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SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

#### PROPOSALS FOR THE U.N.-SUMMIT MEETING

#### Introduction

- I. The prospective "summit" meeting at the UN provides a unique opportunity to demonstrate America's capacity for world leadership. We must meet this challenge worthily. In order to offset the impression of apprehensiveness and indecision which our resistance however justified has created, we should reverse our position dramatically, proposing a series of bold, constructive measures which would capture the imagination of the world.
- 2. In order to win this great encounter, it will be necessary to present our own form of "monolithic" unity, a harmony of people and government symbolized in the person of President Eisenhower. He alone should be in command; he should delegate major responsibility to no one, and should participate in everything. In the spotlight of the United Nations and on his home ground, he should be able to surpass the triumph which he achieved at Geneva.
- 3. In dealing with Khrushchev, we confront a man of immense power. We must act on the assumption that his position is stable. In our judgment of him as a man, we must recognize that his belief in his destiny as the leader of World Communism is unshakeable. Whether his self-confidence harbors the seeds of hubris, we cannot judge, but it would be prudent to assume that his conduct, however undignified or mercurial, will be rational. Indeed, it seems likely that he will attempt to surprise us, as he has so often in the past, by unfolding new traits, at once both imposing and disarming. Where we are braced for a vicious onslaught, there may be none; where we anticipate vituperation there may be reason. He may "steal scenes" shamelessly, or display an unexpected correctness and reserve. No matter what happens, he will be the "costar" with President Eisenhower, but he is sagacious enough to realize that he will be competing with other world figures who are at least a near match for him, especially Nehru and DeGaulle.

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In the face of such a versatile adversary, we shall have to improvise many of our responses, while at the same time taking planned initiatives to leave him surprised and off balance. A number of possibilities are suggested below.

## Courses of Action at the Meeting

- Probably the most dramatic and powerful single step the President could take to dominate the entire meeting would be to announce at the outset that the United States proposes to cease nuclear testing, provided the outcome of the Geneva experts' meeting is promising, and to embark on a vast expansion of our program for peaceful development of atomic energy (Operation CANDOR).
- He might then proceed to recommend the holding of a series of comparable UN-Summit meetings, dealing with other areas of conflict and unfulfilled aspiration. He might propose that the first should be for Southeast Asia, including Australia, the Netherlands and North Vietnam.
- He might then announce that the US, recognizing as Khrushchev has proclaimed - the de facto existence of two great social systems, the "socialist" and the "capitalist," accepts the challenge to peaceful competition between them to see which can most benefit mankind. We will cooperate with all peoples and governments, so long as they do not threaten the subversion of liberty and justice.
- After thus addressing a note of hope and promise to the entire world, the President should declare that the purpose of this meeting is, under the United Nations, to achieve a just and durable gratification to the aspirations of the Arab peoples (the term "nationalism" should be soft-pedaled) and a reconciliation between them and the people of Israel. The United States, which has steadfastly opposed imperialism and aggression, will support this endeavor with a number of constructive proposals:
  - a. It will recognize the government of Iraq.
  - b. It will reduce the commitment of Marines in Lebanon by 50% immediately. It invites the United Nations to call for a corresponding number of replacements from other Nations. including the USSR. Indeed, the US would be happy to stand side by side with its wartime allies in assuring the peace of the area for a brief period until other countries could relieve both. -2-

- c. The United States proposes that a "summit" meeting of the Arab countries not including North Africa be convened, and that the United Nations establish a commission of leading powers to assist it in carrying out the tasks listed below (such a commission should include at least the US, the USSR, India, Canada, UK, France, Italy and a neutral country of Europe).
- d. The first step of the joint UN-Arab "summit" meeting should be to work for the establishment of a political confederation. It should devise some mechanism, perhaps similar to that of the Malay Federation, to insure rotation of the Presidency among the member nations and to avoid the hegemony of one country or leader.
- e. The next task would be the internationalization of Middle East oil. It might be suggested that in order to equalize the benefits to the "have not" nations, the profits of the "have" nations be split three ways: one-third for the internal operating budget and one-third for the long-range development program of the producing country, and one-third for the Regional Development Program described below. A similar arrangement might be proposed for the profits on the transportation of oil through pipelines and the Suez Canal. The existing arrangements with private oil companies would be renegotiated on such a basis as to protect their interests in the event of expropriation and to provide an incentive for continuance of their services, while admitting other countries, such as Italy and Japan, on equal terms.
- f. The key project for the area would be a massive Regional Development Program, with special emphasis on the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates valleys. Capital should be provided by a World Bank which could be based on existing institutions, expanded to include Bloc countries.
- g. The terms of a permanent treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Israel should be sought with mutual concessions on frontiers, including special emphasis on land communications between the members of the Federation, and on resettlement of the Arab refugees; the capital cost of the latter should be under-written by the UN commission members dealing with the Arab federation.

- h. The new Confederation should declare its neutrality to be registered by the UN.
- i. An immediate embargo on arm shipments to the area should be imposed, pending the determination of appropriate levels of armaments for the individual members of the Federation. Arms might eventually be provided in equal measure by Bloc and Free World countries.

### Activities Outside the Conference

- Bipartisanship should prevail. Presidents Hoover and Truman should participate at least ceremonially, if not substantively, in the meeting.
- President Eisenhower should call for a Congressional delegation to participate with him throughout the meeting; this might include the speakers and the majority and minority leaders of the two houses and their Foreign Affairs committees. The Congressional delegation, deploring the churiishness of the Mayor of New York in refusing to act as host, might invite all the "summit" leaders to address a joint session of Congress. The importance of this action cannot be overemphasized, since it would provide a much-needed education to foreign leaders in the independent role which Congress - majority and opposition - plays in the conduct of our foreign relations.
- The President should issue a personal appeal to the American people to measure up to their responsibilities as host to the most important gathering of world leaders in the post-war period, displaying courtesy, dignity and friendliness to all impartially. He should also appeal to the non-American political refugees whom we are sheltering not to commit acts of protest - however justified - which would embarrass their protecting friends and to comport themselves with decorum. The Attorney General might prepare a statement on the legal rights and limitations with regard to political protest. Security must of course be maintained, but public emphasis on the measures taken should be minimized.

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4. The President might state that, while the official Washington reception would be the responsibility of the Congress, he would personally hope that each of the leaders would pay him a personal visit at a later date. The proposal of a specific date for a Nehru-type visit by Khrushchev might go far to restrain the latter's aggressive tendencies on the present occasion.

In conclusion, one might characterize the recommended courses of action by saing that they would represent a truly American response. By avoiding both truculence and defensiveness, polemics and apology, we would present to the world that image of self-confidence and relaxation which it is eager to see in us. We must not forget that most of the world has a strong will-to-believe in the United States which it is not yet prepared to direct in equal measure toward the Soviet Union.

25 July 1958