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October 23, 1952

MEMORANDUM

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Dr. Horace S. Craig

FROM:

John Flliott

SUBJECT: Talk with Charles E. ("Chip") Bohlen

I had a talk last night with Charles F. ("Chip") Bohlen, Counsellor of the State Department, on the subject of the latest developments in Soviet Russian policy.

Mr. Bohlen thought that Stalin's article on political and economic affairs printed in the magazine "Bolshevik" on the eve of the recent meeting of the nineteenth congress of the Soviet Communist Party heralded a striking and arresting change in the Kremlin's strategy.

The Soviet objectiveness remains now as before the same--world demination--according to Mr. Bohlen--and the danger of war is as great as it ever was--but Soviet tactics have changed once more as they have many times in the past and as they are apt to do many times in the future.

What is currently happening is that the masters of the Kremlin are reverting to the "popular front" withods. This course of action will doubtless be on a less formal basis than was the case in 1935 since the Communists no longer enjoy the confidence of the European Socialists that made possible the Leon Blum cabinet in France in 1936-1947 and the alliance that victoriously swept the Spanish elections early in 1936.

The new change of front, calling for cooperation with the bourgeois on certain issues such as the "peace crusade", marks the third shift in Soviet policy since 1945. At the end of World War II, the Kremlin ordered the European Communists to cooperate with bourgeois parties and they did enter into ministerial coalitions in France and Italy and worked with the Social Democrats on an "anti-Fascist" basis in Germany.

But this policy changed abruptly in 1947 with the introduction of the Marshall Plan. The Communist parties were ordered to embark on an outright policy of hostility to the existing order in democratic countries and the Cominform arose as Moscow's reply to Europe Economic Cooperation.

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The failure of the general strikes in France and Italy, above all, the flasco of the Ridgway demonstration in Paris on the night of May 28 have convinced Moscow apparently that the helm must be turned again.

Recent developments in Europe have disclosed the new pattern of Seviet diplomacy. They include such events, for instance as (1) the Kremlin's courting of Pietro Benni, Italian left-wing Socialist leader, and the conferring on him of the Stalin Peace Prize in order to win him over to sooperate with the Italian Communists in the 1963 parliamentary elections; (2) the purge of Andre Barty and Charles Tillon from the high posts they occupied in the French Communist party—a disgrace inflicted on them by direct orders from Moscow—because they esponsed a policy of direct action as opposed to the more subtle and crafty policy of cooperation with bourgeois elements favored by Maurice Thores and Jacques Duclos; (3) the Stalin article and speeches delivered before the nineteenth session of the Soviet Communist Party in which the emphasis was laid on future conflicts between capitalist mations instead of a war between Soviet Russia and democratic countries.

Other recent developments which Hr. Bohlen thought also pointed in the same direction were (1) the appointment of a high-ranking man as Andrei A. Gromyko to become Soviet Ambassador to London which has been interpreted as a move to weam Great Britain away from the United States and the reported Sissolution of the Cominform.

All these developments clearly point in one direction, namely, that Stalin's six now is, above all, to break up the Grand Alliance (NATO). He seeks to isolate the United States by working on the hopes and fears of England, France, Italy, and Western Germany and so detaching them from this country. Stalin's policy is the classic one of "divide and rule" and he seeks to embroil the capitalistic nations among themselves and in this way facilitate Soviet Bussia's conquest of the world.

Mr. Bohlen held that in this crisis a great psychological effort cught to be put forth by the United States for the purpose of maintaining the Grand Alliance of the democratic nations. He thought that to accomplish this end, more attention in the future should be paid to propaganda directed towards our allies as our target.

In the past, he felt, United States propaganda aimed at the Soviet Union had a tendency to be too strident and shrill. The result of these outbursts, he believed, had been to alarm our allies more than to intimidate the Kremlin.

These sharp attacks on the Soviet Union, Mr. Bohlen feared, had been to reinforce the incipient impression lurking in the minds of the peoples of the democratic world that the United States was a warmongering nation, trying to incite hostilities with the Soviet Union. This was an image of the United States that Soviet propaganda was sedulously trying to create in the democratic world and some of our past propaganda had aided them.

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As an example of the sort of thing he had in mind, Mr. Bohlen eited propaganda barrage released in connection with the investigation of the Katyn massacres. He felt that this propaganda had back-fired and, indeed, may perhaps have been responsible for the launching of the Communist bacteriological warfare charges against the United States in reprisal.

I also asked Mr. Bohlen how he interpreted the recent constitutional changes effected by the nineteenth Soviet Congress. He expressed the view that the newly-created Presidium, presumed to be instituted to replace the former Politburo, was only eye-wash. It was too big and clumsy to be a really supreme governing body. On the other hand, the Secretariat which included only three members of the old Politburo seemed to be too insignificant.

What the change signified, Mr. Bohlen was inclined to believe, was the virtual disappearance of the Soviet Communist Party as a governing body and its merger with the State. Some organ of the Soviet State is probably the real source of governmental authority in the USSR today. This change had been going on over many years and had now been consummated.

Mr. Behlen also questioned the current newspaper assumption that Georgi M. Malenkov was now the "Crown Prince" because he had been selected to deliver the report of the Central Committee to the Communist Party Congress—an assignment in past years discharged by Stalin. Since the Soviet Premier was not delivering this report himself in 1952, this duty fell exofficio on Malenkov by virtue of the fact that he is general secretary of the party.

When Stalin dies, Mr. Bohlen thinks, it will be found that he has left behind a solemn will and testament, naming the triumvirate of Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Malenkov and Lavrenti P. Beria as his successors.

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