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Bernstein

On

Words

By Theodore M. Bernstein

SPY. WORD. Ever heard of the word **DISINFORMATION**? It's not surprising if you didn't because it's part of the CIA cant. Let's say a Soviet spy defects in London. Immediately the Soviet KGB goes to work on countermeasures, one aim of which is to divert public attention from the seriousness of the defection. For example, the Soviet press will publish charges that a dozen British diplomats are intelligence agents in disguise and that the British in-publicizing the defection are guilty of provocation and cold war tactics. In the spy trade here such diversionary accusations are known as **DISINFORMATION**. Similar tactics are not uncommon in politics, but among politicians the word — **DISINFORMATION**, that is — hasn't gotten around yet.

IFFY. QUESTION. The little word **IF** frequently introduces words in the subjunctive mood — that is, words expressing a hypothesis, a wish, a condition contrary to fact or something that is doubtful. Because of its frequent appearance in such expressions, some people leap to the conclusion that it must always be followed by a subjunctive. But whereas it is proper to say, "If I were you . . ." (not a fact), it is not proper to say, "He wrs asked if

he were apprehensive over getting married." Sometimes **IF** is the equivalent of **WHETHER**, and merely introduces an indirect question, as it does in the foregoing second example. The verb there should be **WAS**, Indicative mood.

In other instances **IF** introduces a clause suggesting doubt or uncertainty and then the subjunctive is normal: "If he **WERE** honest, his score for eighteen holes would be 79, not 71." But when the emphatic point is not the **IF**, but rather what follows it, the indicative is preferable: "If he **WAS** honest, his score for eighteen holes was 71." If you are in doubt (not "if you be in doubt"), use the indicative because the subjunctive in most uses, is fading decade by decade.

WORD ODDITIES. **INFINITE** and **INFINITESIMAL** start from the same base, but they go in opposite directions. The basic idea in both is incapable of being measured. But **INFINITE** means extending beyond limits or measure and has the sense of vastness. **INFINITESIMAL**, on the other hand, means so small as to be unmeasurable. Underlying both these negative words is the positive word **FINITE**, based on the Latin verb **FINIRE** (to limit or finish), which in turn comes from **FINIS**. And that's a good word to end on. Have a finite, everybody.

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DEPARTMENT D HANDLES SCHEMES

Russians Map Deception

Last in a series

By L. EDGAR PRINA
Military Affairs Editor
Copley News Service

WASHINGTON — Was the Soviet Union ever really racing the United States to the moon?

Maybe yes, maybe no — but they made Americans think so. After a prodigious 10-year, \$20 billion effort, the United States got there first. The Russians still have not put a man on the lunar surface.

Perhaps there will never be a definite answer on the moon race question, but U.S. officials are convinced that one of the missions of the Soviet secret police — or KGB — is to carry out deception and disinformation campaigns as to the U.S.S.R.'s scientific and space programs.

The KGB unit in charge of their "big lie" operations is its Department of "Dezinformatsiya" (Disinformation) or simply, Department D. Staffed by 60 to 75 experts in a wide variety of fields, it operates under the overall direction of the powerful Central Committee of the Communist party.

'DIRTY TRICK'

Department D, located in KGB headquarters in the notorious Lubyanka Prison building in downtown Moscow, specializes in the "dirty trick." Its operatives use such weapons as forgery, fraudulent documents, false news stories and rumors and fabricated intelligence reports.

"Scientific disinformation, both creating false impressions of Soviet capabilities and diverting Western research into nonproductive channels, is an important part of Department D's responsibilities," a U.S. official said.

"A former KGB officer has reported that one of the aims of the KGB at the time Department D was created was to carry out deception concerning the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. He also told

us that Soviet scientists are explicitly instructed to try to mislead Western scientists concerning the subject and degree of success of their current research."

