituency gone, in the wake of French maneuverings, Son was forced to ally himself with the CIA. In January 1956 the final blow was struck, as government troops attacked his camp near the Thai border killing 108 men and destroying the radio station. Son and a few men escaped and entered the service of the CIA in Bangkok.

Although his movement—now known as the Khmer Serai (Free Cambodia)—had been crushed, the CIA revived it steadily and built it into an army of 5000 ethnic Cambodians. Most of these men were recruited from Cambodians living in Thailand and South Vietnam. The mercenary army was based on Thai territory, from which it launched sabotage missions. Son became a front for these operations and plots, mounted jointly by the CIA and U.S. Army Intelligence in Bangkok and Saigon, against Sihanouk and Cambodian neutrality.

The Khmer Serai, transformed into the "National Liberation Front of Cambodia" (sic), announced on May 15, 1970 its support for the regime which grew out of the coup under Gen. Lon Nol. Son, however, secretly entered the capital as his supporters began to prepare for a return to power. Lon Nol, who had the full backing of the Pentagon, wasn't about to step down for the CIA's man. Son had to settle for the post of principal advisor to the premier.

But Cambodian public opinion remains very unfavorable to Son. The urban youth is violently hostile to him. He therefore continues to live in Saigon, where he has the solid support of the South Vietnamese puppets and the entourage of U.S. Ambassador Bunker. More importantly, he enjoys the loyalty of the Cambodian armies trained by American Special Forces units, who consider him a "spiritual father." Son has also renewed his ties with the Japanese groups which carried him to power in 1945. Representatives from Tokyo consult him on their Indochinese political and economic questions.

Son Ngoc Thanh wants to redeem the defeats that impeded his political life, and now anxiously awaits his hour. The CIA, which has backed Son for fifteen years, will be happy to make good his losses.


Charles Meyer was editor-in-chief of the magazine Etudes Cambodgiennes (Cambodian Studies) and Nokor Khmer. From 1957 through 1970 he was a counselor to the cabinet of Sihanouk and continued as such to Lon Nol until June 1970.

How 250 Spied on Reds for Month Told

BY ROSEN MANNOCK
Associated Press Writer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — Twelve-man teams of Cambodian spy troops, trained by American Central Intelligence Agency personnel at an undercover base in Laos, successfully infiltrated deep into Communist territory in Cambodia two months ago, reliable Western sources in Phnom Penh report.

The sources said about 20 intelligence teams of a dozen men each were flown last March from a base near Pakse in southern Laos to secret landing zones in Rattanakiri, Stung Treng and Preah Vihear provinces in northern Cambodia. The entire region has been con-



Marshal Lon Nol gave permission

trolled by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces since early last summer.

The sources said the Cambodian spy teams were flown aboard helicopters from the U.S. air base at Udorn, Thailand. American pilots and crewmen in uniform were aboard some of the aircraft, the sources said.

OTHER helicopters were manned by Thai crews, according to the sources. Thai and American aircraft were also used to keep the teams supplied with food, including American C-rations. American and Thai helicopters per-

etrated the enemy-held region to pick up a number of Vietnamese soldiers captured by the Cambodians.

The helicopters returned after a month to bring the intelligence agents out, and the teams are now located in territory controlled by the Cambodian government, the sources said.

Some details of the accounts were confirmed by U.S. officials, but these officials said they had not been informed of the full extent of the infiltration teams' activities.

The sources gave this account:

IN JULY 1970, about 250 young Cambodians were selected from volunteers of the 15th Brigade, commanded by Lt. Col. Lon Nol, younger brother of Cambodia's ailing government leader, Marshal Lon Nol.

All those picked had completed the equivalent of the ninth grade. Many were students and all were eager to fight the Vietnamese invaders.

The soldiers were flown to Pakse and at a camp nearby underwent eight months of training. Americans in civilian clothes who lived in Pakse supervised their instruction in map reading, radio communications, explosives, first aid, coordination of air drops and other activities.

Discipline was strict, with minor lapses punished by solitary confinement.

The Americans who trained them did not reveal for whom they worked, but the Cambodians were told by their interpreters that the

PERMISSION to train Cambodians in Laos was obtained from Prince Boun Oum, former rightist premier who rules southern Laos largely independent of the Royal Laotian government in Vientiane.

According to one source, agreement to train Cambodian soldiers in Laos was arranged by Lon Nol, possibly through his brother. Lon Nol is believed to have made at least one visit to Laos last summer, and Boun Oum flew to Phnom Penh on one or more occasions.

The sources said the Cambodian intelligence teams were trained alongside a force known as the "White Scarves" made up of ethnic Cambodians from South Vietnam as well as Cambodians from Cambodia.

Despite Cambodia's desperate need for elite troops with specialized training such as that given to the White Scarves, the Western sources said they were used to fighting for the Bolovens Plateau in the heart of Boun Oum's territory. The White Scarves are still in Laos, according to the sources.

BEFORE being flown to their zone of operations in northeast Cambodia last March, the intelligence teams were given North Vietnamese uniforms. This ruse was intended to fool the local Khmer Loeu, hill tribesmen whose loyalty to Phnom Penh was then suspect. The disguise was not expected to fool North Vietnamese units; for one thing, the Cambodians were armed with U.S. M16 automatic rifles, rather than the Communists' AK47.

The teams were under orders to avoid head-on clashes with the enemy. Their mission was to spy on North

Vietnamese and Viet Cong troop and supply movements and send back information about the northeastern provinces.

One team came upon an enemy camp in Rattanakiri province, near where the Ho Chi Minh Trail runs through Cambodia. The team called for air strikes which plastered the camp with napalm and caused heavy casualties. But the bombs also alerted the enemy, and soon after Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's ousted former head of state, singled out Lon Nol's 15th Brigade for an especially strong attack in one of his broadcasts over Peking Radio.

THE AGENTS were considered highly successful for beginners. According to one source, the force of some 250 men lost only two men, one to enemy fire and one to malaria.

But the teams reportedly had leadership problems during the month they spent inside enemy territory, and as a result they have been receiving special additional training.

Where they will be dropped next is not known.

NEW YORK TIMES

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27 MAY 1971

**CAMBODIAN FORAYS
BY SPIES REPORTED**

PNOMPENH, Cambodia, May 26 (AP)—Twelve-man teams of Cambodian troops, trained by Central Intelligence Agency personnel at a base in Laos, successfully infiltrated deep into Communist-held territory in Cambodia two months ago, according to Western sources here.

The sources said about 20 such intelligence teams were flown last March from a base near Pakse in southern Laos to

secret landing zones in Rattanakiri, Stung Trong and Preah Vihear provinces in northern Cambodia. The entire region has been controlled by North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces since early last month. The teams were said to have returned after a month.

The sources said the Cambodians were flown aboard helicopters from the United States air base at Udorn, Thailand. American pilots and crewmen in uniform were aboard some of the aircraft, the sources stated.

Other helicopters were manned by Thai crews, according to the sources.

Green Beret Claims Role In Plot to Oust Sihanouk


NORFOLK, Va., May 22 (AP)—A Green Beret officer says he took part in a secret mission in 1967 designed to aid in the overthrow of Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot reported in its Sunday editions.

Capt. John McCarthy, 28, who said today he will resign his Army commission in August, said the clandestine operation in Cambodia was directed from South Vietnam by the Central Intelligence Agency, the paper reported.

The mission was known as "Operation Cherry," the paper said, and involved McCarthy, working under cover, and members of the Khmer Serai, a society of Cambodians working to oust Sihanouk.

The Pentagon today denied any knowledge of "Operation Cherry."

McCarthy served two years in a federal prison for the murder of a Cambodian mercenary before his conviction was overturned by a military court of appeals. Reached at home in Arizona Saturday, he



CAPT. JOHN MCCARTHY JR.
... alleges CIA operation

refused to elaborate on the newspaper article.

Asked if it was far-fetched to say Cambodians may have been hired for "Operation Cherry," McCarthy said, "No." But he refused further comment. He is now stationed at Ft. Huachuca, Ariz.

Sihanouk was ousted by a Cambodian army coup in March 1970, about a month before American South Vietnamese troops entered the country to hit Communist supply bases.

The U.S. government has consistently denied having anything to do with Sihanouk's downfall.

McCarthy said he is leaving the Army because the government had suppressed defense evidence at his trial.

"I have come to the conclusion that loyalty, silence and faith were to no avail," the Virginian-Pilot quoted him as saying.

E - 219,140

S - 316,275

MAY 19 1971

STATINTL

No Punishment, Newsman Writes

POW Respected by Commies

By WILLIAM THEIS
Chief News American
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — One year after his "40 days with the enemy" as a captive in Cambodia, Washington correspondent Richard Dudman is able to say of the Communist guerrillas who were his guards:

"Where their brand of morality and ethics affected us most directly was that they always respected our rights. We were never coerced or even asked to write or say anything we

considered untrue, nor were we asked to sign anything formulated by anyone else."

Questioned at great length until the "enemy" was satisfied that Dudman and his two journalist companions were not CIA agents—yes. Raced, sometimes blindfolded, from jungle shack to village hut to escape Vietnamese and American troops—yes.

THREATENED, TOO, at the outset by villagers angry at American invaders.

But Dudman's story makes clear that his hardships were not those of punishment. His captors suffered the same poor food, illnesses and brushes with death as he.

Dudman is Washington bureau chief of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. He had been writing about the Indochina war for a decade when he and his companions, Elizabeth (Beth) Pond of the Christian Science Monitor and Mike Morrow of Dispatch News Service International were captured on the highway between Saigon and Phnom Penh.

