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**ELECTORAL AND PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES  
IN THE USSR AND POLAND**

Introduction

The democratic governments of the world show a wide diversity of constitutional systems and political institutions. The great majority, however, may be classified as belonging to one of two principal types: the parliamentary-responsible cabinet type or the presidential type. The characteristic feature of the first is a plural executive, formed from, and responsible to, a democratically-elected legislative assembly. The states of the British Commonwealth, most of the countries of Western Europe, and Japan in the Far East, are examples of this type. The second major type is characterized by an independently elected and powerfully endowed chief executive, called a president. The United States of America and most of the Latin American republics exemplify this type. The political systems of a small number of countries, such as Turkey and Lebanon, embody features of both types.

Common to all democratic governments is the existence of a parliamentary body which has one chamber at least chosen by a broad electorate. Besides serving as the assembly for the debate and enactment of national laws, the parliament invariably has powers of control

and supervision of the executive. In a political system of the parliamentary-responsible cabinet type, these powers are numerous and are exercised continuously through questions to ministers, debates on policy, pending legislation and financial programs, and through votes of confidence and censure. Parliamentary control of the executive is less direct where the presidential type exists, but it is considerable and important nevertheless. It is exercised through the financial powers of the legislature, the hearings and investigations of legislative committees, and various special checks, such as the confirmation of appointments and the ratification of treaties. Impeachment may be provided for as an ultimate weapon of control.

From the experience of many countries over long periods of time, a number of principles with respect to the composition of a parliament and the relations between the legislative and executive organs have become recognized as indispensable elements of democratic government. These principles constitute criteria by which the right of a political system to be classed as democratic may be judged. Judgments in such matters must be liberal, because, human nature being what it is, practice even in the most respected democratic states does not always meet the standards expressed in the essential criteria. Nevertheless, observance of both the form and the substance must be continuously sought for and realized to a high degree.

Using the criteria of democratic government, one may consider the formal provisions of law and the political practice in the USSR and Poland and arrive at judgments about the right of their regimes to be classed as democratic. The criteria listed are a minimal number, being, it is believed, ones which almost all students of democratic government could accept as valid. Information concerning Soviet and Polish practice is derived from numerous scholarly studies of the political institutions and procedures of the two Communist countries and from their official statements and press accounts. The discussion is arranged in the order of the questionnaire of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

USSR

Part I. The Composition and Organization of Parliament.

A. Composition.

Criterion: The suffrage must be broad, with limitations defined in law.

To qualify as a democratic body, the national parliament must have at least one chamber chosen by an electorate that is composed of a substantial proportion of the adult citizens of the country. Both chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, are directly elected, and the suffrage is broad, extending to all citizens who are eighteen or more years of age. In this respect, the Soviet Union compares favorably with the most advanced democratic countries. The only persons excluded are described as "those who have been convicted by a court of law for criminal offenses, with deprivation of electoral rights, as well as those who have been found, in a manner prescribed by law, to be insane". The exclusion of criminals and the mentally deficient is commonly practiced in democratic countries. However, the category of criminals is undoubtedly much broader in the USSR than in democratic countries, because it includes persons serving sentences for anti-state offenses, i. e. political prisoners. What the size of this prison population is no one outside the USSR knows. Estimates

with a fair degree of reliability have placed the numbers in labor camps as ranging upward from three million persons. \* Some of these are probably prisoners-of-war and deportees from the satellites, but the vast majority are undoubtedly Soviet citizens. As long as citizens may be deprived of voting privileges, as well as their liberty, by conviction on political charges, then their rights of suffrage do not possess the protection required in a democratic society.

**Criterion:** Voters must have the right to organize, nominate candidates, and conduct campaigns.

Since the direct participation of a private citizen in the councils of government is only practical in very small communities, representative institutions are necessary. For these institutions to be truly representative, certain prior conditions must obtain. These include the right of citizens to organize with persons of similar views, the right of such organized citizens to choose a candidate, and the right of the candidate and his supporters to appeal for votes. The electoral activities of voters may be temporary and informal, only coming to life just before an election; or, as in most democratic countries, they may produce permanent

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\* cf. Report of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor.  
Appendix III. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Geneva, 1953.

parties which unite like-minded voters, bring forward candidates, and conduct campaigns for votes. Whether parties are temporary movements or continuing organizations, they are essential to the democratic process. In no other way can the single citizen make his influence felt and obtain a choice - the essence of democracy.

The constitution of the USSR, if not endorsing, at least does not deny these basic propositions of democratic government. With respect to the right to organize, it states that:

"In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the right to unite in public organizations: trade unions, cooperative societies, youth organizations, sport and defense organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically-conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state." (Article 126).

This article, of course, implicitly accords the Communist Party a monopoly in the field of political organization. Lest any other interpretation be drawn, Stalin removed it in his speech explaining the draft constitution before the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of the Soviets of the USSR on November 25, 1936. He said:

"Several parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable - in which there

are, say, capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, kulaks and poor peasants, etc. But in the USSR there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the kulaks, etc. In the USSR there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests - far from being mutually hostile - are, on the contrary, friendly. Hence, there is no ground in the USSR for the existence of several parties, and consequently, for freedom for these parties. In the USSR there is ground for only one party, the Communist Party."

Stalin's successors have consistently maintained this rationale for the Communist Party's monopoly of political rights.

Although political organization and activity are reserved to the CPSU, the nomination of candidates to the Supreme Soviet is extended to "public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies". (Article 141). Any liberality this provision might suggest is nullified by the fact that there can be only one candidate in each election district. He is "spontaneously" proposed in the press, or at a mass meeting of voters. Often the local party organization is the proposer, but sometimes the honor falls to one of the other "public organizations and societies". Whoever brings forward the candidate's name, the nominations are immediately closed, and the campaign for votes consists of group and individual tributes to the chosen one.

It is not uncommon in democratic states, because of historical or cultural reasons, for a voting district or a whole area of the country to

be dominated by one political party. The "Solid South " has been a political fact in the United States for almost a hundred years. In Canada, Quebec Province is traditionally Liberal, while Ontario is Conservative. There are British constituencies which regularly elect either Conservative or Labor members to the House of Commons. However, as states the old American cliché, "It's not the election but the primary that counts," there is some choice provided in the nominating process, and in the election the voters are usually offered an opposing candidate, although his chances are admittedly slight.

While the non-party members in the USSR - that is, about 95% of the voters - have no voice in the nomination of candidates and no choice between candidates, they can register dissatisfaction either by abstaining or depositing an invalid ballot. The first would certainly draw attention to one's tepid or hostile attitude. The election for the Supreme Soviet occurs on a non-working day, and the whole propaganda apparatus of state and party is mobilized to make the occasion an overwhelming indorsement of the ruling regime. It would be a brave voter who would act indifferent. Even the travelers have no excuse. Ballot-boxes are provided on long-distance trains, and the passengers dutifully cast their votes as they ride. The ballots are counted and added to the results of the voting in the district through which the train is passing, which may or may not be a voter's residence.



