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REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

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Quantico, Virginia
June 10, 1955

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Dear Mr. Rockefeller:

At your invitation, a group of eleven persons knowledgeable in many fields important to the American-Soviet Struggle, have met as a Panel at Quantico, Virginia, from 5-10 June, to explore methods of exploiting Communist bloc vulnerabilities at this crucial state of world affairs. As your designated Chairman, and on behalf of my colleagues, I am herewith transmitting the reports and recommendations of our group.

All of us appreciate the freedom of action you gave us to develop our own guidelines of investigation. We soon discovered that several significant vulnerabilities could be identified and that fruitful courses of action could be developed only if we looked at the total political and security problems facing the U.S. at this juncture.

We have no expectation that we have produced either a magic formula for positive U.S. action or a substitute for the staff considerations currently under way in the responsible Government Departments. We offer these recommendations and the papers that underlie them as a supplement to those considerations. It is our hope that responsible officials will find our efforts constructive and that use can be made of the many concrete suggestions included in the Panel results.

The over-all report of the Panel and its four appendices represent a general group consensus. We had neither the time nor the data to make, as individuals, definitive commitments of judgment on all the recommendations and on every line of text. But we forwarded these documents confident that they deserve serious consideration by the Government. We are also submitting ten papers prepared by individual Panel members. Many ideas from them have found their way into our joint recommendations; but time did not permit the Panel to evaluate the texts fully. I personally deem them an extremely interesting product of the week's work.

All of us appreciate the contributions made by governmental representatives toward this Panel and, in particular, the willing help of the responsible officials from your office, the Departments of State and Defense, of CIA, USIA, NSC, and OCB, who took of their precious time to join us periodically in our discussions.

SECRET

-2-

The one impression which stands out in my mind is the unanimous belief of the Panel members that the U.S. now enjoys a significant but transitory period of over-all strength vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. The next two or three years afford the United States the opportunity to negotiate from a strong position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice of essential positions of strength. Such negotiation, along with a vigorous and urgent development of potential Free World strength, could create the conditions for victory in the cold war.

May I express our appreciation for having had this opportunity to serve.

Dr. Frederick Dunn
Director, Center of International Studies

Mr. C. D. Jackson
TIME LIFE

Dr. Ellis A. Johnson
Director, Operations Research Office

Dr. Paul Linebarger
School of Advanced International Studies

Dr. Max Millikan
Center of International Studies, MIT


Dr. Philip Mosely
Director, Russian Institute

Dr. George Pettee
Deputy Director, Operations Research Office

Dr. Stefan Possony
Air Intelligence Specialist, Department of the Air Force

Dr. Hans Speier
RAND Corporation

Dr. Charles A. H. Thomson
Brookings Institution



W. W. Rostow

(Center of International Studies, MIT)
Panel Chairman

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

PURPOSE. This report (1) makes recommendations regarding operational positions and actions the U.S. might take vis-a-vis the USSR (as for example at the coming round of East-West conferences) that will permit the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and (2) offers suggestions for related actions advantageous to the U.S.

The Panel assessed the current strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. It concluded that the next several years afford the United States the opportunity to act from a strong position and to exact from the enemy genuine concessions without sacrifice of deterrent strength by us. A full exploitation of the enemy's transitory position of relative weakness and the Free World's actual and potential foundations for strength requires a wide range of U.S. initiatives and actions which transcend the area of negotiation with the Soviet Union.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of this assessment we develop in our submissions a strategy and a broad tactical line for the forthcoming conferences and we submit the following specific recommendations:

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- 2 -

A. Actions Prior to the Conference.

1. The United States should insist that the Soviets lift the Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.
2. Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK, and to France, that they should be prepared to exchange ratifications of the Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference.

B. Actions During the Conference.

1. The United States should be prepared to make a series of proposals designed to move towards the control of armaments. These include:

a. Discussions of:

(1) A proposed agreement for mutual inspection of military installations, forces, and armaments, without limitations provisions.

(2) A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any nationality to fly over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes.

(Proposed with reservations noted in the text.)

b. Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR; after rejection of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort to win the arms race as the safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to accept a satisfactory arms convention.

2. The United States should be prepared to make a series of proposals concerning exchange of persons, information and goods, covering:

a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade.

b. An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes.

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SECRET

- 3 -

c. A convention providing for free and unhampered international communications for the exchange of information and ideas, conditioned on conclusion of an anti-jamming agreement.

d. Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy and a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of the underdeveloped areas.

3. The United States should pursue the following sequence in dealing with German matters:

a. Rapid implementation of rearmament provisions.

b. Proper conditions for free elections.

c. Free elections.

d. Unification of government.

e. Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining Germany's international status.

f. Withdrawal of troops only after a unified Germany has reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral part of NATO. If Germany abstains from joining NATO, she should be permitted to rearm to a level sufficient to meet her security needs.

4. The United States should take the following actions to bring about greater Allied unity on Far Eastern policy, and to worsen difficulties between the Soviet Union and Red China:

a. Take steps to put strains on the Moscow-Peiping alliance.

b. Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the conference.

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SECRET

- 4 -

c. At least once during the conference, the Department of State should obtain for the President the advice of the Japanese Government on a specific Far Eastern point at issue in the Conference.

C. Actions Outside of the Conference.

Outside of the conference, either concurrently with it or subsequent to it, the United States should take the following actions:

1. General

a. Propose an international scientific conference of all powers producing atomic weapons on the problem of reducing the danger of radioactive fallout.

b. The United States should convene at an early date an exploratory conference to discuss implementation of the economic and other non-military provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.

c. Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great power and treat her as a diplomatic equal in developing Far Eastern policy.

2. In relation to Europe, the United States should:

a. Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, and the provisions of other wartime and postwar agreements relating to the limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding inspection to determine compliance with the limitations of these agreements.

b. Take early and forceful steps to assure improved air defense, passive and active, for our European allies.

c. Seek the establishment, organization and support of research and development in the NATO countries on an ambitious scale.

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

d. Relax to the maximum restrictions preventing the flow of necessary technical intelligence to European scientists working in behalf of a Free World.

e. Request SHAPE to make a maximum effort to find tactical solutions to NATO defense which minimize the possibilities of civilian casualties.

f. Explore seriously concrete recommendations designed to reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning atomic weapons.

g. Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for accelerated economic growth in the underdeveloped countries of the Free World.

3. In relation to Asia, the United States should:

a. Greatly increase the flow of investment resources to the underdeveloped countries, including Japan, South Asia and Southeast Asia.

b. Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that its good relations in the South and Southeast Asia are a matter of interest to the U.S. U.S. diplomatic and other authorities in Formosa should openly sponsor informal news and cultural connections there.

c. Convince Asians that the U.S. is capable and willing to deal by means short of major war, with Communist military aggression.

d. Prevent a Communist take-over in Southern Vietnam.

e. In order to convert a major free world problem into an asset, launch a positive U.S. political and economic program for Formosa.

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REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I	PURPOSE	1
II	THE GENERAL SETTING	1
III	THE OBJECTS OF AN AMERICAN STRATEGY	7
IV	GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STRATEGY	8
V	RECOMMENDATIONS	13
	Appendix A - <u>Estimate of the Situation</u>	
	Appendix B - <u>Proposals to Test Soviet Willingness to Make Concessions and to Improve the U.S. Position</u>	
	Appendix C - <u>The German Question</u>	
	1.- Preliminary Diplomatic Action in Preparation for the Summit Conference	
	2.- U.S. Guidelines for a German Settlement	
	3 - German Elections	
	4 - Possible Proposals for German Unity	
	Appendix D - <u>A Proposal for Graduated Disarmament</u>	

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Summary of Individual Supporting Papers

- Tab 1 - "Soviet Estimate of the Situation"
- Tab 2 - "The Requirements for U.S.-NATO to Win in the Arms Race with the USSR"
- Tab 3 - "Alliance and Coalition Problems"
 - (a) "Does NATO Have a Position of Strength?"
 - (b) "Asia Policy"
 - (c) "Japan"
 - (d) "Measures to Cope with Free-World Fears of the Bomb"
 - (e) "Air Defense of the United States and Western Europe"
 - (f) "Factors Influencing the Morale of Allies"
- Tab 4 - "Straining the Sino-Soviet Alliance" with Annex
- Tab 5 - "An Institute for the Study of Peace"

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June 10, 1955

REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is (1) to make recommendations regarding operational positions and actions the U. S. might take vis-a-vis the USSR (as for example at the coming round of East-West conferences) that will permit the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and (2) to offer suggestions for related actions advantageous to the U. S.

II. THE GENERAL SETTING

A. The current disposition of the Soviet leaders to sit down at the "summit" cannot be traced to a genuine interest on their part to ease any tensions for the sake of peace and harmony. It must be traced to a specific Communist interest in improving the Soviet position in the international struggle for power.

They are afraid of the transitory American superiority in strategic airpower, stockpile, and delivery capabilities. They have realized that this superiority is sufficient to be a guarantee of victory in a major war. In addition, they may be afraid that American strategic airpower will be used in the form of a surprise attack against the Soviet Union. (There is evidence that in recent months Soviet leaders have abandoned the time-honored principle of Soviet military doctrine that mass rather than surprise is the decisive factor in war.) The Soviet leaders may be ready to attribute to

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the U. S. the intention of preventive war which they might indeed hold themselves, if the balance of power were reversed. The apprehension of the Soviet leaders is aggravated by their estimate that a lost war would mean the end of Communism.

In view of this grave outlook, the Soviet leaders are interested in gaining time. They need time to achieve nuclear parity--a goal which they can hope to achieve, for all practical purposes, within three to five years. More generally, they need time to shore up their political position, repair their agricultural difficulties, and develop their economic organization.

B. Assuming that this evaluation of the situation is correct, the United States would play into the hands of the Soviet Union if it were to approach the conference with the primary purpose of easing tension. It should meet the Soviet leaders with the intention to force them to retreat.

Even if the foregoing evaluation of the situation is not correct, the United States cannot lose anything by acting at the beginning in the conviction that the Soviet Union is prepared to make concessions.

For years it has been United States policy that we will negotiate with the Soviet Union only from positions of strength. It is not only true that we now occupy such a transitory position of strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union but also likely that the Soviet leaders act at the present from fear of this position of strength. We should, therefore, exploit this strength by pressing resolutely for an improvement of our position in the international struggle of power.

- 2 -

SECRET

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For years, it has been United States policy that we are ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union only if its leaders show by action rather than words that they are willing to work with us toward the preservation of peace. The Soviets did this in the case of Austria; we should now press this policy further.

Instead of meeting the Soviet leaders on their terms and permitting them to center the discussion around issues of primary interest to them, such as the delay of German rearmament and the splitting of NATO, and reduction of the U.S. atomic advantage through disarmament, the United States should seize the initiative by presenting the Soviet Union with heavy demands for major concessions on their part at a price that is tolerable to us.

The conference may present a unique opportunity to the United States for inflicting a diplomatic defeat upon the Soviet Union, to reassert the ideals of the Free World and to buttress peace under American leadership.

C. Moscow's possible private estimate of military weakness is accompanied by public evidence of Soviet internal difficulties. Soviet leaders may find this profoundly disturbing, since it could lead to the weakening or even the destruction of Communism's ideological momentum and mystique both in Russia and abroad.

Specifically:

1. Communist agricultural policy, a key element in Communist theory and practice, is proving ineffective or worse from one end of the Bloc to the other.

2. The withdrawal from Austria, the performance in Belgrade, unusually rapid vacillations in Soviet policy, and improvements in the

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relative military, economic, and political position in Western Europe have sharply raised expectations in Eastern Europe that the satellite structure might change and Soviet power recede from Eastern Europe.

3. The performance of Soviet leadership since Stalin's death has muddied the Stalinist image of inevitable advance and of Communism as the wave of the future, an impression strongly reinforced by recent Soviet diplomatic actions.

4. It is fundamental that the U.S. should seek in the coming months to exploit to the hilt this perhaps transitory position of Soviet political vulnerability, together with weaknesses in the Soviet's own estimate of their position of which we are not aware, but which we may be able to probe out and capitalize by negotiations from an attitude of strength. Yet our actions must be tempered by realization of the facts that there is no indication that the top Soviet leadership has lost effective control over the Russian or the satellite peoples, and that Soviet military strength is great and on the rise.

D. Schematically, the purposes of Moscow's current moves appear to be:

1. To weaken the American military and political position in Europe and Asia by inducing further U.S. troop withdrawals and depriving us of the use of our present air bases;
2. To weaken or destroy NATO;
3. To induce a cut in military outlays of the U.S. and its allies;

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4. To separate us from our allies by widening the area of "neutrality"; and
 5. To maximize the gap between the American and the allied policy positions in Europe and in Asia.
- E. The major lines of action the Soviets may attempt to follow are:
1. With respect to German unification:
 - a. To propose German unification through free elections coupled with the withdrawal of occupation troops, and to put the blame of failure on supposed American unwillingness to withdraw troops;
 - b. To accept Western terms for free elections in Germany at the price of German withdrawal from WEU and from NATO and to confront us if not now, at some time in the future, with the possibility of German acceptance; or
 - c. In any case, to present proposals for German unity designed to unhinge the American military position in Europe, including NATO and our air bases.
 2. With respect to international control of armaments, either:
 - a. To press hard their current position on control of armaments in an effort to separate the United States from the British and the French; or
 - b. To offer more complete inspection terms of a kind difficult for the U.S. to refuse.

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3. To press for recognition of Communist China and support Communist Chinese steps in the Far East designed to separate the United States from other countries.

F. An appreciation of the opportunities open to the United States in the coming months requires an understanding of the following strengths and weaknesses. Strengths include our present decisive superiority in the arms race; satisfaction on balance in Western Europe with the present NATO-WEU structure; a desire in the Free World that the U.S. should not withdraw its forces from Germany and Europe; relatively greater progress in Western than in Eastern Europe; our "open society"; the continued improvement in the Free World position in the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma; the potentialities of strengthening the political, economic, and military position of Japan and Formosa and the SEATO powers; and the potentialities of strengthening the political and economic position of India and the other Colombo powers.

G. Free World weaknesses include a sense of vulnerability to atomic attack brought about by the fear that the U.S. might initiate or stumble into atomic war as a result of Communist provocation; a sense that the U.S. must respond to Communist aggression either by total war or by inaction; the possible attraction to the opposition in Germany of a Soviet proposal that Germany be reunified by truly free elections at a cost unacceptable to us; lack of an agreed allied position on the Far East; Japanese economic uncertainties; seeming Soviet possession of the initiative in easing tensions; disagreement in the Free World over economic policies and strategic matters; economic uncertainties arising

SECRET

in raw materials and food-producing countries from U.S. commodity price fluctuations; and imperfect confidence in U.S. policies and plans.

(The foregoing appraisal of purposes, strengths and weaknesses is expanded in Appendix A.)

III. THE OBJECTS OF AN AMERICAN STRATEGY

A. The next two years afford the U.S. the opportunity to negotiate from a strong position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice of deterrent strength by us. Such negotiation can create the essential conditions for the winning of the Cold War.

In the conduct of its negotiations, the U.S. should keep in mind the continuing objectives of United States foreign policy:

1. To continue to hold the military balance of power in our favor which requires not only that we neutralize our adversaries' striking power in weapons of mass destruction and the many implementing weapons systems, including air defense and electronic warfare, but also that we continue to develop flexible capabilities to undertake military action short of total war and maintain the will to do so.
2. To increase the military, economic and political strength and unity of the Free World and thus be prepared to forestall, check or defeat Communist efforts at erosion conducted by limited military means, and through propaganda, subversion, and diplomacy.
3. To determine and execute our policies in such a way as to maximize the possibility of changes within the Soviet bloc favorable to the

- 7 -
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U. S. interest, by effectively denying to Moscow the possibilities of consolidation and by steadily holding out peaceful alternatives not incompatible with the Russian national security interest, and at the same time encouraging the Soviet satellites and Communist China to support their own national interests wherever the latter come into conflict with Soviet demands on them.

4. To appreciate and act upon the dramatic new opportunities for maneuver opened to us by the current Soviet defensive posture so that our constant goal, a roll-back of Soviet power in Eastern and Central Europe and in Asia is steadily brought nearer and a Free Europe is brought to life.

IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STRATEGY

In pursuing the objectives outlined above, we should be guided by the following general principles, which govern the mood and attitude with which we approach the conference. Some of these principles should probably be enunciated by the President early in the course of the meeting at the summit. Others relate to our behavior as the conference and the negotiations, which presumably will follow it, proceed. The decision as to how much of what follows should be explicit from the start must depend on professional detailed staff work and the judgment of the responsible negotiators.

1. We will achieve the maximum political and psychological impact from this conference if the U. S. delegation contributes at the outset and maintains throughout a mood and positions of high diplomatic seriousness.

- 8 -

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2. The Cold War has not been a contest of our choosing. We disarmed after the war in the hope that we could place reliance for our security on a system of international agreements. Bitter experience has taught us that this hope was illusory, and that for the present our security would have to be based on our own strength and that of those who allied themselves with us. We should speak and act from our conviction that we are now in a position of relative strength. We should stubbornly maintain and expand this position of strength in cooperation with our allies and other friendly countries until the very day that effective measures are actually in operation which give us solid assurance that we and our allies are safe from the threat of attack. However tempting the prospect of a relaxation of tensions may be, we shall not again make the mistake of confusing talk about a relaxation of tensions with progress toward a fundamental solution of world problems. We should take concrete measures to emphasize our strength and confidence, such as those suggested below.

3. While we are quite prepared to live with the Cold War indefinitely, if necessary, we are determined to explore seriously every real possibility of moving, whether by large or small steps, toward reduction of fundamental conflicts. Continuation of the arms race is imposing heavy costs on the entire world. A large fraction of the world's resources are being diverted from serving the welfare of the peoples of the world to building military establishments which we, and perhaps the Soviets, regard as necessary to security. There are many constructive tasks of building the Soviet civilian economy and raising the standard of

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living of the Soviet people which they have been unable to get on with because so large a part of their energies have gone into the production of weapons. With the further development of modern methods of warfare, these burdens will increase.

4. Even more important, the world has hanging over it the shadow of destructive nuclear warfare, which, as Mr. Malenkov has rightly said, could destroy modern civilization. We shall leave no stone unturned in the pursuit of ways to effect a real reduction in this threat. We have a series of proposals we should make at the appropriate time for taking what we believe to be constructive first steps toward a system of arms limitation. As explained in more detail in Appendix D, we are prepared to accept certain of the May 10 proposals of the Soviets; for example, a reduction of ground forces. We have proposals for the development of a workable inspection system for control of armaments. We also have proposals for considering alleviation of the effects of radioactive fall-out.

5. A fundamental solution to the problem of freeing the world from the spectre of atomic holocaust must be based on a genuinely free Europe, with no occupation troops and no interference in the internal affairs of any country by any outside power. Such a Free Europe, composed of the countries from Turkey to Norway, from Poland to Spain, is a long-run goal of American policy. Only when such a community of nations exists, each free to determine its own course in accord with its own culture and historic traditions, each free to engage in

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economic and cultural intercourse and political association with all other members of the European community of nations, will it be possible to attain European security and cooperation based on common trust and interest.

6. The United States wishes to move toward such a Free Europe just as rapidly as possible. The question is how fast and far the Soviet Union is prepared to go and to what extent our Allies are prepared to support such a policy. We still hold to U.S. policy that the wartime and postwar agreements concerning the Soviet satellites for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the holding of free elections in all the countries should be honored. It is our hope that in agreeing to the conference the Soviet Union had in mind the discussion of serious steps toward a Free Europe.

[Some members of the group believe that there is a real possibility that the Soviets will concede the withdrawal of some or all of their forces even though we are unwilling to discuss the abandonment of NATO. Others believe the likelihood of this is negligible, and any attempt to force this issue diplomatically may lead to a successful concentration of attention by the Soviets on the issue of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Europe which would be most damaging to American interests.

There is, therefore, some disagreement among the members of the group on how far to proceed diplomatically beyond the enunciation of long range American purposes. Some feel we should press diplomatically for the withdrawal of Soviet troops only from Eastern Germany and not from Eastern Europe; others for a total withdrawal from both areas. In connection with withdrawal from either area, we shall press for free

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elections. Some suggest a diplomatic initiative on free elections only. Others hold that to raise this issue at the conference would be unworkable and possibly damaging to Allied unity.⁷

7. The Soviets are likely to raise suggestions for the unification of Germany. A recommended position for the U. S. to take is formulated in Appendix C.

8. With respect to the control of armaments, we should emphasize that some degree of understanding and even trust is essential to any effective armaments control scheme. We suggest a series of proposals for the control of armaments which take into account the Russian proposals of May 10, 1955. Our proposals also look to the improvement of relations and the free exchange of people, ideas, and goods. These proposals call first for the initiation of a system of mutual inspection of armaments, including forces and production facilities without, in the first instance, any provisions for arms limitation. Ultimately, an inspection system, to be effective, should provide for free overflights of aircraft by reciprocally inspected aircraft, however sensitive the USSR may be on this subject.* Proposals also include those for an expansion of economic relations and for free exchange of information and ideas, both by the flow of written materials and by unobstructed radio broadcasting, and a proposal for the freer access of persons to all countries. These are all spelled out in more detail in Appendixes B and D.

*Note: Aside from our general assumption that before implementation of all these suggestions will be considered carefully by the Departments, it is recommended that this proposal be examined with particular skepticism by the Department of Defense.

SECRET

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

On the whole range of questions we examined in accordance with the objectives defined in para. III A above, we wish to make the following suggestions for action related to the forthcoming Four Power conference:

A. Actions Prior to the Conference.

1. The United States should insist that the Soviets lift the Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.

2. Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK and to France that they should be prepared to exchange ratifications of the Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference.

B. Actions During the Conference.

1. The United States should be prepared to make a series of proposals designed to move towards the control of armaments. These include:

a. Discussions of:

(1) A proposed agreement for mutual inspection of military installations, forces, and armaments, without limitations provisions. (Appendix B).

