

DES MOINES, IOWA
TRIBUNE

E - 113,781

DEC 19 1972

Ask U.S. Detail All CIA Funds

By Thomas B. Ross
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WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Supreme Court has been asked to compel the government to disclose how much money is being spent by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

William Richardson, an accountant for the public defender's office in Greensburg, Pa., appealed to the court Monday to enforce the constitutional requirement that "a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."

Specifically, Richardson asked the court to declare unconstitutional the law that permits CIA money to be hidden in the budgets of other government agencies and expended without public accountability.

It is estimated that the CIA spends more than \$1 billion a year and that the other intelligence branches, all under control of the CIA director, spend \$4 billion. Most of the money is hidden in the Defense Department budget, principally under expenditures for large weapons systems.

Richardson, who is not a lawyer, argued that the court should hear the case because the CIA practice distorts public understanding of the entire federal budget.

Not only are the CIA funds kept secret, he said, but "falsifying data must be inserted" in the budgets of all other agencies that act as conduits for the CIA's money.

but for the purpose of overturning a ruling by a U.S. appeals court in Pennsylvania that a lower court should give Richardson a hearing.

The government's petition declared: "The decision below, if allowed to stand, is almost certain to spawn a significant increase in suits by taxpayers challenging a wide variety of government programs and a significant number of congressional statutes."

The government argued that Congress had a right to exempt the CIA from the constitutional requirement on total disclosure.



CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 536,108
S - 709,123
DEC 19 1972

Court asked to make U.S. tell CIA budget

Sun-Times Bureau

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M - 66,978
DEC 12 1972

Sweeping Changes In The Works For CIA

By Paul Scott

WASHINGTON — The American intelligence community is preparing for one of the most sweeping realignments since the Central Intelligence Agency was established in the late 1940s.

It could also become one of the most controversial.

In ordering the shakeup, President Nixon's principal objectives are to tighten White House control over the government's vast intelligence commu-

nity and to make it more responsive to changes taking place in U.S. relations with Moscow and Peking.

White House aides say the President hopes to accomplish these objectives in several ways. First, the President plans to replace Richard Helms as director of the Central Intelligence Agency with his "own man." This is expected to be James R. Schlesinger, presently

Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and a member of the inner White House circle.

Second, the President plans to drastically cut the budgets of all intelligence agencies by an estimated \$500 million. This would mean big cutbacks in personnel and operational funds for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence functions of the State Department and military services.

Significantly, the proposed half billion dollar reduction is the same figure recommended in a study made by a panel headed by Schlesinger, when he was Assistant Director of the Bureau of Budget. When the Schlesinger recommendation was first circulated by the White House, CIA Director Helms and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird joined forces to successfully oppose it.

With both Helms and Laird now leaving government, the President has once again dusted off the Schlesinger recommendation and now wants the former Virginia University Economic Professor to see if he can't implement it.

The President would like to see Schlesinger test out some of the ideas he put in papers prepared while director of strategic studies at the Rand Corporation, a government financed "think tank" at Santa Monica, Calif.

These papers dealt exclusively with how systems analyses could be used to improve political, military and intelligence de-

cision making, and cost cutting in these fields. While at the Rand Corporation, Schlesinger also prepared a study on the cost of nuclear weapons proliferation which caught the President's eye.

In discussing the need for an intelligence shakeup with aides, the President indicated that he was replacing CIA Director Helms because the latter was not aggressive enough to make the changes he believes are necessary in the intelligence community. Helms, a career CIA employe, was a holdover from the Johnson Administration.

The President's view is that the government's intelligence roles and missions must be gradually changed to meet the new relationships which exist between the U.S. and Russia and Communist China.

As contracts and negotiations produce new agreement with these communist powers, the President is convinced that much of the intelligence now gathered the hard way and at great expense may become available through mutual exchange of information.

This proposed intelligence exchange is an integral part of the risky "partnership for peace" strategy which Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's national security adviser, has succeeded in getting President Nixon to adopt.

Veteran intelligence officers see the reinvention as a move by the President and Kissinger to make the intelligence community more responsive to their efforts to use foreign policy to build a new world order.

29 Oct 1972

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00010016

WALTER SCOTT'S Personality Parade

Q. *Is the Central Intelligence Agency worth to this country what it costs?—B.S., Los Angeles, Calif.*

A. That is difficult to tell, since practically no man knows what the CIA costs the U.S. taxpayer annually. Its budget is so inextricably mingled with defense appropriations that the truth of the agency's expenditures is virtually beyond the determination of Congress. Sen. John Stennis (D., Miss.), head of the Armed Services Committee, and a few other Senators are supposed to keep a watchful eye on the CIA, but Stennis has long been regarded as a cooperative captive of the intelligence and defense communities.



Legislating dictatorship

The House Ways and Means Committee's 20-5 vote giving President Nixon the power to hack the Federal budget has been described by Rep. James Burke (D-Mass), a member of the committee, as "heading toward a dictatorship."

The facts support Burke's warning. The bill gives Nixon the unlimited right to cut or eliminate any item in the budget. It is the most sweeping such authority ever granted to any President.

It was a servile surrender to Nixon, in the exact language which the Administration demanded. It gives President Nixon the right, in effect, to decide the Federal budget unilaterally, in dictatorial fashion.

The Ways and Means Committee's action is an illegal abdication of the powers granted to it and to Congress by the Constitution.

The committee voted for four years of totalitarian rule over the budget of the United States. The Committee members who voted for the measure are trying to cover up their action by claiming that the President will not cut Social Security, or veterans benefits, or aid to the states and localities. But the Committee deliberately refused to exempt these or any other specific welfare items from the President's axe. The victims can be named now: the poor, the Black people and other nationally oppressed minorities, the working people. That's whom the Committee refused to protect.

One area of the budget is certain to be spared by Nixon — the expenditures for war, war preparations and repression, the appropriations for the Pentagon, the FBI, and the CIA.

The action of the Ways and Means Committee confirms that there is, as the Communist Party election platform says, a "grave danger of a military-racist-fascist type of state, under which the survival of even limited capitalist democracy is threatened."

The action of the House Ways and Means Committee should be condemned by the people, by the trade unions, especially, for the working people will be hit first and hardest by Presidential dictatorship over the budget.

Every House member should be called on now to press for the Ways and Means Committee to rescind its action and, that failing, to kill the totalitarian measure on the House floor.

SEPT 1972

CIA FUNDING CHALLENGED

PRESS SUPPRESSES STORY

Mass Media Ignore Item

A virtual news blackout has been declared by the nation's press concerning the major legal challenges that have been launched against the Central Intelligence Agency.

The August 10 filing of a suit in Washington against CIA Director Richard Helms and other government officials was a matter of court record and easily accessible to the news media. In addition, a news release containing essential facts about the story was hand delivered to the Washington Post, the Evening Star, the Associated Press and United Press International.

A week later, not one line concerning it had appeared anywhere in the country.

Earlier this year on July 20, an important decision in the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals guaranteed that the CIA would be brought to court on a challenge that had been in process since 1968.

America's greatest newspaper "of record" the New York Times, ignored the story, as did the Washington Evening Star and most other papers. The Washington Post carried the story as a small item on page ten.

It was confirmed that editors were well aware of the story and its importance.

A call to one of Washington's two-dailies produced this comment from a leading reporter: "You can call it a 'press conspiracy' if you like, but we're not going to print it and I'm sure no one else is either."

Court Moves

Hit Secrecy

**Special to the Virginia Weekly*

America's "invisible government," the Central Intelligence (CIA), owes its existence to a piece of legislation that is unconstitutional.

This is the likely import of recent actions in Federal Courts in Washington and Philadelphia.

In a suit filed August 10, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, three Washingtonians challenged the secrecy of the CIA's funding and accounting.

The Washington suit followed closely a trail-blazing decision on July 20 of this year by the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia. In that decision a majority of the court held that there was a serious legal question concerning the constitutionality of the CIA act of 1949 which established a secret procedure for financing the agency.

A VIRTUALLY IGNORED CLAUSE

Both court cases are based on a virtually ignored clause of the United States Constitution specifically requiring that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipt and Expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time." The CIA act of 1949 just as explicitly states "...Sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of Government funds."

The spy agency receives somewhere between four and twenty billion dollars each year in public funds (how much is a closely guarded secret) that are carefully hidden throughout the appropriations figures for the entire federal government.

The new suit also asks for a state-by-state and nation-by-nation breakdown of CIA expenditures, as well as separating the money into categories by functions. CIA Director Richard Helms and Eli Richardson, Secretary of the Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare brought into the local suit.

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Special Edition

The Washington Post, The Evening Star, the news services and the local radio stations have seen fit to suppress one of the major news stories of the year--the legal challenges to the nerve center of American imperialism, the Central Intelligence Agency.

For this reason THE VOICE felt obligated to fill the void by bringing out the first "special edition" in its young life.

Domestic Spying

The National Security Act which created the CIA states that it shall not have "police, subpoena, law-enforcing powers or internal security functions." The CIA has been operating in violation of this law for at least fifteen years and probably longer.

In early 1966 Richard Helms, the Director of the CIA, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated flatly that the CIA does not operate in the United States.

Yet in 1964 in a court case involving two Estonian emigrés the CIA presented to the court a secret document authorizing it to engage in certain domestic activities.

This authorization was in the form of an executive order which seems to be in direct violation of the act creating the CIA.

As a matter of fact the domestic operations of the CIA were so large by 1964 that it set up a Domestic Operations Division with headquarters at 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., about a block and a half from the White House.

Major breaks in CIA secrecy in 1966 and 1967 resulted in disclosures that the CIA was very heavily involved in financing all types of programs at such major universities as Michigan State and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In addition, it was revealed that the CIA had subsidized many domestic organizations including the major American student organization, The National Student Association. CIA money also found its way into at least twenty foundations, as well as Radio Free Europe, a large publishing house, and various other organizations.

Have the CIA's domestic operations ceased? A simple inspection of telephone books discloses that today the CIA has offices in at least twenty American cities.

STATINTL

BOSTON, MASS.
HERALD TRAVELER &
RECORD-AMERICAN

D & S - CIRC. N-A
AUG 23 1972

George Minot



George Minot

• WHY economists and others who watch how the people in Washington spend money don't advocate that a good way to save two or three billion a year would be to abolish the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that seems to find out what is going on long after everybody else.

Reference 1
S. C.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503
S - 867,810

JUL 22 1972

Ruling Asked On Secrecy in CIA Spending

The 3rd U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals here has ordered that a three-judge court be set up to decide the constitutionality of a law that exempts the Central Intelligence Agency from revealing its expenditures.

In a 4-3 decision, the appeals court told the U.S. District Court in Erie to empanel the special court.

The ruling Thursday was made on a request filed by William B. Richardson, 52, of Greensburg, Westmoreland County. He charged the government's failure to disclose CIA expenditures violates the Constitutional requirement for an accounting of all government financial dealings.

Richardson appealed to the circuit court after a district court judge in Erie rejected his plea.

In the appeals court decision written by Judge Max Rosen, the court said a citizen has the right to know how his tax money is being spent.

The CIA Act of 1949 exempts the agency from "the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditures of government funds."

Court to Act On Secret CIA Costs

PHILADELPHIA, July 21 (AP)—The Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered a three-judge court set up to decide the constitutionality of a law exempting the Central Intelligence Agency from revealing its expenditures.

In a 4-to-3 decision, the appeals court told the U.S. District Court in Erie, Pa., to empanel the special court.

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Nixon style of communication challenged

McGovern would open White House doors

By Courtney R. Sheldon
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The grand Canyon abyss between President Nixon's style of communicating with the American public and that promised by Sen. George McGovern widens visibly.

How much and how soon should the man on the street know of the inner workings of the White House?

The differences on public information policy are, in part, the normal ones between an incumbent president and a probing, aggressive opponent.

But the Nixon record on contacts with the public has been sidely debated here for several years and Mr. McGovern would like to make it into a central issue — one that flavors the entire campaign. McGovern aides confirm this.

Senator McGovern charges "secrecy and deception in high places" and says "the doors of government will be opened" in a McGovern administration.

Executive privilege

Under a McGovern administration would be a review and modification of the doctrine of executive privilege which Mr. Nixon and previous administrations have invoked to prevent White House staff members from testifying before congressional committees.

Only when testimony was asked on "highest national security" matters would it be refused, Mr. McGovern says. Even a man in the position of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security matters, would be expected to testify on some questions.

There would not be, it is pledged, attempts of prior restraint of the newspapers as there was by the Nixon administration in the case of the Pentagon papers publication.

Nixon-administration officials have heard what Mr. McGovern has had to say about White House secrecy with studied equanimity. They regard much of it as impractical and likely to be reversed in the unlikelihood he takes over the White House.

Presidential style

They are comfortable with Mr. Nixon's style of conferring lengthily with his advisers and then making periodic surprise announcements on television, or at forums where no questions are permitted. They

emphasize how widely he reads, the constant flow of visitors to the White House, and Mr. Nixon's world travels.

Recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court — since Mr. Nixon has named four conservatives to the bench — are dangerous restrictions on government news sources and on individual rights, according to the Democrats.

Mr. McGovern is attempting to give his proposals for an "open door" at the White House credibility by permitting free-wheeling information dispensing by his campaign aides. Newsmen were allowed into a pre-campaign McGovern strategy session at Miami Beach.

Mr. McGovern endured the wrath of the far-left fringe of the antiwar groups in a Miami Beach hotel lobby to demonstrate his willingness to answer questions from all quarters.

Open-door policy voiced

He said earlier he would have invited those who demonstrated for peace in Vietnam during the Nixon administration into the white House rather than ringing the white House with a bumper to bumper blockade of busses.

Mr. McGovern began to unfurl his information policy in early 1972 when almost no one was reading his handouts or bothering to listen to his Senate speeches.

In the light of his acceptance speech attacks on Mr. Nixon, his revolutionary recommendations are being examined here both for their partisan and practical appeal.

Senator McGovern, if elected, says he would put the following into effect immediately by executive order or obtain legislative approval where necessary:

- Classification of documents or classes of documents would be allowed only upon order of the president, the vice-president, and officials confirmed by the Senate, and a decision to classify must be made within 30 days of production of the document. The process would be open to monitoring by the Congress.

- The budgets of all federal agencies, including those involved in intelligence work such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), would be disclosed.

- Cabinet meetings would be open to the press except in rare cases where the national security imposes a secrecy requirement.

word for word from Mr. McGovern's recent press releases

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16 JUL 1972

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

EX-AGENT SEEKS TO LIFT PLEDGE

CIA Secrecy Decision Could Hinder News

BY ROBERT C. TOTH

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — A little-noticed government suit against an ex-CIA man is under way and could have far greater impact on government secrecy restrictions than the Pentagon Papers trial in Los Angeles.

A U.S. district court in Alexandria, Va., has enjoined Victor L. Marchetti, 42, now a writer, from violating the pledge of secrecy in his CIA contract. It granted the government unprecedented "prior restraint" via civil process on his writings on intelligence subjects.

If the government's view is upheld through appeal courts, authorities will have a potent new weapon for curbing security leaks.

The White House has followed the case closely and is considering inserting the same CIA secrecy provision into all government employment contracts if the suit is upheld in the courts.

This would probably inhibit press contacts with officials who would become more vulnerable to government legal action. Much less proof is needed to show a breach of contract in civil court than the "heavy burden" required of the government in criminal cases, like Daniel Ellsberg's, where intent to harm the national interest, as well as actual harm to those interests, must be proved.

On the other hand, if the courts uphold all of Marchetti's arguments, as presented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the CIA contract's secrecy agreement could be declared unenforceable and much more intelligence information would become public from former CIA employes.

This, aside from making a living, is Marchetti's declared aim. He wants to open the agency up to greater congressional and public scrutiny and to force the reform of what he calls its "clandestine-oriented" attitudes and practices.

"This excessive secrecy, the sanctity of the cult of intelligence, is just so much crap," Marchetti said in an interview in his comfortable suburban home. He alleges there is enormous waste and inadequate congressional control over the CIA's \$700 million annual budget and the operations of its 17,000 employes.

The CIA refuses to discuss the case.

Marchetti's experience dates back to the early 1950s, when he served in Europe as an Army intelligence officer. He later was graduated from Pennsylvania State University in Soviet studies and was recruited by the CIA out of the classroom.

He signed two secrecy agreements then. One pledged he would not disclose the initial interview. The second was signed when he began work and was a condition for employment. In it he swore claim to any intelligence information (or collection, handling and analysis of it) learned while in the agency and pledged "never" to reveal such information unless authorized in writing by the CIA chief.

By all accounts, Marchetti did well in the agency and left under no cloud. He first trained for clandestine work but turned to analysis of Soviet military affairs. He rose to become executive assistant to the deputy director, then Adm. Rufus Taylor. A year after Taylor retired, Marchetti resigned his \$25,000-a-year post.

When he quit in 1969, he signed a third secrecy agreement which in effect repeated his earlier pledge not to disclose without advance authorization intelligence information obtained while employed.

Writes Spy Novels

To maintain the same standard of living for his wife and three children, Marchetti turned to writing spy novels and nonfiction on intelligence subjects. He believed he could bring a "certain realism" to these matters that would increase its market value.

From his recitation of the facts, Marchetti was writing about the watchfulness of the agency over his literary attempts.

He first wrote a novel, "The Rope Dancers," which the agency asked to read in its initial stages. Marchetti promised to submit it only in finished form. When the manuscript was completed, a CIA man called and asked to take it to the agency to be copied and studied. Marchetti refused, allowing it to be read only in his house. No objections were made to its content, he said. It was published and enjoyed modest success; an option for movie rights was purchased.

Then he turned to nonfiction, writing an article for the Nation in April ("CIA: The President's Loyal Tool"). He also prepared a piece for Esquire ("Twilight of the Spooks"), and drew up the outline for a nonfiction book. He submitted the outline and the Esquire draft to six book publishers; four made offers, one of which he accepted. But one publisher apparently told the CIA.

Marchetti had not cleared any of it with the agency. He said he intended to submit the unpublished nonfiction when it takes final shape, which means after his editors have seen it. He did not, however, submit the Nation article for clearance at any time because, he said, "there was nothing in it to damage national security."

"That's my judgment," he acknowledged. "In my opinion, the CIA is not qualified to decide what violates national security." Some independent body like the courts should make such decisions, he said.

Restraining Order

The agency moved on April 18, a month after getting the unpublished material, to enjoin Marchetti from alleged further breaches of the secrecy agreements. Without his

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of them together, I ask that we vote no on the amendment.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WRIGHT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. FISHER. The gentleman will recall that the Government of Australia a couple of years ago bought, I believe it was, 32 of the F-111's.

Mr. WRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. FISHER. I had the occasion to talk with the Australian Ambassador when he was on Capitol Hill last week. He brought the subject up. I did not. But he made the statement that the Australians and the Australian Air Force are highly pleased and greatly elated over the performance of the F-111's and they are mighty glad that they bought them.

Mr. WRIGHT. I thank the gentleman from Texas for that comment and I think it reflects the feelings of those who have had some familiarity with the plane, with its performance, its capability and with its safety record.

Mr. Chairman, I urge a vote against the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Gross).

The amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HARRINGTON

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HARRINGTON: Page 2, line 12, strike out the period and insert the following "": Provided, That a sum not to exceed \$2,983,500,000 is authorized to be appropriated for the procurement of missiles for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force during fiscal year 1973 "

(Mr. HARRINGTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, this is part of a continuing problem I have had as a newer member of the committee, and maybe something that the House has become inured to over the years.

The sum that I am talking of here is the sum of \$468.9 million. Even that figure is supposed to be secret. The sum involves moneys that apparently in general have not been made known to the Armed Services Committee, but which are included in this year's authorization bill. It follows a practice that has only been narrowly expanded—a practice which has been followed for years—that only the chairman and the ranking minority member of the General Services Committee are apprised of the use of substantial sums of money and the fact that despite the extensive classified briefings and secret meetings of the committee the majority of the committee was not allowed to know what the money was for.

My purpose in offering this amendment is to apprise the House of the fact that we have a total of approximately \$830 million of the \$21.5 billion that members of the Armed Services Committee know nothing about. Some of the members of the Armed Services Committee, including the gentleman from

New York (Mr. STRATTON) and myself have asked for and been refused information, and that strikes me as not being productive of a well-informed branch of the Government.

I do not know what the money is for. I cannot comment on the mischief that may be turned loose by our inability to know or what we may find ourselves committed to as a result of the expenditure of these funds.

It seems to me, if there is going to be any credibility attached to the legislative process that we are a part of—if we are going to be asked to act both in good faith and in a well-informed fashion—we should have the benefit in sessions that are closed to the public, if there is a sensitive matter before us, to be told as a committee, what this money is for.

I think the history of this country in the last 20 years is rife with examples of moneys being appropriated, particularly to the CIA which end up causing us a lot more grief than the momentary benefit of keeping it secret.

It is for this reason that I come here this afternoon offering this and other amendments which will total approximately \$830 million to apprise Members of the House who are concerned about this problem of the fact that the Committee on Armed Services, Republicans and Democrats alike, do not know what this money is for and have been refused information about it.

I think the time has come, if we are going to be responsible at all in carrying out our obligation to the public and to ourselves that we be given enough information to know it is a worthwhile expenditure of public funds.

Mr. Chairman, I urge that the particular sum be stricken from the budget.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. HARRINGTON).

The amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1973 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

For the Army, \$1,997,332,200, of which amount not more than \$174,658,000 is authorized to be appropriated for the military sciences budget activity;

For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), \$2,661,533,250, of which amount not more than \$131,022,400 is authorized to be appropriated for the military sciences budget activity;

For the Air Force, \$3,168,940,150, of which amount not more than \$124,338,000 is authorized to be appropriated for the military sciences budget activity; and

For the Defense Agencies, \$494,082,050.

SEC. 202. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1973 for use as an emergency fund for research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement or production related thereto, \$50,000,000.

Mr. HÉBERT (during the reading.)

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title II be considered as read, print-

ed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PIKE

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. PIKE: On page 3, line 4, after "Air Force" strike out "\$3,168,940,150" and insert "\$2,723,940,150 none of which shall be authorized for the B-1 program and".

(Mr. PIKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, this amendment strikes \$445 million which is the total amount in this bill authorized for the further development of the B-1 bomber.

Two years ago in our committee report, we said that prototypes of the B-1 bomber were going to cost about \$450 million each. Today, only 2 years later, we are told that prototypes of the B-1 bomber are going to cost \$873 million each.

We are going to build three prototypes of that B-1 bomber and the R. & D. program for these three prototypes is currently estimated at \$2,618,000,000.

Now, obviously, the cost in the last 2 years has escalated like crazy and we are only just beginning. The program is only 2 years old. There was \$100 million in the budget for it 2 years ago. There was \$370 million in the budget for it last year. There is \$445 million in the budget for this year.

All that you are talking about here is the beginning of the cost of building the bomber. This does not include the cost of missiles which are going to be put on the bomber. The missiles are going to cost about \$7 million per bomber.

That is only the beginning on the missiles because that cost does not include the warhead on the missiles that go on the bomber, so we have not really begun to talk about what this program is going to cost.

The Air Force alleges that although it is going to cost \$873 million each to build the three prototypes, they can build the production models for \$35 million each—less than 5 percent of what the prototypes are going to cost. I frankly find that prediction to be incredible. Even if it were credible, and even forgetting the missiles that you are going to put on the bombers, and even forgetting the warheads that you are going to put on the missiles that you are going to put on the bombers—none of which are in this cost here—if we build the 241 of these aircraft that we say we are going to build, and if all of their predictions, which have been so wrong in the past, are true, you are talking about a program with a cost of \$11,113,000,000.

I do not know really how far down the road we have got to go in the capability of blowing other nations to smithereens. Obviously we have got the power to blow the Soviets to smithereens. All we are talking about here is how fine a powder

PORTLAND, ME.
PRESS-HERALD
M - 56,603
TELEGRAM
S - 108,947

JUN 13 1972

Hathaway Asks CIA Watchdog

Congressman William D. Hathaway said Saturday he will introduce a bill Monday to give Congress the means to oversee operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In making the announcement from his Portland headquarters, the second district representative said, "It is essential that the elected representatives of the American people have the right and perform the duty of overseeing the activities and expenditures of the CIA ... as they do with all government agencies."

"In addition to running an extensive spy network worldwide, the agency gives money and technical assistance to secret military and political operations which often run counter to U.S. foreign policy."

Hathaway cited the war in Laos as an example which, he said, "the CIA was financing to the tune of several hundred million dollars a year long before it was public knowledge."

The Congressman, who is seeking the Democratic nomination for the Senate seat now held by Sen. Margaret Chase Smith, said his proposal would establish a joint committee on foreign information and intelligence for the House and Senate.

EPHRATA, WASH.
GRANT CO. JOURNAL
JUN 22 1972
SEMI-WEEKLY - 3,439

Insight by Hal Suit:

Secret Documents Shouldn't Hide Stupid Blunders

The illegal release of the Pentagon Papers and the more recent use of secret documents by columnist Jack Anderson has re-opened the problem of what should and should not be classified.

During a conversation a few years ago with the late Senator Richard Russell I asked why the CIA reports on Lee Harvey Oswald's travels in Mexico had to remain classified as secret and why they had to stay secret for many years to come.

The senator was at that time, and had been for more than a decade, chairman of a special appropriations sub-committee which controlled all CIA funds. There wasn't anyone who was in a better position to answer the question than Russell.

He gave me a plausible reason for the secrecy. The senator noted, and it's true, that we have people in every country in the world who are friendly to the U.S. and though not citizens of this country they often supply our intelligence people with information. Some are businessmen, some fishermen, artists, students and so forth. They are basically loyal to their own country, but still willing to help us. The CIA report on Oswald's travels in Mexico contains not only the facts about his movements in that country but the names of the individuals who provided those facts. If the report was made public at this time some of the contacts would end up facing a firing squad and if they weren't shot or imprisoned, they would no longer be of any value as contacts. Their future services would be nil. Since they are still needed it makes good sense to keep their identity unknown.

But what about thirty years from now? This

is the time frame being recommended by the National Security Council as a reasonable time to keep papers secret yet there are opponents around who want the lid to stay on far beyond three decades.

That's pretty hard to buy even from the individuals who claim diplomatic or military secret codes can be endangered by releasing thirty year old data. It seems illogical to assume that codes aren't changed in more than thirty years and even more illogical to believe any nation can keep a code unbroken for thirty years. If this is happening it is a first for all time. A recent rash of non-fiction books have pretty well dispelled the idea that unbreakable codes exist. If a man or woman can conceive them sooner or later another man or woman will be able to unravel them.

Anyone who reads my columns very long knows I am pro-military, but I've long been aware of the military's inclination to mark anything and everything secret and keep that tag on forever. In some cases this practice can be defended, but not for 50 or 100 years. While true military secrets should be carefully guarded military blunders should not. Time doesn't erase stupidity, but it hides it and that's wrong.

During World War II many a bulletin board was so plastered with memos that it was a standard joke that if one dug deep enough he'd find a KP order from Valley Forge still tacked up. If one could actually dig deep enough in Pentagon records there's a chance that some of George Washington's actual orders are still stamped secret. In a free society that's no joke.

FAMILY WEEKLY
(DATE UNKNOWN)

June 1972

Ask Them Yourself

Want to ask a famous person a question? Send the question on a postcard, to "Ask," Family Weekly, 641 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y. 10022. We'll pay \$5 for published questions. Sorry, we can't answer others.

FOR REP. CHARLES B. RANGEL, N.Y.

You've accused the CIA of aiding and abetting heroin sellers in Asia. What grounds do you have for such a serious charge?--R. D., New York, N.Y.

Despite public disclaimers by the CIA, many of us in Congress have serious reason to believe that the agency is indeed complicit in the trafficking of deadly heroin to our servicemen in Southeast Asia. Newsmen clandestinely entering the secret CIA base at Long Cheng in Laos have reported raw opium openly piled up for sale in the market there. In addition, we know that the CIA regularly supplies arms, transportation and funds to drug-producing hill tribes in Laos and Thailand in exchange for their allegiance, knowing full well that these tribesmen are cornerstones of the drug trade. Most Congressmen have little idea how the CIA operates and how much money it spends. The CIA budget is carefully disguised and hidden. In fact, a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, "Laos, April, 1971," reads like a jigsaw puzzle, with pieces "deleted at the request of the Department of State, Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency." Congress cannot prevent CIA involvement as long as we are deliberately kept in the dark about that agency's operations.

WHERE'S CIA FUNDS?**Full Appeals Court To Hear City Man's Case**

By TOM WERTZ

Tribune-Review Staff Writer

A Greensburg man's challenge of the federal government's right to keep a cloak of secrecy over the amount of tax money spent by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been ordered for review and disposition by the full membership of the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In an order handed down by Chief Justice Collin J. Seitz, the federal suit by William B. Richardson was taken out of the jurisdiction of a three-judge panel and placed in the hands of eight third circuit appeals judges and a federal district judge who first ruled against Richardson in the case.


Judge Seitz' order calls for immediate review and disposition of the case by the appeals court en banc without the submission of additional legal briefs by either the federal government or Richardson.

Warrants Review

The procedural order, according to one spokesman close to the appeals court, does not preclude a ruling one way or the other. However, it does suggest, the spokesman said, that the case is regarded to have such magnitude that it warrants review by the entire court before a decision can be handed down.

Often, the spokesman said, cases are brought up to the court en banc when it appears likely that a lower court is to be overturned or in instances where most recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions directly affect the case before the appeals court.

The spokesman could not speculate on

**Richardson**

what prompted a full court review on Richardson's case.

Richardson, a staff investigator for the Westmoreland County Public Defender's office and a student of Constitutional law, filed suit against the government about a year ago. He claims that the absence of a public accounting of CIA expenses violates specific sections of the U.S. Constitution.

Account For It

The federal government admits hiding the CIA funds but says it has the specific authority under an act of the U.S. Congress. The CIA money is hidden among possibly thousands of other budgetary categories which could range from research on beans to public relations.

The result is, Richardson says, that the American people and the Congress receive a fabricated report on how their money is being spent on any number of governmental service categories.

Connally's Gall

Last year Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was going down the drain. It had a cost overrun on the C-5A transport so prodigious that even the Air Force balked. Lockheed, in tears, came to the Congress as its last hope. By a paper-thin margin, the Congress created the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board (ELGB) with which Lockheed has a drawing account of \$250 million for its salvation. The members of the board are Treasury Secretary John B. Connally, Jr., chairman; Arthur Burns, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; and William J. Casey, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Everyone was happy, or at least as happy as could be expected under the distressing circumstances which initiated the passage of the law, until Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats routinely sent his staff to audit the accounts of ELGB. Mr. Connally permitted Mr. Staats's accountants to go over some accounts and administrative expenses of ELGB, but when Mr. Staats asked for more data, in particular the kind of information supplied by Lockheed that the board used in arriving at its decisions, Mr. Connally wrote a "Dear Elmer" letter, in which he said, "It was not the intent of Congress that the decisions of the board be reviewed by the GAO."

This is new doctrine. All disbursements of public funds authorized by the Congress are reviewable by GAO unless specifically exempted, as in the case of the CIA. Staats and the GAO general counsel, Paul Dembling, maintain that, should Connally be upheld in his stand, the government's priority position as a creditor could be jeopardized, if Lockheed goes bust after all.

Among those annoyed by Mr. Connally's recalcitrance is Sen. William Proxmire. He agrees with Mr. Staats's position that Mr. Connally is "in clear violation of the law," and has proposed to Sen. John Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, that the Secretary be summoned before it to explain publicly an attitude that amounts to defiance of Congress. That should be an interesting session.

CHARLESTON, W. VA.

GAZETTE

M - 63,294

GAZETTE-MAIL

S - 106,775

APR 18 1972

CIA Latitude

Flabbergasting

Fiscal conservatives and no-nonsense leaders such as the late Sen. Robert A. Taft would be utterly flabbergasted to learn that a free-wheeling agency within the United States government is permitted to spend untold millions in tax funds with only minimal accountability to Congress.

But that is precisely the case. The Central Intelligence Agency, which is waging its own war against undefined enemies in Laos, has a secret budget and a high disdain for the legislative branch of government.

Early in the year it was disclosed that funds voted the Agency for International Development have been diverted to the CIA for use in its Laotian war. The disclosure had the side effect of discrediting much of the fine work of AID in extending technical assistance to the people of other lands. Because of the apparent tie to the CIA, AID now operates in the same suspicious light that falls upon government-sponsored radio stations that are nothing more than CIA espionage tools.

There may be some relief from the excesses of America's best publicized secret agency. Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., has offered a bill which would oblige the CIA to provide congressional committees dealing with foreign policy the same information and assessments it now releases only to the White House.

The CIA presently briefs Congress, but only when it has White House authorization to do so. It is an understandable suspicion, under the circumstances, that the CIA's machinations, usually involving the military and political affairs of other nations, are undertaken in giddy and irresponsible fashion. Most of us, given millions of dollars to play with, would be giddy and irresponsible.

Curiously, the CIA has never played a decisive role in any American diplomatic achievement. On the other hand, it has figured prominently in several embarrassments to the nation. It ought to be abolished. If congressional timidity prevents abolition, it should be restricted to certain well-defined work, with full accountability to Congress.

The people are rapidly losing their taste for the cloak-and-dagger skulduggery of Cold War diplomacy, and the Cooper bill might be a good means of getting this information to the CIA.

Bill Anderson

STATINTL

One Thing About CIA—It's Free



WASHINGTON, April 13—In an effort to cheer taxpayers just before the income tax filing deadline, I have made an exhaustive study of the 1,103 page federal budget book searching for bargains.

On page 860 there is a real winner. It is the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the auditors, the CIA is not costing the taxpayers one red cent this year. In 1971, yes, it cost \$2 million for a new building. But today, nothing.

This is amazing, especially when one considers all of the accounts of how the CIA is running airlines in South America, financing armies in Cambodia, and digging all of those tunnels under the Berlin Wall.

According to some accounts, the CIA is at least as large as the State Department, and over there in Foggy Bottom the administrative cost is roughly \$250 million, depending upon how Sen. William Fulbright [D., Ark.] feels at any given moment.

Of course, the CIA is located in the low rent district of Virginia in the hills and valleys near the Potomac River. But even so, nothing is not very much to pay for even that kind of land and all of the people walking around on it.

And, there are a lot of people working in those buildings, according to my as-

sociate, Hit Henderson, who slipped in there the other day with the cleaning women on a No. 56 bus. Henderson reported that he saw several hundred cars in the free parking lots accorded to the spies and assistant spies.

In addition, several hundred other persons were coming to work on the second shift as the day-time crowd rushed home with their attache cases.

Henderson slipped in under the guise of a nursery worker [trees, not babies] and also reported back that the CIA's formal gardens were nicely landscaped, the furniture in the headquarters building was new and modern, and there were deep-piled rugs on some of the executive wing floors.

He mentioned that the sign-in sheet for visitors must have cost at least \$100, namely because it was on a swivel and made several copies. On the way out, Henderson noted that his stashed car, waiting in the visitors parking lot, was blocked by other visitors.

Oh, yes, the murals on the walls were modern art, altho Henderson himself prefers the classics. He could not estimate a cost, if there was one.

In a further effort to find out how the CIA operated on a no-cost basis, I personally got in touch [the method must remain secret] with Col. C. Gordon

Furbish [ret.], one of the most knowledgeable persons in the metropolitan area of Washington. [Furbish is the creator of the saying, "Remember, no matter where you go, there you are."]

"I am not at liberty to discuss the financial operations of the CIA," Furbish said for the record. "However, I can tell you on a not-for-attribution basis that they snitch money out of the rest of the federal budget with special code designations."

The colonel confided that the code word for the CIA in the rest of the budget was listed under "things." Sure enough, he was right. It's even on the White House budget, put down as "transportation for things—\$1,000." In the Department of Agriculture, "transportation of things" was recorded at \$63,000. In the Rural Electrification Administration, "things" cost \$38,000. Even the sub budgets listed "things."

And there you are, another Anderson expose: The CIA's money comes from "things." And if readers think they are being bearded, the whole "thing," for CIA and everybody else, the entire federal budget, adds up to roughly \$256 billion this year. So, tonight, if you get indigestion while filling out income tax returns, take a couple of pills. You can tell your wife "I can't believe that I paid for the whole thing."

CIA: THE PRESIDENT'S

VICTOR MARCHETTI

Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign affairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its authority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations.

In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its operational plans accord with the aims of the administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional leaders. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influential individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more careful than are administrators in other areas of the bureaucracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress.

The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, nevertheless, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere.

After the Bay of Pigs, the agency had its feel the sting of Pre- because it failed in overthrow Castro. C the top of the agency committee, which ti tration, the agency tices. Throughout th tine operations again the same time, and a agency deeply involv ing regimes in Laos

When the Nation: the CIA in 1967, s exposed the agency' labor and cultural c funding conduits, ne tried to restrict the Senator Fulbright's a trol over the CIA h: was simply told by P and get on with its b formed to look into Secretary of State, th of the CIA. Some c because they had be longer thought worth continued under improved cover. A few of the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a \$500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/assassination programs in Vietnam.

The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the financial management of the community, especially in the military intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Administration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should concentrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-

Senators Take Closer Look

The Budget for Foreign Policy

By Murrey Marder

NOTHING CAPTURES the attention of federal policy makers so quickly as laying a hand on their supply of money. So when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began hearings recently for the first time on the State Department's budget there was considerable interest in the government and in the press.

To strike sustained sparks of headlines in a congressional inquiry, however, there must be at least two adversaries to rub together. At the end of the first morning's hearing, therefore, when affable Secretary of State William P. Rogers finished an untrying appearance in which he displayed no desire to quarrel with anyone, especially presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger, most of the broadcasters, cameramen and writing press packed up and left.

There were glum looks around the State Department where morale is decaying even faster than usual since the President's China mission underscored so publicly what has long been so evident: that the most dramatic foreign policy ventures will continue to be run out of the White House through the Kissinger apparatus and that Rogers, in a Harry Truman phrase, will "not fuss" over it—at least not publicly and visibly.

Rogers, in a recent press conference and in the Senate hearing, was consistent in his insistence that he does not feel excluded from anything, that "the system is working very well," that "the foreign policy is very effective," and that in any event it is President Nixon, not Kissinger nor Rogers, who "makes foreign policy."

Even though Rogers may be, as he said, "perfectly satisfied" with his role, the Foreign Relations Committee chaired by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) is not. Fulbright and his fellow critics who have engaged in an intermittent struggle with two administrations over the shaping of foreign policy have no personal quarrel with Rogers, a longtime friend of Fulbright's and other committee members. However, they see their own power eroded by state's lack of combativeness in asserting its officially proclaimed "primacy" in foreign affairs.

The nub of all this is that the Fulbright committee's functions are derived primarily from legislative jurisdiction over the State Department. As state's influence in the process shrinks, so does the committee's. It has watched the shrinkage with chagrin since President Nixon's decision in 1969 to put Rogers, one of his oldest friends, at the top of State rather than an activist, ambitious, foreign policy professional, and to keep full control of foreign policy initiatives in the White House, with Kissinger as his conceptualizer, most-immediate adviser, director of a National Security Council staff that has grown greatly in size and power, and even, as it has developed, supreme secret envoy.

Kissinger occasionally has met with Foreign Relations Committee members at Fulbright's home and elsewhere—and plans to

again. But he is beyond the Committee's official reach, across the dividing line of "executive privilege" that presidents invoke to prevent advisers from testifying before Congress.

One unannounced purpose of the budget hearings was to explore whether Kissinger in his NSC capacity, might be drawn across the "executive privilege" divide to testify before Congress by reaching for him through the National Security Act of 1947 which set up the NSC.

Fulbright asked Rogers, a former attorney general in the Eisenhower administration, if he believed Congress intended the National Security Council to assume the role it now has in foreign affairs. Rogers said he did, that the NSC was intended as "a forum for presenting different views," with the actual "decisions" made by the President. Fulbright, however, thinks that Kissinger's operation has reached a scope never imagined by Congress.

That issue was not pressed very sharply in the recent hearings, but it is being pursued more openly by the Federation of American Scientists, who note that some presidential advisers who wear several functional hats do testify before Congress in capacities apart from their confidential relationships with the President.

What the Fulbright committee focused on most in two succeeding days were State Department budget statistics. But there was an underlying motive there too. For the same reasons that its influence is linked to the State Department's power, the committee is hardly likely to use a meat-axe on State's \$563 million budget for 1973. It would be skinning its own interests.

Until this month, the Foreign Relations Committee never held authorization hearings on a State Department budget, not even in the so-called "great days" of the post-World War II era, when Republican Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan and Democrat Tom Connally of Texas teamed in bipartisan harmony with the Truman administration to reconstruct Western Europe, build NATO and "contain" the Soviet Union. Fulbright, then a young and enthusiastic supporter of that Establishment philosophy, has come full circle on most of its premises.

The "great days" label was really a tribute to the Senate committee's acquiescence and cooperation with the Truman administration's plunge into what Fulbright sees now as imperialism, rather than an accolade for the committee's independence or competitiveness. The committee in those days was the junior partner of the Executive Branch, not a challenger.

It was normal practice then for the Executive Branch to quietly provide drafts of committee members' speeches; even drafts of committee reports. Vandenberg and Connally, insistent on being privy to the "take-off" of policy, were granted apparent copier support.

When Fulbright, midway in the Johnson administration, turned rebel over the Do-

minican intervention and the Vietnam war relations between the Executive Branch and the Foreign Relations Committee, which Fulbright now has headed longer than any other Senator, spun into reverse. His committee was treated as hostile; to borrow the euphemism that the Nixon administration concocted in Indochina, the Executive Branch's relations with the committee offered amount to "protective reaction": each often fires on the other preemptively, on the assumption it will be attacked.

To compete in the foreign policy arena, the Fulbright committee has stretched its imagination and resourcefulness. It has sent its own staff investigators abroad, spotlighting many U.S. involvements and commitments never acknowledged in official public records; it has left a rebellious mark on many pieces of legislation, notably on the conduct of the Indochina war, and the committee now has put before the Senate a major bill based on the work of Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) and others, to curb the President's authority to use troops in war without congressional authority.

The Nixon Doctrine's low posture, and the opening to China, are directions in which Fulbright and his colleagues pointed long ago; but they want to move much faster and farther to wrap up the cold war and U.S. involvement overseas. Last year, the committee hit on the device of attaching a rider to the foreign aid act, requiring the approval of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees of the annual budgets for State and the United States Information Agency. These budgets previously were subject only to clearance by appropriations committees, unlike the budgets of Defense and many other departments that regularly are examined in both ways.

The first round of this new approach now has been played out in the budget hearings. One thing they showed was that most senators were surprisingly unfamiliar with routine day-to-day operations of the State Department or State's relationship to the complex NSC structure that Kissinger controls. The bulk of foreign policy is not high-wire diplomacy, but increasingly, trade, aid, economic rivalry, technology, legal disputes, military weaponry, international conferences, and the like.

In theory, through its examination of State's budget, the committee, as Fulbright expressed it, can "further the process of restoring Congress' proper role in the making of foreign policy."

Fulbright's committee now has acquired the capacity to influence the priorities of State's spending. But that budget is one of the smallest in the federal government; even in embassies overseas, State Department employees represent only 16 per cent of all embassy employees, with the remainder assigned by Defense, AID, CIA, or other agencies.

Furthermore, budget work is tedious business, and attendance of Senate Foreign Relations Committee members at hearings is already woefully spotty. At this point, the committee's latest departure in its search for policy influence is novel but unproved.

U.S. Intelligence Costs Put at \$3-Billion a Year

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 11—Ray S. Cline, director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, estimated before a Congressional Committee yesterday that the United States spends "about \$3-billion" yearly on collecting intelligence around the world.

Mr. Cline, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a \$7.3-million budget request for his bureau. He conceded that the cost of collecting intelligence might be higher than \$3-million, depending on what was considered "intelligence."

The armed forces, for instance, conduct extensive aerial reconnaissance along the peripheries of and over Communist countries, and the Defense Department pays for this, though it is part of the nation's over-all intelligence network.

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000100160001-6

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000100160001-6

28 FEB 1972

Were cop spy funds misspent?

By JOSEPH VOLZ and PATRICK COLLINS

D.C. police are investigating charges that a lieutenant bought unauthorized equipment with thousands of dollars that had been earmarked exclusively for paying informants in vice investigations.

Insp. Robert Klotz, head of the Internal Affairs Division today confirmed his unit was looking into the case but refused to give any details because the probe has not been finished.

Other reliable sources said the alleged incidents occurred last year when the lieutenant took money from the department's confidential fund and made several unauthorized purchases, including some "costly" electronics equipment. They said as much as \$20,000 may be involved.