The belief that the Kremlin is vitally interested in misleading the United States and the West in the scientific field is supported in the Rand Corp. study, "Deception in Strategic Missile Claims, 1957-1962." Here is what the study concluded:

'STRATEGIC DECEPTION'

"Since 1957, the Soviet leaders, principally (Premier Nikita S.) Khrushchev and some top military figures, have practiced deliberate, systematic and sustained strategic deception."

The apparent purpose of this disinformation effort was to lead the West and the non-aligned nations to conclude that the U.S.S.R. possessed intercontinental ballistic missiles in large numbers at a time just after the first Sputnik when the U.S. capability in this field was not fully developed. Thus, there was the phony U.S. "missile gap."

The deception was aided by private conversations with Western diplomatic and political leaders as well as by public statements from Soviet officials.

The United States and its allies are particularly vulnerable to Russian scientific deception when programs in the research and development stage are involved.

SCREENED INFORMATION

This is because the West is largely dependent upon information received through channels which are completely under Soviet control: published articles which have been carefully screened; equipment shown in Soviet parades; well-chaperoned visits to Soviet scientific establishments and the like.

"Given the security controls surrounding Soviet scientists and scientific installations connected with military or space activities, it is extremely difficult to obtain in-

dependent verification of information through sources assuredly under our control and, hence, to identify the scientific deception operations presumably being directed against us by Department D," a U.S. official said.

American scientists, as a whole, are renowned for their political naivete and social consciousness.

The Russians, particularly the Department D experts in the KGB, are quick to exploit them.

A classic example of how the Soviet Union employs its scientists in the shoddy business of disinformation was produced during the visit to the United States of Dr. Pyotr Kapitsa in the fall of 1969.

FULL SWING

Kapitsa, dean of Soviet physicists and director of the Moscow Institute of Physical Problems, made the U.S. scientific circuit. He visited Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Bell Laboratories, the National Academy of Sciences, Stanford, the California Institute of Technology and Rockefeller University.

Thus, he met and chatted with many of America's most eminent scientists. Did he spread any Soviet disinformation in the process? If an interview in the New York Times (Oct. 9, 1969), is any

indication, he certainly did. He made these statements:

— ABM (antiballistic missile) systems are intrinsically very costly, yet they are invariably ineffective. If ABMs are deployed in the United States, it will only increase the number of ICBMs in the Soviet Union.

— Large amounts of money can be wasted in poor management of space programs; the U.S.S.R. is more expert in this field than the United States.

— Soviet spending for space programs is "several times less" than the amount the United States spends.

— He is deeply concerned over the danger of a military confrontation between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

— He believes in the "convergence concept," — that is, that the Soviet and American systems are coming closer and closer together through a scientific approach.

SUPPORTS BELIEFS

Kapitsa did not do badly for one interview. He supported the arguments of those American scientists who oppose the Safeguard ABM system for defending our land-based Minuteman missiles and stimulated doubts as to the wisdom of huge expenditures on armaments, particularly since the systems of the two superpowers are converging.

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Russians Utilize Forged 'Lies'

Friendly Media Publicize Germ Warfare Story

Third in a series

By L. EDGAR PRINA
Military Affairs Editor
Copley News Service

WASHINGTON — As the Central Intelligence Agency's Richard M. Helms has pointed out, the Soviet secret police, in pressing the Krenlin's campaign of lies and slander against the United States, "frequently use seemingly independent media to float fabrications which the Communist outlets then re-surface in the guise of untainted proof."

They do this because the media they own and control are suspect in the West. So, Free World publications with no evident connection with the U.S.S.R. or even with Communist-front organizations are lined up by the KGB.

"Then, through hidden financial subsidies and other methods, the Russians gain sufficient influence to assure the publication of false stories about Western conspiracies, atrocities and military aggressions," Helms says.

A recent example of the KGB's disinformation activity involved Blitz, a weekly publication in Bombay, India, which makes the anything but modest claim that it is "Asia's foremost news-magazine." Ostensibly independent, it is actually a regular conduit for Russian propaganda.

GERM WARFARE CLAIM

Blitz' "big lie" story was that the United States was engaged in germ warfare in Southeast Asia. It recalled the spurious Communist charges of "biological warfare" during the 1950-53 Korean War.