(2) A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any nationality to fly over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes. (Proposed with reservations noted in the text. See Appendix B.)

b. Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR (Appendix D); after rejection of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort to win the arms race as the safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to accept a satisfactory arms convention.

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2. The United States should be prepared to make a series of proposals concerning exchange of persons, information and goods, covering:

a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade.

(Appendix B).

b. An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes. (Appendix B).

c. A convention providing for free and unhampered international communications for the exchange of information and ideas, conditioned on conclusion of an anti-jamming agreement. (Appendix B).

d. Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy and a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of the under-developed areas. (Appendix B).

3. The United States should pursue the following sequence in dealing with German matters:

a. Rapid implementation of rearmament provisions.

b. Proper conditions for free elections.

c. Free elections .

d. Unification of government .

e. Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining Germany's international status.

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f. Withdrawal of troops only after a unified Germany has reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral part of NATO. If Germany abstains from joining NATO, she should be permitted to rearm to a level sufficient to meet her security needs (Appendix C).

4. The United States should take the following actions to bring about greater Allied unity on Far Eastern policy, and to worsen difficulties between the Soviet Union and Red China:

a. Take steps to put strains on the Moscow-Peiping alliance. (Tab 4)

b. Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the conference (Tab 3c).

c. At least once during the conference, the Department of State should obtain for the President the advice of the Japanese Government on a specific Far Eastern point at issue in the Conference. (Tab 3c).

C. Actions outside of the Conference.

Outside of the conference, either concurrently with it or subsequent to it, the United States should take the following actions:

1. General

a. Propose an international scientific conference of all powers producing atomic weapons on the problem of reducing the danger of radioactive fallout (Para IV above. See also Tab 3(d)).

b. The United States should convene at an early date an

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exploratory conference to discuss implementation of the economic and other non-military provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.

c. Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great power and treat her as a diplomatic equal in developing Far Eastern policy. (Tab 3(c)).

2. In relation to Europe, the United States should:

a. Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, and the provisions of other wartime and postwar agreements relating to the limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding inspection to determine compliance with the limitations of these agreements (Appendix B).

b. Take early and forceful steps to assure improved air defense, passive and active, for our European allies (Tab 3(a), 3(d), 3(e)).

c. Seek the establishment, organization and support of research and development in the NATO countries on an ambitious scale (Tabs 2, 3a and 3 c).

d. Relax to the maximum restrictions preventing the flow of necessary technical intelligence to European scientists working in behalf of a Free World (Tab 2).

e. Request SHAPE to make a maximum effort to find tactical solutions to NATO defense which minimize the possibilities of civilian casualties (Tab 3e).

- 16 -
SECRET

SECRET

f. Explore seriously concrete recommendations designed to reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning atomic weapons.

(Illustrative, see Tab 3(b)).

g. Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for accelerated economic growth in the underdeveloped countries in the free world.

(See Tab 3(b))

3. In relation to Asia, the United States should:

a. Greatly increase the flow of investment resources to the underdeveloped countries; including Japan, South Asia and Southeast Asia (Tab 3(b)).

b. Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that its good relations in the South and Southeast Asia are a matter of interest to the U.S. U. S. diplomatic and other authorities in Formosa should openly sponsor informal news and cultural connections there. (Tab 3(b)).

c. Convince Asians that the U.S. is capable and willing to deal by means short of major war, with Communist military aggression (Tab 3b).

d. Prevent a Communist take-over in Southern Vietnam (Tab 3(b)).

e. In order to convert a major free world problem into an asset, launch a positive U. S. political and economic program for Formosa (Tab 3(b)).

- 17 -
SECRET

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The following estimate is consistent with and supports the general strategy set forth in the basic paper.

I. AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY PROBLEMS.

The forthcoming period of several months, during which several East-West conferences will occur, must be viewed in relation to longer-run American objectives, to the general character of the security problems we confront, and to the specific conditions now prevailing.

1. It is the object of U.S. foreign policy to protect American society, not merely by protecting American territory but also by denying to any hostile power superiority of military and ideological power in Eurasia (and ultimately, perhaps, Africa and Latin America.) The USSR and Communist China actively seek, as a continuing goal, to gain that superiority by reducing or eliminating US influence and power in both European and Asian fringes of the Eurasian land-mass.

2. The whole of our effort to meet this challenge proceeds in the context of the arms race, spearheaded by the development and large-scale production of weapons of mass destruction and by the development of ever greater capabilities both for delivery and defense. This arms race is now at a particularly acute stage, and will remain so for many years.* It is probable that for the present and for a relatively brief future period we hold important advantages. Our adversary's atomic stockpile and delivery system are temporarily limited, and therefore he is extremely anxious to avoid a major war because we might win it if it broke out,

*See Tab 2 - The Requirements for US-NATO to Win in the Arms Race with the USSR.

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even though at the risk of grave damage to us and certainly at the cost of extremely serious damage to our allies. Because of the technological acceleration of the arms race and the nature of our adversary, we run the risk that he may, at some stage, achieve a technological breakthrough, and that at that time he would be prepared to exploit his advantage by initiating an attack on the United States. Or he might use his superiority for large-scale atomic blackmail, against the United States or other powers. Even without a technological breakthrough, our opponent could gain such superiority if he maintains his effort and we relax ours.

The United States will not exploit its current advantage by initiating general war. If with great energy and imagination we maintain our superiority in the arms race, we may be able to neutralize the enemy's developing striking power and to best his defenses by further advances of our striking power, thereby continuing to make major war unattractive to him. This is a minimum condition for assuring our security, not a policy for winning the cold war.

3. In its effort to win the cold war, United States foreign policy faces four major tasks:

(a) To continue to hold the military balance of power in our favor which requires not only that we neutralize our adversaries' striking power in weapons of mass destruction and the many implementing weapons systems, including air defense and electronic warfare, but also that we continue to develop flexible capabilities to undertake military action short of total war and maintain the will to do so.

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(b) To increase the military, economic and political strength and unity of the Free World and thus be prepared to forestall, check or defeat communist efforts at erosion conducted by limited military means, and through propaganda, subversion and diplomacy.

(c) To determine and execute our policies in such a way as to maximize the possibility of changes within the Soviet bloc favorable to the U.S. interest, by effectively denying to Moscow the possibilities of consolidation and expansion, and by steadily holding out peaceful alternatives not incompatible with the Russian national security interest, and at the same time encouraging the Soviet satellites and Communist China to support their own national interests wherever the latter comes into conflict with Soviet demands on them.

(d) To bring about, and systematically work toward, a roll-back of Soviet power in Eastern and Central Europe, and in Asia.

II. PROBABLE SOVIET MOTIVES

The converging factors which have probably led Moscow to undertake the current diplomatic offensive are the following:

1. Present Soviet inferiority in strategic air power in conjunction with their realization that for a limited period of time US air power is able to win a major war and to destroy Communism in Russia by surprise attack.
2. Conflicting economic demands and strains within the Soviet satellite economies and societies.
3. The possibility of an effective WEU, including Western Germany.

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4. Conceivably, the unsettled state of the top leadership position in Russia.

5. Soviet desire to stabilize the situation in Europe in anticipation of a crisis in the Far East.

The purposes of this offensive appear to be these: to weaken the American military and political position in Europe and Asia by inducing further U.S. troop withdrawals or depriving us of the use of our present air bases; to weaken or destroy NATO; to induce a cut in military outlays of the U.S. and its allies; to separate us from our allies by widening the area of "neutrality"; and to maximize the gap between the American power positions in Europe and in Asia.

For the present phase it seems likely that Moscow judges the possibilities of expansion of Communist power to be more favorable in Asia and in other underdeveloped parts of the world than in Europe. A softening of Soviet-engendered tensions in Europe may be the prelude to more vigorous Communist Chinese expansion efforts in Asia, where Moscow and Peiping may judge Free World capabilities and cohesion to be inadequate. By lowering the temperature in Europe in advance of a new crisis in Asia, the Soviet leadership may hope to strain the free world alliance system, possibly to the breaking point; perhaps to isolate the U.S., or, in the case of armed conflict between Communist China and the U.S., to make sure that the Soviet Union will not be militarily involved.

In any case, the current phase of Soviet policy seems designed to buy time to build up a future position of greater strength based on atomic parity with, or superiority over the U. S., from which a more

SECRET

effective political offensive might be launched.

III. POSSIBLE SOVIET MOTIVES

1. The possibility that the present Soviet diplomatic offensive is a cover for an early surprise military attack on the U.S. is relatively less likely than any of the foregoing, but it can not be ruled out.

2. It is even less likely that Moscow now seriously intends to seek security by collective means and to devote resources so released to long-term strengthening of the Soviet systems and the Soviet bloc. Within the Soviet Union there may be some leaders who would prefer to devote marginal disposable resources to strengthening the Soviet Bloc within its present territories, and therefore to restrain the rising tempo of the arms race by limiting immediate Soviet ambitions and risks. While these leaders may have some influence, there is no valid evidence that their tactics will be followed. It is judged to be one major American purpose at the forthcoming conferences to explore the existence of such motives or elements in the Soviet camp and to take actions, compatible with the U.S. interest, to encourage the ascendancy of those devoted to collective security.

IV. FREE WORLD VULNERABILITY TO PROBABLE SOVIET STRATEGY

1. The sense of vulnerability to atomic attack; the fear of the U.S. initiating or stumbling into atomic war particularly in view of the fact that its weapons superiority may be short-lived; the susceptibility to "atomic blackmail"; and dependence on allies for the use of U.S. air

SECRET

SECRET

bases and atomic weapons in case of war.

2. The sense that the United States is caught up in a position where it must respond to Communist aggression either by total war or by inaction.

3. Seeming Soviet posture of initiative in easing tensions.

4. The attraction to the opposition in the Federal Republic of a Soviet proposal that Germany be reunified on the basis of truly free elections but that foreign troops be withdrawn.

5. Disagreements in the Free World over East-West trade.

6. Lack of an agreed position on steps that must be taken regarding the Far East.

7. The uncertainty of the Japanese economic situation.

8. Disparity in strategic and tactical thinking between the U.S. and its allies due to security restrictions on weapons data required for responsible thinking.

9. Lack of confidence among many Free World elements in the U.S. policies and plans due to the appearance of purely empirical improvisation on our side, lacking in any general or logical purpose except to oppose our adversary.

V. FREE WORLD STRENGTHS

1. Our present superiority in the arms race, which may be transitory unless the U.S. takes corrective measures.

2. Increasing strength of NATO and satisfaction in Western Europe with the present NATO-WEU structure.

SECRET

SECRET

3. Free World desire that U.S. not withdraw forces from Germany and Western Europe.
4. Relatively greater progress in Western than in Eastern Europe.
5. Our "open" society--we can accept many kinds of relaxation and normalization they can not accept.
6. Consolidation of internal security in the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma, leaving only the Associated States currently vulnerable in Southeast Asia.

- 7 -
SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX B to
Report of Quantico
Vulnerabilities Panel

Proposals to Test Soviet Willingness

To Make Concessions And to Improve the U. S. Position

The following proposals are consistent with the general policy advocated in the basis report. They are premised on the belief that both the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in avoiding an all-out nuclear conflict. Justification for the possible use of these proposals at the forthcoming conference is set forth in Section III.

I. The Proposals

The long-run objective of both East and West is a system of arms control and collective security on which we can all rely and in which we can all have confidence. It will take time to devise and construct such a system. At its core must lie a free exchange of information on armaments and a comprehensive system of inspection tested by trial and error.

The following specific proposals are suggested:

1. An agreement for mutual inspection of military installations, weapons, and armaments. Until experience has been developed on the feasibility of such inspection, this agreement would make no provision for arms limitation. Its purpose would be to provide knowledge and evidence on the basis of which a control plan could be devised.

2. A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any nationality to fly freely over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes. The possibility of abuse of this right could be prevented by the establishment of safely located control points for the international inspection

SECRET

APPENDIX B

-2-

and registration of aircraft for flights across international boundaries.* The convention would be so drawn as not to interfere in any way with any nation's right to control for economic reasons commercial activities of foreign aircraft.

3. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade. We are eager to explore proposals for an expansion of economic relations between nations in the Soviet orbit and those in the rest of the world. We take it as agreed that there should be some control over international traffic in strictly military items, but we are prepared to re-examine existing policies with respect to other items in an attempt to normalize international economic relations. The welfare of the Soviet peoples could be materially advanced if the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe took more advantage of opportunities to secure food, consumers goods, and the like through trade with the rest of the world.

4. An agreement for greatly increasing the freedom of persons to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes. We are ready to affirm our willingness freely to grant visas to Soviet citizens and in other ways to encourage those private exchanges of views and experiences on which international understanding rests if the Soviet Union is prepared to consider similar measures.

5. A convention providing for free and unhampered international communication for the exchange of information and ideas. We will give up all restrictions now in effect in the West on the import of printed

* While it is assumed that all suggestions will be carefully staffed it is recommended that this particular proposal be examined thoroughly by the Department of Defense.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX B

-3-

materials and other communications if you will enter into an anti-jamming agreement.

In addition we would like to press forward with other proposals already made including:

6. The plan for pooling information and facilities for the exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

7. A worldwide plan for a fund for economic development of underdeveloped areas in which both we and the Soviets would participate. The idea here would be to render this kind of aid cooperative rather than competitive between East and West as it now threatens to become. (Reference should be made to the President's speech of April 19, 1953).

II. Comment

1. Our problem at the forthcoming conference is to achieve for the United States a posture of pushing aggressively and realistically for the reduction of international conflict without abandoning any positions of strength important to our security.

2. It is virtually certain that we would have to reject as unsafe any proposals for the limitation of atomic armaments made by the Russians at the conference since such proposals could be acceptable to us only if a complex inspection scheme were fully worked out and tested in advance.

3. A key political problem of the conference is thus to find a posture which will convince our allies and the neutral nations that we have a positive program for promoting real steps toward the reduction of conflict in general and some progress toward disarmament in particular.

SECRET

S E C R E T

It is submitted that these proposals could have this effect.

The stage should be set for them by an opening statement explaining persuasively why, after a period of mutual distrust such as we have been through, a prerequisite to the consideration of a real as against a paper security system for Europe is the development of normalized relations between the East and West in a number of matters not directly affecting security. We must each develop confidence that we know and understand the position and purposes of the other. A helpful factor in achieving this would be a much more extensive interchange of persons, goods, and ideas than has been possible in the face of the restrictions on such interchange both of us have set up since the war.

The tone of the opening statement should be cool and serious, avoiding all propaganda flavor. It should try to evoke sympathetic responses in some Soviet minds by suggesting that we can understand that they have some of the same doubts and worries about the arms race that we have. It should make clear that initially we are making these suggestions bilaterally without fanfare, and with the intent of securing serious consideration of them by the Soviets, not of putting propaganda pressure on them.

The proposals should be put forward not as a package, but as a collection of ideas any or all of which we would be glad to talk about. * The Soviets should be put in a position of either rejecting all of them, one by one, or agreeing to talk about one or more of them. Every one of them involves concessions the Soviets will, for a variety of reasons, find it difficult to make. All of them involve concessions on our part

* FOOTNOTE: No agreement was reached on the point that the proposals should be put forward "as a collection of ideas any or all of which we would be glad to talk about." Some members felt that the trade proposal will be a basis to obtain concessions on the other proposals, and that a solution should be sought in which the Soviets accept the trade proposal exclusively.

SECRET

APPENDIX B

-5-

but in no case do these concessions threaten our security. Each will be regarded by large and important segments of world public opinion as reasonable and their rejection by the Soviets as evidence that they are not really ready to work toward international agreements favoring peace.

These proposals are set forth here without reference to the difficulties that might arise in trying to make them acceptable to the American public. Although there may be serious difficulties in this respect, it is believed that if the President supports the proposals vigorously and makes plain that what we get for these concessions is major concessions in return, he should be able to carry the country with him.

The proposals are designed to accomplish the following effects:

1. They should help to reverse in many quarters in Western Europe and in Asia the unfavorable image of the U.S. as a trigger-happy militaristic power, uninterested in resolving the cold war and abandoning its liberal tradition of dedication to an open society. Whereas our actual policies have not been as restrictive as many persons in Europe and Asia believe, the impression is widespread that we are hysterically restricting reasonable travel to the U.S., that it was interfering with freedom of communication by the seizure of what we designate as subversive material, that our policies are a major obstacle to the substantial expansion of East-West trade which would occur in the absence of this barrier, etc.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX B

-6-

If the Soviets reject all of these proposals, it will be possible for us to make abundantly clear where the responsibility for restrictions on free movement of people, ideas, and goods really lies. If they accept any of these proposals, we will be credited with important steps forward in lifting the Iron Curtain. With specific reference to the East-West trade issue, it is our conviction that if the Soviets agree to discuss expanded East-West trade, it will rapidly become apparent that there is very much less in this for our allies than some of them may have thought.

2. At some point, not during the conference, perhaps, but after it, we should make every effort to spread the knowledge of these proposals through the USSR and especially the Satellites. The things we are proposing are in part actually and in part in a symbolical sense some of the things that the peoples of the Iron Curtain area most desire.

3. If these proposals are put forward in a serious vein and so designed as to have the maximum possible chance of acceptance, their presentation may have great intelligence value in revealing to us just how far the Soviet regime is prepared to go to establish its willingness to make concessions in each of a number of directions. These proposals lie along a continuum of acceptability. It is almost certain that the Soviets would have to respond favorably to a proposal for expanded trade. It is entirely possible that they would consider some form of agreement for increased freedom of movement of persons. It is not at all inconceivable that they would accept some form of inspection system, although we would probably have to insist on a system unacceptable to them. It

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX B

-7-

is almost certain that they will reject the free overflight proposal. Nor are they likely to abandon their jamming program. By testing them all along this line we can get some impressions as to how far they are prepared to go. In addition, we may be able to observe in the details of the Soviet reaction some differences of view among various elements of the Soviet leadership which would be most useful to us in appraising to what extent there are policy disagreements in the upper levels.

4. Finally, these proposals, if made with this end in view, might have some effect in widening the actual perception of possible alternative courses of action amongst the Soviet bureaucracy itself. Even if the very top leadership is completely unified in its conception of the proper strategy, these proposals are bound to come to the attention of persons further down in the hierarchy who may, at some later date, achieve positions of great responsibility in the USSR. If any such persons entertain in the backs of their minds conceptions of how the Soviet Union might conduct itself which are more liberal and less restrictive than those characterizing current policy, it is to our advantage to take every opportunity to bring such speculation into the forefront of their attention. We cannot, of course, be sure that proposals of this kind would have any such effect but it is at least a possibility which we should exploit if it exists.

(Note - As stated in the main report at p. 11, there was not complete agreement among the panel on all issues, and the lack of unanimity applies to some parts of this Appendix.)

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel

The German Question

This appendix consists of four companion papers relating to various aspects of the German unification issue. These are:

- I. Preliminary Diplomatic Action in Preparation for the Summit Conference.
- II. U. S. Guidelines for a German Settlement.
- III. German Elections.
- IV. Possible Proposals for German Unity.

These proposals are consistent with the general strategy advocated in the basic paper.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

I. A PRELIMINARY DIPLOMATIC ACTION IN PREPARATION FOR
THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Very frequently in preparation for a strong position at international conferences, the Soviet Union has made systematic displays of strength, and it is doing the same at the present time. These demonstrations of strength have included fly-bys in Moscow, and particularly, the imposition of a camouflaged blockade on the free sectors of Berlin. These actions are designed to put the U.S. on the defensive and to wear out American negotiators even beforehand. A secondary consideration in imposing the blockade was to force bilateral conversations between Bonn and Pankow.

It is, therefore, necessary even before the commencement of the conference, for the U.S. to make it clear that it will not assume a defensive posture; but that, on the contrary, it will put the Soviets into a defensive frame of mind. Since Germany may be a central topic at the conference, it is indispensable that the U.S. demonstrate from the very beginning that it will not tolerate Soviet skullduggery. Without such an American demonstration of strength, public opinion support in Germany may not be entirely secure.

It is suggested that without delay a secret, preferably three-power, note be dispatched to Moscow demanding that the various blockade measures inhibiting the Berlin traffic be lifted forthwith and that any payments made in compliance with those restrictions be reimbursed. (It may be possible to ask that such a reimbursement take the form of financial support to East German refugees in Western Germany.) The note should state

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 2 -

that the fate of the conference will depend upon Soviet compliance and it should intimate that if no such compliance were forthcoming, the U.S. may not attend the conference. Concurrently with the secret note, we might state publicly that the U.S. is willing to use its engineer forces to rehabilitate the road into Berlin, the alleged poor condition of which furnished the justification for the toll.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 3 -

II. U.S. GUIDELINES FOR A GERMAN SETTLEMENT

There are a number of basic issues affecting unification of Germany. The combinations of solutions to each of these issues, including the sequential order in which individual issues may be solved, are so numerous that greatest care is required to prevent the Soviets from exploiting the complexity of an opaque situation.

What are the Basic Issues?

1. Elections

This problem is discussed in detail in a companion paper.

Desirable - The elections are to be held after an initial democratization of the East German Government, and after the means of pressure by the Soviets and the East German Communists have been reduced or eliminated. The electoral system which is in force in West Germany should be applied throughout the entire country, and the East German electoral system should be scrapped. International supervision is another indispensable condition. The elections are to be held as a first step in the unification of Germany.

Acceptable - The initial democratization of the East German Government, including the reconstitution of parties, is an essential condition of free elections, but does not require a reconstitution of the East German Government. If the Western German electoral system is unacceptable, an entirely new election law should be negotiated.

Unacceptable - Any situation in which the full freedom of elections is impaired. The principle of free elections cannot be bargained away with the Soviets for any purpose.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 4 -

Timing - During the negotiations for elections and during the election period, the rearming of West Germany must be pursued actively and American troops must not be withdrawn.