It was just six days after President Nixon had announced that U.S. and South Vietnamese forces had moved into Cambodia to destroy Communist sanctuaries near the frontier.

DUDMAN IN HIS new book, "40 Days with the Enemy" (Liveright), published today, recalled that he and his friends were "unmilitary" in appearance—carrying no arms and wearing what amounted to western sport clothes.

"Beyond that, we all had been personally opposed to the Vietnam war for a long time," the balding, 52-year-old Dudman wrote. "I am optimistic by nature and felt elated at the prospect of getting my first look at the other side of a war I had been writing about for 10 years."

He got the look, and with it scares from low-sweeping U.S. helicopters, one early blow on the head, a serious tropical disease that hit him after his return to Washington.

HIS FIRST SHOCK came, however, when the captured trio was being raced blindfolded away from a village near where they had been taken prisoner. Dudman, remembering the Communist massacre at Hue, was "certain that the same thing was going to happen to us." He recalled:

"The thought did not frighten me so much as it puzzled and disappointed me. I thought to myself: 'I'm right in the midst of my life. There are so many things I still want to do. Now it looks as if the whole thing will be over in the next minute or two.'"

All he got then was a knock on the head, and many questions. His Vietnamese interrogator told him:

"**IF YOU ARE** truly international journalists you will be released. If you are agents of the CIA, you will be treated according to the law of the country... The Cambodian people do not know that there are good as well as bad Americans. They know only the

tanks and planes of American imperialism. So you are not safe among the Cambodians."

The "task force" that was in charge of Dudman, Morrow and Miss Pond included "two experienced Vietnamese soldiers, a Cambodian defector, a Vietnamese-Chinese Cambodian with limited experience," and Anh Hai, a veteran revolutionary and political leader of the enemy group.

DUDMAN FIRST found trust in the enemy when at one point Anh Ba, the military leader, dropped his loaded pistol and ammunition belt into the reporter's lap when he got out of their land rover during a roadside stop. "We had come a long way from having rifles pointed at our heads that first afternoon," Dudman wrote.

Before their release, the American trio had to write a formal statement on their experience for the Communists and agreed to make a tape recording of their feelings. Hai admitted the latter was for later broadcast use but added, according to Dudman, "only after we know that you are safe."

THE COMMUNISTS turned down small token farewell presents, except for a set of crude chessmen Dudman had carved during their captivity. They gave the three about \$50 in local money, so they would "not be stranded" on the way back to Saigon.

Then, after a final banquet of dog, and one false start interrupted by a storm, they dropped the reporters in the moonlight at a village on Cambodia's Route 1.

Back in Washington, Dudman's concern was for other newsmen still in the hands of the Communists. He advised U.S. officials not to use military or diplomatic pressure for their release, rather private groups of foreign intermediaries. He concluded that the "good sense" of that advice was "well understood at the State Department."

13 MAY 67



*"Don't get sick . . . there is nothing
we can do"*

By KATE WEBB

United Press International

The frankness of our captors amazed and puzzled me. Toshiichi Suzuki of Nihon Denpa News and I both requested interviews and it was we who subsequently ran out of questions. The Vietnamese never tired of talking. It indicated, I personally concluded, the confidence which they kept expressing that public opinion was on their side thruout the world. Thru the interviews and chats with guards, as well as what we saw, we obtained a glimpse of what has puzzled the world—how and why they fight.

We spent two weeks in a place we called Phum Kasat (Press Village.) It seemed to be some kind of transient camp, a collection of thatched roof "hootches" (huts) scattered under thickets of trees between two villages. We were confined to two small huts, one built on the second day when it became obvious the six of us were too cramped in the first.

They put Suzuki and me in one hootch, the Cambodians in the other. There was a manger-type wooden water trough, small bamboo table, hammocks and mosquito nets. We were permitted to walk only to a "squat-hole" type toilet about 50 yards away through some trees at the rear. A lean-to bath house, with a crock of water filled only three times before we were released, backed onto the small hut Suzuki and I shared on those interminably long days and nights.

We had no idea why we were there or for how long. We sometimes lost track of the days and never saw our faces in a mirror. I made a crude sun dial out of a stick in the ground. We gauged when our twice daily meals would come by when the cows from the east village walked past.

HALF A SHELL OF WINE

The monotony was broken only during our conversations with the officers and casual chats with our guards. Otherwise, it was nightly Radio Hanoi broadcasts, rising before dawn for exercises and speculating on the movements of the villagers and 20 or so military personnel in the camp.

One night the guards gave Suzuki and me half a coconut shell filled with rank, fiery rice wine. It was the only night we slept well. One day we saw them pull a motorcycle out of a haystack. There were days we huddled in a



bunker while U.S. "Cobra" helicopter gunships and "slicks" (Hueys) circled overhead. Sweating, we were aware that the black pajamas they had provided for me and the green uniforms given the men would identify us as part of the communist outfit if ever there was an attack.

There were daily visits from the camp doctor, a cheerful young kid with a shock of black hair who lanced my feet and cleaned Moonface's (Tea Kim Heang, a freelance photographer) open wounds. He handed out pills for fever and stomach upsets and warned us against becoming seriously ill because, he said, nothing could be done about it.

We came to know and study the camp dogs, cats and

Kate Webb, 28, UPI bureau manager in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, was captured by the communists while covering military action in Cambodia last month. On Tuesday and Wednesday, she told about her capture and the long walk to her place of captivity. In the following dispatch, the third of four, she describes how she was interrogated and what her captors told about themselves and the Indochina war.

cnickens, the habits of ants, and made half-hearted attempts to learn one another's languages. But most of the time we sat, or lay, wrapped in our own thoughts and deliberately avoiding talk of home or families, Phnom Penh or freedom.

INTERROGATED ALL DAY

I made some diary entries on the back of a cigaret package:

"Friday 16th. S. (Chhim Sarath, UPI driver interpreter) in depths of all-time low. After yesterday's interrogation he sure he going to be zapped. He told me he told not to talk to me. But said I was English and always very good. He huddles in corner silent all day. If had more paper would write essay on prisoners as domestic pets. New house means we must be in for long stay."

"Saturday 17th. Ten days now and days do not vary. We told that interpreter fighting at Pich Nil. My feet worse. Suz and I questioned by "Dad", thin man with bad eyes and girl in black pajamas, speaking bad French. We told to answer in writing 29 questions, and asked if anything want. Tailor measures us for clothes. What the hell is this? Hot, hot."

"Sunday 18th. Interrogated all day by young man with screwed-up index finger with wound. I call him the Finger. Notice girl has wedding ring, tough face, soft voice. Dad there and two old men, one in civilian clothes and specs speaking very good French. The other squat in mil. unif. They all laugh when I ask of their difficulties with Sihanoukists. Splitting headache after interrogation. All in French."

We were given paper for the 29-question questionnaire and I asked them for more to keep a journal. Suzuki also was keeping notes, in Japanese. They made no attempt to take them or read them, and gave us each two sheets of paper for our personal use. They are beside me as I write

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12 MAY 1971

Longtime French Contact With Reds in S. Vietnam Disclosed

BY ARTHUR J. DOMMEN

Times Staff Writer
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PHNOM PENH — The French government was in touch with the top leaders of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front for at least four years before the start of the Paris peace talks, according to reliable French sources. The contact points were in Cambodia.

Through these contacts with the NLF leaders, the French government received accurate advance information of such moves as the preparations for the 1968 Tet offensive in South Vietnam and the decision to transform the NLF into a provisional government in June, 1969.

The French government was thus in a unique position to make assessments of such matters as the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist effort in Vietnam, the delicate and often ambiguous relationship between the NLF and Hanoi, the Communist leadership's readings of American willpower to continue the war, and Communist strategy.

These contacts took place on the grounds of the several French-owned rubber plantations in eastern Cambodia not far from the border of South Vietnam. They were frequent and continued almost up to the day Prince Norodom Sihanouk was ousted as Cambodian head of state.

The United States deliberately avoided trying to make use of the French channel to the NLF for soundings about a peace settlement, the sources said, because President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to do nothing that would obligate the United States to French President Charles de Gaulle, whose hostility to American intervention in Indochina was well known.

American diplomats and other officials used highly valued French channels, however, on Vietnam matters. And American experts on the Tet offensive say ample intelligence was available at U.S. headquarters in Saigon that a major offensive was coming. One source seen many of the official

documents says the top command misread the intelligence they had and thereby underestimated the magnitude of what the enemy planned.)

The possibility that the French would pass on confidential information to the top NLF leadership through Cambodia appears to have been a major reason why the American delegation to the talks with North Vietnam, which opened in Paris in May, 1968, consistently declined to take the French fully into confidence. Instead, the Americans chose to deal with Russian diplomats, thereby giving the Soviet Union the credit for serving an intermediary role.

The French contacts in Cambodia were established on such a firm working basis that when the French wanted to find out some important point of NLF policy, or to discuss a minor detail such as safe passage for a French citizen driving from one place to another within South Vietnam on a particular day, they had only to pass a message to an NLF agent and a meeting with a high-ranking NLF official would be arranged a day or two later.

The French-NLF contacts were directed by French intelligence agents who lived with the management staff of the plantations at Chup, Krek, Mimot, Snuol and other plantation towns in Cambodia. The Quai d'Orsay, French Foreign Ministry, kept in touch through its embassy in Phnom Penh with the NLF's permanent representation in the Cambodian capital. But this channel normally did not afford the face-to-face meeting with the top leaders of the plantation channel.