Very few voters invalidate their ballots by striking out the single candidate's name or by substituting another. They scarcely register among the sweeping majorities compiled by the "Bloc of Communists and non-Party men", i. e. the approved candidates. In the 1950 election for the Supreme Soviet, 99.98% of the electorate voted and 99.73% cast ballots for the official candidates. The vote for the candidates of the Soviet of Nationalities was 99.72% of the total. In 1951 in elections to the supreme soviets of the Union Republics similar unanimity was achieved. The following percentages for the then-labelled Stalinist Bloc were published:

RSFSR	99.76	Ukrainian SSR	99.91
White Russian SSR	99.92	Uzbek SSR	99.92
Kazakh SSR	99.82	Georgian SSR	99.99
Azerbaidjani SSR	99.96	Lithuanian SSR	99.90
Moldavian SSR	99.89	Latvian SSR	99.95
Kirghiz SSR	99.77	Tadjik SSR	99.95
Armenian SSR	99.94	Turkmenian SSR	99.89
Estonian SSR	99.85	Karelo-Finnish SSR	99.52

In the most recent election for the Supreme Soviet in 1954, 99.98% of the total electorate of 120,750,816 voted, and the Bloc candidates were approved by the percentage of 99.79 for the Soviet of the Union and by 99.84 for the Soviet of Nationalities. Figures of this kind are repeated in by-elections to fill vacancies in the Supreme Soviet. For example, the Credentials Committees of the chambers announced ten such elections at the opening of the sixth session in February 1957. The lowest candidate received 99.73% of the vote, and two were elected unanimously.

Such remarkable unanimity occurs in a country of many racial and language minorities, of vast geographical expanse, and of numerous occupational groups. Even if one accepts the Communists' claim about the elimination of class distinctions, the democratic politician may be pardoned for being a little incredulous.

**Criterion:** Voting procedures must insure secrecy and honesty.

Democratic states have developed a considerable body of law designed to protect the secrecy and honesty of the electoral process. The purpose of such legislation is to prevent the intimidation, bribery, or subversion of voters and to guarantee a fair count to all candidates. Some countries have been more successful than others in protecting the purity of the electoral process; none has been entirely free from instances of fraud.

The constitution of the USSR provides that "Voting at elections of deputies is secret". (Article 140). Soviet laws condemn the usual threats to the orderly and honest conduct of elections. The administration of elections and the prevention of abuses are in the hands of a hierarchy of election committees, reaching from the voting precinct to the union republic. These committees are composed of representatives of the organizations which nominate candidates - the Communist Party, trade unions, youth groups, collective farms and so on. The members are

selected by the same kind of spontaneous nomination as are candidates for the supreme soviets.

There is no evidence to indicate that Soviet elections are not technically honest. This is not surprising in view of the control exercised by the Communist Party and the absence of any contest. All the motives which operate to produce intimidation, bribery, and fraud in democratic societies are purposeless in the kind of grand plebiscites conducted in the Soviet Union. A non-Communist observer may wonder how the official bloc always receives between 99.50 and 100% of the total vote, but even these high figures can be believed, given the many pressures to "get out the vote" and the lack of any opposition. Occasionally the press reports that a candidate for an obscure village soviet failed to receive a majority of all valid ballots and thus a second election was required. A student of Soviet affairs believes that these are instances where "the Party wanted to have a few show cases for the purpose of illustrating the 'freedom' of the Soviet elections".\* If so, this is fraud with a reverse twist.

The conclusion on this principle must be that the secrecy and honesty of Soviet elections cannot be appraised by the standards prevailing in democratic countries. In the latter there are usually genuine rivals

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\*W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Regime (Syracuse, 1954), p. 145.

contending for important stakes, and the temptations to win even at the risk of violating the law are sometimes strong. In the Soviet Union, these temptations must occasionally affect party members when they meet to select candidates. If such veteran Communists as Molotov and Malenkov can be guilty of anti-party activities, it would be surprising if lesser comrades were not affected from time to time. The secrecy of party business, however, veils such violations of "socialist legality" as occur.

**Criterion:** Seats in the parliament must be distributed so that in at least one chamber there is a correlation between seats and population.

A parliament cannot be regarded as a representative institution unless there is an equitable distribution of seats throughout the country. It is generally accepted that democratic practice requires the distribution for at least one chamber to be on the basis of population. The other chamber may be, and often is, composed of representatives of the major political or territorial units of the country, or it may reflect social and economic interests. The constitutions of democratic states usually provide for the periodic redistribution of seats, a process often accompanied by a good deal of bickering between the parties standing to gain and those to lose seats in a new allotment.

The constitution of the USSR provides for the distribution of seats in the Supreme Soviet. Each deputy in the Soviet of the Union represents 300,000 citizens, and electoral districts are determined by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet before each election. Seats in the Soviet of Nationalities are allotted according to a constitutionally established formula - 25 deputies from each union republic, 11 from each autonomous republic, 5 from each autonomous region, and 1 from each national area.

As a technical exercise of apportionment, the population of the USSR is as fairly represented in the Supreme Soviet as are the citizens of most democratic states in their national parliaments. Electoral districts of 300,000 compare with the approximately 370,000 in a congressional district in the United States and the some 60,000 in a British Parliamentary constituency. In the Soviet of Nationalities, the smaller territorial units of the USSR are over-represented in comparison with the RSFSR, but probably <sup>no more</sup> ~~less~~ so than are, say, Nevada and New Mexico in the United States Senate.

Where the Supreme Soviet fails to meet democratic standards with respect to representation lies in the monopoly of power by the Communist Party. The great majority of the deputies of both chambers are party members. In the Supreme Soviet elected in 1950, for example, they numbered 1099 of the 1316 deputies. The minority of non-members are faithful adherents of the party line; if they were not, they would not have

been selected and survived the party screening given all candidates. Thus, in practice, the members of the Supreme Soviet represent the seven to eight million members of the CPSU, or about 4% of the population of the country. Only if one believes that the interests and aspirations of the whole Soviet population are identical with those of "the vanguard", "the core", or "the nucleus", as the Communists claim, can the supreme Soviet be regarded as a representative democratic assembly. In the absence of any test of this claim, the foreign observer must remain skeptical.

**B. Organization.**

**Criterion:** The parliament must assemble at regular stated times.

During the time when modern democratic government was developing in England and Western Europe, a favorite tactic of autocratically inclined monarchs was to postpone or evade the assembly of their parliaments. The Bourbon kings of France succeeded in ruling without a parliament for more than 150 years, and the Stuarts in England tried intermittently, but always unsuccessfully, to do likewise. Constitutionalists, therefore, have always regarded a requirement for the regular meeting of a parliament as an essential feature of democratic government.

The constitution of the USSR is explicit in this regard. "Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR are convened by the Presidium of the

USSR twice a year." (Article 46). This provision has been observed, and the 1300-odd members duly gather in regular sessions in the Kremlin. Their meetings, however, are very brief, less than a week as a rule, and during that time they transact an amount of public business that would seem formidable for a parliament which sat almost continuously. The explanation of this efficiency lies in the fact, of course, that the Supreme Soviet merely ratifies, and always unanimously, decisions taken elsewhere by the real rulers of the country.