After a major Soviet propaganda barrage aimed at the Pentagon's **Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000300330001-5** tions for conducting germ

warfare, the KGB decided to "prove" its case. Its tool: the fraudulent document.

The Russians got hold of a letterhead of the Department of the Navy's Office of Naval Research, wrote an incriminating text and forged the name of Gordon D. Goldstein to it. Copies of the phony document were photostated and mailed to editors of various publications in India, including the Statesman in Calcutta, and the Free Press Journal in Bombay.

According to the "letter," Goldstein opened with the statement that Red Chinese agents were spreading rumors "in your country" that "the bubonic plague epidemic in Vietnam and the occurrence of epidemic diseases in other Asian countries" were connected with U.S. biological warfare.

"They (the agents) do not hesitate to assert that the biological weapons stored at special bases of the U.S. Air Force and Navy are negligently protected," the letter continued. "They claim, in particular, that the storing of biological weapons by special BW (biological warfare) units near the Thailand air bases of the U.S. Air Force is carried out in a most incompetent manner.

"An epidemic breaking out in Thailand as a result of such carelessness might — they claim — spread like wildfire into other densely inhabited countries of Asia that lack adequate sanitation, thus leading to the sacrifice of millions of innocent lives."

CLAIMS 'PROTECTION'

Having "admitted" that the United States stockpiles BW weapons in Southeast Asia, the letter then goes on to assure the addressee that charges of negligence in their handling and storage are "irrefutable," while these have been a couple of acci-

dents in the United States, they should be regarded as minor, it said, and the quick inoculation of nearby populations with the proper vaccines protected them.

"Suffice it to point out that during the last 10 years only an insignificant number of cases of bubonic plague or smallpox have occurred among the personnel of the BW laboratories and storage centers at the Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, and the Pine Bluff Arsenal, Ark.," the letter asserted reassuringly.

INOCULATION TOLD

"They were, moreover, immediately localized, and the inhabitants of the nearby towns were protected from any danger of infection through inoculation with appropriate vaccines. We have had the same positive experience in connection with our special depositories overseas."

Blitz, in its March 9, 1968, edition, went promptly to work. It embellished the phony letter with the additional charge that the United States has stored hydrogen bombs in Southeast Asia. Under the headline, "U.S.A. Admits Biological and Nuclear Warfare," it said:

"The Americans have officially admitted in a letter written by the U.S. Department of the Navy to some Indian newspaper editors that the U.S.A. has moved huge quantities of biological warfare weapons and mild (sic) thermonuclear devices into Vietnam and Thailand."

CHARGES PRINTED

The Statesman and Free Press Journal printed the phony charges too, but after the U.S. State Department issued a denial and produced evidence of a forgery both, in effect, published retractions.

Most disillusioning to U.S. officials, however, was the London Sunday Times' copy of April 28, 1968 — long after

the State Department branded the Goldstein "letter" a forgery. Under a New York dateline and carrying Cal McCrystal's by-line, it said:

"The first indication that the U.S. was in a state of readiness to launch germ attacks in Vietnam slipped out last month following rumors that the storage of American weapons of biological warfare at special bases in Thailand was supervised in an incompetent manner.

"There have been charges that the weapons were responsible for a bubonic plague epidemic in Vietnam. Certainly, plague outbreaks are an increasing worry from the South Vietnamese authorities, but the American Navy Department — the branch of the forces which decided to reply to the charges — denied that germ munitions were to blame.

"The Navy Department's accompanying comment, however, confirmed that biological munitions stockpiles DID exist."

Thus, McCrystal, in what was labeled "an investigation," accepted the forgery as gospel. He either ignored or overlooked the U.S. explanation — and the evidence.

Tomorrow: The special Soviet disinformation effort in the scientific field.