Known to Sihanouk

The contacts, according to the French sources here, were known to Prince Sihanouk. He did not object to them because he saw them as hastening the end of the war in Vietnam through some kind of negotiated solution that would bring the NLF to power in Saigon but spare Cambodia from takeover by the Vietnamese Communists in the near future. Sihanouk was so discreet about the contacts that he never once alluded to them in public.

The contacts also became known to South Vietnam and the United States, and they exerted an influence on their diplomacy vis-a-vis France.

The French-NLF meetings began on a systematic basis after the Indochinese peoples' summit conference hosted by Sihanouk in Phnom Penh in March, 1965, at which the NLF was represented. Information about them was passed to South Vietnamese intelligence by South Vietnamese agents in Cambodia.

The fear of the Saigon government that the French might be transmitting information of tactical value to the NLF was reportedly an unspoken reason behind Saigon's decision to break diplomatic relations with France in 1965. After the break, the French Embassy in Saigon was reduced in status to a consulate general and its staff cut sharply back.

American intelligence also learned about the existence of the French-NLF contacts, according to French sources. This reporter has not been able to confirm this information from official American sources but if the Americans knew about the contacts, the information derived from them.

At the time of the American-South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia in May, 1970, American military intelligence maintained that the Central Office for South Vietnam, the Communist headquarters for South Vietnam, was located in the Fishhook area of Cambodia not far from the town of Mimot.

This headquarters was never uncovered, and American officials are now inclined to believe that COSVN was located all along in the NLF Embassy in Phnom Penh. The French have never said anything publicly about COSVN, but their intelligence information is believed to have been more accurate.

Among the top leaders of the NLF who are reported to have had a number of secret meetings in Cambodia with French intelligence agents is Tran Buu Kiem, a member of the NLF Central Committee who became the head of the NLF delegation to the enlarged Paris conference after the bombing halt in November, 1968. He is presently listed by the NLF as minister to the office of the chairman of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

From the point of view of the NLF, the contacts in Cambodia furnished the only available channel for a continuing exchange of information with the Western world—at least until the start of the Paris negotiations — in conditions as close to total security as any that could be obtained anywhere.

The American Embassy in Phnom Penh had been forced by Sihanouk to

continued

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'If you run . . . we will shoot'

By KATE WEBB

Our acquaintance with the communists began at rifle point and ended 23 days later with handshakes and whispers at a pre-dawn release point. Thruout, I found in them an odd mixture of thoughtfulness. They called themselves the "Liberation Front of Cambodia," with the same conscious humor that the Americans in South Vietnam call themselves a "Military Assistance Command." They were Vietnamese, from the north and south of Vietnam, and like American GIs, they were homesick. They listened to radio Hanoi as GIs listen to the Armed Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN). They complained that Cambodian tea was not as good as the tea from the plantations in the north. They sang Vietnamese songs . . . and as he walked thru villages at night, we sometimes heard Cambodian kids calling out "Viet Cong Vietnam," much the same as I have heard South Vietnamese youngsters," calling "O.K. GI."

My notebook entries for the day of our capture were lost when the book was confiscated, but

Kate Webb, 23, UPI bureau manager in Phnom Penh, disappeared on April 7 while covering military action in Cambodia yesterday, she told about her capture by the Viet Cong. In the following dispatch, the second of four, she tells about the long march to the place of captivity.

those first moments will take a long time to forget.

The two soldiers who had captured us tied our arms behind our backs with tape, vines and ropes. They ordered us into a nearby bunker and a few moments later approached with a green sack.

"It's plastique (an explosive widely used in Indochina)," I thought, and tried to scramble out, passing the word back to the others. We all thought we would be blown to pieces.

But the sack was for our cameras and personal effects. One of the soldiers sat methodically taking inventory on our gear.

They counted the money each of us had and noted the makes of our watches and the details on our I.D. cards.

They brought water

in round North Vietnamese military canteens, but it was not enough. We grabbed at the canteens, drained them and pleaded for more. They brought more from a nearby command post that we had passed without seeing.

Running silently on his thick rubber Ho Chi Minh sandals, one of the soldiers returned with the first officer we were to meet. He wore no rank insignia. Only a pistol on an American belt identified him as a superior. His uniform, drab brown shirt and green trousers, was the same as those of the common soldier.

"You are invited to go to my place where there will be food and water," he said, checking the binds on our arms. "It is a short walk from here."

It was the first of many walks which were never short, always long. It was the worst.

The trail was one we had crossed several times while trying to elude the communists. It led back to the Kirirom road, branching off from Das Kanchor, the Cambodian outpost that had been our hoped-for rendezvous point with government troops.


The guards stopped and hacked branches from the trees around us. With difficulty, we each held one with our bound hands. Like walking trees, we set off down the roadside.

A Cambodian wearing a bright blue shirt and civilian trousers appeared from somewhere and soon the other five captives were brought back. That whispered that they had simply undergone questioning by the Vietnamese. The Cambodian, prompted by Vietnamese, announced in Cambodian that we were prisoners of the Cambodian Liberation Forces. He said we were not to fear for our lives and would be taken a short way to another place. He said the Liberation Armed Forces were "humane."

Our ropes were replaced with green plastic-covered wire. Mine, I noticed, were looser than the others. Tied in a chain and warned again not to run from the planes, we marched off into the night.

I remember little of that walk, except that we had no shoes. We were passed by shadowy groups of troops and some girls with pony tail hair styles. Four litters moved past shadows, their bearers running at a shuffling trot. Two litters were closed, carrying dead. Groans and screams came from another and a guard told us it was a malaria case.

We were moving deep into the mountains and an artillery barrage started. We were herded into a three-man bunker. The guards stayed outside. The bunker was typical, deep and thick with about three feet of overhead cover. The six of us crammed inside, hardly able to breathe for what seemed about 30 minutes. It also smelled—of U.S. Our party moved across creek beds, adways uphill. We were passed by two soldiers carrying the tube of a 75 millimeter recoilless rifle on a tree branch and struggling and slithering under its weight.



Continued

HARTFORD, CONN.

TIMES

APR 29 1973

E & S - 135,812

Shaky Cambodian regime

The cabinet crisis that has afflicted Cambodia for the past two weeks offers a discouraging glimpse into the political health of our country's newest Southeast Asian ally.

The premier, General Lon Nol, who was swept into power in the coup that preceded the American-South Vietnamese invasion a year ago, tried in vain to resign.

He has suffered a serious stroke; has been hospitalized in Hawaii; has returned, under doctor's orders to spend no more than an hour a day doing any kind of desk work; and would obviously like to retire.

But if he were to retire, a clique of colonels grouped around his younger brother would lose influence, so they are urging him to remain, in title at least, premier.

His deputy premier, General Sirik Matak, is unpopular with some factions, so everyone prefers to have Lon Nol remain formally premier — even though the latest report on his

health is that he is too ill to make important decisions, or to be told bad news.

Meanwhile, some of the important decisions will apparently include the advice and counsel of a long-time Cambodian exile, Son Ngoc Thanh.

Thanh was briefly his nation's premier in 1945. His ambitions clashed with those of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and Thanh fled into exile, where he encouraged the view that Sihanouk was a tool of Communism.

Thanh has spent most of the last decade raising a clandestine guerrilla army to overthrow Sihanouk, with support from the American CIA and possibly the Green Berets as well.

With Sihanouk now overthrown, Thanh obviously feels it safe to reappear, and the CIA is presumably glad to see him back.

Whether his presence, Lon Nol's tottering premiership, Sirik Matak's enemies or the colonels and their friends will bring stability to Cambodia remains to be seen.

400 honor Burchett in New York

In a filmed message on his 60th birthday, Wilfred Burchett last week told several hundred people that, "It is the greatest honor of my life that so many of you, from different walks of life and a broad cross-section of the protest movement, have come to my birthday party. I know that you are also honoring the Vietnamese people with whose cause we are so closely associated. It is essentially their struggle that brings us together."


The birthday celebration-tribute to the journalist who for the last 20 years has been the most important source of news for the American people on liberation struggles of the Korean and Indochinese peoples was held April 8 at the Esplanade Hotel in New York City. Four hundred people viewed Burchett's message, a filmed interview with Madame Nguyen Thi Binh in Paris and with Cambodian head-of-state Norodom Sihanouk in Peking, heard brief talks by Robert Browne, professor of economics at Fairleigh-Dickinson University and Guardian staff correspondent Carl Davidson and joined in with the songs of Pete Seeger.

Burchett spoke from his suburban home outside Paris where he has been covering the peace talks just before he embarked on his current visits to Peking, Pyongyang and Hanoi. He said he regarded his 60th year as "the most dangerous since the blackout days of the Korean war. That time when MacArthur was racing towards China—and, as things stood in those days—toward World War III. Nixon now seems bent on racing in the same direction. 1971 is Nixon's 'Year of the Hawk,'" Burchett said, "and he is making the most of it. He will continue to do so right up to his switch to the 'Dove' in time for the 1972 elections."

The program provided a rare opportunity for Americans to see and hear Madame Binh, foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and Sihanouk, who noted that "more than two-thirds" of Cambodia "is now administered by the Royal Government of National Union" with "five northeastern provinces totally liberated."

Both sent special greetings to the U.S. antiwar movement. Madame Binh expressed her hope "that the U.S. antiwar movement, including all groups and all organizations, will com-

Guardian photo by Arbolito



Pete sings for Wilfred.

bine all their efforts to undertake vast, vigorous and united actions" against the war and she wished the "best success to the great demonstrations starting on April 24."