**Criterion: Members must possess a minimum list of immunities.**

Long experience in many countries with democratic government has established the necessity of granting to parliamentary members a number of personal immunities, particularly freedom from arrest and freedom of speech within the legislative chamber. Without such protection the individual member is liable to intimidation and harassment in the performance of his duties.

Article 52 of the constitution of the USSR provides that: "A member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR may not be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, or, when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is not in session, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR". Nothing is said about freedom of speech during meetings of the Supreme Soviet.

The immunity from arrest is not a firm guarantee since it may be withdrawn by the party leaders acting through the controlled Supreme Soviet or its Presidium. Moreover, the value of what immunity there is must be appraised against the background of practice in the USSR. There is no instance, so far as is known, of a deputy's immunity protecting him from the avenging wrath of the party leaders. Khrushchev in his famous speech before the 20th Party Congress stated that 98 of the 139 members and candidate members of the Central Committee elected at the 17th Congress of the CPSU were arrested and shot on Stalin's orders. The same fate befell 1108 of the 1966 delegates to the Congress. Just how many of these were members of the Supreme Soviet it is not possible to tell, but a large number certainly were, since there is always a considerable duplication of party and governmental positions in the USSR. High party officers are customarily deputies in the Supreme Soviet. Khrushchev's speech contains many references, furthermore, to Stalin's use through the years of the secret police and judicial authorities to silence the comrades whom he had labelled "enemies of the people". Although Khrushchev and many other Communists have expressed their shock at the Stalinist aberrations from the "norms" of party conduct, no alarm over violations of constitutional immunities has been uttered. Since the leaders of the USSR do not appear to take these guarantees seriously, there is no reason for the foreign observer to do so.



**Criterion:** Subject to constitutional limitations, the legislature must have the right to control its organization and the procedures through which it performs its functions.

A parliament can only fulfill its role if it has the authority to control its organization and the conduct of its business. In democratic states some features of parliamentary organization and procedure are usually prescribed in the constitution, but others are established by rules of order and legislative custom. Their purpose is to insure the orderly and deliberate consideration of parliamentary business, respect the interests of individual members, and strike a balance between the rights of the majority and opposition parties.

Chapter III of the constitution confers on the Supreme Soviet certain authority over its organization and procedure, such as, for <sup>an</sup>example, the right of each chamber to elect a chairman and four vice-chairmen (Articles 42 and 43). By rule and custom various other officers, committees, and procedures are provided for. In fact, the Supreme Soviet is a highly organized parliamentary body.

While superficially the internal organization of the Supreme Soviet and various of its procedures seem similar to those of a democratic parliament, fundamental contrasts exist because it is not a truly deliberative assembly, a place where a consensus emerges from differing, even conflicting, points of view. The Supreme Soviet is essentially a meeting to hear

reports and explanations of decisions taken elsewhere. Some of these decisions in the form of draft statutes are the product of its committees, which meet between as well as during sessions of the Supreme Soviet, but these bodies are in reality instrumentalities of the Communist Party, delegated to express in the proper statutory language the determinations of the party leadership. Committee chairmen when presenting draft statutes frequently mention the source of authority, a resolution of a party congress or of the Central Committee. The deputies who speak merely elaborate on the need for the proposed legislation, usually documenting the case with local examples and experiences. Some of their remarks are often critical of the bureaucracy, and even ministers do not escape. Yet the whole consideration of the matter by the Supreme Soviet is within the framework of a decided policy which is eminently correct. The deputies' unanimous approval always follows.

Thus, the purposes for which parliamentary organization and procedures have been developed in democratic countries have little relevance to conditions in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. There is no need to provide for stages through which a bill must pass, because the lengthy deliberation and debate of a democratic parliament have occurred in the Presidium or the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Rules and conventions to protect minority rights are unnecessary; there is no opposition to be heard. Therefore, in its organization and procedures

the Supreme Soviet exhibits an outward conformity to the practice of democratic parliaments, but the life which animates these bodies resides in the apparatus of the Communist Party.

Part II. The Legislative Function of Parliament.

Criterion: The parliament must be the principal source of statutory law for the nation as a whole, and be endowed with broad and continuing powers to that end.

In a democratic political system it is axiomatic that law should emanate from the elected representatives of the people. A national parliament, therefore, is an indispensable institution. It may be, like the British Parliament, theoretically supreme, limited only by custom, the good sense of its members, and the sanction of the next election; or, more commonly, it may exercise a grant of powers prescribed in a constitutional instrument. The latter arrangement is necessary if the state is a federal one, for there must then be a division of power between the central government and the member units. The national parliament, whether the state be federal or unitary, must be endowed with responsibility for those matters which concern the country as a whole. These almost invariably include such subjects as taxation, fiscal policy, defense, foreign affairs, trade and commerce, and the postal system. The list is lengthening almost everywhere as the complex and interdependent societies of this era require more and more legislation.

As a federal state, the USSR has a national parliament, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and legislative bodies in each of the constituent soviet republics. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is declared in the constitution to be "the highest organ of state power" (Article 30). Its legislative competence extends to all matters of federal jurisdiction, a collection of functions and powers more comprehensive and extensive than is the case in most federal states because of the pervasive planning and controls of the communist system (Article 14).

When examining the degree to which the Supreme Soviet actually serves as the national legislature of the USSR, the observer is again struck by the gap between theory and practice. All the formalities associated with a functioning parliament are present. The right to initiate legislation is enjoyed by individual deputies as well as by almost every official organization in the USSR - a long list in a Communist country. Bills are printed and distributed to deputies. They may be considered by committees, who may call upon ministers and outside experts for advice. Committees report to their chambers through rapporteurs. Amendments may come from committees or be advanced from the floor. Some bills are "referred to nation-wide discussion" and in many cases to the presidiums of the supreme soviets of the union republics. Bills pass the chambers by a simple majority; constitutional amendments require a two-thirds vote. In case the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities

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disagree over a proposed measure, a conciliation commission of members from each chamber is appointed to try to find an agreed solution. If the commission fails, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dissolves the chambers and orders new elections.

Through this parliament pass measures of great import - for example, in 1957, the budget of the USSR (covering all governments - federal, state, and local), the economic plan, an amendment of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the USSR, a reorganization of the provinces and territories under the union republics, and the planned decentralization of the economy. Yet the weighty agenda of the Supreme Soviet is completed in a few days, usually not more than a week. As an instance, the session called to consider and pass the "Law on Further Improving the Organization of the Management of Industry and Construction" performed the task in the period from May 8-10, 1957. It also adopted a long list of constitutional amendments necessitated by the industrial decentralization program. Measures of this magnitude would almost certainly involve a democratic parliament in weeks of debate.

The air of unreality surrounding the sessions of the Supreme Soviet is increased by the fact that all proposed legislation is adopted unanimously. No deputy, be he a Great Russian, a Georgian, or a Lithuanian, a party

constituents would be so displeased with a bill, as to vote against it. There has been no recorded instance of disagreement between the two chambers, so there has been no need to utilize the procedure for settling disputes of this kind. And, of course, parliamentary deadlock has never forced the Presidium to dissolve the Supreme Soviet and order new elections.