2. The Rearming of West Germany and All German Security.

Desirable - West Germany must be rearmed as presently planned. It is imperative that enabling legislation in the German Bundestag provide for the implementation of the Paris Agreements to the full. If possible, the time schedule for West German rearmament should be accelerated. Moreover, a strong NATO air defense system must be created with dispatch and the German component of this system be recognized as crucial. Provision shall be made upon unification to integrate individual members of the growing East German forces into an all-German military establishment.

Acceptable - In general, even minor reductions of the rearmament program and minor stretch-outs should be resisted, not encouraged, although their effect would not be disastrous. It is a matter of quantities.

Unacceptable - A substantial stretch-out or the abandonment of the present program for West German rearmament must be resisted strongly, as this might encourage Kremlin belief that Western German rearmament could be blocked by repeated negotiations.

Timing - The fastest West German rearmament is the most desirable. Any discussion of limiting or slowing down the West German rearmament effort prior to, or as condition of, free elections is to be avoided. The rearmament of West Germany should be completed in the period of clear-cut American military-air superiority.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 5 -

3. Status of Foreign Military Forces in Germany

Desirable - Any change in deployment levels (except as outlined in the accompanying proposal concerning the establishment of a free corridor to Berlin) should be rejected. The Western allies must decide firmly that during the transition period their forces will not be reduced, let alone withdrawn.

Acceptable - Within each zone the foreign forces may be redeployed to limited areas. All sides agree to a proportionate relation of total force levels in both East and West Germany, based on the area and population of each of the two zones. It would be less desirable but still acceptable, if there were an eventual agreement to reduce foreign forces to token strength, provided that German rearmament proceeds at a rapid pace and that this reduction in foreign forces be delayed until a large German Force has come into existence.

Unacceptable - A reduction of foreign forces and involving the de facto elimination of American and other Western armed strength from the German rearmament, is totally unacceptable. (Due to geographical conditions, a Western withdrawal from Germany cannot be paired with a Russian withdrawal from Eastern Germany to Poland but must be paired with a Russian withdrawal behind the Russian border.)

Timing - Western deployment in Germany in whatever form decided upon, must be maintained until the formation of a unified government with which a peace treaty can be signed.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 6 -

4. The National Structure of Germany

Desirable - Germany should be reconstituted as a free, sovereign, democratic, self-reliant and fully unified nation.

Acceptable - As a temporary measure, the existence of two Germanies is acceptable, especially if it should be possible to hold democratic elections in East Germany. The maintenance of the present status is acceptable for a limited period, provided the United States gives convincing evidence that it favors the early unification of Germany, and will work actively for this objective.

Unacceptable - Any direct or indirect encroachment by East Germany or Soviet Russia on the West German Republic, including any attempts to limit the West German Government's freedom of action and interfere with the German participation in the NATO alliance, must be guarded against.

Timing - The unification of the two German governments must follow and should not precede all-German free elections. However, it would be desirable if the East German Government, prior to elections, would assume gradually the character of a coalition government.

5. German Borders

Desirable - The U.S. does not recognize present East German boundaries as fixed. The definitive delineation of German borders must take into account both Polish and German national interests. The Saar also poses a difficult question but no comments on this issue will be made in this paper.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 7 -

Acceptable - The present Eastern frontier is left intact, provided the unified German government consents to a provisional status quo. In this case, a stipulation should be made that the frontier will be subject to future negotiations within a specified time limit.

Unacceptable - Any permanent acceptance and legalization of Germany's Eastern frontier.

Timing - The frontier question should be brought up only after Germany has been unified and an all-German government is able to assume responsibility for any settlement.

6. Limitations on German Sovereignty

Desirable - Ultimately, German sovereignty must be fully restored. Limitations on this sovereignty, if any, should be highly temporary or be identical with limitations placed upon the sovereignty of other nations by mutual consent. No sovereignty limitations should be placed on Germany without the German Government concurring as a full and free partner.

Acceptable - The Western powers, acting jointly with the West German Government, might undertake to offer some security safeguards subject to ratification by an all-German parliament. Such safeguards would be designed to allay Russian fears about the reconstitution of German offensive military strength. However, it is important to protect the right of the all-German government to participate in NATO. As a variant, if Germany were to abstain from joining NATO, it must not be prevented from acquiring defense forces deemed adequate by her to satisfy all German security needs. Faced by this alternative, the Soviets might prefer a relatively weakly-armed

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 8 -

Germany as a member of NATO, as against a very strongly armed but neutral Germany.

Unacceptable - Any limitations imposed upon Germany unilaterally precluding German rearmament or limiting her freedom of political choice should be rejected flatly. Similarly, any temporary limitations on armaments designed largely to allow the Soviets to gain or increase technological time lead must be rejected.

Timing - The question of armaments limitations of any form should not be considered before the formation of an all-German government.

7. The Timing of the Peace Treaty

The peace treaty should be negotiated after the reconstitution of a unified German government. Preferably, in order to avoid pressure, the peace treaty should be negotiated after the levels of foreign troops stationed in Germany have been balanced by prior agreement. (See above under Status of Foreign Military Forces in Germany)

General Timing

The following sequence seems to lie in the Russian interest: abandonment of West German rearmament plans -- the immediate end of occupation -- elections without prior establishment of proper conditions -- the unification of the two governments without prior elections -- the establishment of a unified government with strong Communist participation -- the right to reoccupy Germany -- and the conclusion of a peace treaty predetermining and limiting the international status of Germany, and imposing stringent armaments limitations.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 9 -

The following sequence seems to lie in the American interest: rapid implementation of the Western German rearmament program (Paris agreement) -- creation of proper conditions for free elections (including, perhaps, the creation of a free zone around Berlin) -- free elections -- the unification of the government -- the conclusion of a peace treaty which does not predetermine the international status of Germany -- the end of the occupation at a time when Germany has reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral part of NATO.

The above U.S. conditions for settlement could possibly be abandoned if the Soviet Union were willing to pay a heavy price for the prevention of German rearmament. With the concurrence of West Germany, the United States, Britain and France could agree to release Germany from its NATO obligations and to consent to a strongly rearmed and neutral Germany, provided the Soviet Union evacuates the territory of the European satellites and commits itself not to interfere in the political affairs of the reconstituted satellite governments. Further, the Soviet Union must consent to genuinely free elections throughout the satellite areas, leading to the establishment of democratic and sovereign governments (these elections to be organized in a similar way as outlined in the paper on German Elections), and it must give up all reoccupation rights.

It is doubtful whether the Soviets would agree to such a massive reversal. It is more likely that they will try to achieve a Western withdrawal from West Germany and merely agree to withdraw to the Polish border. This "solution" would be contrary to American interests.

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 10 -

III. GERMAN ELECTIONS

The mere proclamation of free elections will not, by itself, insure that elections will be held in such a way as to reflect the true opinions of the voters. The East Germans at the present moment are unaccustomed to vote. Despite the absence of Soviet pressure, if this could be achieved, they may be psychologically handicapped and fearful of reprisals, may vote the Soviet ticket. Furthermore, there are many technical difficulties which must be faced explicitly in order to avoid Soviet traps.

In view of these difficulties it is considered inadvisable simply to agree on free elections and to disregard the prior establishment of proper conditions. It is believed that the elements outlined below may serve in the development of a U.S. plan.

As a first step, the occupying powers should declare that they will not interfere in the domestic affairs of Germany, either East or West, and that during the pre-election month they will enforce very stringent curfew regulations preventing free circulation of troops among the German population.

Both German governments (which in practice means the East German Government) should promulgate a bill of rights, including strong safeguards against arbitrary police actions and unwarranted arrest.

Elections should be preceded by the establishment of a Four Power Commission which shall have the right to review the cases of all imprisoned persons under sentence or detained for investigation, and to order the release of those imprisoned for political motives. Simultaneously, a

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 11 -

general political amnesty and the dissolution of all detention camps will be put into effect. All subsequent political arrests and all complaints of pressure and discrimination will be reported and adjudicated by this Four Power Commission voting by majority, and not unanimity.

Concurrent with the elaboration of such a protective system, political parties should be reestablished in Eastern Germany, with the right to hold meetings, publish and distribute political literature, use free radio time, etc. It would be necessary to allow those political parties to become going concerns before elections can be held in fact. Candidates and other spokesmen certified by the Commission shall receive full freedom of movement and be guaranteed immunity against unreasonable restrictions in all parts of Germany.

It would be useful to grant immunity not only to those candidates who are actually elected, but even to candidates so that they cannot be punished for political acts perpetrated in the period of their candidacy, even if they should fail to get elected.

As a most desirable variant, it may be suggested that the East German Government should be enlarged to include members of other parties. In particular, the ministries of justice and interior, and the police shall be responsible to the government as a whole and be administered by impartial civil servants appointed by the government as a whole.

It might be inadvisable to hold political elections without testing first the safeguards of the new machinery. Hence, prior to all-German parliamentary elections, free elections for municipalities and Lander

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 12 -

governments, etc., should be held.

All-German elections must not only be free but also secret. They should be supervised by the occupying powers jointly, each supervisory commission operating under the chairmanship of a neutral power who also would be in charge of counting the ballots and certifying the results. (Prior to election, these commissions should be in charge of drawing up the lists of persons eligible to vote; this census will make it possible to identify persons detained by the Soviets and, subsequently, to ask for their release.)

Although the procedure, as outlined, seems cumbersome, it ought to be recognized that intermediary steps will have to be taken between the date of the agreement on free elections and the elections themselves. According to this procedure the negotiations for a basic agreement will be lengthy, and this time should be utilized fully to speed the re-arming of Western Germany. However, once the agreement on free elections has been reached, it should be implemented as rapidly as possible, at the latest within six months; provided that all the required preparatory steps be accomplished before the elections, and according to a tight timetable.

As a further variant to be proposed only in the event that agreement cannot be reached on the holding of all-German elections, consideration should be given to the question of holding elections for two German parliaments, under the same safeguards as outlined above. Once there are two democratic German governments and legislatures, the modality of the unification of Germany could be left up to them for determination.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 13 -

As to the electoral system, the United States should press for the adoption of the electoral law valid in the Federal Republic. In case of determined resistance, a different electoral system might be considered.

The Four Power Commission shall establish schools for the training of German officials in the conduct of free elections.

It must be understood that the agreement on elections will be invalidated by the Four Power Commission voting by majority if and when the various steps stipulated are not being carried out.

The United States should leave no doubt that it will accept the results of those elections only if they were genuinely free and not vitiated by fraudulent practices.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 14 -

IV. POSSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR GERMAN UNITY

1. The problem of German unification probably cannot be unravelled by one spectacular diplomatic stroke. The problem is to bring about, by a series of orderly steps, the establishment of a unified, free, sovereign and self-reliant Germany without endangering the present security position of the United States and the Western Allies in Europe. The United States should propose a program containing the precise steps through which the orderly and democratic unification of Germany can be accomplished.

On the assumption that a general solution for German unity will not be reached, the United States might have available several fall-back positions designed to demonstrate our intention to proceed with a realistic program for German unification. Two such proposals follow.

2. A Limited Approach to German Unification

Evacuation of Berlin

Berlin shall be evacuated by the military forces of the West and the Soviet Union. Berlin is defined to mean the city within its historical limits plus an area of 5 to 10 kilometers beyond the city limits.

A corridor, 50 km in width, shall be established between Western Germany and Berlin, and all Soviet forces shall be withdrawn from this corridor in which free circulation of Germans shall be allowed.

The corridor and the Berlin enclave shall be declared a free zone in which neither the government of Western Germany nor that of Eastern Germany, nor any occupying power, shall have any jurisdiction. (While there is agreement that it would be in the U.S. and German interests if

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 15 -

the Russians permitted the establishment of a free corridor to Berlin, no agreement was reached on the evacuation of military forces from Berlin. Some hold that the withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin would undermine German confidence in U.S. intentions to stay in Germany. Some hold that the establishment of a free Berlin would be hailed as a symbol and token of the future reunification of Germany.)

Establishment of an All-German Commerce and Postal Assembly (Wirtschaftskammer) which shall have jurisdiction over domestic trade, transportation, and postal communication.

Membership in the Assembly should be determined by universal, nationwide suffrage and secret ballot. (See separate proposals on elections.)

The All-German Commerce and Postal Assembly should not possess jurisdiction over any matter except domestic trade, transportation, communications and similar purely practical fields, and must not interfere with the prerogatives in all other, and particularly political matters of the governments of Western Germany and Eastern Germany.

Administration of the Berlin Free Zone

The All-German Commerce and Postal Assembly shall have the responsibility of organizing the administration of the Berlin free zone and supervising the administration of the municipalities located therein, with due regard for the traditional autonomous rights of those municipalities.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

- 16 -

The relations between the free zone and the governments of Western Germany and Eastern Germany, respectively, shall be conducted through non-political organs established by the All-German Commerce and Postal Assembly.

Levels of the combined Western-West German and Combined Russian-East German Military Forces in Germany.

The combined Western-West German and Russian-East German military forces in Germany shall be brought into an equilibrium designed to stabilize the respective forces on a numerical basis proportionate to the population and area of each of the two parts of Germany. If, as a result of these negotiations, force quotas are established, they will give Western Germany considerable leeway to build up its military forces in fulfillment with the Paris Agreements.

After the combined forces have been brought into a proportionate equilibrium, the agreed-upon fixed quotas shall not curtail the freedom of each party to increase the proportion of the German component within the force levels authorized: for example, for an American division or aerial unit withdrawn, a German division or aerial unit may be substituted; a Soviet division or aerial unit may be replaced by an East German division or aerial unit.

3: The Two-Government Approach.

A second compromise solution could be as follows: A minor slow down in West German rearmament -- the possible establishment of a free zone of Berlin -- free elections for a German Economic and Postal Assembly --

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX C

-17-

after a lapse of time, all-German free elections -- the establishment of two democratic rather than one unified democratic German government, with the proviso that unification may be accomplished through negotiations between these two governments -- after such hypothetical unification, conclusion of a peace treaty and predetermination of the German international status in the form of strongly armed neutrality -- end of the occupation.

Whatever compromise solutions the U.S. suggests, it should be made clear that these solutions are provisional. The United States must continue to press for German unification and the reconstitution of German sovereignty, and must do so in such a manner that the U.S. policy would be recognized clearly by the population of both Germanies.

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SECRET

APPENDIX D TO
REPORT OF QUANTICO
VULNERABILITIES PANEL

A PROPOSAL FOR GRADUATED DISARMAMENT

THE PROBLEM

The objective of this proposed disarmament system is to develop by a series of agreements the long-range basis through which a system of limited national military forces can be established gradually at a level low enough so that the feasibility of a surprise conquest of one principal power by another is drastically reduced without eliminating capabilities for strategic defense, defense against minor aggression, and domestic control.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. That the objective of the Soviet Union is to convert or conquer the world;
2. That the USSR is now extremely hostile to the United States, and at best, this hostility can be expected to decrease only slowly.
3. That the United States cannot trust the Soviet Union so long as she has military superiority, equality, or even inferiority unless this is below a certain minimum level.
4. That the Soviet Union equally distrusts the United States and suspects us of equally evil aggressive intentions.
5. That the United States will not initiate a preventive war.
6. That the Soviet Union, if convinced that it possessed decisive military superiority, would either launch a war without warning, or resort to large-scale blackmail.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX D

7. That the U. S. can win an ideological-political-economic cold war if the Soviet Union cannot support subversion with military force.

FACTS

1. U. S. atomic stockpile and delivery systems are sufficient now to destroy the Soviet Union and are likely to remain so for about three years.

2. The Soviet atomic stockpile and delivery system are marginal now; unless opposed by a very effective air defense system better than is now planned, it will be sufficient to destroy for all intents and purposes the U. S. in the period from 1958-1960.

3. The race for atomic stockpile and delivery means is nearly over, i.e., both sides will have adequate capability by 1960 although intensive research and development for superiority should continue on U. S. side. A desperate race for air defense is just beginning. A good air defense is difficult and unpredictable but not impossible because of advances in electronic warfare and new hard-to-counter long-range missiles.

4. A U. S. air defense system capable of keeping the damage to the U. S. below 5% of total destruction is possible by 1958-60 at a cost of \$7 billion each fiscal year provided FY-56 funds of \$2 billion are committed for a Nike local missile defense by July 1955. Delay after that will retard initiation of the proposed system by a time equal to the delay. There is a 50% chance that the system will fail because of advances in Soviet electronic counter-measures. This fault can be corrected by intensive research and development effort. This air defense can probably be maintained indefinitely, if continuously rejuvenated save for rare intervals when it may be ineffective for limited periods due to superior

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX D

Soviet technology. It will, therefore, be a defense in which "now you have it" and "now you don't", depends on the interplay and quality of U.S. and Soviet technology.

5. The Soviets probably have an equal air defense capability, with about the same timing. There is a lesser chance that we can currently jam their system due to recent U.S. comparative neglect of electronic warfare and counter-measures. This can be corrected.

6. An air defense of NATO can be provided by 1958-60 at a cost of a minimum of \$4 billion per year. It is not likely to be effective against surface-to-surface missiles until about 1963-65.

7. An effective air defense of Japan would cost about \$4 billion a year.

8. The Soviet Union now has a superiority of about 2.5 to 1 over NATO in ground force equipment and 10 to 1 in tactical air support aircraft.

9. The Soviet Union has the potential geographical advantage of interior surface lines of communications and therefore of potential superior flexibility in use of these forces against territories adjacent to her perimeter. At low levels of world-wide armaments, it may require an appreciable numerical superiority of US-NATO-SEATO forces to match Soviet ground forces. The United States is handicapped by exterior lines of communications which include easily interdicted sea lines, and inflexibility of most national forces. For example, South Korean and Nationalist China divisions are an asset and usable only in the Far East.

10. The present estimate is that U.S. overseas lines of communications will be able to transport only a fraction of army, air force, and NATO

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX D

requirements during the first year of a general war. Overseas stockpiles and indigenous manufacture are needed to solve the problem, but inflexibility limits transfer between theaters, until a genuine strategic air lift capability comes into existence.

11. The Soviet Union was three years behind the United States military technology in 1946, is tending to become equal in quality to the United States in 1955.

The quality and quantity of Soviet technical graduates is superior to that of the United States in 1955. This will continue if the U.S. does not take drastic action to remedy our technical education system in the primary and secondary schools and in the colleges. After 1960, the Soviet Union will have more living trained engineers than the United States, with present trends. As a result, the Soviet Union is expected to surpass the United States in military technology from now on and should have a two year lead or more by 1965, unless drastic U.S. action is taken.

12. Western Europe is the world's single greatest resource in technical invention, and is now only meagerly mobilized on behalf of NATO. Fully mobilized in aid of NATO, the combined US-NATO technology should surpass that of the Soviet Union.

DISCUSSION

One course of action in the struggle for U.S. survival is an arms race with the USSR. The technical-military solutions will be unstable since they are influenced by unpredictable technical breakthroughs as well as by national military choices. This means that from now on it will not be possible to predict reliably whether the U.S. or the USSR will have the

SECRET

APPENDIX D

advantage during any particular year. Furthermore, equipment, tactics, and strategy will become obsolete at a very rapid rate. Replacement and obsolescence costs will be very high and will require increasingly high military budgets in every category. The military budget to provide reasonable security is estimated at 50 billion dollars a year.

Under the above circumstances, and provided that the United States is never willing to initiate an aggressive war in surprise, at some unknown time in the future the military technical dynamics will favor the Soviet Union enough so that she can destroy us with relative impunity. Whether the Soviet Union will be able to take advantage of her technical breakthrough will depend on the quality of her intelligence, and the corresponding accuracy in evaluation of the US-NATO military weapons systems. This evaluation must be good enough to establish the fact that there is the required necessary over-all superiority which in turn must be adequate to ensure success despite partial failure of the surprise attack on the part of the Soviet aggressor. Thus, an arms race does not provide a dependable or stable solution for the United States if she remains unwilling to initiate a preventive war, but may favor in the long run the Soviet Union who would be willing to initiate a war by surprise on through blackmail.

Alternatively, disarmament cannot be considered a dependable or stable solution by either side unless the chance of success of one principal power of detecting and preventing aggression by another principal power under disarmament is better than under the arms race. Partial disarmament might be possible, but would be desirable for the United States only if the Soviet bloc were willing to yield substantial numerical superiority to US-NATO-SEATO,

SECRET

SECRET

this superiority being, of course, in purely defensive forces. It appears highly improbable that the Soviet Union would agree to this. At some very low level, however, the respective forces would become so small that major campaigns could not be immediately conducted, and no campaign could long endure without further detectable large-scale production, yet small scale aggression could still be countered. Major or long campaigns would require detectable and large scale logistic preparation including manufacture.

If disarmament to a low level in surface forces was accompanied by elimination of purely aggressive atomic forces, establishment by US-NATO-SEATO of strong air defense systems, and by agreed on specified limited military national equipment reserves controlled by UN and mutual inspection, then there would be assured domestic internal control, ability to withstand limited aggression, ability of each country to expand military production if the covenants were broken, and heavy defense against sneak air attacks carried by commercial aircraft, and employing thermonuclear bombs or other mass destruction weapons acquired surreptitiously.

A disarmament plan would need to be put into effect gradually. Accordingly, a relatively safe disarmament plan could be based on the following guiding ideas:

1. A permanent disarmament commission would be established to survey continuously new requirements rising from changing military technology. The basic armament convention will be revised annually so that it will be continuously up to date.

2. An inspection system is instituted on an experimental basis to determine methods and requirements of, and to train personnel for a dependable inspection system including aerial supervision.

SECRET

APPENDIX D

3. Concurrent with the installation of an improved inspection system the powers agree to limit the size of their land forces and to eliminate certain armaments from their arsenals as follows:

Land Forces

U.S.	Sufficient for	5 divisions
USSR	"	"
NATO	"	"
CHINA	"	"
JAPAN	"	"

No ground-to-ground missiles, atomic weapons, or fighter aircraft permitted to ground forces.