Noting the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, Sihanouk stated, "We are well aware of the great wave of indignation that swept the United States, because of this atrocious aggression. We know that American students, black and white, were shot down in cold blood, for protesting. We know that it was because of the tremendous protest movement that Nixon was forced to take United States troops out after two months. Even that was a victory for the protest movement. But Nixon left his Saigon puppets on our soil and continues to this day to send U.S. planes and helicopter gun-ships to murder our people."

The April 8 celebration was at once a tribute to Burchett, who conducted both interviews, and also an effort to insure that his writings continue to reach people here. With the CIA maneuver that brought Lon Nol and Sirik Matak to power in Phnom Penh, Burchett lost his base of operations in Cambodia and a special fund has become necessary for his continued coverage of the Indochinese struggle.

The entire program was broadcast over WBAI, the Pacifica radio station in New York, on April 11. The tapes, along with the filmed interviews, are being prepared for broader circulation.

Burchett interviews Madame Binh

STATINTL

The following text contains key excerpts from a filmed interview with Nguyen Thi Binh, foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and head of the PRG delegation at the Paris peace talks. The interview was conducted by Guardian correspondent Wilfred Burchett and will be shown at the Wilfred Burchett 60th Birthday Celebration in New York City this week.

Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, it is just a little over a year since the CIA brought about the overthrow of the neutralist regime of prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia, and almost a year since U.S.-Saigon forces invaded that country. How would you describe overall developments in Indochina since these events?

In March 1970, the Nixon administration instigated a coup to overthrow the legal government of Cambodia, with prince Norodom Sihanouk as head of state. At the end of April 1970, this same administration launched U.S. and Saigon puppet troops on a large-scale invasion of Cambodia. In February of this year, U.S.-Saigon troops invaded Laos, while U.S. planes repeatedly bombed many areas of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Nixon administration, just like the traitor Nguyen Van Thieu, continuously threatens new military adventures against the DRV. It is because of such actions of the Nixon administration that the war has been extended to the whole of Indochina, creating an extremely serious situation in Southeast Asia and in Asia as a whole.

However, the military adventures undertaken by the U.S. during the past year have not altered the facts of their defeat in Vietnam. On the contrary, the U.S. and its lackeys have sunk still further into the mire and suffered still greater defeats. Looking back over the past year, one sees that the Nixon administration has "succeeded" in the following:

- In transforming neutral Cambodia into a revolutionary militant Cambodia.

- In strengthening the solidarity of the three Cambodian, Laotian and Vietnamese peoples, united in an anti-U.S. front of the Indochinese peoples.

- In forcing U.S. and Saigon troops to be killed uselessly on the battlefields of Laos and Cambodia, while "Vietnamization" of the war in South Vietnam has proved to be a fiasco.

- To sum up: during the past year, Nixon himself has demonstrated the defeat of the "Nixon Doctrine" in Indochina.

What effect will the shattering defeats of the Saigon puppet forces in Laos have on the situation in Vietnam itself?

The U.S. and Saigon puppet forces have been dealt severe blows in Laos and there is no doubt they will suffer even graver setbacks. At the same time they have also been dealt very heavy blows on the battlefields of South Vietnam and Cambodia. Even the serious defeats inflicted on the Saigon puppet troops in Laos (and these include their so-called "elite" units) proves the bankruptcy of the "Vietnamization" policy. It is the bankruptcy of Saigon puppet troops plus American military technique.

It also proves that the Saigon troops are incapable of fulfilling the role allotted them by the U.S. Command. In any case, it is clear that the blows dealt by the Laotian people and their armed forces on the Saigon puppet troops fall equally heavily on Nixon's scheme of "Vietnamization" in South Vietnam.

The official line put out by the Nixon administration for a long time is that the Thieu-Ky regime controls about 99% of the territory and people of South Vietnam? What is your comment?

This is an outright lie. The recent attacks by our Liberation Armed Forces against enemy hideouts in such towns as Da Nang, Phan Thiet, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh and others are a fitting rebuff to such bragging. The continual development of the anti-U.S., anti-Thieu-Ky-Khiem movement--among all sections of the population in the towns and other areas under the temporary control of the enemy--also proves the isolation and the impotence of the Saigon administration, maintained only thanks to U.S. dollars and bayonets.

Reports state the U.S. intends adding some 30% of additional prison space in South Vietnam in the next few months--specifically for jailing political opponents of Thieu and Ky in view of the forthcoming elections. Could you comment on this? And what do you expect can come out of these elections?

I must point out that the U.S. and the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique are building new prisons in South Vietnam, not only to lock up political opponents of Thieu and Ky in relation to the "elections," but above all to detain, torture and ill-treat South Vietnamese patriots in general.

As for the approaching so-called "elections," I would like to recall our position. It is as follows: As long as there are hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Vietnam, as long as the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration, set up by the U.S., is still there, any so-called "elections" organized at bayonet point and gunpoint can only be regarded as a fraud.

They are only aimed at legalizing an administration which is a U.S. pawn. I would also like to recall that we have repeatedly declared that we are ready to enter into discussions with a Saigon administration which does not include Thieu, Ky and Khiem, and which has declared itself for peace, independence, democracy and neutrality, in order to seek a correct political solution to the South Vietnamese problem, in a spirit of unity and national conciliation, without foreign interference.

Could you say a few words about the attitude of the U.S. delegation to the Paris talks and what should be a realistic basis for ending the war?

Nixon's policy is to prolong and extend the war in order to acquire a position of force on the battlefield, as well as at the conference table.

That is why the attitude of the American delegation to the Paris Conference for more than two years has been a negative, stubborn and perfidious attitude. Negative because the U.S. delegation refuses to consider our reasonable and realistic peace proposals. Stubborn because the so-called U.S. "peace proposals" are nothing but unreasonable and impudent demands based on the perfidious because the U.S. resorts to all sorts of trickery to deceive public opinion, especially American public opinion.

NEWS PRESS

M - 48,828

S - 74,643

MAR 19 1972

FINAL SESSION TODAY

Promotions, Panel Spark

By NORMAN M. COVERT
Daily Press Military Reporter
The World Affairs Forum closed its last full-day session Thursday afternoon with a brisk give-and-take during two hours of full-panel participation and special ceremonies promoting two men to brigadier general status.

Audience participation perhaps reached its peak in the afternoon session, which began with the promotion ceremonies at 1 p.m. A major highlight was a standing ovation

accorded the lecture team. Maj. Gen. Edward Daultz, deputy chief of staff for reserve affairs at U.S. Continental Army Command, Ft. Monroce, effected the promotions for Army Reserve Cols. Frank F. Harold and W. Stanford Smith Jr.

The panel had to field many questions during the two-hour open forum, many coming from the large group of local students attending. There weren't many easy questions.

Marine Corps Col. Clayton V. Hendricks was asked about

presence of U.S. Special Forces troops in Cambodia and the work of Central Intelligence Agency men in Southeast Asia by one student.

Hendricks pondered the question and answered, to his understanding there are no special forces troops in Cambodia and the CIA doesn't let many people know its activities.

Foreign Service Officer

Walter R. Cook remarked the CIA is present "all over the world conducting covert activities." He said no one not directly involved knows of CIA activities, not even the panel.

FORUM

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MERCURY

M - 126,382

MERCURY-NEWS

S - 184,103

MAR 13 1971

Analysts Say Peace Possible If U.S. Will Negotiate

By JUDI SCHULTZ
Mercury Staff Writer

Two analysts of the Indochina war Thursday said peace is possible in Southeast Asia if the United States government will negotiate for it.

Banning Garrett, Southeast Asia editor of Ramparts magazine, during a panel discussion at San Jose State College, said the biggest obstacle to peace is the U.S. government's reluctance to abandon its war strategy.

Joining Garrett in the discussion were Chris Jenkins, a member of the International Volunteer Services in Vietnam from 1966 to 1968, and Karen McConnell of the East Asia Study Center at Stanford University.

Miss McConnell analyzed China's possible responses to the invasions of Cambodia and Laos.

Their appearances were part of the Conference on Economic, Social and Political Survival, a week-long program sponsored by Students for Peace and Freedom.

Garrett said the Nixon war policy encompasses the pursuit of two goals — the urbanization of basically rural South Vietnam and the subsequent control of the populace from urban centers and the severing of the supply routes from North Vietnam.

Garrett claimed the U.S. and South Vietnam were losing badly in battles for strategic positions in both Cambodia and Laos.

"In Cambodia, the U.S. did not count on the peasant revolution and the rapid growth of the National United Front of Cambodia," he said.

The attack on the Phnom Penh airport Jan. 22 by 50 men demonstrated the support of local villagers and airport personnel, he said.

The next logical step for the Nixon administration to take, Garrett contended, was an invasion of Laos.

The editor said that a news blackout on Laos developments leaves some questions, but he claimed there is evidence that the Laos army, trained by the CIA, has been decimated and the CIA base at Long Cheng has been evacuated.

"The crisis has developed for President Nixon," he said. "If he is clearly losing, not to escalate is to de-escalate and that means to lose the war."

He said the situation is the same that President Johnson faced. "You have to escalate just to regain the ground you've already lost," Garrett said.

But he said he thinks the alternatives are fewer for Nixon. Possibilities he sees are that the U.S.-backed troops of the Saigon government invade North Vietnam or that the U.S. sever North and South Vietnam and Laos with a nuclear contamination zone, produced obviously by a nuclear bomb.

