MEMORAND PROPERTY Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100080006-3 25X1A9a Bob Amory concurs in recommendation. April 1960 L CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM (DATE) CONFIDENTIAL **SECRET** CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPLACES FORM 10-101 (47) FFICIAL ROUTING SLIP 1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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The boss does not think much of this proposal and asked what you and thought of it. JSE-					
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FROM SAME ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE					
EO/DCI blp x-8823 18 Apr 60					
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ORM NO. 007 Replaces Form 30-4 (40)					

Approved For Release 2000

FORM NO. 237 Replaces Form 60-x which may be used.

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6 April 1960

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

221 - Admin Building

SUBJECT: Harrison Salisbury's Article in Saturday Evening Post, 19 March 1960.

With respect to the Salisbury article, I would suggest the following steps might be worth considering.

- 1. Discuss at the OCB level whether there is agreement with
- a. Salisbury's favorable interpretation of developments in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev;
- b. His thesis that Khrushchev is seriously apprehensive over the ominous development of China;
- c. His contention that Khrushchev in the long run will seek an alliance with the West against China;
- d. His implied recommendation that US policy should move in that direction now.
- 2. In the light of the findings on the above, the OCB might determine whether
 - a. The Salisbury thesis is one which is favorable to long range US interests and should be followed up tactically and operationally now;
 - b. Any or all of his theses are detrimental to US interests and should be countered;
 - c. His views are without real significance or impact, and should be ignored.

- 3. If his views are considered wrong and dangerous, appropriate action might be recommended by the OCB to various Departments.
- 4. With respect to CIA, our suggestion would be to labor with New York Times editorial personnel through whatever channels are available, to persuade them, preferably, to dissociate themselves openly from Salisbury's views, or at least not to come out in support of them.

I would suggest that such an exercise would be timely not in terms of Salisbury alone. There is a strong current of similar thought in Europe, centering around the so-called Starlinger Thesis. Even deGaulle is believed to be influenced by it. A review of our own long range interest would place us in a better position to react to European pressures in this direction which are likely to grow stronger in the future.

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Chief, SRS/DDI