Some of the equipment has reportedly been delivered to a District police station. While sources said they do not know if any of the equipment was for personal use, the alleged diversion of funds highlights a police department's difficulties in auditing its confidential funds.

Auditing a department's confidential fund is almost as difficult as keeping tabs on the CIA since policemen, like spies, don't want to compromise their contacts by telling city accountants who got the money.

Last year, an undercover narcotics detective who was authorized to spend confidential funds to buy dope resigned from the force after police charged he was using drugs himself.

Re-programming of city funds has been a sore point between city officials and the Hill. Sen. Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, chairman of the Senate D.C. Appropriations Subcommittee has on several occasions objected to city officials transferring funds from one account to another without informing him.

Confidential funds are used to pay for information during investigations of narcotics, gambling and prostitution. Underworld figures might be paid to help police finger suspects or the funds could be used to purchase drugs.

Last year, the police department, saying it was stepping up its war on heroin dealers, received \$200,000 in confidential funds, double the amount budgeted in 1970.

Some District officials contend police should get even more cash to finance the crusade against drug pushers.

"I wouldn't be opposed to giving the police another \$100,000," said a high city official.

"But the problem is, it is hard to account for precisely how the money is spent. And we must be sure that they (the police) are using the money for the right things."

Buying information has become an expensive investment for local law enforcement agencies. The Metropolitan Council of Governments will ask for more than \$500,000 next month "to provide motivation for sources to cooperate" with police in the local war against organized crime.

Some District officials have been concerned about how the department has "invested" the confidential funds in the past.

One authority said: "The police have spent the money, sometimes, for small narcotics buys — \$15 maybe. We've had enough of those kinds of arrests. We want them to use the money so that we can get some of the big guys. I hope they won't make any buys of less than \$100."

DALLAS, TEXAS
TIMES HERALDE - 214,519
S - 257,936
FEB 24 1972

Spy Knows Tricks of Many Trades

STATINTL

By LANA HENDERSON
Staff Writer

Dan Tyler Moore's life has been shrouded in mystery, cloaked in intrigue.

As head of America's worldwide counter-intelligence system during World War II, he was a dealer in espionage, a spy and counter-spy, the Big Daddy of them all.

In his 64 years, the distinguished Mr. Moore has been the business associate of some of the world's most famous men — Joseph Kennedy, Elliot Ness and Gen. Claire Chennault.

And now the man of adventure — in Dallas Wednesday to address the Mary Craig Class, Dallas Women's Club — spends his time penning best-sellers and lecturing nationwide.

"The Central Intelligence Agency is very successful now," Moore said. "Whenever a politician wants to fight the system, he attacks the CIA because it can't say anything back. A lot of people think it's a stumble-bum organization, but it's not. Without it, the U.S. would be ushered off the map, because every nation has spies in every other nation."

Moore, who served with the Office of Strategic Service, predecessor of the CIA, says the CIA's budget today is a billion dollars. He added that he does not know how many spies the U.S. has but probably wouldn't say even if he did know.

Moore's adventures — subject of two of his books "The Terrible Game" recently sold to the movies and "Cloak and Cipher" — began after he received a degree in physics from Yale but decided to give up science for the stock market.

"I love physics," the Washington, D.C., native said, "and it's still a hobby of mine. But physicists live cloistered lives and I did not want to spend the rest of my life locked in an ivory tower."

So at 22, Moore, godson of former President Theodore Roosevelt, entered the family business, Roosevelt and Son in New York. As a runner on Wall Street, his first assignment was to carry \$3-million in liberty bonds to the stock exchange.

"When I got to the security room and opened the bag, it was full of newspapers," he recalled. "I had just been a decoy. The guards behind me had the money all the time."

It was while working in the company's statistical department that the late Joseph Kennedy came to select men to establish the Securities and Exchange Commission under President Franklin Roosevelt. Moore went along.

"I only took a year's leave of absence," Moore, later named head of the SEC foreign department, remembered, "but Kennedy was so fascinating that I stayed with him. He had some fascinating sons but Old Joe was really THE interesting fellow."

"The press was horrified when Roosevelt appointed him as head of the SEC because he was the greatest stock rigger of them all," Moore continued. "The story goes that when FDR appointed Kennedy, he told the press: 'I'll tell you this, but it's off the record. It takes a thief to catch a thief.'"

"When he got out of the trade and quickly cleaned up the market," he added. "I

have seen him stand for hours with a ticker tape running through his fingers. He could tell when a stock pool was forming just by looking at the rise in prices. He called the attorneys and they'd subpoena the company records."

When a stock scandal broke out in the Ohio securities division, Moore was dispatched to "round up the crooks." He wrote the Ohio Securities Act, enforced it for a year and a half and then set up the regional office of SEC for Ohio, Michigan, Indiana and Kentucky.

It was the publicity he received in his anti-fraud activities that caused Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan to bring him to Washington during World War II to work in the Office of Strategic Service. Serving in the "phony" rank of major, Moore became the originator of America's worldwide intelligence system with headquarters in Cairo, Egypt.


"Donovan had a theory that the international spy was like the con man," Moore asserted, "so he called me. And he turned out to be perfectly right."

After the war, Moore; Elliot Ness, the man who stopped Scarface Al Capone, and Gen. Chennault formed two export-import houses, the Middle East and China Companies.

"Elliot and I were friends for many years," Moore said. "He wasn't like the television series portrayed him to be. He was a man who tried diplomacy first and resorted to gunfire only when all diplomatic efforts failed." Moore, married almost 40 years and the father of four children — "two of them twins

who have twins" — makes his home in Cleveland Heights, Ohio. "My wife has been with me ever since Wall Street," he said, "and she likes my life. It gives her life a little variety."

Dan Tyler Moore, speaking to the Mary Craig Class on "Spy Warfare: The Tricks of the Trade," displays a decoding device used by international spies.



YORK, PA.

RECORD

FEB 17 1972

M - 33,894

Curbs on the CIA

Through the efforts of a handful of U.S. senators, controls have at long last been placed on the operations, cost and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. These curbs are contained in the foreign aid authorization bill signed last week by President Nixon.

Credited with providing the controls are Senators Clifford Case of New Jersey, Frank Church of Idaho and Stuart Symington of Missouri. All are members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Together with Sen. William Fulbright, committee chairman, they have protested increasingly that Congress has too little knowledge of the CIA's activities, particularly in Southeast Asia.

According to the New York Times, Senator Case urged last summer a tightening of restrictions over the Defense Department's use of its funds overseas and over its power to transfer "surplus" military material to other U.S. agencies. Senator Case, the Times said, insisted that the CIA be included lest U.S. involvement in Cambodia develop surreptitiously, as he said it had in Laos.

Such restrictions, the senator said,

"would prevent the circumvention of congressional intent in funding of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through the CIA rather than through more open government agencies."

A number of senators, particularly those serving on the Foreign Relations Committee, have complained over the years regarding the lack of congressional knowledge and control over military action abroad. The disastrous "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba soon after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in 1961 was one of the major operations planned secretly by the Central Intelligence Agency. Since then the agency has been blamed or received credit for masterminding various coups and revolts in various parts of the world.

The CIA, by the nature of its intelligence work, must indeed have privacy. But when it comes to involving the nation in military operations abroad, and otherwise affecting foreign policy, the CIA should be responsible to Congress as well as the President for its actions. The curbs that were placed on the agency last week are a start in that direction.

Letters To The Editor

A Matter of Public Trust

Tom Braden's column (Mayor Lindsay and the Public Trust) is either an intentional hatchet job or the result of some terribly sloppy thinking. Mr. Braden compares his long ago intrigues with Allen Dulles of the CIA to Mayor John Lindsay's refusal to meet secretly with two New York policemen to hear corruption charges. ✓

Braden's once-upon-a-time spy story (completely unattributed and uncheckable) doesn't even come close to marking "the fall of John Lindsay," as he so pompously concludes. It could, however, mark the fall of Tom Braden from any position of respect among news analysts.

Mr. Braden urges his readers to compare Allen Dulles with John Lindsay in terms of their sensitivity to "public trust" on the basis of their reactions to similar situations. Dulles, of course, is set up as the winner.

The little game passes lightly over the following facts: Dulles was not an elected official; his allegiance was very pointedly to the President alone; secret meetings were far more possible for him than they are for Mr. Lindsay; Dulles very probably acted to protect his own reputation as an administrator, to avoid public embarrassment for the President, and to maintain his department budget. In fact, "public trust" didn't enter into it at all.

A better one-for-one comparison could have been made if only Mr. Braden's story had him telling the President about the money leak at CIA. Then we could see whether or not the President indulged in any secret meetings without telling Allen Dulles about it.

DONALD C. DILWORTH.
Brunswick, Md.

STATINTL

5 JAN 1972

Marines New Chief Looks Toward Future

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

WASHINGTON, Jan. 4—Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., newly-installed commandant of the Marine Corps and former Central Intelligence Agency deputy director, said today that United States intelligence can do its job for less money and probably will be obliged to.

Cushman, speaking at a Pentagon press conference, said "the mood of Congress" as he reads it is that the intelligence operations cost too much and fund cutbacks can be expected.

Must Know Stopping Point

He said he believed intelligence can do the job for less money by knowing when to stop collecting facts. He added that while those engaged in intelligence always feel they never have enough facts, they have to stop somewhere.

The big problem, he continued, is knowing where to stop and making sure that one stops there.

He said, however, that good management will insure call-

ing a halt at the right place and he was sure Richard Helms, CIA director who recently was given expanded responsibility in the intelligence field, will make sure that the agency does not go too far.

Asked the size of the U. S. intelligence budget, Cushman said he was not free to say.

Tells Marines Roles

On the subject of the Marine Corps' role under the Nixon doctrine in which U. S. allies will be expected to provide the men for their own defense while the U. S. supplies arms and, perhaps, sea and air power, Cushman said he could foresee no situation in which Marines would be used for extended ground combat, such as Viet Nam.

However, he said, there may be occasions when Marines will have to be sent in temporarily to seize and hold strategic foreign territory or evacuate Americans from trouble spots.



[AP Wirephoto]

Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. meeting newsmen.

JAN 1972

STAMP

The Billions in the White House Basement

by Timothy H. Ingram

By cliché, the power of the purse is now widely referred to as Congress' only remaining lever for redressing the balance between itself and the presidency. Increasingly, Congress is recognizing that its foreign affairs and treaty-making functions are mere ornaments, and that its traditional checks on the Executive are either unrealistic or meaningless. What is left is the appropriations power, and a handful of senators and representatives are invoking it in a muted but growing struggle to revive congressional strength.

Few appreciate, however, the extent to which even the power of the purse, that bulwark of legislative authority, is already controlled by the presidency. As Congress attempts to tame the Executive by threatening to cut off funds for things like war, it finds that the Executive has already developed innumerable devices for

Timothy Ingram, formerly with public television's "The Advocates," is a Washington writer.

getting the money, anyway. And far from successfully denying the President his money, Congress is even having a hard time getting him to spend what is appropriated.

The Constitution, of course, says that the appropriations power is the exclusive prerogative of Congress. But in the vacuum created by Congressional indifference to overseeing the bureaucracy's spending habits, and by the now empty ritual of blue-penciling the President's annual budget, the Executive has amassed a mound of spending prerogatives of its own: transfer authorities, contingency funds, lump-sum appropriations, special waiver authorizations, and covert financing.

A look at several discretionary spending options will give some idea of the extent of the Executive's grasp of the purse strings—and some indication of what Congress is left holding. For example, through secrecy, transfer powers, mislabelled military assistance, unauthorized commitments, and cloaked grants of excess war goods, the President and his national security managers are able to hire mercenaries, discourage a rump insurrection in Ceylon, promise South Korea \$3.5 billion, and turn over an unknown amount of equipment, helicopters, and bases to Vietnam. A simple budgetary procedure called reprogramming allows the Navy to quietly secure a behind-the-doors reversal of a congressional decision to defer production of the controversial F-14 fighter. And the pipeline, a huge reservoir of unexpended funds, permits the Pentagon to spend above the level of appropriations authorized by Congress. While lamenting the loss of its war powers, Congress consoles itself with the thought that it still maintains control over domestic priorities by its annual allotment of funds. But through impoundment, the President refuses to spend some \$12 billion in appropriated monies, placing a post mortem item veto on such programs as urban renewal, regional medical clinics, food stamps, and farm loans.

The panoply of deceptive devices available to the Executive's budgetary Houdinis was graphically illustrated in a memo submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary Laird on August 30, 1971. According to *The New York Times*, the Joint Chiefs offered several ways of by-passing the limited military appropriations by Congress to generate an additional \$52 million or

more, to increase the strength of the Cambodian Army.

The first would be simply to transfer \$52 million appropriated for economic aid to the military aid program. The second would be to use economic aid money to buy all "common use" items such as trucks and jeeps, which have military as well as civilian value, thus freeing the other funds for strictly military uses. The third would be to increase procurement for the U. S. Army by \$52 million and give the materiel to the Cambodians, for "repayment" later. The fourth would be to make some exceptions in Defense Department supply regulations, declaring equipment to be "excess" and delivering it to the Cambodians.

In addition, the memo proposed, the Joint Chiefs would clandestinely provide for a mechanized brigade, an artillery brigade, and coastal patrol units, as well as ground troops and extensive logistic support. AID would help finance the paramilitary force of armed civilians, which the planners hoped would number 200,000 by mid-1973 and more than 500,000 by 1977. The CIA, with its secret budget, supposedly would help train and direct Cambodian military units, as it is now doing with Laotian and Thai troops in Laos, and would provide airlift support with its subsidized airline, Air America. The proposals represented a complete subversion of congressional authority.

But the real significance of the story was not reported: how commonplace these methods have become. The Executive devices are as widespread as they are ingenious.

continued

30 DEC 1971

The CIA's New Cover

The Rope Dancer
by Victor Marchetti.
Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., \$6.95

Richard J. Barnet

In late November the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a series of "senior seminars" so that some of its important bureaucrats could consider its public image. I was invited to attend one session and to give my views on the proper role of the Agency. I suggested that its legitimate activities were limited to studying newspapers and published statistics, listening to the radio, thinking about the world, interpreting data of reconnaissance satellites, and occasionally

publishing the names of foreign spies. I had been led by conversations with a number of CIA officials to believe that they were thinking along the same lines. One CIA man after another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me that the days of the flamboyant covert operations were over. The upper-class amateurs of the OSS who stayed to mastermind operations in Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and elsewhere—Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald—had died or departed.

In their place, I was assured, was a small army of professionals devoted to preparing intelligence "estimates" for the President and collecting information the clean, modern way, mostly with sensors, computers, and sophisticated reconnaissance devices. Even Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now be as much a museum piece as Mata Hari. (There are about 18,000 employees in the CIA and 200,000 in the entire "intelligence community" itself. The cost of maintaining them is somewhere between \$5 billion and \$6 billion annually. The employment figures do not include foreign agents or mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-man hired army in Laos.)

A week after my visit to the "senior seminar" *Newsweek* ran a long story on "the new espionage" with a picture of CIA Director Richard Helms on the cover. The reporter clearly had spoken to some of the same people I had. As *Newsweek* said, "The gaudy era of the

adventurer has passed in the American spy business; the bureaucratic age of Richard C. Helms and his gray specialists has settled in." I began to have an uneasy feeling that *Newsweek's* article was a cover story in more than one sense.

It has always been difficult to analyze organizations that engage in false advertising about themselves. Part of the responsibility of the CIA is to spread confusion about its own work. The world of Richard Helms and his "specialists" does indeed differ from that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organizations, in spite of their predilection for what English judges used to call "frolics of their own," are servants of policy. When policy changes, they must eventually change too, although because of the atmosphere of secrecy and deception in which they operate, such changes are exceptionally hard to control. To understand the "new espionage" one must see it as part of the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence, is a global strategy for maintaining US power and influence without overtly involving the nation in another ground war.

But we cannot comprehend recent developments in the "intelligence community" without understanding what Mr. Helms and his employees actually do. In a speech before the National Press Club, the director discouraged journalists from making the attempt. "You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men." The same speech is made each year to the small but growing number of senators who want a closer check on the CIA. In asking, on November 10, for a "Select Committee on the Coordination of United States Activities Abroad to oversee activities of the Central Intelligence Agency," Senator Stuart Symington noted that "the subcommittee having oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency has not met once this year."

Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and veteran member of the Armed Services Committee, has also said that "there is no federal agency in our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA." Moreover, soon after

MONESSEN, PA.
 VALLEY INDEPENDENT
 DEC 28 1971
 E - 18,086

Review of intelligence

YEARS AGO, then Sen. Eugene McCarthy used to come down hard once in awhile on what he viewed as excessive secrecy about the Central Intelligence Agency's budget and operations. Though there was considerable sentiment favoring closer surveillance of the CIA, and a greater degree of accountability to Congress, nothing much came of McCarthy's efforts.

Despite his attempt to shed some light on how much money the CIA spends, and to force disclosure of such information as could be revealed without hurting the national security, the agency remained essentially hidden from the public. The size of its budget continued to be concealed in appropriations for other governmental functions. Watchdog committees set up by both House and Senate presumably were privy to quite a bit of information, but most of Congress as well as the general public was kept in the dark.

That period is recalled by the current effort of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, to extract more public information about the CIA and other intelligence groups. The situation is basically unchanged today: no one who is telling seems to have any clear notion of what the CIA budget amounts to, though estimates range from four to six billion dollars annually.

The approximate size and extent of CIA operations remain hidden from the public, which also gets only fragmentary (and often disquieting) hints as to the CIA's role in foreign policy decisions and implementation.

For the past several months Nedzi has been chairman of a group set up by the House Armed Services Committee to oversee intelligence operations. Inquiries thus far, he said the other day, have led him to conclude that from the standpoint of national security "more can be made public than is being made public."

This is the heart of the matter. No responsible person suggests that the operations of the CIA or other intelligence agencies ought to be made an open book to the public — and, by extension, to other governments. Intelligence work is by its nature secret, and would quickly be undermined by excessive disclosures.

The public which is served by intelligence agencies and which foots the bill for them, however, has the right to general information about how big they are and how much they spend — and above all, about how well they stay within carefully defined limits of their proper function.

Congressional review of the situation with this in mind would be a sound step in the public interest.

STATINTL

LANSING, MICH.
JOURNAL

E - 81,637
S - 83,576

DEC 24 1971

Psychic Spies

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., along with some other congressmen, has been complaining about the super-secrecy of the Central Intelligence Agency budget which is annually hidden in various appropriations.

Nedzi, who heads a special House group that oversees intelligence spending, said he suspects the Kremlin knows more about the CIA budget than anybody in Congress and insists that the public should at least know how much total money is being spent.

Meanwhile, the director of a hypnosis research center in Texas has claimed that the Soviets are rapidly developing psychic research to a point where their agents in the not-too distant future will be able to successfully probe U.S. secrets by means of such things as extrasensory perception.

Some events of recent years suggest that Nedzi may not be far off in his suspicions about Russian knowledge of U.S. intelligence operations. Congressmen might learn a great deal more if they talked more often with Soviet diplomats in Washington.

And if all else fails, they might also try the psychic training route.

20 DEC 1977

Would Air CIA Costs

Washington, Dec. 19 (UPI)—
Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.),
new chairman of a House sub-
committee on the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, said today he sus-
pects that no one outside the
Budget Bureau and the Kremlin
knows how much the United
States spends on intelligence.
Stating that he has seen pub-
lished accounts showing the CIA
budget runs to \$6 billion an-
nually, Nedzi said he expects to
learn more about CIA operations.
He said he hoped that at least
some of the information could be
made public.

STATINTL

Despite Its Being in the Telephone Book

CIA Is an Unlisted Number When Congress Dials

SO FAR as I've found in a lot of traveling, the United States is the only country in the world which lists its central intelligence agency in the telephone book, and enables anyone to call up and speak to the director's office.

But an extraordinary exchange on the floor of the Senate recently made clear how little else the people who put up the money for intelligence know about how it's spent. The debate took place on the day the military appropriations bill was finally passed so it attracted little attention, but it was revealing.

It was provoked by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) who offered an amendment providing that not more than \$4 billion in the defense budget could go for the intelligence services, including the CIA, the National Security Agency and the intelligence branches of the various armed services. Symington's point was not only to set a limit, but to set a precedent.

CONGRESS does appropriate all the money that goes to intelligence, but it doesn't know how much, or even when and how. That's because it is hidden in the defense budget, with the result that Congress doesn't really know just what it is appropriating any military money for because it never knows which items have been selected for padding to hide extra funds for intelligence.

Evidently, Symington believes that the actual amount spent is a little over \$4 billion, instead of the \$6 billion reported in the press, because he wasn't trying to cut intelligence funds except for CIA payments to Thai soldiers in Laos. He is one of the nine senators entitled to go to meetings of the Appropriations Subcommittee on the CIA, supposedly the confidential watchdog over the agency. As he pointed out though, there hasn't been a full meeting all this year.

What he wanted to do was to establish that Congress does have some rights to monitor the intelligence empire which it created by law, and he was driven to the attempt because of exasperation at President Nixon's recent intelligence reorganization. It was an-

By Flora Lewis

nounced to the public as an upgrading of CIA Director Richard Helms and a better method to avoid waste and establish political control.

Senator Symington and many other well-informed CIA watchers in Washington, are convinced that Helms has been kicked upstairs. The result, they believe, will be an increase in military influence over intelligence—which has been recognized as a danger throughout the history of intelligence because it tends to become self-serving, the doctor diagnosing himself according to the therapy he likes.

There is also a concern that the reorganization, which makes the President's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger top dog over intelligence, will centralize the system so much that it will become a tool for White House aims, not an outside source of technical expertise.

Responsible political control over the intelligence community's actions, as distinct from its factual and analytical reports, is necessary and desirable. But despite the public impression, in the last few years the CIA has been the most honest source of information for Congress on sensitive issues such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, while the Pentagon, State and White House have dealt in obfuscations. Whatever his Department of Dirty Tricks might be doing, Helms has been more straightforward with his secret session testimony on what is really happening in these unhappy places than the people who do have to explain and justify their funding to Congress.

BUT, as the Senate debate showed, that isn't saying very much. Sen. Allen Ellender (D-La.), who heads the CIA subcommittee, pointed out that 20 years ago only two senators and two congressmen were allowed to know what the CIA was spending, and now there are five on each side of the Capitol.

He implied that they also knew what the CIA was spending its money for. Sen. Wil-

liam Fulbright (D-Ark.), had the wit to ask if that mean Ellender knew, before the CIA set up its secret army in Laos, that this was the purpose of the appropriation. Ellender said, "It was not, I did not know anything about it . . . it never dawned on me to ask about it."

Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), had the humor to point out that there has been a lot in the press about the CIA Laotian army in the past couple of years, and asked whether Ellender has now inquired about it. Ellender said, "I have not inquired." Cranston pointed out that since nobody else in Congress has Ellender's right to check the CIA, that meant nobody in Congress knows. Ellender replied, "Probably not."

Symington's amendment was defeated. But at least the record is now clear. A recent Newsweek article quoted a former CIA official as saying, "There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive closer scrutiny and 'control' than the CIA."

"The reverse of that statement is true," said Symington, "and it is shameful for the American people to be misled." The record proves him right.

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STATINTL

LIMA, OHIO

NEWS
DEC 15 1971

E - 40,873

S - 45,674

CIA Secrets Target Of Senate Inquiries

By GEORGE KENTERA

WASHINGTON (NANA) — Both Senate and House are showing a growing restiveness over being kept in the dark about this country's vast intelligence apparatus.

This restiveness is particularly strong in the Senate at present, but it also exists in the House — and it has been present almost since 1949, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was first granted power by Congress to operate without congressional review.

The mounting frustration on Capitol Hill is hardly likely to produce any legislation requiring disclosure by the Nixon administration of intelligence funding or activities.

But it is almost certain to result next year in discreet efforts, primarily by Congressional committees and subcommittees involved, to lift at least partially the curtain that now hides an intelligence effort said to cost up to \$6 billion a year.

Sen. John C. Stennis, D-Miss., powerful chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, has already felt compelled to promise a thorough committee study and, "if necessary," an investigation into intelligence operations.

In making that promise to the Senate, Stennis specifically referred to President Nixon's reorganization early this month of the U.S. intelligence system — a reorganization that some senators fear removes the system even farther from any accountability to Congress.

Two other signs point to some congressional action next year:

— Sen. Stuart Symington, the Missouri Democrat who has long protested the lack of information Congress gets about intelligence matters, reportedly is ready to press a demand that the Senate be given a thorough accounting in private session.

— And Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Detroit Democrat and chairman of a special House subcommittee on intelligence, is quietly laying the groundwork for what is likely to be public hearings about the many-sided intelligence apparatus.

Members of Congress like Symington and Nedzi are not seeking to know all, or even a good deal, about the nation's intelligence setup. But they believe Congress as a rule ought to know something, perhaps about the intelligence budget, and they are dissatisfied with the present system, under which only a handful of senators and representatives knows any of the facts.

On the night of Nov. 23, the Senate held an extraordinary debate on an amendment by Symington to the \$70.8 billion defense appropriations bill. The amendment would have set a limit of \$4 billion for intelligence spending — by the CIA, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and for intelligence work performed by or for the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Fifty-six senators voted against and defeated the amendment — but 31 senators voted for it. And one of those 31 votes was from Montana's Democratic Sen. Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, who praised Symington and said, perhaps significantly:

"He has raised an issue which is just now in its infancy, but which in time I am confident will grow to enormous proportions. It is time, in my judgment, that we take a long, hard look at our intelligence community, its function and objectives."

Nedzi thinks so, too. In his preparatory work, he and his subcommittee aides have all the CIA, the Defense Depart-

ment and the State Department, and also "eight hours of continuous discussions" at the national security agency.

Still to come are the FBI, the Atomic Energy Commission and, finally, the intelligence agencies of the armed services that reportedly spend the lion's share of the intelligence budget.

"I haven't come to any conclusion... Yet on the whole question of how far one should go in making public activities of this kind," Nedzi says. "What I think I'd like to do is get people from the agencies to present unclassified versions of their positions and provide a forum for critics and students of the problems."

An opponent of the war in Vietnam, Nedzi thinks his appointment in July as chairman of the intelligence subcommittee by Rep. F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, may have "tempered the strong passions" some frustrated house members have about intelligence procedures.

Still, more than a dozen bills have been introduced in Congress this year aimed at making intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, accountable to Congress. That is a rate slightly higher than average since 1949; in the two decades since then, almost 200 such bills have been introduced — and none has passed.

Whatever review power Congress has over intelligence matters resides in four congressional subcommittees.

On the House side, one is Nedzi's subcommittee, created in July. The other is the intelligence operations subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. Its members are an official secret, but there is good reason to believe they are the ranking three Democrats and two Republicans on the full committee's defense subcommittee. George Mahons of Texas.

On the Senate side there are also two subcommittees. One is the central intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee which includes Stennis, Symington, Democrat Henry M. Jackson of Washington and Republicans Peter H. Dominick of Colorado and Barry Goldwater of Arizona. This subcommittee reviews CIA programs, but not financing.

The other is the intelligence operations subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. Its members are Chairman Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, Stennis, Democrat John L. McClellan of Arkansas and Republicans Milton R. Young of North Dakota and Mrs. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.

It seems worth noting that Symington is a part of these elite groups and yet is a leading protester against the setup they represent.

One reason may be Ellender's explanation on Nov. 23 about the way five senators (from the Appropriations Committee) decide what funds the intelligence agencies need.

"This method of appropriating funds for these intelligence activities has been in effect for at least 20 years that I know of..." He said. "We five who sit on this committee hear the testimony of those applying for funds. The funds are justified to us.

"We ask many questions. None of this information is in writing, nor is it recorded, but it is simply given to us, and we weigh it and then recommend appropriations as is seen fitting... I would hesitate to suggest that more senators and more members of the House be involved in this sensitive work."

At another point, Symington and his supporters referred to newspaper disclosures two years ago that the CIA was financing much of the war in Laos.

12 DEC 1971

STATINTL

LETTERS

'Big Spender'?

I would like to commend Kenneth Auchincloss for a masterful job in his handling of the CIA study (NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Nov. 22). However, having spent two years in Vietnam in a military-intelligence capacity, I must take issue with him regarding his statement that military intelligence lies within the realm of the "big spender." On the contrary, in Vietnam we were the Silas Marner of the intelligence community.

I don't dispute the \$775 million budget but the Army's bureaucratic bungling in the dispersal of this money has reduced the budget for actual intelligence operations to a mere pittance. While in Vietnam, I spent more than \$400 of my own money to pay sources for worthwhile information, simply because the money available to me through military channels was inadequate to sustain an effective operation.

ADAM BUTKUS

State College, Pa.

NEWSWEEK has informed us that the annual U.S. expenditure on espionage and counterespionage of various kinds is around \$6 billion. That's more than the whole of our late foreign-aid program.

We evidently spent more last year in spying on our neighbors around the world than in trying to help them. Why on earth is this called "intelligence"?

GIANNA OSCURO

La Jolla, Calif.

OWENSBORO, KY.
MESSENGER & INQUIRER

DEC 10 1971
D - 27,204
S - 26,580

President Gains in Foreign Policy Making

The Senate is not lacking in would-be foreign policy makers. Led by Fulbright, Mansfield, Symington, Church and Cooper, they have been trying to change the Senate's "advise and consent" prerogative to order the President to "yield and carry out" its policy.

After a whole first session struggle in the current Congress the effort collapsed. It signaled President Nixon's biggest foreign policy triumph, one that may set the principle of the ascendancy of the Presidency in matters of foreign policy.

The triumph was on three successive votes on the defense appropriation. By a 54 to 39 vote, the Senate deleted from the bill an amendment by Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, that would have reduced the American forces in Western Europe to 250,000 men by June 15. The president's letter to John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Services Committee, pointed out that a substantially unilateral reduction would be a mistake, and added:

"Passage of the proposed troop cut would, with one stroke, diminish Western military capability in Europe and signal to friend and adversary alike a disarray and weakness in the American government. It would undermine vitally important new initiatives for peace in Moscow and Peking."

The Amendment had been adopted by the Appropriation Committee by 15 to 14, but the letter tipped the balance against it on the floor, when its full import was realized.

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DEC 1971

**The hidden costs of the U.S. spy establishment**

WASHINGTON — "I'm not aware of anyone in Congress who knows how much this country spends on intelligence," said Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich), the new chairman of a House subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency.

Nedzi said in a UPI interview on Sunday that he expects to learn the answer to this and other questions about the CIA and related intelligence groups, and that he hopes at least some of this information can be made public.

Recent debate in the Senate suggested that intelligence work is costing \$4 billion or more annually. Nedzi said he had seen published accounts showing the figure runs to \$6 billion.

Catholic Bishop to aid pacifists

MEMPHIS, Tenn. — The Catholic Bishop of Memphis says he plans to establish draft counseling services in his diocese and is seeking volunteers to help staff them.

The Rev. Carroll T. Dozier, in a 5,700-word pastoral letter issued at Masses yesterday, asked for help with the services and urged Catholics to work for immediate U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

"I pledge my support to any young man of draft age who refuses to serve in the military because he conscientiously objects to war and killing. . . . I shall provide help for any young man seeking to formulate his conscientious objection to killing another human being," the 60-year-old bishop said.

SHAWNEE, OKLA.

NEWS-STAR

DEC 9 1971

M - 11,674

S - 11,770

The Pursuit Of Peace

Summitry is in its heyday. Mr. Nixon has trips planned to many places other than Peking, to talk with leaders of other nations. The Russians are traveling all over the globe making agreements. Leaders of every European nation except Spain, Portugal and Greece are constantly on the move between capitals. World government may someday be run, like America's nuclear retaliation system, in a fleet of ever-airborne planes.

In the pursuit of peace all this happens. But there is war in Vietnam, in Laos, in Cambodia, in Pakistan, in Ireland, possibly any day in the Middle East. In Southeast Asia American troops are being withdrawn, but U.S. bombing goes on mightily, interminably, and, as publication of three different sets and versions of the Pentagon Papers last month reminds Americans, no one is really sure how the United States ever got into this diabolical holocaust, according to D. J. R. Bruckner of the Los Angeles Times.

There is no certainty the United States will not get into another, either. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is publishing its hearings into presidential warmaking powers now; it will probably report out a bill before the end of the year to limit those powers; the chance of Senate passage of that bill next year is good. Whether the House—its normal condition is confusion, laziness and panic in the face of presidential threats—will act on it, or pass it, is another matter.

As a cautionary measure, the bill is not so bad. But it is not good, either. Its early sponsors, to win conservative support, accepted a provision supplied by Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman on the Armed Service Committee, to authorize the President to make a first strike "to forestall the direct and imminent threat" of an attack on the United States. Should something like that be written into law? Adolf Hitler claimed that Germany was threatened by attacks from Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Otherwise, the bill would require Congress to act within 30 days if a President were to continue any hostilities he committed American armed forces to. Whether that is of any value when the bill would, for the first time in American history, authorize a President to start a war, is highly questionable. Somebody started the war in Vietnam without any such authority.

As Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) wrote in a letter to the Washington Post last summer. "The truth is, out of 160 occasions when the President has committed U.S. forces to military operations abroad, only five have been declared wars. Over half of these (other) 155 actions were begun without any prior approval from Congress and almost 70 took place outside the western hemisphere."

Legislation is only words so long as Congress is systematically ignorant of the foreign and military operations of the United States. Take the war in Laos, where the CIA used intelligence funds to support an army of 30,000 men. Neither Congress nor the people know how big the U.S. intelligence budget is, or whether it is used to make

In the Senate, five men are authorized to know. On Nov. 23, Sen. Allen Ellender (D-La.), chairman of the appropriations committee, said in a floor debate that he is one of the five. He claimed the United States needs the secrecy which the Senate has provided to keep itself ignorant of what is going on. Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) asked him whether he knew, at the time he approved CIA appropriations, that the CIA was funding the war in Laos. Ellender's reply says everything about Congressional control over warmaking:

"... Mr. President," he said, "I wish to say that I do not know. I never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA asked for. It never dawned on me to ask about it. I did see it publicized in the newspapers some time ago."

Such is the way Congress keeps an eye on the executive branch which, in the words of GOP Senate leader Hugh Scott, "maintains as much secrecy as possible to the point of suffocation and isolation;" which only a few months ago refused to allow its chief foreign policy planner Henry Kissinger to testify, refused to detail military aid plans for the next five years, and has now reorganized the intelligence apparatus in such a way that Kissinger, protected by claims of executive privilege, can throw a shroud of secrecy over the whole works.

Congress can pass its bill to limit warmaking powers; it can cut the defense budget with a crude meat-axe (the only weapon it knows how to use); it can send investigating committees abroad to publicize the government's waste, corruption, deceit and atrocities; it can horrify sane men everywhere by revealing the extent of the business community's greed-governed complicity in America's secret war machine and the evil pervasion of military surveillance over the civilian population—and the President will still be free to go to war when he decides to and then to justify his action in any words he chooses to use. A President is subject to the judgment of all those leaders he meets at the summits more than he is to the judgment of the Congress or the people.

If it will make Congress feel better to have a restraining law on the books, such as it is, the bill may as well be passed. But, if Congress is to regain its constitutional role in the government of the United States, including its authority to declare war, it will have to reorganize itself, restructure its committees, improve its staff, and outlaw executive privilege.

To be blunt about it, Congress is systematically stupid. Its very operational structure prevents it from adequately understanding the defense budget or foreign policy, or from devising alternatives to executive initiatives in these areas. Congress is said to be in a battle now with the White House over warmaking powers. Well, there is a lot of political wrangling going on. But there is no real battle. Congress is not yet equipped to do battle. That is why, ultimately, the White House is so well equipped to do battle wherever and whenever it pleases.

LAWTON, OKLA.

PRESS DEC 8 1971

M - 12,119

Nixon Policy Triumph

The Senate is not lacking in would-be foreign policy makers. Led by Fulbright, Mansfield, Symington, Church and Cooper, they have been trying to change the Senate's "advise and consent" prerogative to order the President to "yield and carry out" its policy. After a whole first session struggle in the current Congress when the effort collapsed, it signaled President Nixon's biggest foreign policy triumph, one that may set the principle of the ascendancy of the Presidency in matters of foreign policy.

The triumph was on three successive votes on the defense appropriation. By a 54 to 39 vote, the Senate deleted from the bill an amendment by Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, that would have reduced the American forces in Western Europe to 250,000 men by June 15. The President's letter to John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee, pointed out that a substantially unilateral reduction would be a mistake, and added:

"Passage of the proposed troop cut would, with one stroke, diminish Western military capability in Europe and signal to friend and adversary alike a disarray and weakness in the American government. It would undermine vitally important new initiatives for peace in Moscow and Peking."

The amendment had been adopted by the Appropriation Committee by 15 to 14, but the letter tipped the balance against it on the floor, when its full import was realized.

Just as significant was a decision by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky Republican not to co-sponsor with Sen. Frank Church, Idaho Democrat, another hostile amendment. It provided that funds could be used only to carry out the policy enunciated in an earlier Mansfield amendment to withdraw all forces from Indochina promptly by a certain date, and subject only to the release of American prisoners of war. Nixon had flatly refused to be hounded by this Mansfield amendment, and said that he would not change his policy of relating withdrawals to the level of enemy activity, the survival of the Thieu government and the progress in peace negotiations. Cooper's retreat left the President unchallenged in his withdrawal policy.

Finally, Sen. Stuart Symington's amendment to impose a \$4 billion ceiling on spending by all intelligence agencies of the executive branch—primarily the Central Intelligence Agency—produced the first critical discussion in recent years of the secrecy surrounding appropriations for intelligence purposes. The total figure was never mentioned, but it is said to be \$6 billion. The Senate defeated this amendment 56 to 31.

The triple confrontation with the President was over and the \$70.8 billion defense appropriation bill was passed, 80 to 5, the last major appropriation measure of the session. The doves are now licking their wounds.

HAZELTON, PA.
STANDARD-SPEAKER

D - 22,706

DEC 4 1971

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Waste and duplicity in intelligence gathering?

Former CIA 'spy' comes in from the cold—into hot water

By Joanne Leedom

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

In the basement of his home in Oakton, Va., with dogs and children running havoc around him, Victor Marchetti wrote a spy novel last year. Today Mr. Marchetti and his new book "The Rope Dancer" are stirring up havoc of another kind just a few miles from his home, at Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters where Mr. Marchetti was an official just two years ago.

Today Mr. Marchetti is the spy "who came in from the cold—into hot water," to quote one of his friends. Now an outspoken critic of the agency, Mr. Marchetti has been traveling around the country promoting his exposé of the spy's world and crusading for reform in the CIA.

Mr. Marchetti left the CIA after a 14-year career in protest over what he asserts is its waste and duplicity in intelligence gathering, its increasing involvement with the military, its amorality, and what he says now is its subtle shifts to "domestic spying."

Reform, he says, in the entire intelligence network should be three-pronged: (1) reorganizing responsibilities, (2) reducing size ordered by President Nixon. Placing CIA director Richard Helms as overall coordinator of national intelligence recently was in part aimed at eliminating the waste in the nation's \$3 billion/200,000-man intelligence operation which spans a dozen governments and funding, and (3) exposing the intelligence community to more public control and scrutiny.

Silence maintained

The CIA, in its turn, has remained customarily silent to the public attack. However, one former top CIA official, who asked to remain anonymous, agreed with some of Mr. Marchetti's points but disputed his main arguments.

Since Mr. Marchetti began speaking out several months ago, a major restructuring in the intelligence community has been ordered. It was also aimed at tailoring intelligence output more closely to White House needs.

This reform and Mr. Marchetti's own criticism come at a time when Congress, too, is demanding more knowledge and control over the intelligence networks. For the first time Congress has ordered public hearings on the CIA next year, and Mr. Marchetti plans to testify.

agency was hard for me to identify at first. I began first to criticize the waste. This is ridiculous, I thought. We could be doing the job for \$2 billion less.

"The second thing that was most annoying to me was the military influence. This is very pervasive. When the Secretary of Defense controls 85 percent of the assets, he [the CIA director] doesn't have the muscle to make changes. The military influence in many ways is the greatest single factor of waste. They want to know more and more and are responsible for collection overkill."

To these two criticisms, the former CIA official who worked close to the director and who responded for The Christian Science Monitor, partly agreed. "There is unfortunately an awful lot of duplication," he said, but added, "What is needed is tighter control over the military [not the CIA]. It's not a question of the CIA duplicating the military, but of the military duplicating what the CIA does. The President's reorganization is a strong move in the right direction."

Another one of Mr. Marchetti's complaints is that the traditional intelligence work of gathering and assessing information has been "contaminated" with paramilitary activity.

A prime example is Laos where the CIA recruited and armed thousands of natives, says Mr. Marchetti, who worked in the CIA as an intelligence analyst, as special assistant to the chief of plans, programs, and budgets, to the executive director, and finally as executive assistant to the agency's deputy director.

"[At the time] perhaps a handful of key congressmen and senators might have known about this activity in Laos. The public knew nothing," he declared.

According to the former CIA administrator, however, paramilitary activity is shifting out of the CIA now and into the Army. "But in any case," he said, "the CIA doesn't decide on this activity; they are directed by the President and the National Security Council." If there is to be reform in the use of the CIA, he argues, it must come from the President's direction.

While Mr. Marchetti is highly critical of the CIA's paramilitary and clandestine interventions in other countries, he insists that the real threat of the CIA today is that it may "unleash" itself on this country.

Concern noticed

"In recent years as domestic unrest increased, I've noticed the CIA is concerned about the FBI's apparent inability to handle subversion in this country. I think there's an effort to convince the nation that the CIA should get into domestic intelligence."

"Ridiculous," snapped the former CIA administrator, and left this charge at that.

To reform the intelligence network, Mr. Marchetti says there should be a reorganization to limit the Defense Department to the routine intelligence needs of various departments—Army, Navy, etc.

"Then I'd put the National Security Agency under the control of the President and Congress," elaborated Mr. Marchetti. "Congress has very little knowledge about what goes on. The Pentagon papers and the way the Supreme Court acted strips away the shield intelligence has always had. We need to let a little sunshine in; that's the best safeguard."

Laos example cited

The former administrator insists, however, that there are already adequate controls through special congressional committees which control appropriations and military affairs. "If you had the whole Congress and Senate debating these issues in executive session, you might as well do away with it [secret intelligence operations]. Inevitably there would be leaks."

"Of course there would be leaks," admitted Mr. Marchetti. "What I'm really saying is that in the final analysis if we made the President walk through it [his decision to use covert forces in foreign countries], the President would see it's all not worth it. Then if we deny ourselves these alternatives we'd have to act in a diplomatic fashion."

DANBURY, CONN.
 NEWS-TIMES
 DEC 3 1971
 E - 29,870

A blank check with no maximum limit

Even in these days of \$230 billion federal budgets and \$27 billion federal deficits, \$579 million is a lot of money.

It represents about \$11,000 for every man, woman and child in Danbury.

One would expect that when Congress votes an appropriation of \$579 million, it would know what the money is going for.

But in the case of the current Defense Department budget, it does not.

That \$579 million fund is the last item on the table of aircraft procurement requested by the Pentagon for fiscal 1972 and is identified merely as "classified projects."

Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, the only senator who is a member of both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee, suspects this is one of the hidden items to cover intelligence funding, for the CIA and for other intelligence operations.

But the Pentagon won't admit it is, nor will it say it isn't.

Senator Symington, a former Air Force secretary, has been on the Armed Services Committee for the past 20 years ranking immediately behind the chairman in seniority. Not once has he or the full committee, let alone the entire Senate, been informed what hidden funds are included in the defense budget for intelligence operations. During this period, U.S. intelligence operatives have been credited with or blamed for U.S. involvement in affairs of foreign countries, including the secret war in Laos.

Senator Symington last week tried to put a limit on the blank check Congress provides for intelligence operations. He offered an amendment to the defense appropriations bill to put a \$4 billion lid on the blank check.

He didn't ask that the budget provide a breakdown of the \$4 billion, nor that secret material be revealed to the Senate. He just wanted intelligence funding limited to intelligence, so we don't get into another situation where U.S. personnel are organizing and running a war on foreign soil, and an airline to go with it, without Congress or the American taxpayers knowing about it.

Unfortunately, only 30 other senators joined Senator Symington in voting for the amendment, so the intelligence operatives not only continue to have a blank check but one without limit as far as Congress is concerned.

The usual Pentagon supporters in the Senate won this round. But the questions Senator Symington and others raised about U.S. military and intelligence officials involving this country in distant wars cannot be hidden away like the \$579 million appropriation.

Sooner or later, the administration, the Pentagon, the CIA and others involved will have to face up to these questions. As far as taxpayers are concerned, the sooner the better.