4. It also will be provided that all presently known strategic weapons systems including bombers, fighters, missiles, submarines, missile ships, surface naval vessels over 10,000 tons, and their atomic explosives will be prohibited. However, since no assurance can be obtained against technical discoveries, surreptitious production and adaptation of civilian equipment each country will be permitted to:

a. Maintain a stockpile of immediately usable nuclear weapons. Special provision for the inspection and defense of the stockpiles should be made.

b. Maintain a full fledged air defense system using ground to air systems with associated ground control and warning nets. Atomic warheads are permitted provided the range of the missiles is controlled.

c. Maintain naval forces to defend against submarines and mines.

SECRET

APPENDIX D

5. It must be recognized explicitly that a disarmament scheme of the above type does not necessarily provide safety against subversive military operations, guerrilla attack, biological warfare, etc. Most of these forms of war are, at present, marginal but may become important in a state of general disarmament. Hence, so long as effective safeguards against these forms of war cannot be devised, military precautions must be allowed in these fields. Should safeguards become practical, additional disarmament agreements can be negotiated.

6. Disarmament agreements should not prohibit the production and use of nuclear materials, aircraft, etc., for civilian and peaceful uses. In particular, nuclear production should be continued and the development of a nuclear industrial technology encouraged. Agreements must be concluded concerning the types of nuclear materials which may be used by the civilian economy. Likewise, civilian aircraft may have to conform to performance limiting specifications.

7. There should be no limitation on military research and development; R&D prototypes should be included in scheduled levels of equipment; U.S. industry should be constantly tooled up and be ready for conversion to war production; nuclear materials should be in a shape that permits easy refabrication; finally, U.S. weapons systems should be kept up to date.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. A prolonged arms race will be unsafe, unstable, and costly to the United States.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX D

2. A graduated disarmament will still be costly but it may reduce the areas of risk and instability.

3. Specifically, if the Soviet Union were deprived by disarmament of the ability to destroy the United States and to invade free nations in Eurasia, their strategy would have to be based solely on their psychological, political, and subversive strength which the United States should be able to match.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That U.S. propose this disarmament plan to USSR.

2. That upon rejection of this plan, the U.S. make every effort to win the technological armaments race as the safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to ultimately accept satisfactory arms convention.

- 9 -

SECRET

SECRET

SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL PAPERS
SUPPORTING QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL REPORT

(As indicated in the Chairman's letter of transmittal, several individual participants each undertook to write a paper on those forthcoming problems which were within his particular areas of concern. Drafts of each paper benefitted in varying degrees by comments of the author's colleagues and in many cases recommendations from these papers were accepted in the agreed report; but unlike the report proper these papers represent the views of the participant indicated since there was no time for detailed joint examination. A substantive index follows.)

TAB 1: "Soviet Estimate of the Situation -- The Development of the World Political and Military Situation and the Tasks of the People's Democracies" - Dr. George Pettee

An appreciation of the position of the Communist orbit vis-a-vis the Free World, in the form of an address by a high Soviet official to his civil and military colleagues.

TAB 2: "The Requirements for U.S.-NATO to Win in the Arms Race with the USSR" with two Annexes: "The Comparative Military Technology of the U.S. and USSR" and "Scientific and Technical Personnel" - Dr. Ellis A. Johnson

The relative status and trends of the U.S. vs. USSR military technology indicate present equality and a Soviet 3-5 year lead by 1965, unless U.S. and NATO undertake maximum efforts.



SECRET

-2-

TAB 3: "Alliance and Coalition Problems" - Dr. Frederick S. Dunn

The advantages and costs to the U.S. of the Free World system of alliances and coalitions; some ways in which the Soviets have tried to break down this system, and how these might be countered.

(a) "Does NATO Have A Position of Strength?" -
Dr. George Pettee

NATO forces constitute a present position of strength but have four latent weaknesses which can be corrected by timely action.

(b) "Asia Policy" - Dr. W. W. Rostow

Relations between the European and Asian situations are outlined and U.S. courses of action suggested to maximize free world strength in Asia and to put effective pressure on Communist China conducive to changes in the U.S. interest.

(c) "Japan" - Dr. Paul Linebarger

The restoration of Japan as a great power, best developed through bilateral Washington-Tokyo arrangements, must be founded on national honor and real power for Japan. Once effective, Japanese power will exercise a significant restraint on Communist power in the Western Pacific.

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

- (d) "Measures to Cope with Free-World Fears of the Bomb" -
Dr. Stefan Possony

Seven specific proposals to effect calmer attitudes and allay irrational apprehensions in NATO nations, concerning atomic warfare.

- (e) "Air Defense of the United States and Western Europe" -
Dr. Ellis A. Johnson

A tight air defense is essential to maintain motivations and reduce resentment toward the U.S., and such defense is practical.

- (f) "Factors Influencing the Morale of Allies" - Dr. George Pettee

There are many obvious questions which an ally can ask, all concerned with the basic question:

"Why be an ally instead of a neutral?"

- TAB 4: "Straining the Sino-Soviet Alliance" with Annex: "Chinese Political Behavior" - Dr. Paul Linebarger

The Sino-Soviet alliance may be subjected to strain by American psychological strategy threatening Peiping with a Moscow-Washington arrangement at Peiping's expense. Red China's strategy seeks the immediate humiliation of the U.S. before Asia; this the U.S. must avoid.

- TAB 5: "An Institute for the Study of Peace" - Dr. George Pettee

Proposes as an aid to unwinding the cold war, to establish a "Peace College" to organize knowledge and train experts comparable to like institutions applied to techniques of war.

SECRET

Dr. George Pettee

Tab 1 to Report of
QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

Soviet Estimate of the Situation

(An appreciation of the Position of the Communist Orbit Vis-a-Vis the Free World, in the form of an address by a high Soviet officials to his civil and military colleagues.)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION

AND THE TASKS OF THE PEOPLES DEMOCRACIES

(Note: The following is a digest of the important address made by Bozhemoiski at the Yaroslavl conference of leading personnel of the CP-USSR with officials of the government and representatives of the staffs of the Red Army, Red Navy and Red Air Force, 20 April 1955. It was impossible to obtain the entire text, and it is apparent that some subjects of importance which must have been covered in this speech have been omitted from the digest, and that the analysis of the present situation of capitalism, and of internal conditions in the Soviet Union, were especially emasculated, and the data on Soviet arms production was wholly omitted).

Comrades! The development of the military, political and economic situation in the world has brought us at this time to a very critical point. Many developments which have been commenced and which have continued in the period since the end of the war with Germany, or of the Japanese war, have reached a stage of maturity. Some other developments necessary for the security of the USSR and the other People's Democratic Governments will require several years of further development. In order to furnish the most favorable conditions for the further development of the strength of the Communist nations, so that at a time not more than four years hence they can face all issues with calmness and assurance of freedom of action, it is necessary to adopt a very important line of policy which has certain major differences from that of the previous eight years.

It is very important that the reasons for the new policy line should be understood by the leading cadres of the Party, of the Government, and of the Glorious Armed Services of the USSR. The objective bases for this

- 2 -

policy, and the essential features of the line to be followed for the next three to four years will also of course be communicated to the carefully selected leading cadres of the parties, governments and armed forces of the other peoples' democratic states which are associated with us.

In order to understand the present situation with clarity one must examine the characteristics of the situation of the world, that is, of the Communist and Capitalist countries, from the time of 1946. At that time the German and Italian fascist powers had been crushed by the great coalition of the capitalist democracies and of the Soviet Union, with the Soviet Union and its Glorious Armed Forces playing the predominant part.

(Interrupted by Cheers)

In 1946 we can say that the leading capitalist power, the US, had come out of the war with a greatly strengthened industry, although with an economic system containing many weaknesses. The second capitalist country, England, had come out very much weakened. The rest of the capitalist countries, excluding the defeated former enemy countries, were economically and politically weak, and the objective conditions existed, so far as their purely internal conditions are concerned, for the rapid and successful evolution of governments of peoples democratic form. This was true in France, in Belgium, in the Netherlands, in the Scandinavian countries which had been in the war, and in the countries of Eastern Europe in which such a development was actually successful. It was also true of China and of other areas in the East.

The will to peace of the peoples of the world was extremely strong at that time, and there was some appearance, although we did not at any time

believe that this was an actual fact, that the government of the US would heed the will of the peoples and would permit the development of peoples' democracy to go forward in Europe and in Asia.

It was in the latter part of 1946 and the first part of 1947 that the possibility of a direct and peaceful development of the world was turned about into a renewed period of crises, of attempts to encircle and strangle the socialist countries, and of preparation for war by the capitalist powers.

The important developments in this connection were the decision in China for war against the Communists and the rejection of a coalition with the Communists which had been the only possible course for peaceful development. After the London Conference of October 1946 the series of moves by which the capitalist world resumed its posture of enmity to Communism was continuous.

There were, at this time, and during the years up to this year, several systems of tactical measures, of economic, political or military order, by which either side has been able to accomplish the capture of positions which were in doubt, or the consolidation of positions in which either side held already an advantage.

The first important measures of consolidation by the capitalist enemy was the exclusion of Communists ~~from~~ the coalition governments of Italy and France, in the months of May and June 1947. This had however already been preceded by the decision in Washington to undertake large measures of financial aid to many of the countries of Europe, in the form not of United Nations Relief but of unilateral economic support with the objective of the restoration and consolidation of capitalism. In June the US put forward the

so-called Marshall Plan, under a smoke screen of beneficence and sham good will. Comrade Molotov, and our great Politburo had, at that time, to make a very quick decision. Was this move compatible with the peaceful development of a peoples democratic world system and with the abolition of the struggle between Communism and Capitalism, or was it the beginning of the restoration of capitalism and the first move in capitalist plans for the encirclement and destruction of Communism? Our great leaders were not unequal to this occasion and they promptly made the correct decisions. Since that time the principal enemy power, the US, has utilized its surplus economic capacity as its chief weapon or tool in all its plans, and has sought at all times to combine the stabilization of its own economy through this means of shipping its surpluses to the world of weaker capitalist states which it has reduced to the role of colonies. As incidental methods it has also employed all measures of chicanery, of sabotage, of secret agencies, to attack Communist elements in the trade unions, to attack Communist influence in the governments, and to leave no stone unturned in general to consolidate capitalism and to arm the capitalist coalition against us. In 1949 it changed openly from the pretense of beneficent economic aid including food relief, and began to base its aid overtly upon the armament of all states surrounding the Communist bloc.

The US also began in about 1948 a far more energetic program for attaining what it hoped would be a permanent and overwhelming superiority in the new category of atomic weapons. It is to be noted that it at no time, even in 1946, ceased to maintain the development of its atomic and strategic air power. It also put forward the slogan of union in Europe against us, and in 1950 it organized the military alliance of NATO as the

first step toward an attack upon the Soviet Union.

The only other major course utilized by the US which need be mentioned is the cynical attempt to utilize the United Nations as an instrument in the renewed struggle of the capitalist world against the socialist world. This had its example par excellence in the unscrupulous manner in which the US utilized illegal proceedings to obtain a pretended endorsement by the United Nations of its intended intervention in the domestic conflict in Korea, so as to prevent the peoples democratic government of North Korea from uniting that unfortunate nation.

On our side also, as the capitalists have learned, there have been certain means and tactical methods available to make sure that the gains were not all theirs. We were able, without difficulty, to make the step from coalition government to peoples democratic government in Hungary, and in Czechoslovakia, having already accomplished this step in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. We were able to establish a state government of approximately our type in the eastern zone of Germany.

There were several different situations in the world in 1946 where local wars were in progress and in which the Communist patriotic elements of the area concerned had a fair prospect of success in stabilizing the area on the side of socialism and peace. Each of these situations was decided, one way or the other, by 1950. In Iran it was impossible for us to support the Communist elements because of the situation as to the United Nations and as to the difficulty of providing direct Russian support under the legal and political difficulties without too quickly arousing the further antagonism of the US, at a time when there was still hope that the US might be dominated by the peace-loving elements. It was only after the

nefarious Byrnes and Truman had committed the US to its present course, and Wallace, for example, had been excluded from the Cabinet, that this became no longer a consideration for our policy.

We were at this time unable to complete successfully the attainment of state power in Greece, in Malaya, and in the Philippines. We were, however, able to carry to a successful conclusion the destruction of the corrupt and rotten Kuomintang faction in China, and this was the great single success for us, as the temporary reestablishment of capitalist systems in Western Europe was the greatest success on the side of the enemy. This great achievement in China was accomplished under the wonderful leadership of Comrade Mao, and of a number of Chinese Communist generals who proved, once again, that the workers and peasants can produce military leaders whose intelligence and energy can surpass that of the most redoubtable of the capitalist militarists.

By 1950 decisions had been reached as to the form that stabilization would take in almost all of the areas left in doubt at the close of the war against Germany and Japan. There was one area left in which some initiative could be taken in that year, namely Korea. It was not yet possible to make further headway in any short time anywhere else. The hypocritical government of the US had stated in apparent good faith the objective truth that Korea was not an essential to the security of the US. Under energetic Communist rule it had been possible to develop social and economic and military strength in North Korea, under the leadership of the great Kim il Sung, which far surpassed the feeble capabilities of the corrupt semi-colonial system in South Korea. It was therefore correctly decided that Korea should be united as a nation, since this could be done

in an action of great simplicity and quickness, and at negligible cost and with great benefit to the human elements concerned. It was at this point that the true intentions of the US became thoroughly revealed, when they moved instantaneously to intervene, at considerable cost, and through nefarious misuse of the United Nations. The Americans were, as we know, well able to overcome the heroic fighting of the North Korean Army through the moves of the infamous MacArthur, but the Chinese Communist Government, which they despised, was also able to frustrate the hopes of the capitalist world and to restore the situation to substantially where it had stood. This was one more proof of the power that can be mobilized by the patriotic Communist workers and peasants and of the equality or superiority of military skill and heroism.

Since 1950 we have had only one major project affecting the division of the world into Communist and Capitalist camps, the successful completion of the defeat of the French in Indochina. The US has also had only one such project in hand, the addition of Western Germany to the armed capitalist circle. Except for these two situations, which remain open, the situation of Capitalism and of Communism has been stabilized for the present, under conditions of extreme effort and tension. The effort entailed for the capitalist powers has taken the form of a great program of armaments. This has had certain economic consequences which have to be examined, but has also become the basis for an orientation of world opinion and of feelings in many places against the US or against the continuation of the armaments program.

The arms race, kept up in its most essential elements, at small expense, by the US through the continued production of fission materials

and through the development of a long-range air force, entered a new phase in 1951. It is a curious evidence of the emotional instability and irrationality of the US ruling circles that, although the success of Communism in China was followed by reductions in the military budget of the US, the events in Korea led them to more than triple that budget. An important factor was undoubtedly the American recession in the level of economic activity which occurred in 1949 and early 1950, and which no doubt convinced the ruling circles that as always, capitalist industry could not be kept at a stable high level of activity without a large armament program.

In spite of the great scale of the US military budget for the last five years the US has plainly counted upon its atomic superiority as the factor which enabled it to face the possibility of war without defeat. The capitalist governments find it easy and economically advantageous to utilize money and to produce munitions of war, but they find it far more difficult in the face of the sentiments of the people toward peace, to use large numbers of men in their armed services. This being so, it has been natural that the Americans, having developed with the help of many scientists from other countries, the atomic weapon, have lovingly cultivated this most barbarous of all means of war as their main reliance, and have hoped at all times that with it they could dominate the world in a way that would be cheapest for themselves.

You all know how they have been frustrated. As soon as our great leaders knew of the nature of this new weapon they undertook to reduce to the minimum the time during which it would represent a one-sided advantage to the capitalist military ambitions. The Americans did not fail to predict

that we could never make the atom bomb. Their more sensible elements said that we could make it, but only in a very long time. We made it in a very short time! (Interrupted by cheers). We now have enough of these weapons, and enough very modern bombers, so that if the capitalists wish to undertake mass murder they too will be hit.

It remains true that at present, and for about three more years, they will have the advantage of us in the scale with which they can use atomic weapons. However, within three years we will be able to use them on such a scale that relative equality will exist. At that time, having the welfare of the peoples of the world in interest, we will be able to take the lead in demanding the elimination of the use of such weapons, and the military balance will then be placed on the basis of other weapons, in which we are inferior in no respect! (Cheers)

The great Red Army has been fully maintained in all arms. It has developed, quicker than the enemy, the tactical doctrine and the appropriate methods of organization, of command, and for the conduct of battle, appropriate for the future conditions if atomic weapons are used, or for the war in which atomic weapons will remain a latent threat but not actually be used. Our tanks are superior to those of the enemy. Our artillery is fully equal to that of the enemy. The Red Army stands ready as always to defend the socialist Fatherland and all the peoples' democracies associated with the USSR.

The Red Air Force, except for very long-range modern air craft, is now fully equal to the enemy. Even in the very long-range type, we are actually ahead, although the possession by the enemy of many bases relatively close to the USSR gives him still some advantage for what he calls strategic

air war. For the proper air battle as distinguished from the war against civilians we are superior in types and numbers of planes, and have the greatest air force ever seen. The Red Fleet is growing in strength. It is equal to its tasks in the waters adjoining our coasts, in the Black Sea, in the Baltic, in the North, and in the Far East. We are ready to conduct submarine warfare on a scale far superior to that reached by the Germans. For the war against enemy use of the oceans in his attack on the socialist countries, we have also a sea mine capability which can deny him the possibility of the use of most of the foreshore of Europe, and if atomic weapons are used we can make it impossible for him to use any European or other port upon which he may depend. The flow of his supplies from North America to this hemisphere can really be denied to him. Without this, as is plain, the US could never have played any effective military role in the First World War or the Second World War. Whether atomic means are used or not we can prevent his use of the seas.

A most important consideration is the economic position of the capitalist world. This is characterized by the temporary stabilization of industrial and general economic conditions. This stabilization rests for the time being upon the armament effort. We already have in the recessions in the US in 1949 and again in 1953 the evidence of the fundamental instability of the capitalist economy. We have also ample evidence, for which one need only read the capitalist commercial press, for the rapid intensification of the struggle for markets, and for the incompatibility of the stability of the economies of the various capitalist countries. German merchants are already gaining trade opportunities formally claimed by the English, in South America, in Africa, in the Middle East. The lessons taught

by Lenin's Imperialism remain valid. Only the large scale arms effort constitutes the glue to hold the incompatible elements together.

In this situation the position of the colonial and former colonial areas is of prime importance. Here the ability of the US to give various forms of assistance plays a role of covering and cloaking the objective economic realities and the arms boom also contributes. The fundamental factor in which is revealed the reality of capitalist exploitation of these areas is the disparity in the terms of trade by which the capitalist world acquires the material products of the colonial areas as ridiculously low prices based upon starvation wages, while selling the products of industry at high prices. This was altered temporarily through the disorderly and unregulated rise of colonial material prices in 1951 and 1952 to meet the needs of the enemy armaments program. Any relaxation of the armaments program will make this an acute source of disturbance to prices, to US popularity in the areas of raw material supply, and to the stabilization of anti-Communist governments in these areas. Conditions in South Asia, in Africa, and in all of Latin America, will reflect fundamentally this objective relationship.

It is therefore evident, Comrades, that we are at the commencement of a new period. This period will not be a long one. It will last for three or four years. But it will have a character of its own, as the time after the substantial stabilization of the two worlds, and before it will be wise for the Communist powers to accept the risk of a major war.

The great objective characteristics of this period are as follows:

1. The USSR has not yet attained such a degree of capability of large-scale use of atomic weapons that it can force the enemy to accept the outlawing of the use of such weapons, or can use

them without fear of any disadvantage. This will require two to four years.

2. The technical armaments race in all other weapons is one in which we are fully equal to the capitalist countries, and in which we may expect to have a general and definite advantage by 1960.
3. The normal contradictions of the capitalist system, internally within the major capitalist countries, and between them as competitors in trade, and between the major industrial countries in general and the former colonial countries, are glossed over temporarily by inflation financing in the US and by the spill over of the effects of the armaments program in the form of high prices for colonial materials.
4. As long as the armaments effort continues at its present scale, or slightly higher, the capitalist industrial systems will continue to exhibit considerable stability and vitality. This is in accordance with the estimates made some years ago by Comrade Varga, but tends to extend the duration of capitalist stabilization longer than could be done without the armaments.
5. The world division into two camps is now nearly complete, and tension between the two camps is at a maximum. There is very little flexibility left in the entire situation.
6. We have exhausted the systems of economic and political and military tactics available to us for increasing the area of Communist control and for stabilizing Communist power, short of those which we can apply only when a major war is an acceptable risk.

7. Germany and Southeast Asia are the only points of flexibility where either side may expect to gain or lose anything substantial without major war, and for the time being.

The general and specific objectives of the Communist powers must therefore be as follows during the next few years.

1. We must seek to exploit the opportunities in Germany and Southeast Asia and to prevent the enemy from gaining any further advantages at these two points.
2. We must seek a relaxation of tensions, so far as these exist in the mind or psychology of the enemy capitalist leading elements.
3. Because the objectives in Asia, namely to gain the rest of the former French controlled area and Formosa, cannot be pursued in a way to contribute to relaxed tension immediately, they will be continued by the means already planned for the next year.
4. Because our objective of a neutral Germany is an objective which we can seek only through relaxation of tension, we will make all European issues the field of a policy a la Litvinov, or in the guise of what the world once called "the spirit of Locarno", immediately. The objective is that Germany must not be added to NATO, since NATO without Germany will be small danger to us under the military conditions of 1960 or later, while NATO with Germany would constitute a great threat.

5. The objective of inducing a spirit of relaxation in the capitalist world should be pursued with the objective of inducing the Americans to cut their armaments budget by at least one-quarter, if possible by one-half. Further foreign aid by the US should be brought to an end through the resurgence of all elements in American opinion inclined to peace, or inclined to economy in the budget. An alliance of these two forces in American opinion may be counted upon to be very powerful.
6. If it proves impossible to make progress with relaxation in Europe while maintaining tension in the Far East on Formosa and Indochina, it may be necessary to accept stabilization in the East also. This decision will be made in the first instance in the highest circles of the CP-USSR and of the Government of the USSR.
7. Since an unarmed Germany will be of no military importance for at least four years after it joins one side or the other, we will accept an arrangement by which Germany is united and by which it becomes a capitalist "democracy", with the agreement that it is neutralized for three years, and that thereafter it will be free to join any side, including joining NATO and commencing its rearmament.
8. We will open a new tough policy line in 1959, when it will be too late for Germany to matter as a military factor.