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STATINTL

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Russians Try To Discredit

Americans Soviet KGB Wages Campaign Of Slander

Against U.S. Leaders

Second in a Series

By L. EDGAR PRINA
Military Affairs Editor
Century News Service

WASHINGTON — A prime job of the Soviet secret police (KGB), assigned it by the powerful Central Committee of the Communist party, is to discredit individuals, organizations and governments regarded as inimical to the interests of the U.S.S.R.

Acting through its Department of "Dezinformatsiya" (disinformation), the KGB has used fraudulent stories, forgery, deception, false rumors and propoganda in efforts to damage the reputations and effectiveness of Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Sargent Shriver, Nelson A. Rockefeller, J. Edgar Hoover, John Foster Dulles, William P. Rogers and many other American leaders.

It has employed the same immoral tools in an unrelenting campaign of slander against such U.S. government organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Peace Corps.

OTHER TARGETS

Although the United States is "Enemy No. 1" to the Kremlin, the KGB has other objectives as well. It aims to lure the West and divide it.

How do you drive a wedge between the United States and its allies? If the U.S.S.R. is viewed as stable, strong and aggressive in its pursuit of foreign policies, the West is encouraged to remain united.

On the other hand, if the West can be made to believe the Communist superpower is riven with domestic problems, is chastened by the "threat" of Red China and is seeking a genuine detente,

then the allies are inclined to lower their guard.

COMMON THEMES

Accordingly, among the standard Soviet disinformation themes are these:

1. The U.S.S.R. has severe internal troubles; there is, potentially, at least, a viable domestic opposition to the Communist regime; the Soviet-Chinese split is going to lead to war.

2. The KGB is dull, plodding and ineffective.

3. The United States treats its allies with arrogance and contempt.

In the last four or five years, particularly since the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, the Soviet disinformation effort has focused heavy attention on the Middle East.

If one were to pick a prime target in the Middle East for the Department of Disinformation (or Department D, as it also is known), the name of Lt. Gen. Moshe Dayan likely would head the list. The popular Israeli defense minister, a tough-talking hawk, military hero and possible future prime minister, is the kind of leader who could rally a nation in time of war.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the general recently was the intended victim of a typical Soviet-type, fraudulent-document libel.

Known to U.S. officials as the "Denholm Forgeries, Part II," the document was armed with a multiple warhead. It sought to discredit Dayan and British and American intelligence agencies and show Western collusions with Israel. The unusual aspect of the case was that the forgery surfaced in Israel.

PHOTO COPY

The document was a photostatic copy of an alleged secret dispatch to the U.S. Army attache in Tel Aviv from Col. Charles J. Denholm, chief of the collection division, office of the assistant chief of staff for Army Intelligence in Washington.

Denholm, who looks like he might be a teacher, now is a major general serving as commander of the Army Security Agency in Washington.

Dated May 25, 1959, the forged paper said, in part:

"In connection with your inquiries concerning Maj.

Gen. Moshe Dayan, we have consulted CIA authorities. They informed us that Dayan was well known to their British colleagues since he was involved in some delicate operations they conducted in the Middle East. SIS (British Intelligence Service) approached Dayan in 1941 while he was in a British prison and obtained his release before his sentence expired.

"The CIA considers that acceptable provisions for joint contact with Dayan could be worked out with SIS in accordance with previous practice. CIA will instruct its officer in Tel Aviv, Mr. W. Lockling, on the matter and he will get in touch with you. You must maintain close liaison with him as mediator."

Here, one is supposed to conclude, is a lackey of the old imperialists (British) being passed on to the new imperialists (Americans).

Certainly, one of the purposes of the disinformation fraud was to involve the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the British Intelligence Service in alleged attempts to recruit Dayan as an agent. Another purpose was to diminish the prestige and influence of Dayan, a hard-liner against the Soviet Union's intrigue in the Middle East and its Arab clients, and defense minister's post.

CONCEDES POSSIBILITY

A slightly off-focus photostat of the phony document was published by the leftwing sex-and-scandal weekly, Haolam Hazeh, Nov. 10, 1970, in Tel Aviv. Uri Avneri, its editor, is a member of the Knesset (parliament) and a bitter political opponent of Dayan.