LEWISTOWN, PA.
SENTINEL

E - 14³¹²
DEC 3 1971

Editorials

More Control Of Government Agencies

There are certain sections of our democracy of which no branch of government has complete control. For instance, look at the C.I.A.

Two years ago, many people were shocked when they found out that the Central Intelligence Agency was giving scholarships to students for study in foreign countries. The implication was that these students, in return for their tuition and books, were spies for the United States government.

The U.S. citizenry was shocked to find out that not even Congress knows where funds earmarked for the C.I.A. are spent. The C. I. A. has been allowed to operate under the assumption that unless all of their plans are shrouded in complete secrecy, the security of the United States will be threatened.

We feel that the reverse is true. We cannot see any harm in letting Senators and Congressmen with security clearance know where these funds are being spent. On the contrary, we are afraid that the very secrecy of this agency is a threat to all of the people of the United States. We supply funds to a police agency which is not responsible to anyone.

The temptation is there for a power hungry individual to use the funds against the forces of democracy. If there is nobody to answer to what is the harm in trying to set up a private dictatorship? Even if the attempt fails, the next year he could tell the Congress that it was none of their business what he was trying to do. Tradition would dictate that Congress would accept this — then give the agency more funds for another year's work.

We will grant that this would be an extreme case. However, we believe that there is a distinct possibility that the C.I.A., as well as other agencies without direct control, could someday work against our government.

We therefore believe that all agencies of the U. S. government should be forced to submit to the Congress a budget with every dollar earmarked for a specific project.

Only then can we be sure that none of our tax dollars are being spent to subvert our own government.

TOWARD LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF THE C.I.A.

STANLEY N. FUTTERMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

Every few years the C.I.A. is rediscovered. The inspiration is rarely the same: Guatemala in 1954; the U-2 incident in 1960; the Bay of Pigs in 1961; support for the National Students Association in 1967. This year it is mainly Laos.

How far the Nixon Administration has been forced to come in the past year in acknowledging the C.I.A.'s role in Laos may be seen by a comparison of two official reports. In March, 1970, in response to increasingly detailed newspaper reports and rising pressures from Congress, President Nixon issued a 3,000 word statement on Laos, including a nine point description of "the precise nature of our aid to Laos."¹ There was no mention of the Central Intelligence Agency. On August 3, 1971 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a staff report on the situation in Laos, cleared for publication by the Administration after 5 weeks of negotiation with the Committee staff. The published report reflects numerous deletions insisted on by the Administration but includes the now officially conceded revelation that "the most effective [friendly] military force in Laos is not the Royal Lao Army, but the . . . irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the C.I.A."²

There have been revelations about C.I.A. foreign operations before and official or semi-official confirmations of them. What is unusual about the official confirmations of C.I.A. operations in Laos is that they have been forced out of the Administration while the activities are still in progress. The revelations come also at a time when the Congress is heavily engaged in an effort to legislate limits to the President's discretion in foreign affairs.

These events have led to the introduction in the present Congress of several bills which comprise the first proposed legislation intended to bring the C.I.A.'s foreign operations under substantive legislative restraints. It is not that past years were without congressional flurries over the C.I.A. Over the years some 132 bills had been introduced either to establish standing committees to oversee the C.I.A.'s activities or to authorize special investigations of the C.I.A.'s role. Not one passed, and only two ever reached the floor of even one House, where both were decisively defeated by better than two-thirds majorities.³ The remarkable thing is that the activity was all confined to jurisdictional battles within the Congress. The traditional issue has been which small group of Senators and Representatives would be privy to the doings of the C.I.A.

Not until 1967 was the first bill introduced to limit what the C.I.A. could do with its funds: Rep. Ryan's measure to prohibit the C.I.A. from contributing funds to domestic organizations.⁴ The Johnson Administration avoided what surely would have been considerable pressure for such legislation only by announcing that all existing covert financial assistance to the nation's educational and private organizations would be terminated by about the end of the year.⁵ More recently, Congress has compelled the Nixon Administration to terminate covert C.I.A. funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and forced it to seek legislation to provide open government funding of the Radios.

3

VENTURA, CAL.
STAR-FREE PRESS

NOV 30 1971

E - 31,084

S - 30,953

We've Got A Secret . . .

NOBODY CAN ACCUSE THE Central Intelligence Agency of overspending, because nobody seems to know how much it spends. Some senators raised questions about the CIA's super-secret (\$4 billion?) budget last week, and were told to mind their own business. ✓

There are a couple of folks in Washington who claim to know what the CIA's allowance is, but they aren't talking. Whether they really know or simply want other people to think they do — they're keeping the secret, either way.

One of the I've-got-a-secret senators is John Stennis of Mississippi, who often sees money matters in patriotic terms, and is a man of no small faith. "If you're going to have an intelligence agency," said Sen. Stennis, "you've got to shut your eyes and take what comes." ✓

Well, we **have** shut our eyes, and we've taken what has come: the Bay of Pigs, a U.S. invasion of Santa Domingo, a few coups in Latin America, assorted assassinations of enemy agents (or suspected double agents) in two hemispheres and other hard-to-explain goings-on around the world — not to mention Vietnam. . . . ✓

If it's too much to ask for the American people to know what the CIA is up to, we should at least have some idea how much of our money is being spent to do it. Whatever the investment, the dividends haven't been very encouraging to date.

That is, unless you view them as Sen. Stennis suggests, with both eyes shut tight.

27 NOV 1971

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00010

CIA Revamping

STATINTL

How the Administration Is Trying to Improve Intelligence

Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence in Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms has taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nixon believes (correctly) that our nation's intelligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly assigned Mr. Helms to correct it.

By HENRY J. TAYLOR

A sick elephant is a formidable danger. And secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick it is.

Incredibly, we spend close to \$6 billion a year for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in scope than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money.

Legendary Gen. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic Services conducted our entire World War II espionage throughout four years and throughout the world for a total of \$135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least \$1.5 billion a year.

Next to the Pentagon with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., is the largest building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. But the CIA maintains secret offices in most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the public.

About 10,000 people work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, burrowing everywhere for intelligence. These include many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treachery. I could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own clandestine communications system with Washington and the world.

The Pentagon spends \$3 billion a year on intelligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence arms operate worldwide, of course, and—largely unknown—they also have an immense adjunct called the National Security Agency which rivals the CIA in size and cost.

Then there exists the important Intelligence Section of the State Department, likewise worldwide. Its chief re-

ports directly to Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II, it is understandably jealous of its prerogatives, and traditionally it plays its findings very close to its vest.

Additional intelligence agencies—all growing, all sprawling, all costly—spread out into the world from the office of the secretary of defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and even the Department of Commerce.

In fact, there are so many additional hush-hush agencies that recently in West and East Berlin alone there were at least 40 known U.S. intelligence agencies and their branches—most of them competing with one another.

Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." The acquisition of intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it is another; and the use of it is a third. The 1947 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. It also makes the CIA directly responsible to the President. But it is simply not true that the CIA is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widely believed.

Again and again, no one and everyone is responsible.

The function of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick elephant is threatening our national security by surprise, surprise, surprise.

Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new and sweeping intelligence reorganization authority on an over-all basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to review, and thus affect, all our foreign intelligence agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr. Helms, this undercover world's most experienced pro, can cut at least \$1 billion out of the morass.

The President confided that he is totally fed up with the intelligence com-

self-protective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he wants its output brought closer to the needs of the President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six men), which serves the National Security Council and the President himself.

In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr. Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises. And the President could not have picked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.



CIA Director Richard Helms heads up the 15,000-man intelligence operation that is now being streamlined.

STATINTL

NATION
27 NOV. 1971

Congress and the CIA

President Nixon has issued an executive order which invests Richard Helms, director of the CIA, with authority to oversee all the intelligence agencies (the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, etc.) and to cut "bureaucratic fat" and professional overlapping wherever possible. There may be merit in this new order, but there is incontestable merit in Sen. Stuart Symington's reaction to it. The Senator notes that the CIA was brought into existence in 1947 by an act of Congress. Its powers and duties are defined by legislation adopted by the Congress. The director and deputy director are subject to confirmation by the Senate. Last year the Congress appropriated between \$5 billion and \$6 billion for the intelligence establishment; no one knows the exact amount, since part of the CIA's budget is artfully concealed. Yet the Senate was not consulted about the proposed reorganization. Senator Symington serves on the CIA subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. To his knowledge, the subcommittee was not consulted about, nor did it approve, the reorganization ordered by the President. As a matter of fact the subcommittee has not met once during the current year. This is an amazing state of affairs. Surely the Congress has a right to be consulted about the reorganization of an agency which owes its existence to an Act of Congress and is sustained by annual appropriations voted by the Congress.

The fact is that the CIA enjoys an autonomy almost as complete as that enjoyed by the FBI. Whatever the original intention of the Congress, the CIA functions today as an adjunct of the White House. The intelligence it gathers is available to the President; it is not available to the Congress. Under the proposed reorganization, it will be even more directly responsible to the President, and by its oversight control over the other agencies will be supplying him with a unified appraisal. An agency that gathers information for the President may be tempted to provide him with the estimates it thinks he wants (as the Pentagon Papers have shown, intelligence reports that do not coincide with White House opinion are apt to be ignored), and as Joseph Kraft pointed out in a recent column, there is much to be said for diverging, even conflicting, reports in the highly subjective area of intelligence evaluation.

The CIA is closed off from scrutiny by the press, public and the Congress; like the FBI, it functions in splendid bureaucratic isolation. Mr. Helms is such a gray eminence that a private elevator takes him to and from his office in the CIA structure in Langley, Va. Like Mr. Hoover, he is usually not "available," except at budget time. Recently, however, he has been trying to give the agency a new, or at least a brighter image, since he is well aware of a growing restiveness in the Congress and of the need to slash budgets. A *Nation* editorial of May 3 called attention to the way in which Mr. Helms was "breaking cover" to talk about the brilliant achievements of the

agency and to assure us that it is staffed by dedicated friends of the democratic ideal. Now he is up to the same antics again. This week he is the "cover boy" on *Newsweek*, with the predictable feature telling of gallant CIA capers of a kind that could have been made known only by the agency that is so super-secret it feels compelled to conceal its activities from the Congress.

Congress should not take any more of this guff from the agency or its director. It has authority to insist that its authority be respected and it has a clear responsibility to act in that spirit. In an editorial last August 2, we remarked on a measure, introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, which would require the CIA to make its intelligence reports available to the chairman of the germane committees of the Congress (Armed Services and Foreign Relations) and also require the agency to prepare reports at the request of the Congress. There is precedent for such legislation in the instructions given the AEC. After all, the CIA often gives to foreign governments information and reports which it will not make available to the Senate or the House. This is selective secrecy carried to a grotesque extreme.

Hearings will be held on Senator Cooper's bill (S. 2224) during the first week of February. It is a wise and sensible proposal. We hope it is adopted. We hope too that the CIA subcommittee will come alive and begin to exercise a real degree of oversight over the agency. Better still, the Senate should adopt the resolution offered by Senator Symington (S. 192, November 13) to create a select committee which would oversee the CIA. But there is really only one way to deal with the problem of the CIA and that is to make it directly responsible to the Congress. If it is engaged in activities of such a character that they cannot be reported to the Congress, then it should be told to abandon those activities. There is no place for a secret agency of the CIA type within the framework of a constitutional democracy, which is how Justice Stanley Reed once characterized our form of government. As long as the CIA can plead secrecy, Congress will be unable to exercise effective oversight. The time has come to make both the FBI and the CIA subject to close and continuing Congressional supervision and control.

Europe troop cut defeated

CIA fund limit also loses as arms bill passes

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — The Senate passed last night a \$70.8 billion defense appropriations bill for fiscal 1972, after rejecting an amendment designed to force a unilateral reduction of United States forces in Europe. The vote was 69 to 5.

Also rejected by a 56-to-31 vote was an amendment offered by Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) to set a \$1 billion ceiling on expenditures by the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The defeat of these two controversial amendments virtually guaranteed that the defense appropriations would encounter little trouble in a House-Senate conference committee.

Senate bill

The Senate bill provides about \$200 million less than what the House version allowed and about \$2.7 billion less than the administration request.

The amendment to force a 20 per cent reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, offered by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), was defeated 54 to 39.

The vote was only slightly closer than the 61-to-36 margin by which a more drastic move to reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe was defeated six months ago.

Europe uneasy

But the moves in the Senate for a reduction in the U.S. military commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been viewed with some uneasiness in Europe. It appeared to be the majority leader's intention, in part, to keep the pressure on the administration and the NATO countries to negotiate a reduction in U.S. troop levels.

In a letter to Senator John Stennis (D., Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, President Nixon said the congressional concern "for a more equitable sharing of the defense burdens in Europe and elsewhere" has been a significant factor in his administration's foreign policy.

"A great mistake"

But he said the Mansfield amendment was "ill-timed" and would be "a great mistake," in the view of the negotiations now going on.

In the letter, released to the press early yesterday, Mr. Nixon said the United States was in the final stages of talks to establish "improved arrangements for the sharing of the defense burden in Europe, including an agreement with West Germany to offset nearly \$2 billion of United States costs."

Mr. Nixon also noted that Manlio Brosio, a former secretary general of NATO, will go to Moscow next week to begin discussions on mutual East-West force reduction.

The Mansfield amendment would have required the United States to reduce its troop level from 310,000 to not more than 250,000 by June 15, 1972.

Last May, Mr. Mansfield had proposed that the troop level be cut to 150,000 by the end of this year, but he acknowledged yesterday he "would have fallen through the floor of the Senate" if it had passed. It was too much of a cut over too short a time, he said.

But since then, he said, the nation's economic position has deteriorated even further and the United States cannot continue to carry the full burden.

Several senators expressed sympathy for Mr. Mansfield's view but voted against his amendment, primarily on the grounds that a unilateral reduction by the United States would weaken its negotiating position.

The Symington amendment to limit spending for intelligence work was fought bitterly on the floor by Senator Stennis and Senator Allen J. Ellender (D., La.), chairman of the appropriations committee, on the grounds that it would endanger national security by opening up the CIA to budgetary scrutiny. Senator Symington argued successfully that his intention

was not to make the CIA a public agency but rather to eliminate redundancy and waste in U.S. intelligence operations being conducted by several agencies without coordination.

Another issue, that had promised to produce a floor fight was the proposed new Cooper-Church amendment to cut off funds for U.S. military operations in Vietnam, except for what would be needed to withdraw safely.

The Senate rejected a similar proposal when it was brought up as an amendment to the foreign aid bill, but it seemed to get new life when President Nixon said he would ignore a congressional declaration of national policy stating that the United States would withdraw all forces from Indochina if Communist forces release all American prisoners of war.

The move to resurrect the Cooper-Church amendment, died, however, when Senator John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.) withdrew his support because, according to Senate sources, he felt the measure did not have the votes to pass.

In other action, the Senate adopted by an 82-to-14 vote an amendment offered by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) to provide Israel with up to \$50-million in credits, \$200 million of which would be used to provide Israel with F-4 Phantom aircraft.

The move appeared to be designed primarily to pressure the administration to make more aircraft available to Israel, something the administration has been reluctant to do for fear of adding to the political instability in the Middle East.

Opponents of the move pointed out that there is already money available for the purpose and authority for another \$300 million is contained in the new foreign military assistance bill, currently in a House-Senate conference.

Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, opposed the amendment, saying, "This Congress is interfering with the President's effort to bring about a negotiated settlement in the Middle East."

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000100160001-6
 SAN ANTONIO, TEX.

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How Much For What?

'Spy' Spending Keeps Senators In The Dark

McClatchy Newspapers Service

WASHINGTON — The full extent of congressional ignorance about US intelligence operations, including covert military action in Laos, was spotlighted on the Senate floor last night in an exchange between Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., and appropriations committee chairman Allen Ellender, D-La.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., had offered an amendment to the Pentagon budget bill to limit outlays for intelligence activities to \$4 billion.

The bill has no separate item for this purpose and the actual amount is unknown to all but Ellender and four other members of a special intelligence subcommittee.

Ellender reported his committee slashed \$390 million from administration requests for intelligence operations. But the Senate could not determine the original figure or the reduced figure.

Addressing Ellender, Cranston declared:

"The chairman stated that he never would have thought of even asking about CIA funds being used to conduct the war in Laos. I am sure I never would have thought to ask such a question. But it appeared in the press that perhaps that was happening. I would like to ask the senator if, since then, he has inquired and now knows whether that is being done?"

"I have not inquired," Ellender replied.

"You do not know, in fact?" Cranston asked.

"No," said Ellender.

"As you are one of the five men privy to this information, in fact you are the No. 1 man of the five men who would know, then who would know what happened to this money?" Cranston continued. "The fact is, not even the five men, and you are the chief one of the five men, know the facts in the situation."

"Probably not," said Ellender.

Cranston noted that the \$70 billion defense appropriations measure spec-

ifies outlays for pay and allowances, clothing, travel, retirement pay, health care, welfare and recreation, medals and awards, emblems and insignia, milk purchases, acquisition of weapons systems — but not a word about funding for the CIA and other intelligence groups.

"Is the way these items are handled inflated, or bloated, in fact, some of them, at least — that will cover up what is in this bill for intelligence?" he asked.

"Yes, the senator is correct — some of it," Ellender replied.

Cranston and Sen. John V. Tunney, D-Calif., voted for the Symington amendment, which was rejected, 56-31.

STATINTL

SYMINGTON'S SHOT IN THE DARK

Spy spending still top secret

(UPI)—The Senate refused yesterday to limit U.S. intelligence agencies spending after a rare open discussion on how Congress supervises the secret spy network.

The proposed \$4 billion ceiling, an amendment by Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., to a defense money bill, was rejected 56 to 31.

Sen. Symington, a former secretary of the Air Force, said that though he served on the armed services and foreign relations committees he had no idea how much is spent on intelligence gathering. He said the \$4 billion limit was just a shot in the dark.

LESS SCRUTINY

"The point," he told senators during the dinner-hour debate, "is that we do not have the facts required to allocate the resources of the country."

"There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA," Sen. Symington said, and the same is true of other intelligence agencies of the government.

As a case in point, Sen. Symington cited the central intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee headed by Sen. John Stennis.

He is one of five senators entrusted with the details of the intelligence budget, it came out during the debate.

Another of the five, Sen. Allen Ellender, D-La., chairman of the appropriations commit-

tee, acknowledged that intelligence outlays were hidden by padding out line item appropriations in various bills.

He said he could not reveal how much is spent on intelligence because "that's a top secret."

Sen. Ellender conceded he did not know in advance about the CIA's financing of any army in Laos.

Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the foreign relations committee, argued that such lack of congressional knowledge demonstrated the need for more accountability.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is the CIA going off and conducting a war of its own," Sen. Fulbright said. He disputed Stennis' contention that revealing the total budgets of intelligence agencies would disclose any military secrets.

"I don't believe it is tragic" for the Senate to demand the information thru such a device as the Symington amendment, Sen. Fulbright said. "The Senate is due an explanation."

Sen. Symington at one point shouted "I can be trusted" in expressing his frustration over being kept in the dark.

Sen. Stennis argued that Congress itself had set up the agencies.

He told senators: "You're just going to have to make up your mind that you can't have an accounting — shut your eyes and take what comes."

STATINTL

24 NOV 1971

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0001

Intelligence Outlay Ceiling Is Rejected by Senate, 56-31

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

After a sharp debate punctuated by such shouts as "the Senate is due an explanation" and "I can be trusted," the Senate last night voted 56 to 31 against an amendment to put a ceiling on spending by government intelligence agencies.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), in offering the amendment to the defense money bill, said his purpose was to let Congress in on what American intelligence operatives are already doing and plan to do in this country and abroad.

"The point," he told the senators during the dinner-hour debate, "is to state that we do not have the facts required to allocate the resources of the country."

Symington and his allies thus made the stiffest challenge yet to the way Congress tries to keep track of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and the separate intelligence arms of the Army, Navy and Air Force, operations which altogether reportedly cost some \$6 billion a year.

"There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA," Symington said, "and the same is true of other intelligence agencies of the government."

As a case in point, Symington cited the Central Intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee which is chaired by Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.).

When Stennis during the debate said "it is so tragic" to try to limit intelligence operations through hasty action on the Senate floor, Symington shouted in reply: "I wish his interest

was such he had just one meeting, just one meeting."

The Missourian said he did not know how much the various intelligence agencies of the government spent in any one year, adding that he understood published estimates of \$6 billion were too high. But his amendment, in an attempt to force an accounting, would have limited total spending by all the various agencies to \$4 billion in the fiscal year starting next July 1.

Chairman Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) of the Senate Appropriations Committee and its Intelligence Operations subcommittee said during the debate he could not tell fellow senators how much is spent on intelligence because "that's a top secret."

Ellender conceded under questioning by fellow senators that he did not know in advance about the CIA's financing of any army in Laos. Symington's allies, especially Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee, argued that such lack of congressional knowledge about worldwide activities demonstrated the need for more accountability.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is the CIA going off and conducting a war of its own," Fulbright said. He disputed Stennis' contention that revealing the total budgets of intelligence agencies would disclose any military secrets.

"I don't believe it is tragic" for the Senate to demand the information through such a device as the Symington amendment, Fulbright said. "The Senate is due an explanation."

Symington at one point shouted "I can be trusted" in expressing his frustration in being kept in the dark about

covert intelligence operations. He said such lack of information undercut his effort to vote sensibly on the allocation of the nation's resources.

Several senators expressed uneasiness over the White House's recently announced reorganization of intelligence functions. "No doubt about it," Symington said of the reorganization, "we're putting intelligence in the hands of the military."

Stennis, in declaring that Congress in its own laws creating the agencies stressed the need for secrecy on intelligence operations, said to his fellow senators: "You're just going to have to make up your mind that you can't have an accounting — shut your eyes and take what comes."

He promised that the Senate Armed Services Committee would conduct an in-depth analysis of the nation's intelligence activities, including the restructuring recently ordered by the White House.

In the meantime, Stennis said, "The only thing to do is vote this amendment down" and work for reforms in a more orderly fashion.

STATINTL

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Symington Wants Cut In Intelligence Spending

By a Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 23—
Senator Stuart Symington
(Dem.), Missouri, in a major
attack on secrecy in govern-
ment, proposed today that Con-
gress cut intelligence expendi-
tures from more than 5 billion
dollars to a mandatory ceiling
of 4 billions.

He charged, in a speech pre-
pared for delivery, that present
intelligence operations were
wasteful, overlapping and in-
adequately supervised by Con-
gress.

In a reference to the Indo-
china war, he said that he be-
lieved "at least one war" could
have been avoided if it had not
been for "pressures, combined
with unwarranted secrecy," on
the part of the intelligence
agencies.

Symington's proposed ceiling
would apply to the Central In-
telligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency and all
other intelligence units, includ-
ing those within the branches
of the armed services.

He said that he had not been
able to determine how much
was being appropriated this
year for intelligence operations,
although he is a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee
and the Armed Services Com-
mittee and an exofficio mem-
ber of the Appropriations Com-
mittee.

When the final draft of the
military appropriations bill was
before the defense appropri-
ations subcommittee last week,
he said, no mention was made
of the multibillion-dollar appro-
priation requests that it con-
tained for much of the 15 in-
telligence operating or advisory
operations.

After the meeting, he said,
he asked the committee staff

"in general about intelligence
appropriations." He said he was
told that the staff had been in-
structed to talk about those ap-
propriations only with five
senior members of the commit-
tee—chairman Allen J. Ellender
(Dem.), Louisiana, and Sena-
tors John L. McClellan (Dem.),
Arkansas; John C. Stennis
(Dem.), Mississippi; Milton R.
Young (Rep.), North Dakota,
and Margaret Chase Smith
(Rep.), Maine.

Symington said he had the
greatest respect for the five
members, "but I do not believe
that they, and they alone,
should render final decision on
both said authorizations and ap-
propriations without the knowl-
edge, let alone the approval, of
any other Senators, including
those on the Armed Services
Committee who are not on this
five-member subcommittee of
appropriations, and all mem-
bers of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee."

Symington quoted press esti-
mates that put intelligence ex-
penditures at 5 to 6 billion dol-
lars a year. He said that de-
spite his committee assign-
ments he had been unable to
say whether these estimates
were accurate. Another Sen-
ate source termed them fairly
accurate.

The Senator renewed his criti-
cism of a reorganization of the
intelligence machinery an-
nounced earlier this month by
President Richard M. Nixon.

He said it could mean turning
intelligence operations over to
the military, thus leading to
billions of dollars in additional
and often unnecessary defense
expenditures, because military
estimates of enemy plans, pro-
grams and production tend to
be higher than civilian esti-
mates.

He objected also that the re-
organization put policy control
of intelligence in a new com-
mittee in the White House,

headed by Henry A. Kissinger,
presidential assistant for na-
tional security affairs.

"This gives executive privi-
lege to the final policymakers
and therefore, except for the
power of the purse, enables the
policymakers to, in effect, take
the entire question of intelli-
gence out of the hands of Con-
gress," he said.

Symington had charged earli-
er this year that Kissinger,
rather than Secretary of State
William P. Rogers, had become
the President chief adviser on
foreign policy and, unlike
Rogers was not available for
questioning by Senate commit-
tees.

He complained recently that
the change in intelligence ar-
rangements had not been dis-
cussed with anyone in the Sen-
ate. He said today that Kissin-
ger had called him and said
that Symington was correct and
that the change should have
been discussed with the proper
committees of Congress.

Symington said it was non-
sense for anyone to think that
a high degree of secrecy was
necessary for intelligence oper-
ations.

He pointed out that congress-
ional and public discussions
constantly referred to the costs
of such new weapons as the
nuclear aircraft carrier, the
C-5A transport plane or the
main battle tank. These discus-
sions do not go into how these
weapons would be used in a
war, he said.

"By the same token, knowl-
edge of the over-all cost of in-
telligence does not in any way
entail the release of knowledge
about how the various intelli-
gence groups function or plan
to function," he said.

"Why should there be greater
danger to the national security
in making public over-all intel-
ligence costs than in making
public other over-all security
costs?"

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Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000100160001-6

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000100160001-6



CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

E - 434,849

NOV 20 1971

Just ask

Q. How much does it cost the nation to support the CIA?— S.J.

A. Taxpayers provide nearly \$750 million yearly to the agency. To fulfill its intelligence-gathering functions, the CIA is staffed with men who can speak 113 languages and hold degrees in 298 areas of specialization.

Spy Versus Spy

As recently as April 14 Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, assured the world that "the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States Government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before." That's all right, the administration has now said, but it costs too much and the overlapping and competition among agencies is wasteful and inefficient. The revelations of former CIA official Victor Marchetti (at one time an aide to the deputy director of CIA) that the combined intelligence budget is \$6 billion puts it a billion or so higher than previous estimates. Over 200,000 employees are involved. Hence the President's new reorganization order. Mr. Helms is to have "enhanced leadership" to bring all the fiefdoms under control.

The White House announcement produced two principal reorganizational tools: (a) a new joint intelligence budget and (b) a new evaluation group, which theoretically will affect the missions in Defense, State, the National Security Agency, and the CIA, to name the most prominent. All intelligence agencies will submit their budgets to Helms instead of to the Bureau of the Budget, and he is to sort out the wheat from the chaff. This is not really a new grant of authority. The National Security Act of 1947 gave two jobs to the CIA director - command of the agency itself, and coordinating responsibility as director of Central Intelligence, chairing the United States Intelligence Board. He also sits on the National Security Council. The idea of central supervision has been there from the start. But the idea has foundered on the realities of power; that is to say, the Pentagon. That outfit is run by the Secretary of a department, while the CIA director is still just the head of an agency. For large overseas operations, as in Vietnam and Laos, CIA is completely beholden to the Pentagon.

Bureaucratically, Helms is also in an unfavorable position, although this may not have been the President's intention. Helms will make his combined budget recommendations not directly to the National Security Council, but to a new National Security Intelligence Committee, headed by Henry Kissinger. The reorganization scheme struck Senators Symington and Fulbright as an attempt to wrest from Congress its oversight responsibilities in intelligence matters. Kissinger is inaccessible in the White House, protected from congressional questioning by executive privilege.

Kissinger gains more power through the other presidential innovation, the Net Assessment Group headed by Anthony Marshall in Kissinger's office. This group's task is to define the situation for the United States vis-à-vis the great powers, or any other problem it wants to designate as a crisis. Vigorously pur-

sued, this concept obviously will change the mission and emphasis of the various intelligence agencies. Some will wax, other wane. But they'll still compete. Rep. Nedzi, head of the subcommittee on intelligence oversight for the House Armed Services Committee, has been looking up and down the well-shaded streets of the Intelligence Community and finds that, "There is indeed real competition among the various agencies." He is not certain Helms' budget authority will do anything more than feed interagency suspicions. There will be the argument that intelligence requires compartmentalization at the cost of efficiency, that budget control will mean a monolithic intelligence voice instead of healthy if costly rivalry. Nedzi is concerned but philosophical, gearing up for his duties by going back to the basics set forth in Compton McKenzie's spoof on British intelligence, *Water on the Brain*. In that classic the fictitious Sir William Westmacott, head of the Security of the Realm, is addressing a new recruit. "After all, the whole point of the secret service is that it should be secret."

STATINTL

17 NOV 1971

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0001001600



HENRY J. TAYLOR

Our Spy Elephant Is Sick

Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence in Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms has taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nixon believes (correctly) that our nation's intelligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly assigned Mr. Helms to correct it.

A sick elephant is a formidable danger. And secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick it is.

Incredibly, we spend close to \$8 billion a year for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in scope than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money. Legendary Gen. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic Services conducted our entire World War II espionage throughout four years and throughout the world for a total \$135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least \$1.5 billion a year.

NEXT TO THE PENTAGON with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., is the largest building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. But the CIA maintains secret offices in most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the public.

About 10,000 people work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, burrowing everywhere for intelligence. These include many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treachery. I could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own clandestine communications system with Washington and the world.

The Pentagon spends \$3 billion a year on intelligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence arms operate worldwide, of course, and -- largely unknown -- they also have an immense adjunct called the National Security Agency which rivals the CIA in size and cost.

Then there exists the important Intelligence Section of the State Department, likewise worldwide. Its chief reports directly to Under Secretary

of State John N. Irwin 2nd, it is understandably very close to its vest.

ADDITIONAL intelligence agencies -- all growing, all sprawling, all costly -- spread out into the world from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA), and even the Department of Commerce.

In fact, there are so many additional hush-hush agencies that recently in West and East Berlin alone there were at least 40 known U.S. intelligence agencies and their branches -- most of them competing with one another.

Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." The acquisition of intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it is another; and the use of it is a third. The 1949 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. It also makes the CIA directly responsible to the President. But it is simply not true that the CIA is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widely believed.

Again and again, no one and everyone is responsible.

THE FUNCTION of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick elephant is threatening our national security by surprise, surprise, surprise.

Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new and sweeping intelligence reorganization authority on an over-all basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to review and thus effect, all our foreign intelligence agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr. Helms, this undercover world's most experienced pro, can cut at least \$1 billion out of the morass.

The President confided that he is totally fed up with the intelligence community's duplications, contradictions, self-protective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he wants its output brought closer to the needs of the President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six men), which serves the National Security Council and the President himself.

In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr. Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises. And the President could not have picked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.

STATINTL

The Constitution And The CIA

William B. Richardson of Greensburg is making some nationwide waves in his drive to hold the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to a better accountability of its expenditures.

It looks like a federal court will finally listen to his Constitutional plea that these expenditures should not be hidden under various other headings and departments in the national budget.

Richardson should be commended for proving again that an individual, using due process of law, can have an impact on his government in a Democratic society. We hope his example of involvement is contagious.

Richardson, we believe, has a good point, but we wonder what impact his campaign will have on the effectiveness of the secret operation of the CIA.

Obviously the money was buried in the budget on the premise that certain nations should not know how much and where we are spending cash on clandestine activities.

This contention would seem to be considerably weakened if just the overall amount spent by the CIA is to be made a matter of public record. But it is apparent the government would also rather keep this total figure a secret. What the CIA apparently fears is that if they are required to justify these expenditures with a detailed account, the effectiveness of the operation based on "super secrecy" would be destroyed.

Richardson told The Tribune-Review that the destruction of the

CIA is not his goal, but he feels strongly that the agency should work within the framework of the Constitution. He said that the basic reason for his attack on the current CIA operation goes beyond financial accountability. He wants the organization's operation, its very concept for being, to adhere to constitutional limits. This includes its "para-military" operations during peacetime, according to Richardson.

Richardson is apparently apprehensive over the possibility that the CIA is overlapping its operation, beyond constitutional limits, into areas of responsibility held by other divisions or units of the military and government. We feel he may be correct.

When we expressed our fears, to Richardson, about the ancient paradox between secrecy or national security and the need and the right to know, he said the Constitution can and will protect both facets.

Richardson contends there is no dilemma of confidence or conflict of interest involved if we stick to Constitutional guidelines. He feels we can still maintain our confidence in the ability of Congress and the executive branch of government in operating agencies, secret or otherwise, in the best interest of the nation and still have public accountability as to both action and money.

We hope he is right. Perhaps our past skepticism as to how the Constitution has been interpreted and instituted is unwarranted. We hope his case is soon aired in our courts and we look with considerable interest at the outcome.

EXECUTIVE SHELL GAME

STATINTL

HIDING BILLIONS FROM CONGRESS

LOUIS FISHER

Mr. Fisher is the author of *President and Congress: Power and Policy*, to be published by the *Free Press* in January.

According to the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, it is the policy of Congress that the accounting of the government provide "full disclosure of the results of financial operations, adequate financial information needed in the management of operations and the formulation and execution of the Budget, and effective control over income, expenditures, funds, property, and other assets." Despite that general policy, it has been estimated that, in a budget for fiscal 1972 of \$229.2 billion, secret funds may amount to \$15 billion to \$20 billion.

The financing of the war in Vietnam illustrates how billions can be spent for programs known to relatively few Congressmen. In September 1966, President Johnson expressed his "deep admiration as well as that of the American people for the action recently taken by the Philippines to send a civic action group of 2,000 men to assist the Vietnamese in resisting aggression and rebuilding their country." Other announcements from the White House created the impression that not only the Philippines but Thailand, South Korea, and other members of the "Free World Forces" had volunteered troops.

However, hearings held by the Symington subcommittee in 1969 and 1970 revealed that the United States had offered sizable subsidies to countries that involved themselves in Vietnam. It was learned that the Philippines had received river patrol craft, engineering equipment, a special overseas allowance for its soldiers sent to Vietnam, and additional equipment to strengthen Filipino forces at home. It cost the United States \$38.8 million to send one Filipino construction battalion to Vietnam. Senator Fulbright said that as he saw it, "all we did was go over and hire their soldiers in order to support our then administration's view that so many people were in sympathy with our war in Vietnam."

The Philippine Government denied that U.S. contributions represented a subsidy or a fee in return for the sending of the construction battalion, but an investigation

Mr. Fisher's article is the second of three which *The Nation* is running this fall on the elusive ways whereby accounts are kept, and expenses budgeted, by the federal government. "Military Budget: Double-Talk Bookkeeping" by Richard F. Kaufman appeared in the issue of November 1; an article by Sen. Frank Church on the executive's power to impound funds authorized by the Congress will be published soon.

Philippines in exchange for its commitment of a battalion to Vietnam.

The Symington subcommittee also uncovered an agreement that the Johnson administration had made with the Royal Thai Government, back in 1967, to cover any additional costs connected with the sending of Thai soldiers to Vietnam. The State Department estimated that U.S. support to Thai forces—including payment of overseas allowances—came to approximately \$200 million. A number of other expenses were also involved, such as modernization of Thai forces and the development of an anti-aircraft Hawk battery in Thailand. The Foreign Ministry of Thailand denied that the United States had offered payments to induce Thailand to send armed forces to Vietnam, but GAO investigators revealed that U.S. funds had been used for such purposes as the training of Thai troops, payment of overseas allowances, and payment of separation bonuses to Thai soldiers who had served in Vietnam. An interim GAO report estimated that the U.S. Government had invested "probably more than \$260 million in equipment, allowances, subsistence, construction, military sales concessions, and other support to the Thais for their contribution under the Free World Military Assistance program to Vietnam."

U.S. subsidies were used once again to facilitate the sending of South Korean forces to Vietnam. Assistance included equipment to modernize Korean forces at home, equipment and all additional costs to cover the deployment of Korean troops in Vietnam, additional loans from the Agency for International Development, and increased ammunition and communications facilities in Korea. To assure that the dispatch of men to Vietnam would not weaken the defensive capabilities of the Republic of Korea, the Johnson administration agreed to finance the training of forces to replace those deployed in Vietnam and to improve South Korea's anti-infiltration capability. From fiscal 1965 to fiscal 1970, Korea's military presence in Vietnam was estimated to have cost the United States \$927.5 million.

The legal basis for this assistance to free world forces in Vietnam derives from authorization and appropriation statutes of 1966. Funds were made available to support Vietnamese "and other free world forces in Vietnam, and related costs . . . on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine." In 1967 assistance was broadened to include local forces in Laos and Thailand. Reports on such expenditures were submitted only to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of each house. One would not know from the general language of the statutes what type of financial arrangement the Administration might enter into, or with what country. Even staff people who had access to the reports said that they did not know the nature and dimension of financing the free world forces until hearings were held by the Symington subcommittee.

Legislation in 1969 and 1970 tightened up the language of the statutes somewhat by placing a ceiling on the funds that could be given to free world forces. Standards were also established for payments of overseas allowances. The

by the General Accounting Office confirmed that "quid pro quo assistance" had indeed been given. Moreover, there was evidence that the Johnson administration had increased other forms of military and economic aid to the

HOUSTON, TEXAS

POST

NOV 14 1977

M - 294,677

S - 329,710

An intelligent move

The Nixon administration's plan to consolidate the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies operating abroad is a step toward further efficiency and economy in this vital and expensive bulwark of our national security.

Under the administration plan, Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms will supervise all U.S. foreign intelligence gathering operations. The revamping holds the promise of reducing conflicting and overlapping efforts by a plethora of U.S. intelligence organizations.

Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield and Republican Sen. George D. Aiken, both members of a special Senate review panel for CIA activities, have endorsed the reorganization plan. Speaking of the need for centralized administration of our intelligence work, Sen. Aiken said:

"We've had too many intelligence agencies. Every agency of government seems to have one — the Defense Department, the Navy, the Army, and God knows how many others. If you have more than two agencies of government working on the same thing they always try to undercut each other."

The public gets only sketchy indications of the huge sums spent by government agencies on intelligence gathering precisely because most such activities are classified. One indication appeared a few months ago in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report that the CIA spent well over \$100 million last year to halt North Vietnamese advances in Laos.

It remains to be seen what economies can be effected in intelligence agency budgets but it is reasonable to assume that some money can be saved through reduced duplication of effort and coordinated planning. The main goal, however, is improved efficiency. This country's economic troubles dictate that we get more mileage from our intelligence-gathering dollars as from other forms of government spending.

No next assignment for this spy

STATINTL

BY POLK LAFFOON STATINTL

Once during the conversation his hands seemed to shake. He was lighting his second or third cigarette, rather a lot for the short time he had been talking. The nervous edge was peculiar — it didn't jibe with the kind of image Victor Marchetti had painted of himself.

A real-life spy who came in from the cold, Marchetti is a 14-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency who has just authored a book called "The Rope Dancer." The novel purports to show espionage work for what it really is, as Marchetti experienced it. What he described, while dressing last Tuesday morning, is hardly nerve-fraying.

"Not all spies are dashing, handsome, debonair," he said with anti-James Bond certainty. "The average spy is married and lives in the suburbs, belongs to the PTA, or is a scoutmaster." Marchetti was all of those things, and he indicated that his job was equally unextraordinary.

"I WORKED OUT of Washington, was permanently assigned to headquarters, and occasionally went on overseas assignments. For example, years ago we were interested in Soviet military aid, so I might go to Indonesia for as long as ten weeks, to try to get a better handle on what the Soviets were up to."

But most of the time, the ex-agent stressed, he was engaged in collating and interpreting vast supplies of information coming in from sources all over the globe. It was painstaking, arduous work, bureaucratic tedium that differed from corporate tedium only in that it dealt with national security instead of marketing strategy.

"The bulk of the information acquired today is through satellites, overhead sensors, and electronic sensors," Marchetti said, again subverting the martini-mistress mystique that permeates espionage literature. He added that much additional information comes through diplomatic and official channels, with newspapers and magazines providing most of the remainder."

FIDGETING RESTLESSLY, the aspiring writer smiled, and partially amended his de-romanticized "heresy."

"Maybe 10 per cent of all the people engaged in espionage work are back alley spies. But of these, 19 out of 20 are faking it under the cover of diplomacy. They try to acquire local agents in the country where they're working."

To the disillusionment of spy-novel aficionados everywhere, however, Marchetti emphasized that there are very, very few agents living overseas without cover, and that their contribution is of marginal value. "It's kind of like fishing — you throw them out and sooner or later you get a strike."

No clue to the speaker's own unease emerged as he discussed his idea for the book. "I was just sitting around talking with another agent. We were saying that things in the agency were so screwed up that it wouldn't be surprising to find that a Russian was running it. We meant it as a joke, of course, but that's where the book began."

WITH THE PUBLICATION of "The Rope Dancer," Marchetti terminated a long, distinguished career with the CIA. He was assistant to the director of the entire agency when he resigned, and prospects for the future were good. So why did he quit?

"I'd lost a great deal of faith in the agency and its policies. If I couldn't believe in it, I couldn't serve it," he said sounding more like a campus politician than a hardbitten "spy." In truth, Marchetti left for a variety of reasons, some of them intriguing for the insights they lend to the arcane workings of the CIA.

While hard to see, the government is spending far in excess of what it should for defense. He labels the \$50 billion poured into defense each year, and the \$30 billion more for Vietnam as

absurd with the problems at home. "It's ridiculous overkill. We're like two guys standing across the street from each other with triggers on mortars, cannons, and rockets. We don't need it," he said, looping his tie.

IN HIS VIEW, the same kind of thinking that led to the arms buildup is reflected in the structure of the modern CIA. "It's too big, too costly, with too much military influence." Marchetti says the quality of the agency's product — good data — has been diluted accordingly. "We need more control from within the organization, and more directly from the outside."

Separately, Marchetti condemns the "cold war mentality" that colors much of the CIA's thinking, and translates to poor estimates of the international situation. "Cuba is the perfect example," he said eagerly, recounting the misguided thinking that led the U.S. to back Batista against Castro under the mistaken assumption that most Cubans also were anti-Castro.

Then, he says, when Castro won after all, the U.S. labeled him a Marxist and forced him into Russia's embrace. "That's what's wrong with Vietnam and Laos today," Marchetti continues, "we're trying to support governments not representative of the people."

ALMOST TO THE end of his reasons for resigning from the CIA, the cheerful novelist finished dressing, and readied himself to face anew the rigorous publicity tour. And still he eluded any indication of why he seemed slightly edgy.

"I disliked the clandestine atmosphere one finds in an organization like the CIA," he said, finalizing the list. "What bothers me most is when some guys got restless in the CIA and military intelligence a few years ago. With groups like the SDS, the Black Panthers, and with civil unrest in general, people in the CIA began to wonder what they should do about it."

Drawing on yet another cigarette, Marchetti explained that such internal disorders are properly the co the FBI or the army, not the CIA. Nevertheless, vociferous minority of the agents — the "spooks" — he calls them — began to say, "We're the experts. We should do the work."

THIS RATIONALE could lead to trouble at home as it already has in numerous small countries pockmarked by CIA interference. Marchetti disliked the trendline, and resigned.

Gathering papers together to go meet his public local representative, he mentioned that he was that he no longer is associated with an outfit instrumental in the conduct of the Vietnam war. He feels comfortable as he talks with his 17-year-old son, almost of fight the war, and a hearty disbeliever in it.

His clean conscience has been tempered by budgetary regrets, however. "I had to tell my son he wanted to go on to college, he'd have to manage way I did, by working his way through." Marchetti regrets that he has to be careful in acquiescing wife's requests for new living room furniture.

The problem is that in leaving the CIA, and a high within it, Marchetti was exercising an uncommon id — at least uncommon in 41-year-olds with a wife, three children. He left a \$23,000-a-year job, with promise of substantially more soon, for the vague knowns of a writer's life.

Marchetti is morally at peace with himself. Whi precisely the key to his restlessness. He has a second movie contract. And that? He is a spy without his next assignment.

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCHE - 326,376
S - 541,868

NOV 12 1971

More Executive Secrecy?

A further indication of the tendency of the Nixon Administration to keep vital information from Congress is suggested by the recent White House announcement of a reorganization of the government's intelligence operations. The reorganization plan would, among other things, give Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the authority to co-ordinate his own budget with those of intelligence agencies in the State and Defense departments. But more significantly, from the standpoint of Congress, it would vest responsibility for making the so-called "net assessment" of intelligence data in a unit working under Dr. Henry Kissinger as head of the National Security Council staff.