9. We will in the near future undertake a series of diplomatic or other political gambits, including:

A visit by Nehru to Moscow.

A visit by high Soviet authorities to Balkan states including Yugoslavia.

The restoration of Austrian sovereignty.

An invitation to Adenauer to visit Moscow for exploratory talks before the meeting of heads of state.

Proposals to be made at the meeting of heads of state meant to induce an optimistic wave of relaxation in US and Western opinion.

All of these policies or measures constitute a major direction contrary to that which had to be taken during the nine years in which the world has been consolidated between the two camps. It is in accordance with the teachings of the great Lenin and the great Stalin, and the teachings of the Communist Party. In contrast to minor shifts in the last nine years, this will constitute a major shift in the Leninist line.

The great objective is to establish the conditions for a period comparable to the period 1924-1929 during which relaxation, disarmament, and the contradictions of capitalism combined to smash up the capitalist world. In the former case there was one great danger for us, the emergence of Nazism in Germany at a time when the relative power of Germany and of Russia was if anything in favor of Germany. Now the development of fascism in a form comparable to the form which it took in Germany under Hitler would make no difference in the degree of our danger or security.

The tactics of the next three or four years are to permit the now stabilized capitalist world to become unstable, to develop severe trouble in the colonial areas, to develop acute rivalries between the industrial nations, and to create the conditions for internal economic collapse in the US.

The same period will be utilized, of course, in the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries to:

Attain equality in atomic military power.

Attain superiority in non-atomic military power.

Strengthen the industrial and agricultural basis of the national economy.

Create an improving living standard for the peoples so as to maximize their loyalty to a system which promises an expanding life in the immediate following years.

Establish the strongest possible industrial base, dispersed for better survival against enemy attacks.

Prepare to exploit the opportunity of the period after 1959 for the final showdown with capitalism, either through progressive severe concessions obtained rapidly enough to permit no renewed stabilization, or through general war, preferably without atomic weapons.

The fundamental elements of the new line will be made known through conferences of the leading party, government and military cadres in each of the Communist countries. Party discipline will be maintained in all Communist parties in implementing this line until further decisions are made. Communists who fail to understand the Marxist reasoning which makes this

line necessary will be charged with Trotskyism and leftism. Comrade Mao has concurred in the analysis and has assisted in stipulating the criteria governing the continuation or cessation of pressure in the East.

Comrades! This is probably the last occasion in Communist history when it will be necessary to adopt a policy of apparent accommodation with the capitalist powers. If necessary to accomplish the objective results which are sought, very substantial concessions may be necessary. Even very substantial concessions are quite acceptable for the objectives in view. Forward under the banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and the banner of the Communist Fatherland.

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Tab 2 to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities
Panel
Dr. E. A. Johnson

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR US-NATO TO WIN
IN THE ARMS RACE WITH THE USSR

PROBLEM

To determine the requirements which must be met if the US and NATO are to win the arms race.

FACTS AND DISCUSSION

The dynamics of the development of military weapons systems must be recognized as having gone through an extraordinary revolution which began during World War II. This was primarily a revolution resulting from advances in the art of management of research and development. It occurred almost simultaneously in Germany, Britain, and the United States, with Germany having an edge of a year or two. This was one of the important factors which permitted Germany to hold off most of the rest of the military world in spite of tremendous economic and population inferiority.

The nature of the new dynamics can be contrasted with the past by observing that weapons systems in ancient times endured for almost one thousand years without any drastic change. Changes over a decade or century seldom had more than a relatively small effect on the outcome of battle. Prior to World War II, major elements of weapons systems lasted from 20 to 50 years without important change. Since World War II and at an increasingly accelerated rate, many weapons last only for a few years. In ground-to-air missiles, for example, the rate of technological advance is so rapid that missiles and missile systems are

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usually obsolescent, if not obsolete, by the time they become operational. U. S. armaments programs have not yet been geared to this fundamentally new fact, but are still geared to the pre-World War II technological pace.

This exacerbates the whole nature of the arms race. The rate of progress that occurs within a 5-15 year period is illustrated by the following advances:

1. Atomic bombs and warheads have changed effectiveness by a factor of 10,000 times over World War II H.E. bombs of similar weight;
2. Ground-to-air missiles have improved the effectiveness of defense against air attack between 5,000 to 200,000 times;
3. Ground-to-ground missiles have improved the range of artillery by a factor of ten times and will extend this to a factor of 200 within the next five years;
4. The ceiling of bomber aircraft has been lifted from 20,000 feet to 75,000 feet;
5. Capacity of cargo aircraft has been lifted from 20 tons to 50 tons pay load;
6. The effectiveness of high explosive ammunition has been improved by a factor of 20;
7. The effectiveness of poison gases have been improved by a factor of 20;
8. The effectiveness of infantry rifles has been improved by 50 to 100 per cent in spite of the long-established nature of the rifle technology;

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9. Anti-crop and anti-animal BW have the capability of bringing to starvation all of Russia with the expenditure of only a few hundred heavy bomber sorties.

The improvements of this type are not due to the creativeness of single individuals acting as isolated men, but result primarily from the use of large teams of technical experts highly organized, using intricate and expensive laboratory facilities, and guided by a sophisticated management system which relates the material machines of war to the strategic and tactical requirements of the military campaign and of the nation. Because of the sensitive and critical relation of the weapon to the weapons system, to the tactics and to the strategy, the choice of military characteristics tends to be the most important single factor determining tactical military superiority. The inevitable consequence of great research and development systems and the related guidance by the strategic and technical planning groups leads to rapid changes in the relative positions of the competing US and USSR military weapons systems. Both systems operate from the same basic foundations of knowledge of the laws of the natural sciences and of the commonly held knowledge of the arts of engineering. The two systems obviously react not only to the long-range guidance of the strategic and tactical planners but also react very rapidly and often violently to intelligence which indicates favorable progress on the part of the opponent who must be matched. The intelligence information which indicates the development of an opposing weapons system requires the invention of the defensive

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weapons system that each combatant must always employ simultaneously with his use of weapons in attack.

There are still important effects due to the lucky technological breakthrough. Such a breakthrough may require extensive revision of weapons systems in which there has been a heavy investment of production and of our research and development programs and establishments. For example, the recent unclassified French invention of the carcinitron has importantly improved the capabilities of electronic counter-measures, (jamming and interference) and requires redesign and review of the entire warning and control system for air defense, as well as for all electronics fire control equipment of strategic bombers, medium bombers and air interceptors, and ground force radio communications. The effect of such highly organized R&D systems, therefore, is to make the tactical military solutions short-lived, and to produce an unstable situation with respect to strategy and technical planning, and to the obsolescence cost of military production. In a race for military superiority, however, there is no way to stabilize the situation, rather there is an increasing requirement for improvement in the quality of research personnel and their facilities and in the management systems which guide the military research and development system. Annex A and Annex B present the evidence which shows that the United States has lost a 3-year lead during the last 10 years, that the Soviet Union is now the ~~equal~~ equal of the U.S. in military technology, that the quality and numbers of the technical labor force of the U.S. will become inferior to that of the Soviet Union from 1960 onwards, and that as a consequence, it can be

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expected that unless drastic action is taken on a national scale, the Soviet Union will be from two or more years ahead of the United States in military technology by 1965. A lead of two years by the Soviet Union could be absolutely mortal to the United States. On the other hand, the United States has the capability of preventing this contingency, albeit this would require a strenuous and costly effort.

The actions which must be taken to improve the internal situation of the U.S. in military technology are:

1. Cut down the lead time in political decision-making affecting military technology;
2. Improve the budgetary cycle and decision-making system to prevent continued fiscal stretch out and starvation of forward-looking and indispensable technological programs.
3. Streamline and unify further the military management systems which provide guidance on the basis of strategic and tactical planning.
4. Overhaul the technical information system including security, control, rapidity of transmission and distribution, channels for free exchange of ideas, and data storing.
5. Take action which will improve technical education in the secondary schools, and in the technical colleges and universities. It is most critical to improve technical education in the secondary schools.

The other great immediate step that can be taken is to incorporate the technical manpower capabilities of Western Europe into a U. S.-NATO complex for the development of modern weapons systems. It is important to remember that, except for Britain, most of the great technical talent

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of Europe, i.e., France, the Benelux countries, Germany and Italy, are unorganized and are not supported by either adequate facilities or adequate research and development funds. Thus, the military-technical contributions from these countries are unimportant since research and development efforts are poorly organized, there is no adequate strategic and tactical guidance and these countries are not permitted to consider jointly with the United States the tactics required by modern weapons systems, especially atomic weapons. They contribute only by lucky chance and, therefore, with very low effectiveness as in pre-World War II technical systems. This efficiency is a fraction of their full capability.

It is well to remember the great German creativeness that existed just prior to and during World War II when German research and development was highly organized. In that time the Germans developed the first guided missiles, the first jets, the new types of high speed submarines, the homing torpedoes, the aircraft-laid influence mines, the new poison gases (G-agents), as well as a host of other new firsts, most of which we have not as yet been able to improve in any fundamental way, although such improvement is now beginning to take place.

The British work in jets and in aircraft is one of the primary bases for the Russian progress in turbo-jet engines which the Russians added to the basic work provided by World War II German technology.

The French carcinitron, their zero length aircraft bombers, new guided anti-tank weapons, and light armored vehicles indicate the good capabilities of the French.

- 6 -
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The Dutch capabilities in electronics is outstanding. For example, they have produced an unclassified VT fuse and are able, in general, to export electronics to the United States in spite of high tariffs.

The Italians have the only industrial-academic complex which relates military transportation to fundamental problems of soil mechanics.

In summary of the NATO technical capabilities, it is clear that the large number of creative scientists and engineers in Europe, with their excellent record of invention and productivity will, if fully mobilized and supported, double and probably triple, the US-NATO research and development capabilities.

If such a US-NATO tactical-military development system could not only be established but could retain its cohesiveness for the next two decades, there appears to be no question but that it would by far exceed in quality the technical capabilities of the equivalent Soviet system. The US-NATO system would again lead the Soviet system by two years or more by 1965 if action were taken immediately. This should be sufficient to meet, and with the much greater NATO productiveness, to on the average maintain indefinitely US-NATO military superiority.

We need to mention the danger of subversion if NATO scientists are employed. It may certainly be true that there is a greater danger of subversion and security leaks to the USSR if there is extensive employment of NATO scientists and engineers, even if greatest care were to be taken by the NATO countries who participate. It must be remembered a security system is costly. The great value added by NATO scientists

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will be somewhat reduced by the increased leakage of technical information to the Soviet Union. However, it is well known that there is always an appreciable time lag from the time that intelligence information is received and the time when the new ideas or new concepts can be incorporated in a fruitful way into the existing and complicated weapons systems which have been based upon strategic and tactical guidance from one's own planners. The increasing rapid pace of research and development leads to less danger from subversion. Since the use of espionage and intelligence information is subject to an inherent time lag of its own, in general the imitator usually finds himself at a disadvantage if he overemphasizes imitation.

Taking into account the fact that the U.S. has lost or is losing its leadership in the race for armaments, the 20 or 30 percent degradation which might be expected from subversion amongst NATO scientists will not seriously reduce the great value to be gained by adding them to a cooperative system since the addition of the full strength of NATO scientists which might improve performance by 100 percent or more.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Since 1946 the U.S. has lost a 3-year lead over the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union is now tending to become equal in military technology to the United States.
2. The quality of the Soviet technical labor force and the number of personnel in the Soviet technical labor force will exceed that of the similar U.S. technical labor force from now on. It is expected that this

SECRET

will result in a 3-5 year lead by the Soviet Union over the U.S. by 1965.

3. The internal situation of the U.S. with respect to military technology can be improved by more rapid decision making, better management and guidance of military research and development, by improved budgetary procedures, and by educational reforms.

4. The over-all situation of American technology can be improved only by broad spread improvement in technical education in the secondary schools and also in technical colleges and universities of the United States.

5. The US-NATO position and military technology can be improved by 100 to 200 percent (minus security leaks) by organizing and supporting NATO research and development at a high budget level.

6. The combined effect of internal improvements in the U.S. and the addition of NATO scientists could lead to a situation in which U.S.-NATO had a lead of 2 years or more over the Soviet Union by 1965. This could be just the difference between victory and defeat in cold war or hot war.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A maximum effort be made to improve management of the research and development systems in the United States.

2. Maximum action be taken to improve technical education in the secondary schools and colleges of the United States.

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3. A substantial budget should be provided to establish, organize and support research and development in the NATO countries. Preliminary costing indicates the price tag might ultimately reach two billion dollars a year which could be profitably spent to improve the security situation of the United States.

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THE COMPARATIVE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY OF THE US AND USSR

The Problem

The problem is to establish the relative status and trends of US vs. USSR military technology.

Facts

Immediately following World War II, W. B. Shockley surveyed the technological advancement of the two countries and presented his findings in a memorandum dated 30 January 1946.^{1/} The objective of the Shockley study and of the current one is to determine the existence of the time lags in the introduction of new military items as indicators of the current and future relative positions of the US and the USSR in research and technological development.

The method introduced by Shockley is followed in large measure in a study by ORO, ORO-T-322. This is directed to determining the time lag or lead in the introduction of new items or of particular characteristics of weapons judged militarily desirable by the U.S. and the USSR. In this approach, the probabilistic future work of the research and development agencies is excluded from consideration since it is impossible to identify which developments will actually culminate in successful application. Progress and trends shown by actual introduction of end items is a better measure of the relative state of the technology of the two countries.

Where data for a specific item permit, US and USSR achievements are charted on a time scale basis and the chart provides the pattern of time lag

^{1/} "Relative Technological Achievements in Weapon Characteristics in the US and USSR," Memorandum, Office of the Secretary of War, 30 January 1946.

for a particular weapon characteristic. The composite pictures of time lag patterns for the several characteristics of specific weapons are then subject to analysis as to over-all comparability of US and USSR achievements in technology.

Lack of substantive data on USSR military items and disparities in US and USSR development programs during the 1945-1955 period have necessitated a more general interpretation of less specific evidence in some instances than in Shockley's study. This is true, for example, in the area of electronics. Available information on USSR achievements together with data on US achievements provide a basis for general conclusions as to time lag between the two countries. There are not sufficient supporting data on USSR electronics to warrant a time scale comparison of the developments in the two countries. For armor, there are only fragmentary pieces of intelligence on developments in the USSR. As of 1954-55, assumptions based on limited evidence represent the only basis for comparison of USSR tank developments with US developments.

In two respects, 1945-46 was a more propitious time than 1954-55 to make such an analysis and to obtain reliable indicators. The first applies to the accessibility and reliability of data. At the close of World War II, the US military services had possession of sufficient data pertaining to Russian weapons achievements to assure valid comparisons with US achievements. At the present time, the extent of reliable data from the USSR is indeed limited. US Intelligence estimates represent the bulk of our current information on Russian achievements. The tight Soviet security security cloak may well have hidden advancements which would be particularly pertinent in a comparison of technological achievements. Estimates of dates for production and operational use of USSR equipment may be considerably later ones than the true dates.

The second factor in timing that favors the 1945-46 over the 1954-55 study pertains to the opportunity for national choice in the selection of and emphasis on specific developments during the periods covered. During World War II the US and the USSR directed their national scientific and technological effort toward the single objective of winning a war. Hence, technological effort was largely expended on weapons and the development of these weapons served as a valid index of the technological potential of the nations, as analyzed by Dr. Shookly in 1946.

The past ten years has been a period of so-called peace and the focus of weapons development in the US and USSR has been less consistent. The emphasis on military research and development has been geared to the national requirements established for the respective military programs. For example, the Russians placed greater emphasis on the development of fighter planes at a time when Americans were stressing bomber developments. In general, the Soviets have not put much effort on marginal improvements with the intent that simplicity and numbers offset possible benefits to be gained from further refinement. The US on the other hand has emphasized the need for research to meet specific and detailed requirements such as safety measures for the protection of personnel, in aircraft, tanks, etc.

This element of choice reflected in the over-all programs and in specific developments makes it difficult to compare directly currently available data on US and USSR technological achievements. A comparison of the specific characteristics in the development of a single weapon must allow for a greater number of influencing factors than was the case in 1945-46.

For example, in the absence of immediate requirements for US aircraft to excel in any specific area, the US has chosen to trade other performance for range in both its fighters and bombers. Hence, the US is found to have a

- 4 -

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comparative technological advantage for this characteristic and corresponding lags for other characteristics. In this case, both the lead in fighter range and the lags in fighter speed and rate of climb may be regarded as the result of US choice. In tanks, the USSR has adopted the diesel engine that provides far greater combat range for the USSR tanks than the gasoline engine provides for US tanks. This difference in range capability is the result of choice.

Weakness in U.S. development is so much due to poor choice as any other factor and the elements of choices should be reviewed. It may be that one of the major values of a study of comparative technological achievements is the clues it provides toward pointing up shortcomings in our own design philosophy.

Notwithstanding possible discrepancies in the data, the indeterminate factors related to the element of choice, and the limited number of items covered, the comparisons of achievements presented in this study are considered to be sufficiently representative of time lag trends to serve as indicators of the relative status of technological developments in the US and the USSR. The consideration of validity is supported by the inclusion of an analysis of the most controlling factor of all research, development and production capabilities in both the US and USSR--that is the volume and rate of development of scientific and technical manpower in the two countries. The analysis of this factor contributes to the analyses of weapons characteristics and the deductions on technological development.

Comparisons of the relative development status of the US and the USSR for the specific items included in this study in the mid-forties and the mid-fifties are presented in Table 1, grouped under headings "aircraft", "armor", "ordnance", "electronics", and "scientific and technical personnel".

This table represents a general summary drawn from the lag-times on a large number of items covered in ORO-7-322.

Conclusions

On balance, the Soviet military technology had a lag of about three years behind the US at the close of WWII^{1/}, but by 1954 this lag had been eliminated and the Soviet Union is now at least our equal in military technology especially in the air and on the land. Within the past decade the Soviet not only caught up to the US but in some cases passed us. The trend is such as to indicate over-all superiority of Soviet military technology in the not too distant future. This prediction is based not only upon specific achievement rates in military end items but upon the volume and rate of increase of USSR scientific and technical personnel and labor force which is now approaching numerical equality with that of the US and is increasing at a rate at least 50% faster.

Recommendations

The recommendations are implicit in the conclusions. With our present level of research and development effort the US since WWII has lost a three-year lead and the trend indicates a future over-all superiority of Soviet military technology unless actions are taken to strengthen our own and NATO research efforts in funds, management, and personnel. By support of NATO science we can add almost immediately a great new reservoir of skill to the US-NATO system.

^{1/}The weighting includes Shockley's conclusions that the USSR in 1946 was "at least 5 years behind the US" in oil refining capability with a development rate of one-half the US rate.

TABLE 1 (Summary Table)

ESTIMATED LAG-TIME IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS USSR

	MID-1950s		MID-1940s	
	Year	Lagging Country	Year	Lagging Country
<u>AIRCRAFT</u>				
<u>Aircraft Engines</u>				
Turboprop-optimized shaft horsepower	1955	US	1952	US
Turboprop-optimized shaft horsepower	1952	USSR	1949	US-USSR
Turboprop-optimized shaft horsepower	1954	US	1949	US
Turboprops-axial compressors-thrust	1954	USSR	1948	US
Jet Fighters	1955	USSR	1947	US-USSR
Combat radius	1954	US	1947	US-USSR
Thrust	1955	US	1949	US-USSR
Weight/Thrust ratio	1954	US	1948	US
Service ceiling	1954	US	1948	US
Rate of climb at sea level	1954	US	1948	US
Speed in level flight at 30,000 ft.	1954	US	1948	US
Time to climb to 30,000 ft.	1954	US	1948	US
<u>Bomber Aircraft</u>				
Jet light bombers-Initial Production	1951	USSR		
Jet medium bombers-Initial Production	1954	USSR		
Heavy bombers-Initial Production	1954	US-USSR		
<u>Aircraft Guns</u>	1953	US-USSR		
	1955	US-USSR		
	1955	US lag		
<u>FINANCE</u>				
Anti-aircraft Guns			1945	USSR ranging from 2 yrs behind to 2 yrs ahead of US
Ground Rockets				
Ground Missiles				
<u>AIRBOR</u>				
<u>Enginepower</u>	1955	US-USSR		
Hit Probability	1955	USSR (marginal)		
Penetration	1955	US-USSR		
Mobility	1955	US		
Weight	1955	US	1944	US
Maneuverability	1955	USSR (15-20% disadvantage)	1944	US
Range	1955	US (marginal) (2 - 1% disadvantage)	1944	US
				3 1/2 yrs behind*

TABLE 1
(Summary Table)

ESTIMATED LAG-TIME IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS-USSR

MID-1940s

MID-1950s

Year	Lagging Country	Estimated Time Lag	Year	Lagging Country	Estimated Time Lag
1955	US-USSR	equal	US		* 1 1/2 to 2 yrs behind
1955	USSR-US	equal			
1955	USSR	(marginal)			
1955	USSR	Ranging from 0-2 yrs behind	1945	USSR	* At least 2 yrs behind
1953	US lag		1945	USSR lag	
1956	US lag		1945	USSR lag	
1953	USSR lag		1945	USSR lag	
1954	US lag		1948	US-USSR equal	

ARMOR (Continued from page 1)

Armor Protection

Slope

Quality

ELECTRONICS

SCIENTIFIC and TECHNICAL PERSONNEL

Professional, Technical and Kindred Workers

Graduates of Institutions of Higher Learning

Professionally Active Engineers

Engineering Graduates

Schockley op cit.