Jenkins discussed the growing popularity in South Vietnam of a negotiated peace, based on the demands of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the National Liberation Front.

"In South Vietnam in the American-controlled and protected urban areas, there are many people who are advocating the peace terms of the PRG. These people are the general populace. They are not members of the NLF or of the Communist Party," he said.

Miss McConnell said U.S. sinologists have detected evi-

dence of a new view emerging in Chinese policy in Southeast Asia.

She said the Maoist line on warfare since 1949 for emerging nations has been one of self-reliance. China traditionally has offered encouragement to struggling nations, she said, but has been against massive invasion in support of them.

WITH SIHANOUK IN PEKING STATINTL

ALESSANDRO CASSELLA

Mr. Casella is employed in the Far Eastern Documentation Center of the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies. Early this winter he received through the Chinese Consulate in Geneva a visa to visit Peking, his purpose being to interview Prince Sihanouk, who had earlier agreed to the meeting. The two-hour conversation, which is printed in part below, took place at Sihanouk's villa, situated in a large compound near Peking's Fisherman's Court.

Q. Your Highness, when you were in Phnom Penh, you felt that Cambodia should follow a policy of neutrality. Why? . . . In view of the situation today, do you feel that your policy of neutrality has been a failure?

A. Having acquired our independence from France in 1953, we felt that it was our task to safeguard this independence at all costs. At that time one could already see the beginning of what was to be the struggle between the Communists and the free world. I knew that if Cambodia were to become involved in that struggle it would have meant an end to its independence. It was, therefore, imperative for us to find some way to avoid involvement in the struggle between the Communist and Western ideologies. In 1954, Nehru spoke to me of non-alignment, and in 1955, at New Delhi, I adopted this policy for our country. I cannot regard Cambodia's neutrality as a failure. On the contrary, it gave Cambodia fifteen years of peace and independence and I am sure that if the Cambodian people could speak their minds today, they would wholeheartedly approve a return to that policy.

Q. When you were in Cambodia it appears that you had certain difficulties with the Left. There was an armed rebellion in Batambang Province and, in 1967, your relations with China were somewhat strained.

A. Yes, in 1967 we had certain problems with China. I am, as you know, a keen patriot and I demand that other countries respect my country's independence. Consequently, it was my duty to defend our independence even against my best friends. In this respect, I am quite near to the position of General de Gaulle. I have always considered myself a Gaullist, and, like de Gaulle, I wished that my country's independence be respected and its dignity be upheld. Well, it was not so much the People's Republic of China that was meddling in our affairs but rather some local Maoists, some Sino-Cambodians, some Red Khmers in Phnom Penh, and also some Chinese elements who were more royalist than the King—that is to say, more Maoist than President Mao. These people had at one-time endangered the tranquillity and independence of Cambodia. It was my duty to put a stop to their endeavors, and this I did. China has understood my attitude perfectly well and has not criticized it. . . .

Q. Don't you feel that your economic policy of nationalization was one of the reasons which induced the right wing to overthrow you?

A. Indeed, the right wing strongly opposed my policy of nationalization. Those men who overthrew me wanted a pro-American capitalist Cambodia. It was not to advance the interest of the people that they wanted such a policy but only for their own gains. Moreover, among those who support Lon Nol are not only the military, who are by profession anti-Communist, but also the bankers, the businessmen, the landowners—all those who constitute the right-wing elements in all countries. These people are opposed to neutrality, which presupposes some form of coexistence with the other camp.

Q. At the time of the coup you were in France. Why didn't you return to Cambodia?

A. I was seriously ill and it is for this reason that I spent two months in France in a hospital. I left the hospital only to see Mr. Pompidou and the day I had lunch with him, I was overthrown by Lon Nol. I had known for several days before the coup that, had I returned to Cambodia, I would have been arrested, tried and executed by a group of army officers. Of course, I had the people on my side, but they were without arms and could not have rescued me. I had no thought of turning myself over to the enemy. It is for this reason that I chose to fight abroad.

Q. When you left France, you stopped in Moscow. Why?

A. I went to Moscow to see my son who was working there; also to see Messrs. Podgorny, Brezhnev and Kosygin. The Russians advised me to return immediately to Cambodia, but I had already decided that if I returned I would be arrested and executed. After Moscow, I went to Peking from where I organized the resistance. I had hoped the Russians would support me, but when they saw that I had no intention of returning to Cambodia to be executed, they dropped me. So only China helps me, and I remain in China. Of course, if the Russians had adopted toward me the same attitude adopted by the Chinese, I would have been overjoyed. But they did not. No doubt they considered that their interests are on the side of Lon Nol.

Q. It has been said that you went to Moscow to obtain assurances that the Vietnamese revolutionaries who were occupying some of the border areas of Cambodia would promise to return to Vietnam after their eventual victory. Is that true?

A. The Vietnamese are an extremely independent people. North Vietnam is independent both from Russia and from China. If one wishes to insure that the Vietnamese respect Cambodia's borders, it is not with Moscow or with Peking that one should negotiate but with Hanoi. And I did negotiate with Hanoi. Hanoi gave me the

HAMILTON, MONT.
WESTERN NEWS
MAR 3 1971
WEEKLY - 2,130

WE HAVE A POLICE STATE PAST EMBRYO

With the CIA playing a major role in conducting the war in Laos and Cambodia, along with Department of Defense bombers and gunships flying protective support overhead, it seems that Nixon has found a way to conduct the war while bringing home the infantrymen, at least the draftees.

Using foreign soldiers to fight the war in Asia reminds Americans of the fondness Americans held for the Hessians hired by King George in the American Revolution.

Reports throughout the nation are that the Army has been engaged in a nation-wide spying upon American citizens building up dossiers on the thoughts of American citizens. Husbands and wives had best whisper softly if they converse about anything over the bang, bang, bang on the boob tube. Private views and intimate thoughts might find their way into the Army spy dossier and react badly upon you in the years to come! And if the Army don't get you the FBI is on the job as well.

It is now fairly well established that the CIA inspired at least four or more attempts upon the life of Cuban President Castro. The first try of the CIA was to furnish special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to work. By the time the Cuban leader died his system would have discarded all traces of the sophisticated poison, so it would be thought he had died of natural if mysterious causes. The CIA failed to get the poison in the food. So they tried bullets the next three times, at least, but failed in these efforts.

There may be people who think poison and lead are too good for Castro. Put the shoe on the other foot. What if the Cubans were making a government-spy-planned effort to kill our president?

Then there is Old Edgar Hoover and the FBI. It is notorious that his men have been working day and night for years building up detailed information about citizens throughout the country in an effort to discredit them when the time comes handy.

At one meeting not long ago it was developed that of a crowd of less than 150 in attendance more than 50 were undercover spies of one type or another.

It is getting so that the undercover spies will have to wear badges to keep from investigating each other.

This is not a funny situation. It will ultimately undermine the country. We thought it horrid for the Soviet, the Nazis and the Fascists to conduct a police state. We are endangered by the same sorry practices?

APR 25 1971

H - 948,782
S - 1,253,556

MISSION OVER

Green Berets Saying Goodby to Themselves

BY GEORGE McARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

NHA TRANG, South Vietnam—
The fabled Green Berets, possibly the only American soldiers who liked this war, made their formal farewells Wednesday. There were a few half-hidden tears as the band played but no regrets.

Col. Michael Healy, a rumped, deep-throated soldier, stood beneath a drizzling rain and said the final words:

"Our job is done. We can withdraw from the battlefield with our heads high and pride in the gallant officers and men of the 5th Special Forces Group."

It was a brief moment in history, a footnote perhaps, and the words were appropriate. The rhetoric would have sounded false in other units which have long since lost most of their identity in Vietnam. But the Green Berets, battered thought they were, played their own game to the end.

Dignitaries Absent

Though U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and military commander Gen. Creighton W. Abrams were invited to the final parade at Green Beret headquarters, neither attended. It didn't matter to the close-knit band of sturdy men talking about such places as Loc Ninh, Bu Dop or Lang Vei. It was as if the Green Berets were saying goodby to themselves.

They were on their good behavior, though some admitted hangovers from a private party Tuesday. The small, white-palated compound, the neatest military camp in South Vietnam, was spotless. A camouflage cargo parachute was spread over a bit of grass where drinks were served. There was pink champagne and succulent lobster lifted Wednesday morning by Nha Trang fishermen. There were even big dolphins carved in ice by a Green Beret rifleman.

It was a far cry from the John Wayne days when small teams of Special Forces troopers recruited motley bands of Montagnards to defend remote camps along the borders.

Hazardous Duty

Through those lean years every Green Beret in almost 100 such camps knew he probably could be overrun—if the enemy wanted to pay the price. At places like Bu Prang, shelled and besieged for 45 days, life literally depended on the flick of an eyelash. The Green Berets, who seldom numbered more than about 1,500 men in Vietnam, left 700 dead, mostly in camps like that.

Unlike most Army units, the Green Berets remember such things as vivid, only-yesterday experiences. Their memory is active since nobody much pays any attention to a Special Forces type on his first tour. They keep coming back and a few have served eight and even nine years in Vietnam.

Sgt. 1 C. Antonio J. Coelho, a 44-year-old who has been a Green Beret since their earliest days, is more or less typical. He resigned from the Army a few years ago but came back "because I missed those so-and-sos."

A stocky short-spoken man, Coelho stood at attention with the staff Wednesday to get the last medal which will be presented at a Special Forces formation in Vietnam. It was the Distinguished Service Cross, the nation's second highest combat medal, given Coelho for two rescue missions only last August. Twice he led helicopter teams through hails of fire to save both American and Vietnamese soldiers.