It is obvious that the serious discussion and the settlement of controversial issues have occurred before the Supreme Soviet has convened. It has simply ratified decisions taken by the party leaders or put the stamp of official authority on the work of legal technicians, as in the case of the constitutional amendments. Some of the members of the Supreme Soviet have participated in the real discussion and decision-taking, but they have done so by virtue of their place in the party organization. Their work was finished before the hundreds of other deputies descended on Moscow.

### Part III. The Budgetary and Financial Powers of Parliament

**Criterion:** The parliament must have ultimate control over the raising and expenditure of public money.

Historically, democratic government has developed through the financial powers wielded by representative assemblies. The power of the purse has been the key opening the door to the control and supervision of all governmental functions. Consequently, every democratic

constitution lodges ultimate authority over the raising of revenue and the expenditure of money in the parliament.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as the "highest organ of state power," has the formal financial powers set forth in the constitution as: "Approval of the consolidated state budget of the USSR and of the report on its fulfillment; determination of the taxes and revenues which go to the Union, the Republics, and the local budgets." (Article 14). The annual budget of the USSR is an extremely complex document. It includes not only the items of revenue and expenditure common to all national states but also the financial operations of the other governmental units and the industrial and commercial enterprises of a communized country. The problem of maintaining "control" over such vast financial affairs would pose a formidable task for any parliament.

The Supreme Soviet discharges its responsibility, after receiving the budget from the Council of Ministers, through budget committees which report to the two chambers and through speeches by individual deputies. The budget committees apportion the work to a dozen or so sub-committees. The Committee members familiarize themselves with the parts of the financial program assigned to their respective groups, and they can then give explanations to their fellow deputies. The discussion of budgetary matters in the chambers largely takes the form of criticisms of bureaucratic shortcomings in ministries or state enterprises. There is no debate of the great issues which

which certainly are involved in the preparation of the budget of the Soviet Union - issues such as the allocation of resources between various parts of the economy, the amount to be spent on national defense, tax policy, state loans, and the control of inflationary pressures. These are problems for determination by the highest party councils, and decisions have been taken before the budget reaches the deputies.

#### Part IV. The Controlling Function of Parliament

**Criterion:** The parliament must have the power to obtain information and to audit executive performance.

The degree of control over the executive possessed by parliaments in democratic countries varies considerably. At one extreme is a constitutional system like that of France where the ministry is frequently changed as parliamentary opinion fluctuates. The executive is dependent upon and subservient to a parliamentary majority. At the other extreme are governmental systems of the presidential type in which the executive has an independent mandate from his popular election and has constitutionally founded powers which the legislature cannot limit. In between is the British type with a ministry dependent on a parliamentary majority but possessing powers, notably dissolution, of keeping that majority solid and reliable. Regardless of the constitutional relationship between the executive and legislative organs, democratic principles require, as a minimum, the right of the parliament to obtain information from the executive and to audit executive performance. The statutory



and customary means of providing these minimum controls vary from country to country, but whatever they are, the parliament is exercising a trust conferred by the sovereign electorate.

No parliamentary body has in theory more power than the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It elects all the principal officers of the state - the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (a collegiate body which functions as the head of state), the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court, and the Procurator-General. The Council of Ministers resigns before the meeting of a new Supreme Soviet, and then a joint sitting of the two chambers invests a Chairman of the Council and approves his appointment to ministerial office. The Supreme Soviet can dismiss a minister or the entire Council. Information can be demanded from the Council or from individual ministers by the Supreme Soviet, its committees, or any deputy. The Supreme Soviet, and its committees within their special competence, can investigate breaches of the constitution and law by any public authorities. The Supreme Soviet can appoint investigating and auditing commissions to inquire into any matter. All told, a tremendous plenitude of power.

The record shows no exercise of these powers except in the most formal sense. The Supreme Soviet approves decrees of its Presidium appointing and dismissing ministers, but these actions merely record decisions taken by the Presidium of the CPSU. The sequence of events in the June 1957 shake-up in the Kremlin is illustrative of the actual method of "appointing and dismissing" ministers. A factional

fight occurred in the Party Presidium. The Party's First Secretary, Khrushchev, transferred it to a hastily summoned meeting of the Central Committee where his supporters outnumbered those of his opponents. The losers, charged with anti-party activities, were removed from their party offices. Then the chief victims, Messrs. Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, were duly dismissed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from their ministerial positions. The decree of dismissal will be approved, unanimously, when the Supreme Soviet meets again. All the changes in high governmental positions since the adoption of the constitution in 1936 have occurred in like manner, dictated by Stalin while he lived and settled now by the relative strength of his heirs in the Party Presidium.

Conclusions

Although the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in its composition, organization and functions can be portrayed from constitutional provisions and supporting statutes as an almost model democratic parliament, practice is so different that it fails to merit that title in scarcely any respect. It meets practically none of the criteria that represent minimum standards of democratic government. To summarize:

1. The suffrage is broad, but effective participation in politics is limited to members of the Communist Party.
2. The Communist Party controls the procedure for nominating candidates for election to the Supreme Soviet.
3. Secrecy of the ballot and honesty in the conduct of elections are of little importance when there are no competing parties and candidates.
4. Seats in the Supreme Soviet are equitably distributed throughout the territory of the USSR, but a small minority, the Communist Party, is overwhelmingly represented in both chambers.
5. The Supreme Soviet meets regularly but only for a few days.
6. Parliamentary immunities have no meaning in a state that equates anti-party activity with treason.
7. The organization and procedures of the Supreme Soviet, while formally parliamentary, are manipulated by the single, controlling party.

8. The Supreme Soviet purportedly enacts all national legislation; actually it approves, always unanimously and within a few days, previously drafted bills and decrees issued in the name of its Presidium.

9. While the budget of the USSR is approved annually by the Supreme Soviet, the real debate and decision-making in financial matters occur in the top organs of the CPSU.

10. Although the Council of Ministers is nominally responsible to the Supreme Soviet, the latter has no means of enforcing that responsibility, and ministers are actually appointed and dismissed on orders from the Presidium of the party.

The question naturally arises of why the Communist rulers of the Soviet Union bother with the formalities of a parliamentary system of government. Every four years they set up, nation-wide, the machinery for casting, counting, and reporting millions upon millions of ballots. Twice a year some 1300 deputies assemble in Moscow and for a few days hear and make speeches, sit on committees, and approve laws and decrees.

All this activity serves useful purposes, although it has little relevance to parliamentary government as practiced in democratic countries. When the constitution was proclaimed in 1936 it undoubtedly gave an aura of legitimacy to the Communist dictatorship, and the Supreme Soviet probably continues to have value within the USSR as a symbol of constitutionalism. Moreover, the constitution was publicized

by the Kremlin and foreign Communists as a great advance in democratic government. Stalin declared,

"It will be a document testifying to the fact that what millions of honest people in capitalist countries have dreamed of and still dream of has already been realized in the USSR. It will be a document testifying to the fact that what has been realized in the USSR is fully possible of realization in other countries also. But from this it follows that the international significance of the new Constitution of the USSR can hardly be exaggerated."

