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Soviet Account of Missile Crisis Stresses Summit Offer

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MOSCOW, July 28--According to Soviet archives just made public, four days before President John F. Kennedy informed the world about the Cuban missile crisis, Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev proposed a meeting with him that Mr. Kennedy first seemed to support but rejected later in the day.

The Foreign Ministry documentation dealing with the 1962 crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba was included in an article by Anatoly A. Gromyko, the son of Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, which was published in the monthly historical journal *Voprosy Istorii*.

Reports Meeting with Rusk

The first of two articles, entitled, "The Caribbean Crisis," covers events up to Mr. Kennedy's speech of Oct. 22, 1962, in which he reported on the discovery of Soviet offensive missiles on Cuba and demanded their withdrawal by Soviet authorities.

Presumably, the second article will cover events up until Mr. Khrushchev's decision to pull out the missiles in return for an American pledge not to invade Cuba.

Mr. Gromyko's article reports on a private meeting be-

tween Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, shortly before Mr. Kennedy's speech. Mr. Rusk gave Mr. Dobrynin a copy of the speech and a message for Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Dobrynin said after reading the documents that "the United States has deliberately created a dangerous crisis."

In his article, Mr. Gromyko also rebuked those Americans who later accused his father of bad faith when he failed to disclose the presence of the missiles when he met with the President at the White House on Oct. 18.

The article recalls the attempted invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961, and asserts, "The Soviet Union and Cuba, in full conformity with the norms of international law, in the summer of 1962 reached an accord on the strengthening of the defense capabilities of Cuba."

Calls Missiles 'Defensive'

"Medium-range missiles were deployed on the island for defensive purposes. This was an action aimed at exerting a sobering influence on the advocates of military adventure in Washington and the preventing of a new American invasion against the Cuban people," the article says. It does not mention that on Oct. 14 American aerial reconnaissance and film also disclosed plans to build bases for intermediate range missiles.

Mr. Gromyko is a section chief of the Institute of the U.S.A., a research institute of the Academy of Sciences.

Accounts of the meeting between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Mr. Kennedy, which lasted more than two hours on Oct. 18, say that Mr. Kennedy decided against raising the matter of the missiles and that Mr. Gromyko did not mention them. Later, American writers often accused the Soviet Foreign Minister of duplicity, something his son resents.

The article says that the goal of these accusations "was to hide the true character of the meeting and to invent still an-

other pretext to justify the violation of the norms of international law by the activity of the Government of the U.S.A. in the fall of 1962 against Cuba and the Soviet Union."

It also says that the Kennedy Administration "consciously rejected different diplomatic means, by the help of which it would have been possible to avert the confrontation."

To underscore this point, Mr. Gromyko says his brother gave Mr. Kennedy a proposal from Mr. Khrushchev—who is not mentioned by name in the article—suggesting the two men meet "to settle disputed international problems and the examination of questions which cause divergences between the Soviet Union and the United States." Mr. Gromyko quotes as his source the Soviet foreign policy archives.

American versions say only that such a meeting was mentioned obliquely.

The article says, "the President reacted positively to this proposal of the Soviet Union." But, according to the article, at a dinner that evening given by Mr. Rusk for Mr. Gromyko, Llewellyn E. Thompson, then a special adviser on Soviet Affairs to the President, told Mr. Dobrynin that "the White House would like to postpone the summit meeting."

The article said that it was difficult to determine whether Mr. Kennedy in fact wanted a summit and was dissuaded by his advisers, or whether his initial positive response was only "diplomatic camouflage" to disguise "the planned aggressive course against the Soviet Union and Cuba."