The Vietnamese were members of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups which are the pride of the Green Berets. Though they are frequently called mercenaries, the CIDGs are mainly Montagnard or ethnic Cambodian peoples who choose the Special Forces rather than face the South Vietnamese draft.

The Green Berets formed fierce attachments to the CIDGs, mainly to the simple, sturdy tribesman of the highlands. Almost every Green Beret sports one or more of the

and bronze bracelets the Montagnards give away as tokens of esteem (along

with lots of rice wine which they also ladle out liberally at ceremonial events).

Saigon Conflict

"We took them out of loincloths and put them into uniforms and now they are elite forces," Col. Healy says. "It does something to you to remember the old days and then see some of them now wearing officers' shoulder boards. They are no longer social outcasts, they are part of the country."

In those early days Healy referred to, the Green Berets got into trouble siding with the Montagnards in their fights with the Saigon government. The conflict sometimes had humorous aspects.

In those mixed up days the Central Intelligence Agency was actually paying the salaries of the CIDG troops and the mo-

ney came down through the Green Berets to be distributed by the South Vietnamese officers who were nominally in command. The South Vietnamese would frequently pocket much of the money. One Special Forces captain, who was unable to get his counterpart to cooperate in properly paying the troops, used a blunt solution.

One month on payday he called the camp together and explained what had been happening. Then he put the money—about \$5,000 worth of Vietnamese piasters—in a gasoline soaked pit and burned it all. Next month, with the camp near mutiny, the South Vietnamese captain agreed to set up a reasonable accounting system.

The loyalty of the Green Berets for the CIDGs, whom they affectionately call "Yards," a shortening of the French pronunciation for Montagnards, is evident in other ways. Of the nine Medals of Honor won by Green Berets in Vietnam (four posthumously), four were won by men risking their lives to save their CIDG comrades.

At the peak of Special Forces strength in South Vietnam, the CIDG forces

STATINTL

Continued

WASHINGTON POST
10 FEB 1971



Only Eight Months Old

Out-of-Date Notes on Cambodia

By Robert G. Kaiser

STATINTL

THE LATEST ROUND of escalation, Vietnamization, preparation for withdrawal (or whatever has been going on in Indochina recently) has revived the old uneasiness. One feels it in Washington and New York and, undoubtedly, elsewhere in the land. Are we getting out, or going in, or going mad—or what? Is the situation better or worse than it was last month or last year? Does this train take us where we want to go?

That remains to be seen, of course, Messrs. Nixon and Kissinger think they see the desired terminal at the end of this line, and perhaps they do. The new operation into Laos has already opened a new season of public speculation on the future, and we are certain to be bombarded with a rich variety of utterly conflicting opinions for some weeks to come. Perhaps, though, it would be more instructive to look back at the route we've recently followed than to speculate about what may or may not be coming up next.

THAT LINE of inquiry appealed the other night to this correspondent as I was exercising that venerable journalist's prerogative of shuffling through old piles of stories and notebooks. I spent seventeen months of 1969-70 in Indochina, returning home in August. My last visit to Phnom Penh was in June eight months ago. Notes made on that visit look very old indeed; they describe an out-of-date version of the war in Indochina.

By June there was already quite a big war in Cambodia. In the first ten weeks after the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk, ten of the country's nineteen province capitals had been attacked by North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. The town of Siem Reap in Northwest Cambodia, near Thailand, had just been attacked, and the nearby monuments at Angkor had fallen under Communist control.

But Phnom Penh was still virtually untouched by the war, and the feeling there was that the situation was extremely serious,

but not yet threatening. Cambodian troops had shown themselves courageous but incompetent, and the Cambodians were confident (as they seem to be still) that the first would more than compensate for the second. The Lon Nol government was still looking for aid agreements with the United States and South Vietnam, but seemed sure it would get what it needed. One of the two government papers in Phnom Penh carried a cartoon in early June depicting President Nixon as an angel, wings and all.

THE AMERICAN PRESENCE in Cambodia then was tiny. We had a *charge d'affaires*, a military *attache* with two or three assistants, three or four Foreign Service officers and half a dozen visiting firemen from Washington, Bangkok and elsewhere. Though you were only half an hour by air from Saigon in Phnom Penh, it felt like forever. In Phnom Penh there were no Americans, no significant signs of war, no change in normal life—or so it seemed.

Our military *attache* was Col. William Pietsch a determined and unpredictable optimist (the subject of columns by Joseph Kraft and both Alsops) who was relieved of his job later in June. Col. Pietsch said of the Cambodians in June that "these people have the capability of pulling themselves

out of this danger without any help from anybody else." He added that "if the government (of Lon Nol) can hold through the next rainy season, they've got it licked."

A senior American diplomat then in Phnom Penh told visitors that the North Vietnamese might not push the war in Cam-

bodia too far for fear of involving the Thais in the fighting—which could mean invoking the SEATO Treaty, this diplomat suggested. The Communists might not want to "fight a whole slew of countries at once," my notebook records this diplomat as observing.

Last June the Americans were much the most optimistic people in Phnom Penh—apart from the euphoric Cambodians themselves. Others on the circuit of diplomats and longtime European residents of Phnom Penh whom the foreign correspondents visited were less hopeful about the Cambodians. "They will last as long as someone from outside will support them," one ambassador said of Lon Nol and his regime. Most others shared that view, but all of them—from European countries, mostly—assumed that the United States would indeed provide the support Lon Nol would need.

At the time many American journalists tried to explain to those Europeans that they were wrong—that political considerations would make it impossible for Mr. Nixon to give as much help as Lon Nol would need. That was the impression many of us got in Saigon. It seemed perfectly sensible at the time.

Why, Stanley Resor, the Secretary of the Army himself, had come to Saigon to tell the senior commanders that there could be no more bold U.S. action like the operations into Cambodia. On the contrary, Resor said, the war had to be wrapped up. American opinion wouldn't stand for any more, he said, describing to the colonels and generals at MACV the opposition of Wall Street lawyers and other prominent citizens to the Cambodian incursions.

In the post-Kent State doldrums, commanders in the field ruled out all but flatly any operations into Laos. They also saw no way for Americans to do much in Cambodia beyond supporting South Vietnamese troops that would operate there.



Two members of the U.S. 199th Light Infantry Brigade hoist an American flag atop a mound at Firebase Brown in Cam-

continued

2 FEB 1971

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A Multiple Choice Dispatch

STATINTL

A Report on Just About Any Day's Events in Cambodia

PHNOM PENH, Jan.—Communist forces [encircled, continued to besiege, applied renewed pressure] against Cambodia's capital today as the Indochina War [nearing a crucial juncture, escalated once again, started winding down, entered a new phase, further baffled experts].

Farther south, a combined Vietcong-North Vietnamese force [occupied positions alongside, withdrew from strategic passes, cut] Cambodia's one overland link to the sea. An estimated [three battalions, two divisions, one armored corps] of Communists reportedly were involved in the [retreat from, advance on] National Route 4 between Phnom Penh and the Gulf of Siam.

Military sources on-scene said that the over-all Communist goal was to [boost American casualties, starve Phnom Penh's civilian population, slow the pace of Vietnamization, capture the resort beaches of Kompong Som]. This assessment was confirmed by [a Khmer Rouge district chief, a high-ranking NVA defector, diplomatic sources in the capital].

Just outside Phnom Penh city limits last night, an ear-splitting [crackle of small arms fire, roar from massed enemy cannon, silence] rose above the blackness.

Foreign diplomatic sources expressed fear that with the onslaught of the [dry, wet] season, the Communists would [concentrate on upgrading guerrillas, attempt to capture the capital, amputate strategic western provinces]. Informed conjecture has it that the enemy will first tip his hand by [mass-

By David Hoffman

ing, withdrawing] units near the strategic crossroads village of Pak Teoroi.

Pak Teoroi appears as Roipak Teo or Teopak Roi on some military maps.

Questioned sharply by newsmen, U.S. advisers continued to deny the presence of American [CIA agents, infantry units, B-52 bombers, specially trained dog packs] in once-neutral Cambodia. Other sources, while declining to be identified, contradicted the advisers on this crucial point.

A South Vietnamese communique said that [tankers steaming up the Mekong, Lt. Gen. Do Cao Tri, B-52 bomb strikes, the dog packs] would bring an end to Phnom Penh's critical fuel shortage. That shortage, in turn, had been discovered and announced in Washington. The South Vietnamese communique was monitored beside the Hotel Royale pool, where nighttime swimming is popular.

Western correspondents have not been allowed out of Phnom Penh for [one month, two months, since President Nixon's incursion]. However, a [Burmese, Filipino] rice expert attached to a Cambodian company was quoted as saying "Communists everywhere outside. Coming big trouble."

In the [Parrot's Beak, Angel's Wing, Dog Face, Fishhook] area of Cambodia, which abuts South Vietnam, NVA regulars were reported [rebuilding, ignoring, restocking] their old jungle sanctuaries. This was believed preparatory to [a withdrawal northward, a strike east toward Saigon, a general refurbishing] during the [dry, wet] season.

Asked to interpret the current [lull, step-

up] in Communist military activity, a U.S. Command spokesman would say only that "the enemy's military capability remains intact. Further information must come from Washington."

A Pentagon spokesman said it was the U.S. Command's responsibility to interpret enemy intentions. Further information, he said, was available in [Saigon, Phnom Penh, Cincpac in Hawaii]. He added that the U.S. response was made in accord with President Nixon's important policy statement of [May 9, June 11, July 26, Oct. 14], "as is well known."