The actions of Communist leaders have destroyed any illusions that foreigners might have had concerning the development of democratic government on the basis of the constitution of 1936, but the abandonment of the parliamentary forms it establishes would probably be considered harmful in propagating the picture of a "democratic" Russia in Asia and Africa.

More important however, than the maintenance of domestic or foreign notions of the USSR as a parliamentary democracy are the practical benefits which the CPSU derives from the electoral system and the meetings of the Supreme Soviet. The "elections" are an occasion to stir up the faithful and to remind all citizens of the blessings of Soviet rule. They justify an immense program of internal propaganda. The meetings of the Supreme Soviet provide a link between the top leaders and the local party organizations. While the deputies do not have many responsibilities of a parliamentary nature, they do bring opinions current in hundreds of local areas to Moscow, and they carry

back the explanations and arguments delivered from the Kremlin podium. In other words, the pseudo-parliamentary system serves as an alternate apparatus for the collection of information and the dissemination of the party line. It is so controlled and manipulated that it poses no threat to the monopoly of the party, and it gives a lot of minor functionaries the satisfaction of being part of the ruling elite.

Poland

The Polish constitutional system, like that of the other "people's democracies", follows closely the Soviet model. There is a single-chamber national Diet (the Sejm) composed of 459 deputies elected for terms of four years. The Diet elects a collegiate head of state, the Council of State. It also appoints and dismisses the Premier and the other members of the Council of Ministers.

Until recently the Soviet paternity of the Polish electoral and parliamentary system was clearly evident in practice. Elections to the Diet were controlled by the Communist Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), and parliamentary actions merely ratified decisions taken by the Communist leadership. However, for more than a year the changes that have been occurring in Poland have been reflected in the governmental system. A new electoral law was promulgated on October 24, 1956, and on the basis of this law a Diet was elected on January 20, 1957.

The following discussion, organized according to the criteria by which the Soviet system has been appraised, is based upon the new law and what is known of current practice. Judgments must be tentative, for Polish conditions are obviously in a fluid state. It is questionable whether there will be another election similar to the last, and the role that the Diet is expected to play in Polish affairs is probably as uncertain to the Poles as to outside observers.

Part I. The Composition and Organization of Parliament.

A. Composition

Criterion: The suffrage must be broad, with limitations defined in law.

The Polish electorate is composed of all citizens eighteen years of age and older. Only the mentally deficient and those persons convicted of crime are deprived of the right to vote. These are universally recognized disqualifications, although the second probably disfranchises more people in Poland than is the case in democratic countries where political offenses are unknown to the law. Perhaps more important than the total number disfranchised by judicial convictions is the practice of arresting opposition leaders in order to brand them with a prison sentence. The opposition is thus intimidated and rendered leaderless.

Criterion: Voters must have the right to organize, nominate candidates, and conduct campaigns.

The Communist regime in Poland has differed from the Soviet model in permitting the continued existence of parties besides the PZPR. Two of these, the United Peasant (ZSL) and the Democratic (SD), purged remnants of the former organizations bearing those names, have been political allies of the Communists. The constitution authorizes political activity by social and cultural organizations, but no challenge to the established order of the Polish People's Republic is allowed.



For the election of January 20, 1957, some 60,000 nominations were made by political parties, trade unions, youth organizations, and even by religious groups. These names were screened and reduced to about 10,000 by local commissions composed of representatives of the three parties forming the National Unity Front, the PZPR, the ZSL, and the SD. A central commission of the Front then selected 720 candidates, apportioning them as follows: PZPR, 50%; ZSL, 25%; SD, 10%; Non-Party and Catholics, 15%. All candidates in a constituency ran on a single list, but there were about seven names for every four seats to be elected. The majority of the candidates were supporters of the National Unity Front, and they were favored by being put at the head of the list in each electoral district. Some of those at the bottom of the lists were evidently "revisionists" or persons suspected of hostility to the regime. Gomulka was sufficiently convinced of their attitude to make a fervent radio appeal on January 19th for ballots without the deletion of top names, thus insuring the election of Front deputies. The Catholic Church organization quietly supported his plea, for it believed that the election of a large number of non-Front candidates might well produce the fate he predicted, that Poland would disappear from the map of Europe.

Thus, for the election of 1957, the Polish people had a limited right to organize in political parties, nominate candidates, and conduct campaigns in their behalf. Certainly the parties are not independent in the sense that such organizations are in a democratic state; their continued existence depends upon their willingness to cooperate in the

Communist-led National Unity Front. The nominating process is controlled, but the Front finds it necessary to offer some candidates who are not patently tame captives of the Communists. Moreover, a restricted choice is permitted by listing more candidates than seats to be filled. The ability of non-Communist groups and candidates to appeal for votes is greater than in other states of the Soviet Bloc but still closely limited by the restraints of a dictatorial regime. This was brought home to candidates who took too literally the promise of a new democratic order. Before the January election a resolution of the Consultative Committee of Political Parties instructed local commissions to remove from the ballot the names of Front candidates who revealed "weakness of character, lack of responsibility in their activities, as well as failure to observe the principles of the program of the National Unity Front and the discipline binding members of political parties." Several were removed.

Criterion: Voting procedures must insure secrecy and honesty.

The electoral laws make provision for secret balloting and honest counting of votes. The degree to which they are observed and enforced is difficult to judge. The claims for voter participation - 95.03% in 1952 and 94.14% in 1957 - are high by the standards of

most democratic countries but less remarkable than the virtually 100% recorded for elections in the USSR. There are good grounds for believing that the election results just after the war were deliberately falsified, and local officials have probably continued to be generous to Front candidates. The announced results of the 1957 elections, however, have a certain verisimilitude. While 447 of the 452 Front candidates won, the Communists were not always the leaders in the voting. Except for Gomulka and Spychalski, every Politburo and Central Committee secretary received fewer votes than opposing non-Communist candidates. Twelve of 22 Catholic candidates were elected. There were marked differences in the percentages of votes received by the "Stalinist" Communists and the Gomulka Communists, the former being much less popular. In some cases, prominent Catholic laymen and leaders of the United Peasant and Democratic parties got between 95 and 100% of the vote cast in their constituencies. Thus, although the result accorded with Gomulka's plea to the electorate, his victory appears to have derived from the voters' appreciation of the realities of the Polish situation rather than a wholesale rigging of the election.

Criterion: Seats in the parliament must be distributed so that in at least one chamber there is a correlation between seats and population.

The Polish parliament has only one chamber, and the seats are apportioned to districts of relatively equal population by the Council

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of State. There is little evidence of unfairness in the geographical apportionment.

#### B. Organization

**Criterion:** The parliament must assemble at regular stated times.

The Diet ordinarily holds two sessions annually, and it determines its own time of adjournment. Until the present year, its sessions were not much longer than those of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, about two weeks at the most. The first session of the current Sejm has lasted much longer, and it is taking its role as the national parliament with some seriousness.