Senators Symington and Fulbright are properly concerned that this overhaul may mean that intelligence operations will be even further beyond the reach of Congress than they already are. Despite repeated attempts in the Senate to enact bills requiring the CIA to make reports to responsible Senate and House committees and to compel the CIA at least to reveal its gross budget, Congress has so far not acted.

With Dr. Kissinger having final responsibility for making the intelligence assessment on which the President presumably will act,

Senator Fulbright for good reason sees "a further erosion of congressional control over the intelligence community." On the basis of a claim of executive privilege, Dr. Kissinger has avoided testifying before congressional committees.

While conceding that the changes could be constructive, Senator Symington wants to hold hearings on the reorganization in order to ask questions about what it means as to the assignment given by Congress to the CIA. Obviously, Congress should be kept informed about intelligence activities, not only because Congress is expected to appropriate money for them but also because, in legislating in response to presidential requests, the legislators should have access to the same data on which the executive is relying for making its judgments.

Recent disparate analyses by the CIA and the Defense Department as to the nature and strength of Soviet capabilities lead to the suspicion that the White House would like to produce an intelligence estimate over which it has firmer control and which Congress would have to accept. Such a development would hamper Congress in making independent legislative judgments and in serving as a check upon the excessive power of the executive.

E - 634,371
S - 701,743

NOV 10 1971

Penna. Man Challenges Spending Secrecy by CIA

By PETER H. BINZEN
Of The Bulletin Staff

Secret spending by America's chief spy network, the Central Intelligence Agency, is undergoing a quiet court test here.

The complainant is a western Pennsylvania taxpayer

who filed suit after vainly trying to get information about the CIA through regular channels. His case is now before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit here.

The taxpayer, William B. Richardson, 52, of Greensburg, Westmoreland County charges that the government's failure to disclose CIA spending violates the constitutional requirement for a regular accounting of all government receipts and expenditures.

CIA spending is concealed in other departments. The government has never said how much money the agency gets or how the money is spent. The agency is thought to employ about 15,000 civilians and to spend about \$300 million a year.

Richardson is asking that a three-judge federal court be convened to hear his case. This plea was rejected by a district court judge in Erie last year. He said the issues raised were political in nature and, hence not capable of being decided by a court.

Richardson then appealed to the circuit court. He is not a lawyer and has no lawyer representing him. However, the circuit court found his case interesting enough to appoint a University of Pennsylvania law professor to file a brief as friend of the court.

Professor Files Brief

In his brief filed last month, the professor, Ralph S. Spritzer, joined Richardson in asking the circuit court judges to direct the district court to convene the court of three judges. The circuit court has heard oral argument in the case. Its decision is expected before the end of this year.

Although individual congressmen have sought to force disclosure of CIA spend-

ing, Richardson's case is believed to be the first challenge in the courts of Washington's policy of secrecy.

Richardson, who has a law degree from the University of Tennessee, is an investigator for the Westmoreland County Public Defenders' office. He was formerly an insurance claims examiner.

In May 1967, he wrote the Government Printing Office asking for documents published in compliance with the constitutional requirement that "a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."

The reports he subsequently received carried no listing for the CIA. When Richardson inquired about this omission, he was informed that the Treasury Department had "no other information available

with respect to the agency mentioned in your letter."

Richardson wrote back that to comply with the Constitution the government should terminate immediately its "present methods of reporting."

Details Not Available

S.S. Sokol, commissioner of accounts for the secretary of the treasury, subsequently informed Richardson: "All the receipts and expenditures of the government are published in the secretary's reports; however, by statute, the details of receipts and expenditures for the above agency (CIA) are not available."

The statute Sokol referred to was the CIA Act of 1949 exempting the agency from "the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds."

Richardson then filed suit on grounds that the government's reports were "fraudulent." He asked that Sokol and Treasury Secretary David M. Kennedy be enjoined from publishing the annual statement of receipts, expenditures and balances of the U.S. Government until it complies with the constitutional mandate.

While "no one wants to destroy the Central Intelligence Agency," argued Richardson, it was wrong for the government to engage in "subterfuge" through use of a "spurious document."

In its brief to the court of appeals, the government noted that Congress had limited disclosure of CIA financing "in the interests of national security, national defense and foreign policy." It said Richardson's quarrel was with Congress.

Spritzer in his brief said the issue narrowed down to a request that the court direct the treasury secretary to report "the aggregate sum transferred to the CIA and the total amount expended by that agency."

There need not be disclosure of information about the CIA's organization, personnel or activities, he said.

"So viewed," said Spritzer, "there is no basis for the government's apprehension that an order of the court would require revelation of materials of decision that probably could not be made public."

Case Cost \$2,000

Richardson in a telephone interview, said the court case has already cost him close to \$2,000.

"I've been bucking the establishment for a long time," he said. "I'm a believer in civil rights and adherence to the Constitution."

A former government attorney

in the case, Assistant Attorney General William D. Ruckelshaus, is now administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

A Secret... A Secret... He May Pry Loose The CIA's 'Little' Secret

By TOM WERTZ
Tribune-Review Staff Writer

A Greensburg man has won a major battle in his attempt to force the federal government to divulge the amount of tax money spent annually by the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Whether William B. Richardson wins the war, however, still rests finally with the U.S. District Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and, perhaps, the U.S. Supreme Court.

Richardson sued the federal government, Secretary of the Treasury John Connally and Commissioner of Accounts S. S. Sokol for violating the U.S. Constitution by publishing what he calls a fabricated report covering all governmental spending. It's a fabrication, Richardson says, because it includes CIA money "hidden" throughout accountings for most government service and agencies, making all accounts fabrications.

Major Milestone

Richardson's case, although rejected once by the federal district court for technical deficiencies, reached a major milestone in the last few days when an independent third party appointed by the district court submitted a brief supporting Richardson's position and recommended that a three-judge panel be convened to hear the case.

While the brief of the "amicus curiae" (friend of the court) does not automatically suggest a decision one way or another by the federal court, it lends considerable and perhaps surprising support to Richardson's whole argument.

The "amicus curiae" is Atty. Ralph S. Spritzer of Philadelphia, a professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania and, ironically, a former member of the U.S. Solicitor General's office which is presently defending the government in Richardson's suit.

Richardson said he was both astonished and pleased that Spritzer's brief supports his position. He's also a little embarrassed because he opposed Spritzer's appointment originally as "amicus curiae" on the grounds that Spritzer previously worked for the federal government and could hardly be regarded as a disinterested party.

The U. S. Solicitor General's office in Washington, D. C., doesn't view Spritzer's intervention into the case lightly either. A spokesman for that office said reputation carries considerable weight

and, no doubt, the government will be submitting a supplemental brief to answer Spritzer's argument.

Refuses Comment

The CIA itself (which curiously answers its telephone by repeating the number dialed, rather than "Good morning, this is the CIA") refused all comment on the case, except to say that it knows of the existence of the case and that "We are restrained by the Congress and the President from commenting or speculating on matters like these." What was sought was some indication of the impact of Richardson's court petitions if they were, in fact, granted by the federal courts.

Among other things, the granting of Richardson's petition would wipe out a Congressional disclaimer of secrecy for the CIA insofar as total public spending goes and force the U. S. Treasury to list a total amount of tax money spent on behalf of CIA operations, as well as make accurate all-other accountings which now "hide" the CIA amounts.

Any such ruling would represent the first crack in the bubble of absolute secrecy that has surrounded the CIA since its inception.

Spritzer, in his brief to the court, supporting Richardson, said in part:

"The government argues that all monies are being accounted for since all receipts and expenditures are shown under some descriptive head (in the U. S. Treasury report.)

"It is hardly an accounting in any meaningful sense, however, if the expenditures of the CIA are shown as welfare payments or aid to underdeveloped countries — any more than it would be a satisfactory accounting if a taxpayer were to file a tax return showing items of income as capital gain and expenditures for personal pleasure as contributions to charity.

"Only an accurate and identifiable head of appropriation—one bearing the name and thus disclosing at a minimum the general purpose for which funds are being employed—can satisfy the Constitutional obligation to account for the 'Receipts and Expenditures of all public money . . ."

Before reaching that conclusion, Spritzer previously in his 32-page brief said the question Richardson is raising is not political, that he has legal jurisdiction as a taxpayer and a citizen of the United States, that the issue will turn the government up-side-down, so to speak and that the issue raises a "sub-

stantial" Constitutional question which is worthy of review by a three-judge panel.

A 'Simple' Issue

Spritzer, in upholding Richardson's legal standing to question the lack of accounting as a violation of the Constitution, said, in substance, that Richardson is not challenging a Presidential discretion, or governmental policy in terms of war or peace. Rather, he said, he is simply saying that the Constitution mandates an accounting, regardless of policy, war or peace. He put it this way while arguing against some interpretation of *Flast versus Cohen*, a 1968 case in which it was held that taxpayers had standing in the federal courts only when challenging expenditures made for "the general welfare." Spritzer said:

"Surely, it could not be contended that the tens of billions of dollars spent for defense purposes are 'incidental' and that the taxpayer therefore has no interest that they be spent in accordance with the demands of the Constitution. Whether a taxpayer has status to litigate with the President the limits of the latter's power as Commander-in-Chief to conduct military operations without a Congressional declaration of war is another question."

For Richardson, a staff investigator for the Westmoreland County Public Defender's Office, the court test on the CIA funding has been a long haul, involving hundreds of hours of tedious research. Suffice to say, he's happy at this point to have Spritzer at his side as the case moves up the long arm of the federal court system.

HELMES TOLD TO CUT GLOBAL EXPENDITURES

Nixon Order Aims at Better Intelligence Gathering

By BERNARD WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 — President Nixon has given Richard Helms, his Director of Central Intelligence, new orders—and new authority—to trim costs and improve the output of the nation's global intelligence system.

In a statement issued yesterday by the White House—under circumstances strongly suggesting it was designed to attract as little public notice as possible—Mr. Nixon disclosed details of a far-reaching reorganization.

Intelligence experts here believe that Mr. Helms, armed with his new Presidential backing, may be able in the coming months to cut \$1-billion from the \$5-billion to \$6-billion that the United States spends yearly to ascertain, with spy satellites, electronic eavesdropping, secret agents and other sources, Soviet and Chinese Communist military developments. The reorganization plan, which has been under study at the Office of Management and Budget for at least a year, makes three main changes, informants say:

1. It gives Mr. Helms, who is 58 years old, the first authority ever given an intelligence chief to review—and thus affect—the budgets of all the nation's foreign intelligence agencies as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, which he will continue to head. The other agencies include units within the Defense and State Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. It will free Mr. Helms from much day-to-day responsibility for espionage, counter-espionage and such covert operations as the White House periodically orders through its secret "Forty Committee."

This committee, named for a numbered memorandum, includes Henry A. Kissinger, the White House national security assistant, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin 2d, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Helms.

Mr. Helms's duties here will be assumed by his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

3. It creates a new intelligence subcommittee under the National Security Council with the aim of tailoring the daily "product" garnered by the nation's vast overseas intelligence network closer to the needs of the "consumers". President Nixon and his top staff.

Presumably, intelligence sources say, the Forty Committee will be merged into the council's new subcommittee since the membership of each is identical.

Not Always Responsive

"The President and Henry [Kissinger] have felt that the intelligence we were collecting wasn't always responsive to their needs," said one source. "They suspected that one reason was because the intelligence community had no way of knowing day to day what the President and Kissinger needed. This is a new link between producers and consumers. We'll have to wait and see if it works."

Mr. Kissinger will add the chairmanship of the new subcommittee to several others he already holds.

Another development in the president's reorganization is the creation of a "net assessment group" inside Mr. Kissinger's National Security Council staff. It will be headed by Andrew M. Marshall, a consultant with the Rand Corporation of Los Angeles.

"Net assessment means comparing over-all U.S.S.R. forces and capabilities with those of the U.S.," said an American intelligence expert. "It's as complicated a calculus as exists. We in the intelligence world often know more about Soviet forces and capabilities than we do about our own—and this new group is intended to pull it all together in one place for the President."

Resources Committee

Under the new plan Mr. Helms will also head an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee on which will be represented the state and Defense Departments, the office of Management and Budget and the C.I.A.

The white house announcement said that the committee will "advise the D.C.I. on the preparation of a consolidated program budget." This, in the view of experts, is Mr. Helms's new authority to supervise and, at least partly, control the work involved in collecting intelligence.

The Pentagon spends \$3-billion yearly on intelligence if all its activities are counted, said one source.

"This is 80 per cent of everything the United States spends for intelligence," he said. The President hasn't given Helms control of the D.O.D.'s Intelligence budget, but at least he can now see it and advise on it before it's presented as a fait accompli."

STATINTL

STATINTL

BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

M - 237,967
S - 566,377

NOV 6 1971

Common sense in foreign aid

The final shape of foreign aid will be decided within the next few days on the floors of both Houses of Congress, and any prognosis of what it will be must necessarily await the possibility of somersaults under White House pressure.

As the bill left the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, it was two bills, and the Administration was clearly the loser in its running battle with the Senate's Fulbright school. "We" are not satisfied, the President's press secretary, Ronald F. Ziegler, told newsmen. "We" do not believe it is enough to meet the President's policy. Mr. Ziegler's pronouncement well may have assured passage of the bill or bills in substantially the present form, for it is precisely on the matter of presidential policy, rather than the sums to be authorized, that the Senate majority now has the bit in its teeth and is reluctant to let go.

The current bills authorize expenditures of \$2.3 billion, roughly \$1.2 billion less than the President wanted and \$700 million less than was in the bill the Senate defeated a week ago Friday, 41 to 27. But it is not in the amounts alone that the bills come down hard on the side of the Senate in its latest rowdydow with the White House.

The bills would separate economic and military assistance, as should have been done long ago, thus as-

sureing that a recipient nation's need for butter will not be measured by its eagerness for guns — and its willingness to use them at the whim either of an authoritarian regime or at the urging of the US State Department, the CIA or the Pentagon.

The military aid bill, indeed, specifically wipes out the CIA program for financing "volunteers" in Laos, as well as other outside mercenaries elsewhere. It also imposes a spending limit of \$341 million for military activities in Cambodia. This is all the Administration had asked, but the ceiling was imposed, almost pointedly, as an expression of the Committee's determination to prevent a later transfer of funds for what the Administration might regard as an emergency.

About half of the proposed authorizations, \$1.1 billion, is for economic and humanitarian aid, including \$250 million for Pakistan refugees and \$139 million for the United Nations. There may be some increase in these funds, for they are inadequate. But the in-fighting will be on the military bill, especially since it incorporates the Mansfield amendment setting a six-month deadline for total US withdrawal from Indochina.

The chips are down now, with the Senate, as its critics right along have been demanding, asserting its right to be heard, not told, by the White House. The next few days should be interesting ones.

White House Shakes Up Vast Intelligence-Gathering Network

CIA's Helms Seen Possible Czar, Pentagon's Agency Downgraded as Kissinger and Staff Receive New Powers

BY DAVID KRASLOW

Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — The White House announced Friday a shakeup of the government's massive intelligence bureaucracy that could have major impact in enabling the President to assess more accurately any Soviet threat to the United States.

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, emerges from the long-planned reorganization as an even stronger figure with responsibility for coordinating all intelligence activities. Some sources said Helms' role could develop into that of an intelligence czar.

Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, and the National Security Council staff also are given significant new powers in the shakeup.

Budget-Clearing Procedure

The Pentagon's high Defense Intelligence Agency is downgraded and will be required, along with other intelligence arms of the government, to clear its budget through a new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee chaired by Helms.

Informed sources said the shakeup reflected the President's unhappiness with the quality of information supplied him on occasion and his belief that the splintered intelligence activities can be coordinated better.

The President also is convinced, it was said, that the government's intelligence bill — reliably estimated at about \$5 billion a year now—is unnecessarily high. Administration officials hope to achieve a saving of at least several hundred million dollars along with greater efficiency.

For years many in Congress and in the executive branch have thought that the government's intelligence effort, because of growth of staff and fragmentation among various agencies, was becoming unmanageable and that the cost was getting out of hand.

The studies that led to Friday's announcement were launched secretly by the National Security

Council more than a year ago.

A major change, which for the first time will give the White House the expert capability to make its own intelligence evaluation of such strategic problems as the Soviet missile threat, is the establishment of the Net Assessment Group within the National Security Council staff.

The group will be headed by a senior staff member. A White House source said that job would go to Andrew W. Marshall, now director of strategic studies at the Rand Corp. in Santa Monica.

The different interpretations that the Pentagon and the CIA have given to the construction of about 90 missile silos in the Soviet Union is expected to be one of the first strategic policy problems to be put before the NAG.

The size of the defense budget and the strategic arms limitation talks with the Russians could be affected by whatever decision the President finally makes regarding the purpose of those still-empty silos.

Pentagon analysts have tended to a more alarmist reading of the silo construction, suggesting the Russians may be developing a new weapons system for offensive purposes.

While not ruling out that possibility, the CIA, it is understood, tends to the view that the silos are designed primarily to afford greater protection for missiles already in being and are therefore defensive.

Thus, where differences arise in the intelligence community on strategic questions, the NAG would be expected to reduce such disputes to manageable proportions for the President.

Helms' strengthened position will derive in large measure from his new authority over what the White House described as a "consolidated intelligence program budget."

Never before has there been a single intelligence budget. Under the present system each agency engaged in intelligence work submits its own budget request to the White House.

Under the reorganization the budget requests will go to the committee chaired by Helms and whose membership will include representatives of the State and Defense departments and the Office of Management and Budget.

Also among the "major management improvements" announced by the White House were:

—"An enhanced leadership role" for the director of central intelligence (Helms) in "planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence."



—Establishment of a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, chaired by the President's national security assistant (Kissinger), whose membership will include the attorney general, the director of central intelligence, the undersecretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

That committee is to "give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence user."

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RICHARD HELMS
... intelligence chief

GEN. ROBERT CUSHMAN
... new CIA duties

Helms to Oversee U.S. Spy Network

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon announced a long-awaited reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community yesterday creating a government-wide coordinating role for CIA Director Richard Helms and bringing military agencies under closer civilian control.

The overhaul was ordered following what the White

House called "an exhaustive study" of the far-flung foreign intelligence agencies of the U.S. government. The various agencies are unofficially reported to employ 200,000 persons and to cost \$5 billion yearly.

The aim of the reorganization, according to the White House announcement, is to improve "efficiency and effectiveness." Although the statement did not say so, high-ranking officials are known to feel that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful information it produces.

There also have been reports that the President and senior aides were unhappy with the military intelligence planning which went into the abortive Sontay prison raid and the South Vietnamese incursion. House officials denied yesterday

that reorganization is in response to dissatisfaction about particular estimates or reports.

One of the principal changes announced yesterday is the creation of a consolidated foreign intelligence program budget for the entire government, to be supervised by a high-ranking committee under Helms. Officials said Helms would be empowered to dip into any intelligence agency, civilian or military, for information to justify elements of its budget.

According to the announcement, Helms is being granted "an enhanced leadership role ... in planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence."

Helms has been instructed to reorganize his own office

he may assume his new government-wide responsibilities, officials said.

He will turn over many of his operating responsibilities for the Central Intelligence Agency to his deputy director, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr.

Cushman served four years as the national security aide of then-Vice President Nixon from 1957 to 1960, and is considered close to Mr. Nixon.

Helms will become chairman of a reconstituted U.S. intelligence board to consider national intelligence requirements and priorities, the security of intelligence data and the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Other members of the board will be Cushman, the chiefs of the major intelligence agencies of the Defense and State Departments and representatives of the Treasury Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Atomic Energy Commission.

Two elements of the reorganization appear to give greater control to the National Security Council staff under presidential assistant Henry A. Kissinger.

A new NSC intelligence committee, headed by Kissinger and including Attorney General John N. Mitchell and other high officials, has been established to give "direction and guidance" on national intelligence needs and evaluate the usefulness of the information received from the user's point of view.

At the NSC staff level, the reorganization created a new net assessment group to be headed by Anthony Marshall, former director of strategic studies of the Rand Corp. NAG, as it is known, will produce White House assessments of the relative strategic balance between major powers, as well as assessments of intelligence quality.

The assessment of the strategic balance is a critical factor in the battle over future military budgets. U.S. military leaders, intelligence services and some outsiders have expressed anxiety about a large Soviet buildup of strategic arms and are calling for ex-

The White House announcement also said that Mr. Nixon has ordered three consolidations in the Pentagon's intelligence organization:

- A national cryptologic command to consolidate all communications intelligence activities under the director of the National Security Agency, the monitoring and codebreaking agency with headquarters at Fort Meade, Md.

- An office of Defense investigations, to consolidate all personnel security investigations in the Defense Department.

- A Defense map agency to combine the now separate mapping, charting and geodetic organizations of the military services.

Officials said the reorganization is "not a plan to save money," but they expressed optimism that some funds will be saved through the various new controls and consolidations.

STATINTL

U.S. Aid Revived As 2 Bills

Senate Panel Cuts Amount By \$1.2 Billion

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously yesterday to revive foreign aid, but only after splitting it into two separate economic and military assistance bills and slashing more than \$1.2 billion from President Nixon's \$3.6 billion request for this year.

The two bills, totalling \$2.329 billion in authorizations, are intended as an "interim" substitute for the \$2.9 billion measure rejected by the Senate Friday by a 41 to 27 vote.

White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler told reporters immediately after the committee action, "We are not satisfied with that level. It is not sufficient to meet the essential elements of the President's policy." He added, "You may quote the President" that the \$2.329 billion figure "is insufficient."

Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) told reporters that he believed the committee had reported out the best bills it could, given the deep disagreements within it over the aid program.

But he said he would offer floor amendments to raise the total, although not all the way to \$2.9 billion again, because that would simply risk another rejection of the program by the Senate. He said he believed he could count on enough vote switches to pass

the two measures if their total added up to somewhere between \$2.329 billion and \$2.9 billion.

The two bills reported out yesterday:

- A \$1.144 billion economic and humanitarian aid authorization. This includes \$250 million for development loans, \$175 million for technical assistance; \$225 million for the Alliance for Progress, \$250 million for Pakistan refugee relief and \$139 million for the United Nations.

- A \$1.185 billion military aid authorization, which includes \$350 million for military aid grants, \$435 million for war-related economic supporting assistance (of which \$85 million is earmarked for Israel) and \$400 million for foreign military credit sales (with \$300 million in arms credit authority earmarked for Israel). The biggest cuts were in this area.

An unusual feature of committee voting was the use by Scott of a proxy from Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.), who has been absent from the Senate for two years because of illness and has never appeared on the floor during that period. Mundt's proxy was decisive in an 8-to-7 committee vote to package humanitarian and economic aid together, instead of leaving them separate and having a total of three bills.

The military bill contains a \$341 million ceiling on aid to Cambodia, which the administration has now said it will accept, after threatening a veto of the earlier aid measure over an identical provision. Although it is only seeking \$341 million in funds for Cambodia aid, it had opposed a ceiling in case it wanted to switch more for emergency reasons.

State Department spokesman Charles Bray said yesterday, in the first such assurance yet given by the administration, that Cambodia aid programs "have come close to their peak and will be declining." The \$341 million ceiling was designed to head off a suspected increase.

Other important provisions approved by the committee yesterday would limit CIA operations in Cambodia; require annual authorization for

basic State Department expenses; bar use of U.S. funds for outside mercenaries to fight in North Vietnam, Thailand or Laos (thus wiping out a CIA program of financing Thai "volunteers" in Northern Laos). Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's end-the-war-in-six-months amendment also is in the bill.

Despite committee approval, the aid program still faces serious obstacles. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) and some other former aid supporters who voted against the bill on the floor last Friday still have serious reservations about the use of military assistance as a tool to "bribe" potential allies and still fear that aid to Cambodia may lead to deeper U.S. involvement and a long-term financial drain.

Traditional foes of high foreign spending may not be fully assuaged by the committee's big slashes.

In the House, which has already passed a \$3.4 billion authorization bill, the whole issue will have to come to the floor again. Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.) said yesterday it will be hard to get both bills through the House separately, since economic aid has always piggybacked to passage on the shoulders of military aid.

Even if the authorizations pass both chambers the program could face new cuts in the appropriations committees. Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Allan J. Ellender (D-La.) said yesterday he couldn't envision his committee voting out more than \$2 billion to \$2.2 billion in actual appropriations.

Before taking final action yesterday, the committee defeated, 10 to 6, a proposal by Sens. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.), Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) and John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to approve a flat \$2.4 billion in a single bill, and include language barring any funds in the bill from being used for Cambodia and Laos except for the purpose of assisting in withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina.

Javits told reporters before the meeting that he would

seek a \$2.9 billion authorization, but Case said the three shaved the figure to \$2.4 billion when it became clear that the higher figure had no chance.

Fulbright and the bulk of Committee Democrats opposed the Javits-Case-Cooper proposal because they favored a three-bill approach — seeking to have each of the separate portions of the program fly on its own — and a lower total figure, \$2.655 billion.

The committee first voted 9 to 7 for a three-bill system, then voted 8 to 7 to join economic and humanitarian aid. It went down each separate item in the two final bills, and Republicans won enough increases to push the final two-bill total to \$2.329 billion. Scott said he favored a single package for fear military or economic aid portions might be defeated if sent to the floor alone, in a three-bill system.

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, in a statement yesterday, blasted defeat of the earlier bill, saying (in a reference to Fulbright) that he hoped it didn't indicate a desire to return to "Fortress Arkansas."

He declined to link the bill's defeat to any possible slowdown of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, but in emphasizing the need for military aid to U.S. allies, said the U.S. Navy would have to pull out of the Mediterranean without the support of Greece and Turkey.

continued

24 OCT 1971

THE CAMBODIA DILEMMA

Senators Seek U.S. Policy Limits...

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

The leading members of the Senate's foreign policy establishment are convinced that the United States is walking into another Asian bottomless pit in Cambodia. This week they will begin the most far-reaching effort yet to control U.S. policy there before it develops.

Sweeping anti-war amendments and fund cut-off proposals are part of the effort. But for the first time those who oppose further military commitments in Southeast Asia have come up with a series of specific, carefully-worded restrictions on U.S. activities which, if passed, would do much to return congressional partnership to the conduct of foreign policy.

"We are getting out of South Vietnam," says Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana, "but it looks like we are getting into Cambodia.

"It appears to me that the old pattern is perhaps being repeated; that the handwriting is on the wall for another Vietnam, despite all disclaimers to the contrary.

During a 1969 visit to Cambodia, Mansfield found only two Americans at the embassy in Phnom Penh. When Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown in 1970, there were 11 Americans there. Now, Mansfield says, "There are upwards of 150 and the trend is up."

Many of Mansfield's Senate colleagues do not believe the United States would make a massive commitment of American air and ground force to Cambodia, as it did in Vietnam.

But to many of them, Cambodia looks like a trap that could drain financial and political resources from the United States for years, preventing the kind of decisive disengagement from Indochina that Senate doves believe to be a necessity.

The Cambodia question has been simmering beneath the surface in the Senate for more than a year, since the Nixon administration began a rapid increase of aid to the Lon Nol government after the U.S. invasion of Communist sanctuaries in the spring of 1970.

Many members of the Foreign Relations Committee have watched with increasing discomfort as U.S. military and economic aid has multiplied.

Last week a prominent dove leaked to The New York Times a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird which spelled out a proposed five-year program of pacification, "psychological operations" and "unconventional warfare" for Cambodia, and listed the ways to fund such a program by diverting appropriations from other areas, masking military aid as economic assistance and declaring large amounts of military equipment "excess" so that it could be diverted to Cambodia.

The memorandum calls for doubling U.S. expenditures by 1977 to a level of \$500 million a year.

Capitol Hill sources admit that the memorandum was never agreed to by Laird, and that both the State Department and Henry Kissinger's National Security Council Staff apparently opposed the plan.

But its disclosure accelerated an effort within the Foreign Relations Committee to set stringent limits on future aid to Cambodia.

Aid Bill Provision

Senators Stuart Symington, D-Mo., and Clifford Case, R-N.J., added a provision to the foreign aid bill last week that would limit money to Cambodia in fiscal 1972 to an absolute ceiling of \$250 million for all military and economic assistance.

The expenditures would have to be accounted for in such great detail that State Department officials complained privately the procedure might be both unmanageable and dangerous to national security.

A second part of the Symington-Case amendment would limit to 200 the number of American personnel who can operate in Cambodia, and would allow for funds to pay only 50 third-country nationals employed in Cambodia by the U.S. Government.

The bill states explicitly that no more than \$250 million from any government source can be spent "to carry out directly or indirectly any economic or military assistance, or any operation project, or program of any kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers, in to for or on behalf of Cambodia."

A subsection states that in computing the \$250 million limitation, the value of any goods provided must be listed at "fair market value and in no case less than one-third of acquisition cost."

State Department officials first learned of the Cambodia limitations from the newspaper. It appears to have been caught off guard.

Department officials said yesterday they did not know whether the administration would make a major effort on the floor of the Senate to remove the limitations from the bill, although they acknowledge that an intense effort could be expected in a House-Senate conference committee.

Administration objections are many. The ceiling would represent a 40 percent cut in planned aid to Cambodia. The strict accounting called for could be interpreted, one official noted, to include the state Department's internal budget. The State for Washington officials assigned to Cambodian affairs and even the cost of airplane rides to Cambodia by sightseeing members of Congress.

More significant, the cost breakdown was interpreted as requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to report is expenditures — both for military and intelligence operations — to the Congress as a whole, instead of just to special CIA-oversight committees in the Senate and House.

Worst Moment

From the administration's point of view, Senate doves have chosen the worst possible moment to attempt remote-control cost accounting of the Indochina War.

As more and more U.S. troops depart from Vietnam, the five North Vietnamese and Viet Cong divisions in Cambodia become an increasing threat which needs to be countered with more, not less, U.S. aid to the growing Cambodian army.


Senate opponents do not deny the strategic importance of the Cambodian border areas or the pressure that could be exerted there by the North Vietnamese.

But they believe the administration should closely consult Congress every step of the way in order to resist the temptation to pour massive resources into Cambodia as a diverting the attention of the enemy and U.S. critics from Vietnam.

OCT 16 1979

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STATINTL

Historian Cites Erosion In Power of Congress

By Irene Jones

Tribune Staff Writer

In the last decade there has been "such a significant breakdown in government separation of powers" in the United States that "the peace and security of the nation are now threatened," Dr. Henry S. Commager, well-known historian, said Thursday night in Salt Lake City.

The legislative branch, which should be strong enough to represent the people and be the "center of gravity in the government" has not had "the courage to use its appropriation powers "to limit executive control" now exercising beyond its limits," he said.

Speaker At U.

Dr. Commager, Amherst lecturer, was guest speaker at the University of Utah Contemporary Issues lecture in the Union Ballroom. About 300 persons attended.

In the 1960s, Dr. Commager continued, there was an "erosion" of legislative power "never experienced before in history." This "new ingredient" in government may be "compounded with factors which will permanently alter government."

The President, he claimed, now holds more "inherited executive power" than ever before, and his powers, especially those dealing with war, need to be reconsidered, "as they threaten the peace of the world." He noted that the last two administrations "have conducted a war overseas "without consulting the legislative branch."

Pentagon A Threat

The "growing power" of the Pentagon is also "a threat," he said. "The Pentagon now

conducts its own domestic and foreign policies . . . its own wars." And now, he added, it severs Congress from information by exercising "secret powers on a large scale." For an example, he said the total fund for espionage in the U.S. is \$2.9 billion (exclusive of the CIA), "and we don't even know how they use the money."

A particularly important item has been the executive immunity and privilege exercised when confronted by congressional demands, and vice-versa, he said. The executive branch should quit "messing around" with legislative powers, he added.

Used Effectively

"If we look at incidents of exercise used by the executive power in the last decade, we'll find that they have been used most effectively . . . and the last decade has been the worse in relation to war and foreign policy," he said.

The judicial branch of the government should not have a representative from every part of the country, "as some suppose", he said, but should represent the best minds in the nation regardless of where they are from." The Supreme Court, he added, "is a super constitutional convention always in session making and remaking the constitution."

Encouraging young people to vote, Dr. Commager said party conventions should "abandon their convention circuses and get back to the business of electing officials to run the government."

11 OCT 1971

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000100160001-6

THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

STATINTL

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.

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THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad: for what it has allegedly done as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big


This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U. S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is world-wide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-

Spies: Foot Soldiers in an Endless War

OUTSIDE London's Marlborough Street magistrates' court one morning last week, a throng of newsmen waited impatiently. The object of their interest, an ostensibly minor Soviet trade official named Oleg Lyalin, 34, failed to show up to answer the charges against him—"driving while unfit through drink." He was resting instead in a comfortable country house near London where, for the past several weeks, he had been giving British intelligence a complete rundown on local Soviet espionage operations. His revelations prompted the British government two weeks ago to carry out the most drastic action ever undertaken in the West against Soviet spies: the expulsion of 105 diplomats and other officials—nearly 20% of the 550 Russian officials based in Britain.

The case generated waves from Moscow to Manhattan. As soon as Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev returned to the Soviet capital from his three-day visit to Yugoslavia, he took the extraordinary step of convening an emergency meeting of the 15-man Politburo right on the premises of Vnukovo Airport. The high-level conference, which forced a 24-hour delay of a state dinner in honor of India's visiting Premier Indira Gandhi, might have dealt with the still-mysterious goings-on in China. But it might also have dealt with the difficult problem of how the Kremlin should react to the unprecedented British expulsions—a problem that Moscow, by week's end, had not yet solved.


Potato-Faced Fellows

In Manhattan, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home spent 80 minutes with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. "We have taken our action," said Sir Alec, "and that's all there is to it." Nonetheless, he emphasized that the British step was "designed to remove an obstacle to good relations." Harrumphed Gromyko: "That's a fine way to improve relations." He added that Moscow would be forced to retaliate. But the British apparently knew of some spies among the remaining 445 Russians in Britain. "Yes," said a Foreign Office man, "we have retained second-strike capability."

The British case dramatized the expanse and expense of espionage activity round the world. It was also a reminder that the old spy business, which has received little attention in the past three or four years, is as intense—and dirty—as ever, despite the rise of a new type of operative. Since World War II, espionage has undergone a metamorphosis. For a time, its stars were the famed "Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00010-6" agents—the Colonel Abels, the Gordon Lonsdales, the Kim Philbys. Says British Sovietologist Robert Conquest:

embassy operations rather as a skilled armored thrust compares with human-wave tactics in war." Moreover, the growing phalanxes of routine operatives are supported by spy-in-the-sky satellites that can send back photographs showing the precise diameter of a newly dug missile silo. But even as the modern army still needs the foot soldier, so does espionage still need the agent on the ground. "A photograph may show you what a new plane looks like," says a key intelligence expert, "but it won't tell you what's inside those engines and how they operate. For that you still need someone to tell you."

Eric Ambler, author of spy mysteries, has little use for the new species of



BBC FILM SHOWING SOVIET "DIPLOMAT" AT SECRET PICKUP POINT

There was still a roar in the old lion.

spy, particularly the representatives of the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB), the Soviet Committee for State Security, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "KGB men?" he sneers. "They're the potato-faced fellows you see on trains in Eastern Europe wearing suits that aren't quite right and smelling too much of eau de cologne. The CIA people all smell like aftershave lotion. They always look as if they are on their way to some boring sales conference for an unexciting product—and in a way, they are."

In one respect, Ambler is unfair and behind the times. The contemporary KGB man is generally far more polished and more accomplished in foreign languages and manners than his counterpart of a few years ago. But Ambler is right in

liberately misleading, planted by departments of "disinformation."

It is work that occupies tens of thousands of mathematicians and cryptographers, clerks and military analysts, often with the most trivial-seeming tasks. Yet it is work that no major nation feels it can afford to halt. Says a former British ambassador: "We all spy, of course, more or less. But the Russians are rather busier at it than most. They're more basic too: not so subtle as our chaps. I like to think that we have a certain finesse in our methods—that we don't go at the thing bull-headed. But maybe our tasks are different from theirs, just because this country is so wide open."

Wide open or not, there remains the question, in Eric Ambler's words: "What on earth has the KGB got to spy on in

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WICHITA FALLS, TEX.
RECORD-NEWS

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Danger from within

✓ The American people should take seriously the warning from a top intelligence agent that the CIA may succumb to the temptation to pry inordinately into internal affairs of this nation. Victor Marchetti is campaigning for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U.S. intelligence community.

✓ His words have the ring of authority. He spent 16 years with the Central Intelligence Agency, rising eventually to a position in which he prepared intelligence estimates for the White House. He thinks the CIA is too costly and open to too much military influence.

But, primarily, he fears that the CIA may, with the end of the cold war in Europe and the war in Vietnam, "turn

✓ on the United States" itself. That is, begin operating against student groups, political movements, etc.

If a man of his background and knowledge fears such developments, then it might be time for all Americans to be alert to the dangers. A police-type society is contrary to all that America stands for, and one of the last things we want to happen here.

But it could happen here, and we hope that the President and congress will concern themselves more with this agency which has had, in the past, singular freedom of action.

Americans must continue to be aware of dangers from within along with those from outside our boundaries.

E - 20063 4 1972
S - 28,219

Congress would like to know

What does the CIA do?

By Jack McWethy
Congressional Quarterly
Washington

Since Congress created the ultra-secret Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, a growing number of members have been itching to find out more about what their creation does.

The push is on again this year, with impetus being provided by disclosures that the United States is involved in a clandestine war in Laos that Congress didn't know about.


More than a dozen bills have been introduced this spring and summer aimed at removing some of the legal blinders Congress put on itself with respect to the CIA. Some would allow the legislative branch to share more fully in the agency's intelligence information.

In the last two decades, nearly 800 bills have been introduced aimed at easing the tension between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA. Not one bill has passed and only two have been put to a vote. As a result, the CIA remains a mystery even to the body that voted it into existence.

The agency is so secret that some members of Congress who are supposed to know about CIA activities — members of the four highly select intelligence oversight subcommittees — did not know how deeply the CIA figures in the continued existence of the Royal Lao government. CIA oversight is supposed to be conducted by subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Much to the irritation of some members, the CIA oversight subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee not only keeps its business with the agency a secret, but also keeps the subcommittee's membership a secret from other members of Congress.

Explanation of Secrecy
Paul Wilson, staff director of the House committee, told Congressional Quarterly the membership was a secret "because that's the way it's always been."



The late Alice Inoues, former CIA director

Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington, a member of the Senate Armed Services CIA oversight subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on U.S. commitments abroad, had to send two staff members to the jungles of Laos to find out how extensive the CIA program was in that supposedly neutral country.

"In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos," Symington told a closed session of the Senate June 7.

Nine senators, including Symington, sit on one of the two Senate subcommittees designed to provide legislative oversight of the CIA.

Not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the

requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. To the CIA director, the law granted the authority to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds."

The Senate Appropriations Committee has a five-man subcommittee with the primary responsibility of reviewing the CIA budget, a figure which later is hidden in the accounts of other government agencies.

According to William W. Woodruff, the one-man staff of the Appropriations oversight subcommittee, the senators discuss more than just the CIA when its director, Richard Helms, testifies.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff said. He said Helms also provided the subcommittee with budget estimates for all government intelligence operations, including those not specifically under the jurisdiction of the CIA.

While the House Appropriations Committee veils its oversight operation in secrecy, the House Armed Services Committee just formed a new subcommittee to deal with all aspects of intelligence.

For the last seven months Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., chairman of Armed Services, used the full committee to weight CIA testimony.

"To say the committee was performing any real oversight function was a fiction," said freshman committee member Michael Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrat. The new subcommittee will be under the direction of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich.

No Kifling Society
"I find it very difficult to believe the oversight committees could not obtain some pretty accurate information on how much of that CIA money was going into Laos," commented Sen. Jack Miller, R-Iowa, during the Senate's June 7 closed session.

Sen. J. W. Fulbright D Ark., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, retorted: "It has been said that we all know

continued

JEANNETTE, PA.
NEWS-DISPATCH

E - 137032
OCT 4 1973

Greensburger Pursues CIA Funds Suit

William B. Richardson apparently is not bluffing in his one-man legal battle to force the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose how it obtains and spends its funds.

Richardson sued the federal government some months ago claiming that funds expended by the agency in secret were in violation of the United States constitution. That suit was dismissed by a federal district court which refused to convene a three-judge court to hear the case.

This week Richardson, a Greensburg resident, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari naming Secretary of the Treasury John Connally and Commissioner of Accounts S. S. Sokol as respondents. Richardson's appeal to the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals asks the court to review the previous dismissal.

In his original suit, Richardson claimed that the U.S. Constitution specifically forbids the government against spending funds in secret. Richardson charges that funds for the CIA are secretly drawn from all other government agencies and that as a result reports filed by the U.S. Treasury and other agencies are false.

The federal government has 30 days to respond to the petition, after which the circuit court will rule on the petition.

GREENSBURG, PA.
TRIBUNE-REVIEW

D - 25,713

SEP 30 1971

SECRET SPENDING--

Greensburg Man Appeals Decision In 'CIA' Lawsuit

A Greensburg man who has sued the federal government, claiming that funds expended in secret by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) violate the U.S. Constitution, has appealed his case to the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

William B. Richardson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari this week, naming the United States, John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury, and S. S. Sokol, Commissioner of Accounts, as respondents.

The petition asks the high court for leave to review a federal district court ruling which dismissed the case and refused to convene a three-judge court to hear the merits of the case.

Richardson claims that the U.S. Constitution specifically forbids the government to expend funds in secret and that, as a result of secret accounting, reports by the U.S. Treasury are fraudulent.

He alleges that funds for the CIA are drawn from the budgets of all other government agencies, making the the accounts filed by those agencies false.

The federal government has 30 days in which to file an answer to the petition, after which the third circuit court will make a ruling.

STATINTL

Kissinger And The Spooks

By Andrew Tully
The McNaught Syndicate, Inc.

WASHINGTON—Shortly after he took over his post as President Nixon's top adviser on national security affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger complained wryly to an aide that "These spooks really tell me more than I want to know about the birth rate in Cambodia."

Kissinger's reference was to the Republic's vast espionage empire, with its nearly 200,000 employes, its "secret" \$5-billion annual budget, and its penchant for overwhelming the White House with every scrap of incidental intelligence it can gather.

The story is timely because at long last it appears that something will be done to reduce the size and cost of this empire. Sen. Allen Ellender, D-La., chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, wants to cut \$500-million from the total intelligence budget, thereby eliminating 50,000 jobs. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird already is engaged in a reorganization plan to whittle down the size of the enormous military spy shop.

Laird got moving shortly after President Nixon, early this year, ordered a study of all intelligence operations. The pres-

tigious Central Intelligence Agency, which employs a variety of experts ranging from beauticians to nuclear scientists, is also expected to bite the economy bullet, albeit with a certain amount of kicking and screaming.

But the Pentagon will suffer most from the axe, for the simple reason that its intelligence community is the biggest and costliest—and possibly the least efficient. Laird presides over an establishment which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, intelligence divisions of the three services and the super hush-hush National Security Agency, the nation's code-making and code-breaking apparatus. It is an establishment that employs some 150,000 people and spends an estimated \$3-billion a year.

Laird's spies are in trouble with President Nixon. He has been telling the defense Secretary for months that the military spy factory is "too damn big," and that its bigness apparently breeds inefficiency.

Specifically, although he boasted of both operations in public, Nixon was unhappy with the intelligence planning for the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos and the abortive prisoner-of-

war raid at Sontay. More recently, he has been "unimpressed"—as he told Laird—with intelligence on Viet Cong hit-and-run attacks in South Vietnam. Both the Pentagon and the CIA got a scolding from the President when they failed to discover Soviet missile installations near the Suez Canal during the summer of 1970.

Nixon also reportedly has cracked down on so-called "politico-sociological" studies conducted within friendly foreign countries by Army Intelligence, or G-2. After complaints from Secretary of State William Rogers, Nixon in July ordered the Pentagon to recall a research group dispatched to Czechoslovakia to prepare an estimate of the chances of a people's revolt.

Rogers is said to have described the project as representing a "dangerous gamble" that could get the U.S. in serious trouble. He compared it with the notorious 1965, "Camelot" project set up to determine the factors involved in promoting and inhibiting revolution in Chile. That operation was cancelled after a strong protest by the Chilean government, but by then it already had cost the taxpayers \$1-million.

Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that any administration by itself can reform our swollen intelligence community. Like all bureaucratic baronies, it is a powerful lobby within the administration. No President wants to be accused of restraining, for budgetary reasons, a spy who might discover tomorrow that Red China has invented a new bomb. Eventually, if any real reorganization is to be realized, Congress will have to step in with its power of the purse strings.