Meanwhile, to the North, in Laos . . .

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THURSDAY, JANUARY 28, 1971

Cambodia's no caper

Two headlines next to each other yesterday summed up much of the situation regarding Cambodia:

Said one: "Laird Says Combat GIs Won't Go to Cambodia."

And the other: "U.S. Admits GIs Landed in Cambodia."

In the process, UPI quoted Defense Secretary Laird as defending U.S. military action in Southeast Asia as "an indispensable building block in President Nixon's strategy for peace."

THE AMERICAN public has become accustomed to Orwellian situations and statements about Indochina in the past 10 years. Still the Cambodia situation is offering further variations: it would be funny if it were not so frightening.

Hopefully, Laird was right yesterday when he indicated to the Senate Armed Services committee that large-scale U.S. ground forces "will not be introduced" into Cambodia.

But many will disagree with his assertion that the U.S. has violated neither the spirit nor the letter of congressional restrictions (and past Administration statements) on operations in Cambodia. We have come a long ways backward since President Nixon last June promised "no U.S. air or logistics support" for South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, a remark that seemed to imply no such support for Cambodian forces as well.

NOW THE ADMINISTRATION is ducking through all sorts of semantic loopholes, and it is difficult to say how deeply the U.S. military is involved.

Much has been made of the three helicopters carrying a couple of dozen American GIs in civilian clothes that landed at Phnom Penh's airport to retrieve two helicopters. That action is small in itself, but the furor symbolizes the suspicions that much more has been going on.

Not only have U.S. helicopter gunships been in action, there is increasing talk about the role of American "instructors" and "military equipment delivery teams."

That does not count what the CIA with its own paramilitary potential might be doing.

WASHINGTON keeps saying it isn't committed to the Lon Nol regime in Phnom Penh. But the rationale for our increasing involvement is to keep the Cambodian government and military afloat to buy time for the South Vietnamese government to get stronger and American forces to keep pulling out.

That would indicate the Cambodians are riding for a fall. It also sounds far too much like the kind of more-war-for-peace logic that led us ever deeper in Vietnam.

As Senator Stuart Symington said after listening to Laird yesterday: "We've been getting a very optimistic briefing. But I'm in the unfortunate position of receiving optimistic briefings over the last six or seven years."

THERE WAS considerable criticism last year when the Senate fought to impose restrictions on the Administration's activities in Indochina. But were it not for those restrictions it could be that major U.S. combat units would be headed back into Cambodia today to become another building block in the pursuit of peace.

The congressional battle is likely to be joined again. That is a good thing in terms of keeping U.S. policy in the direction of deescalation.

But it is bad in terms of divisions over agreement needed on domestic needs. President Nixon's policy in Cambodia could shoot down his "New American Revolution" at home.

23 JAN 1971

Crisis in U.S. war policy

By Richard E. Ward

A U.S. secretary of defense does not visit Indochina for pleasure or a picnic. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird went to Indochina last week because of the serious crises confronting "Vietnamization" and U.S. policies in Cambodia and Laos.

Contrary to the official optimism about "Vietnamization" and other U.S. operations, the picture in Indochina has never been gloomier for Washington. In essence, this is the situation confronting the Nixon administration:

"Vietnamization" is more than a failure; it is now being understood in the U.S. for what it is: merely a word to deceive Americans into believing that the administration was withdrawing and disengaging from Vietnam. To make the deception credible, it was necessary to withdraw some U.S. troops from Vietnam. Now the day of reckoning has arrived. Although troop withdrawals to date have been compensated by stepped-up air attacks, the point is approaching when further troop withdrawals will seriously impair U.S. ability to keep the puppet regimes in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane from collapsing. Furthermore, U.S. senators and representatives are finally saying openly that they understand Vietnamization means a prolonged, if not indefinite, war in Indochina. This point was specifically stated by senators of the Foreign Relations Committee interrogating Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Defense Secretary Laird on Dec. 10 and 11, 1970. Neither of the two cabinet members could affirm that the U.S. would completely withdraw from Indochina.

Rogers caught in the mire

The situation confronting the U.S. is particularly acute in Cambodia. The administration's difficulties were exposed clearly during the Foreign Relations Committee hearing. The senators asked several times: how could the administration say that widening the war into Cambodia was a step toward peace? Rogers squirmed and engaged in subterfuge, only to mire himself deeper in his own contradictions. The administration's spokesman claimed that the Cambodian invasion and subsequent U.S.-sponsored operations in Cambodia were aiding "Vietnamization" and saving U.S. lives in Vietnam, and thus it was necessary to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into Cambodia so that more Asians could fight to save more American lives. The true picture is quite different.

Perhaps the administration once believed it could make Cambodia into a U.S. bastion for isolating the resistance in South Vietnam. But that strategy failed during the U.S. invasion of Cambodia last May and June. Not only has Cambodia failed to become a U.S. bastion but the Lon Nol regime installed by the CIA has been on the brink of military collapse since U.S. troops left, despite continuing intervention by Saigon and Thai forces and large-scale U.S. air attacks. One of Laird's main purposes in going to Indochina was to find a way to avoid a final debacle in Cambodia.

U.S. intervention in Cambodia had nothing to do with saving U.S. lives in Vietnam. The reason for lowered U.S. casualties is simply a consequence of deliberately minimizing U.S. ground combat operations in Vietnam. For at least six months, there have been no...

Initially, this policy was inaugurated to appease public opinion in the U.S., since casualty and death tolls have served to generate antiwar sentiment. Now it is a serious question whether the U.S. Army in Vietnam itself is an effective fighting instrument. It is no exaggeration to say that the situation borders on mutiny, as attested by reports in Newsweek, Life, the Washington Post and other publications.

In Laos, the U.S.-sponsored mercenaries were unable to mount any significant operation during the 1970-71 dry season. The U.S. answer was to attempt to find a solution in air attacks of unprecedented intensity since autumn, but with negligible results.

New U.S. strategy

Before and during Laird's visit to Indochina, the new U.S. strategy began to emerge. Bombings of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are again being utilized to salvage a rapidly deteriorating U.S. posture. Washington's scenario appears to be slightly different from that of the Johnson administration. The raids first began dramatically in November (actually there were earlier U.S. attacks on a smaller scale), apparently in a final bid to intimidate the North, to demonstrate U.S. will and to give Hanoi a chance to surrender before more systematic attacks get underway.

These attacks are now beginning on a regular basis and the administration probably is deluding itself into believing it has gained acquiescence of U.S. and world opinion for its "protective reaction strikes." Undoubtedly larger-scale attacks are in the offing before long, because the present level of attacks does not provide much military advantage and the Pentagon still believes that massive attacks against the North can produce results.

Apparently, the White House is operating under greater illusions than during the Johnson administration. When the preceding administration began its aerial attacks, the North's air defenses were in a relatively rudimentary state. Now the North's aerial defense network is the best that has ever been utilized in combat and, even more important, the people of the North are mobilized and fully prepared to defend themselves. Having been tested by the previous raids, they can be certain of the outcome of the new attacks.

The administration seems to be contemplating intensified air attacks in the South as well; thus belying the administration's claims of success in "pacification." Writing in the Jan. 16 Washington Post, Murrey Marder reports:

"A plan to shift large numbers of South Vietnamese civilians from the rugged, northern section of the country to the fertile delta area is being drafted in Saigon, U.S. officials confirmed yesterday. ... The intended project, still in a formative stage," continued Marder, "is currently designated as the South Vietnamese Land Development and Housing-Building program."

Genocidal scheme

An effort is being made to pretend that this is a Saigon project. More likely it is the latest CIA-invented "pacification" scheme. Conceivably it could involve the forced movement of as many as 1 million people. This project was denounced Jan.

Cambodia

—U.S.

inches in

By Daniel Southerland
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Phnom Penh, Cambodia

United States involvement in Cambodia has reached the point where it would be absurd any longer to speak of it as "low profile."

But it would be equally absurd at this stage to suggest that the United States is edging toward anything like another Vietnam, or even another Laos.

At the U.S. Embassy here, there is an obvious effort to avoid the mistakes of Vietnam, to limit the U.S. presence, and to make sure Americans do not start doing what Cambodians can do for themselves. This is what the "Nixon doctrine" is supposed to be all about.

The embassy has a staff of about 70 Americans, housed in a four-story apartment building on one of Phnom Penh's tree lined boulevards. This is a far cry from a year and a half ago when the United States renewed relations with Cambodia and set up a small embassy staff in a cramped former servants' quarters attached to a modest house rented by the chargé d'affaires. The embassy's profile was so low then many of the city's pedicab drivers had trouble finding it.

But as one official describes it, the present enlarged embassy staff is "still smaller than our mission in Guatemala, not much larger than Burma, and perhaps the size of Kuala Lumpur."

Congress has approved \$255 million in military and economic aid to Cambodia, and U.S. officials say additional personnel will be needed to help administer the expanded aid program. But they say they still hope to keep the total staff here below the 100 mark.

"We can't be low profile here," said the U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, Emory C. Swank, an expert on the Soviet Union and America's first ambassador to Phnom Penh in five years.

"It has to be at least a medium profile," he said, in an interview. "We do have an important role here. . . . But we hope to keep any increase in personnel to a modest level."

Ambassador Swank said it was hoped that only specializing in economic affairs would have to be brought in to supervise the projected economic-aid program.

The military-aid program is administered by the embassy's six-man political military section, with backstopping from Saigon. Possibly four more persons are to be added to this section to meet the expanded work load, the Ambassador said.