Annex B to Tab 2 to
Report of Quantico
Vulnerabilities Panel
Dr. E. A. Johnson

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL

More important perhaps, than any other single factor in measuring the power potential of a nation are the number of highly trained scientists and engineers and the capability of the nation in training more. In the U.S. this group represents approximately one percent of the total labor force; for the USSR the percentage is slightly higher. These small groups are the key contributors to the technological developments of both war and peace and to the reservoir of basic scientific knowledge on which technology rests.

For the past two centuries the nations of Western Europe have been the source of most of the major advances in the basic sciences. Until World War II the contributions of the U.S. were primarily technological in character as, so far as is known, have also been those of the USSR since World War II.

The surprise manifested in this country that the USSR was able to develop so rapidly the hydrogen bomb and long-range heavy bombers, both of which require a high order of technical skills, is hardly justified if one looks at Russia's resources of professional, technical, and kindred workers. In the past 15 years the USSR has more than doubled its professional labor force while the U.S. has had only a 50 percent increase. (Table 1) The USSR now exceeds the U.S. in the total number of professional and technical personnel, and the rates of increase indicate a continuing Russian superiority in numbers in the immediate future.

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TABLE 1

TOTAL LABOR FORCE AND TOTAL PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL

US - USSR

	Total Workers (Excluding armed forces)		Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers	
	US ^{1/} (millions)	USSR ^{2/} (millions)	US ^{1/} (millions)	USSR ^{2/} (millions)
1940	46.1	31.5	3.5	2.5
1950	58.6		4.5	
1953	61.2	44.8	5.4	5.9
	Percent Change 1940-1953			
	32.8	42.2	54.3	136

1/ Office of Defense Mobilization, "Manpower Resources for National Security - A Report to the President by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization," 6 January 1954.

2/ Nicholas DeWitt, "Professional and Scientific Personnel in the USSR," Science, 2 July 1954.

The rates of increase of the professional group in the two countries reflect the differences in basic educational philosophy. In contrast to the educational system of the U.S. in which motivation for the support of education has been the benefit of the individual, in Russia education is provided for the benefit of the state and is intended to serve the purpose of the state alone.

In the pragmatic development of Soviet education, the emphasis has been on the sciences and practical arts. Since 1930 the Soviet leaders have stressed the key role of education of specialists in the development of the communist state. The purpose of higher education as expressed in a Soviet encyclopedia is "To prepare highly qualified politically trained engineering personnel with well rounded education, cultured, wholeheartedly devoted to the motherland and the cause of Lenin-Stalin, capable of mastering and using the newest accomplishments of advanced science and technology and of merging scientific theory with the practical work of building a communist society." This is in sharp contrast with educational philosophy in the U.S. where a large number of college students, particularly women, are enrolled for a general and cultural education with no emphasis on special training.

Following a 1933 decree concerning placement of trained personnel, Soviet authorities established the legal practice of placing professionals and subprofessionals involuntarily, as well as voluntarily, within the occupational fields that coincide with the formal specialized training completed by them in academic institutions. Hence, the planned educational system provides the technical cadres for the specific needs of the economy. The result is that even though the sciences in Soviet

Russia may be less well developed than in the West, the USSR can and does concentrate its resources and its effort on items of strategic significance in the Soviet national program.

The needs of the national program are the determinants of Soviet educational requirements. Following seven years of compulsory elementary school training in which about a third of the curriculum is devoted to arithmetic, algebra, geometry and the natural sciences superior students are admitted to the secondary schools. Here the student has no choice of courses and 40% of his three year curriculum is devoted to science and mathematics. The steady increment of acceptances into higher educational institutions during the past few years has been maintained because of the spectacular increases in numbers of graduates from secondary schools. In 1954, for the first time, there was a surplus of secondary school graduates over the available admission vacancies in institutions of higher learning.

The current rate of growth in professional and subprofessional classes in the Soviet Union exceeds that in the U.S. In 1953 there were 200,000 graduates from institutions of higher education in the Soviet Union and the figure for 1954 has been put at 230,000 (Table 2). It is estimated that the number of graduates in 1956 will approximate 330,000, an increase of 43 percent over the size of the 1954 class. Forecasts for the U.S. are far more modest as shown in Table 2.

Backing up the professional class in the Soviet economy is a large body of well-trained subprofessionals. They represent the core of the supporting and intermediate level technical personnel who in America

come from technical institutes, junior colleges and even from regular four-year colleges. The Soviet subprofessionals are trained at "technikums," three or four year schools somewhat above the level of our junior college. Training is provided for engineering aides, agricultural, medical, legal, and pedagogical workers. The courses are about 40% theoretical; the engineering course, for example, includes mathematics through calculus. Since part of the training is on-the-job, the students are prepared to enter industry immediately on graduation.

TABLE 2

NUMBERS GRADUATED FROM INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

	United States ^{3/}	USSR ^{2/}
1940	186,500	
1942	185,300	
1944	125,900	
1946	136,200	
1948	272,100	
1949	366,600	
1950	433,700 (postwar peak)	185,000
1951	384,400	
1952	331,900	220,000
1953	304,900	200,000
1954	292,900	230,000
1955	264,000*	
1956	303,000	330,000
1957	321,000	
1958	324,000	

*Figures for 1955 and subsequent years are preliminary projections made by Wm. A. Jaracz, Head, Statistical Services Unit, Research and Statistical Standards Sections, U.S. Office of Education, and transmitted in a private communication.

In 1952 there were 3500 technikums with a total enrollment of about 1,000,000 students. Graduates numbered about 350,000 that year, and of these about 50,000 had taken their training in engineering.^{4/} The U.S. on the other hand has only 1,000 two year technical institutes with a total enrollment of 50,000 students and approximately 10,000 annual graduates.

The rate of growth of the subprofessional class in the USSR is keeping pace with that of the professional class as shown in Table 3. The relative increases in the subprofessional group ensures an adequate, necessary support for the professional group.

TABLE 3

USSR PROFESSIONAL AND SUBPROFESSIONAL WORKERS^{2/}

	Total Professional and Kindred Workers (millions)	Professional Workers With Higher Education (millions)	Change	Subprofessionals With Specialized Secondary Educ. (millions)	Change
1940	2.5	0.85		1.65	
1952	5.5	1.79	+110%	3.72	+125%
1953	5.9	1.99	+ 11%	3.96	+6.3%

Of paramount importance to the U.S. currently is the comparison of the scientific and technical manpower pools of the U.S. and the USSR and their respective rates of growth. In the USSR the growth of the scientific and technical manpower pools has come about as a result of direct actions taken by the government, such as the setting of higher pay scales for scientists and engineers and the use of the government's occupational assignment powers. In the U.S. the corresponding growth has been influenced by factors of a much more indirect and much less

controlled nature.

TABLE 4

	US ^{5/}	USSR ^{4/}
1947	19,300	
1948	28,900	29,000
1949	45,200	
1950	52,700	28,000
1951	41,900	30,000
1952	30,300	30,000
1953	24,200	40,000
1954	22,200	50,000
1955	24,000	
1956	30,000	
1957	34,000	

In 1954 about 22,000 new engineers were graduated in the US and approximately twice that number in the USSR. Virtually all Soviet engineering school students are granted five year deferments and sometimes even exemptions from military service. All the evidence indicates that the Russian engineers have a sound training lasting five and a half years with a 5,000 hour curriculum. The result is a training equivalent to a point between the US bachelor's and master's degrees.

On the numbers of professionally active engineers in the two countries current estimates place the US ahead by approximately 100,000. Estimates for several years since 1930 are shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

PROFESSIONALLY ACTIVE ENGINEERS

	US ^{6/}	USSR ^{2/}
1930	215,000	41,000
1940	278,000	283,000
1950	543,000	
1952		467,000
1953	633,000	

Although the US currently leads in the number of professionally active engineers, this lead is being cut at the rate of about 20,000 per year on the basis of present rates of training and, assuming a continuation of these rates, the USSR will achieve parity with the US in numbers of engineers in about 1960. One bright spot in the picture is the upturn in the number of new US engineering graduates expected to occur in the current academic year (1954-55) which is the result both of an increase in total college enrollments and in the percentage of students enrolling in engineering curricula. The number of first year engineering students expressed as a percentage of high school graduates of the preceding academic year is shown for each year since 1947 in Table 5.

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE OF US HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES ENROLLING
IN ENGINEERING COURSES^{7/}

Year	Percent
1947	5.9
1948	4.5
1949	3.3
1950	2.9
1951	3.4
1952	4.2
1953	4.7

While reliable data on the number of professionally active natural scientists in the USSR are not available and figures on US scientists are not as well substantiated as are those for engineers, there is reason to believe that the US also enjoys a lead at the present time in the number of trained scientists. The Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training^{6/} placed the number of scientists in the US in 1953 at 237,000. The number of Russian scientists is estimated by the Scientific Manpower Commission to be somewhere in the neighborhood of 150,000 to 175,000.

The number of degrees granted in the US to students completing curricula in the natural sciences has been declining since the postwar peak was reached in 1950 in a manner somewhat parallel to that exhibited in engineering. There is reason to believe that the low point was reached in 1954 and that the number of natural science degrees will show an upturn

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beginning in 1955. Table 6 shows the total number of degrees granted
(bachelors, masters, and doctors) in the major branches of natural
science in each of the years since 1951.

TABLE 6

NATURAL SCIENCE DEGREES GRANTED IN US

	Biological Sciences	Mathematics	Physical Sciences	Totals
1951	16,300	7,000	20,200	43,500
1952	14,300	5,700	16,900	36,900
1953	12,600	5,300	14,800	32,700
1954	12,100	5,000	13,900	31,000

At the most advanced levels of training in the sciences, comparable to our doctorate, the USSR appears to be stepping up considerably the numbers being trained. While there is no exact equivalent to the Ph.D. in the Russian educational system, the degree which seems to come closest to the doctorate is that of "Kandidat" which requires three years of study and research. In 1952 there were about 5,500 Kandidat degrees granted as against 7,700 doctorates in the US. The distribution of these degrees between the scientific and technical fields and other fields of study appears to be considerably different in the two countries, however. In the US approximately 40% of the doctorates granted are in the fields of science, engineering, and mathematics while these same fields account for about 80% of the USSR's Kandidat degrees.

A major obstacle to the accomplishment of a significant increase in the US rate of training of scientists and engineers is the acute shortage of science teachers at the high school level; a shortage which is expected to become more severe in the immediate future. Since 1950 when college graduations reached their postwar peak the number of college graduates

prepared to teach in high school has fallen more rapidly than has the total number of graduates and the number prepared to teach science or mathematics has fallen more rapidly still. While the number of bachelor's degrees in all fields has dropped 34%, the number prepared to teach in high school has dropped 42%, and the numbers prepared to teach mathematics and science have dropped 51% and 56%, respectively. In chemistry the number prepared to teach at the high school level dropped from 1,700 to 600 between 1950 and 1954 and in physics the drop has been from 950 to 300. The numbers trained for high school teaching in science and mathematics for each of the years 1950 to 1954 are shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7
NUMBER PREPARED TO TEACH HIGH SCHOOL
MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE^{8/}

	Mathematics	Percent change from 1950	Science	Percent change from 1950
1950	4,618		9,096	
1951	4,118	- 10.8	7,507	- 17.5
1952	3,142	- 32.0	5,246	- 40.3
1953	2,573	- 44.3	4,381	- 51.8
1954	2,281	- 50.6	3,978	- 56.3

The significance of the rapidly diminishing flow of trained high school teachers of science and mathematics becomes more apparent when viewed in the light of high school enrollment which will increase from a total of 6,600,000 pupils in 1952-53 to 9,300,000 by 1959-60 and to somewhere between 11 and 12 million by 1965. The number of science

teachers needed in the schools will rise from 67,000 in 1952-53 to an estimated 84,000² in 1959-60. By 1965, this number will probably reach 100,000. The current annual need for new science teachers is placed at more than 7000 and is expected to approach 10,000 within the next few years. The fewer than 5000 potential replacements now graduating annually fall far short of satisfying requirements.

The effects on the quality and quantity of training in science and engineering of current and prospective shortages of high school teachers of science and mathematics are, of course, impossible to predict with any accuracy but since students are often introduced to the sciences at the secondary school level and acquire their interest in preparing for scientific careers at this stage in their education the results of a shortage of well trained high school science teachers cannot help but be a deterioration in the quality of science education and a constriction in the flow of scientists in training.

In summary, available data on scientific and technical personnel in the USSR and comparable data for the US show that the US is leading the USSR in the number of professionally active, trained engineers and scientists but that Russia's higher rates of training in these fields will result in USSR parity with the US about 1960 and superiority thereafter. If all professional, technical, and kindred fields are included, the USSR appears already to be ahead in the total number of trained workers.

ALLIANCE AND COALITION PROBLEMS

A primary objective of the U.S. at the forthcoming conference will be to block all attempts to the Soviets to weaken or destroy the system of alliances and coalitions existing in the Free World. A related objective will be to gain greater support among the uncommitted nations for our position and to provide them with a better image of our intentions and capabilities.

The advantages of our alliances and coalitions are obvious. They are the means for maintaining abroad the bases which are essential in the present state of military technology. The most important alliance, NATO, is an indispensable prerequisite to the present security system of Europe. The coalitions serve to check the spread of Communist influence and of neutralism. They likewise provide an operational framework for working toward the common aims of the non-Communist world.

At the same time, it must be realized that these alliance and coalition arrangements are purchased at considerable cost to the United States. They require us to give up a certain amount of our freedom in making policy. We are bound to pay serious attention to the views, demands and special interests of our allies, even though this is often inconvenient and costly. To carry allies with us involves compromise and bargaining, as well as delays in action.

If at the present time the U.S. should decide on a bold and strong program in dealing with the Soviets, one of the chief problems will be

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-2-

to get our allies to go along with us. At the same time the Soviets, in seeking their own objectives, will undoubtedly try to work through the members of the coalitions and through the uncommitted nations.

It must be kept in mind that these arrangements are unstable in nature, and that their members usually have little military strength to offer to the common effort. The U.S. is constantly faced with the necessity of providing substantial foreign aid to keep the allies in line and is also confronted with the risk that a change in government or some maneuvers by the Soviets might lead particular members to lapse into neutralism or, at the worst, to go over to the other side.

An additional difficulty must be kept in mind. In a time of crisis, coalition systems tend to convert little disputes into big ones. Their purpose, of course, is deterrence by confrontation of a potential opponent with a superior force, but if this does not succeed, a general war may be the outcome. In an atomic age, coalitions tend to diminish the chances of localizing disputes and taking care of them by limited and conventional military action.

But in spite of these heavy costs there can be little doubt that a wisely administered system of alliances and coalitions is an indispensable aid in the present crisis. The total gain in strength appears clearly to outweigh the disadvantages. If there were any doubt about this, it should be removed by the persistent and almost desperate efforts of the Soviets to break up the system by any means.

Among the ways in which the Soviets seek to lure our allies away from us, two seem to offer particularly strong appeal. One of these

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-3-

arises out of the widespread fear of atomic warfare, and the other is based on economic aspirations.

The first takes advantage of the fact that the atom bomb has become, in the minds of vast numbers of people in Europe and Asia, a horror weapon. This is a response which can exist with or without a rational foundation, and is frequently accompanied by a feeling of distrust of the U.S. as the originator and chief possessor of nuclear weapons. The resulting fears have been effectively played upon by the Soviets through the suggestion that in an atomic war between the U.S. and the USSR, the states which are members of alliances and coalitions with the United States will be among the first to be bombed whereas those which have remained neutral will be spared. The inhabitants of the perimeter states are especially sensitive to this suggestion since they as a rule lack the depth in territory which might lessen the effect of atomic attack.

This feeling of horror may in time give way somewhat to more rational attitudes. But perhaps the most effective way to deal with it would be to assist our allies to acquire at the earliest possible moment the best available defense apparatus against nuclear weapons. This would be costly and would take time, but the dimensions of the problem are not outside the range of prudent calculation, and sufficient progress has been made in perfecting defense methods so that they can generate some feelings of confidence.

The second method of luring our allies into neutralism or indifference is through tempting economic offers. These are especially effective in regard to two pivotal allies, Germany and Japan. Unless the Free World can present to them the prospect of expanding markets without excessive

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-4-

competition and the chance of acquiring their supplies without leaving them in a condition of chronic dollar shortage, it will be increasingly difficult to hold them as effective allies.

At the moment the problem is particularly acute with regard to Japan which faces a bad and steadily worsening economic condition, and is being subjected to tempting lures of large trade with Communist China. Fortunately for us, the arrangements made thus far have been executed by the Chinese in a slipshod manner or in bad faith. One promising way to meet the situation would seem to lie in the direction of encouraging a much more rapid rate of industrial growth in the underdeveloped countries than now exists. This could be done by a greatly increased flow of investment resources to these parts of the world. The result would be the opening up of new markets for the industrial products of Japan, and a reduction in the attractions of trade with the Communist mainland.

The main point to remember is that the alliances have been brought into existence to further the basic objectives of the U.S., which are also presumably the objectives of the Free World. The structure of an alliance should never be allowed to hinder attainment of the objectives of the alliance. It is quite possible that by skillful diplomacy the U.S. can present its views to its allies in such a way as to carry them through without substantial opposition. A forceful and clear statement of the U.S. position should leave little room for bargaining on behalf of special interests. Opportunity to be heard should of course be given, but effective leadership can be counted on to avoid fruitless discussion. The important thing is not to worry in advance about all the possible

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TAB 3

-5-

objections which our allies might raise to various courses of action but to make our own policy decisions and then to proceed to the business of persuading our allies of their cogency.

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Dr. George Pettee

Tab 3 (a) to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel

DOES NATO HAVE A POSITION OF STRENGTH?

In discussing this subject, it is necessary to speak from impressions and opinions on some matters. What is said about the attitudes of the NATO soldiers is based on direct contacts. What is said on military matters will be said without documentation, but is believed to be in general conformity with military views.

1. What Do the NATO Soldiers Think About it?

The good soldiers in NATO have a great sense of positive accomplishment. They have worked very hard for years now, under some very frustrating conditions. They believe that they have fairly substantial forces now, and that these forces could really fight. They also feel that some of the things that the enemy has been doing this year are things that he would not have to do if NATO had not attained a position of strength.

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- 2 -

2. Present Status of NATO in Military Terms

The present force of European NATO, beginning with the army force, based upon elements receiving MDAP support and in D to D-plus-30 status, amount to about 3 million men. For European NATO, together with Spain and Yugoslavia, the total is about 3,200,000.

The airforces are fairly strong in fighters and light bombers and reconnaissance, and taken on the basis of squadrons and by planes in D-Day readiness, they may be measured as something like 1/3 of the U. S. Air Force.

The navies have large numbers of ships for work in coastal waters in wartime, including mine-sweepers and all types of escort vessels.

These forces have now been equipped, in addition to the pre-MDAP equipment, with about \$8 billion of delivered MDAP equipment together with \$12 billion covered by national expenditure; these figures being for all services. Out of this total, the armies have received about \$5 billion in delivered MDAP hardware and about \$7 billion for equipment from national expenditure. The equipment of the armies by conventional standards is approximately complete, although there are specific shortages in trucks,

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some types of electronics and in ammunition.

The planning and programming of equipment for the NATO forces is conducted under a peculiar system in certain respects. Only part of the forces in any country is subject to MDAP support, these normally being that part of the forces committed to NATO command and in D-Day to D-plus-30 state of readiness. However, the three criteria, MDAP supported as against non-supported, NATO committed as against national committed, and D-plus-30 as against lower military readiness, are not exactly parallel. One result of this is that the major bodies of data involved in the flow of information for the planning processes are not comprehensive, either in terms of military capabilities or by available supplies. There is no such consistent and integrated sequence of strategic, logistic and budget plans as is required in a fairly systematic planning sequence.

The entire arming of NATO has also been conducted in accordance with an initial concept of arming up to a static or "level-off" strength. The

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- 4 -

rapid evolution of newer armaments, and the consequent adaptation of tactics and force organizations, have made such a "level-off" concept fallacious.

The capabilities of the NATO armies at present will include stopping the Russian Army at the Rhine, on the condition that tactical atomic weapons would be used in large quantities, and by large quantities one means at least four figures. This would hold good for a war commencing in 1956 or 1957. Taking this as a fact and the confidence of the soldiers that it is a sensible fact, this has been enough to give Europe some sense of having military security for the time being, and, of course, subject to many qualifications.

At the same time, the air defense system in Europe is wholly inadequate for a war under present circumstances and is rapidly becoming even more so. The ground-to-air anti-aircraft system is about as good as the Germans had in 1944. The defense by fighter aircraft, although based upon fighters much superior to those of World War II, is of dubious value in the light of the short distances, short warning times, and small numbers of all-weather fighters.

It is probable that no substantial flow of military freight across the ocean can be assured during the first six months of a war.

To summarize these capabilities, NATO forces now constitute a positive and substantial asset on the Free World side. Assuming that the true deterrent effect is the effect of the over-all balance between all of our military assets on the one hand and all of theirs on the other, as measured in the minds of the highest enemy political and military authorities, and that it requires all of our assets to constitute the total, it would seem fair to rate the NATO forces as something on the order of 10% of the total military assets upon which we rely to deter the enemy from war.

3. What Does NATO Lack?

The first serious military weakness in the present NATO system is the lack of an adequate air defense. It would appear impossible for NATO to continue to have a position of strength as much as three or four years ahead without a serious effort in this respect. Taking it that military realities must be satisfied, if the position is to be really strong, and that the satisfaction of military realities must also be plausible to at least

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the central cadres if confidence is to be maintained in military and political circles, it is vitally necessary that there be established for Europe a thoroughly modern system of air defense. In this connection, it may be noted that although the European publics may be much less well-informed than the American public on this subject, the information available to the interested groups in Europe is fully equal to U.S. public information and general cognizance. Pictures of NIKE are printed in the European press, European newsreels cover atomic shots in Nevada, etc.