But the Nixon administration is indeed making the first meaningful progress in intelligence reform since Harry Truman established the CIA. Even if Congress again shirks its responsibilities, the cost of spying almost surely will be reduced in the next year or two. Richard Nixon has a record for frugality.

STATINTL

29 SEP 1971

STATINTL

On civilians and intelligence

U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is reported to be considering a major innovation at the Pentagon, a civilian to be in charge of intelligence gathering and evaluating. And high time.

One of the very big lessons which came out of the "Pentagon Papers" was that Pentagon intelligence was different all through the Vietnam war period from intelligence gathered at CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). And there seems to be little doubt about which was the more reliable.

The Pentagon's intelligence from its own sources was guilty all through of underestimating the capabilities of the other side and of overestimating what various levels of American forces could accomplish. The most pertinent fact about it is that in 1965 Lyndon Johnson agreed to the commitment of a half a million Americans to Vietnam on the assumption that it would be all over successfully in ample time for the 1968 election.

Had President Johnson listened to CIA and State Department intelligence rather than to Pentagon intelligence he would not have made that mistake. Their reports and estimates were consistently closer to reality.

The reason for the difference is plain enough. CIA and State's INR are both staffed by full-time professionals in intelligence work, most of them civilians. There are a good many former military men in these services, but they are men (and women) who have gone perma-

nently into intelligence, not just for a short tour of duty.

Military intelligence is heavily staffed, and always so far headed, by officers to whom it is a temporary duty between regular service tours. They are not professionals devoting their entire time to intelligence. Nor are they civilians who can see such matters from a nonservice-connected point of view. It is difficult for an Army, Navy or Air Force officer to forget his own service when handling intelligence. His inevitable tendency is to hear, see, and stress any information or purported information which will enhance the role of his own service, particularly if he is going on in that service.

Ideally, the Pentagon would take its intelligence from CIA and INR. CIA has no axe to grind but its own, and there is really almost nothing it can want which it doesn't already have — including relative anonymity and total freedom from detailed scrutiny in the Congress. A select committee of Congress goes over its budget every year. Much of it is totally secret. There are never any debates on the CIA budget in Congress. The committee is always generous to CIA. It has no special reason to turn out anything but the most objective intelligence it can manage to produce.

The Pentagon won't take its intelligence from the CIA. Human nature doesn't work like that. But it would help to have a nonservice-connected civilian in charge of Pentagon intelligence. It would reduce the likelihood of another Vietnam war.

STATINTL

29 SEP 1971

British Secret Service forgers help the Tories

STATINTL

By TOM FOLEY

The stir created by the British government's charges of Soviet "espionage" in Britain has brought British intelligence into the world's headlines once more after a long absence. Britain does maintain a large and powerful intelligence apparatus, both at home in Britain and abroad, and one which works in close co-ordination with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

At one time, in fact, the CIA depended upon British intelligence for most of its work connected with former British colonies which had become independent, such as Iraq, Jordan and Egypt in the Middle East, and African countries like Zambia and Nigeria.

"Psychological warfare" and propaganda, which the British brought to a high peak of efficiency under such experts as Richard Crossman, head of the Psychological Warfare Executive (PWE) in World War II and later chief editor of the New Statesman magazine, has long been recognized as a British specialty.

So it is no accident that the British and British organizations in the "Cold War" period are generally spotlighted as being behind a whole series of faked "Soviet memoirs," mysterious rumors about the USSR and Soviet personalities, alarmist reports about "menacing Soviet troop movements," and even faked "Soviet hooklets" such as one issued recently containing violent attacks on Islam distributed in Ceylon, Pakistan and Egypt.

The most notorious fakery carried on by British intelligence was the "Zinoviev letter" of 1924, which cost the Labor Party that year's elections, brought the Tories back to power, and disrupted attempts to ratify the newly negotiated Anglo-Soviet treaty. The letter was supposed to have come from Grigory Zinoviev, then head of the Communist International, and urged a campaign of terrorism and sabotage in Britain working with the "friendly" Labor Party. Later it was shown that the letter was a forgery, written by a White Russian emigre in Berlin, and that four separate divisions of British intelligence had actually identified it as a forgery. Nonetheless, someone in British intelligence passed it on to the press as genuine, and the damage was done.

Who the "someone" was has never been determined, but it could only have been someone in the top circle of British intelligence, which still today is a preserve of extreme rightist Tories who tend to be fanatical anti-Communists as well. From 1924 down to the present, there have been a steady stream of such fakes and forgeries from British intelligence, nearly all of them strengthening the hand of the far right in British politics.

This situation has never been cleaned up, because the structure and functioning of British intelligence is treated as a sacred preserve, not to be mentioned in public. The average British subject did not learn anything about M.I. 5, the British equivalent of the FBI, until a train of scandals brought some facts about it out into the open in the 1930s.

M.I. 5, technically, the British Security Service, is responsible for all domestic security and counter-espionage; its Director-General reports to the Home Secretary (who in other countries would be called the Interior Minister). The curious thing about M.I. 5 is that in reality it is responsible to no one; is not part of the British government at all, and is not mentioned in any British law or regulation.

The implications of this set-up are astounding; there can be no Parliamentary "watchdog" committee over M.I. 5, because M.I. 5 does not legally exist; it is — in every sense of the word — beyond the law. As Lord Denning put it in his official 1933 report on the Profumo scandal: "The Security Service (M.I. 5) in this country is not established by Statute nor is it recognized by Common Law. Even the Official Secrets Acts do not acknowledge its existence."

So, while the head of M.I. 5 reports to the Home Secretary, M.I. 5 is not part of the Home Office;

which is like saying the head of the FBI reports to the Attorney-General, but the FBI is not part of the Justice Department or even of the U.S. government, which does not acknowledge that it exists.

M.I. 6, the British Secret Service, is "Britain's "spy" agency engaged in activities outside Britain itself. The head of M.I. 6 is responsible to the Foreign Secretary (presently, Sir Alec Douglas-Home), the equivalent of the U.S. Secretary of State. (There is a State Dept. intelligence service, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, but M.I. 6 is a combination of this with the functions of the CIA): M.I. 6 functions under the same kind of secrecy as M.I. 5.

Co-ordination of intelligence work, including the work of the comparatively open Military Intelligence Service, is done by the Joint Intelligence Committee at the British Foreign Office. It may seem extraordinary that the Foreign Office, Britain's "State Department," should be the chief intelligence center in Britain's government. But it is not so surprising when the extent of the former British Empire is considered; and it should be remembered that British colonies were assigned to M.I. 5, the "FBI" service, because they were considered "domestic" and not "foreign."

The total amount of funds available to Sir Alec and his colleagues in intelligence is not large; informed estimates place it at around \$50 million a year, compared to \$4 billion for the CIA. But British intelligence chiefs, being outside the law, can spend it on anything they please, including forged evidence of "espionage."

BALTIMORE SUN Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000100160001-6

M - 164,621
E - 189,871
S - 323,624

SEP 27 1971

DOVES AWAIT AID MEASURE

Senators Likely To Use Bill For Policy Amendments

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — When Congress sent the draft bill to the White House last week Senate doves lost what seemed to be an ideal vehicle for foreign policy amendments, but an even better one is on its way: foreign aid.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has the foreign aid bill bottled up for the moment because of a fight with the administration over information, but Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), the chairman, has said the panel will report out a bill eventually.

"Christmas Tree" Bill

When it does come out, however, the expectation is that there will be a number of "hookers" in it, possibly even an amendment to cut off funds for the war in Vietnam. In any case, committee sources acknowledge that the foreign aid bill will be a "Christmas tree," ornamented with amendments to affect foreign policy and to increase congressional influence in the field.

The administration considers the foreign aid bill vital, particularly the portions affecting Southeast Asia. The \$3.3 billion authorization bill contains \$565 million for Vietnam and \$201 million for Cambodia, Laos and Thailand in economic supporting assistance. It contains an additional \$209 million in military aid for Cambodia (military aid to Vietnam, Laos and Thailand is contained in the Defense budget).

But there is growing opposition to foreign aid in Congress and many members—including both liberals and conservatives—would not be adverse to seeing the entire program terminated. Thus the Senate—more loaded with foreign policy amendments than the House—could present the House and the administra-

take-it-or-leave-it basis.

The bill to extend the draft gave Senate liberals a similar, though weaker, strategic position.

At least 30 senators were willing to suspend the draft and to hold the bill as hostage for a strong anti-war national policy, including a nine-month deadline for total U.S. withdrawal from Indochina.

They held up the draft bill for 2½ months after the selective service law expired, but finally lost the fight in the face of intensive pressure put on by the administration, which asserted that the Senate was jeopardizing national security.

It is doubtful that the administration can exert as much pressure in behalf of foreign aid. President Nixon, himself, de-emphasized foreign aid when he included in his latest economic recovery package a 10 per cent cut in the program.

Public opinion polls have shown that this cut in foreign aid was the most popular of the steps taken by the President. Thus there is not likely to be any backlash from delaying action on a foreign aid bill.

Those contemplating ornaments for the foreign aid bill include the McGovern-Hatfield forces, who favor cutting off funds for the Vietnam war at a certain time, even though the Senate has already rejected the funds cut-off approach on several occasions.

Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the majority leader, has said he intended to reintroduce an amendment to force a reduction in the U.S. troop level in Europe. He failed in his attempt to attach such a rider to the draft bill, but in view of the increasing deterioration of the U.S. economic position in the world, Mr. Mansfield has indicated he will try again.

While the majority leader is leaving his options open, the most obvious vehicle for a troop-cut amendment seems to be the foreign aid bill.

Besides the majority leader, Senator Fulbright, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, also has his irons in the fire.

For example, he will try in committee to amend the foreign aid bill to require annual authorization for the State Department budget as well as that for the United States Informa-

tion, appropriations bills are needed annually for these agencies and such bills are outside the Foreign Relations Committee's jurisdiction.

Budget Approval

Mr. Fulbright has noted that one reason that the Armed Services Committees wield such influence with the Pentagon is that they must approve its budget annually.

The committee is also likely to tighten provisions in the foreign aid law that provides for an automatic funds cut-off if the executive branch refuses to provide certain information.

At present, the President can waive the requirement by simply stating his reasons for not providing the requested information.

Last month, Mr. Nixon withheld a five-year plan on military aid from the Foreign Relations Committee on the ground that it was a tentative internal document.

Other Provisions

There are numerous other provisions for presidential discretion that are likely to come under attack.

For example, the President can now shift up to 10 per cent of the funds in any one category of foreign aid to another, and he has special authority to use up to \$250 million to help a country that is "important to the security of the United States" and is "a victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression."

These provisions in the law, according to committee sources, allowed the administration to give military aid last year to Cambodia, deepening the U.S. commitment to the defense of Indochina without specific congressional authorization.

The committee is also expected to endorse the House action of cutting off military aid to Greece and Pakistan, but will probably remove the escape clause that allows continued aid to Greece if the President decides that the national security of the United States requires it.

Floating Around

Other foreign policy proposals are floating around Congress and could eventually find a home in the foreign aid bill. They include legislation to restrict the President's war-making powers, to require publication of the total CIA budget, to ban the CIA from engaging in military operations, to make CIA intelligence data available to Congress and to place a ceiling on U.S. expenditures in Laos.

While these proposals are not directly related to foreign aid, the Senate does not usually balk at attaching riders to bills simply because they are unrelated to the subject matter.

STATINTL

7 6 AUG 1971

Intelligence Units Face Revamping

The White House is expected to decide within the next several weeks whether to act on proposals for reorganizing U.S. intelligence operations — particularly those of the military — with the aim of making these vast and far-flung activities more efficient and less expensive.

Several possible reorganization plans have under study since early this year. Now however in addition to some internal Nixon administration pressure to revamp the intelligence apparatus, Congress is also pressing the White House to act.

According to informed congressional sources, Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, has threatened to cut at least \$500 million out of the roughly \$5 billion that the government is estimated to spend annually on all forms of military and foreign intelligence operations.

Ellender's action, these sources say, would have the effect of cutting about 50,000 people out of a corps of military and civilian personnel engaged in intelligence work that now numbers an estimated 200,000 people.

Ellender's chief target, sources close to the senator say, is not the highly specialized, civilian-run Central Intelligence Agency, but the separate intelligence operations run by each of the military services and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Officials have estimated that about \$3 billion of the total amount tucked away for intelligence each year in a variety of appropriations bills is spent by the military. The uniformed services account for about 150,000 of the total personnel figure.

Ellender's concern is known to involve overlap between the work of the individual services, too many agents gathering data of doubtful significance, too many admirals and generals doing work that could be done by lower ranking men, and the setting up of a global communications network that allegedly exceeds the strategic needs of military commanders.

Government officials say that the original impetus for reorganization was a widespread feeling in the Executive Branch that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful intelligence produced. Also, there was said to be dissatisfaction because the form in which some kinds of intelligence were presented to the White House was not readily usable.

Under the original White House study completed last spring, a number of options were developed.

The most far-reaching involved creation of a new super-intelligence agency headed by a Cabinet-level officer and combining many of the now separate activities of the Pentagon, CIA and the huge code-cracking operations of the National Security Agency.

Another involved movement of the CIA's highly esteemed director Richard Helms into the White House as the top intelligence man with increased authority over all aspects of intelligence.

STATINTL

TOP SECRET
AUGUST 1-14 1971

Mercenaries

The hushed-up war in Laos shows how the super-powers can raze a country without the public's being much aware of it. Military assistance, CIA funds, and random bombings have helped uproot over a third of that country's population, George McT. Kahin reports in this issue, and how many know or care? Senator Stuart Symington has been trying for many weeks to get this story publicized, but much of it remains hidden. At the very least, Symington believes, the Congress ought to stop financing mercenaries in Laos.

One year after the Fulbright amendment struck support for these mercenaries out of the Defense appropriations bill, or so Fulbright thought, the administration was still paying for Thai troops in Laos. Nothing has prevented Thai forces from expanding their military operations into the northern part of the country. It must have taken all the Pentagon's legal brainpower to short-circuit the Fulbright amendment. The DOD had to chisel money from CIA funds, which it claimed the appropriations bill did not really cover. According to Symington, it has even described the Thai forces as "volunteers" and included them with "local forces in Laos" eligible for special military aid. The administration claims the amendment never defined "local forces in Laos and Thailand." Those Asian countries are all so close, you know, and though the Thai nationals in Laos were recruited and trained in Thailand, aren't those Indochinese pretty much the same?

Symington now proposes to specifically prohibit US support for all Thai regulars or irregulars, conscripts or volunteers, who stray into other countries, though he would not forbid US help to Lao troops in Laos or Thai troops in Thailand. With more and more of the people of Laos becoming refugee nationals and paramilitary dependents, the administration would miss the support of Thai troops and its ubiquitous CIA slush fund. But as Mr. Kahin suggests, if we persist in this war by air and by proxy, we may soon find ourselves alone with another enemy - the homeless of Laos.

STATINTL

MILTON VIORST

Erosion of Nixon's War Powers

It's been getting harder lately for the Central Intelligence Agency to perpetuate the myth that the United States is not engaged in a war in Laos. So the other day, it came clean -- or almost clean.

The CIA reluctantly authorized the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to publish a report which detailed years of American involvement, but omitted just enough fact to leave some doubt over whether its activities actually violated American law.

Press dispatches already had made clear that American personnel were engaged in fighting in Laos. The press also had established that the CIA was financing Thai mercenaries in Laos. Both actions are contrary to congressional prohibitions. But though everyone knew of them, the CIA never admitted them. Finally, warned that the Foreign Relations Committee planned to tell all, the CIA had a choice: Either keep lying and look absurd, or make a bargain.

So for five weeks, the agency and the committee negotiated. The CIA wanted to expunge facts: the committee wanted its report cleared for security. In the end, the agency won a few skirmishes, but the committee carried the battle.

By giving the report an official security clearance, the CIA confessed publicly that it has for years been waging a war it had told no one about.

The war in Laos, in fact, makes Vietnam look as veiled as a newborn babe. For Vietnam, Congress was, at least, given an annual opportunity to inquire into military appropriations. But Laos expenditures were always hidden within the secret CIA budget.

Last spring, after it became apparent what the CIA was up to, Rep. Herman Badillo of New York proposed an amendment to the armed services appropriations bill to bar any funds for secret Laotian operations.

In the ensuing debate, Rep. Jerome Waldie of California and Chairman Edward Hebert of the House Armed Services Committee engaged in the following colloquy:

Waldie: "While recently in Indochina, I visited Laos and several questions occurred to me . . . Mr. Chairman, I would ask if there are funds in this bill for the Central Intelligence Agency."

Hebert: "There are funds in the bill for intelligence work for all agencies."

Waldie: "Can the gentleman tell me in what portion of the bill those funds are contained?"

Hebert: "No, I cannot tell the gentleman that."

Waldie: "Is it available so that a member of this House of Representatives may go to the committee and examine the classified documents involving the amount of money available for the Central Intelligence Agency in this bill?"

Hebert: "No, sir, it is not. The chairman takes full responsibility of not discussing the matter further."

In cutting off the debate, Hebert was saying that, under White House direction, the CIA had authority to conduct the war anywhere, and that neither Congress nor the American people had a right either to be informed about it or to exercise control over it.

Certainly, many Americans would have disagreed with that, and with Hebert's aphorism that, "secrecy is one of the prices we must pay for survival." The Badillo amendment, however, didn't have a chance. It lost by a vote of 172 to 46.

But strangely, while rumors

of the impending CIA revelations circulated on Capitol Hill last month, Hebert had an apparent change of heart. Although he is a staunch Pentagon supporter, Hebert's views are far from the mindless jingoism of his predecessor, the late Mendel Rivers of South Carolina.

On July 28, Hebert established a new subcommittee to investigate the CIA. He named as its chairman no patsy for the Pentagon, but Lucien Nedzi, an aggressive anti-war liberal from Michigan.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Capitol, Sen. Stuart Symington, chairman of the subcommittee which authorized the CIA report, announced publicly that he was dissatisfied with the amount of information the agency still concealed. He hinted he would try to prove that the CIA knowingly violated federal law, particularly in financing the Thai mercenary force.

These signs indicate that, even if Congress does not withdraw the CIA's mandate for adventurism, it may be preparing to exercise greater control.

Clearly, however, the episode represents a further step in the continuing erosion of the President's war powers. The secret war in Laos was an abuse of those powers. Congress is now reasserting the constitutional principle that such powers are too important to be left to the President alone.

STATINTL

MORNING - 292,789

WEEKEND - 306,889

AUG 7 1971

from the GLOBE'S Bureaus

STATINTL

Edward W. O'Brien

Symington scores on Laos

WASHINGTON — Senator Stuart Symington has achieved a monumental feat in gathering and publishing information about the secret war being waged in far-away Laos by the United States.

As the past two decades have demonstrated, it is no longer necessary for Congress to declare war before shots can be fired. But Congress still must appropriate the money to fight a war and presumably would know the basic facts before furnishing the funds.

Symington is a senior member of the Senate bodies most directly involved — the

Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Appropriations committees, and, holy of holies, the Central Intelligence Agency subcommittee.

Nonetheless, as he has said repeatedly in recent weeks, the true scope of the American military effort in Laos and many of the critically important details were withheld from him as well as the rest of the Senate.

"I HAVE BEEN hoodwinked," Symington told his colleagues after learning the truth belatedly.

"Let's face it. We have been appropriating money for this war in the blind."

Because of his concern about American commitments abroad, Symington visited Laos many times over the years.

"Every time, upon my return, I thought to myself, 'I finally have the picture,'" he says.

"But later I found that was not the case."

THIS SPRING, as chairman of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, Symington sent two staff investigators to Laos. Their findings, classified as top secret, prompted Symington to



MR. O'BRIEN

arrange a rare closed session of the Senate June 7.

The staffers' report and the transcript of the Senate session, with many deletions by administration censors, were finally released a few days ago, giving the American public for the first time a fairly complete account of how their resources are being used in Laos.

For Symington, who probably knows more about the subject than any other congressman, there were two principal surprises.

THE UNITED STATES this year is spending at least \$284 million on the Laos campaign — or five times the figure previously suggested by the administration. The real figure, Symington said, is doubtless much higher than the \$284 million.

The dollars are significant as a measure of military activity.

Second, the U.S. Air Force since February, 1970, has been regularly using Big B-52 bombers for attacks on Communist ground troops in Northern Laos, not far from the Communist China border.

That part of Laos contains thousands of Chinese antiaircraft crewmen and civilian construction workers.

AS SYMINGTON SAID, The United States is risking a confrontation with China, and "if we lost some B-52s up there, either from antiaircraft or fighter attacks, this could well be a different ball game."

The administration explains that by resisting Communist forces in Laos, military pressure is lessened on American troops in South Vietnam. Further, the administration hopes that somehow little independent Laos can be kept from falling to full Communist control.

The administration may be right, though many don't think so.

But Symington's point is that the issue of fighting a ravaging war in Laos is so serious it should be debated and decided not in a few quiet offices in the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon but in a public forum.

School Board shall, on or before the 1st day of the months of November, December, February, March, April and May, during the 1971-72 school year, submit to this court reports each of which shall cover the following topics:

a. Students, including (1) the number of students by race enrolled in the school district; (2) the number of students by race enrolled in each school in the district; (3) the number of students by race enrolled in each classroom in each of the schools in the district; and (4) the number of school days during each month that each child has participated in multi-cultural activities pursuant to the elementary school program, broken down by learning resource center visits, inter-site visits, and field-study trips.

b. Teachers, including (1) the number of full-time teachers by race in the district; (2) the number of full-time teachers by race in each school in the district; (3) the number of part-time teachers by race in the district, and (4) the number of part-time teachers by race in each school in the district.

c. Transfers, describing the requests and results which have accrued by race, under the majority-to-minority transfer provision which is a part of this Court's Order.

d. Specifying any change which may have been made in the boundaries of any zone or zones.

e. Transportation system, including the number of vehicles in use and the extent to which black and white students are transported daily on the same buses.

f. Utilization of equipment, including a statement that all gymnasiums, auditoriums, cafeterias and like facilities are being operated on an integrated basis.

g. If it appears that the plan hereby adopted does not in actual fact and in operation provide the unitary system for which it was designed and adopted, the Order of this Court may be changed to whatever extent necessary to accomplish the objective.

Signed at Austin, Texas, this 19th day of July, 1971.

JACK ROBERTS,
U.S. District Judge.

[In the U.S. District Court, Western District of Texas, Austin Division]

CIVIL ACTION No. A-70-CA-80

United State of America v. Texas Education Agency, et al.

ORDER

Pursuant to Rule 60(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of July 19, 1971, is corrected on the last line of page eight to read 8900 elementary students rather than 89%.

It is so ordered.

Entered this 22nd day of July, 1971, in Austin, Texas.

JACK ROBERTS,
U.S. District Judge.

CIA SHOULD REPORT TO CONGRESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, in 1947 Congress passed the National Security Act, which greatly restructured the executive branch of Government. In addition to combining the various armed services into the Department of Defense, the act also established the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the work of the individual intelligence-gathering branches of each armed service, and also to report directly to the National Security

Council and the President of the United States.

Thus, the President was given the tools which would permit him to make the decisions which could lead to peace and to war in the coming decades.

Unfortunately, Congress did not give itself the same tools, although the legislative branch of Government is equally charged by the Constitution with making those same decisions. The National Security Act of 1947 did not specifically exclude Congress from receiving reports and periodic and regular briefings, nor did it specifically provide for them. It was silent. As might have been expected, regular reports have not been forthcoming. When specific requests for information on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency have been made these questions have generally not been answered.

The problem with that approach has been that, with such a supersecret agency, it is difficult to know just what questions need to be asked. Since requests for the CIA are carefully hidden in the President's budget and in authorization and appropriation bills, it is impossible to know even how much money is spent by the intelligence community, let alone for what purposes it is spent.

Congress should have that information—even though most of it must necessarily be highly classified, because it does have the responsibility for major decisions of foreign policy. The power of the purse and the power of the sword are the two major power grants committed to the Congress by the Constitution. Each is intimately connected with operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, and so far, Congress has neglected to use either power.

The bill I am introducing today will help Congress to fulfill its responsibility. It is a companion measure to S. 2224, introduced in the Senate by the senior Senator from Kentucky, JOHN SHERMAN COOPER. Its sole purpose is to require the CIA to make regular and special reports to the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees and the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. Such reports would deal with the intelligence information collected by the Agency and analyze its significance in terms of our relations to foreign countries as well as national security.

Naturally, such reports would often deal with sensitive subjects, and the Members of the committees and their staffs would be subject to the same security clearance as members of the executive branch dealing with the same reports. The only purpose for receiving such reports would be to enable the Congress to fulfill adequately its decision-making role. The question of the public's right to know is not at issue.

In 1954, when Congress set up the Atomic Energy Commission, it specifically provided that the appropriate body of Congress constantly be kept apprised of the Commission's activities. The act states plainly:

The Commission shall keep the Joint [Atomic Energy] Committee fully and currently informed with respect to all of the

Commission's activities. The Department of Defense shall keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed with respect to all matters within the Department of Defense relating to the development, utilization, or application of atomic energy. Any Government agency shall furnish any information requested by the Joint Committee with respect to the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the field of atomic energy.

Those serving on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee describe it as a "refreshing experience" because "the committee does not have to go after the information; the information is volunteered."

The Congress should have similar access to information gathered by the intelligence community. Only in this way can we be better equipped for the decisions which we have the responsibility for under the Constitution.

I hope that this bill will be thoughtfully considered in both House of Congress, and that it will be enacted into law at an early date.

Text of bill follows:

H.R. ———

A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403), is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

"(g) It shall also be the duty of the Agency to inform fully and currently, by means of regular and special reports to, and by means of special reports in response to requests made by, the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate regarding intelligence information collected by the Agency concerning the relations of the United States to foreign countries and matters of national security, including full and current analysis by the Agency of such information.

"(h) Any intelligence information and any analysis thereof made available to any committee of the Congress pursuant to subsection (g) of this section shall be made available by such committee, in accordance with such rules as such committee may establish, to any Member of the Congress who requests such information and analysis. Such information and analysis shall also be made available by any such committee, in accordance with such rules as such committee may establish, to any officer or employee of the House of Representatives or the Senate who has been (1) designated by a Member of Congress to have access to such information and analysis, and (2) determined by the committee concerned to have the necessary security clearance for such access."

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. BELL) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. BELL. Mr. Speaker, earlier this year, I and 20 other Congressmen introduced H.R. 4911 to provide that State and local laws and regulations on environ-

CIA Said To Spend \$100 Million In Laos War

By GENE GISH
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The CIA spent more than \$100 million last year on a secret war in Laos, using irregular Lao forces bolstered by a large contingent of Thai mercenaries.

This was one of the conclusions to be drawn from a staff report released yesterday by a Senate subcommittee on United States agreements and commitments abroad.

The top secret report was heavily censored by the Pentagon, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, but what remained was the most detailed account so far of U.S. operations in Laos, where, according to some senators, the U.S. is spending more than \$1 billion a year.

Brunt Of Fighting

By not following previous policy of deleting all references to the CIA, the administration for the first time acknowledged the agency's direct support and supervision of the guerrilla warfare being waged by Lao irregular forces, which, according to the report, are carrying the brunt of the fighting against the Communists.

The report was prepared by two members of the subcommittee staff, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, after a 12-day tour of Laos last spring. Its contents were reported to the Senate last month in a secret session, and Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), the subcommittee chairman, made public a "sanitized" version yesterday.

U.S. Spent \$284.2 Million

Excluding the amount spent on U.S. air operations in Laos and the cost of the Thai mercenaries, the report said, the U.S. spent \$284.2 million in that country in fiscal 1971.

Of this amount, \$162.2 million was in military assistance and \$52 million in economic aid. This leaves \$70 million unaccounted

for. However, subcommittee sources made it clear that there was no other program to which the money could have gone.

The sources noted, moreover, that William P. Rogers, the Secretary of State, has stated publicly that the total U.S. expenditure in Laos for fiscal 1971, excluding the cost of the bombing—was \$350 million. This would place the cost of the Thai mercenaries at about \$65 million for the year.

\$374 Million For 1972

Some of this \$65 million is accounted for by an increase in the military aid program, but considerably less than half, according to subcommittee sources.

The budget for fiscal 1972, according to the report, totals \$374 million for military assistance, economic aid and the CIA. Again, the amount allotted for the Thai forces or U.S. air operations is not included in this figure.

The report said that U.S. air operations in Laos were declining because some squadrons are being transferred out of Southeast Asia and also because more aircraft are being used in Cambodia.

B-52 Raids Increased

In 1969, the report said, the U.S. was flying about 400 sorties a day. In April of this year, the level was down to about 340 sorties a day. Because of the deletions, the report did not give the breakdown between missions flown over northern Laos and the Ho Chi Minh trail.

The report noted, however, that the U.S. had increased the level of B-52 raids over northern Laos since last year, although the comparative figures were censored. B-52 bombers are used for high-altitude saturation bombing.

As for the ground war, the report said "friendly forces" totaled about 96,000 men, but that the regular forces are used almost exclusively for "static de-

fense." The irregulars, sponsored by the CIA, do most of the day-to-day patrolling, ambushing and attacking, the report said.

About 4,600 Thais

The irregular forces are composed of 30,000 indigenous troops—including a large contingent of Meo tribesmen—and Thai mercenaries. The number of Thai forces was deleted, but senators have said they numbered about 4,600.

The report said the CIA supervises and pays for the training of Thai recruits in Thailand and then transports them to Laos by Air America, another CIA-financed operation.

Once in Laos, the Thais join the Lao irregular forces, which, according to the report, are "trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the CIA."

More Chinese

The report also stated that the number of Chinese forces in northwestern Laos has been increased from 6,000 to 8,000—an estimate given two years ago—to somewhere between 14,000 to 20,000.

Chinese forces are in northwestern Laos ostensibly to build a road, but the report said they have recently installed 300 new radar-directed, anti-aircraft weapons along the route.

The Chinese also have built 12 small-arms firing ranges, normally associated with the stationing of ground troops, as well as 66 basketball courts, the report said.

While the area occupied by the Chinese is off limits to U.S. bombers, the report said, the Royal Laotian Air Force has bombed the area at least twice.

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HE'S BETTING HIS FUTURE

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Is The CIA Unconstitutional? Bill Richardson Says It's Out Of Bounds

By TOM WERTZ

Tribune-Review Staff Writer

When the federal government tells you it spends 100 million dollars each year on agricultural research, it may, in fact, be spending only 50 million.

When it says it receives and expends 80 million dollars to study the impact of foreign imports on the American market, it may be spending only 45 million on that project.

When it says that the total educational budget for the year 1970 was 30 billion dollars, the actual money expended for educational purposes may have been two billion short of that amount.

Where's the other money going? Some of it, or all of it, is going to support the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which carries out classified, clandestine projects all over the world in the name of national security.

But just how much money is expended, from which regular government agency the money is taken, and the nature and scope of secret work it supports, no one outside of the very tight inner circle of government really knows.

Intricate System

The CIA is the only United States government agency which is immune by Congressional statute from making a public accounting of how it gets or spends public tax money. The secrecy of its receipts and expenditures is maintained through a very intricate system of federal budgeting wherein the budgets of hundreds of unrelated federal agencies — ranging from agriculture to medical research — are purposely inflated to hide, perhaps, billions of dollars diverted to the CIA by manipulations within the government's Budget Bureau.

While dozens of books and articles — some factual, some combinations of fact and fiction — have been written in recent years about the functions of the CIA and its role in a free society, only one individual questioning the CIA's unaccountability and its purpose in America has seen fit to challenge its existence legally, through the courts, in what may become one of the most controversial Constitutional law issues in modern America.

The man is William B. Richardson, a 52-year-old Greensburg resident, student of Constitutional law, husband, father of three, a southerner by birth, former government employe and former insurance manager who presently makes a living by investigating cases for the Westmoreland County Public Defender's Office.

Massive Fraud

Richardson believes firmly that the unaccounted for, secret maintenance of a clandestine agency, such as the CIA, violates the United States Constitution in a number of respects and reduces the government to a deliberate perpetration of a massive fraud against the American people.

In 1967, Richardson, then a claims manager for an insurance company, put his personal success on the block, so to speak, and filed suit against the government in an attempt to force the U.S. Treasury Department to stop publication of what he regarded as a fraudulent accounting of public spending because the government admittedly did not list all the money it spent and, moreover, purposely distorted accounts of all listed expenditures to hide from the public what it allocates to the CIA.

Specifically, Richardson claims it violates Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the United States Constitution which states clearly that, "... No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."

'The Merits'

Since 1967, he has been to the United States District Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court, and is now in the process of going through the court system for a second time after being turned down each step of the way on procedural matters relating to court jurisdiction and like issues. At no time have the courts, as yet, reached a decision on what lawyers call "the merits" of the case, i.e., whether the CIA funding method violates the Constitution.

presently before the Third Circuit Court

of Appeals which is expected to decide any day now whether the case is of such consequence Constitutionally to warrant a full hearing on the merits by a three-judge panel. If the case gets to the point of discussing merits, he said, the court will have no choice but to declare the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 unconstitutional. It is through that Congressional act that the government manipulates the budget to allow for secret spending.

What motivates Richardson? And what is his overriding concern on CIA spending?

With only traces of his southern accent showing here and there, Richardson made it clear that he is both repulsed and frightened by what the CIA is purportedly doing with public money.

Inherently Wrong

"I feel it's inherently wrong and the reasons are obvious", he said. "It's one thing to hide funds used in international efforts to accumulate power... but it's quite another thing to use hidden funds to try to direct the thinking of your own people."

And that, he said, is what the CIA appears to be doing.

Richardson said his concern reached the point of alarm and a determination to initiate a challenge when it was disclosed a few years ago by the New York Times and Ramparts magazine that the CIA was underwriting hundreds of "conduits" throughout the United States, among them the National Student Association, in an effort to control public thinking.

"I never in my life had any idea they were operating in the zone of interior" (meaning within the United States and its possessions), he said.

He said he believes that, if unchecked, an organization like the CIA, with unlimited funds, undefined goals, acting as a para-military agency in

continued

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USED CIA EXPENSE FUNDS**Ex-Army Spy Tells of Viet Draft Bribing**

BY THOMAS J. FOLEY

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—A former undercover Army intelligence agent told lawmakers Monday that he used an unlimited CIA expense account to bribe a Saigon draft board and keep an invaluable South Vietnamese youth acting as an interpreter in his spy ring.

The testimony by K. Barton Osborn, 26, described his 13 months in Da Nang, supposedly as a civilian assigned to help in the Vietnam pacification program but actually setting up a spy ring.

From the expense funds—with no accounting necessary—Osborn said he was able to retain his South Vietnamese interpreter who was about to be drafted. Osborn said the youth gave the money to the draft review board in Saigon and stayed out of the army.

The agent, at the time a private first class trained

at Ft. Holabird, Md., testified before the House government operations subcommittee, which is studying U.S. aid programs in South Vietnam.

Osborn, now a graduate student at American University in Washington, D.C., repeated testimony he had given before anti-war groups about witnessing torture and assassination of Viet Cong suspects by U.S. soldiers.

In appearing under oath before the House group, Osborn and Michael J. Uhl, another former intelligence agent, became the first Vietnam veterans to testify before a congressional committee about atrocities they themselves had witnessed.

They told how they had seen U.S. military personnel push suspected Viet Cong out of helicopters to intimidate other prisoners and get them to talk.

They also said that members of an interrogation group at the Da Nang Marine base accidentally killed one prisoner when,

trying to force him to talk, they went too far and punctured his eardrum and brain with a pointed piece of wood.

Osborn testified that his interpreter, a Chinese woman, was shot through the neck by a U.S. Army captain, whom he did not identify, as she was on her way to lunch. He said he believed the captain shot the woman because of his "complete disdain" for Orientals.

"When I asked him why he did it, he said the woman was only a slave anyway and that it didn't matter," Osborn testified.

Viet Cong suspects, Osborn said, were turned over to groups called "provisional reconnaissance units," which were primarily Vietnamese personnel with U.S. advisers. They were part of the Phoenix program which was designed to root out the Viet Cong infrastructure and which Osborn characterized as a "sterile depersonalized murder program."

He said suspects often were turned over to the units for interrogation without investigation or verification of charges. Once in the interrogation process, Osborn testified, "They all die." He said he never saw a suspect who ever lived.

For the first time, Os-

born revealed details of the training and operations of Army intelligence.

He said he operated a 50-man spy ring out of a counter-insurgency unit in the Marine Corps base outside Da Nang. He said the marines never knew he was an Army private first class and that it took him six weeks to win their confidence so they would use information he gave them of Viet Cong activities in the I Corps area.

Osborn said he was paid once a month by an administrative captain who passed the money under the table during lunch at the Navy officers' club in Da Nang.

But, he said, he had an unlimited expense account from the CIA to set up the spy ring for ferreting out Viet Cong suspects in the I Corps area.

C.I.A. Says It Maintains Force of 30,000 in Laos

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 2—The Nixon Administration acknowledged today, through a Senate subcommittee staff report, that the Central Intelligence Agency was maintaining a 30,000-man "irregular" force now fighting throughout most of Laos.

Many news articles in recent years have described C.I.A. sponsorship of an irregular army in Laos. However, the subcommittee report represented the first time that the agency publicly and officially confirmed its military activities in Laos. The report indicated that the use of the irregular units in Laos was more widespread than had been indicated in the news accounts.

The force has become "the main cutting edge" of the Royal Laotian Army, according to the report, and has been supplemented by Thai "volunteers" recruited and paid by the C.I.A.

The agency's involvement in a secret war in Laos was finally confirmed officially in a staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on foreign commitments by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, two former Foreign Service officers who made an inspection trip to Laos in April. A version of their report, once classified top secret, was made public today after clearance by the C.I.A. as well as the State and Defense Departments.

Publication of the detailed 23-page report marks the formal acknowledgement of the secret war that the United States has been conducting in Laos ever since the breakdown of the 1962 Geneva accords, which were supposed to re-establish the neutrality of that country.

In making public the report, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, the subcommittee chairman, said: "It is an encouraging sign that the executive branch has finally agreed that much of the United States Government has been doing in Laos may now be made public. The veil of secrecy which has

long kept this secret war in Laos officially hidden from the American people has been partially lifted."

Senator Symington complained, however, that the executive branch was still refusing to make public "certain truths concerning the nature, composition and command arrangements of the Thai forces in Laos." The information the Administration has refused to make public, he said, bears on the question whether the recruitment of the Thai forces violates a provision against hiring soldiers that was written into the Defense Appropriations Act last year.

One fact kept secret by the executive branch is the presence in Laos—referred to in the past by Senator J. W. Fulbright—of a series of Thai generals who use the Thai equivalent of John Doe as their names. The senator did not give the Thai equivalent. In contending that the provision against hiring troops is not being violated, the State Department has argued that the Thai volunteers came under the command of the Royal Laotian Army.

Out of the report came the first detailed description of the rapidly rising cost of the American military involvement in a war in which, the report observed, "the Royal Lao Government continues to be almost totally dependent on the United States, perhaps more dependent on us than any other government in the world."

U.S. Spent \$284.2-Million

In the fiscal year 1970, which ended on July 1, a "partial total" of United States expenditures in Laos came to \$284.2-million, of which \$162.2-million was for military aid, \$52-million for economic aid and \$70-million was spent by the C.I.A. exclusive of the amount spent on the Thai forces.

This was the first time that the C.I.A. has permitted disclosure of its spending in Laos, and even then the figure came out indirectly through subtraction from over-all estimates included in the report.

In the current fiscal year, the report said, the estimated cost of military assistance has "risen rapidly," doubling since January, mostly because of increased ammunition being furnished the Royal Laotian and irregular forces. The cost of military and

economic aid plus the C.I.A. programs is now expected to come to \$374-million in the current fiscal year. At that level, the report observed, the cost will be more than three times as large as it was in fiscal 1967 and 25 times as large as when United States assistance began nine years ago.

Not included in these estimates were the costs of United States bombing operations in northern Laos in support of the Royal Laotian forces and in southern Laos against the Ho Chi Minh supply line used by North Vietnam.

The report said that American air operations in Laos had declined over the last two years, with United States planes aver-

aging 340 sorties a day this April, compared with a daily rate of 440 in the first part of 1969. At the same time, B-25 bombing in northern Laos has increased since it was begun in February, 1970, with what amounts to "free fire zones" being established for the bombers. These zones have been cleared of the civilian population and any activity in them can be considered to be supporting the enemy.

The report also said that in recent months the Chinese Communists have increased their air defenses along the road they are building in northern Laos, making the "area one of the most heavily defended in the world." The Chinese, the report said, have moved in "a heavy new increment" of radar-directed anti-aircraft guns, raising the total to 395, including for the first time 85-mm. and 100-mm. guns that are effective up to 68,000 feet.

The area around the Chinese-built road is "off limits" to American planes, but the report noted that on at least two occasions the road had been attacked by unmarked Royal Laos air force T-28's furnished by the United States.

The Chinese build-up of anti-aircraft defenses began after an attack by two Laotian planes in January, 1970.

In the last two years, the report said, the size of the Chinese forces along the road has increased from 6,000 to between 14,000 and 20,000. Since November, 1970, the Chinese, in addition to "upgrading earlier road construction," have constructed eight small-arms firing ranges of a kind normally associated with garrisons of ground troops as well as a large number of basketball courts.

The Chinese road stretches from the Chinese border to Muang Sai in north-central Laos, with branches extending toward Dienbienphu in North Vietnam and toward the Thai border. The purpose of the road remains unclear, but the report observes that in terms of "areas of influence," the "practical effect of the Chinese road is that the Chinese border has already been shifted southward to encompass a substantial portion of northern Laos."

To subcommittee members, probably the most significant disclosure of the report was confirmation that their irregular units in Laos are "trained, equipped, supported, advised and to a great extent organized by the C.I.A."

The "B.G. units," as they are known. (For the French term "battalions guerriers"), "have become the cutting edge of the military," the report said, "leaving the Royal Lao Army as a force primarily devoted to a static defense."

These units began as a force of Meo tribesmen under Gen. Vang Pao operating around the Plaine des Jarres, but now, the report said, they are operating in all sections of Laos except a small military region around Vientiane, the administrative capital.

Except for a 1,500-man cadre from the Royal Lao Army, all members of these units, according to the report, are "volunteers," with their rations and pay supplied indirectly by the C.I.A. and guaranteed evacuation of wounded by air America helicopters.

At one point in 1968-69, the size of the irregular forces totaled 38,000 men, according to the report, but it is now down to about 30,000 men, largely because of desertions, heavy casualties and "financial restraints incurred by budgetary limitations."

With the military manpower base in Laos "exhausted," the report said, the agency turned to Thai "volunteers" to supplement the irregular forces.

The precise number of Thai "volunteers" in Laos was deleted from the report, but Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey and Senator Fulbright have used a figure of about 4,800.

The report—made public, in its declassified form, with gaps representing security deletions—said:

"Most of the irregulars have been recruited, we were told, by a 'volunteer force' outside the Thai army, although (deleted)."

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TROOPS POUR IN

Laos bristles with Chinese

(UPI) -- Red China has quietly built up its military presence in neighboring Laos to a force of 14,000 to 20,000 men.

A report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee disclosed yesterday that the Chinese have installed 395 radar-guided anti-aircraft guns along a road they are building deep into the interior of northern Laos. Some of the guns can hit planes 63,000 feet high.

The significance of the buildup is not known but American officials regard it as virtual extension of China's southern borders into a neighboring state, the report said.

The report not only detailed China's role in Laos, but was the first officially sanctioned account of day-to-day CIA activities in directing Thai and Royal Laotian commando forces against the communists.

Also, it was the first time the CIA was willing to acknowledge its role. The heavily-censored report had been classified secret.

Two committee consultants, James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, prepared the 23-page document after a two-week trip to Laos last spring.

They said the overall situation in Laos was

growing steadily worse and that U.S. aid was the only thing preventing a complete route by North Vietnamese and communist Pathet Lao forces in the country.

CIA expenditures for the past fiscal year, not counting its support for an estimated 4,800 Thai irregulars, was put at \$87 million. The report said: "The CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits) and operational costs in Laos."

An exact breakdown of the war's cost was not given, but some senators have said it runs more than \$1 billion a year plus the cost of U.S. bombing runs over the Ho Chi Minh trail leading into South Vietnam.

The road the Chinese started in the early 1960s now stretches 45 miles across the northern tip of Laos within 20 miles of Thai.

It is virtually a Chinese garrison with all the earmarks of permanence, according to the report.

Altho the road is off-limits for American bombers, Royal Laotian planes flying too close to it have been fired at.