According to Avneri, he received the photostat in the mail a year earlier from an anonymous sender in Paris. He said the postmark indicated it came from a section of the French capital in which a number of foreign embassies are located.

In an article accompanying the published document, Avneri conceded that "I assumed, a priori, that there was a reasonable possibility of its being a forgery by a foreign espionage service, such as Soviet intelligence."

However, he said he decided to publish it after Dayan refused to discuss with him, off the record, the question of war and peace, and after a British newspaper correspondent learned of its existence.

The timing of publication suggested another explanation. It came shortly before the Israeli Labor party elections. Dayan was reported to be locked in a bitter fight with Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon for the party leadership. Each would like to succeed Golda Meir as prime minister.

The publication was not calculated to advance Dayan's political aspirations.

DISCREPANCIES CITED

A study of the photostat indicates the form is a correct copy of a Department of the Army letterhead. The content raises suspicions, but the signature makes the forgery plain. The use of "SIS" as the designation of British intelligence is strange because the service has been known since shortly after World War II.

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By BENJAMIN WELLES

WASHINGTON.

IT CAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it's been," says his wife, Cynthia. "Some days he has on what I call his 'Oriental look'—totally inscrutable. I know better than to ask what's happened. He'll talk when he's ready, not before, but even when he talks he's terribly discreet."

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, apparently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband—at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms's job is definitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington.

Successive budget cuts, balance of payments restrictions, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.'s public image have all reduced its operations considerably. President Nixon has recently ordered a fiscal and management investigation into the intelligence "community," a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelligence agencies to hide in the bureaucratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs adviser,

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Henry Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing: intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion—or, sometimes, no opinion—behind a screen of words.

Considered a cold-blooded necessity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be undemocratic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through "front" foundations of the National Student Association plus private cultural, women's and lawyers' groups, and, finally, two years ago, the Green Berets affair.

The 58-year-old Helms knows this, better than most. As the first career intelligence officer to reach the

top since the C.I.A. was created in 1947, his goal has been to professionalize the agency and restore it to respectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to cross the image of the Director as a man who moves in lavish mystery, jettisoning secretly around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of "security," the public's vague fears and Congress's probing questions. If Helms rules an "invisible empire," as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor.

While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occasionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He prefers the Occidental, a tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed entering a private home.

He likes the company of attractive women—young or old—and they find him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer.

"He's interesting—and interested in what you're saying," said Lydia Katzenbach, wife of the former Democratic Attorney General. "He's well-read and he doesn't try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton '43 routine that some of the columnists around town use."

Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press—even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency's ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation's capital.

Yet, if he gives the appearance of innocence—he is witty, gregarious, friendly—the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass of apparent contradictions: inwardly self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, absorbed in the essential yet fascinated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and can recall precisely what few Americans can—what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap

The Big Lie

Soviet Style

This is the first in a series of four articles analyzing the Soviet Union's campaign to discredit the West and sow confusion with deception, fraud and forgeries.

By L. EDGAR PRINA
Military Affairs Editor
Copley News Service

WASHINGTON — At No. 2 Dzerzhinsky Square, not far from the Kremlin in downtown Moscow, there's a rather ugly gray limestone edifice whose notoriety has been recorded in novel and news story.

It is the infamous Lubyanka Prison building, the end of the line for many an important "enemy" of Stalin and his successors, but in czarist days the home of the Lubyanka Insurance Co.

Since the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Lubyanka has also served as headquarters of the dread Soviet secret police, the Cheka, when it was first set up under Felix Dzerzhinsky.

Today the secret police organization is known as the KGB or, more formally, the Committee of State Security, and one of its busiest arms is Department D of its first chief directorate, popularly called the Department of "Dezinformatsiya" (disinformation).

A more apt name, according to U.S. intelligence experts, would be "Department of Dirty Tricks."