Program limited

But he said there is no intention at this time of establishing a full fledged U.S. economic-aid mission with aid technicians such as exists in Vietnam, or a U.S. military assistance group with military advisers as has been the procedure in a number of other countries.

"There are inevitable pressures to add to your staff when you have aid programs and must be accountable to Congress for them," said Mr. Swank.

"There is also an inevitable temptation to take things over," the Ambassador said. "Americans are very impatient."

"But I hope we've learned something in Vietnam. . . . The Cambodians want to help themselves."

Of course, the United States is doing a number of things in Cambodia that are coordinated from outside Cambodia and have little to do with the embassy in Phnom Penh.

The most significant of these activities are the air strikes and reconnaissance missions that U.S. planes and helicopters are flying in support of the Cambodians and the South Vietnamese operating in Cambodia. American planes also help fly ammunition, weapons, and other supplies into Phnom Penh daily as part of the military aid program.

During occasional emergencies, American helicopters have flown medical evacuation and supply missions for the South Vietnamese, according to the U.S. command in Saigon.

No advisers in field

Americans are involved, too, in the training of Cambodian troops and copter crews in South Vietnam, and there has been some secret training of Cambodian troops in southern Laos.

[As to airlifting South Vietnamese troops, however, Reuter reported a statement Tuesday by the U.S. Command:

"We wish to clarify a statement from the Department of Defense that ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) troop reinforcements have been lifted by U.S. helicopters in the Route 4 (Cambodia) operation. This has not been done, although it is within the guidelines laid down for U.S. air power to prevent the reestablishment of sanctuaries in Cambodia."]

But the embassy in Phnom Penh will play a key role by running the military aid program and will do the same with economic aid once Washington decides what kind of economic assistance it wants to give.

There are no U.S. advisers with Cambodian military units, and none of the 39-odd members of the defense attaché's office as an adviser to the Cambodians. They are largely doing what military attachés are

STATINTL

A Cambodian Tale, Starring Nop Nem

STATINTL

By PETER R. KANN

PHNOM PENH—The Cambodian war is, among other things, an interesting study in what some would call conversions and what others might consider pretenses.

There's Prince Sihanouk, the eccentric Parisian-oriented royalist, who is now playing proletarian revolutionary in Peking. And there's Lon Nol, Sihanouk's one-time prime minister and loyal retainer, who a year ago was helping the prince relay Russian arms to the Vietcong and who now serves as the staunchly anticommunist leader of the new republican regime.

There are old Khmer Rouge (Cambodian Red) partisans, who long fought against Sihanouk, but now suddenly find themselves allied with him and the Vietcong. There are Vietcong units wandering around Cambodia pretending to be Cambodian. And there are South Vietnamese officers walking around Phnom Penh acting like Americans.

There are clerks who have become cabinet ministers but there are also royalist colonels who have become republican generals. Bar-girls have taken to dressing like commandos. The newly popular Americans all go around speaking French, while the suddenly out-of-favor French community stays home studying English.

Altogether, it often seems that everyone here is acting out roles in some kind of fairy tale. Cambodia, indeed, was very much a fairy tale kingdom before the war. And even now it sometimes blinks into focus as a land of valiant little elves battling black-clad trolls for control of fabled lost cities like Angkor Wat, a land whose charming prince turned into an ugly frog; a land now run by new wizards with magical names that spell themselves both forward and backward—Lon-Nol.

One of the very strangest individual odysseys of this brief war is that of Lt. Nop Nem. His story, involving both conversions and pretenses, may also be significant for the bit of light it casts on developments in the Cambodian countryside, that political vacuum that the Vietcong are seeking to fill. The Cambodian government insists that the Vietcong are failing in this effort; Nop Nem's story offers some shreds of evidence to the contrary.

Nop Nem is no ordinary soldier. He is Cambodia's number-one movie idol, a tall, rough-hewn and handsome actor who, during an 11-year career, has starred in 75 feature films. Most have been classical, historical and romantic epics. Nop Nem once earned a million riels (\$20,000) a film; he drove a fast green sportscar, and he married a beautiful Cambodian actress named—really—Kim Nova.

Princely Film-Making

Nop Nem was also a favorite of Prince Sihanouk who, among his many hobbies, used to write, score, produce, direct and star in films. "Sihanouk was always thirsty to work with me. I was his favorite actor," Nop Nem recalls. The prince's thirsts were invariably quenched, and so Nop Nem co-starred in several Sihanouk productions. (The prince's film-making technique was probably unique. No

rehearsals and no retakes. "He just said 'roll em' and printed whatever he got.") The most famous Sihanouk-Nop Nem production was "Ombre sur Angkor" (Shadow Over Angkor), the story of a CIA-Thai-South Vietnamese plot to seize the ancient ruins of Angkor Wat and to overthrow Prince Sihanouk. Nop Nem played the villain. Prince Sihanouk played himself. The film was entered in the 1968 Moscow Film Festival, and Nop Nem attended to pick up the award: A "certificate of participation." The new Lon Nol regime, now aided by the Americans, Thai and South Vietnamese, has banned the film.

After Sihanouk fell last March, Nop Nem volunteered for the army and was assigned to a psychological warfare unit at Kampong Speu, about 40 kilometers from Phnom Penh. After three months of desk duty there he volunteered to serve at Srang, a more forward position to the south. There Nop Nem spent several uneventful weeks until, on the night of Sept. 29, the Vietcong attacked. And the Cambodians retreated.

Nop Nem and two comrades spent much of the night sleeping in a ditch, covered with leaves and branches. The next morning they met several score other survivors from their unit and proceeded toward a nearby village. En route they were caught in a Vietcong ambush. Nop Nem, along with several comrades spent that next night hiding in a wet rice paddy, underwater except for his handsome nose.

Sometime during the night they were discovered by a VC patrol. The VC began shouting questions in Vietnamese, which Nop Nem doesn't understand. "Then they hit me three times with a rifle butt," he recalls. Nop Nem and his friends were tied up and marched off by the enemy.

Word of Nop Nem's disappearance reached Phnom Penh the next day and several sportscars full of the capital's "beautiful people"—in bell-bottom khaki pants and wrap-around sunglasses—sped to Srang. But the star was gone.

He was by then being interrogated at an enemy camp. A Vietcong asked Nop Nem, through an interpreter, what he had been doing in Srang. Nop Nem replied that he had been scouting the scene as the site for a new movie. The actor added that he had made movies with Prince Sihanouk, the nominal leader of the VC-led liberation war. But the Vietcong interrogator was unimpressed. "In fact, he had never even heard of me," says Nop Nem.

Nop Nem was marched off to another enemy camp. Along the way he says he passed many Cambodian villagers who seemed to be working with the Vietcong. What's more important, they saw him. "They all started shouting my name. Nop Nem! Nop Nem!" the actor recalls with some pride. And thus the enemy finally realized that Nop Nem was no ordinary prisoner. He was kept in a village for about two weeks, during which time he was subjected to interrogation and indoctrination by Vietcong and Khmer Rouge.

Then Nop Nem was assigned to a Khmer Rouge platoon that was recruiting and propagandizing in the villages of Kampot Province, about 50 miles southwest of Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge were mostly veteran rebels who had once fought against Sihanouk, but now found themselves fighting with him and the Vietcong. They explained to Nop Nem that "everyone must now unite to fight the American imperialists." The Khmer Rouge kept asking Nop Nem how many American imperialist troops were in Phnom Penh. The actor replied that all he had seen were American journalists.

The Khmer Rouge also told Nop Nem to work hard with them and to prove his loyalty to the liberation forces.

The propaganda-recruiting team took Nop Nem through dozens of villages in the next four weeks. The actor was introduced to the villagers as a volunteer to the liberation cause, and he was invariably the star attraction at these meetings. "I didn't have to give any speeches. I just stood there and the Khmer Rouge let the villagers look at me," he says. Sometimes villagers asked Nop Nem about his movies and occasionally about the war, but a Khmer Rouge always was present to monitor his replies.

The Khmer Rouge told the villagers about "American imperialism" and the "Lon Nol puppet clique" and explained the "liberation war." Single men were asked to join the "liberation army." Nop Nem says the single men were not physically forced to join, "but they were asked to join, and the Khmer Rouge who asked them carried guns." And so most men who were asked to join agreed to do so. Some families tried to protect their sons by sending them off to village pagodas to become monks. The Khmer Rouge did not drag them out of the pagodas, but they did tell villagers not to take gifts of food to the monks.

The Khmer Rouge generally stayed in a village for several days. Sometimes they paid for their food, but generally they signed for what they ate and explained that Prince Sihanouk would come and redeem the IOUs later. Nop Nem says he saw no physical maltreatment of villagers. Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops and cadre passed through the villages from time to time, but generally stayed only a few hours.

Nop Nem says that among the Vietcong and Khmer Rouge he met were five Chinese nurses. They spoke neither Vietnamese nor Cambodian. Each nurse wore three badges on her peasant tunic. One of Chairman Mao, one of Ho Chi Minh, and one of Sihanouk. The nurses, says Nop Nem, carried Western-type medicines, but also gave acupuncture (a Chinese needle cure) for aches and pains.

Rules to Remember

The Khmer Rouge also established some rules in the villages. The ones Nop Nem remembers were: No stealing, no removing goods from the village, no chasing girls, and no marrying more than one wife.

During his days in the villages Nop Nem says he saw frequent air strikes by Skyriders (Americans) and T-28s (Cambodian).