Cost of War in Laos Placed at \$130 Million

By GEORGE SAERMAN
Star Staff Writer

A previously classified Senate report released today indicates the United States secretly spent about \$130 million in the last fiscal year on "irregular" troops under CIA control in the Laos war.

The money, according to the staff report of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, supported 30,000 Lao irregulars operating in four of the five military regions of Laos, plus Thai irregulars operating mainly in the strategic Plain of Jars in North Laos.

The exact number of the Thai forces is deleted from the report by administration censors. But Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, after reading the uncensored report, on June 8 put the number of Thais at 4,600.

Long Negotiations

The version made public today follows five weeks of intensive negotiations between the authors of the report, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, and three representatives of the executive branch—one each from the State Department, Defense Department, and Central Intelligence Agency.

It is the first time that CIA activities in Laos have been confirmed and given some detail publicly.

The report states that the Lao irregulars—called BG units after their French name, bataillons guerriers—are part of the irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and, to a great extent, organized by the CIA.

These forces, the report continues, have become the "cutting edge" of the Lao military forces, far more active and efficient than the 60,000-man Royal Lao Army.

Encouraging Sign

Sen. Stuart Symington, chairman of the security subcommittee which sent Lowenstein and Moose to Laos for 12 days, April 22 to May 4, said it was "an encouraging sign that the executive branch has finally agreed that much of what the United

States government has been doing in Laos may now be made public."

But he hit the continued unwillingness of the administration "to acknowledge certain truths"—mainly the composition and command arrangements for the Thai troops in Laos.

On June 7, Symington presented the whole uncensored report to an executive session of the Senate. A "sanitized" version of the debate behind closed doors is to appear in the Congressional Record tomorrow.

Most Exact Figures

For the public record, the 23-page report today manages to give the most exact figures to date on the cost of the secret operation, but overall totals still are obtained only by putting together bits and pieces of what the administration has allowed through censorship.

For instance, a key passage lists a total of \$284.2 million as the total U.S. expenditure in Laos in the fiscal year ending June 30—exclusive of bombing costs. That \$284.2 million, the report says, is made up of "an estimated \$162.2 million in military assistance, \$52 million in the AID program (economic) and \$(deleted) spent by CIA exclusive of the Thai irregular costs."

By school-boy mathematics—uncontested by administration representatives—that makes the CIA budget for irregulars \$70 million.

Rogers' Estimate

In addition, Secretary of State William P. Rogers said June 15 that the total U.S. expenditures in Laos in fiscal 1971—exclusive of bombing—was \$350 million, not \$284.2 million.

That makes an additional \$65.8 million spent.

Committee sources say part of that \$65.8 million went for additional and unexpected expenditures after the staff was in

Laos. But the vast bulk was to pay for the Thai irregulars—a figure deleted from the report.

\$130 Million Total

Therefore, a conclusion, produced from the report, sources close to the Senate committee and public statements by Rogers, is that the U.S. spent about \$130 million on the activities of the irregulars in Laos—Lao and Thai irregulars.

Also for the first time, the report produces official figures to document the steeply rising costs of the Laos war since 1963. For the fiscal year 1972 which began July 1, the overt military assistance program alone is to cost \$252.1 million.

Chinese Double

The report also finds that Chinese participation in Laos, along the road from the Chinese border into north central Laos, has more than doubled in two years. Up from 6,000 men, the Chinese force is now estimated by U.S. intelligence at between 14,000 and 20,000 men.

Since November 1970, the report says, the Chinese, besides improving previous road construction, have installed eight small-arms firing ranges usually associated with ground garrisons, plus anti-aircraft guns, raising the total to 395.

The report says that, despite the huge expenditures of American money and Lao and Thai manpower, "most observers in Laos say that from the military point of view the situation there is growing steadily worse and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy."

STATINTL

The Nation

Congress:

For the President— Some Ties That Bind

I slept sounder than ever I remember to have done in my life . . . when I awakened. . . . I attempted to rise, but was not able to stir: for, as I happened to lie on my back, I found my arms and legs were strongly fastened on each side to the ground.
—From a Voyage to Lilliput in "Gulliver's Travels"

WASHINGTON — With a maze of legislative strings, the Congress last week dramatically accelerated efforts to ensnare a latter-day Gulliver named Richard Nixon. Those leading the attack, however, had an even larger target in mind: the ever-increasing power of the institution of the Presidency itself.

Thus, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee threatened to cut off funds for the military aid program unless the Executive Branch produced a Pentagon document. Committee rooms rang with complaints of excessive secrecy by the Executive Branch and proposals to force the Administration to supply Congress with information. And a bill to limit the warmaking powers of the Presidency began moving with unexpected speed and support through the legislative machinery.

Through all the noise and activity, which seemed to be ignored but was certainly not unheard by the Gulliver in the White House, ran a deep constitutional power struggle between the Presidency and the Congress. Ever since the Nixon Administration took office, and even before, in the closing days of the Johnson Administration, a Senate frustrated at not being included in foreign policy decisions and at being excluded from policy information, spoke in an assertive mood, seeking

to re-establish itself and Congress as a whole as a branch of the Government co-equal with the Presidency.

The most direct challenge last week — and one that could produce a stormy confrontation — came from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which discovered a little-noticed provision in the 1961 Foreign Aid Act. Basically the provision states that a foreign aid program will be cut off if, within 35 days, the Executive Branch has not supplied a foreign aid document requested by a Congressional committee — or, alternatively, if the President has not invoked Executive privilege to keep the document from Congress.

By a unanimous vote the committee decided to invoke the provision to require the Defense Department to turn over a five-year military assistance plan which it has refused to supply to the committee. In perhaps the clearest test of the Executive Branch's right to withhold information since the Eisenhower Administration tussled with Senator Joseph McCarthy, the Pentagon was thus faced with a choice of turning over the document or facing a suspension of its billion dollar military aid program to more than 40 nations.

The President could invoke Executive privilege, but that would set a precedent and undercut all the lesser reasons that the Executive Branch has been using for withholding information from Congress—that it would not be in the national interest to release such information or that the data were merely "internal working documents."

A Senate Judiciary subcommittee, meanwhile, began hearings on legislation, offered by Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that would compel Government officials to appear before Congressional committees and testify unless the President invoked Executive privilege. "When the Government operates in secrecy, its citizens are not informed and their ignorance breeds oppression," said Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, the subcommittee chairman, at the outset of the hearings, and

that pretty well summed up the frustration in the Senate over Executive Branch secrecy.

In a less punitive manner, Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky came forward with a proposal that Congressional committees, like the Executive Branch, should be furnished with information by the Central Intelligence Agency, again on the premise that if Congress is to help set foreign policy then it must be informed. Senators Clifford P. Case of New Jersey and Stuart Symington of Missouri, meanwhile, were pressing amendments that would prevent the President from using undisclosed C.I.A. funds to fight a secret war in Laos.

On the theory that the Senate should give advice as well as consent, Senator Vance Hartke advanced with a double-barreled resolution. One part would call for Senate confirmation of the new United States representative to the Vietnam peace talks in Paris. The other would offer the advice of the Senate that in the negotiations the United States should agree to total troop withdrawal in nine months if agreement was reached on timely release of American prisoners of war.

The latter part was a variation on the Senate-approved troop withdrawal amendment of Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, that was still tying up legislation extending the draft. On Friday, House and Senate conferees reached agreement on a compromise that would considerably weaken the force of the Mansfield amendment but would retain the concept that the President should withdraw all troops by a "date certain" subject to the release of American P.O.W.'s.

All these various legislative strings, even if they should be tied down, would not fundamentally change the balance of power. At most they might make the Congress better informed in giving advice and thus more able to serve as a counterbalance to the Presidency. Undoubtedly the most important string, therefore, was one that Senators, Republicans and Democrats, in testimony last week be-

fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Professor Alexander M. Bickel of Yale Law School said: "In matters of war and peace, a succession of Presidents — well intentioned and patriotic, to be sure — have indeed come close to canceling the effectiveness of Congress. The result is a dangerous contradiction of the principles of democratic government, which I believe ought to be set right."

They were welcome, well-heeded words to members of the Foreign Relations Committee as they set about last week to consider legislation defining and restricting the war powers of the Presidency. What is expected to emerge is an amalgam of proposals offered by such unlikely partners in a challenge to the Presidency as conservative Senator John Stennis of Mississippi and liberal Jacob K. Javits of New York. Basically their proposal is that the President could undertake emergency military actions, such as repelling an attack on United States forces, but could not continue military hostilities for more than a month without obtaining Congressional consent.

Even Senator Hugh Scott, who as Republican leader has stood as the Administration's spokesman against Congressional intrusions on Presidential prerogatives, joined in the drive for war powers legislation. "The time has come," he said, "when Congress will not be denied the right to participate, in accordance with the Constitution, in the whole enormous business of how wars are begun." Earlier in the month, Representative Gerald R. Ford, who as House Republican leader has been a conservative champion of the Administration, had endorsed war powers legislation. When the Republican leaders start talking that way it was proof that Congressional resentment and frustration over the secrecy and powers assumed by the White House were running deep.

Even the long passive House Foreign Affairs Committee was getting into the act. It included in the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill amendments that would cut off military and economic aid to Greece until constitutional democracy is restored in that

BOOK
REVIEWS*Intelligence**Scandal*

BY VLADIMIROV

SCANDAL is the word best characterizing the context in which most citizens have viewed, in recent times, the intelligence establishment, particularly the CIA. This is the conclusion arrived at by Professor Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University in his book* on the U.S. intelligence system which he has been studying for a good many years.

The book is by no means an exposé. The author's position is rather that of a well-wisher who would like to see the defects in the system eliminated in order that it might function more successfully. All the more noteworthy, then, is the material he has collected, as well as some of his own admissions, for they reveal the basic deficiencies of the "intelligence establishment" which are essentially a reflection of the evils of the social system that engendered it.

In Ransom's opinion the intelligence system, with the CIA at its head, is inefficient. Indeed, he considers "the CIA problem" to be one of the most urgent problems of U.S. foreign policy inasmuch as the failures of the CIA and the political scandals caused by them seriously damage the national interest and the international prestige of the United States. The same applies to the other intelligence agencies which perform functions similar to those of the CIA.

* H. Ransom. *The Intelligence Establishment*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970

The chief members of the vast espionage and subversion community, apart from the CIA, are the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) with subordinate services in the army, air force and navy, the National Security Agency, the State Department's Office of Research and Intelligence, the intelligence branch of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). There are ten or more other departments and offices, among them the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the Agency for International Development, Ransom tells us, which while not officially associated with the intelligence community nevertheless play their part. The annual budget of the intelligence establishment, according to the author, is in the neighborhood of \$4,000 million, of which \$1,000 million each goes to the CIA and the National Security Agency. The central offices of the CIA, DIA and the NSA alone have a personnel of more than 30,000.

A large part of the book is given over to an analysis of the activities of America's principal intelligence agency, the CIA. Ransom is of the opinion that the CIA has become something more than an intelligence outfit, it has assumed a wide range of political functions in the sphere of international relations and enjoys far greater powers than were foreseen by the National Security Act of 1947. Violating the norms of international law, the CIA interferes in the internal affairs of other states. It prosecutes undeclared wars, maintains dictatorial regimes and engineers the overthrow of governments undesirable to the U.S.; it influences elections, sends its agents into public organizations in the U.S. and abroad in order to control their activity, directs the work of "free" radio stations, secretly organizes the publication of books and articles, creates "private" air companies which are used for espionage purposes. Ransom maintains that the CIA has exceeded all limits as regards the use of foreign diplomatic and other official U.S. agencies for espionage and subversion. According to the American journal *Foreign Affairs*, of the 22,000 persons on the staffs of 263 U.S. diplomatic missions, only 3,300 are employed by the State Department. The remaining 18,700 work for the intelligence and propaganda departments.

Of considerable interest is Ransom's account of how the intelligence information obtained by the American

espionage network influences important government policy decisions. In the United States, according to Ransom, intelligence alone has the exclusive prerogative to make assessments concerning the situation in any foreign country and the plans of the respective government. This is all the more disturbing since the intelligence people, in the author's opinion, are stricken with what he calls "information pathology," i.e., a tendency "to interpret events in terms of how they prefer things to be rather than as they actually are" (p. 37). Anti-communism, hatred for the socialist countries lead a sinister colouring to intelligence estimates, helping to create a war psychosis in the United States and engender anti-Soviet campaigns.

Describing the state of affairs in the American espionage community, Ransom comes to the conclusion that the CIA is in need of reform. Since the unsavoury reputation earned by American intelligence is, in Ransom's opinion, due mainly to espionage, plots, political provocations, etc., which he euphemistically refers to as "clandestine political actions," he proposes removing them from the CIA's province. He suggests further that thought be given to the question of introducing censorship of the American press which, he says, writes far too much about the CIA's blunders and is hence to blame for its "bad publicity." Finally, he advocates stricter government control over intelligence agencies, with a view primarily to establishing a more effective system of operative leadership of subversive activities in order to reduce the risk of failure.

Ransom's recipes, of course, are not likely to produce the desired results, for it is not a matter of rectifying some individual flaw, but of the sum total of the sinister activities of the American intelligence. The affairs of the CIA and the other espionage agencies are conducted with the knowledge and consent of the President and on instructions from the National Security Council. This means that all its activities are directed by the top men in Washington in keeping with the requirements of the foreign policy strategy of American imperialism. The adventurous nature of that strategy makes it safe to predict that new "scandals" are in store for U.S. intelligence in the future as well.

STATINTL



MARIANNE MEANS

Congress Wants CIA Briefings

CIA officials are very concerned about a new Senate move to require their secretive agency to give detailed global intelligence to congressional committees on a regular basis.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled hearings this September on a controversial measure that would greatly expand the number of senators who have access to classified CIA evaluations and information.

The bill, proposed by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., would require the CIA to brief the full Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on a routine schedule, similar to the system under which the agency briefs top foreign policy officials of the executive branch.

ALARMED CIA OFFICIALS view the proposal as potentially jeopardizing their clandestine operations around the world. There are 119 congressmen on those four committees, and that's a lot of people to keep a secret. Consequently the CIA's three congressional liaison agents are trying quietly to have the measure killed.

The Senate however, is in a mood to expand its influence over Presidential foreign policy-making, and better intelligence is a vital tool toward that goal. The measure already has considerable supporters, including Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, and Sen. Stuart Symington, the only senator on both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

The CIA now reports only to five special sub-committees of the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Those groups are concerned primarily with the CIA budget and operations. The CIA does not regularly brief Fulbright

or other congressmen whose major interest is in the field of foreign policy.

SENATE LEADERS COMPLAIN that they are asked to authorize and fund Presidential decisions that may result in U.S. soldiers going into combat but are told little more than the general public about the information and analyses that prompted those decisions. Cooper, a long-time opponent of the war in Vietnam, introduced the bill in the wake of the Pentagon Papers. He was angry to discover from the papers that the CIA had warned President Johnson full-scale bombing of North Vietnam might not frighten Hanoi into giving up.

CIA officials fear that congressmen privy to intelligence secrets will not be able to resist the temptation of leaking — and perhaps misinterpreting — snatches of information that serve their own political purposes or can get them publicity. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular has long had a reputation for being a sieve.

But congressmen retort, justifiably, they are no worse at keeping secrets than the White House itself. It is common practice for White House and State Department officials to leak classified documents and secret foreign intelligence when it suits their purpose. For instance, the administration recently surfaced intelligence warnings of new Soviet missile sites to help generate support for military budget items.

Even so, the administration keeps reasonably tight control over the number of officials who have access to CIA intelligence and who have permission to leak selected secrets at the appropriate moments. Congress has no such control over its members, and the odds that an individual congressman might make a grievous error in judgment about what is safe to make public are not inconsiderable.

STATINTL

U.S. Defends Funding of Thais in Laos

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

The Nixon administration has denied charges by Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., that it has violated Congressional restrictions by financing Thai irregulars fighting in Laos.

State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray III said yesterday that these volunteers from Thailand, operating on their own under Laos command, do not fall under the amendment of Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., to the Defense Appropriation Act last year.

According to that amendment, Bray said, the U.S. government is prohibited from using any of the \$2.5 billion for Vietnam to support other "free world forces" aiding the local governments of Laos and Cambodia.

"We have taken the position in the executive branch," said Bray of the Fulbright amendment, "that these free world forces would be formally organized units provided by other governments and under the command of nationals of those governments."

"Not Regular Forces"

Such is not the case for the Thai volunteers in Laos, Bray said. "They are not from the regular forces of Thailand, and they are under Lao command in Laos." Case had earlier estimated their number at between 4,000 and 6,000, but state department officials said that number is "slightly high."

Both Fulbright and Case insist that the amendment is intended to prevent the use of mercenaries.

Bray also denied Case's charge on the floor of the Senate yesterday that the funds to support these Thai volunteers come out of the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency. He stood behind a letter sent by the department to Case July 15—and released yesterday—that support goes through the Lao military program funded by the Defense Department.

But other officials admitted that the actual mechanics of transmitting the funds to the Thais, most of whom are fighting in North Laos around the Plain of Jars, may be worked out by the CIA—who advise the local Lao forces there.

Case's statement yesterday accused the administration of a "glaring inconsistency" in its position on financing Thai forces

in Laos." He noted the contradiction between what the July 15 letter from the state department said and a statement by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird June 14, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Case quoted Laird as saying, in answer to a direct question by Case, that the senator was "correct" about funds for the volunteers coming from "somewhere else" — "The military assistance program will not fund that program," Laird said.

Yet the July 15 letter to Case stated that "support for these irregulars is supplied under the Lao military aid program which, as you know, is funding through the Department of Defense budget as 'Military Assistance, Service-Funded (MASF)'"

Bray said he could not explain the "confusion" over what Laird had told the Foreign Relations Committee. Both he and Case noted, however, that Laird's words were technically correct, since the name, "military assistance program" as such has been eliminated from Laos — as well as Thailand and South Vietnam.

In 1966 Congress bowed to the request of the Johnson administration and included military aid to those three countries in the regular Defense Department budget. So the "military assistance program" formerly controlled by the State Department in Laos has become the defense department's "Military Assistance, Service-Funded" program. Laird did not emphasize this point to the Foreign Relations Committee in assuring Case that no funding would go through the extinct "Military Assistance Program."

Case yesterday also asked that the administration provide a White Paper on all the details of Laos. He said the taxpayer has a right to know what is being done with the \$350 million a year the administration has admitted spending there. Bray said no such White Paper is being prepared. But administration officials said that much of the information may soon emerge in several transcripts of a Senate hearing cleared for publication by the administration.

STATINTL

W. PALM BEACH, FLA.
 TIMES JUL 24 1972
 E - 23,270
 POST-TIMES
 S - 69,302

Legislation Needed

New legislative safeguards offer the only hope for putting reins on the secret wars and intrigues foisted on U.S. citizens under the guise of "national defense" and "public interest."

Pending in the Senate are three bills to put strings on the super-secret funds and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Kentucky Republican Sen. John Sherman Cooper proposed a bill which would require the CIA to make available to Congress the "same intelligence conclusions, facts and analyses that are now available to the executive branch."

Another Republican, Sen. Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, authored a bill limiting commitment of troops, funds and military equipment to Laos and other areas. Sen. Case said he sees the need "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

The third bill, introduced by Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.), would require an accounting of CIA funds and prohibit concealment of the spy agency funds in appropriations for other agencies.

Future of the three Senate bills can only be guessed. But in the House, five resolutions on similar issues went down the drain in rapid-fire order. One was authored by Rep. Paul N. McCloskey (R-Calif.) who argued that the Congress has a right to be told "the entire truth" about Laotian operations. In contrast, the Foreign Affairs Committee argued that telling the truth about Laos "would not be compatible with the public interest" and the resolution was defeated on the floor of the House along with three similar resolutions.

Admittedly, some phases of government operation directly related to national defense appropriately belong in highly restricted classifications. The Laotian situation, however, and concealment of accurate figures on CIA funding illustrate the deliberately deceptive techniques frustrating efforts to learn the extent of U.S. entanglements in Indochina.

It is a cliché -- and a none-too-accurate one -- to observe that survival of a democracy depends on an informed electorate. Certainly, survival demands an informed Congress. The pending Senate bills -- and perhaps more -- are clearly called for and merit wide support.

USIA Accused Of Aiding Thieu

By Tim O'Brien

Washington Post Staff Writer

Two members of a House subcommittee accused the U.S. Information Agency yesterday of aiding incumbents in Vietnam elections by supplying political poll results only to the South Vietnamese government, excluding challengers and potential challengers from access to the information.

Rep. William S. Moorhead, (D-Pa.), chairman of a Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, said \$133 million has been spent on information services in South Vietnam, of which the United States has supplied 90 per cent.

"In my own personal view," he said, "what it boils down to is that we have helped the Saigon regime build a massive propaganda machine."

John E. Reinhardt, assistant USIA director for East Asia, admitted that the agency's poll results are classified for official use only, for one year. He said that although the polls could be of limited value to incumbent candidates, they are not taken for partisan political purposes.

Reinhardt also said the USIA has issued orders that its facilities and personnel may not be used to influence the outcome of forthcoming Vietnam elections. The polling itself, he said, was stopped in February.

Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) said giving poll results to government officials and withhold them from challengers is "a political boon to the government in power."

Moorhead termed the expenditure of U.S. funds for polling "a waste and possible misapplication of money."

The subcommittee also heard testimony from two former AID officials in Vietnam who resigned because of alleged misuse of AID polls. Theodore Jacquency, who now heads a new group that seeks "fair elections" in South Vietnam, said he resigned "because I felt that U.S. policy in Vietnam supported President

CORDS, a pacification and development program administered by AID in South Vietnam. He said results of the poll—which quizzed Vietnamese on such subjects as government leadership and candidate preferences—were for the eyes of Thieu supporters only."

In addition to the polls, Jacquency said, the U.S.I.A. and Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office lent vast "political propaganda services" to the Saigon government, "at a time when that government is denying freedom of the press to many Vietnamese nationalists."

Jacquency charged that "despite declarations of U.S. impartiality, U.S. resources have been diverted to assist President Thieu's campaign."

He recommended a full congressional investigation of U.S. involvement in South Vietnam elections along with an inquiry into the Thieu regime's policy with respect to the right of others to "disseminate their views freely."

Meanwhile, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) introduced legislation to "once and for all put an end" to what he said was U.S. financing of mercenary forces from Thailand fighting in Laos.

On June 7 the State Department admitted that the United States was supporting Thai forces in Laos but described them as volunteers.

Symington's amendment would ban the use of American funds to support any member of a local military force in Laos who is not a citizen or national of Laos. He claimed the Nixon administration has found a loophole in legislation adopted by Congress last year which was designed to prevent U.S. backing for Thai operations in Laos.

The legislation barred the use of Defense Department funds, but Symington charged that the administration avoided this sticture by using money available to the CIA.

The Senate Rules Committee approved a special \$100,000 al-
of the origins of the Vietnam war.

States pursuant to article V of the Constitution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 1318

At the request of Mr. FANNIN, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1318, a bill to deny tax exemption under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

S. 1442 THROUGH S. 1445

At the request of Mr. Moss, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1442, a bill to provide that the first \$3,000 received as civil service retirement annuity shall be excluded from gross income; S. 1443, to eliminate the survivorship reduction during periods of nonmarriage of retired employees and Members, and for other purposes; S. 1444, a bill to increase the contribution by the Federal Government to the costs of employees' health benefits insurance; and S. 1445, a bill to provide increases in certain annuities payable under chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, and for other purposes.

S. 1659

At the request of Mr. FANNIN, the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. IRVIN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1659, a bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act.

S. 2223

At the request of Mr. TALLEMAGE, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) were added as cosponsors of S. 2223, a bill to amend the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

S. 2258

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN, the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE) and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) were added as cosponsors of S. 2258, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Acceleration Act.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 62

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN, the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 62, authorizing the display of the flags of each of the 50 States at the base of the Washington Monument.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 99

At the request of Mr. CASE, the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 99, a joint resolution proposing establishment of a National Collegiate Press Day.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 114

At the request of Mr. CURTIS, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 114, a stable purchasing power resolution of 1971.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 35—SUBMISSION OF AN ORIGINAL CONCURRENT RESOLUTION FAVORING THE SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

(Ordered to be placed on the calendar.)

Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following original concurrent resolution:

S. CON. RES. 95

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress favors the suspension of deportation in the case of each alien hereinafter named, in which case the Attorney General has suspended deportation pursuant to the provisions of section 244(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (66 Stat. 204; 8 U.S.C. 1251):

A-9687873, Chan, Chuen.
A-17949342, Chin, Lean.
A-6816735, Funk, Thomas Fredrik.
A-13232197, Moy, Huey Nai.
A-10465009, Torres de Bejarano, Socorro.
A-11596572, Yee, Soon King.
A-8486968, Terrazas-Barrio, Eiren.
A-4316706, Ioanides, Gabriel Constantinos.
A-1834768, Herrera-Marquez, Aurelio.
A-18496866, Luna, Wah Guin.
A-3212791, Caudanosa-Leza, Rogelio.
A-6499744, Cartier, Paul August.
A-12027264, Liu, Lal Chih.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS—1972

AMENDMENT NO. 224

(Ordered to be printed and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.)

CLOSING LOOPHOLES: AN AMENDMENT TO END U.S. FINANCING OF FOREIGN MERCENARIES IN LAOS

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last year many of us thought that the Congress, by means of amendments to the Defense authorization and appropriations bills, had made it unlawful for the U.S. Government to pay Thai troops to fight in Laos or Cambodia. Today there are Thai troops in Laos and they are being paid by the U.S. Government. The State Department has finally admitted that we are paying the Thais, but the Thai Government still asserts there are no Thai troops in Laos.

In our discussions with the executive branch, we have encountered two lines of legal argumentation being used to justify the U.S. role in this bizarre affair. First, it is argued that the legislative history of last year's amendments indicates that the amendments' sponsor, whose avowed purpose in proposing the amendments in the first place was to prohibit payment for Thai troops in Laos or Cambodia, had, by inference, condoned the very practice he was seeking to prohibit. Second, it is argued, that, even if this had been the sponsor's intent, the legislation enacted contained loopholes which permits the executive branch to do lawfully what the sponsor had sought to prohibit. Either way, they say it is legal for the United States to hire Thais to fight a war in Laos which the Lao are no longer able to sustain with their own manpower.

For those who find this situation diffi-

cult to comprehend, a brief review of the facts will be helpful before I propose a legislative solution to this problem.

Following the U.S. incursions into Cambodia in May 1970, it was recognized that language of the defense authorization and appropriations legislation providing \$2.5 billion for "support for Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces" could possibly be interpreted as permitting U.S. financing of Thai troops in Cambodia and Laos. Indeed, in August 1970, the State Department acknowledged that a "tentative agreement" had been reached between the United States and Thai Governments regarding the sending of Thai troops to Cambodia.

It was generally understood at the time that the provision of any troops to Cambodia by Thailand would be contingent upon the furnishing of financial support by the United States.

It was in the light of these facts that an amendment was added to both the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts which provided that nothing in the authorization to support "Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnam forces" could be construed "as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

This amendment was originally proposed by the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee who declared that his intention was to prevent our paying for South Vietnamese or Thai forces to expand their military activities in Cambodia and Laos so that we would become involved in large-scale operations in close support of the Government of Cambodia or the Government of Laos.

Nevertheless, despite this amendment, a Department of State spokesman admitted on June 7 that there were Thai forces in Laos and also that the United States was supporting them, although he described them as "volunteers."

This spokesman did not say that these Thai forces are operating principally in the war in northern Laos, a war that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan has said has "nothing to do with military operations in South Vietnam or Cambodia."

The amendment included in the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for fiscal year 1971 never defined "local forces in Laos and Thailand" and the prohibitions written into the Appropriation Act applied, of course, only to "appropriations available to the Department of Defense during the current fiscal year." Thus, it might be argued that Central Intelligence Agency funds were not covered by the amendment.

In addition, it has been argued by the executive branch that the Thai forces in Laos are "local forces in Laos," even though they are Thai nationals who were recruited and trained in Thailand, are transported by us from Thailand to Laos; then they are sent back to Thailand

20 July 1971

How the CIA can help

While there is much that can be criticized in the secrets revealed in the Pentagon papers, one agency that comes out of them with a record for calling its shots correctly is the Central Intelligence Agency. As Crocker Snow Jr. pointed out in last Sunday's Globe, it suggests that the last few Presidents should have listened more to the CIA than to the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the White House advisers.

For it appears that if they had, there would have been no doubts about President Diem's regime in Saigon; the domino theory would not have been trotted out to justify the war, and the war would not have been escalated.

Why were not the CIA reports given greater credence? The answer may come only with less secrecy in Washington. But perhaps part of the answer lay in the disastrous 1961 invasion the agency ran at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba (for which President Kennedy, nonetheless, took all the blame).

And perhaps another part lies in a deliberate downplaying of the CIA's role. It had been an operational as well as an intelligence agency

when John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State and his brother Allen was CIA director. But after the Bay of Pigs, Robert Kennedy urged a tight control of operations and, according to what CIA director Richard Helms told the editors last April, the CIA was urged to present options rather than hard recommendations.

It is not publicly known what role if any the CIA played in the futile invasion of Cambodia and the abortive raid on an empty North Vietnamese prison camp. Enough is known about its role in Laos to make it subject to severe criticism, however.

All of this makes more attractive the proposal of Sen. John Sherman Cooper that the CIA share its intelligence estimates with Congress, which passes on its secret budget without knowing, for the most part, where the money goes. This would help Congress reach a judgment on important policy questions.

At a time when Congress is rightly reasserting its responsibility, that would be most helpful. It would be infinitely preferable to having to vote on the basis of limited information designed to support administrative policies.

STATINTL

Topless Secrets: A Political Fed

STATINTL

A few U.S. senators and their journalistic allies have renewed a heavy-handed attempt to force the secrecy and subtlety of the Central Intelligence Agency under the thumb of Congress.

Critics of U.S. foreign policy, in Indochina and elsewhere, are especially eager to call the CIA to account and thus by asserting accountability to restore what is commonly referred to as the usurped "congressional responsibility in the making of foreign policy."

The erroneous implication is that Congress is primarily responsible for the formulation of foreign policy, whereas Congress is only one source of authority in relations with other nations and in national security affairs. Senators Cooper, Case and McGovern want the real fount of foreign policy — the Executive Branch — brought under much closer congressional control and influence, which is impracticable and improbable.

The CIA makes a convenient scapegoat, especially for those who disagree with the foreign policies of the incumbent administration and even

more especially for those who fail to understand the functions (and limitations) of the CIA as an adjunct of the National Security Council, responsible directly to the President.

Undue secrecy in government is deplorable, but it does not follow that there must be no secrets or that the intelligence garnered by the CIA must be shared with 535 members of Congress. Some congressional oversight of the functions of the intelligence community, of which the CIA is only one member, is desirable and in fact it is now and has for years been exercised at the President's discretion through ranking congressional leaders.

But where congressional oversight ends and congressional control begins is a moot point. Congress in the past has wisely recognized the restrictions its sheer size and the scope of its concerns impose on its dealings in day-by-day international affairs. It has, therefore, given the Executive Branch the tools with which to exercise the President's pre-eminent constitutional authority in foreign affairs, the mechanics of which involve the very security of the United States.

17 JUL 1971

Controlling the C.I.A.

Senator Cooper's proposal that the Central Intelligence Agency share with Congress its intelligence estimates is a logical corollary to the reassertion of Congressional responsibility in the making of foreign policy. The lawmakers obviously cannot fulfill their constitutional function in this vital area with maximum wisdom and effectiveness unless they have access to the best available information.

As matters now stand, the Executive enjoys almost exclusive access to information compiled by the intelligence community. Congress is thus at a serious disadvantage in attempting to weigh important policy decisions, especially when an Administration makes public only selective intelligence data designed to support its policies.

Senator Cooper has emphasized that his proposal is not aimed at C.I.A. operations, sources or methods, but is "concerned only with the end result—the facts and analyses of facts." It would not compromise and it does not seek to control intelligence operations. Indeed, Senate approval of the Cooper bill would represent in a sense a vote of confidence in the intelligence community—at least in its information-gathering function.

The question of control over the vast intelligence network, and especially of the C.I.A.'s clandestine action operations, is raised in other proposals. These include three bills prepared by Senator Case designed to increase Congressional control over C.I.A. participation in foreign wars and quasi-military operations; a bill introduced by Senator McGovern requiring C.I.A. funds to appear as a single line item in the budget; and long-standing efforts to strengthen over-all Congressional oversight of the intelligence agency. The principle of such proposals merits support of a Congress that too long has neglected its essential role in the formulation of United States foreign policy.

WORCESTER, MASS.

TELEGRAM

JUL 19 1957

M - 62,339

S - 108,367

Probing the CIA

✓ Congress, which is in an anti-Vietnam, anti-Administration mood, is directing its attention to the Central Intelligence Agency. A number of bills being debated would flush some of the CIA spooks out into the daylight and give Congress more of a say in the agency's operations.

It is a sensitive subject, to say the least. The CIA says it must be close-lipped to be effective. But some of its critics think its curtain of secrecy gives it the power to act as an invisible government, accountable to no one.

✓ The various proposals offered attack the problem from different angles. Rep. Herman Badillo wants an amendment which would confine the CIA to gathering and analyzing intelligence. Sen. George McGovern wants all CIA appropriations and expenditures to appear in the budget as a single line item. (CIA expenses are now concealed). Sen. Clifford Case has introduced legislation to prohibit the CIA from financing a second country's operation in a third country. (as the CIA is doing now with the Thais in Laos). Senator Sen. John Cooper, who is a former ambassador and friendly to the CIA, nevertheless wants its "conclusions, facts and analyses" distributed in full to the relevant committees in Congress as well as to the executive branch. This would require an amendment to the National Security Act.

It is plain that some of these proposals are aimed at the executive

branch, which Congress has become very suspicious of. Many congressmen have the feeling that they have been hoodwinked by various presidents (the Tonkin Gulf Resolution affair, for example), and they are convinced that the powers and secrecy of the CIA permit the executive branch to do things in foreign affairs that would otherwise be impossible under the Constitution.

Congress' attitude is understandable. After all, the Constitution regards the legislative as perhaps the most important branch of the government, yet Congress does not even know what is going on in foreign affairs, half the time, and is powerless to do anything when it does learn the facts. The war in Laos, for example, has been run by the CIA without congressional approval or even debate.

Yet, how effective can an intelligence agency be if its activities are exposed to congressional scrutiny? How long would its secrets remain secret if they were pored over by congressional committees?

The questions raised by these proposals in Congress are fundamental in their implications. On the one hand, the United States must have effective ways to gather intelligence — and it also must on occasion be able to operate clandestinely.

On the other, it cannot tolerate an agency that functions under too tight a secrecy curtain with almost unlimited funds and powers. That way lies other Bays of Pigs.

16 JUL 1971

STATINTL

House Unit Discloses Civilian Killings in U.S.-Backed Program

By FELIX DELAIR Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 15 —

Previously classified information read into the record of a House Government Operations subcommittee today disclosed that 26,843 nonmilitary Vietcong insurgents and sympathizers were "neutralized" in 14 months through Operation Phoenix, a counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam financed by the United States.

The total number, it was said, was made up of 9,829 "killed," 7,751 "sentenced" to prisons and 9,272 "rallied" — the United States military term for being "induced to rally to the [Saigon] Government" after having been identified as serving the North Vietnamese intelligence apparatus.

Calendar Year Calculated

The figures, which were declassified and provided by the State Department to Representative Ogden R. Reid, Republican of Westchester, were recited during questioning of Robert H. Nooter, assistant administrator of the Agency for International Development.

The 14-month period, beginning January, 1970, was described in a State Department memorandum to Mr. Reid as "the 1970 pacification year."

Using the same set of figures, Mr. Reid calculated a "neutralization" figure for calendar 1970 of 22,341. He said that of this number, 8,100 were listed in the "killed" category.

How many of the total neutralization figure for calendar 1970 were listed in the "sentenced" and "rallied" categories was not shown in the State Department memorandum.

Mr. Reid did cite separate category figures for the first two months this year, however, and said that if they were projected on an annual basis they would show 27,011 Vietcong neutralized, including 9,774 "killed," 8,076 "sentenced," and 9,161 "rallied." The actual figures for January and February of this year were given as 1,629 "killed," 1,343 "sentenced" and 1,527 "rallied"—a total of 4,502.

The State Department memorandum mentioned that the program's goal last year was 1,800 per month to be "rend-

ered ineffective or neutralized," or 21,600 for the twelve months.

The memorandum said the neutralization goal for the year beginning last March "is down to 1,200 per month, of whom half or 600 should be in the sentenced category."

The South Vietnam Government's master plan of pacification, including the Phoenix program, uses the term "quotas" for neutralization rather than "goals." Its quotas for each of the four military regions add up to 14,400 neutralizations on a 12-month basis this year and stipulate that in each area one half of the quota is to be filled by those "sentenced."

The State Department memorandum was silent on Mr. Reid's contention that many if not most of the Vietcong listed in the "killed" category were actually victims of "planned murder" of civilians in violation of the Geneva convention.

Purpose of Program

The three-year-old Operation Phoenix, part of the Vietnam pacification program, was designed to combat the effect of underground Vietcong operations in South Vietnam.

A still-classified General Accounting Office report has placed at \$80-million the amount of United States funds devoted to the operation in the last three years, mostly from the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Representative Reid read the State Department figures into the record of the subcommittee hearing after failing to obtain responsive answers to questions put to Mr. Nooter.

"I am shocked and dismayed," Mr. Reid said, "that Gen. Creighton W. Abrams—presumably on instructions—has endorsed and called for the implementation by United Vietnamese plan embodying the elimination or neutralization by killing or capture of a quota of 14,400 members of the Vietcong infrastructure in 1971."

He continued: "Assassination and terror by the Vietcong or Hanoi should not, and must not, call forth the same methods by Saigon, let alone the United States, directly or indirectly."

"A great number of Vietcong," he said, "while insurgents, are nevertheless civilians, and thus specifically protected from assassination under the Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war."

"The Administration," the Congressman declared, "must totally disassociate itself from this Phoenix program and insist unequivocally that Saigon stop dead in its track this mechanism for civilian murder or stand criminally condemned before the world."

From other sources, Mr. Reid cited figures showing that United States military personnel engaged in Operation Phoenix in October, 1970, totaled 441—193 lieutenants and the rest majors or higher-ranking officers. Such personnel do not actually apprehend Vietcong or shoot them while trying to escape, the sources explained, but only "identify or finger" the men.

The subcommittee has called for testimony Monday by William E. Colby, retiring deputy to General Abrams.

STATINTL

PARKERSBURG, W. VA.
NEWS

JUL 16 1977

M - 19,095

S - 33,939

Unshrouding More Secrecy

✓ Two unrelated bills each aimed at imposing a greater measure of restraint on the Central Intelligence Agency, now are before Congress.

✓ One, introduced by Senator Cooper, Kentucky Republican, would require the agency to make its report available for Congressional scrutiny. The 1947 law which created the CIA does not forbid such inspection, but makes no specific provision for it.

The other bill, offered by Senator McGovern, South Dakota Democrat, would require the appearance of all CIA appropriations and expenditures in the budget. What the CIA spends and how it is spent now are concealed in the appropriations for various other agencies.

Ever since it was created the Central Intelligence Agency has been a mys-

terious arm of the Government so far as the public is concerned, operating in a cloak-and-dagger atmosphere. How useful it has been nobody not intimately acquainted with the administration of foreign policy knows. The suspicion, however, is strong — nurtured no doubt by the very secrecy that cloaks its operations — that it has been a meddlesome irritant in international affairs, getting the Nation into more foreign entanglements than it kept it free of.

Whether or not either or both of the measures here referred to should be enacted, the purpose back of them — stripping away some of the secrecy from this particular agency's activities, and bringing foreign affairs in general under greater Congressional control — is one of which most citizens, we believe, will approve.

GREENWICH, CONN.
TIME

E - 12,881

JUL 15 1971

Keeping Tabs

The problem of making Congress privy to the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency without impairing its effectiveness is not a simple one. The CIA has traded on this circumstance in the past, using it to head off any serious move for congressional surveillance of CIA operations and spending.

Some reasonable compromise ought to be arrived at, however. In recent years it has become increasingly evident that the super-secret agency — so secret that Congress had only the roughest idea of its expenditures and virtually no information about what it did until after the fact — engages in clandestine activity about which the most serious questions can

be raised. There have been indications that the CIA may manipulate internal affairs of other countries and even engage in military operations — all without the knowledge, let alone the consent, of Congress.

As noted above, the difficulties posed by the nature and function of the CIA are not the sort that can be easily dealt with. The intelligence agency cannot be an open book; that would render it ineffective. It would be unrealistic to make public reports on what the CIA is currently involved in.

The bill introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky would not demand this, however. It would require that Congress, through its appropriate committees, be kept informed by being supplied with current CIA activity reports. Cooper's rationale in offering the legislation is sound: he argues that at present Congress must make important national security judgments without having access to anything like all the pertinent data.

Cooper's is not the only bill to address itself to this subject. In a concerted effort to bring the matter to head, Sens. Clifford P. Case of New Jersey and George McGovern of South Dakota also introduced measures. Three offered by Case are designed, he told his colleagues, "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars." McGovern's bill would let Congress in on how much is spent by the CIA, and would bar the present practice of concealing an undetermined amount of CIA funds in appropriations for other agencies.

Congress ought clearly to proceed with care in evaluating these measures. It must steer a course between the advantages of having more knowledge on which to base foreign policy decisions and the drawbacks of exposing sensitive intelligence operations to scrutiny. This will be difficult, but it is not impetus of legislative proposals. Somehow the dangerous practice of treating the CIA as is it were wholly exempt from review must be halted.

TARENTUM, PA.
VALLEY NEWS-DISPATCH

E - CIRC. N-A

JUL 14 1971

Our opinions

Secret war makers

DISTASTEFUL, as it may be, the survival of any society, totalitarian or free, depends to some degree upon the quality and quantity of information it is able to accumulate about the military plans and capabilities of potential adversaries. But a broad chasm separates the business of espionage and those of diplomatic maneuvering or military operations and it is its routine disregard of this essential division that has prompted critics both in and out of government to question the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As a matter of ordinary course, the CIA reportedly meddles in domestic affairs of other countries, setting up a coup here, shoring up a "sympathetic" government there — activities which are conducted with neither public mandate nor knowledge. The CIA even wages war on what can only be presumed to be largely its own initiative. Some 5,000 Thai troops under CIA supervision are fighting in Laos, a country whose neutrality this government ostensibly respects.

Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent the CIA from financing military operations without congressional authorization. Sen. Case says his purpose is to prevent the CIA and the Defense Department from making "end runs around the Cooper-Church and Fulbright amendments," which prohibit the use of American ground forces in Laos or Cambodia and the use of Pentagon funds to provide military support to the governments of those nations.

The case for the measure, however, is not confined to our clandestine activities in Indo-China, for there is no justification for the CIA to carry out military operations anywhere without congressional approval. The CIA budget, estimated to be as much as a billion dollars, is hidden among the routine budgets of various federal agencies. Espionage funds may well have to be kept under cover but Congress must insist that the CIA confine its activities to gathering information and not expand them to the point of making war.

HEGS

JUL 13 1977

E - 92,000

S - 107,903

THE GOVERNMENT

\$1.7 Billion Aid Fund

'Loss' No More Oversight To Average U.S. Taxpayer

AS HARD AS MOST AMERICANS have to struggle these days to pay their federal income taxes, common sense would certainly seem to dictate that Congress and the federal bookkeeping establishment ought to know, or at least be able to find out, what happens to the peoples' tax contributions when they get spent.

Thus, it came as a real shocker to learn last week that the General Accounting Office, which happens to be the watchdog spending agency for the Congress, hasn't been able to find out what happened to \$1.7 billion of a \$2.1 billion appropriation authorized by the Congress to be spent or committed for the South Vietnam pacification program.

After months of study and scratching around for information, the GAO was forced to report that it could account for only \$330.2 million of the \$2.1 billion authorized by Congress to be spent on this particular program during the fiscal years of 1968, 1969 and 1970.

What happened to the rest of the money remains a mystery as far as the government auditors are concerned. Whether it was spent without proper record being kept, whether it was frittered away, or whether it was simply stolen or embezzled will probably never be known.

The money was supposed to be handled by an agency called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support or CORDS for short.

THE \$2.1 BILLION HANDLED OVER to this agency came principally from funds appropriated for the Defense Department but a portion also came from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Agency for International Development.

In trying to trace what happened to all this money the GAO even sent auditors to Vietnam. They found that even though there were 12 different auditing groups within the internal structure of CORDS, only two of these groups had made any audit reviews between the time the agency was established in 1968 and 1970.