**Criterion:** Members must possess a minimum list of immunities.

By provisions of the Polish constitution, members of the Sejm have the same kind of immunity from arrest given deputies of the Supreme Soviet in the USSR. There is no special guarantee of freedom of speech in the Diet. As in the case of the Soviet Union, the Polish provisions on parliamentary immunity fall short of the usual democratic practice. The extent to which freedom of arrest is truly guaranteed depends upon the interpretation of "socialist legality" current in Poland from time to time. At present, the interpretation appears to be a more liberal one than in the USSR or the other satellites, and it may be that in the future the Polish Communists have usually been less

vindictive than their fellow Marxists. However that may be, many deputies in the past, Gomulka for example, have been arrested and have languished in jail without thinking it worth while to raise the question of parliamentary immunity. The Sejm has even deprived a deputy of his immunity several years after his arrest, ignoring his absence up to that time.

**Criterion:** Subject to constitutional limitations, the legislature must have the right to control its organization and the procedures through which it performs its functions.

The Sejm chooses its Presidium, consisting of a president and three vice-presidents; a Council of Elders, and the membership of a number of committees. The Diet and its committees are served by a secretariat (the Bureau). It adopts its own rules of order. All this is in conformity with the usual rights and actions of a democratic parliament. Where the Sejm has differed from the parliaments of democratic countries is in the purposes for which they are respectively constituted. The latter exist to give expression to the national will, and their organization and procedures are designed to insure that this occurs effectively and fairly. The Sejm, on the other hand, has registered publicly and with a show of technical legality the policies of a self-constituted ruling party, the PZPR. This was admitted in a Radio Warsaw broadcast of January 31, 1957. The speaker declared:

"We in Poland are on the eve of a great political season... The previous Sejm ... constituted a

democratic ornament concealing the very undemocratic practices in our political life . . . the new Sejm will be in a much happier position. "

Some doubt that the new Sejm will be more than a "democratic ornament" arises from an article in the official party organ, Trybuna Ludu (February 20, 1957), which suggests that the democratic character of the Diet is still more shadow than substance. The article's author said:

"In the new Sejm, the PZPR has an absolute majority; 237 members or 51 percent . . . /BuE/ the Party's leadership is not based on the above. If . . . it was possible for the PZPR to gain only 40-odd percent of the Sejm mandates . . . would then the Party's leadership be in danger in our country? No. Because PZPR leadership cannot depend on a formal majority in the Sejm . . . /E/ must be based on something else . . .

"I mean by this that the PZPR deputies should be a driving force /ablc/ to persuade other Sejm deputies . . . This persuasion, based not on the position of strength but on right, would not meet with basic opposition because the ZSL and SD, although they are independent political movements, do not constitute a structural opposition to the PZPR, but on the contrary, are also fostering socialist development, as well as are non-Party deputies . . . Neither the multi-party system nor the different ideologies in our Sejm endanger the socialist system in Poland and the leading role of the PZPR. "

In other words, the PZPR must dominate, regardless of votes. Hardly a happy augury for a democratic assembly.

Part II. The Legislative Function of Parliament.

**Criterion:** The parliament must be the principal source of statutory law for the nation as a whole, and be endowed with broad and continuing powers to that end.

The Polish Sejm has met these principles in only a formal sense. It has ratified the decrees of the Council of State and passed the bills proposed by its Communist majority. A more responsible and vigorous role for the Diet has been promised by Gomulka, and the deputies may enjoy in the future a somewhat greater initiative and freedom in proposing legislation, debating, and voting. The development of a truly deliberative assembly is unlikely, however, as long as the Communist Party dominates the whole political process.

Part III. The Budgetary and Financial Powers of Parliament.

**Criterion:** The parliament must have ultimate control over the raising and expenditure of public money.

The constitutional provisions and the procedures of the Sejm for handling the annual budget conform to basically sound parliamentary practice. One is faced again, however, with the difference between form and substance. While the budget submitted by the government is considered by the Diet and emerges in statutory form, the control of the deputies over financial policy is no more real than it is over other kinds of legislation. Responsibility actually rests in the Politburo of the Communist Party.

Part IV. The Controlling Function of Parliament

**Criterion:** The parliament must have the power to obtain information and to audit executive performance.

The Polish constitution provides for parliamentary control of the executive in the ways customary in countries having a responsible cabinet form of government. The Sejm appoints and dismisses the Council of Ministers as a group and individually. It can put questions to ministers and require a reply. It is entitled to receive and debate reports on the execution of the national budget. Ministers or their representatives are required to appear before Diet committees and to answer questions. Besides holding the foreign minister responsible for the conduct of his office, the Sejm may debate issues of foreign policy and adopt resolutions embodying its views. All the methods and techniques of responsible parliamentary government are provided for.

The Sejm exercises these powers, but its authority is hollow for it does not control the real government of Poland, the Politburo of the Communist Party. The Premier and his ministerial colleagues are undoubtedly influential officials, but behind them and controlling them are the First Secretary and the men who support him at the top of the party organization. Moreover, two subjects of public interest, namely the secret police and Polish relations with other Communist countries, have never been considered as suitable for Diet inquiry or debate.



The unreality of the Sejm's authority is tacitly admitted in recent promises to strengthen control of the executive. Gomulka in his speech to the October 1956 Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee said:

"The Sejm should exercise large-scale control over the work of the government and of the state organs. To insure this, the introduction of certain changes in the Constitution is indispensable. In my opinion, Sejm control over the executive organs of state power should be exercised by an institution subordinated directly to the Sejm and not to the government, as has been the case up to now. The Supreme Chamber of State Control, subordinated to the Sejm, should be restored.

"I also hold that the Sejm should have the right to exercise control over our trade agreements with other states . . . The Sejm should also have the right to endorse all our treaties with other countries, concluded by the government and ratified by the Council of State."

So far, these constitutional changes are not known to have been made. The problem of making the actual correspond to the theoretical situation, under which, in Gomulka's words, "the foremost task of the Sejm is to exercise the highest legislative and controlling power," is revealed by the following passage from his speech:

"A sensible definition of the powers of the Sejm and even extension of these powers beyond the limits envisaged in the Constitution, accompanied by a sensible definition of the tasks of the Party toward the state apparatus, do not lead to a collision between the Sejm and the political substance contained in the thesis on the leading role of the Party."

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A body which has to submit to the leadership of another  
can scarcely be considered the "highest power" in a state.

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Conclusions

Until the changes bringing Gomulka to power in October, 1956, Polish electoral practices and the role of the Sejm were little different from their counterparts in the USSR. Although two parties besides the Communists, the United Peasant and the Democratic, had a titular existence, all political power was effectively concentrated in the PZPR. It controlled the nomination of candidates and the electoral machinery, and it manipulated the Diet as an instrumentality of the party. In law-making the Sejm was in no sense a deliberative assembly, and its financial powers were nominal. The majority of the deputies, being party activists, had no interest or desire in attempting to control the executive, which was already being directed and supervised by the Central Committee and its functional departments. The Sejm, therefore, was utilized to maintain the illusion of a parliamentary democracy and to serve propaganda needs from time to time.