The key function performed by Department D, which was created in late 1959, is to help prepare, carry out and monitor deception/disinformation operations — an effort directed primarily against the United States ("Glavni Vrag" or "Enemy No. 1") and its allies. It has a headquarters payroll of perhaps 30 to 75 experts of various types. Its chief for a number of years was the recently deceased Gen. Ivan Ivanovich Agayants.

Vasily Sitnikov, an expert on North Atlantic Treaty Organization affairs, was No. 2 and may have been advanced to acting chief.

Underscoring the department's importance is the fact that one of the most powerful groups in the USSR, the

Central Committee of the Communist Party, directly supervises its work. The schemes and themes of disinformation are planned by the party leaders and committee staff units handle the details. If forgeries are required, they are prepared by Department D experts or satellite intelligence services, often the East German and Czech.

The aim of the game is not simply to mislead and defame the Western powers but, through such weapons as phony "facts," fraudulent documents and false reports, to prompt them to take actions contrary to their own interests.

Richard M. Helms, director of Central Intelligence, has pointed out that the Russians "have a long tradition in the art of forgery." They produced the spurious anti-Semitic tract, "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," at the turn of the century.

Soviet forgeries began appearing in volume in 1957 and many of them have been aimed at American targets through a worldwide network.

"The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) put these fakes under the microscope," Helms told the Senate Internal Security subcommittee when he was top aide to Allen W. Dulles at the agency. "We found that each Soviet forgery is manufactured and spread according to a plan. Each is devised and timed to mesh with other techniques of psychological warfare in support of Soviet strategy."

Helms listed three main purposes of the disinformation effort:

1. To discredit the West generally, and the United States and its government specifically, in the eyes of the rest of the world.

2. To sow "suspicion and discord" among the Western allies, especially between the United States and its friends.

3. To drive a wedge between the peoples of non-Soviet block countries and their governments by fostering the line that "these governments do not represent their citizens because they are puppets" of the United States.

The Soviets use a variety of types of documentary frauds, including the false news story, the distortion of a genuine document, the forgery, the fabricated account, the false fact or true account attributed to a non-existent organization.

According to Helms, a number of tricks are "used by the Soviets to nurse a little 'plant' into a big lie." He cited a few:

"One is to print a local or planted rumor as a news article using both (Soviet) bloc and free world papers as outlets. Another is to lend the tale a seeming authenticity by replaying through bloc media stories attributed to the Western press. A third device is the allegation that the current Soviet charges are proven by secret Western documents — documents that do not even exist as forgeries."

The major Soviet disinformation themes charge that the United States is an imperialist power bent upon world domination; that it interferes in the affairs of independent countries and that it connives against its own allies.

To promote these themes, the Soviets have peddled some fantastic concoctions.

Would you believe Nelson A. Rockefeller sent a "letter" to President Dwight D. Eisenhower outlining a cynical plan for using U. S. military and economic aid to press a world domination goal?

How about an "agreement" between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi of Japan "to permit use of Japanese troops anywhere in Asia?"

Or a "letter" from Dulles to the U.S. ambassador to Iran, in which the secretary made insulting remarks about the shah?

Perhaps a "letter" from Dr. Frank B. Berry, assistant secretary of defense for health, to Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy in 1958?

This one had Berry asserting that 67.3 per cent of all flight personnel in the U.S. Air Force were psychoneurotic, many showing phobias, "hysterical syndromes and fits of unaccountable animosity."

Berry also "reported" that studies of chronic overstrain of the nervous system among Strategic Air Command pilots and navigators indicated "excessive and systematic use of alcohol (quite often even in flight), use of narcotic drugs (particularly cigarettes containing opium and marijuana), and sexual excesses and perversions."

For good measure, this line was added: "Moral depression is a typical condition of all crew members making flights with atomic and H-bombs."

The forged Berry letter first surfaced in the East German newspaper Neues Deutschland in May, 1958, and then was replayed in other Communist organs.

Later Soviet disinformation projects pushed charges just as far out.

For example, a "letter" dated June 18, 1963, from Sargent Shriver, director of the Peace Corps, stated that a "re-creative" in Ethiopia dovetailed with the

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