The second essential is that the NATO armies be reconstructed so far as required for the tactics of atomic warfare. Furthermore, since the period is necessarily limited during which the use of tactical atomic weapons enables weaker NATO forces to face otherwise stronger Russian forces, and given the expectation that tactical atomic warfare will have to be excluded from ground war or that both sides will use it equally, further very serious changes in the scale or design of the army forces will be necessary.

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SECRET

- 7 -

Thirdly, in order to reap the military profits which may be within reach if and when the enemy ground forces are stopped on the continent, the NATO forces must have a capability of rapid offensive follow-up of successful ground battle. This imposes serious new requirements in terms of the systems of forces, tactics and equipment.

Fourthly, the rapidly developing situation in regard to electronic counter-measures demands a strenuous effort if the communications systems for ground warfare under actual or latent atomic attack are to be satisfied.

4. The Conditions Required for the Maintenance of a Position of Strength in NATO.

a. The ground space of Germany is indispensable to any highly effective system of NATO air defense.

b. A German army is essential for holding at any line east of the Rhine even with large scale use of atomic weapons and even more so if there is to be any prospect of holding without use of atomic weapons.

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SECRET

- 8 -

c. German industry and scientific capability are urgently needed in connection with the progressive re-equipment of the NATO forces for new forms of warfare.

d. Active German support of the NATO military position is an essential for the maintenance of military confidence and for the conviction by the military cadres of NATO that the NATO system makes military sense, and German neutralization would correspondingly be fatal both militarily and morally.

e. The maintenance of a position of strength in NATO, even with German participation, requires long continued American aid to avoid an otherwise very rapid shrinkage in military strength relative to the rapid technical evolution of war.

f. Energetic participation by European elements in the NATO effort, morally, politically and militarily, demands that U.S. policy be rationally comprehensible to the European mind.

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Tab 3(b)
to the Report of the
Quantico Vulnerabilities
Panel
Dr. W. W. Rostow

ASIA POLICY

It is altogether likely that the Soviet diplomatic offensive in Europe is geared to its intentions in Asia. Moscow has consistently demonstrated that its world policy is a unified program in which a setting of detente in one region is used to minimize resistance to aggression in other areas.

The United States is alone with Russia in having major vital interests at both ends of the Eurasian continent; but we have been less systematic in linking our European and Asian programs.

This brief appendix is designed briefly to outline some possible relations between the European and Asian situations and to suggest broadly the courses of American action which would maximize the American and Free World strength in Asia, in the light of the developing European situation.

The following appears true of the Soviet position concerning the European-Asian link; over the current planning future (say, 3 to 4 years):

1. Moscow is more confident of making geographical gains for Communism in Asia than in Europe;
2. There is more likely to be a situation of extreme tension, threatening armed conflict, in Asia than in Europe;

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3. The schisms between the U.S. and the rest of the Free World over policy in Asia are regarded as a major Free World vulnerability.

By and large, it appears to lie within United States capabilities to prevent any significant Communist advance in Asia due to the following potentially favorable factors:

1. The Chinese Communist internal situation is such that Peiping is unlikely to undertake forms of aggression which would draw significant resources away from its first five-year plan.

2. The regions of most likely military engagement in Southeast Asia present the Communist bloc with an extraordinarily long and difficult line of supply as well as extremely difficult terrain, excepting South Vietnam and Laos. This line is met by Allied lines which are relatively short in time and cheap in cost, because of Allied command of the open sea.

3. Aside from South Vietnam and possibly Laos, there are real foundations within Free Asia on which the United States can build a policy which could not only deny Communism's advance in Asia by means short of major war, but which could bind Free Asia more closely into the Free World and progressively eliminate the schisms which Moscow and Peiping have hitherto exploited with considerable success. The main headings for such a policy appear to be these:

(a) The development of the capability and the will to use American military strength to deal with Communist military aggression short of major war and a persuasive projection of that intent to Asians. On the

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basis of such a capability, we should seek to achieve the following psychological atmosphere in Asia:

(i) The anticipation that the future will bring an eventual Free World victory, and that wisely fatalistic Asians should therefore join the winner as soon as they can.

(ii) The fact that Communism is wicked and that Communists will sooner or later be punished or dishonored by the peoples whom they now hold captive.

(b) A further development of our investment programs in Asia on a scale sufficient both to outstrip Chinese Communist economic development in Southeast Asia and to provide Japan with markets and sources of supply sufficient to solve the acute and dangerous Japanese balance-of-payments problem, and thus to give Japan the foundations for a position of dignity and strength within the Free World.

(c) An increased American interest in emphasis on the problems of Southeast Asia, accompanied by more vigorous efforts to align the U. S. around the world with programs to accelerate the elimination of colonialism.

(d) Prevention of a Communist take-over of Southern Vietnam both for its own sake and to give the rest of Southeast Asia time to gain further strength and confidence, since Peiping is unlikely to turn to a major subversive effort elsewhere until its ambitions in Indochina are achieved.

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(e) A positive U.S. program for Formosa which frankly acknowledges that the U.S. does not intend to initiate a war to install the Chinese Nationalists on the mainland or to encourage military efforts by the Nationalists to initiate a major war with China, but which is designed to achieve the following:

(i) A situation in which Free Asia supports a constructive economic and political policy on Formosa; and

(ii) Transformation of Formosa into a forward-looking Chinese political base, training the cadres for a technically modern, revolutionary Sunyatsenist democracy and providing the political foundations for U.S. and Free World action in China should major war arise from Communist initiative or should a crisis develop on the mainland capable of exploitation by the Chinese Nationalists with or without U. S. support.

- 4 -
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TAB 3(c)
To Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel

JAPAN

THE PROBLEM

The Soviet balance of power with NATO, including Germany, can be dislocated against the USSR if the United States moves toward the serious rearmament of Japan: what factors are needed to make Japan a great power in fact, and to ensure that it is a great power closely associated with the United States?

ASSUMPTIONS

1. If Japan has no strategic interests for which weapons are needed, Japanese armament may exist in fact but the Japanese will lack morale and national support.
2. Japanese strategic interests -- short of wars of conquest, which are ruled out ab initio -- can at present exist only in concert with other powers, such as the U.S.
3. Effective Japanese home air defense is the first precondition to any Japanese military role in the world.
4. Japan has been the only actual great power in East Asia in the past century and is capable of being the predominant power in that area once again.

FACTS

1. The Japanese have been omitted from all international lists of great powers for the last ten years.

SECRET

SECRET

TAB 3 (c)

-2-

2. The Japanese military and naval power did contain all of China's offensive capacity and restrict the entire Asiatic USSR for thirty years before 1945.

3. The Japanese have never done well as a satellite nation. They must be treated with real honor and seriousness as a principal if they are to perform well, not with a feigned or psywar deference.

DISCUSSION

1. The Japanese should not be disregarded during the "summit" conference. Since they are not participants, they should be briefed by priority channels.

2. Japanese advice to the Americans should be sought and obtained. The Japanese should under no circumstances be allowed to play the role of neutrals or observers.

3. If the real military potential of Japan is considered, the bilateral Washington-Tokyo complex is more powerful than any conglomeration of minor Northeast Asian states. The American-Japanese alliance already exists in all but name. The missing essential is to make it actual by treating the Japanese as a great power, not as a mercenary dependent of the U.S. forces in Western Pacific.

4. Japanese military and naval technology can and should be recruited for the common defense of the U.S. and Japan.

5. The economic and military role of the Japanese should be re-studied, first in the American government, and secondly in discussions

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TAB 3(c)

-3-

between Tokyo and Washington, so as to find the maximum position of weight, power, prestige and wealth which the Japanese people and emperor can earn with their own efforts in the next twenty years.

CONCLUSIONS

1. A strong Japan may eventually relieve the U.S. military and naval overcommitment in the Western Pacific; it will also relieve the U.S. of involvement with minor political details (Cambodia; Laos; the successor to Chiang) which are of vital interest to Japan but secondary interest to the U.S.

2. A non-neutral Asian bloc led by Japan could eventually offset both Nehruism and Maoism on the purely Asian scene.

3. U.S. aid to Japan, economic or military, will be morally and politically bad for Japan until we find methods for obtaining real Japanese aid for the U.S. and then accept it. The U.S. cannot forever shame the Japanese by "giving" them things.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. No psywar on Japan's role should be used now.

2. Japan should be cut in on the conference by means of U.S. communication with Japan.

3. The potential of Japan as a real great power should be restudied by the U.S. government in the first place and by the U.S. and Japanese governments in the second place.

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TAB 3/10

-4-

4. Japan beat Russia once; the revival of Japan in fact is itself a weapon which does not require advertising or diplomatic promotion; these steps should therefore neither be publicized nor kept secret, but handled quietly and soberly.

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TAB 3 (d) to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
Dr. Stefan Possony

MEASURES TO COPE WITH
FREE-WORLD FEARS OF THE BOMB

General apprehension about nuclear warfare is one of the main weaknesses of the U.S. position in Europe, including the NATO countries. There is a tendency to dismiss this apprehension as irrational or to take the attitude that Europeans simply must readjust to new conditions of warfare. However, their apprehension will not evaporate as a result of this attitude. It must be recognized that European apprehensions -- which are not entirely "irrational" -- pose a serious problem for American policy.

The following steps should be considered as possible means to come to grips with this problem:

1. Europeans believe that they, practically alone, will be the victims of nuclear war, and that the United States will not be seriously hurt. This impression can be corrected by a suitable information program.

2. Europeans are fearful that they are particularly vulnerable to nuclear attack. It is quite true that European countries possess entirely inadequate air defenses. They also lack proper civilian defenses. Moreover, it is true that due, for example, to short warning times, they are more handicapped in some respects, than the U.S. It is suggested therefore that the build-up of a NATO military and civilian air defense system be given a high priority and that it be based on the most recent technology, including, to the extent practical, on ground-to-air missiles with atomic war heads.

SECRET

TAB 3 (d)

-2-

3. Since at this time, the European nations (except the UK) do not possess nuclear weapons, it is not particularly surprising that they take a negative attitude. Consideration should be given to the allocation of a few small weapons to some of the NATO allies, assuming that such nations comply with US security requirements. It is of primary importance to transform some of our allies into "nuclear powers." Unless and until we do, we shall not be able to convince them of the soundness of our strategy.

4. The unreasonable fear about atomic weapons may be alleviated by having foreign troops participate in a troop indoctrination program, such as was undertaken by the U.S. Army in Nevada. Participation in such tests should take place outside of the U.S. and within the NATO area.

5. Fear about fall-out -- which is the single most significant component of the nuclear fear -- may be reduced by disclosing that fall-out can be avoided and by stating that there is no intention on the part of the U.S. to use nuclear weapons in such a way that large scale fall-out will occur. It is particularly necessary to state that employment of nuclear weapons in defense of the NATO area will not entail massive fall-out -- and to adjust military plans accordingly. Since, however, fall-out cannot be avoided entirely, there should be some safety indoctrination in exposed areas.

6. An invitation may be issued to the Soviet Union asking them to associate themselves with the U.S. policy on fall-out. This declaration of intent should be followed up with an international scientific conference on fall-out. (Note: It should be recognized that recent U.S. statements

SECRET

SECRET

TAB 3 (d)

-5-

on fall-out have done more harm than good. The U.S. should make up its mind to get civil defense without frightening Americans and particularly Congress into it: The truth is that Americans so far have not become actively fearful, but the Europeans have succumbed to a fear almost bordering on panic.)

7. Clarifying statements should be issued and strategic actions engaged in -- or at least not shied away from -- to disprove the following equations erroneously believed in by many Europeans:

Any nuclear bomb is excessively devastating;

The employment of a limited number of bombs means a full-fledged nuclear war and extremely high casualties;

The employment of nuclear bombs in local war must bring about global nuclear conflict.

Instead, the following points should sink in:

There are numerous differences between bombs and their employment;

The employment of bombs in war does not necessarily lead to excessive damage and casualties, and under some circumstances, may reduce the human cost of war.

The employment of nuclear weapons does not by itself lead to global war, on the contrary it may prevent it; in any event, between 1945 and 1955, the nuclear superiority of the U.S. has kept the peace and preserved the independence of the NATO nations. Henceforth, future Western security demands intimate and active nuclear cooperation among the NATO nations.

It is recognized that some of the above suggestions may increase apprehension at least in the short-run. The "frightfulness" of the weapon

SECRET

SECRET

TAB 3 (d)

-4-

cannot be conjured away, and any attempt to do so would backfire. It is believed that, if the NATO nations became more familiar with the nuclear problem, actively participate in nuclear defense and offense, and in the process lose their present acute inferiority complex, they will take a calmer attitude ultimately and may become less inclined to interfere irrationally with U.S. strategy.

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TAB 3(e)
To Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
Dr. Ellis Johnson

AIR DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE

Since 1946 the favored strategic solutions in a conflict between the United States and Soviet Union have favored the war of annihilation initiated by surprise using atomic weapons delivered by manned strategic bombers, and since 1954, in fancy, by intercontinental ballistic missiles. The early lead of the United States which resulted from the intensive effort of the Manhattan District during World War II was soon recaptured by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet atomic program begun in 1946 is expected to culminate in a stockpile of thousands of atomic weapons by 1965 of which a large number can be thermonuclear weapons of the size of 10 megatons or greater.

At the same time the Soviet Union has concentrated with equal intensity on delivery systems and now matches the U.S. in the quality of its strategic bombing aircraft. It is at least at parity, if not well ahead of the U.S. in the development of intercontinental missiles. Therefore, although the present situation of the Soviet Union is one of inferiority in both atomic stockpile and air vehicles to deliver the stockpile, this inferiority is in numbers alone. Their problem is primarily one of production and is one which they will have solved for all practical purposes by 1960. At that time so far as atomic weapons are concerned and so far as air vehicles suitable for delivery of the atomic weapons are concerned, the Soviet Union will have a sufficiency more than adequate to destroy the U.S. many times over if their air attack is unopposed. We can summarize this situation by stating that the race

SECRET

SECRET

TAB 3(e)

-2-

for atomic stockpiles and the race for strategic delivery is nearly over so far as unopposed delivery is concerned.

This does not mean that there should not be a continuing and intensive effort to improve the U.S. strategic delivery systems. However, since in quality the two opponents have reached equality the prognosis is that the delivery systems and the stockpiles will for all practical purposes remain on an equal basis rather than on a basis which gives unilateral advantage to one or the other of the opponents.

This has resulted in an intensified race to achieve an air defense which could nullify the delivery of the atomic weapons. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union acquired access to the German "Wasserfall" technology at the end of World War II. Each country acquired a captive set of German scientists, each has exploited the technology as intensely as possible, each is constructing almost simultaneously the anti-aircraft missile sites to defend the most vulnerable targets in each target complex. The most impartial intelligence analyses assign (within the limits of accuracy of intelligence information) approximately equal capabilities to the two nations. Since the air defense technologies involve the most intricate and complex detection, control and communication systems and the most complex problems of aerodynamics, physics, propulsion, electronics guidance as well as tactics, the outcome of the technology race for an air-tight defense, with respect to the time of identical capability, remains uncertain.

What has been proven beyond question of doubt is that it is within the realms of technical and economic possibility to establish an air defense system tight enough so that not more than one or two or three bombers

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SECRET

TAB 3(e)

-3-

out of a force of a thousand bombers would ever be able to deliver their atomic war load on the target city. This would be an incredible achievement compared to World War II anti-aircraft defenses. But just as the technology has improved the effectiveness of atomic weapons by 10 thousand times over World War II high explosive bombs, the same technology has improved the effectiveness of air defense weapons by 200 thousand times. The technology which gave us atomic weapons is now providing the invulnerable defense against these weapons. Very long range, the manned-strategic bomber appears to be doomed to ineffectiveness in the face of surface to air missile technology.

The problem of anti-missile defense is not yet solved but the prognosis of the most skilled technicians indicates that the defense against the as yet unborn intercontinental missile already exists in embryo, and will probably emerge in full scale capability before the intercontinental missile itself becomes practical.

Yet the outcome of any technological contest is like that of the military conflict. The outcome depends upon the good luck of the technological breakthrough of the creative inventor, of the good management of research development and decision-making of the wise executive, of the far-seeing Congress and Senate and indeed of the whole decision-making system of the culture. The problem of who has an adequate defense against the opposing delivery systems cannot be predicted with great accuracy.

In 1955 the studies of such notable groups as that led by James Killian who reported his findings to the President in the Killian Report,

SECRET

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TAB 3(e)

-4-

of Lamplight, another MIT study, the Operations Research Office of the Army, of the RAND Corporation of the Air Force, of the Lincoln Laboratories, and of the Weapons System Evaluation Group, all indicate that within the period 1958-60, the U.S. has the capability, if it chooses to appropriate the monies required, for having an air defense system which will keep the damage to the country probably below 2 per cent and almost certainly below 5 per cent. This level of defense would cost not more than \$3 billion a year. Although this is a heavy cost and although the outcome of the technological battle to provide this defense is probabilistic, especially with respect to electronics jamming, the judgment of the most skilled technical personnel indicates the eventual superiority of air defense over air attack at least in the period after 1960.

Since the air attack and air defense systems will be in continuing competition, the effort in both must be maintained but it seems probable that if the United States makes the wise decisions and makes the best use of its technical personnel, it can by 1960 nullify the threat to the U.S. posed by the growing Soviet stockpile and the growing Soviet bomber forces.

Let us now address ourselves to the question of the air defense of NATO. There is no question but that the morale and the motivations of the populations and of the leaders of our allies in the NATO countries are very adversely affected by the threat of atomic attack of their cities, lines of transportation, and military establishment and on the NATO forces, both domestic and allied, who support their respective countries. Both the

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SECRET

TAB 3(e)

-5-

Germans and the French are especially sensitive to the dangers of atomic use in their countries. They know one simple mathematical equation: one times zero equals zero; that is to say that if the probability of survival against an atomic air attack is small or **zero** then it makes little sense to have an excellent ground defense good enough to be sure of repulsing a Soviet ground attack if the country is destroyed from the air by atomic air attack.

Our allies are especially aware of the large number of medium bombers or intermediate range ground-to-ground missiles that the Soviet Union can bring to bear on them, as well as the growing Soviet stockpile of atomic weapons. We can therefore expect our allies to lose motivation more and more as they become acquainted with the growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile. For this reason their investment and the investment of the U.S. in defensive ground forces will be of no value if an air defense of the NATO countries as good as that of the U.S. is not provided.

Such a defense is possible. It can be achieved by 1958 against manned-bombers and by 1961-65 against ground-to-ground missiles. The estimated cost of this defense is at least \$4 billion a year to include the defense of England, and the Continent including Italy. Of this cost not more than \$3 or \$4 billion will be required for the initial capital investment in guided missiles systems.

The effect of geography is important in an air defense system in Europe. The warning system must be so close in front of the anti-aircraft weapons line or the line where the bomb is dropped that only a limited warning time is available. This warning time is so short that there is

SECRET

TAB 3(e)

-6-

absolutely no value in providing manned-interceptor aircraft. The only possible system that could be effective would be a ground-air-missile system.

The only modern ground-air-missile system that can be provided by 1958 is a Nike air defense system. Investigations of the procurement capabilities show that these must be manufactured in the U.S. and that this is easily within the capability of the U.S. Nike production already established and planned for.

This 1958 air defense system, because of the technical dynamics, will have a relatively short life so far as providing a permanent and continuing effective air defense system is concerned, and it must be re-phased to a better system as rapidly as possible to meet improved enemy systems.

This improved air defense system is best provided by supporting research and development in the NATO countries so that they can design an air defense suited for indigenous manufacture. Their own inventiveness and capability in research and development is extremely high; note for example the fact that the Wasserfall technology now being exploited by the U.S. and the Soviet Union was developed in Germany. After the initial capital investment, therefore, the most economic way of developing a native defense system would be to support a research and development system and production in the NATO complex. The psychological effect of such an effective air defense system would be very great on both the NATO populations and on the Soviet Union.

It is predicted that the present antagonism arising from the existence of atomic weapons and fall-out now very much directed towards the U.S. would

SECRET

SECRET

TAB 3(e)

-7-

then be turned around and directed towards the Soviet Union, and the present unhealthy atomic psychosis which exists in the NATO countries would be changed to a healthy resentment of the Soviet pressure. Furthermore, hope would be reborn in the value of defense against ground attack which would still exist at the perimeter by the threat of the ground forces of the Soviet Union.

It should be noted that even though an air-tight air defense system was established the possibility of tactical use of atomic weapons within the NATO countries themselves would leave a residue of serious resentment and uneasiness which would be directed primarily toward the U.S. It is essential therefore that SHAPE and the U.S. make a maximum effort to find other technical solutions than in the use of atomic weapons within the NATO countries. This appears to be entirely feasible since at a minimum atomic weapons could be used in interdiction bombing in Russia and if necessary in the Satellite countries in order to limit the attacking forces mounted by the Soviet Union against NATO. Such a strategy and tactic would re-establish the confidence of the NATO populations in the U.S. as a wise and firm leader.

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S E C R E T

Dr. George Pettee

TAB 3(f)
To Report of
QUANTICO VULNERABILITY
PANEL

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE MORALE OF ALLIES

In attempting to summarize some of the ways in which our conduct toward our allies affects their attitudes toward the alliance, a major point is to try to see the thing from the point of view of the allies. This may be difficult, but there are some possibly effective approaches. While it might require a very learned man to imagine the workings of the mind of another nation in its cultural patterns, it may be possible for us, simply by recalling the quarrels a husband can have with a wife, or the irritations between a father and a son, to remind ourselves how easily the same facts can appear differently to different points of view.

The starting point of this discussion will be in terms of some of the questions which allies must ask themselves, or which anyone of us might ask for them if we were engaged as their counsel. Thereafter there will be a short treatment of the criteria of a strong ally, in terms relevant to the present, and finally a short summary of principles or measures which we should bear in mind if we wish our allies to be strong in their alliance.

A. The Alliance from the Point of View of an Ally.

1. Why is an alliance with the United States not like the Monroe Doctrine, requiring no effort by the protected countries?