The procedures used in the last election represented a considerable modification of the usual Communist plebiscite. The PZPR and its Front allies could not have failed to win a majority in the Diet, but so many "revisionists" and non-Front candidates could well have been elected as to endanger Communist control. The possibility of such an outcome, however, does not justify calling the electoral system democratic. Polish practices will only meet

that standard when there are really independent parties, free to nominate candidates and appeal for votes.

The Sejm elected in January is somewhat less of an artificial parliament than Poland has been accustomed to since becoming a Communist state. It is meeting in longer sessions, debates are less perfunctory, and a minority vote is sometimes recorded. And yet it cannot rise above its source. Until Poland has a genuinely free election, as the democratic world understands that term, its Diet cannot approach in organization or functions the standards of a true parliament.

The dilemma of the incompatibility of Communist doctrine and parliamentary democracy remains. Poland has yet to resolve it.

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2. Senior Research Staff on International Communism

a. General

The Senior Research Staff on international Communism is located organizationally directly off the Office of the DD/I. It has a T/O of six, but a present strength of seven officers, two research assistants, and one secretary.

b. Origin

(1) The production of intelligence on international Communism has been a matter of concern to the intelligence community 25X1A2g for several years. In 1949 the IAC established the so-called [redacted] Committee which was to be a permanent inter-agency body to plan and coordinate the production of intelligence on international Communism. This group did not prove to be particularly effective in dealing with the problem.

(2) In 1951 at the time of a major reorganization of the intelligence production units of CIA, the Secretary of State accepted responsibility for all research on international Communism.

(3) In 1954 a study was conducted of the intelligence needs of the United States Information Agency. This report recommended that the Department of State continue to do research on international Communism. It noted the need for a small group of top-level experts to develop a penetrating insight into the nature of Communism and to propose methods of countering it. It proposed the creation of a permanent IAC subcommittee on international Communism. As a result of this study, the Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination on 9 November 1954 proposed the creation of a Senior Research Staff on International Communism.

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(4) On 3 August 1955, the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the Army, addressed a memorandum to the Intelligence Advisory Committee expressing concern on the production and handling of intelligence information on international Communism. The Army said it felt there was a lack of an adequate program for the production of basic intelligence, and a lack of coordination of the total collection and production effort on international Communism. The Army suggested the creation of a special agency to deal with the subject.

(5) On 4 August 1955 the SA/PC produced a paper entitled "Organizational Proposal for the production of Intelligence on International Communism." This paper proposed that the Department of State continue to do research on international Communism in support of National Intelligence Estimates, National Intelligence Surveys and Current Intelligence. In CIA, 25X1A8a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was to be enlarged to do research on Communist organizations, nets and personalities. In addition, it proposed that a Senior Research Staff should be created to engage in work described as part intelligence, part estimating and part speculation on policy with emphasis on proposing the means for the United States Government to counter Communism.

(6) To implement this recommendation it was recommended "that in lieu of formally establishing at this time a Senior Research and Planning Unit as proposed in the paper of November 9, 1954, two or three senior officers be assigned to devote themselves to the kind of work described in the recommendation. They should be administratively assigned to the DD/I, encouraged to develop mutually stimulating

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relations with the DD/CI and particularly

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with access to such operational information as would be relevant to their task. These research and planning officers should not have administrative responsibilities or the management of research programs. They should have the objectivity expected of intelligence officers and while they should be accessible to operational personnel for consultation on operational problems, they should not become involved in operational responsibilities. They should have overt status in order to permit easy consultation with policy officers in other departments, with scholars, and academic institutions and with individuals and institutions of other countries. This proposal reflects the view that the development of a Senior Research and Planning Unit as proposed in the 9 November paper must be evolutionary since its acceptability and influence will depend upon the quality and performance of the individuals in it." "That the Senior Research and Planning Officers proposed in this recommendation be selected by the top officers of the Agency on the basis of individual merit from any part of the Agency or from outside and that they be assigned administratively to the DD/I, but that they have free access to senior officers in all parts of the Agency. The assignment of officers to this function will in itself have the effect of encouraging promising individuals with a background in this field to devote themselves over a long period of time to study and speculation on international Communism."

(7) The 4 August 1955 paper of the SA/PC was concurred in by the DD/I, DD/P and the DD/S and approved by the DCI, with minor exceptions, on 18 August 1955.

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(5) One other aspect of the historical development of the Senior Research Staff should be noted. The Chief, CI Staff, has consistently been a strong advocate of the creation of a "national authority" on international Communism to be located directly under the DCI and to be charged with coordinating and centralizing all government research activities in the field of international Communism. This concept differs from that proposed by the SA/PC in that what the Chief, CI, proposes is, in effect, an Office of International Communism. This office would deal with the subject on a broad, all-source basis which would include access not only to special and other compartmented types of pertinent intelligence but also to the great volume of operational information on the subject currently available to the Clandestine Services. It would also have far reaching contacts outside of the intelligence community including such bodies as the investigating committees of the Congress such as the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. It would deal with such organizations outside the government as the American Legion, universities and research institutes, and the large body of individuals who are "professional anti-Communists." This plan is similar in many respects to the aforementioned G-2 plan, and the abortive effort of former FBI-men Ladd and Tracy to set up an anti-Communist library center. Obviously the ambitious proposals of the Chief, CI, envisaged CIA developing into the national focal point on all efforts against Communism.

c. Organization and Functions

(1) The SRS on International Communism was organized in January of 1956 and opened its offices at [REDACTED]

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on 21 January of that year. Cramped working conditions prevail but in effect fulfill an ivory tower concept in keeping the SRS isolated from normal operating disturbances. An unavoidable handicap regarding its location is the lack of convenient access to library facilities which results in excessive delays in acquiring reference material for essential research.

(2) The Staff as originally conceived envisioned five senior research officers, five research assistants and two secretaries. Currently on board are seven senior research officers including the Chief and Deputy Chief, two research assistants and one secretary; seven of the above ten individuals are slotted against the six slots currently authorized on the SRS table of organization. Two of the senior research officers are on loan; one from <sup>FDD</sup> OIR and one from OCI. Both are carried in slots provided by these components.

(3) The organizational position of SRS within the Agency is the result of compromise between locating it in the Office of the Director or within the DD/P. It is currently under administrative supervision of DD/I with the stipulation that it maintain close relations with the <sup>25X1A8a</sup> [redacted] and operational elements of DD/P and with OIR.

d. Production

(1) SRS has operated on an almost complete system of self generation. The Staff receives foreign intelligence information ranging from OO and CS raw intelligence reports through OCI dailies and weeklies to national estimates. This material is read, clipped and filed so as to provide a basis for a SRS study on the effect of international Communism in its broadest aspects on any country in the world.

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In addition to its accumulation of published material, the SRS Staff, by informal meetings, attempts to keep in touch with other experts on Communism in the intelligence community.

(2) The research approach of SRS is in part determined by the size of its Staff in relation to the field to be covered, and in part by the need to achieve differentiation from that of other research elements working in the same field, especially OIR and [REDACTED] <sup>25X1A8a</sup> However, an effort has been made to absorb and synthesize the basic research performed by others.