Out of the \$330.2 million spent or obligated, and for which records could be found, the auditors reported that \$33.5 million of this "was not used in CORDS and was subsequently used by the contributing agencies for other purposes." What those other purposes were the auditors said they were unable to determine.

Since the auditors couldn't find where this \$33.5 million was expended, this means that out of the \$2.1 billion authorized only about \$270 million in expenditures could be traced through proper records being kept.

One of the projects CORDS administered was what was termed a "village self-help" program. While the auditors reported that from a political standpoint this program "has experienced a degree of success," they also said that one of the problems encountered in administering this program was "misappropriation of funds."

THE AUDITORS ALSO SAID they found that many of the responsible officials in the CORDS organization were unaware of the amounts obligated under their programs and in some instances did not know the amounts in their budgets.

Even assuming that most of the funds turned over to CORDS was spent for authorized purposes and wasn't misappropriated or embezzled, this whole operation represents an almost unbelievable example of the loose, shoddy and wasteful manner we have been blowing money away in Vietnam all these years.

This past Sunday we noted that since we got ourselves mixed in Vietnam we have spent over \$130 billion on the war and its associated other costs. That adds up to about \$600 for every American, and when one thinks what this same amount of money could have accomplished in our own country compared to what it has accomplished over there, it becomes more understandable why so many Americans are so fed up with our Vietnam misadventure as they are today.

It is too late now to cry over milk that has already been spilled. Yet, if nothing else comes from this GAO report of the untraceable \$1.7 billion spent in Vietnam by this one government agency, it should at least force the Congress to tighten the screws on future appropriations and demand some proper record keeping on the part of government officials handed the responsibility of spending our taxpayers' money.

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00010016

ST. PAUL, MINN.
DISPATCH

E - 130,292

JUN 13 1974

Editorials

Controls for the CIA

Two Republican senators, John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky and Clifford Case of New Jersey, have introduced separate bills to give Congress greater control over activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the present state of public opinion, their proposals may have a better chance of approval than similar efforts made in past years.

The CIA finances (from taxpayer money) and directs mercenary armies of hired Asian soldiers in Laos and has been active in the political and military affairs of Cambodia and Thailand. It has engaged in behind-the-scenes operations in South Vietnam. What other political intrigues it may be running elsewhere in the world are unknown to members of Congress and to the public.

Sen. Cooper's bill would require the CIA to keep Congress more fully informed "to enable the Congress to be better able to share with the Executive Department its responsibilities in making national security policies."

Sen. Case is more specific. He would limit covert use of funds and military equipment by the CIA for supporting foreign troops in Laos or

elsewhere without prior approval by Congress. He said his purpose is "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operations of the Executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

Both Cooper and Case are, in essence, trying to restore lost congressional influence in foreign affairs and to restrict secret interventionism. The CIA has legitimate functions as an intelligence gathering agency, but over the years it has moved into other fields, including the implementing of its own recommendations of international policy by hiring foreign armies to do its bidding, as in Laos.

In the CIA, as in other branches of the Executive Department, the combination of power, secrecy and practically unlimited funds has produced the potential for dangerous involvements in foreign affairs. Congress should assert its right to fuller knowledge of CIA operations. As the Pentagon papers have shown, too much authority in the hands of a few men constantly shielded from public view and accountability is not suited to the democratic form of government.

S 10700

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

evidence presented is substantially the same as that presented earlier.

Subsection (c) permits a subsequent board unlimited by previous findings or recommendations only if fraudulent evidence submitted by the respondent formed the basis in whole or in part for the findings of the first board.

Section 964(a) prescribes the standards for the types of discharges permitted.

Subsection (b) provides that a member discharged for unsuitability may receive an honorable or general discharge based upon his military record considered in the light of his mental and physical capabilities.

Subsection (c) authorizes an undesirable discharge on the grounds of misconduct after a civil conviction for a crime involving narcotics or sexual perversion, where State law authorizes imprisonment for one year or more; after conviction of a crime classified as a felony under title 18, United States Code, or the District of Columbia Code, or for which the Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes the award of a punitive discharge; or after conviction of a crime of sexual perversion for which the respondent was adjudicated a juvenile offender.

Subsection (d) authorizes a discharge for misconduct for unauthorized absence of more than one year or for fraud or misrepresentation at the time of enlistment which if known at the time would have resulted in the rejection of the member by the service.

Subsection (e) authorizes an undesirable discharge on the grounds of unfitness based upon frequent involvement with authorities, sexual perversion, a pattern of shirking duties, or a pattern of dishonorable failure to pay debts.

Subsection (f) authorizes an undesirable discharge on the grounds of security.

Subsection (g) permits the issuance of a discharge other than undesirable in cases where the respondent has received a personal decoration by his service, or where otherwise warranted by the facts of the case.

Subsection (h) prohibits the execution of a discharge for misconduct for civil conviction if an appeal is still pending unless the Judge Advocate General of the service certifies that the appeal is frivolous or without merit. If a discharge is executed prior to the final disposition of the appeal and the appeal later results in the member not having been legally convicted of a felony, he must receive all pay and benefits he would have received if he was not so discharged. An undesirable discharge so issued shall be changed to a general or honorable discharge, and a general discharge may be changed to an honorable discharge if warranted by the individual's record.

Section 965 authorizes honorable or general discharges based upon grounds other than those prescribed in this chapter, as prescribed by law or provided in regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense.

Section 966 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations providing for the review of discharge actions to determine that all proceedings were fair and impartial and that they were conducted consistent with the provisions of the chapter. No decision on review may be less favorable than the action ordered by the discharge authority. Review by the Court of Military Appeals may be obtained. No decision upon review by the Court may be less favorable than the action ordered by the discharge authority.

Section 3 conforms the table of chapters of subtitle A, title 10, United States Code to the changes made by the addition of chapter 48.

Section 4(a) amends section 867 of title 10 to provide for review by the Court of Military Appeals of cases in which petition for review is made under section 966(b).

Subsection (b) limits review of such cases to issues of law specified in the grant of review or raised by the armed force.

Subsection (c) specifies that cases reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals are to be returned to the reviewing authority specified by section 966(a) for further consideration or action in accordance with the decision of the court.

The other subsections of section 4 make technical changes in accordance with these provisions.

Section 5 provides for the amendment of section 867(b) (4) to authorize the representation by appellate military counsel of respondents whose cases are before the Court of Military Appeals.

Section 6 adds the definition of "respondent" to section 801.

Section 7 makes section 266 of title 10, relating to the composition of boards for appointment, promotion, demotion and involuntary release of Reserves, subject to the provisions of chapter 48.

Section 8 amends section 1161 of title 10, relating to dismissals of commissioned officers, to provide that no commissioned officer may be discharged for reasons of misconduct, unfitness, or security under conditions other than honorable, except pursuant to chapter 48.

Sections 9-11 amend sections 1161-1165 of title 10 to make discharges under those provisions subject to provisions of chapter 48.

Section 12 amends section 1166 of title 10 to require that in actions considering the separation of regular warrant officers the burden of justifying the separation is on the government.

Section 13 amends sections 3781, 3782, 3783 and 3785 of title 10 to require that in the proceedings of selection boards, board of inquiry, and boards of review considering the removal of regular commissioned officers because of substandard performance of duty, the burden of justifying the removal is on the government. All rights and procedures set forth in chapter 48 govern these proceedings.

Sections 14-15 make similar changes with respect to such boards considering the removal of general officers.

Section 16-20 make similar changes in the sections of title 10 concerning analogous proceedings in the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force.

Section 21 amends sections 321-323, and 325 of title 14, United States Code, to make similar changes in analogous proceedings in the Coast Guard.

Section 22 provides that the amendments made by the Act are to be effective on the first day of the sixth calendar month following the month in which it is enacted.

By Mr. CASE:

S. 2251. A bill to provide that the President notify Congress of his intention to exercise certain special authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF FOREIGN MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TRANSFERS

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I am today introducing legislation which would require the President to give Congress advance notice of money transfers within the foreign military and economic assistance programs.

I have long been concerned by the so-called "flexibility" written into the Foreign Assistance Act. The President now has authority to shift large amounts of money programed for one country to another country, with the proviso that he notify Congress within 30 days.

Thus, the law as presently written allows the administration to make a significant commitment to a foreign coun-

try without including either the Congress or the public in the debate.

Under this authority, the administration shifted nearly \$100 million to the Cambodia Government during 1970. The largest portion of this transfer was made before the 1970 elections, but Congress was not notified until the end of November.

I firmly believe that such a large commitment of U.S. Government funds to Cambodia should have been widely discussed in advance, for it involved a significant step toward our becoming entangled in that country.

Then in December 1970, the administration came to Congress for a large supplemental foreign aid appropriation, and we were asked to vote money for those other aid programs from which money had been borrowed in order to send the nearly \$100 million to Cambodia.

Frankly, I was disturbed by the whole process, and that is why in December I introduced with Senator SYMINGTON an amendment requiring the President to give the Congress advance notice of aid increases in Cambodia. Happily, the Case-Symington amendment was accepted by the Congress and then signed into law by the President.

But in the case of Cambodia, almost all the horses had escaped by the time we got around to closing the barn door.

So in the future, I am proposing that the President give the Congress 30 days advance—or 10 days in case of an emergency—before he shifts scheduled levels of foreign military or economic assistance funds to any country.

If decisions are to be made that affect our country's foreign policy, let them be made with full congressional and public knowledge prior to the event—not 30 days after the fact.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2251

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 652 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as added by section 8 of the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 652. Limitation Upon Exercise of Special Authorities.—The President shall not exercise any special authority granted to him under section 506(a), 610(a), or 614(a) of this Act unless the President, at least thirty days (or 10 days if he certifies, in addition, that the national interest requires it) prior to the date he intends to exercise any such authority, notifies the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in writing of each such intended exercise, the section of this Act under which such authority is to be exercised, and the justification for, and the extent of, the exercise of such authority."

Sec. 2. The last sentence of section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is repealed.

By Mr. CASE:

S. 2252. A bill limiting the total amount of excess defense articles that all Government agencies may make available to foreign countries;

HENDERSONVILLE, N.C.
TIMES-NEWS

E - 10,062
JUL 12 1977

Congress Would Close CIA

"Nobody knows how much the Central Intelligence Agency spends or what it actually does. Not even Congress."

The quotation is from an editorial in The Asheville Citizen and it is a statement with which we beg leave to disagree--vehemently.

Had The Citizen said no American, including members of Congress, knew what the CIA did or how much it spent, we would have been inclined to agree. But without such a qualification we cannot.

We dare say that the fellows down on the American desk at the Russian center on Red Square know within a few bucks how much money CIA has to spend and--of greater seriousness--pretty much what the CIA people are doing most of the time.

What The Citizen seems to be overlooking, however, is that the CIA is supposed to be a combination of intelligence agencies, an outgrowth (as we remember it) from the OSS which Col. "Wild Bill" Donovan organized back during or just prior to the entry of the U.S. in World War II.

The Citizen--devoted as its editors are to the right of the people to know--rather gloatingly points out that all this is to be changed and that Congress is to get access to CIA reports as well as its appropriations and expenditures.

If the CIA hasn't already been 'done in' by some of our loyal Americans who passed on the nuclear experiments, or by people like Kim Philby, a Britisher who sold out to Moscow when a student and rose to be chief of British counterintelligence, it has the coup de grace from such congressional legislation.

Of course, we know how much the Russians knew up to the point where a yokel in the House of Commons threatened to speak on the matter unless something was done about Kim, and after a certain point he was given nothing important--although he once held a higher security classification in the CIA halls than General Leslie Groves (who headed the atomic bomb project).

We don't have any friends at CIA. We don't know whether it has accomplished anything or not. We know it apparently has spent a lot of money. But it is a cardinal principle in intelligence (spy) work that nobody knows anyone except his immediate superior and his single (or perhaps rarely) multiple lower contacts.

Boy, old 007 James Bond would really shudder if he knew that Teddy Boy Kennedy, Wild Willie Fulbright and some of the others knew both who he was and what he did for a living, because, if any one thing has been shown in the Times-Post-government business it is that Washington is about the loosest and talkingest town in the world.

Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey would limit covert use of funds and place some "outside control" on these "free wheeling" operations of the executive in foreign policy.

This would just be ducky, but we suggest that Senator Case take a few minutes off and examine the Constitution to see where it places the responsibility for foreign affairs.

Over in Moscow old Kim must be having a good laugh at that one.

To Curb Secret Warmakers

Distasteful as it may be, the survival of any society, totalitarian or free, depends to some degree upon the quality and quantity of information it is able to accumulate about the military plans and capabilities of potential adversaries. But a broad chasm separates the business of espionage and those of diplomatic maneuvering or military operations and it is its routine disregard of this essential division that has prompted critics both in and out of Government to question the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. ✓

As a matter of ordinary course, the CIA reportedly meddles in domestic affairs of other countries, setting up a coup here, shoring up a "sympathetic" government there—activities which are conducted with neither public mandate nor knowledge. The CIA even wages war on what can only be presumed to be largely its own initiative. Some 5000 Thai troops under CIA supervision are fighting in Laos, a country whose neutrality this Government ostensibly respects. ✓

Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent the CIA from financing military operations without congressional authorization. Mr. Case says his purpose is to prevent the CIA and the Defense Department from making "end runs around the Cooper-Church and Fulbright amendments," which prohibit the use of American ground forces in Laos or Cambodia and the use of Pentagon funds to provide military support to the governments of those nations. ✓

The case for the measure, however, is not confined to our clandestine activities in Indochina, for there is no justification for the CIA to carry out military operations anywhere without congressional approval. The CIA budget, estimated to be as much as a billion dollars, is hidden among the routine budgets of various federal agencies. Espionage funds may well have to be kept under cover but Congress must insist that the CIA confine its activities to gathering information and not expand them to the point of making war.

Congress Turns to the CIA

STATINTL

Congress, in its continuing Vietnam-inspired effort to break the Executive's near monopoly of powers in foreign affairs, is now tackling the Central Intelligence Agency. This is understandable, and was to be expected, too. The agency's powers are great—or so one suspects; no one representing the public is really in a position to know. Yet because it operates under virtually absolute secrecy, it does not receive even that incomplete measure of public scrutiny which the Defense and State Departments undergo.

The proposals in Congress affecting the CIA fall into two categories. Those in the first category start from the premise that the CIA is essentially an operations agency and an ominous one, which is beyond public control and which must somehow be restrained—for the good of American foreign policy and for the health of the American democratic system alike.

So Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent CIA from financing a second country's military operations in a third country (e.g., Thailand in Laos) and to impose on the agency the same limitations on disposing of "surplus" military materiel as are already imposed on Defense. The thrust of these provisions is to stop the Executive from doing secretly what the Congress has forbidden it to do openly. Unquestionably they would restrict Executive flexibility, since the government would have to justify before a body not beholden to it the particular actions it wishes to take. The advantage to the Executive would be that the Congress would then have to share responsibility for the actions undertaken. Since these actions involve making war and ensuring the security of Americans, if not preserving their very lives, we cannot see how a serious legislature can evade attempts to bring them under proper control.

Senator McGovern's proposal that all CIA expenditures and appropriations should appear in the budget as a single line item is another matter. He argues that taxpayers could then decide whether they wanted to spend more or less on intelligence than, say, education. We wonder, though, whether a serious judgment on national priorities, or on CIA's value and its needs, can be based on knowing just its budget total. In that figure, critics might have a blunt instrument for polemics but citizens would not have the fine instrument required for analysis.

In the House, Congressman Badillo recently offered an amendment to confine the CIA to

gathering and analyzing intelligence. This is the traditional rallying cry of those who feel either that the United States has no business running secret operations or that operational duties warp intelligence production. The amendment, unenforceable anyway under existing conditions, lost 172 to 46, but floor debate on it did bring out a principal reason why concerned legislators despair of the status quo: Earlier this year House Armed Services chairman Hebert simply abolished the 10-man CIA oversight subcommittee and arrogated complete responsibility to himself. Congressman Badillo is now seeking a way to reconstitute the subcommittee. This is a useful sequence to keep in mind when the agency's defenders claim, as they regularly do, that CIA already is adequately overseen by the Congress.

Between these proposals and Senator Cooper's, however, lies a critical difference. Far from regarding CIA as an ominous operational agency whose work must be checked, he regards it as an essential and expert intelligence agency whose "conclusions, facts and analyses" ought to be distributed "fully and currently" to the germane committees of Congress as well as to the Executive Branch. He would amend the National Security Act to that end. His proposal is, in our view, the most interesting and far-reaching of the lot.

To Mr. Cooper, knowledge is not only power but responsibility. A former ambassador, he accepts—perhaps a bit too readily—that a large part of national security policy is formulated on the basis of information classified as secret. If the Congress is to fulfill its responsibilities in the conduct of foreign affairs, he says, then it must have available the same information on which the Executive acts—and not as a matter of discretion or chance but of right. Otherwise Congress will find itself again and again put off by an Executive saying, as was said, for instance, in the ABM fight, "if you only knew what we knew . . ." Otherwise Congress will forever be running to catch up with Executive trains that have already left the station.

The Cooper proposal obviously raises sharp questions of Executive privilege and of Executive prerogative in foreign policymaking—to leave aside the issue of keeping classified information secure. But they are questions which a responsible Congress cannot ignore. We trust the Cooper proposal will become a vehicle for debating them in depth—and in public, too.

FORT WORTH, TEX.
STAR TELEGRAM

M - 102,470
S - 218,306

Demands for Secrets Growing in Congress

Efforts are being made in both houses of Congress to get the administration to give Congress detailed information on American undercover operations in Laos and Vietnam and on intelligence activities in general.

The House has rejected five resolutions by Rep. Paul McCloskey of California calling upon Secretary of State William Rogers to provide information. There is a move in the Senate

by Sen. George McGovern of South Dakota to bring the figures on Central Intelligence Agency financing out in the open.

Both of these movements are led by men who are ardent crusaders against the administration's Vietnam policies. They are asking that the administration be made to reveal what no government responsible for the national security should have to reveal.

Fortunately, they do not seem at the moment to be having much luck. As it is the chances are that there will be less instead of more confidential information made available to Congress, or there will be more caution in choosing those to whom such information will be given. Sen. Mike Gravel of Alaska has just demonstrated the inadvisability of turning over secret documents to the whole Congress and expecting them to remain confidential.

BRISTOL, CONN.
PRESS

E - 16,949 9 1971

Attacking The CIA

Nobody particularly likes spy organizations but every country has them.

Some of the members of the United States Senate have begun to take after the Central Intelligence Agency which is directed by Richard Helms.

Senator George McGovern (D.-So. Dak.) proposes that the CIA funds reported on one line of the federal budget instead of being masked under other budget items. Senator John Sherman Cooper (R.-Ky.) wants to force the CIA to furnish congress regularly with intelligence information now given only to the

executive branch. One can imagine how "secret" this would be when furnished to 100 senators and 435 congressmen.

The CIA is a huge sprawling organization engaged in a distasteful but necessary business around the world.

If it is to be effective, it has to be secret to whatever extent is humanly possible. Despite some of its blunders it has been an effective arm of government.

If these critical senators get their way and the CIA is ordered to expose its activities, its usefulness is at an end.

9 JUL 1977

EXPOSE THE CIA?

Several attacks on the Central Intelligence Agency (Richard Helms, director) began Wednesday in the Senate.

Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) urged that CIA funds be reported in one line of the federal budget, instead of being masked as for decades past in other budget items.



Richard Helms

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) introduced a bill to force the CIA to furnish Congress regularly with intelligence information hitherto given only to the government's Executive branch.

The Cooper proposal, it seems almost needless to say, got friendly comments from Democratic Sens. J. W. Fulbright (Ark.), Mike Mansfield (Mont.), and Stuart Symington (Mo.).

Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) promised to introduce bills to forbid the CIA to sneak money to Thailand for Thai troops fighting in Laos.

Some things which these and other CIA-baiters seem not to have learned in all the years of the agency's existence:

The CIA is a big organization engaged in the difficult, dangerous, sometimes distasteful but utterly necessary work of espionage around the world. It has to be as secret in its operations as is humanly possible if it is to be effective. And if the CIA cannot go on being at least as effective in the future as it has been in the past, then God help the U.S.A.

STATINTL

House Rejects Call For More Facts On Laos

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, July 7—The House rejected today a resolution asking the administration for information about its military operations in Laos, while in the Senate two bills were introduced to provide Congress with CIA information and greater budgetary control over the agency.

The rejected House resolution was offered by Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. (R., Calif.). It would have directed the secretary of state, "to the extent not incompatible with the public interest," to turn over to the House documents containing policy instructions given to the U.S. ambassador in Laos.

The period covered by the resolution was from January 1, 1964, to June 21, 1971. Specific information the resolution sought pertained to:

1. Covert CIA operations in Laos.
2. Thai and other foreign armed forces operations in Laos.
3. U.S. bombing in the country, other than along the Vietnam-related Ho Chi Minh trail.
4. U.S. armed forces operations in Laos.
5. U.S. Agency for International Development operations in Laos connected with CIA or military operations.

The House voted to table, or lay aside permanently, the resolution by a 261 to 113 vote. The House Foreign Affairs Committee opposed the resolution on the grounds that the information sought was of a "highly sensitive nature," that its disclosure "would not be compatible with the public interest" and that the administration already has privately briefed appropriate committees on the subject.

Cooper Proposal

In the Senate, John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.) introduced a bill to require the CIA to give to certain congressional committees all information, including intelligence analyses, that the agency gives to the executive branch.

The committees would be the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

These committees, in turn, would be required to make available the CIA information that they receive to any member of Congress who asks for it, in accordance with rules and procedures each committee may establish.

Senator Cooper's proposal is drafted as an amendment to the 1947 National Security Act. Mr. Cooper noted that the law does not prohibit the CIA from giving intelligence information to Congress, but it does not require the agency to do so.

At present, the CIA reports regularly to a small group of senators and representatives, within the appropriations and armed services committee of both houses. But other members of Congress are not given access to this information.

In introducing his bill, Senator Cooper noted that Congress is asked to support the administration's foreign and national security decisions by providing money for the deployment of weapons, stationing American troops abroad and sending them into combat, and by approving binding commitments to foreign countries.

Such congressional approval, he said, "should be given upon the best information available to both the executive and legislative branches."

Right To Secrecy

Senator Cooper said his bill would not touch upon the constitutional question of the government's right to secrecy, which was raised recently by the publication of the "top-secret" Pentagon papers. But he said he believed that his bill, if enacted, would "result in much declassification of information for the Congress and the public as a whole."

Senator George S. McGovern (D., S.D.) introduced a bill to require all expenditures and ap-

propriations for the CIA to appear as a single line in the executive budget. The measure would require the CIA to disclose only its total annual budget.

At present, CIA expenditures are hidden in the budgets of other agencies, and only a few members of Congress—members of small subcommittees within the appropriation committees of both houses—know how much the CIA is spending.

McGovern's Complaint

"I believe that CIA funding is now so substantial," Senator McGovern said, "that such a single-line item for the agency in the budget would not communicate usable information to potential adversaries."

Because Congress does not know how much it is actually appropriating for the CIA, he said, it cannot set priorities and balance expenditures for intelligence operations with other domestic and defense needs.

Senator Clifford Case (R., N.J.) said he will introduce tomorrow three other bills, all designed to restrict CIA activities abroad. The bills, which Mr. Case outlined last month, would place congressional controls over CIA military operations abroad, including the hiring of foreign mercenaries and the use of U.S. surplus weapons.

In the House, several other resolutions requesting more information were rejected by voice vote after the roll-call on the first McCloskey resolution.

Other resolutions, also offered by Mr. McCloskey, asked for documents related to U.S. bombing operations in northern Laos, together with aerial photographs of 196 Laotian villages that Mr. McCloskey says have been damaged or destroyed by the bombing, and documents pertaining to the U.S.-supported pacification program in South Vietnam.

But the main fight was over the first McCloskey resolution, which its supporters said would turn over to the House only information that already is well known to the enemy.

Maryland Roll-Call

Opponents contended, however, that disclosure of the information could endanger national security. Representative Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen (R., N.J.) argued further that if the information were made available to members of Congress, there might be those who would "leak" it to the public.

On the roll-call, the Maryland delegation voted as follows: Goodloe E. Byron (D.), Edward A. Garmatz (D.) and William O. Miller (R.) voted against the resolution; Gilbert Gude (R.), Clarence D. Long (D.), Parren J. Mitchell (D.) and Paul S. Sarbanes (D.) voted for it. Lawrence J. Hogan (R.) was absent.

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 536,108
S - 709,123

JUL 8 1974

CIA curbs pushed in Senate

By Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Legislation was introduced in the Senate Wednesday to require the Central Intelligence Agency to limit its covert operations, supply its estimates to Congress and disclose how it spends its money.

The bills reflected the two-fold reaction in Congress to the disclosures of the top-secret Pentagon history of the Vietnam War: praise for the CIA's 20-year record of sound assessments and concern with its clandestine maneuverings.

None of the bills is likely to receive the approval of President Nixon. Since the CIA was created in 1947, a succession of Democratic and Republican Presidents have treated the agency as their private source of information and a vehicle for performing "dirty tricks" outside the knowledge of Congress and the people.

Ever since the United States became involved in Vietnam in 1950, the CIA has produced intelligence estimates that would have been embarrassing to the incumbent President if they had been made available to the opposition party or leaked to the public.

For example, as The Sun-Times disclosed June 23, the CIA provided an estimate in 1969 that Mr. Nixon could have withdrawn immediately from Vietnam and "all of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation."

Similar CIA estimates, revealed by The Sun-Times and other newspapers, showed that Presidents Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson were consistently warned that the Saigon regime lacked broad popular support and that deeper U.S. involvement would be risky.

But the Pentagon papers also disclosed that, while the CIA's intelligence division was sounding the alarm, its plans division was conducting clandestine raids in North Vietnam and plotting first for and then against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Legislation introduced by Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.) would limit such operations and the use of covert funds and military equipment to support them without specific approval by Congress.

Case said his proposal is designed "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

Sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.), only de-

clared presidential contender, offered the bill to require disclosure of the CIA's budget and prevent its money from being concealed in appropriations for other agencies.

It is reliably estimated that the CIA spends \$1 billion a year. An additional \$4 billion reportedly is spent by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the code-making and code-breaking National Security Agency, and the various military units that run the spy satellite program.

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) introduced the bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 so that the CIA would be required to supply its intelligence estimates to the House and Senate committees dealing with foreign affairs and the armed services.

8 JUL 1971

House Defeats McCloskey Bid for Laos Data

BY THOMAS J. FOLEY
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The House Wednesday knocked down an attempt by Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R-Calif.) to force the State Department to reveal details of secret U.S. operations in Laos.

Members voted 261 to 118 against McCloskey's resolution of inquiry that would have asked the State Department to furnish documents "compatible with the public interest" containing policy guidelines to U.S. ambassadors in Laos over the last seven and one-half years.

A short time later, McCloskey and Deputy Undersecretary of State William B. Macomber Jr. engaged in an exchange at a House freedom of information subcommittee hearing when the congressman sought to question Macomber on the same subject.

Televised Hearing

McCloskey's repeated questions at the televised hearing about Laotian bombing policies brought a reminder from Macomber that he had appeared before the subcommittee to testify on State Department classification procedures.

"I didn't come up here to engage in a political discussion with you," he told McCloskey.

When McCloskey rephrased the questions in terms of whether Congress had the right to know about U.S. policy in Laos, Macomber finally said sharply:

"I'm not an expert on Laos, Pete, and I must say, this is the kind of thing that makes it difficult to cooperate with the legislative branch of government. If you want to use television time to belabor the State Department on this, I suggest you wait until you get somebody up here who is prepared to testify on Laos."

'Out of Order'

Rep. Frank Horton (R-N.Y.) called McCloskey "out of order" for his questions. Subcommittee Chairman William Moorhead (D-Pa.) said William Sullivan, former U.S. ambassador to Laos, will testify later this month and suggested that McCloskey wait until then to ask his questions.

McCloskey, who plans to run against President Nixon in the 1972 GOP presidential primaries, has been seeking release of information on CIA and other government activities in Laos since he made an 11-day trip to Indochina last April.

His resolution of inquiry that the House turned down is a seldom-used device designed to give the legislative branch a lever to obtain information from the executive branch. If approved by the House, the department would have had 15 days to reply.

Laos Bombing

McCloskey told the House the United States has been involved in the war in Laos for seven years. He said more bombs have been dropped there than on Germany in World War II.

Noting that the Senate has held a secret session on the Laotian war, McCloskey said it was "incredible" that the House should not also be informed.

Rep. Peter Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.) replied that it would be naive to think that 435 members of the House could have access to classified information and that none of it would be made public.

Meanwhile, in the Senate:

—Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) introduced legislation that would require the executive branch to give appropriate congressional committees Central Intelligence Agency reports and analyses now available only to the Administration.

—Sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.) proposed that the total amount spent each year by the CIA be made public.

STATINTL
STATINTL

Efforts to Quiz Macomber on Laos Raid Fail

By SHIRLEY ELDER

Star Staff Writer

Deputy Undersecretary of State William B. Macomber Jr. has declined to answer insistent questions from Rep. Paul N. (Pete) McCloskey, R-Calif., about U.S. bombing in Laos.

Macomber told a House freedom of information hearing yesterday he knows little of what goes on in Laos.

He said he was invited to testify about the State Department's system of classifying documents and any further effort to try and get him to talk about Laos would further strain relations between State and Congress.

McCloskey has been hammering at what he feels is a calculated administration effort to hide a clandestine war in Laos from Congress and the public. He said each bombing strike in that country is personally controlled by the U.S. ambassador.

Rebuffed by House

Earlier yesterday, McCloskey, who has vowed to oppose President Nixon's bid for re-election next year if the war is not over, was rebuffed by his own colleagues in an information-gathering effort.

On a 261-118 vote, the House killed a McCloskey resolution that would have directed the secretary of state to tell Congress about U.S. involvement in Laos.

Then, by voice votes, the House tabled similar resolutions of inquiry seeking data about other U.S. activities throughout Southeast Asia.

One resolution sought copies of the once-secret Pentagon papers, which already have been made available on a top security basis, and another sought a report of the so-called Phoenix assault against Viet Cong agents.

7-Year War Claimed

McCloskey told the House that the United States has been at war in Laos for seven years and more bombs have been dropped in that one country than were rained on Nazi Germany.

But Rep. Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, R-N.J., argued that the resolution was an unwise attempt to obtain highly sensitive information.

Although Macomber, in his testimony before the subcommittee headed by Rep. William Moorhead, D-Pa., declined to talk about Laos, he agreed that many State Department documents are over-classified.

Half of the approximately 400,000 documents accumulated at State each year, he said, are marked Top Secret, Secret of Confidential.

About 6,000 State Department officers have authority to classify documents, Macomber said, and some misuse that power to simply limit distribution of the papers involved.

He suggested there should be some kind of automatic system for declassifying documents after a period of time, perhaps 10 years.

A shorter declassification period—some have suggested two years—would be unrealistic, Macomber said, and just lead to new and bigger bureaucratic problems.

In the Senate, meanwhile, Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., introduced legislation requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to provide Congress regularly with detailed intelligence information.

Cooper said Congress needed this kind of evaluation and analysis, now available only to the executive branch, in order to participate in the formation of foreign policy.

Two other senators also suggested proposals relating to the CIA.

Sen. George S. McGovern, D-S.D., suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single line item in the budget. Agency funds currently are concealed in other budget items.

Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., said he would offer measures prohibiting such CIA activities as the funding of Thai troops to fight in Laos.

July 7, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

approximately \$70,000, much of which he used for the benefit of harassed debtors of the bank. This defendant was no motivated by personal gain in most of the embezzlement, instead he manipulated the books of the bank to cover up the accounts of delinquent depositors. The judge was on assignment from another district and imposed the sentence without securing even a presentence report by the probation officer.

In 1961, two bank embezzlers were committed to the same Federal institution from the same district within the same week. Yet, sentenced by different judges, one received a term of six months, to be followed by eighteen months probation, and the other received a term of 15 years.

The above are not isolated examples. In the fiscal year ended June 30, 1969, the average sentence for transportation etc. of stolen motor vehicles varied from 13.5 months in the District of Massachusetts to 48 months in the Southern District of Iowa and 50.5 months in the District of Minnesota. Terms for forgery ranged from an average of 12 months in the Southern District of Georgia to 70.3 months in the District of Kansas. In fact, the overall average of time imposed varied from 24.2 months in the Middle District of North Carolina and 23.1 months in the Western District of Wisconsin to 74.7 months in the District of Maryland and 75.3 months in the Northern District of Oklahoma.

By Mr. CRANSTON (for himself, Mr. MONTROYA, Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. Mr. BAYH, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. DOMINICK, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. HARTKE, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. INOUE, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. MOSS, Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. PELL, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. TOWER, Mr. TUNNEY, and Mr. WILLIAMS):

S. 2230. A bill to designate a certain traffic circle in the District of Columbia as the "Benito Juarez Circle." Referred to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

BENITO JUAREZ CIRCLE

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, Senator MONTROYA and our fellow cosponsors, I introduce today, a bill calling for the designation of a circle in Washington, D.C., as the Benito Juarez Circle.

Recently the Government of Mexico presented to this Capital City a magnificent statue of Benito Juarez, which stands on a grassy plot in the middle of the traffic circle formed by the intersection of New Hampshire and Virginia Avenues and 25th Street NW. The circle which grew out of urban redevelopment and the new street construction has no name.

Benito Juarez, a Zapotec Indian, led a revolt against the Spanish Conquistadors who continued to oppress the peasants long after the Republic of Mexico achieved independence. Juarez was an accomplished lawyer and served as Governor of Oaxaca before he became President of the Republic.

We believe that naming the circle would be appreciated by our neighbors to the south who have often honored our national leaders. It would also be a gesture of this Nation's esteem for a Mexican leader who is a hero to all Americans, North and South, who love freedom.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I am pleased to join today in cosponsoring the bill which will designate the circle in the District of Columbia upon which the statue of Benito Juarez rests as Benito Juarez Circle. The Government of Mexico presented this statue to the United States as a gesture of friendship between our two people. Benito Juarez was a strong believer in freedom and the rights of the individual and a strong admirer of Abraham Lincoln, whose contemporary he was.

Benito Juarez stands as a symbol of what a man can do with determination. Against overwhelming odds, he fought against the French invasion of Mexico and the establishment of the empire. This occurred at the same time that we were experiencing the Civil War in this Nation. Sometimes nearly alone, he stood as a symbol of the hope of the eventual return to republican government in Mexico. Through his example and hard work, the Mexican people were eventually able to reassert their independence and chart their own destiny once again.

Benito Juarez made the Indians in Mexico part of the ruling class, being a Zapotec Indian himself. I believe that it is altogether fitting and proper that we honor Juarez in this fashion, for his example has meant much in this country as it has in his native Mexico. By honoring Juarez we honor all Mexicans everywhere who have given so much to the culture of our continent.

By Mr. McGOVERN:

S. 2231. A bill to require that appropriations be made specifically to the Central Intelligence Agency. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill which would require that proposed appropriations, estimated expenditures and appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency should be required to appear in the Budget of the United States. Each of these items would be shown as a single sum.

This bill would also prohibit the use of funds appropriated to any other department or agency of the United States from being spent by the CIA.

There can be no doubt that our Nation requires the services of a major intelligence agency—the function served by the CIA. And by the very nature of its activities, the CIA cannot afford to have its detailed programs made public through an itemized budget. But we have been led into a practice which is completely contrary to our democratic principles and perhaps to the Constitution itself by hiding the expenditures for this agency in the budgets of other government agencies.

The American people have a right to know the purposes for which their tax dollars are used. Their elected representatives have the right to decide the priorities of the Nation as expressed in the Federal budget.

The Federal Government provides the Nation with a supermarket of services, and the taxpayer should be able to de-

each if the various items including intelligence.

But we cannot, at present, decide how much we want to allocate for intelligence activities. If the CIA budget were a single item in the budget of the United States, we would be in a position to judge if we wanted to spend more on intelligence operations and clandestine wars than on improvement of the environment or on education or even on other aspects of national defense.

Thus, one major purpose of this legislation would be to allow the Congress to exercise its constitutional powers over Federal finances by knowing where the administration proposed to allocate each tax dollar. This would not endanger national security, because the only choice available to Congress would be on national priorities—the CIA as opposed to other agencies and programs—not specific CIA activities.

Congressional oversight of the CIA would remain as at present.

I believe that CIA funding is now so substantial that such a single line item for the agency in the budget would not communicate usable information to potential adversaries. Indeed it would merely demonstrate what is already known—that the United States maintains a massive intelligence operation.

The second major purpose for the legislation is to allow Congress and the taxpayer to know the exact amount of money going into other Government programs. As it stands now, some Federal programs and agencies must have greatly inflated budgets in which CIA funds are hidden. As a result, we are led to believe that some programs are better financed than, in fact, they are. We have no way of knowing what these programs and agencies might be.

Personally, I am concerned that some of the money apparently allocated to American agriculture is CIA money. The needs of the American farmer are not adequately met as it is, although some people are critical of our farm support programs. If CIA funds are being hidden in agriculture funds, our debate over aid to agriculture is unreal.

I cite agriculture as an example. The same would be true of any agency or programs whose budget was the hiding place for CIA funds.

Because it is a matter of simple commonsense, I propose that the one hidden item in our budget be made subject to congressional and public scrutiny. We are talking about hundreds of millions of dollars. The people have not only the right but the need to know how their dollars are spent.

Mr. President, I ask that the text of the bill be printed following my remarks.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

S. 2231

A bill to require that appropriations be made specifically to the Central Intelligence Agency

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That commencing with the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1972—

of the United States, sub-

JAMES BOND TYPE ASIA LETTER

AN AUTHORITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by THE ASIA LETTER Co. Tokyo Hong Kong Washington Los Angeles

STATINTL

29 June 1971

STATINTL

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (II): No intelligence operation in Asia is as well-heeled as that of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.).

The annual working budget of the C.I.A. runs over US\$600 million.

That's just a starter.

The agency spends far more than that in Asia alone if you count the cost of some of the "borrowed" services from other U.S. Government agencies. For instance:

---U.S. Air Force planes are used to monitor foreign nuclear tests and collect air samples. The agency, while having its own cryptographers, draws on the Army's corps of 100,000 code specialists and eavesdroppers to tap Asian communications.

---C.I.A. specialists often operate off U.S. Navy ships in the Pacific, usually involved in electronic surveillance.

---The agency also is privy to information from the Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) which has a substantial operation of its own in Asia.

The D.I.A. spends from its own budget more than US\$1 billion a year flying reconnaissance planes and keeping satellites aloft.

Those satellites allow C.I.A. analysts to know more---from photographs, taken 130 miles up---about China's topography than do the Chinese themselves.

---The U.S. State Department's intelligence section also feeds a considerable amount of confidential data it collects through its embassies, consulates and travelling diplomats to the C.I.A. This includes information gathered by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) the Justice Department and the U.S. Treasury (Secret Service) often attached to diplomatic missions abroad.

The C.I.A. also works closely with the intelligence services and police forces of the countries considered America's allies in Asia, exchanging information with them.

Where does all the C.I.A. money go?

It funnels out in myriad directions: To pay for the agency's overt intelligence gathering activities, to finance "dirty tricks" and other clandestine capers, to prop up ousted or failing politicians and to pay for "disinformation" and other psychological warfare ploys.

Despite the C.I.A.'s oft-deserved sinister image, a good deal of its funds are expended on open intelligence gathering operations.

These go for subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals and other publications and salaries for those who must scan them for intelligence tidbits.

It is estimated that more than 50% of the C.I.A.'s world-wide intelligence input comes from such overt sources. (An estimated 35% comes from electronic spying and less than 15% from JAMES BOND-type, cloak-and-dagger operations.)

An exception is Asia.

A greater amount of the C.I.A. funds expended in Asia go into covert activities.



21 JUN 1971

THE WAR IN INDOCHINAThe Not-So-Secret War

For good reason, the U.S. military involvement in Laos has often been called the "secret war." Unlike Vietnam, where most of the American military role is out in the open, the U.S. activities in Laos—a supposedly neutral country—have necessarily been obscured by successive Administrations. And with equally good reason, Congress from time to time has grown uncomfortable over the lack of clearcut information about Laos—a restlessness that was manifested once again last week in a rare secret session of the United States Senate.

The meeting was called by Sen. Stuart Symington, chairman of a subcommittee on national commitments. Basing his charges partly on a report compiled by two subcommittee aides who recently visited Indochina, Symington contended that the U.S. is spending far more money in Laos than the \$52 million a year voted by Congress in economic aid and the estimated \$90 million allotted for military assistance. The real figure, claimed the Missouri senator, was closer to \$100 million a year, with the difference coming from secret Central Intelligence Agency funds not controlled by Congress. Symington also pointed out that B-52s are bombing Communist forces in northern Laos and that the U.S. is supporting Thai troops fighting there. The latter program, the senator charged, was a breach of the Fulbright amendment to this year's defense appropriations bill prohibiting the use of Congressionally approved money for the funding of "mercenaries" in Laos or Cambodia. "I have been hoodwinked," Symington thundered. "I don't want to serve as a figurehead, and I don't want to be in the Senate if we write laws that are flouted."

Loophole: Unfortunately for the doves, there was little new in the information put forth at the session. That the B-52s have been bombing northern Laos has been common knowledge—even to senators—for some time. That the CIA is supporting Thai mercenaries at enormous cost has also been discovered and rediscovered. And it was not so easy to establish that the Nixon Administration was

violating the Fulbright amendment. It was, in fact, simple enough for Administration spokesmen to point out that the amendment also contained a clause stating that nothing in the amendment should be construed as prohibiting military actions designed to insure a "safe and orderly withdrawal from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war"—a loophole if ever there was one.

As a whole, the Senate treated Symington's secret session with a massive yawn, and as it rambled on, more and more legislators rose and strolled out of the chamber. "I must say that I heard nothing yesterday that I had not heard before," Senate Republican leader Hugh Scott reported the day after the three-and-a-half-hour meeting. "I believe that what we had was a rather lengthy tempest in our ancient and honorable teapot." And Sen. J. William Fulbright summed up Symington's performance with the observation: "It was very disappointing that the Senate as a whole . . . [was] not more interested in it. They are apparently reluctant to be interested even as to the facts of what is going on in Laos."

The whole experience left many doves wondering what had happened to the "no more Vietnams" movement. The answer to that question seemed to be that, as long as President Nixon continued to wind the war down visibly by withdrawing U.S. troops from Indochina, few senators of either the hawkish or dovish persuasion were disposed to question what he did in the "invisible" sector of the conflict.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BADILLO

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BADILLO: Page 7, line 4, before the quotation marks insert the following new sentence: "Nothing in clause (A) or (B) of the first sentence of this paragraph or in the immediately preceding sentence shall be construed to authorize the use of any of such funds by the Central Intelligence Agency (or by any agency or person operating on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency) to engage, in any manner or to any extent, in the organization, supervision, or conduct of any military or paramilitary operation of any kind in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand (including any operation of the kind commonly called 'guerilla warfare' operation) which will be executed by forces composed in whole or in part of (i) mercenaries, (ii) regular or irregular personnel of any armed force of any foreign nation or area, or (iii) personnel other than those listed in clause (i) or (ii) who are under arms and are indigenous to any foreign country or area."

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, this is a very specific amendment limiting the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency to the gathering of intelligence, and specifically prohibiting the Central Intelligence Agency from conducting guerrilla operations in Southeast Asia. The necessity for the amendment arises because the enabling act which created the Central Intelligence Agency provides that the CIA may perform "such other functions and duties related to intelligence and affecting national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

There has been clear evidence from news accounts over the years, which I am sure all of you have read, that the Central Intelligence Agency is conducting guerrilla operations in Laos and Cambodia. This last week, as you know, the Senate had a secret session involving our activities in Laos and Senator SYMINGTON in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD indicated as follows:

In the case of Laos one is unable to cite a figure for the total cost of this war to the United States. First, because what the United States is doing, and the cost of what we are doing, continues to be cloaked with official secrecy by the executive branch. Second, one cannot cite a figure for the total cost to us of the war in Laos because, it must be said in all frankness, neither you, nor I, nor any other Member of Congress is in position to know what those costs actually are.

Yesterday, my colleague the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE), questioned the chairman of the committee as to whether this bill specifically included funds for the Central Intelligence Agency, and the chairman answered that it does. The chairman also refused to say what the amounts were and said that only he and the ranking minority member of the committee knew.

The gentleman from California Mr. WALDIE also asked the chairman as follows:

What is the purpose of the CIA activity in Laos?

The chairman answered as follows:

Mr. HEBERT. The activity of the CIA in all sections of the world, in Laos, the Middle

East and everywhere is the gathering of intelligence for the protection and security of the United States.