2. If our security is essential to the security of the United States, is that not simply a very nice thing for us?

S E C R E T

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3. If the protective wing of the United States is enough to make the "smart money" in this country confident as to the security and stability of the country, does not this provide the opportunity for hanging onto some of the good things we have, ranging from colonies to big estates or mink coats.

4. If the United States really expects us to make serious efforts for the aims of the alliance, how can it expect us to play on the team when we cannot hear the signals.

5. It is difficult enough to make military plans based upon a budget dependent upon the grace of one unpredictable legislature. How can we plan independence upon not one but two such legislatures?

6. If we are to be soldiers of the Free World coalition, are we to be second class soldiers with second class equipment, expected "not to reason why" on strategy or tactics?

7. If the enemy, with his advantage of numbers and of interior lines, concentrates against us on our isolated sector of the great perimeter, where are reinforcements for us to come from?

8. If we have lots of men, and are in a part of the world where for geographic and logistic reasons neither side could fight with great quantities of heavy equipment, what sort of force system, tactical system and equipment system should we have on a rational basis, as distinct from a merely skimped version of US TO&E.

9. Has the US no answer to the small war problem except the massive all-out use of atomic weapons?

S E C R E T

10. If the United States will not give us the essential facts about the effectiveness of some of the weapons which will be in the battle, just how can we prepare our minds for the combat -- should we stand on one foot and chew our nails?

11. If the U.S. is enmeshed in the complex organizations and procedures of several alliances in addition to its own governmental complexities, what is to assure us that decisions can be made on time when the time is very short.

12. (For some of the colonial areas) Why does the U.S. subject us to the economic fall-out of erratic supply and demand for the exports of raw materials which are the basis of our livelihood?

13. If the U.S. makes such a clamor that only a NIKE defense system or a better one is adequate for air defense, and makes no move to assist our air defenses, are we to assume that we are expendible?

14. If one can have a free ride under the protection of the United States why should one be an ally instead of a neutral?

B. What are the Criteria of Strength of an Ally?

1. A large proportion of the vote in elections (90 % or so) cast in favor of parties which support the status quo with its possibilities of reform, and against the parties of revolution, Communist or Fascist.

2. The voting by the parliament of a considerable portion of the total budget for defense purposes, roughly speaking 40 percent of the budget, and between 7 and 10 percent of the GNP, (though differing of course for richer and poorer countries).

S E C R E T

3. The display of a practically effective will to accomplish stable and democratic solutions to political and economic problems in colonies, and such problems as land reform in countries where such problems exist.

4. Furnish, pay and train military full-time manpower equal to at least 1 percent of the population.

5. In NATO, and in continental Europe, the assignment to NATO command of a large proportion of the total forces, and a show of responsibility in maintaining such an assignment.

6. Some initiative and imagination by the leading military cadres in learning the nature of modern war.

7. Self-respect in the military and political cadres of our allies and some capacity for spontaneous initiative in support of the alliance.

C. Principles and Measures Which Should Govern the U.S. Role Toward Allies.

If our allies are in fact allies, what will make them better and stronger allies?

1. We must undertake to underwrite the expensive initial equipment of forces if they are willing to provide the men, commit the forces to the common purpose, and cannot support the initial cost.

2. We must assist, on at least a catalytic scale in the establishment of specific arms industry production capacity.

3. We must take great pains to keep the reasons clear why their military effort makes military sense, and especially to be sure that

S E C R E T

their leading military and political cadres understand the rationale.

4. We must assure them that whereas they are in general locally committed by theatre, the U.S. with some other UN or NATO support accepts the role of inter-theatre reserve, deployable to meet enemy strategic concentration.

5. We must initiate programs to provide, partly at our cost, modern air defenses, especially in Europe and Japan.

6. We should move rapidly to develop reasoned designs for the force systems of countries of Greek, Turkish and Korean types, adapted to the theatres and to the availability of men and of equipment.

7. We should commence the full mobilization of the great Western European capacity for the development of weapons and counter-weapons.

8. We should provide them in permanence the essential military and political conditions of elementary economic and business confidence.

9. We must assure them that the decision-making difficulties of a very complex alliance will not prevent emergency action on time, since we will accept the necessity for unilateral decisions in emergency.

10. We must show enough conviction to oppose our own firm judgment to that of popular emotion when we deem the latter wrong, and enough care for the peoples to accept the obligation of leadership, to explain and elucidate and persuade, time without end.

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TAB 4 to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
Paul Linebarger

STRAINING THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE

THE PROBLEM

Can the United States so impair the relationship between the top leaders in Peiping and those in Moscow as to make the worldwide strategy of Communism more difficult and less efficient for Communists to execute?

ASSUMPTIONS

1. That with or without recognition, the United States and the "Chinese People's Republic" do not at the present reciprocate even that minimum of trust and confidence which might permit American diplomats or propagandists to seduce Chinese Communist leaders from their loyalty to world Communism as represented by Moscow.

2. That the racialist chauvinism characteristic of part of Kuomintang mentality persists in the CCP leadership, though somewhat beneath the surface, and that the Chinese Communists are suspicious of deals between alien Westerners (e.g. "white men") at their expense.

3. That all Communist control systems engender the more or less distinct flavor of "a sense of conspiracy and persecution" reminiscent of paranoia, that therefore the chronically suspicious emotional posture of CCP leadership presents the antagonists of Red China with a Peiping vulnerability.

FACTS

1. The United States cannot develop relations with Peiping rapidly enough to do any serious wedge-driving from the Peiping end of the

SECRET

SECRET

TAB 4

- 2 -

Peiping-Moscow alliance in the next few weeks.

2. In the continuation of long-established Chinese political habits, the Chinese Communists in fact (though not in words) presumably despise the British for being so weak as to recognize Red China and respect us for having the strength not to recognize Red China.

3. The Chinese, both Nationalist and Communist, are concerned only with right and wrong after the political facts supporting one morality or the other have been determined by force, and therefore the Chinese Communists are primarily interested in establishing a de facto political system in the Far East which will make the United States permanently and essentially wrong; the fundamental ideological issue of recognizing or not recognizing "People's China" is very little different from the earlier problem of U.S. recognition of "Manchoukuo."

DISCUSSION

1. The appended review of "Chinese Political Behavior" presents some of the highlights of a necessary discussion of these points.

CONCLUSIONS

1. For the period 1955-1958, for the purpose of manipulating Peiping (and without reference to other, concurrent policy), the United States leaders should deal with the USSR concerning Red China but should seek to minimize dealing with Red China concerning Red China.

2. The President should give the impression that a Washington-Moscow bilateral deal might, with Russian willingness, settle the China problem.

SECRET

SECRET

TAB 4

- 3 -

3. The Russians should be asked their advice on what to do about "the two Chinas" at the summit meeting. News of the U.S. inquiry should reach the world press, even if the inquiry is informal and off the agenda.

4. At some later date, U.S. policy can work directly on Red Chinese leadership; this time has not yet come. The only practicable line of approach is at present through the Russians.

5. As a principal anti-Communist power, the United States should seek to make Russia, as the principal Communist power, responsible for all the consequences of Communist leadership. This will impose a sustained strain on Sino-Russian relations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the U.S. initiate the problem of China at the summit and attempt to make discussion of China both secret and bilateral.

2. That no real "solution" be sought to "the China problem" because there is no problem which can be defined and solved; the many problems, some almost unrelated to each other, will require years for their solution.

3. That at a meeting with Chou En-lai, most matters be referred to American-Russian discussion for settlement.

4. That on no account the United States should acquiesce in Red China's pretensions to being the paramount power of all East Asia.

(ANNEX ATTACHED)

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ANNEX to TAB 4
to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
Paul Linebarger

CHINESE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

(ANNEX TO "STRAINING THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE")

PRELIMINARY

If the subject of China is properly handled, there is a pretty good chance of making the Communist Chinese regime, particularly its dozen top leaders, feel that they have run a serious risk of being victimized by a conference in which they are not participants. This is a major Chinese Communist vulnerability. Sino-Soviet relations cannot be broken at this time, but they can be strained. If the strain does not now show on the surface, we will nevertheless stand a good chance of putting a deep strain on the Russo-Chinese alliance which will show up later.

SOME CHINESE TRADITIONS TODAY

The Chinese Communists at the present time are trying to follow many standard traditional political Chinese habits, thinking habits, talking habits, with, however, the new context of Communism. One of the basic bad features of Ch'ing-dynasty foreign policy, which exasperated British and American diplomats in the 19th Century almost to the point of frustration and insanity, was the Chinese habit of cold sustained affirmation of things they wished to be true, whether or not they were. China (the mandarins said) was the most civilized country on earth, and there was no comparable power. Even in specific cases, the Chinese Imperial officials blandly denied the merely factual truth: there had been no murder; there

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SECRET

ANNEX to TAB 4

- 2 -

were no disturbances; there was a riot but it was caused by the foreigners; there wasn't any riot, and therefore, it couldn't be discussed; and the riot might occur later, but hadn't occurred then; furthermore, they had already paid for it. In this respect, the Chinese negotiators in Korea were doing the exact thing that their great-grandfathers did in 1839, in 1840, 1851, in 1860. Modern Russians have been driven to the realization that sheer outright symbolic lying was a daily requisite to getting along in Communist China.

Symbolic affirmation is an inward necessity in a Chinese society. It is something which the Chinese do to each other in a dispute between individuals, each man takes an extreme position and there is a bargaining as to fact itself before they meet each other intellectually.

Bargaining proceeds by means of known procedure so that there are understandable steps. First, the affirmation; second, the ceremony of engaging the conflict; third, the appeal to disinterested parties for approval or disapproval; fourth, an actual settlement.

Since the Maoist leaders are attempting to repudiate their own Confucian past, their present position leaves them both sheltered at the present and vulnerable in the future to a wide variety of semantic and emotional attacks. It is vital to them to make affirmations: that Chiang Kai-shek is not Chinese, that he does not exist, that Taiwan is an American colony, that American power is a "paper tiger." Each affirmation has for them the function of attempting to force a response from us. Each is potentially a point of strength on which to negotiate further.

SECRET

- 3 -

OUTSIDE VALIDATION

The CCP leaders need outside validation of what they say. The Chinese Communists have been playing one particular propaganda game with us. We have been playing an almost unrelated one back at them. Each gets pleasure from his own communication and neither elite seems to need the other.

CHICOM VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES

One of the major changing factors in Chinese Communist policy tactics is their day-to-day, week-to-week, month-by-month estimate of the U.S.A. That they are attempting to set up a political radar to determine named individuals, identified cliques, particular groups (activist and non-activist), winning people and non-winning people in our government, in our Senate, in our executive is reasonably certain. On the basis of their crudely "sociological" estimate of our leadership, part of their decisions are reached. In many ways our propaganda, if it were capable of being more subtle, could address itself to the specific task of feeding material directly into the CCP estimate of us.

THE NEED FOR HONOR

In terms of what an American policy can do to China at the present time, the present China of Communism is the same China which seven years ago was the China of Chiang Kai-shek. China has many of the same needs. One of the reasons that a Communist China won a considerable degree of support from intellectuals and youths, while turning to the USSR, is because of the fact that the USSR is more capable of exporting honor and

SECRET

ANNEX to TAB 4

- 4 -

has less tendency to export non-honorable, purely material aid than we.

In other words, American aid, physical aid sometimes combined with political shame, can be a highly destructive mixture to be given to any of our allies. China, 1945-1949, seems to be a case in point. The American contribution to the destruction of Chiang's position was not a conspiracy in the State Department but a great part of American destructiveness arose from Chinese realization that what they got physically was not accompanied by honor of themselves, of their country, their leaders, or of their purposes.

There is nothing in the USSR to shame the Chinese Communists, nothing humiliating. And this situation, so much to the Soviet advantage, reflects on through to the simple hearts of the people.

Therefore, part of our policy toward the "Chinese People's Republic" should be very carefully addressed to avoiding honor for that government. We should not pay that government honor as we did Bonn, Germany, pay that government honor as we did to General Wu Hsiu-Ch'uan when America recognized the Chinese Communists somewhat and had him come to New York, pay that government honor by making the fuss we made over Panmunjom.

Wherever we can ignore that government, addressing ourselves to Moscow, talking about that government to third parties or in general using whatever is readily derogatory about the Peiping government, we will prod the governing group, plus the hundreds of thousands immediately below them, to do something about our "shaming of them." This will complicate their policy and will cost us virtually nothing. In

SECRET

ANNEX to TAB 4

- 5 -

this social and psychological respect, we have several inexpensive points of very real advantage in dealing with this Chinese Communist regime.

RECOGNITION OF MOSCOW

One point at which we can go on almost forever without serious loss is, first, American insistence that Moscow is the top dog of the Soviet world -- Moscow, not Peiping. We can hold that Peiping is responsible to Moscow and that only Moscow (as an actual great power) can negotiate directly with us on matters of substance. The more we hammer that point, the less Peiping can respond directly to us.

Secondly, there is the threat of an American-Soviet agreement concerning any aspect of Communist China. This poses a very real strain on Sino-Soviet relations and on the "Chinese People's Government" internally. There is a point of ceremony which Chinese Communists and Nationalists both understand perfectly, and on which the United States has allowed itself to be booby-trapped: the historic protocol of seniority.

If the senior powers of the Communist and non-Communist world meet, that should be a Moscow-Washington meeting.

If the Chinese powers meet, it should be a Taiwan-Peiping meeting.

For the U.S. to deal with Chou En-lai is like one gentleman dealing with another gentleman's valet. And, therefore, any attempt on their part, either the Russian or Chinese, to make the United States deal with Peiping is the reduction of the United States to the status of Peiping, which is something which we should avoid.

SECRET

ANNEX to TAB 4

- 6 -

Finally, the weakness of Soviet controls over Chinese foreign policy, over Chinese armament, etc., is a real one.

SPECIFIC VULNERABILITIES

Specific weaknesses in Chinese politics can affect Sino-Soviet relations. There are three which are very compelling.

The first is the probability that the Chinese do not believe in the A-bomb, do not take atomic weapons seriously, considering these to be firecrackers or impressive mechanical gadgets capable of having a strong emotional effect on persons from the West but not workable against fanatic, dispersed Chinese infantry. Except for a few technicians, this ignorant assumption covers governing cadres at the top. This belief may lead to a rather sharp strain on Sino-Soviet relations, if at any point the Chinese are willing to risk an A-bomb.

Secondly, the Chinese have many more naive illusions about "Asia" than do the Russians. The Chinese are very poorly equipped to deal with Indonesia, with Siam, with Malaya, with Burma. They do not have people who know the languages, they do not know the geography, the economics or the political backgrounds of these countries. A great deal of Chinese Communist thinking on this subject is not really Communist but seems to be second-hand Japanese thinking from the period of the last war. Here and there one finds a shrewd individual but very few of these people are writing or communicating their judgments, with the result that the Chinese Communists' image of Asia is a much more unrealistically integrated "Asia" than anything that the Soviet leadership has assumed. And so it is

SECRET

ANNEX to TAB 4

- 7 -

an "Asia" much more anti-American, anti-British than anything the Soviet Union would trust. Here again there is an opportunity for long-range U.S. political strategy.

The third issue is that when it comes to the responses of the Asian governments, the Chinese can score only accidental successes. As two examples one can suggest that Chou En-lai adopted at Bandung what might be called his "George C. Marshall tactics." All he had to remember was what kind of a Chou En-lai it was whom General Marshall once liked. It was a charming, sweet, amiable Chou En-lai. This "Chou En-lai" he replayed with the skill of a great dramatic actor.

MAJOR CHINESE TARGETS

There are two groups of targets which the Chinese seek. First, the Chinese Communists wish to sustain the unique relationship they have with the Soviet Union. This relationship is more than emotionally necessary to them: it is religiously necessary. This moral relationship provides the cornerstone of the entire system of Chinese Communist political survival at the present time. They are part of one part of the West, and therewith a portion of the modern world; they are a member of a 20th Century organization of civilized states. Many Chinese felt that if they could not become a respectable member of the Western democratic camp, they would be well advised to become modern by joining the other Western "democratic" camp.

The second problem involves the old Chinese "family of nations." This family of nations includes those countries in which the Chinese written

language, Confucian ideology, and Chinese literature were used between the eighth and nineteenth centuries, A.D. One can almost draw it on the map by asking which of these nations of the world have traditional Chinese names which impress the Chinese as being genuine Chinese names, such as Vietnam (Yuehnan), Korea (Ch'aohsien), or Tibet (Hsik'ang). At its widest colonial periphery, the Chinese family of nations would include (for example) the Somali coast, Ceylon, most of Malaya, some of Luzon, parts of Kashmir, Nepal and other points to the south, Formosa, Okinawa, and the Spratly reefs.

THE TIME FACTOR

Finally, it must be underscored that it is the Chinese Communists who seek to impose haste on their own recognition by the U.S., their admission to the United Nations, and the like. The United States has nothing to gain and everything to lose by giving the Chinese Communists something for nothing at this time. We should not proceed at all unless we derive a real American interest from the concession.

In form, the current working decision on China should be to handle the decision on China matters at the Washington-Moscow level or at the Peiping-Taipei level.

In fact, there is no need to take up solutions to China issues until Japan is ready and able to participate as a great power. Any bargain reached by the United States in China will have to be lived with by the Japanese, and if Japanese economic interests in China are not included in a settlement with Peiping, the U.S. will have to foot the bill in the long-run. A real concurrence of Washington and Tokyo is a precondition to the definitive kind of settlement which the USSR is now demanding for China.

S E C R E T

Dr. George Pettee

Tab 5 to
Report of Quantico
Vulnerabilities Panel

AN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF PEACE

The gradual "unwinding" of the cold war was a concept which played a central role in the thinking of the group during the week. Some such concept was necessitated by any position which rejected the inevitability of a great war between the US and the Soviet power. The general strategic ideas advanced rest upon this concept. It was felt that the transformation of the world situation from the present one of high tensions based upon accumulated hates and fears and anxieties, into a situation in which the abolition of major war would have been accomplished must be accepted as a genuine possibility.

There was no tendency however to slip into optimism. It was recognized that such a transformation of the present one into a peaceful one would require most strenuous effort and a very long time, possibly two decades, more or less. It was also recognized that the initial laying down of foundations of accomplishment in mutual give and take with Russia, and the creation of a basis of good faith in US-Russian dealings, would demand enormous skill and patience, and everlasting realism.

It was implied, rather than explicitly stated, that this concept of a process of transition from the present condition to a peaceful one involves a variety of problems on which a great deal of the essential logic is not now known. Differences of viewpoint were apparent within the group, and these differences were difficult to reconcile because of the sheer absence of a body of knowledge in the minds of the participants.

S E C R E T

None of us came to the conference in a state of being learned on the subject, of how to produce and maintain a peaceful state of the world, since there is no man today who is an expert on this.

The nature of war, and the nature of peace, and the nature of a peaceful order, not only within a state^{as} is the familiar historical phenomenon, but in a multi-state system, which is not a familiar historical phenomenon, are all involved in this problem. So also is the general concept of world revolution, and the problem as to how revolutionary are the US aims of a peaceful world, and how reactionary is the enemy concept of inevitable conflict.

The existence of the problem area seems to be a reality. This being so, the questions arise:

Have we an organized body of knowledge in this field?

If not, are there considerable bodies of knowledge that are pertinent to the problem but awaiting organization?

Have we trained experts on the subject?

If the answers to the first and third questions above are negative, what should we do about it?

Proposal:

It is proposed that the problem calls for the establishment, soonest, of something like an Institute of Advanced Studies of Peace and War.

It is further proposed that this Institute be established on the following basis.

1. The study program of the Institute be based upon the granting of full time appointments on a two years basis to a number of

2
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

scholars or experts drawn from government, including military service personnel.

2. The appointment be without specific assignment except that the individual must spend full time for nine months of each year at the institute engaged in self-directed studies related to the main problem.

3. There be no bar to cooperative study among several individuals who choose to work together upon a problem too large for one man to deal with effectively in two years.

4. The Institute operate a series of conferences to be attended by a small number of leading individuals drawn from all areas of US life to hear, test and argue the tentative findings of the Institute and to offer practical guidance in an informal manner.

5. The initial number of individual members of the Institute be 10, with approximately 10 to be appointed each year, so as to maintain a steady group of about 20.

6. The location of the Institute to be close to a center of University life, with ample library facilities and other resources for full use of existing knowledge resources.

7. The initial funding to be in the amount of \$500,000 for the first year, and \$1,000,000 per year thereafter, until or unless experience demonstrates that a larger sum could be effectively used or that results do not justify continuation.

S E C R E T

It is submitted that the establishment of such an institute, without publicity as to its exact scale and funding, would be a move favorable to American interests in the world and would be viewed with approval throughout the friendly world. It could serve, if well handled, as an important counter to the picture of the US as a nation that can and does spend at will a quarter of a billion for an aircraft carrier.

The all important factor in the success of the Institute will lie in the administration of its program in the most complete spirit of scientific freedom for the minds of its members. If complete intellectual freedom to investigate the problem of peace by the most uninhibited intellectual approaches can be established, and if the most powerful and energetic minds can be attracted to the Institute, it can be expected that the payoff may be of very radical importance within five years and that the first important fruits may be obtained in less time than that.

The Institute would amount to an establishment, first in the world, of a Peace College to match the War Colleges. It is not at all meant to imply that there would be a conflict of views as between the two types. In fact the Peace College would probably find friendly sisters in the War Colleges, concerned as they both would be in part with the analysis of the basic human facts behind the great strategic issues.

It is conceivable that the effort should be conducted on a far larger scale and in a greater variety of institutes rather than in one small one. At least at the start, and until experience should demonstrate

S E C R E T

the existence of a range of problem areas of undoubted significance, and of undoubted feasibility for the application of large intellectual and research resources, the effort should be to have the smallest number of men of the highest intellectual calibre, and endowed with the most dedicated sense of urgency, so long as the number is up to the minimum required for intensive cross-stimulation of minds.

The Institute would represent the initiation of an R & D capability for the mastery of the problem of peace, the first seed perhaps of an application of human brains to this problem comparable to the application of human brains to the techniques of war.

S E C R E T