(3) It is the aim of SRS to avoid duplication. Under a planned program, SRS has initiated a series of its own publications on international Communism which in their viewpoint have not been covered elsewhere. Efforts have been made to coordinate, particularly with [REDACTED] <sup>25X1A8a</sup> ONE, OCI and OIR. This coordination has not necessarily resulted in a complete agreement of views, and SRS has published material even if another component disagreed with its contents. While under the condition of its charter this is permissible, it is not a wise situation to permit within CIA. The net result may be that two separate documents both bearing the CIA label could take exactly opposite views concerning some development in the field of international Communism. A case in point was the rather extended debate within the Agency on the role of the Nenni Socialists in Italy, wherein the SRS took one view and the CI Staff another. Another issue between these two units has been on the question of the legality or illegality of the Communist Party.

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(4) SRS publications are distributed to approximately 225 consumers. Particular items may receive broader dissemination, especially if the [redacted] 25X1A8a or other component wishes to send a publication to the Field. While SRS has received no specific requirements from any of its consumers, they have received comments on their publications which have been both critical and constructive. To date the principal consumers of these formal publications have been the NSC Staff, OCB Staff, OIR, ONE, [redacted] 25X1A8a IO Division and SR Division and other intelligence researchers in the intelligence community concerned with the problems of international Communism.

(5) In the course of its two years of existence, SRS has produced approximately seven major studies, plus some 60 memoranda on the subject of international Communism. The following titles are indicative of the subjects covered: "International Communism and Youth: The Challenge of the 1957 Moscow Festival," "Communism in Eastern Europe: Post-Stalin Developments in the Satellites," "The Promotion of Constitutional Stability in Afro-Asian Countries: A Weapon in the Battle Against Communism," "Significance of Liberalization in Communist China," "Suggested Topics for Discussion with the Intellectual Elite of the Satellites," "Proposed Establishment of an Institution of Higher Technical Learning in South East Asia," "Possible Change in Chinese Communist Strategy Toward U. S.," "First Get Your Sputnik."

(6) In order to put the SRS work in perspective, it should be noted that during 1957 [redacted] 25X1A8a [redacted] 25X1A8a produced about 116 reports ranging from briefs, book dispatches, and memos for exclusively CIA use internally to handbooks

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and studies. Of the [redacted] publications, some 23 were distributed to other U. S. government agencies, while about 43 were passed to foreign intelligence services with whom the Clandestine Services are in liaison. The [redacted] publications included such titles as "Communist Party Clandestine Organization and Activity 1954-1956," "Chinese Communist Party Influence on Latin American Communist Parties," "Effect and Utilization of Sputnik," "Themes for Soviet/Satellite Propaganda," "Nature and Function of CP Technical Apparatus," "Afro-Asia Solidarity Conference, Cairo, Egypt, 26 December 1957 - 1 January 1958," "Clandestine Net for International Communist Communications," "Kerala--Communist Pattern of Deception," "Possible Third Force Views of the British Labor Party Leader Gaitskell," "Titoism and Soviet Communism," "Selected Reactions of Satellite Officials Following the Stalin Denigration, June 1956 - June 1957," "Trends in Moscow's Training of Foreign Communists," etc.

(7) As can be seen from the above listings, there is no clear delineation between the subjects covered by SRS and [redacted] nor could one be expected. It also should be noted that although the two units might both produce a paper on the same subject, it would be expected that the approach and treatment would be different.

e. Other Research on Communism

(1) In order to analyze the role of the Senior Research Staff in the intelligence community properly, a compendium of the work being done on the subject is appropriate. This list includes only those units which originate material on the subject, and not processors or recipients such as the Office of Basic Intelligence and Office of National Estimates.

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(2) Within CIA

(a) Senior Research Staff (DD/I) - high level speculative approach with mandate to make policy recommendations.

(b) Office of Current Intelligence (DD/I) - prepares weekly analysis entitled "Communist Propaganda in Policy Perspective," also occasional articles for weeklies.

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(c) [REDACTED]  
(DD/P) - emphasis on operational aspects of clandestine Communist activities; prepares part of NIS Supplement No. 103, "International Communism."

(d) Soviet Russia Division (DD/P) - prepares material primarily to backstop operations.

(3) Outside CIA

(a) Office of Intelligence Research (State) - prepares Supplement VI, "Communism," of the National Intelligence Surveys which deals with the Communist apparatus in individual countries.

(b) Army - does little original research on Communism, although some undoubtedly is done in overseas commands. This was noted in the 1957 report by representatives of the Bureau of the Budget on Germany as an area where CIA could supply reports.

(c) Navy - little or no original research.

(d) Air - The Office of Special Investigations is particularly interested in reports on areas where major installations are located overseas, e.g., Spain and Morocco.

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f. Conclusions and Recommendations

(1) The following conclusions and recommendations are made with regard to the Senior Research Staff on International Communism:

(a) The work produced by SRS appears generally to have been of good intellectual quality. The Staff has obviously made a sincere attempt to produce the type of material originally envisaged by the SA/FC. The studies produced have been generally well received.

(b) The original concept of the establishment of the SRS on International Communism within CIA as visualized by the SA/FC/DCI has not materialized in actual practice. There are several factors which have contributed to this failure:

1. Rather than being received with full cooperation by all components concerned, SRS has been viewed with hostility and suspicion in certain areas where cooperation is important.

2. Failure to effect full coordination on certain publications, perhaps not exclusively a fault of SRS, has resulted in conflicting views being issued as representing the Agency's position on important issues.

3. The SRS Staff has probably not been sufficiently close to the policy level of the Government in order to be as effective as originally envisaged.

4. The great bulk of the material produced by SRS was basically self-generated rather than being in response to requirements or suggestions from consumers.

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(c) There is no question as to the value of a Senior Research Staff on International Communism with a charter to speculate on policy provided it is properly located and properly used. There is a question as to whether it is either advisable or appropriate for CIA to have a unit engaged in this type of policy planning. Whereas high level research on international Communism is one thing, extending that into recommendations for U. S. action in the broad foreign policy field undoubtedly transgresses into the area of Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. Further, critics of CIA are constantly alleging that it proposes policy.

(d) There is basically very little that SRS does today that could not be done outside of the Agency, particularly if arrangements could be made for such a unit to handle classified material. During this time when the Agency has reached its maximum size and must use all personnel slots for high priority activities, it would appear that this is a unit whose functions could actually be transferred to a research foundation or university under contract to the Agency.

(2) It is

Recommended that:

25X1A5a1 [redacted] be expanded to include a Senior Research Staff on International Communism. (This can be accomplished with little or no increase in the Agency's budget for [redacted] 25X1A5a1

25X1A5a1 (b) The missions and functions of SRS be transferred to [redacted] and that SRS within the Agency be abolished.

25X1A5a1 (c) The personnel of SRS be given two alternatives (1) that if they desire to transfer elsewhere in the Agency, and there is need for their services, they be permitted to do so; (2) that they be transferred to [redacted] and from staff to contract status at salaries in line with [redacted] standards, with the contract protecting the retirement and other benefits of the employee.