If that is the understanding of the activities of the CIA by the chairman, then he should be in support of this amendment, because all I am saying is that that should be precisely the activity of the Central Intelligence Agency, to gather information, and not to engage in guerrilla activities. But because we do not know exactly what funds are available either in this body or in the Senate, and we do not know exactly to what purpose they are being put, this amendment is prepared so that we can be sure that the activities are limited.

I seek only to insure that the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency be limited to those specified in the law, and that is to the gathering of intelligence. Certainly after the recent disclosures it becomes all the more important that we insure that the agencies of the executive department comply with the mandates of the Congress.

Even before the New York Times published parts of the Pentagon study of our involvement in the Vietnam war, it had become apparent that the CIA had literally been running the entire military operation in Laos, including the hiring, training, and leading of a mercenary army of Thais and Meo tribesmen and the tactical control of an air war which has made the Laotian people refugees in their own land.

As early as 1964, the CIA recruited Thai pilots to fly planes with markings of the Royal Laotian Government against Communist forces in Laos and there is evidence these Thai pilots are still flying missions in Laos, under CIA control and supervision. Reliable estimates given recently to the Senate indicate that the CIA currently is paying about 5,000 Thais to fight in Laos.

Enactment of this amendment is necessary if Congress is to regain some measure of meaningful control and oversight in the field of foreign affairs. Regardless of how individual Members might feel about the recent articles in the New York Times, it is clear that the nature and extent of our involvement in Southeast Asia has repeatedly been hidden from and misrepresented to the American people and their elected Representatives. I strongly suspect that the pattern of subterfuge and outright misrepresentation continues. This amendment represents a step toward squaring with the American people. I urge its adoption.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. Would the amendment preclude the CIA from supporting such things as have been reported in national magazines, such as the pay for personnel in the Saigon Police Force, which police force is being used, of course, for campaign purposes to support the Thieu government in Southeast Asia?

Mr. BADILLO. Yes it would, because it would seek to limit the Central Intelligence Agency to the gathering of intelligence and to its functions as approved

by the Congress. Specifically it excludes the support of activities commonly called guerrilla warfare, support of mercenaries, support of regular or irregular personnel of any armed forces of any foreign nation or area within Southeast Asia.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CONYERS. I want to commend the precision with which the gentleman has formulated this amendment. I believe it is an exceedingly important one. I applaud his courage and support him.

Mr. BADILLO. I thank the gentleman very much.

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

The gentleman's amendment seeks to place a restriction upon the use of any funds authorized in this proposed act for military or paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia organized or supervised by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Central Intelligence Agency was established by the National Security Act. It functions under the National Security Council under the President of the United States. It initiates no activities of its own without direction from the President and/or the National Security Council.

I do not propose to debate on the floor of the House the activities or functions of the Central Intelligence Agency. I will state categorically that the intelligence activities conducted by our Government are essential to the security of this Nation.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, as I read it, seeks to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from organizing, supervising, or conducting any so-called military or paramilitary operation of any kind in Southeast Asia which would be executed by mercenaries, regular or irregular personnel of any armed force of any foreign nation or area, or any other personnel of a foreign nation. I will not go into the ramifications of such a restriction should it be enacted. I will merely tell the House that in my opinion, as well meaning as this amendment may be, it is very dangerous to the security of our country. Secrecy is one of the prices we must pay for survival. Today, there seems to be a penchant for exposing Government secrets which wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the enemy.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York would seriously restrict our intelligence activities in Southeast Asia and would certainly most seriously affect, and perhaps even prevent, the further withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

I am not going to expand upon my statement any further.

I urge the House to overwhelmingly defeat this amendment.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WALDIE. Can the gentleman tell me in what portion of the bill these funds are contained?

Mr. HEBERT. No, I cannot tell the gentleman that.

Mr. WALDIE. Is it available so that a Member of this House of Representatives can go to the committee and examine the classified documents involving the amount of money available for the Central Intelligence Agency in this bill?

Mr. HEBERT. No, sir, it is not. The chairman takes the full responsibility of not discussing the matter further.

Mr. WALDIE. So whatever those sums are and to whatever purpose they will be put, that is only known to the chairman of the committee?

Mr. HEBERT. It is known to the chairman and the ranking minority member of the committee. This is a policy which has prevailed throughout the years in all administrations.

Mr. WALDIE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think I understand the policy that no other member of the committee knows that information.

Mr. HEBERT. That is correct.

Mr. WALDIE. May I ask this question?

In title IV there is a prohibition against using any of the moneys appropriated in this bill for the payment of free world forces serving in Laos. Are there any funds being appropriated by this bill for the payment of any forces in Laos?

Mr. HEBERT. No, there is not any provision for the payment of those forces. The only moneys that are involved in this bill are those providing for the intelligence agencies of this country.

May I make a further correction, I do not want to mislead anybody by saying that the chairman and the ranking minority member know about these funds and only them, because the entire committee is briefed by the CIA on its functions. So I do not want to have that misconception carried away that the members of the committee do not know of the activities of the CIA and of the other intelligence agencies, this we do know. This year, for the first time in the history of the committee, at the chairman's request, the CIA was invited to appear before the entire committee. Its director, Mr. Helms, appeared and subjected himself to all kinds of questions and all the questions were answered by the director, Mr. Helms.

Mr. WALDIE. May I ask the chairman one final question?

What is the purpose of the CIA activity in Laos?

Mr. HEBERT. The activity of the CIA in all sections of the world, in Laos, the Middle East and everywhere is the gathering of intelligence for the protection and security of the United States.

Mr. WALDIE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HUNGATE).

(Mr. HUNGATE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, we will soon be called upon to vote on the Nedzi-Whalen amendment, or some House ver-

sion of the McGovern-Hatfield amendment. Since I fear there may have been a considerable amount of high-pressure, slick, oversimplification of this problem, I believe the following editorial in the Washington Post is illuminating:

CONGRESS VOTES ON THE WAR

The McGovern-Hatfield and Nedzi-Whalen amendments, which are to be voted on today in the Senate and House respectively, would not "end the war" or automatically retrieve the American POW's or guarantee the safe exit of American forces or, least of all, assure a Vietnamese reconciliation. Any such claim promises more than either amendment can deliver and invites further frustration and disillusionment. Not only does fulfillment of claims like these lie to a great extent in other than American hands. But the American system of Government gives the President broad authority to conduct a war. It is idle to pretend while the fighting goes on that Congress can remove that authority; in fact, McGovern-Hatfield explicitly concedes the point.

So it is misleading the public to talk of these proposed congressional restraints in terms of a "date certain" for our withdrawal, however comforting and convenient that piece of shorthand may be to supporters of both measures; Vietnam has given us enough deceptive shorthand, and also enough easy—and offensive—sales pitches—...

My colleagues, as you are well aware, I voted in favor of fixing December 31, 1971, as the date for withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Southeast Asia. I have voted three times this year to end the draft on June 30, 1971, in the belief that if wars in Southeast Asia can be fought with volunteers, they will prove they have the popular support of the American people. If they cannot, and I would assume this one cannot be fought with volunteers since 80 percent of combat troops are draftees, then the President could come to Congress and ask us for troops and prove his justification for the request. Then we could restore to Congress a meaningful voice in foreign policy.

However, since a majority of this Congress sees fit to draft our young men and ship them halfway around the world to fight 10,000 miles from home, I find it difficult to vote against funds to provide them with supplies, equipment, arms and ammunition they need to defend themselves and our country's position, even though we might not have selected their mission in Southeast Asia. As one who served in the combat infantry in World War II, I would consider it irresponsible to send a draftee into a combat zone without providing him with all the support those fortunate enough to stay at home can provide.

Therefore Mr. Chairman, I must oppose the Nedzi-Whalen amendment.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. NEDZI. Did the Washington Post editorial recommend voting for or against?

Mr. HUNGATE. The Washington Post wrote these very skillful lines, I thought, with which I agree and found that in essence my construction would be meaningless and then it came out for it.

I think it is very much like the story you have all heard of a man coming in

the House and speaking about 10 minutes, and another Member said I heard you speak and I cannot tell where you stand. Can you tell me whether you are for or against it? The guy speaking said—

I watched the gentleman when he came in this House and raised his hand and took the oath to become a Member and I said, "There is a man, and no matter how long he is here, he will never know what's going on."

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GUBSER. Would you not summarize the Washington Post editorial this way—that they gave all the reasons for voting against Nedzi-Whalen in order to justify their point that you ought to vote for it?

Mr. HUNGATE. The gentleman's point seems accurate to me.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WHALEN. I would just like to read for the Record the editorial's conclusion.

The amendments as written are by and large thoughtful and responsible, though limited. A wise Congress would enact them, and a wise President would welcome them as reinforcement of his own policy and his own concern for the Nation.

Mr. HUNGATE. I appreciate the gentleman's contribution, but I would say as to the expression "a wise Congress," I presume its wisdom will be revealed in the future hours today.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ARENDS. When you must make a decision on what the Washington Post article sets forth as to whether this is a wise Congress or not—that is a far stretch of imagination.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. ABZUG).

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from New York is recognized.

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, we have all been very concerned about the shocking revelation in the last few days, that there have been secret military and political decisions by our Government without the consent or knowledge of this great body. These decisions were all the more shocking because they indicate that Government policy on Vietnam was constructed and conducted by lies and deceptions. There was a discussion that took place earlier in the debate between two members of your committee, Mr. Chairman, in which they suggested that classified material concerning the needs of our defense was available for inspection to the Members of this House.

Subsequent to this an inquiry was made of you, Mr. Chairman, by the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) with respect to information available concerning the CIA, and you indicated that it was not available for inspection by Members of either the Armed Services Committee or the House.

My question to you, sir, is this: Is classified material concerning the needs of our defense and the matters about

11 JUN 1977

Inside Washington



Cheaper and Better Intelligence Sought



STATINTL

Robert S. Allen and John A. Goldsmith

WASHINGTON — Without fanfare the prestigious Senate Appropriations Committee is taking a long, hard look at the agencies which conduct the Pentagon's far-flung and costly intelligence activities.

Last year, at the committee's urging Congress imposed a flat manpower ceiling — 138,000 employees — on those activities. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, recognizing the problems in his department's sprawling intelligence complex assigned Assistant Secretary Robert F. Froehle as coordinator.

Now the Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on defense is scheduling a couple of days of closed-door hearings to explore further economies. Congressional experts believe Froehle has at least been able to identify expenses assignable to gathering defense intelligence.

Major targets of the committee's interest are two little-known Defense Department agencies which together spend far

more than the often publicized Central Intelligence Agency. They are the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, and the National Security Agency, NSA.

NSA is the government's electronic spy-agency, specializing and cracking codes. Congressional critics wonder whether NSA has carried its activities to a point where much of the product is no longer worth the cost.

The Defense Intelligence Agency was originally established to coordinate intelligence activities of the separate military services. Critics claim that the coordinating agency has itself become a center of military bureaucracy.

BILLIONS AT STAKE — Overlapping responsibilities of CIA, Defense, and the State Department's intelligence bureau have periodically come under congressional criticism. That is one of the issues involved this time.

The Appropriations Committee is primarily interested, however, in the very large sums expended and the quality of the product not just in the possible duplications involved. The inquiry is being undertaken in connection with the committee's review of the annual defense appropriations bill.

The costs of many intelligence operations are classified, of course. For defense intelligence cost estimates, even when declassified, may be misleading because military personnel ostensibly assigned to other duties may actually be full or part-time intelligence operatives.

The costs of many intelligence operations have been more or less officially estimated at slightly under \$3 billion annually. That is substantially more than the \$500 million estimate which is usually used for the per year expenses of CIA.

The Senate committee is, therefore, hunting for economies in the agencies where most of the nation's intelligence dollars are spent.

with a concern in the White House over the cost and operations of the intelligence community. President Nixon is reported to be considering a reorganization of intelligence activities.

The President and, more frequently, national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger are said to be dissatisfied with the quality of the intelligence which reaches them. They would like to improve the product, clarify the lines of responsibility, and cut costs.

They are said to be increasingly concerned that the career director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, who doubles as boss of CIA, has no real power to coordinate all activities in his agency, Defense and State, though that was the concept when his job was created.

Helms himself, the first career man to head the Central Intelligence Agency, is highly regarded by the President. Even the critics of CIA in Congress applaud Helms for keeping his agency out of foreign policy decision making.

However, there has been increasing criticism of intelligence preparation for such operations as the empty-handed raid on the prison camp at Son Tay. More recently Kissinger was reported critical of the intelligence which let the South Vietnamese be quickly outnumbered and over-matched on their invasion of Laos.

As the United States seeks accommodation with the Soviet Union (and perhaps, China) on limiting strategic arms, and amid the continuing controversy over NATO and Warsaw Pact troop levels in Europe, the gathering of reliable intelligence can have a tremendous bearing on the making of wise national security judgments.

So, while they may lack the headline potential of a cloak-and-dagger spy story, there is real interest here in the efforts by Congress and the White House to produce better intelligence at lower cost.

STATINTL

Roger's Brief

CIA's Little Army From Thailand

FROM JERSEY, General Washington hired a schoolteacher named Nathan Hale to spy on the British in Manhattan. It was bad judgment. Hale had no experience in espionage, as he soon proved by being captured and hanged, to become an American immortal.

In the Civil War the government hired the Pinkerton outfit to set up an espionage system. It was never much good, but neither was the Confederate.

In World War II we set up a spy system in Switzerland, and after the war it was consolidated as Central Intelligence Agency. It has grown every year of the 26 since, encircling the globe with its tentacles, becoming a dense empire defying the President and the Congress to comprehend or control its global activities.

Excepting its frequent blunders, nobody knows or can discover what it is up to in a given time or place. Compared with it, Hoover's FBI is an open book.

* * *

FOR FBI AGENTS are subject ultimately to court examination of their activities, which involve constitutional rights. CIA agents don't deal with those having constitutional rights, and nobody says how or why it disburses moneys voted to it by a generous and spellbound Congress.

Most CIA action naturally focuses on trouble areas abroad, Europe in general, Latin America, the Mediterranean and the Far East. Since we have been engaged for 20 years in Asian intrigue, half of that time in warfare with Asiatics, that is where the CIA sleuths and provocateurs congregate and conspire in this or that policy, which is removed from the hands of the President and the will of Congress.

This has become a savage and slippery maze of blind forces at work, which no extraneous power on earth can unravel.

* * *

IT IS A PREPOSTEROUS and dangerous situation for the Americans, and bears no relation to their traditional integrity of purpose and responsibility.

Senator Chase of New Jersey, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, said last week he has learned from government sources there are "4000-6000 Thai troops in Laos, and the United States is paying them through CIA."

He avers this is a violation of a congressional directive last year, prohibiting financing mercenaries in Laos except to help free POWs or facilitate American troop withdrawals. The committee is currently taking testimony from two aides recently in Indochina. The Senator said he wrote to Secretary of State Rogers about it a month ago, and has received no reply.

Then why not invite the Secretary to tell the committee what he knows about it, which might not be much, as there is no evidence Mr. Rogers talks to CIA, or vice versa.

But congressmen enjoy complaining, and don't enjoy doing. If they enjoyed doing they would adopt a joint resolution calling for an audit of CIA expenditures over the past few years. The howling would be pitiful that this would uncover supersecret investigation abroad, and work untold harm to vital American "interest." Who say? Who knows if CIA conniving is beneficial or detrimental to vital American interests anywhere, since nobody has ever yielded an inkling of what it is all about?



FRAMINGHAM, MASS.
NEWS

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MAY 18 1971

High Cost of Spies

President Nixon is reported to be weighing a major reorganization of the nation's foreign intelligence activities.

It is an effort worth Presidential attention, and not merely because of the vast amounts of money that are spent.

Economy is the prime motivation in the reorganization plan worked up in the White House. The nation spends \$5 billion annually on intelligence-gathering; five Federal agencies besides the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) have intelligence programs, and at least 200,000 people are involved.

Some White House officials are reported to believe \$500 million could be saved. That's 10 per cent of the spying budget; the savings alone sound like an enormous sum.

Mr. Nixon is reported unhappy with some of the failures of the vast intelligence network: not knowing that American prisoners had been removed from that North Vietnamese prison; not predicting the stiff resistance to the Laos incursion; not forecasting the Polish riots.

It may be that a leaner, more centralized operation would be more omniscient; that is certainly a goal worth pursuing.

But an equally important goal Mr. Nixon should not overlook is to

separate intelligence-gathering from subversion, and from clandestine pursuit of American foreign policy interests that could perfectly well stand the light of day.

It is the CIA that has financed a guerrilla army in Laos—a program that ought to be in the Defense Department's budget, if it is indeed worth doing.

It has been CIA money that has quietly underwritten student trips abroad and Radio Free Europe; the result has been to distort one of America's proudest traditions, that of individual action independent of government.

It has been CIA efforts to find "cover" for its agents as researchers and scholars — and occasionally, in fact, to buy the services of legitimate scholars — that have made Americans suspect in many parts of the globe.

Intelligence-gathering is a vital part of the conduct of our foreign policy. But it need not become so entwined in other activities and agencies, both public and private, that Americans abroad are automatically suspected of spying or subversion.

To remedy that problem is just as important as tightening up the budget.

THE TALK OF THE TOWN

Notes and Comment


THE NEW YORKER herewith announces the first in a series of plans to save the taxpayers billions of dollars a year. But let's begin with a fact or two. A writer for the *Times* has revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency costs six hundred million dollars annually. We're sure it's much more, but we'll accept the figure. He further reports that fifteen per cent of its information comes from "agents"—that is, people seeking to overthrow other governments or prop them up, whichever the case may be. That part of it is fine—some governments need overthrowing; some need uppropping. Sometimes it's a little hard to decide which, but we'll leave that to Henry Kissinger. Thirty-five per cent of its information is gathered by electronic snoopers. We don't know how this works. Now, here's where we come in. Fifty per cent of the C.I.A.'s daily "input" is received from "overt sources, such as periodicals." We're a periodical, and we can help. Because of the way our business works, we have people reading all the time—reading everything: newspapers, magazines, books, unsolicited manuscripts (none of these even get to the C.I.A.), pamphlets. Our readers are intelligent, patriotic people, always thinking of their government. It's amazing how much duplication there is in this country. So the C.I.A. can close down this half of its operation, and we will take over at no cost. Probable net saving: three hundred million dollars. It should never have cost that much just to have people read. Anyway, any time any of us finds anything worthwhile, it'll be Xeroxed and mailed to Washington. If it seems really urgent, we'll phone it in.

Your World

Is This the Same CIA?

By GARY McEOIN

For the first time in at least 10 years, the head of the CIA has spoken publicly about his work. His reason, he explained, was to counter the "persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency."



I must say I was amazed to learn that such criticism exists. Perhaps the CIA has means of access to domestic public opinion which I lack. But in my constant investigation of the issues raised by the existence and activities of the CIA, this one has never appeared even marginally.

On the contrary, the type of agency which Richard McGarrah Helms described in his talk would be hard to criticize. It has "no police, subpoena or enforcement powers." All it does is to collect facts about situations around the world that may affect the national security of the United States

and to project "likely developments from the facts."

But there it stops, according to Helms. "We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we cannot and must not take sides," he said. "The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts. . . . Our role extends to the estimate function. . . . but not to advocacy."

Apparently Helms has neglected to read President Eisenhower's memoirs, a grave oversight for a collector of facts. In "Mandate for Change" Eisenhower describes in detail the role of Allen Dulles, Helms' predecessor as head of the CIA, in the invasion of Guatemala in 1964 and the overthrow of that country's constitutional government by a mercenary army financed and outfitted by the CIA and private United States interests.

THE INVASION was at the point of failure when the invaders lost their air force in combat. Eisenhower in Washington reviewed the crisis with Henry Holland of the State Department and Allen Dulles. Holland, who in Eisenhower's own words was "the real expert in Latin American affairs," warned of the appalling harm the United States would suffer in Latin American and world opinion if we intervened officially. But Dulles fought him and persuaded Eisenhower to overrule him. The planes were replaced and the Guatemala government was overthrown.

Helms has also disclaimed any infiltration of the academic community. Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish political scientist and economist, expresses in his latest book ("The Challenge of World Poverty") his grave concern at "the prostitution of U.S. academic life" through the financing of re-

search on Latin American problems by the CIA and other government agencies. Latin America's intellectuals fully share Myrdal's evaluation.

Eisenhower's account of his second administration ("Waging Peace") also places the CIA in a role far more extensive than the collection and projection of facts. He provides data which can be collated with information from other sources to establish the leading part played by the CIA in organizing and equipping the force assembled in Central America in 1960 to invade Cuba.

A public official engaged in espionage might possibly defend the morality of deceiving an enemy. I do not see, however, any possible moral—or even political—justification for treating the American public as the enemy to be deceived. Yet such a practice seems to have become a recognized and widely accepted part of our institutions.

The CIA is not an insignificant detail of government. Its annual budget, for which the director does not have to account, is in excess of \$3 billion. The size of its staff is classified but it reportedly more than 20,000. Employees are exempt from civil service procedures. The agency makes and enforces its own rules for hiring, investigation and firing. And, as transpired in 1969 when it refused to allow its members to testify at a court-martial of Green Berets charged with murder, it is not even answerable to the nation's judicial system.

National security considerations may justify such exceptional procedures. But they must not be expanded to the point where they erode the bases of our system of law and justice.

STATINTL

1 MAY 1971

STATINTL

Nixon Reported Weighing Revamping of Intelligence Services

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10 — President Nixon is said to be considering a major reorganization of the nation's foreign intelligence activities to improve output and cut costs.

Those familiar with the plan say that the options range from creating a new Cabinet-level department of intelligence to merely strengthening the now-imprecise authority of Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, over the global intelligence operations of the Pentagon and other federal agencies.

The reorganization plan has recently been presented to President Nixon. It covers 30 to 40 typewritten pages and was prepared primarily by James R. Schlesinger, assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, and K. Wayne Smith, a former Pentagon systems analyst now on the National Security Council staff.

The informants say the plan grew from instructions Mr. Nixon gave his staff last autumn, to draft various reorganizational and cost-cutting studies.

Complaints Voiced

Both the President and Henry A. Kissinger, his assistant for national security affairs, have frequently expressed dissatisfaction over the erratic quality of the foreign intelli-

gence provided them. Some White House officials estimate that at least \$500-million could be cut from the \$5-billion spent annually on national intelligence.

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have said that while occasionally intelligence of extreme usefulness — such as the incredibly detailed information on Soviet and Chinese Communist missile development obtained from spy satellites — has been produced, the service has frequently failed to forecast such sudden developments as the riots that forced a political reshuffle in Poland last December.

Mr. Nixon is particularly dissatisfied, his associates say, by the cost and size of the Government's global intelligence operations when compared with their results. In addition to the Central Intelligence Agency, five federal agencies are involved in intelligence overseas. At least 200,000 people are involved, 150,000 of these uniformed personnel in the Defense Department.

The President was seriously irritated, aides say, by two recent failures of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, which numbers 3,000 and spends an estimated \$500-million yearly. One was faulty intelligence prior to the abortive prison-camp raid at Son Tay, in North Vietnam, last November. The other was failure to forecast North Vietnamese resist-

ance to the South Vietnamese Army's incursion into Laos Feb. 5 to March 25.

'Their Estimates Were Better'

"Hanoi threw 35,000 men or four divisions against the 17,000 in ARVN," said one qualified source. "They stripped North Vietnam of troops, gambling that the United States wouldn't invade the North — and they were right. Their estimates were better than ours."

The most drastic option open to Mr. Nixon would be the creation of a new department of intelligence to be headed by an official of Cabinet rank. It would combine the Central Intelligence Agency with 15,000 civilian employees; the Defense Department's code-cracking National Security Agency with 103,000 uniformed personnel and its Defense Intelligence Agency with 3,000. The C.I.A. spends about \$500-million yearly; the National Security Agency \$1-billion and the Defense Intelligence Agency \$500-million.

The merit, some experts say, would be to concentrate in one department the collection of foreign intelligence now performed not only by the C.I.A. but also by the Army, Navy, and Air Force separately around the world. However, opposition would be forthcoming from vested interests in the armed services and in Congress. They say, therefore, that Mr. Nixon is unlikely to adopt it.

At the other end of the scale, informants report, Mr. Nixon could merely issue an executive order defining — thus strengthening — the authority of Mr. Helms over the intelligence operations of such powerful federal agencies as the Pentagon, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Officers Meet Weekly

Their principal intelligence officers meet weekly as members of the United States Intelligence Board. Mr. Helms, as the President's chief intelligence adviser and head of the C.I.A., presides, but his authority is unclear. It derives from a letter written by President Kennedy in 1963 to John A. McCone, one of Mr. Helms's predecessors, and has never been updated.

While Mr. Helms has full control over the C.I.A., the Pentagon's worldwide intelligence, which Robert F. Froehle, an

Services

Assistant Secretary of Defense has estimated costs \$2.9-billion yearly.

"When you have the authority but don't control the resources," a Defense Department official observed, "you tend to walk very softly."

The President is said to regard Mr. Helms as the nation's most competent professional intelligence officer. Last month, informants disclose, Mr. Nixon wrote Mr. Helms congratulating the C.I.A. on its recent annual estimate of Soviet defense capabilities.

To provide control over the huge intelligence system and make it responsive to his needs, Mr. Nixon is likely, his staff associates say, to choose one — or a combination of — the middle options before him that do not require Congressional approval.

Closer Ties Possible

It is likely, officials say, that Mr. Nixon will eventually bring Mr. Helms and a top-level staff of evaluators from C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., closer to the White House, possibly into the National Security Council staff.

Officials concede that under a reorganization Mr. Helms might relinquish to his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, of the Marine Corps, some of his responsibility for the C.I.A.'s day-to-day collection operations and concentrate, instead, on intelligence evaluation for the President. One possibility envisaged under the reorganization would be the creation by Mr. Helms of an evaluation staff in the White House drawn from the C.I.A.'s Office of Current Intelligence and its Office of National Estimates. The latter prepares long-range studies in depth of potential trouble spots.

Another would be the creation by Mr. Nixon of a White House intelligence evaluations staff made up of Mr. Helms, General Cushman, Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Ray S. Cline, director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

STATINTL

CIA 2.04.1

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Evening News

STATION WTOP TV
CBS Network

DATE May 3, 1971

7:00 PM

CITY Washington, DC

IMMENSE SECRET FUNDS OF CIA

WALTER CRONKITE: The dominating news out of Washington today was, of course, the anti-war activity.

Here is Eric Sevareid's analysis.

ERIC SEVAREID: The federal government operated today almost, if not quite, as usual. What police and troops confronted was not a peaceable demonstration to present grievances, it was a mass conspiracy to break the law and do violence to other people's rights and property. It was Halloween raised to the tenth power.

By any comparable measurement, police and troops acted with restraint. This will not preclude cries of "police brutality" and "repression." But not many people here in or out of government, including those who devote their lives to preserving republican liberty view what police did here today as repression.

They are much more worried about the kind of repression that advances noiselessly like the fog on little cat feet, and always in the name of national security.

They believe with James Madison, that there are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power than by violence and sudden usurpation.

So a congressional leader argues the self-evident proposition that in a free society, the secret and semi-secret police, above any other institution must be monitored and overseen by some other arm of government. And he is heard in stony silence.

So a congressional committee tries to subpoena networks' unused films and scripts, which is no different from demanding to search a journalist's, or for that matter his memory.

So the head of the Central Intelligence Agency with its immense secret funds, declares that people just have to take it on faith that he and his colleagues are honorable men.

STATINTL

U.S. Budget Appendix: Book of Revelations

THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: APPENDIX — FISCAL YEAR 1972.

(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1112 pp., \$8.50)

Reviewed by Walter Pincus

The reviewer was chief investigator for the Symington Subcommittee inquiry into American military commitments abroad and their influence on foreign policy. A former investigative reporter for *The Washington Post* and *Washington Evening Star*, he is now organizing a national daily newspaper, *The Morning News*.

Year in and year out, the old Bureau of the Budget (now streamlined into the Office of Management and Budget) has produced the finest source book available on operations of the United States government—the 1,112-page, agate-typed, table-laden Appendix to the budget.

This year's volume is no exception. It should be required reading for every member of Congress and college president, cabinet officer and Common Cause official, syndicated pundit and Vice President, student leader and appropriations committee chairman, the leadership of the ADA, American Legion, League of Women Voters and Chambers of Commerce; and finally, most of all, the President himself, locked away from the telephones and the Oval Office, taking as a single whole the vastness and vagaries of this massive government as they emerge from the pages in the dull-est of prose and endless columns of figures.

One senses, however, after reading these documents of the past several years and through almost all the newest volume devoted to fiscal year 1972 (the 12 months that run from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972) that almost no one outside government—and certainly very few inside—has attempted this feat.

It is a feat, it's sad to report, because the going is oppressively difficult. The

worst writers in the world, alternating words, could not have produced English language as incomprehensible or boring as some stretches in the Budget Appendix, e.g. the 16 pages devoted to Department of Defense, revolving and management funds.

But persistence in pursuit of the fine print has its rewards, the most notable of them being the possession of some uncosmeticized facts bearing on what the federal government is about and how it operates.

In accordance with the official billing, the Appendix "contains the text of appropriation estimates proposed for the consideration of the Congress together with specific supporting information on the various appropriations and funds, and other supplementary material." That excerpt is illustrative of the difficulties in coming to grip with the tome. On the one hand bureaucratese construction of the sentence would put accountants to sleep; on the other it hardly begins to convey the extent of the revelations that await the diligent.

The Appendix contains brief written descriptions about the programs and personnel of almost every government agency (don't look for the CIA or the National Security Agency) and the dollar figures that are applicable. It also supplies figures—and often descriptive material—on what happened in the past (fiscal 1970), what is estimated as

happening in the present (fiscal 1971), and, of course, what is planned by the administration for the future (fiscal 1972). By measuring the administration's future plans (which conveniently are noted in *italic print*), one can gain insights on where the government really intends to go.

To the more experienced Appendix reader, the changes to be found between one volume and the next give more than a direction of policy—they give a tone of government, an attitude toward the Congress and perhaps the public.

This is not to say the Appendix doesn't have its lighter moments. On page 637 you find that Attorney General John Mitchell is asking for a special, new, \$2,500 fund specifically for "official receptions and representation." In plain English that is cocktail party money for the Justice Department. Take note that Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans already has a similar fund—but his is only for \$1,500.

The lighter moments in government are, however, few and far between. Generally, the nation's problems and the government's solutions parade across the grey pages in platoons of agate type.

Consider the example of the health and nutrition programs subsumed under Community Development, Office of Economic Opportunity. The new spending proposal is \$159.5 million—down \$30 million from fiscal 1971. An explanation for the reduction is offered in the text of the budget: "A number of programs will be transferred to HEW . . ." Turn to the HEW portion of the big book and you find out, indeed, that there is reference to the agency taking

over the OEO programs in the category of "project grants for health services development." But the puzzler is that the over-all HEW budget for such programs is also \$2 million less than it was in fiscal 1971. There-

"Plus one 'armored vehicle' which is purchased new each year for the director."

by, in all likelihood hangs a bureaucratic tale.

In the foreign military field, this year's Appendix reflects an administration that is seeking more blanket authority for the spending of money overseas—an approach that runs counter to a good deal of talk and some past action by Congress in limiting the actions of the President through control over the purse.

Buried in small print on page 350 is a "general provision" which the Nixon administration seeks to attach to the overall \$76 billion defense budget. This language would permit Defense Secretary Melvin Laird to transfer up to \$1 billion of defense money from one appropriated Pentagon fund to another without first getting congressional approval. Though technical sounding, the provision has clear and broad overtones. The Congress could go through hearings and debate over the size of ABM spending only to find some time later that the Defense Secretary—perhaps with the approval of Appropriations Committee members, perhaps not—has

Our Intelligence in Vietnam, And Why It

STATINTL

Doesn't Work

By STEPHEN E. AMBROSE

HOW can our intelligence be so miserably, consistently bad? Between them, the CIA and the intelligence branches of the three armed services have a budget that probably exceeds the GNP of North Vietnam. They have agents everywhere, extensive and sophisticated lines of communications to get information back to headquarters, the most modern and complex computers to sift and analyze the raw material, and the best brains in the country to read the computer feed-outs and explain the big picture. There is precious little romance in the process, as in the old days of spying, but our information gathering and evaluation techniques represent the culmination of modern American technology. We have committed our best tools and our best men, and we have failed.

It has been so from the beginning. In 1965 the Air Force informed the President that its intelligence indicated that a few weeks of bombing in North Vietnam would bring the enemy to his knees. In 1966 and 1967 Army intelligence concentrated on the infra-structure of the enemy in the villages. Isolate the Viet Cong, the formula ran, and the rebellion will dry up. Unfortunately for the Army, for every V.C. identified and eliminated, two more sprang up. During the same period Air Force intelligence indicated that the bombing campaign was destroying North Vietnam's ability to fight, while the interdiction bombing in Laos and Cambodia had made it impossible for the enemy to get supplies into South Vietnam. The CIA and the services used every index they could invent—all pointed to the collapse of the enemy. When McNamara and Rusk and Johnson told us we had turned the corner, or spoke of light at the end of the tunnel, they were not whistling in the dark. They based their optimistic predictions on absolutely complete, absolutely reliable information. The enemy had no offensive capacity left and would soon wither away.

Then came Tet. It was an intelligence disaster of an order of magnitude equaled only by Pearl Harbor and MacArthur's assurance that the Chinese would not enter the Korean war even if American troops marched to the Yalu. Tet was one of the few major, widespread ground offensives in human history to catch the defenders completely by surprise.

The American response was not to reevaluate the technique, but to step it up. We sent in or bought additional agents, created better communications, added more computers, and set up extra committees in Saigon and the Pentagon to collate everything. We built incredible devices to find out where the enemy was—devices that could, for example, take the temperature of an area and on that basis indicate whether there were human beings gathered together under the jungle cover. We flew reconnaissance missions all over Indochina, taking millions of photographs with cameras so sensitive that they could pick up the numbers on an auto license plate from 10,000 feet and more.

Armed with all this information, the intelligence people went to Nixon and said we had a great opportunity at hand. The North Vietnamese were concentrated in a few narrow areas of Cambodia. Foolishly, they had even placed their command headquarters for the entire war near the Cambodian border. COSVN, the intelligence people said it was called. We could pick off the nerve center of the entire enemy war effort in a short campaign and, if not end the war, at least buy time in which to prepare the ARVN to fight the battles. Nixon believed, and who can blame him? The best intelligence service in the world was positive.

So the President went on television to speak of Stalingrad and the Bulge and other great battles. He told the American people their sons were about to win a victory that would be

COSVN in detail and then outlined the process whereby our troops were going to surround and capture great numbers of the enemy, in an operation comparable only to the German blitzkrieg in Poland, France, and Russia.

When he next appeared on television, the President showed us movies highlighting the results of the Cambodian invasion. We had captured some rice and a few small arms. He did not mention COSVN or enemy troops. A few months later, American intelligence thought it spotted a PW camp, so we raided North Vietnam—and again came up with nothing.

Now comes Laos. Intelligence had finally figured out that the stupendous interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail had not worked. Still there was hope. American intelligence sources indicated that the North Vietnamese were weak, while ARVN was growing stronger. With a little American air support, ARVN could move into Laos and physically occupy the trail, thus cutting the enemy supply line completely. The results of this latest blunder are too painful to discuss.

How could it happen? The men involved in the intelligence process are not stupid, the technology they have at their disposal does work. Everyone involved in the system works long, hard hours. They know that men's lives depend on the accuracy of the information they gather, so they check and double-check everything. Yet they are always wrong.

One factor, of course, is common to all spying. Men believe what they want to believe—the classic example is Jack Kennedy's belief in the CIA's assertion that the Cuban people were thoroughly anti-Castro

and would rise up against him at the first small sign of outside support, such as a landing at the Bay of Pigs.

The more important factor is in the broadest sense political. No one, not even we Americans, has yet devised a method of gathering intelligence that can operate without the support of the people. The Battle of the Bulge could never have occurred in France, for example, because while Eisenhower's armies were operating in France his intelligence was superb. He always knew where the Germans were and what they were up to, for the simple reason that the Germans could not hide their movements from the people of France, and the vast majority of Frenchmen wanted the Allies to win. Thus they reported, accurately and truthfully, what they saw. When Ike's armies got to the German border, they lost this advantage, which allowed the Germans to mount a secret attack.

In a war zone, people give information to the side they want to win—that is, they make a political choice. Nothing provides quite so clear or conclusive an answer to the question—whose side is the ordinary Vietnamese on?—than the failure of our intelligence. Every time a Vietnamese peasant tells the truth to the Viet Cong or lies to the Americans, he is casting a vote—the only vote that counts. No intelligence service in the world can operate successfully in such a situation, not even

RALEIGH, N.C.
NEWS & OBSERVER

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Reform Foreign Aid

Congress has been getting a lesson lately in the vicissitudes of the U. S. foreign aid program. "Food for Peace" funds, one committee found, have actually financed war. American grants to help Laotian refugees somehow wound up paying instead for our clandestine military operations there. These are specific parts of a general problem that has helped to give "foreign aid" a bad name.

The problem is control of the cumbersome machinery through which America channels foreign aid and implements foreign policy. John Franklin Campbell, former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, dealt with the problem at length in a magazine article published late last year.

Not counting the cost of Central Intelligence Agency operations, and of keeping U. S. troops on foreign soil, America's overseas programs run up an annual bill estimated at \$5.6 billion. That is a big hunk of money — appropriated and spent with virtually no coordination and too little control. Dozens of agencies are involved in our foreign aid programs, though the most prominent are the State and Defense Departments, CIA, U. S. Information Agency and Agency for International Development. They dicker individually with budget officers and Congress for the funds they use.

Campbell contends: "Ex-

penditure of all government funds abroad should be centrally planned in one place, and the logical place to do it is the State Department. Otherwise there is no assurance that the money serves a coherent national purpose."

He could have added that, indeed, some money serves its opposite purpose. Besides simplifying the implementation of foreign policy, more coordination of foreign aid spending and tighter control over it should promote efficiency and faithfulness to original spending goals.


President Nixon knows the problem Campbell discussed. Last September he suggested to Congress various measures to alleviate it. New "organizational arrangements" for channeling the three basic types of foreign aid (security, humanitarian and development) were recommended. Another proposal was that more U. S. aid money be spent through international agencies. That would be a prudent move for several reasons. Not the least is that too much of this money appears to serve America's own short term designs more than the well-being of the recipients.

Nixon's proposals do not go far enough. They lack sufficient consolidation and control measures. But they do offer a starting point for foreign aid reform. Following recent disclosures about fund diversions, Congress should be ready to make a start.

MILWAUKEE, WISC.
JOURNAL

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GARDNER
THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL

Annual budget message

CHARLOTTE, N.C.
NEWS

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JAN 27 1971

Editorial Research Reports

ARMIES OF SPIES

The United States is still trying to find an acceptable formula for mixing undercover operations with democracy. The latest disclosures that the army has been spying on thousands of civilians again raises questions about the seemingly uncontrolled growth of intelligence operations in this country.

Most of the Army's civilian-watching began in 1967 when it was called in to deal with racial and anti-war disturbances. Ranking officers discovered they had no information on potential troublemakers. An organization called Continental United States Intelligence was set up to get it. Before the unit was disbanded in 1969, it had fed the names of some 18,000 civilians into its computers, dossiers and files.

In the wake of charges that this was the entering wedge of the police state, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird on Dec. 23, 1970, ordered a shakeup of military intelligence operations to place their operations under stricter civilian control. Laird said he wanted to

make sure these activities were "completely consistent with Constitutional rights, all other legal provisions and national security needs."

Protecting civilian rights may not be all that is on Laird's mind. He is also said to be concerned about increasing the efficiency of military intelligence and reducing the high cost. For the most part, the budgets of the various agencies are classified. The fiscal 1971 Defense Department budget requested a total of \$5.2 billion for intelligence and communications. Thomas Ross and David Wise estimated in The Espionage Establishment (1967) that the CIA spends about \$1.5 billion annually.

Most of the past criticism of intelligence operations has been directed at the Central Intelligence Agency. It was blamed for the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, where it not only had charge of planning the operation but carrying it out. The "company"—as it is sometimes known — was also strongly criticized for its handling of the U-2 incident in 1960.

Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over Intelligence Setup

Following is the fifth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — President Nixon has become dissatisfied with the size, cost and loose coordination of the Government's worldwide intelligence operations.

According to members of his staff, he believes that the intelligence provided to help him formulate foreign policy, while occasionally excellent, is not good enough, day after day, to justify its share of the budget.

Mr. Nixon, it is said, has begun to decide for himself what the intelligence priorities must be and where the money should be spent, instead of leaving it largely to the intelligence community. He has instructed his staff to survey the situation and report back within a year, it is hoped—with recommendations for budget cuts of as much as several hundred million dollars.

Not many years ago the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence bureaus were portrayed as an "invisible empire" controlling foreign policy behind a veil of secrecy. Now the pendulum has swung.

The President and his aides are said to suspect widespread overlapping, duplication and considerable "boondoggling" in the secrecy-shrouded intelligence "community."

In addition to the C.I.A., they include the intelligence arms of the Defense, State and Justice Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. Together they spend \$3.5-billion a year on strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, Communist China and other countries that might harm the nation's security.

When tactical intelligence in Vietnam and Germany and reconnaissance by overseas commands is included, the annual figure exceeds \$5-billion, experts say. The Defense Department spends more than 80

per cent of the total, or about \$4-billion, about \$2.5-billion of it on the strategic intelligence and the rest on tactical. It contributes at least 150,000 members of the intelligence staffs, which are estimated at 200,000 people.

Overseeing all the activities is the United States Intelligence Board, set up by secret order by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 to coordinate intelligence exchanges, decide collection priorities, assign collection tasks and help prepare what are known as national intelligence estimates.

The chairman of the board, who is the President's representative, is the Director of Central Intelligence, at present Richard Helms. The other members are Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Ray S. Cline, director of intelligence and research at the State Department; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, head of the National Security Agency; Howard C. Brown Jr., an assistant general manager at the Atomic Energy Commission, and William C. Sullivan, a deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Intelligence men are aware of the President's disquiet, but they say that until now—half-way through his term—he has never seriously sought to comprehend the vast, sprawling conglomeration of agencies. Nor, they say, has he decided how best to use their technical resources and personnel—much of it talented—in formulating policy.

Two Cases in Point

Administration use—albeit, tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance planes to help police the Arab-Israeli cease-fire of last August is considered a case in point. Another was poor intelligence coordination before the abortive Sontag prisoner-of-war raid of No. 21, at which time the C.I.A. was virtually shut out of Pentagon planning.

By contrast, the specialists point out, timely intelligence helps in decision-making.

It was Mr. Cline who spotted the sign of a Soviet nuclear submarine buildup at Cienfuegos,

Cuba, last September. suspicions, based on the arm of a mother ship, plus two conspicuous barges of a type used only for storing a nuclear submarine's radioactive effluent, alerted the White House. That led to intelligence behind-the-scenes negotiations and the President's rewarning to Moscow not to service nuclear armed submarines "in or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the intelligence community resist talking with reporters, but their views over several months with Federal officials deal daily with intelligence matters, with men retiring from intelligence careers with some on active duty indicate that President Nixon and his chief advisers appreciate the need for high-grade intelligence and "consume" eagerly.

The community, for instance, has been providing the President with exact statistics on numbers, deployment characteristics of Soviet missile sites, nuclear submarines and power for the talks with Russians on the limitation of strategic arms.

"We couldn't get off ground at the talks with this extremely sophisticated information base," an official commented. "We don't give our negotiators round figures—about 300 of this weapon. We get it down to the '284 here, here and here.' When our people sit down to negotiate with the Russians they know all about the Russian strategic threat to the U.S.—that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence has its drawbacks, some sources say, for it whets the Administration's appetite. Speaking of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, a Cabinet official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

Estimates in New Form

In the last year Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have ordered a revision in the national intelligence estimates, which are prepared by the C.I.A. after consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some of the future Soviet strategy have been ordered radically revised by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present Soviet capabilities allows Henry and others to criticize us for some sponginess about predicting future Soviet policy," an informed source conceded. "It's pretty hard to look down the road with the same certainty."

Part of the Administration's dissatisfaction with the setup and organization of the

Helms Said to Rate High
Sources close to the White House say that Mr. Nixon and his foreign-policy advisers—Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—respect the professional competence of Mr. Helms, who is 57 and is the first career head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in June, 1966, Mr. Helms has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening discipline and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and among the public. His standing with Congress and among the professionals is high.

According to White House sources, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mr. Helms added authority to coordinate the activities of the other board members. He is reported to have declined.

A major problem, according to those who know the situation, is that while Mr. Helms is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board, his agency spends only about 10 per cent—\$500-million to